When adjusted for Israel’s population size, this attack by Hamas was worse than what 9/11 was for the United States. The attack, on a Jewish holiday, was the darkest day in Jewish history since the Holocaust. Hamas murdered Israeli civilians in cold blood, raped and beheaded victims, and took at least a hundred Israeli hostages to Gaza. Hamas fighters killed babies and parents in their homes. Partygoers at a music festival were slaughtered.

After an estimated 2,000 Hamas fighters breached the Israel-Gaza border in 29 different places, the Israeli security establishment allowed a narrative to form that it had very little or no intelligence about the invasion.

A full reckoning will require months if not years of investigation. Meanwhile, Intelligence failures can arise in at least four different ways:

•             Through a breakdown of intelligence collection

•             Through a failure of analysis

•             Failure on the part of decision makers to listen to intelligence provided.

•             When sufficient distance is not maintained between intelligence and policymaking, so that intelligence becomes politicised.

Before Hamas’s attack on Israel, there was, self-evidently, a failure of Israeli intelligence collection. Israeli intelligence, principally Shin Bet and Israeli military intelligence, failed to discover Hamas’s plot from their human intelligence or technical intelligence sources in Gaza. This is surprising since Gaza is one of the most intensely surveilled places on earth.

Hamas resorted to low-tech, old-fashioned, tradecraft that foiled Israeli high-tech capabilities. Its attack was only known to a small number of commanders, who gave orders by word of mouth avoiding live feeds of the border. Israel did not detect whispers of the attack beforehand. Movement near the border zone was a daily occurrence. Use of bulldozers and civilian trucks was common in Gaza. Hamas snipers took out Israeli electronic sensors. Hamas also apparently used electronic cyber capabilities to jam communications of Israeli commands.

There may have also been a failure of analysis. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was a textbook example of intelligence failure. This time there was a similar analytical failure before Hamas’s assault.

Political Failure

It is not known how much or what intelligence, if any, Israel’s premier, Benjamin Netanyahu, was given before the attack. If it is true that Egyptian intelligence provided the Israeli government with a warning, was it overlooked? Or did Israel’s divided domestic politics contribute to intelligence being ignored?

On October 9, Egyptian intelligence said publicly that it had given Israel repeated high-level warnings of a pending attack before the Gaza-based Hamas struck, including a direct phone call from Cairo’s intelligence minister to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in late September. US intelligence also warned its own policymakers of unusual Hamas activity and of a general increased threat from Hamas based on multiple streams of intelligence.

Underestimating Hamas’s Capabilities

The assessment about Hamas appears to have been dismissed for three key reasons. First, a belief that Hamas did not have the capabilities to carry out the attack, nor the intention to do so because it would fall outside of their historic pattern of behaviour.

Second, these beliefs about Hamas were not thoroughly challenged within Israeli intelligence nor through sharing the assessment with international partners who might have had useful intelligence on this.

ALSO READ: ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR – Hamas Leadership, Setup and Capabilities

Third, Israeli defences, be they deeply buried sensors, walls, or automatically defended sections of the border, were considered to be too strong for Hamas.

Israel’s feeling of military superiority could have led to complacency, assuming Hamas would not launch a major attack because Hamas could not defeat Israel. Israel miscalculated both Hamas’s capabilities and its intentions-and its own defense capability.

However, Israeli leaders and other observers were well aware that Tehran had been increasing aid to support Hamas for years. Israel nevertheless very clearly underestimated how much such resources boosted Hamas’s current military capabilities and command and control.

Misunderstanding Hamas’s Intentions

Israeli leaders may have calculated that Hamas would not wage such an attack in part because Israel was providing economic incentives for peace (eg, the transfer of Qatari funding to Gaza).

Hamas has been identified as a religious terrorist group with an antisemitic and millenarian mission of jihad to destroy Israel and kill Jews. Hamas’s rise represents the “Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”

Rather than peace, it is likely that Hamas (and its backers in Iran) wanted war, anticipating a major Israeli military response to its October 7 attack, which it could weaponize in information war against the Israelis to gain sympathy for the Palestinian cause internationally and erode support for Israel.

Hamas very likely wanted to provoke an overreaction by Israel that would impair Arab-Israeli “‘normalization’ in the Middle East,” including the ongoing US-brokered talks for a Saudi-Israeli peace deal that had made progress in 2023.

Hamas’s Denial and Deception

Hamas deceived Israel by giving a public impression that it was not willing to go into a fight or confrontation with Israel while preparing for this massive operation. Second, small cell of Hamas operatives communicated for two years via hardwired phones embedded in the network of tunnels underneath Gaza; avoided using cells phones and computers in order to evade detection.

Preparations for War Concealed

A CNN investigation analyzed propaganda video and satellite imagery that showed expansion of and increased activity at multiple Hamas training camps in Gaza over the past two years.

It is believed that Israeli military intelligence had collected specific information on how Hamas could invade. From observing rehearsals they also had information about the level of violence Hamas terrorists were willing to inflict.

ALSO READ: EDITORIAL – The Hamas Terrorist Attack of 7 October

Evidence suggests that about a year ago Israeli analysts had a copy of the Hamas attack playbook, the Jericho Wall document, which detailed how Hamas fighters would breach the border using paragliders, drones and rockets, and what they would seek to attack.

Comments

This Israeli failure will be relatable for intelligence agencies around the world. Intelligence analysis is difficult to do accurately, and failures can have huge consequences.

There are two elements of an intelligence assessment: the first is what people, skills, finance and equipment does the adversary possess (capabilities) and, second, what does the adversary want to do with these assets (intentions).

If analysts believed that Hamas could not behave in this way, they would tend to look for intelligence that reinforced that view, and exclude intelligence that refuted it. Assumptions and biases need to be constantly challenged.

Intelligence failures can show where agencies have invested too much resource, while under-investing in human intelligence or analytical techniques. These lessons are hard won, and it is a sad reality of intelligence history that strategic failures often act as drivers of reform and improvement.

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Chernobyl has no military significance but it is one of the fastest land routes for invading forces. It is close to the border and also has a 2,600 square kilometre ‘exclusion zone’. The route via Chernobyl is one of four ‘axes’ Russian forces have used to invade Ukraine. The others were a second vector from Belarus, an advance south into the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv and a push north out of Russian-controlled Crimea to the city of Kherson.

Nevertheless, the advance through Chernobyl brought back the memories of the disaster that occurred on 26 April 1986 at Reactor No 4 in the ChNPP, near the city of Pripyat in present-day Ukraine. It is considered the worst nuclear disaster in history. The explosion led to the release of radioactive isotopes in the environment and most of the radioactive dust settled in the forest in the vicinity of the reactor. With the sacrifices and valiant efforts of the liquidators, the radioactivity settled down. The reactor core was covered, the top soil in the nearby region removed and replaced, and exclusion zone established and disposal of the radioactive waste was carried out.

The most astonishing part for the dosimetrist who ventured into Reactor Complex 4 was to find that the core of the reactor was empty, except for the inverted upper biological shield (Elena), ruptured fuel channels and the graphite blocks strewn due to the force of the explosion. Upon venturing further into the complex, it was discovered that the lava of nuclear fuel had melted down to the basement levels and formed a solid mass known as the Elephant’s Foot. Even after 35 years, the inside of Reactor No 4 main hall, turbine hall and the basement are highly radioactive.

The New Safe Confinement put in place in 2016 has drastically reduced the background radiation levels in the area. However, disposed off equipment, vehicles, clothing (firemen clothes in the basement of the Pripyat Hospital), the forest and the soil in the area are still radioactive and not safe to handle without adequate protection. Danger of wildfire, which has the potential to release some of the radioactive dust in the atmosphere, is always present. Radioactive dust contains alpha emitters, which if ingested/inhaled can cause serious health problems.

In the field of nuclear energy, safety is of paramount importance. Operational guidelines for a nuclear reactor are fairly comprehensive covering all possible contingencies. Several mechanisms are put in place to ensure safety. Redundancy is the key for ensuring safety. There are no safety mechanisms for the leftovers of the Reactor No 4; the only way to lower the radiation levels is by shielding. The first and the second structure are important for containing the exposed core. The structures may be compromised in the event of a war or an armed conflict.

The strategic location of ChNPP makes it a dangerously attractive choice for a well defended offensive position during an armed conflict. Military units and assets stationed would be considerably safer as targeting the area would risk causing another fallout. Bombardment of the area would expose the buried radioactive waste/debris which would be an undesirable outcome. Although the Reactor Nos 1, 2 and 3 have been decommissioned, many hotspots of radioactivity remain throughout the area. Risk of Cesium-137 dispersion might rise if any military action were to occur. Apart from this, the location of the NPP facilitates troop movement and the ability to oversee operations in that region.

All parties involved must ensure the radiation levels are kept in check. Movement of heavy vehicles should be carefully planned so as not to cause any sort of contamination. Periodic checks should be implemented and the standard operating procedures for monitoring of dosage should be carried out.

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The inaugural 2+2 ministerial level meeting between India and Australia was held, on 11 September, a fortnight ahead of the first Quad in-person Summit in Washington DC. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajanth Singh met Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Peter Dutton in New Delhi for an in-person meeting. That the two countries have kickstarted this new format of engagement suggests the growing trust and comfort level between India and Australia.

The meeting completed the set of such engagements the members of the Quad are having bilaterally with one another. The first such exercise India had was with Japan later on with the United States and now with Australia, all of whom are also working closely in the Indo-Pacific region.

Taking forward the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of both countries drew a roadmap encompassing political, economic, security and defence-related issues underscoring the importance of “advancing their shared objectives of an open, free, prosperous and rule-based Indo-Pacific region, in line with India increased engagement” in this sphere.

Some of the major takeaways from the Australia-India Ministerial Dialogue include enhancing supply chain resilience and strengthening cooperation in the maritime domain. The latter that would enable deeper partnership between the two countries on a range of maritime-related themes such as maritime domain awareness, broadening linkages between maritime agencies, combating challenges like marine litter, and focusing on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The ministers also appreciated the presence of a liaison officer from Australia at the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region, based in Gurgaon.

The ministers used the opportunity to reinforce “their commitment to maintaining a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region” and emphasized the need for the South China Sea Code of Conduct, currently under negotiations between China and ASEAN, to be consistent with international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The ministers reiterated their commitment to strengthen their work through a number of trilateral and other minilateral platforms in the Indo-Pacific, including the Quad. Other areas that found prominent mention in the press statement include defense trade cooperation, including continued dialogue between the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) of India and Defense Science and Technology Group of Australia, information sharing, and strengthening interoperability through augmented number of bilateral and multinational exercises.

Prime Ministers Meeting

Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison met for a virtual summit in June 2020, at which the two sides elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). The Australian foreign minister during a recent statement to the press said that the 2+2 dialogue is a direct result of the elevation of the relationship.
During their meeting, the joint statement noted, the four ministers reiterated “their commitment to fully implement the CSP based on mutual trust and understanding, common interests and shared values of democracy and rule of law.” Further they highlighted “the importance of advancing their shared objective of an open, free, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific region, in line with India’s increasing engagement in the Indo-Pacific region through the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative and Australia’s Indo-Pacific approach and Pacific Step-Up.” The 2+2 dialogue will be held at least once in two years to maintain the traction in the relationship.

Modi and Morrison met agian, on 23 September, in Washington, a week after they spoke over phone and reviewed the rapid progress in the India-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including through the ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue, and exchanged views on regional developments and the forthcoming Quad meeting.
It was the first meeting between the prime ministers of India and Australia since the AUKUS (Australia, the UK and the US) security partnership was unveiled, on 15 September, by US President Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Morrison.

Comments

A crucial factor in India-Australia bilateral relations that witnessed a quantum leap is in the area of defence. After the country pulled out from Malabar five-nation naval exercise in 2007, Australia was readmitted and took part in the first phase of the exercise hosted during August by the United States off the coast of Guam. This war-game exercise allows the Navies of India, Australia, Japan and the United States to demonstrate, coordination, synergy and inter-operability of the four countries on the high seas.

With India assiduously working on its Atmanirbhar plan and promoting defence manufacturing in the country, the move to further research in this strategic field through India’s Defence Research Development Organisation and Defence Science and Technology Group of Australia would allow both countries to explore new frontiers in critical technology amid India seeking access to source rare earth material from the country.

Given that both New Delhi and Canberra have had to bear the brunt of increasingly belligerent Chinese behavior, including the use of force against India and trade coercion against Australia, these fast-paced strategic developments are understandable.
Australia-India relations have been improving for several years, but relations have seen a dramatic shift in the last couple of years, evident in the number of high-level engagements between the two sides. With worsening relations between India and China as well as Australia and China in recent years, both New Delhi and Canberra have been realigning their interests and partners, and those connections will likely grow manifold in the coming years. After many years, Australia was finally invited back to the Malabar naval exercise last year. For Australia, even as the U.S. security alliance remains central to their security, Canberra has been expanding its Asian partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

With worsening relations between India and China as well as Australia and China in recent years, both New Delhi and Canberra have been realigning their interests and partners, and those connections will likely grow manifold in the coming years.
India, for its part, long avoided taking sides between the U.S. and China. While Sino-Indian relations have been in trouble for several years, the Galwan confrontation in 2020 brought the relationship to an all-time low. The Indian response to Galwan has been very different and much tougher, partly because 20 Indian soldiers died. As a result, India has decided to pursue closer strategic engagements with a number of like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially Australia.

Australia has also seen more than its fair share of bullying behavior from China, much of it because Morrison asked for an independent inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic in April 2020. Since then, China has engaged in severe economic and trade coercive practices against Australia, targeting everything from barley, beef, seafood, wheat, and wine to coal, cotton, copper, education, and timber.

Augmented Australia-India ties within bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, and other minilaterals and multilateral institutions are a reality that is unlikely to slow down for the foreseeable future. The convergence of strategic interests in ensuring an Indo-Pacific order that is free of hegemonic and muscular policies will bind India and Australia in the coming years. The two will likely also expand their partnership both in pursuing strategic partnerships and thematic ones like supply chain resilience initiative.

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The drone could be launched from a military cargo aircraft, like C130J or the C17. The Joint Working Group on Air Systems of the India-US DTTI (Defence Technology and Trade Initiative), will oversee the project. It is the inaugural co-development project under the U.S.- India DTTI, aimed at bringing sustained leadership focus to promote collaborative technology exchange and create opportunities for co-production and co-development of future technologies for Indian and US military forces.

The agreement was signed by Brig. Gen. Brian Bruckbauer and Air Vice Marshal Narmdeshwar Tiwari, both co-chair of the US-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative on 16 July 2021. The agreement outlines collaboration for design, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of systems to co-develop an ALUAV Prototype.

The project is valued at more than $22 million with costs shared equally, and marks the largest-ever defence Research, Development, Test and Evaluation collaboration between the United States and India. The objectives are the Design, Development, Demonstration, Test and Evaluation of technologies including physical hardware such as small UAVs, avionics, payload power, propulsion, and launch systems through prototyping that meet the operational requirements of the Indian and U.S. Air Forces.

Under DTTI, Joint Working Groups on land, naval, air, and aircraft carrier technologies have been established to focus on mutually agreed projects in respective domains.

The two countries have also inked key defence and security pacts over the past few years, including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 that allows their militaries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies as well as provides for deeper cooperation.

The two sides have also signed COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) in 2018 that provides for interoperability between the two militaries and the sale of high-end technology from the US to India.

In October last year, India and the US sealed the BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) agreement to further boost bilateral defence ties.

Clarity Sought on Predator Drones

India has sought “more clarity” from the United States about the price fixation, maintenance and transfer of technology in the proposed $3 billion (around Rs 22,000 crore) deal to acquire armed MQ-9B Predator drones before finalising the deal. India plans to buy 30 armed drones, which are designed for long-range precision strikes against hostile targets on land and sea, from the US.

The Indian government finalised the plan to acquire these 30 drones, also known as SeaGuardian or SkyGuardian remotely-piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) to strengthen its long-range unmanned lethal capabilities. The army, navy and Indian Air Force (IAF) are to get 10 drones each, with different payloads to hunt and destroy targets over land and sea, the report saidt.

Once the project gets the AoN from the DAC, India will issue an actionable LoR (letter of request) to the US government. The final contract would be signed after the US responds with a letter of offer and acceptance and notifies US Congress.

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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (dubbed New START) was to expire on 5 February. After taking office on 20 January 2021, US president Joe Biden proposed extending the treaty for five years. The Kremlin quickly welcomed the offer.

The lower house of Russian parliament, on 27 January, quickly approved the extension of the last remaining nuclear arms control pact days before it was to expire.

The State Duma voted unanimously to extend the New START treaty for five years. The pact’s extension did not require congressional approval in the U.S., but Russian lawmakers had to ratify the move.

Before the Biden administration took office, Russia always had offered to extend New START for five years – a possibility that was envisaged by the pact at the time it was signed. But President Donald Trump charged that it put the U.S. at a disadvantage. Trump initially insisted that China be added to the treaty, an idea that Beijing bluntly dismissed.

The Trump administration then proposed to extend New START for just one year and also sought to expand it to include limits on battlefield nuclear weapons.

The treaty, signed in 2010 by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, limits each country to no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, and envisages sweeping on-site inspections to verify compliance.

Biden indicated during the campaign that he favored the preservation of the New START treaty, which was negotiated during his tenure as U.S. vice president.

Russia has long proposed prolonging the pact without any conditions or changes, but the Trump administration waited until last year to start talks and made the extension contingent on a set of demands. The talks stalled, and months of bargaining have failed to narrow differences.

The negotiations were also marred by tensions between Russia and the United States, which have been fueled by the Ukrainian crisis, Moscow’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and other irritants.

After both Moscow and Washington withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, New START is the only remaining nuclear arms control deal between the two countries.

Earlier in January, Russia announced that it would follow the U.S. in pulling out of the Open Skies Treaty, which allowed surveillance flights over military facilities, to help build trust and transparency between Russia and the West.

Treaty Overview

By resolution 71/258, the General Assembly decided to convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.

The Conference took place from 27 to 31 March 2017 and from 15 June to 7 July 2017 in New York.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon activities. These include undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and the provision of assistance to any State in the conduct of prohibited activities. States parties will be obliged to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. The Treaty also obliges States parties to provide adequate assistance to individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take necessary and appropriate measure of environmental remediation in areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by the Conference (by a vote of 122 States in favour, with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on 7 July 2017, and opened for signature by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 September 2017. Following the deposit with the Secretary-General of the 50th instrument of ratification or accession of the Treaty on 24 October 2020, it entered into force on 22 January 2021 in accordance with its article 15 (1).

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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is now part of international law, culminating a decades-long campaign aimed at preventing a repetition of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. But getting all nations to ratify the treaty requiring them to never own such weapons seems daunting, if not impossible, in the current global climate.

When the treaty was approved by the UN General Assembly in July 2017, more than 120 approved it. But none of the nine countries known or believed to possess nuclear weapons the United States, Russia, Britain, China, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel supported it and neither did the 30-nation NATO alliance.

Japan, the world’s only country to suffer nuclear attacks, also does not support the treaty, even though the aged survivors of the bombings in 1945 strongly push for it to do so.

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China sees democratic Taiwan as a breakaway province, but Taiwan sees itself as a sovereign state, with its own constitution, military, and elected leaders.

Taiwan’s status is a red line for Beijing, a part of what it regards as its unimpeachable territorial integrity. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has repeatedly said that it would use military force to prevent any move towards formal independence by Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province.

The US has called China’s latest warning “unfortunate”, adding that tensions did not need to lead to “anything like confrontation”.

What’s behind the China-Taiwan divide?

Analysts say Beijing is becoming increasingly concerned that Taiwan’s government is moving the island towards a formal declaration of independence and it wants to warn President Tsai Ing-wen against taking steps in that direction.

President Tsai, however, has repeatedly said that Taiwan is already a independent state, making any formal declaration unnecessary.

On 28 January, Chinese defence ministry spokesman Wu Qian defended the recent military activities near Taiwan, saying they were “necessary actions to address the current security situation in the Taiwan Strait and to safeguard national sovereignty and security”.

“They are a solemn response to external interference and provocations by ‘Taiwan independence’ forces,” he added. “We warn those ‘Taiwan independence’ elements – those who play with fire will burn themselves, and Taiwan independence means war.”

China and Taiwan: The Basics

China and Taiwan have had separate governments since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. Beijing has long tried to limit Taiwan’s international activities and both have vied for influence in the Pacific region. Tensions have increased in recent years and Beijing has not ruled out the use of force to take the island back.

Although Taiwan is officially recognised by only a handful of nations, its democratically elected government has strong commercial and informal links with many countries.

Like most nations, the US has no official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but a US law does require it to provide the island with the means to defend itself.

The new US administration is expected to maintain pressure on China over a wide range of issues including human rights, trade disputes, Hong Kong and Taiwan, amid the deteriorating relationship between the two powers.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, meanwhile, said China should “not underestimate” the island’s determination to defend its sovereignty and uphold freedom and democracy.

What is the history and source of this tension?

The first known settlers in Taiwan are Austronesian tribal people thought to have come from modern day southern China. The island first appears in Chinese records in AD239, when China sent an expeditionary force to explore – a fact Beijing uses to back its territorial claim. After a brief spell as a Dutch colony (1624-1661) Taiwan was administered by China’s Qing dynasty from 1683 to 1895.

From the 17th Century, significant numbers of migrants started arriving from China, often fleeing turmoil or hardship. Most were Hoklo Chinese from Fujian (Fukien) province or Hakka Chinese, largely from Guangdong. The descendants of these two migrations now make up by far the largest population group.

In 1895, following Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Qing government had to cede Taiwan to Japan. After World War Two, the Republic of China – one of the victors – began ruling Taiwan with the consent of its allies the US and UK, after Japan surrendered and relinquished control of territory it had taken from China.

However in the next few years, a civil war broke out in China and the leader at the time Chiang Kai-shek’s troops were beaten back by the Communist armies under Mao Zedong.

Chiang and the remnants of his Kuomintang (KMT) government fled to Taiwan in 1949. This group, referred to as Mainland Chinese and then making up 1.5mn people, dominated Taiwan’s politics for many years, even though they only account for 14% of the population.

Having inherited an effective dictatorship, facing resistance from local people resentful of authoritarian rule, and under pressure from a growing democracy movement, Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, began allowing a process of democratisation, which eventually led to the 2000 election of the island’s first non-KMT president, Chen Shui-bian.

Where are things at now?

Relations between China and Taiwan started improving in the 1980s. China put forward a formula, known as “one country, two systems”, under which Taiwan would be given significant autonomy if it accepted Chinese reunification.

This system was established in Hong Kong to be used as something of a showcase to entice Taiwanese people back to the mainland but over the last year it has come under massive pressure with many analysts already questioning whether it still exists in the city.

In Taiwan, the offer was rejected, but Taipei did relax rules on visits to and investment in China. It also, in 1991, proclaimed the war with the People’s Republic of China on the mainland to be over.

There were also limited talks between the two sides’ unofficial representatives, though Beijing’s insistence that Taiwan’s Republic of China (ROC) government is illegitimate prevented government-to-government contact.

Alarm in Beijing

Beijing became alarmed in 2000, when Taiwan elected as president Chen Shui-bian, who had openly backed “independence”.

Chen was re-elected in 2004, prompting China to pass a so-called anti-secession law in 2005, stating China’s right to use “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan if it tried to “secede” from China.

In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. He sought to improve relations with China, mainly through economic agreements.

In elections in January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen defeated Kuomintang party candidate Eric Chu. She leads the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which leans towards eventual official independence from China.

After Donald Trump won the 2016 US election, she spoke to the president-elect in a phone call, in what was a break with US policy set in 1979 when formal relations were cut. Despite the lack of formal relations, the US has an agreement to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons and has stressed any attack by China would cause “grave concern”.

Throughout 2018, China stepped up pressure on international companies forcing them to list Taiwan as a part of China on their websites and threatening to block them for doing business in China if they failed to comply.

In 2020, Tsai won a second term. By that time, Hong Kong had seen months of unrest with protesters demonstrating against the mainland’s increasing influence – a trend that had many in Taiwan worried Beijing would next set its eyes on Taiwan.

Later that year, China’s implementation of a national security law in Hong Kong was seen by many as a yet another sign that Beijing was becoming significantly more assertive in the region.

In the meantime, the US has been intensifying its outreach to Taiwan, reassuring Taipei of its continued support. In September 2020, Washington sent its highest-ranking politician to hold meetings on the island for decades. Beijing strongly criticised the meeting, warning “not to send any wrong signals to ‘Taiwan independence’ elements to avoid severe damage to China-US relations”. During the controversial visit, China conducted a live-fire military exercise in the waterway that separates the island from the mainland.

President Joe Biden’s administration has said its commitment to Taiwan is “rock solid”. In the first few days of Biden’s presidency, Taiwan reported a “large incursion” by Chinese warplanes over two days. Taiwan’s air force moved to warn away the Chinese aircraft and deployed air defence missile systems to monitor the planes. Analysts said China was testing Biden’s support for Taiwan.

How much of an issue is independence in Taiwan?

While political progress has been slow, links between the two peoples and economies have grown sharply. Taiwanese companies have invested about $60bn in China, and up to one million Taiwanese now live there, many running Taiwanese factories.

Some Taiwanese worry their economy is now dependent on China. Others point out that closer business ties makes Chinese military action less likely, because of the cost to China’s own economy.

A controversial trade agreement sparked the “Sunflower Movement” in 2014 where students and activists occupied Taiwan’s parliament protesting against what they call China’s growing influence over Taiwan.

Some Taiwanese vocally support formal independence but most favour the middle ground. Officially, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) still favours eventual formal independence for Taiwan, while the KMT favours eventual re-unification. Opinion polls show only a small minority of Taiwanese support pursuing one or the other at the moment, with most preferring to stick with the current middle ground.

Yet more and more people say they feel Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Support for the DPP increased at the January 2016 election. This was partly because of dissatisfaction with the KMT’s handling of economic matters, from the wealth gap to high housing prices, and partly because of worries that Mr Ma’s administration was making Taiwan too dependent on Beijing.

Comments

The Biden’s administration needs to deter China from greater military coercion of Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan was a war and peace issue for China and a conflict was certainly possible, but both sides have a variety of incentives for the situation not to escalate.

The whole world needed to get serious about what a long term strategic competition between the US and China looked like.

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The Biden presidency will have to deal with the most important strategic challenge of the times – the belligerence of China. The appointment of an Indo-Pacific coordinator signals the continued commitment of the new administration to managing China’s ambitions and investing in regional partnerships in Asia – including with India. But this will be accompanied by Washington’s need to keep up a working relationship with Beijing. Given the relatively bipartisan support for the relationship with India, New Delhi should not be overly concerned about the tactical ebbs and flows in Washington’s policy – for the strategic convergence between the two is unmistakable.

Despite concerns that may be expressed about what has come to be seen as India’s democratic backsliding, Biden is likely to invest in the India partnership across the realm of defence, economy, technology, and climate – and perhaps even make a trip to India in the first half of his term.

Biden’s Core Team

While Biden’s nominees to head the state and defence departments and the CIA are all well-known individuals, their depositions before Senate committees a day before the inauguration give an insight into the new administration’s thinking.

Secretary of State nominee Anthony Blinken listed the most pressing challenges as rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry from “China, and Russia and other authoritarian states, mounting a threat to a stable and open international system”. He also noted “a technological revolution” was reshaping our lives. If the US doesn’t lead, he said, “there can be only two outcomes: another nation will step in or none will, and chaos shall ensue”.

On specifics, Blinken argued the US must defeat Covid-19, out-compete China and take the lead in tackling climate change.

Blinken also singled out democracy and human rights as central to the Biden administration’s global outreach. Thus overall, while India would be happy with the tone and tenor on China, though what the new China containment strategy will be is still unclear.

The defence secretary-designate, Gen. Lloyd Austin (Retd), talked about India’s near western neighbourhood. While he reiterated the US resolve to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, he qualified it, as Trump avoided doing, by saying safeguarding the gains in women’s rights, etc, must be a precondition to a final settlement. On Pakistan, he seemed to regress to old formulations like underscoring its importance to Afghan peace and regional stability.

The new approach to foreign policy was articulated most consistently over the last year and more by Jake Sullivan, one of Biden’s closest associates, who has been designated as the new national security adviser. A report issued by Washington’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last fall, which was co-authored by Sullivan, gives some insights into the new thinking.

The report points to the overreach of American foreign policy in recent decades and proposes a “less ambitious” foreign policy. The Carnegie report notes that “There is no evidence America’s middle class will rally behind efforts aimed at restoring US primacy in a unipolar world, escalating a new Cold War with China, or waging a cosmic struggle between the world’s democracies and authoritarian governments.”

Biden’s team took charge with the recognition that the expansive globalist ambitions of the American foreign policy establishment have lost much domestic political support.

Biden’s Immediate Actions

For a start, Biden’s priorities were focused on managing the raging COVID-19 pandemic which has claimed 400,000 lives in the US, an economic crisis and a deeply polarised society and politics as was witnessed during the siege of the US Capitol in January.

President Biden’s 17 acts of rolling back prominent Trump policies on the very first day could send some awkward signals about the way the new administration may view the outcome of the last four years of US policies.

Biden’s first actions as president were sharply aimed at sweeping aside former President Donald Trump’s pandemic response, reversing his environmental agenda, tearing down his anti-immigration policies, bolstering the teetering economic recovery and restoring federal efforts to promote diversity.

Immediately after taking over, Biden executive order that will eventually provide relief and citizenship to migrants who have no legal documents would benefit five lakh Indian beneficiaries.

Most expect a return to the pre-Trump era with the US playing a more active role in world dynamics. Secretary of State nominee Anthony Blinken said that India had been a “bipartisan success story” of successive administrations, and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin has also been batting for stronger Indo-US ties. Biden himself is a vocal proponent of friendly ties with India and has been a familiar face in New Delhi since his days as the Vice-President under Barack Obama.

India will continue to keep a close watch on Biden and his State Department nominees who might raise human rights concerns, after the comparatively less intrusive Trump administration.

China Policy

Social dynamics of the American society and the weakening US economy could prevent Biden from playing any hard options against China on issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Biden administration has displayed a bold intent by refusing to be intimidated by China over Taiwan – the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt was sent to the South China Sea to promote ‘freedom of the seas’.

It is unlikely that Biden will dilute the high status that Trump accorded to India in his strategic calculus for the Indo Pacific in the containment of China. Convergence of Indo-US interests has not been disturbed by Trump’s exit.

Indo-Pacific Policy

On its way out of power, the Trump administration, on 13 January, declassified a Indo-Pacific policy it evolved and shaped during its time in office to reveal broad and tough measures to contain China, including “accelerating India’s rise,” through diplomatic, military, and intelligence support.

Broad outlines of the policy were always known, but the decision to reveal it in detail in the turbulent waning days of the Trump dispensation even though the declassification was scheduled for 2042, came as a surprise even amid the toxic pathology between Washington and Beijing over the origins of the coronavirus pandemic.

Public disclosure of the policy will put pressure on the incoming Biden dispensation to stay on course with an evolving US-China-India policy that has progressively gotten tougher on Beijing.

The ten-page document, revealed during heightened tensions between India and China amid a continuing border stand-off, states that enhanced US assistance and intelligence sharing should aid New Delhi in key areas of conflict with Beijing, including over border disputes and water rights.

It outlines the US decision to “offer support to #India – through diplomatic, military and intelligence channels to help address continental challenges such as border dispute with China and access to water, including the Brahmaputra and other rivers facing diversion by China.”

“A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counter-balance to China,” the document states.

Outlining Washington’s desired outcomes, that policy seeks that “India’s preferred partner in security issues is the United States” and “India maintains the capacity to counter border provocations by China,” and “India remains pre-eminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean Security.”

During its four years in office, the Trump administration’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific theater was vigorous, and the pandemic, which the Trump administration blames on China, appears to have accelerated it beyond its initial moves in 2018, when it renamed US Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command in a signal it was bringing New Delhi into the security loop.

The US is fully aware of this and of India’s significance in the Indo Pacific strategy. Biden is unlikely to slow down the momentum that the Quadrilateral of nations involving Japan, Australia, India and the US, has gathered towards realisation of shared concerns and formulation of strategic intent against an aggressive China.

Pakistan

During the Trump era, de-hyphenation of Pakistan from India became a reality. Ties between the US and Pakistan may take off once again. The new US defence secretary, in his confirmation hearing with the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed the need for engaging with the Pakistan military. Pakistan’s geostrategic location gives it out-of-proportion strategic stakes. Pakistan has moved closer to China but US-Pak mutual interests have not changed. The US needs Pakistan for its Afghanistan policy, which will contribute towards an eventual final withdrawal. On the other hand, Pakistan needs US support for its economy.

Middle East

The Middle East and Asia are the two foreign policy theatres which will test Biden. Biden has shown signs of reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and reconsidering sanctions. Bringing back Iran to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will involve a number of steps, including rebuilding the trust with the Iranian leadership that got severely hit after the decision taken by the Trump administration to withdraw from the nuclear deal which was followed by the 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani.

Though there is little scope for a complete revision in the overall Middle East strategy, a withdrawal of support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen is expected as the situation has caused a humanitarian crisis and embarrassment to the US. Facilitated by the Trump administration, the accords between Israel and Bahrain, and Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) carry some weight, but there is little expectation of a major breakthrough on thorny issues like Israel-Palestine.

India’s interests are primarily the opening of Iran’s energy supplies, the rights on development and usage of Chabahar, stability of the Gulf nations where the large Indian diaspora resides and a general absence of violence.

Russia

India’s immediate concern is to see that the S-400 air defence system deal with Russia goes through. It remains contentious in US eyes with no certainty about application of sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The US imposed sanctions on Turkey recently under the CAATSA for the purchase of S-400 missile defences from Russia.

Top American officials have been taking a “pragmatic view” on the issue. India cannot wish away overnight the fact that it has huge dependency on Russia. So whether the Biden administration imposes sanctions or not India has to build its capability. Ultimately India will take decisions based on its own strategic interests.

Delhi’s Expectations

New Delhi is looking at “five baskets” of engagement: Strategic, environment, energy and climate change, digital and IT, education and health care.

According to Evan Osnos’s biography of Biden, he was one of the key advocates of strengthening the Indo-US partnership, especially in strategic areas.

With about 2 lakh Indian students in the US and the Trump administration’s progressively hardening line on visas, Delhi will look towards easing of norms for those aspiring to study and work there.

The US and India see each other as key strategic partners and analysts expect the Indo-US relations to grow closer and become less strained. With the coalition against China likely to persist, America’s ties with India and other Pacific nations, including Japan and Australia, may experience a further boost.

The major policy changes India is hoping for are in terms of software exports, H1 visa policy, minimum compensation for engineers (via which Trump tried discouraging hiring Indian IT professionals). Bilateral trade between the two countries was at $88.75 billion in 2019-20. In 2019, the US was the largest goods export market (17% share) for India and, in terms of goods import supplier, it was the third largest. In April-September 2020, the US was the second biggest source of FDI for India. It’s likely that higher portfolio investments influenced by federal rates will flow into India.

With India focusing on becoming a manufacturing hub, there might be a rise in US funding influx and India would hopefully become the alternative choice.

Defence Cooperation

A day after US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke for the first time with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, on 29 January, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby told reporters at a news conference, “The Secretary made it very clear that we’re going to remain committed to a strong US-India bilateral relationship.”  During his conversation with Singh on Wednesday, Austin pledged to work collaboratively with India to sustain the progress in the bilateral defence relationship, the Pentagon said earlier.

“During the call, Secretary Austin emphasised the Department’s commitment to the US-India Major Defence Partnership, observing that it is built upon shared values and a common interest in ensuring the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open,” Kirby said.

The Indo-US defence ties have been on an upswing in the last few years and in June 2016, the US had designated India a “Major Defence Partner”.

The two countries have also inked key defence and security pacts over the past few years, including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 that allows their militaries use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies as well as provides for deeper cooperation.

The two sides have also signed COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) in 2018 that provides for interoperability between the two militaries and provides for sale of high end technology from the US to India.

Comments

The Trump years have seen two important developments in India-US relations. One is the sharpening tensions on trade and the other is the deepening defence and security cooperation. The Biden moment offers the opportunity for Delhi to overcome the bilateral differences on trade and elevate defence cooperation to a higher level.

The need to take the Indo-US security-defence relationship to the next level is apparent to sober thinkers in both nations but the obstacles to it are not insignificant. There is no guarantee that the US-India positive trajectory will continue.

An essay published earlier this month by Joshua T. White, a leading scholar with the Brookings Institution, details the concerns on the American side. President Joe Biden will have to deal with apprehensions about India’s fiscal limitations, its ties with Russia, its “ponderous response” to Chinese provocations on its border, and its “drift toward illiberal majoritarian politics”. In addition, writes White, the Biden administration will likely seek, for good reason, to rebalance the bilateral relationship away from a disproportionate focus on security issues in order to address a wider array of topics including global health, energy and climate change, and technology cooperation.

On the Indian domestic front, prime minister Narendra Modi will have to contend with the long-held view that Democratic administrations are prone to hyphenating India and Pakistan, do not walk the tough talk on China, indulge in rank identity politics which they expect other nations including their allies to emulate, and lecture New Delhi on human rights, liberalism and the environment without accounting for an Indian exceptionalism, which has been in the forefront of pushing back against communitarian discourses. These are the challenges that both countries have to overcome, respectively, if they are serious about containing the rise and rise of China.

The post INDIA-U.S. – US Policy Toward India Under Biden appeared first on IMR.

Turkey has reportedly supplied materials and fighters to Libya in a bid to change the course of the civil war. Erdogan provoked Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, and both countries were on the brink of a war

Turkey’s proxy wars are growing in number. Turkey has reportedly supplied materials and fighters to Libya in a bid to change the course of the civil war. Erdogan provoked Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, and both countries were on the brink of a war.

The Turkish president also intervened in Syria. Later, it instigated Azerbaijan, pushing for a full blown war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Libya

The Turkish president has pushed Turkish arms, the military and proxies to volatile regional battlegrounds. This began in Libya when Turkey announced a military intervention in civil war in January 2020.

Erdogan is a key supporter of the Tripoli-based government of National Accord that is fighting the Libyan National Army, led by commander Khalifa Haftar.

In April 2019, the Libyan National Army launched an offensive to seize the capital. Despite a UN embargo, Turkey deployed its military forces, sent Syrian militants and even armed the government of National Accord.

French president Emmanuel Macron accused Turkey of meddling in the Libyan conflict. In Macron’s eyes, Turkey has threatened European interests with its military deployments.

“I have already had the opportunity to make this very clear to president Erdogan: I now consider that Turkey is playing a dangerous game in Libya and is in breach of all the commitments it made at the Berlin conference. This is the same speech I made this afternoon during the exchange I had with president Trump, because it is in the interests of Libya, of its neighbours, of the whole region, but also of Europe”, Emmanuel Macron had said.

Dispute with Greece

In August, Turkey pursued an aggressive gas exploration effort in eastern Mediterranean. Erdogan has sent a gas exploration ship to waters claimed by Greece and Cyprus and also angered France by his actions.

Encounters between Turkish and Greek vessels on the high seas raised the threat of war. France sided with Greece. Erdogan responded by saying: “France is often on the agenda. I don’t want to give names, but I am forced to because he comes at me a lot. It isn’t with our people but he says we have a problem with Erdogan. Mr Macron, you are going to have way more problems with me.”

Support to Azerbaijan

By the end of September, Erdogan triggered a new conflict, and ramped up support to Azerbaijan. On September 27, fighting broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed region at the crossroads of Asia and Europe.

ALSO READ: Armenia and Azerbaijan: The Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh

Erdogan sent Syrian mercenaries to assist Azerbaijan and gave Azerbaijan complete military support, defying calls for a ceasefire.

“Given that the three Minsk countries, USA, Russia and France have neglected this problem for nearly 30 years, first of all, it is unacceptable that they are involved in a search for a ceasefire in the face of these negative developments that came to surface in these days but if something is wanted, the invaders should leave these lands in order to achieve a solution”, Erdogan said.

Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also not gone down well with Russia. Russia and Turkey were at the opposing ends of the conflict and when Kremlin managed to get Baku and Yerevan sign a peace deal, Erdogan landed in Azerbaijan to fan the flames again.

Muslim Nations Upset

Erdogan intends to lead the Muslim world but his actions have offended other Muslim nations. He is already on the wrong side of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and in 2019 joined then Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad for an Islamic conference. Iran too was a part of this conference. But, Erdogan found a way to upset Tehran too. He recited a politically incorrect poem during his visit to Azerbaijan.

It is said enemy’s enemy is your friend and in Erdogan’s case, Russia’s rival US slapped sanctions on Turkey. The US is upset with Erdogan for purchasing S-400 missile defence systems from Russia.

Comments

Unchecked ambition can invite trouble. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions have put his country in trouble. Erdogan wanted to be a caliph, unseat Saudi Arabia’s position and befriend both arch-rivals US and Russia. He also wanted Turkey to lead the European Union. However, Erdogan has single-handedly upset the entire world and put his country into an uncertain and isolated future. The list of Erdogan’s misdeeds is only growing ever since he came to power.

“We have unanimously observed that Turkey has continued with its provocations,” said French President Emmanuel Macron. The EU is not pleased with Ankara and is pressing sanctions.

Turkey under Erdogan is keen to re-establish its Ottoman-era pan-Islamic identity. He seeks to gain influence in the entire perceived “Muslim world” through a mix of diplomatic initiatives and supporting a more forceful Ottoman-like religious narrative.

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Past History

Before World War I, for 800 years, the Ottoman Empire – the largest religious empire in the world – was a dominant force in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East and was built on the principles of Islamic rule as laid down by the Caliph or “Khalifa” (religious title to the sultan or king of Ottoman Empire).

in 1909, as the then Ottoman king Abdul Hamid II felt increasing competition from European powers, he began to send emissaries all over the world to consolidate a religious backing of the Muslim community. He sent one of his most important emissary known as Jamaluddin Afghani to then-British India, to stoke religious passion in the Muslims of India and gain political support from Muslims spread around the world.

In a few years from that time, World War 1 began. As the war raged, the Ottomans found themselves at a technological disadvantage against the European powers. While they were being challenged from outside by the Europeans, there was also an internal conflict going on; the emergence of the Young Turks Movement (YTM), led by the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later titled Ataturk).

As the internal and external wars raged to weaken and kill the Ottoman Empire, prominent Muslims in British India, namely Mohammad Ali and his brother Maulana Shaukat Ali joined with other Muslim leaders such as Pir Ghulam MujaddidSarhandi Sheikh Shaukat Ali Siddiqui, Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, Barrister Jan Muhammad Junejo, Hasrat Mohani, Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, and Abul Kalam Azad founded the All India Khilafat Committee (AIKC). The AIKC was instrumental in demanding the British to ensure the protection of the religious Caliphate even during the founding of modern Turkey.

As the Ottoman Empire was being dismembered into different countries, the AIKC along with numerous other Muslim organizations sent aid to the war-ravaged lands which included food, clothing and other essentials. Many Muslim soldiers in the British Indian Army refused to fight for the British against Ottomans, whom they regarded as co-religious brothers. This resulted in British forces ferociously putting down numerous revolts within the units comprising of soldiers of the Muslim community.

When Pakistan separated from India in 1947, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the country. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan intended to model Pakistan along the lines of Ataturk’s Turkey.

Turks have always been strict adherents of their adopted religion and continue to take pride in their historic role as propagators of Islam, either through coercion, political dealings or military force. They have absolutely no sense of guilt about having done it.

Turkey and Pakistan’s romantic relationship further strengthened during the Cold War, when they both decided to side with the United States, while India was friendly with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. This alliance, with the blessings of the United States, allowed both the countries to develop a robust religious, cultural and military relationship.

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On 27 September morning, Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, launched a large-scale offensive operation in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Overnight, it became one of the hottest topics around the world. After 14 days and hundreds of casualties on both sides, a ceasefire was brokered in Moscow under Russian pressure. Strangely or not, the new status quo did not differ from the situation before that. Ankara, even when it was not officially part of the conflict, hastily expressed its disappointment with the peace agreement reached. If nothing changed, then what was the issue?

The only logical answer is – because they did not achieve what they had hoped for and the premature peace was a failed end-conflict state.

Access to Oil & Gas Fields

The Caspian Sea has several functioning oil and gas fields, the products of which go to the European and international energy markets. These pipelines pass north of the troubled region through Georgia and reach Turkish ports and then head to Europe.

Turkey must have planned to clear the area south of Nagorno Karabakh in order to build another pipeline and allow for its secure operation. However, to link it to Nakhchevan, there had to be a second step, so that Turkey and Azerbaijan could gain access into certain territories of south Armenia, viz:

•             Either the valley north of Arevik National Park – everything along the 80 km Tegh-Goris-Balak road, or

•             Manage to separate a 20 km long piece of land connecting the Betschenagsku Pass next to Shahbuz National Reserve with the border facing the Minkend village, or

•             Surround Armenia and pressurise them into some sort of cooperation for such a project.

This way they could control the entire transportation from the massive Shah Deniz field and its neighboring sites completely ignoring Russian or US pressure and becoming a major supplier for the EU and other markets, where they could set the terms.

Existing Oil and Gas Routes

Currently, all the oil and gas pipelines connecting the massive fields of Caspian region with the distribution depot in Erzurum in Turkey and the international markets follow the route of the trade between Asia and Europe. Azerbaijan is the only choice for overland trade if Russia and Iran are to be avoided. Azerbaijan offers only one option – a narrow 40 to 90 km wide flatland valley, known as the “Ganja Gap”, named after the largest city in the area.

North of it is Caucasus, with steep alpine hills reaching altitudes of over 3,200 metres (10,500 ft) and south of it is Lesser Caucasus, a flatter mountainous area, but still having ridges between 2,000 and 3,000 metres (6,500-9,800 ft) altitude. The terrain is hard and just traversing it is not for beginner trekkers or climbers. Any construction going through the mountains would require immense amount of effort and risk, which is why the Ganja Gap has no alternative to date.

The only other valley, which has some basic infrastructure is the valley on the Aras river. It serves as the border between Nahkhchivan province, Armenia and Azerbaijan on the north and Iran on the south. The problem with that valley in Azerbaijan is that the villages in it are at the foot of the mountain and are inhabited by ethnic Armenians, so the Azerbaijani state has little or no control. If an important and expensive project is built through it, it can easily be sabotaged as the distance between it and the settlements and military batteries in the mountain would be less than 20 km and there would be direct visibility.

The Ganja Gap, on the other hand, is naturally protected from the areas of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh by the uninhabited Murovdag range, which is the highest range in Lesser Caucasus and with ridges at 3,200 metres (10,500 ft) altitude or more, is practically unpassable.

Reasons for Nagorno Karabakh Stalemate

The birth of the animosity between the ethnic Armenians in the area and the Azeri could be traced back to the policies of Stalin of taking and giving regions for achieving desired results within the newly created and growing USSR and with its neighbors – warming the relations with the stronger and secular Turkey and creating a buffer with Iran. Even though the area has been inhabited predominantly by Armenians for over 2,000 years, it was governed as Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). The conflict die out under Moscow’s strict control for the next few decades, but escalated immediately after the fall of the USSR.

During this war, Russia supplied the majority of the arms to both sides as the military leadership there was intimately familiar with it – they had been part of the same system not long ago. The defensive batteries built on higher ground by the Armenians have allowed for very effective defence against Azeri army attempts over the years and as a result Nagorno-Karabakh, together with several surrounding territories, is now de jure Azerbaijani, but de facto independently run by Armenians with a local government. It is important to note that the Republic of Artsakh, the Amernian name of Nagorno Karabakh, has not been recognized by any country in the UN.

The situation throws up many questions about the repeated calls by President Aliyev and President Erdogan that Armenia should stop its occupation. If the region is part of Azerbaijan and nobody has recognized it as a separate body, then how can they get it back? On the other hand, if they do not have control over it and, in fact, they have never had control over it, then is it really theirs? It is similar to claiming outside territories for the sheer desire to add territories rather than considering historical facts and population composition. The later is possible, but it is called invasion and requires greater preparation and superiority to achieve success as the locals are likely to retaliate. 

Potential Scenarios

•             Turkey is the least content party with the agreement. They will try to disrupt this one way or another as peace with the current status quo is their worst scenario. However, they will have to step in themselves, because of the low morale in the Azerbaijan army (numerous reports of alcohol abuse among Azeri officers and demotivated mercenaries from Syria, who are sent as human shields against the Armenian forces). Additionally, the only settlements, which the Azeri army managed to clear (as per the Azerbaijan defence ministry) after two weeks of intensive fighting are 12 small villages, located in the flat lands at 300-400 metres (1,000-1,300 ft) altitude. It is unclear how they intend to capture bigger towns at 1,000-1,600 m (3,300-5,200 ft) altitude and the surrounding mountains where guerrilla warfare will likely ensure.

At the time of writing, the press secretary of the minister of defence of Armenia, announced on 13 October, that the enemy had resumed offensive operations.

•             is possible that Israel is pressed unofficially by the US to offer Armenia a solution to the Azeri attacks, as their weaponry seems to be providing a big advantage so far. This will, however, trigger Russian response as they are already unsettled from the recent sale to Georgia of Israeli air defense system.

•             If Turkey intervenes directly, it is possible that Russia will intervene as well and use the chance to increase its influence in the region. Miscalculated strategy by Turkey could become a major threat to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Turkey’s Position

Turkey’s course has shifted significantly in recent years and its foreign policy can be described as highly controversial, to say the least. Turkey has been the most vocal party in the conflict, even if it was not directly involved in it. It immediately expressed disagreement with the peace accord when the spokesperson of the president, Ibrahim Kalin, announced, on the day of the ceasefire, that the root cause of the problem was the Armenian occupation of Azeri lands and if that did not change, peace could not be a solution.

It is clear that Turkey, rather than Azerbaijan, has greater motivation in the elimination of the unwanted presence there. The Azeri rhetoric has been repetitive of the statements by Ankara or unfounded and grave threats, such as the possible targeting of the Mitsamor nuclear power plant. The statement was baseless, because a possible Chernobyl-like scenario would mean at least as much or more damage to Azerbaijan or Turkey due to a number of factors – proximity of Turkey (15km from it), weather conditions this time of the year/ Coriolis effect of the atmosphere and the resultant direction of the potential radioactive clouds and so on.

Turkey’s major problem is that it is often dependent on various superpowers and has to consider number of geopolitical realities. Until a few years ago they had to just juggle between US and Russian interests, while now China seems to be the biggest player. In 2009, President Erdogan said, with regards to the Uighur policy in Xinjiang, “the incidents in China are, simply put, a genocide” and followed it with domestic policy for safe haven for the Uighur diaspora.

That changed in 2016, when Turkey arrested a prominent Uighur political activist, who had been living and residing in the country for the last 15 years. That continued with hundreds of similar arrests and extraditions. Since then, the two countries have signed 10 bilateral agreements and China has become Turkey’s second largest import partner, investing $3 billion between 2016 and 2019 and promising to double that by the end of 2020. Last year, China’s central bank secured a $1 billion swap and helped salvage various poorly managed projects or take majority stakes in other multi-billion projects, that could be part of the Belt and Road Initiative – ultimately allowing access to the Mediterranean.

The economic crisis from the coronavirus pandemic pushed Turkey to search for investment alternatives other than with their usual partners. Completing all local Chinese funded projects would mean empowering China in the mid to long term, which would mean that Turkey will have to make some hard choices very soon, including possibly leaving NATO and, thus, decreasing its US and EU pressure.

Georgia’s Position

Georgia tried to remain silent as long as possible. They currently benefit from the pipelines going through their territory. Politically, Georgia’s position could always be risky, because they can theoretically shift between being Western/US or Russia oriented foreign policy and a shift towards the Islamic world is impossible. None of that, however, is in line with Turkey’s orientation in the last few years, which could be the reason why Erdogan might pursue an alternative for the oil and gas transportation.

Russia’s Position

Russia’s position is one of the most complex as it is the real heavyweight in the region. Both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s leaders had close ties with Russia due to the common past as part of the USSR. Currently, both countries are looking elsewhere – Armenia is oriented towards the West, but is dependent on Russia for energy and Azerbaijan is aligned with Turkey. Russia sells arms to both sides, which theoretically means that they want to have the conflict continue as long as possible.

However, there are other interests as well. The Hajiqabul-Mozdok gas pipeline is operational and Russia imports 175 billion cubic feet per year. Additionally, the Baku-Novorossyisk (Northern Route Export) oil pipeline imports at 105,000 barrels per day.

Third, and most important aspect, is the regional influence that Russia can have. Countries like Georgia and Armenia can serve as a buffer between Russia and Turkey. Considering that Turkey has been warming up its relations with China significantly and Iran is already under Beijing’s heavy influence, it would be imperative for Russia to have a safe zone of countries, which are not likely to be advancing up north anytime in the future, as Russia will have to take care of its own 4,209 km border with China. The chance that Turkey or Iran could be spreading Jihadist influence through marginalized Islamic groups should not be neglected as well. Finally, Russia has to act in a such way, that there will be less motivation for the US or the West to affect the region.

It is possible, that the Russian strategists saw that Azerbaijan’s new equipment -Israeli missiles and drones – might quickly erase the advantages of the highlands that the Armenians had for decades and, for the first time, genuinely threaten the whole existence of the enclave. This way, their best move would be to intervene fast and press for a peace agreement. Which is what happened on 11 October in Moscow, when Vladimir Putin insisted that both sides reach peaceful agreement and Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov mediated over 10 hrs of peace talks.

Israel’s position

Currently, drones, which Israel sold to Azerbaijan, are known to be Harop and Orbiter 1K. The former, made by state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), is able to carry a 25 kg warhead.

Additionally, there were reports that Azerbaijan used Israeli rockets LORA, also produced by the state IAI. This is the first conflict where these modern missiles were used. These hypersonic rockets have a range of 400 km and CEP of 10 metres and can be launched from a standard intermodal container (standard cargo looking containers) on a ship or land launched. They could be easily transported to any point without raising suspicion by observers and can be fired off from anywhere in Azerbaijan and reach their target in Nagorno Karabakh.

Israel’s strategy to sell weapons to Azerbaijan is very complex as it has to reflect on their opportunities, but most importantly – major geopolitical risks and threats. Obviously, the defence industry has to have clients. However, the possible threats are far more important. Even though Azerbaijan is allied with Turkey, President Aliyev is viewed as a potential friend in case of future hostilities with Iran, one of the biggest threats to Israel’s existence. Azerbaijan has a tense relationship with Tehran because of the marginalization of ethnic Azerbaijanis, who make up roughly a fifth of Iran’s population.

American Position

The US have been relatively silent. Until several years ago they had no share in the LNG import of Turkey, now they are responsible for about 10% of them. Additionally, Erdogan announced on 8 October that Trump and he had set a goal to increase their bilateral trade to $100 billion. The US also has one of its largest air bases in Incirlik, which is strategically important for the regional influence in the Middle East.

However, the US will not want to increase Russian influence in Caucasus, which means that they will try to stop Turkey, directly or indirectly, from achieving their Caucasus agenda.

The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is highly complex and very important. If a remote mountainous area of 4,400 sq km with population of 150,000, a barely functional local economy, which attracts below 10,000 tourists per year in its few monasteries, with no ties to any major movements or well known terrorist groups, attracts so much attention, we should ask ourselves why and analyze each potential party’s stake in it. So far, Turkey stands to win the most should the conflict be resolved the way they want – Armenians leave the occupied territory. Considering this has not happened in the last 2,000 years even after numerous genocides in the region and one of the superpowers has a lot to lose in such scenario, the future events can turn out to be extremely interesting and important.

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There is a long history of politics and strategic moves behind the continuing validity of fascination for the Western world in Asia. We will have to see how, with unnatural ease, India and Japan both have accommodated many of the values and lifestyle patterns of the West in their social-cultural behavior while at the same time, they see difficulties in overcoming the mindset gap between themselves.

This year, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has set up the New and Emerging Strategic Technologies (NEST) Division because a realism-based approach tells that, no matter how sharp the mind of Kautilya or edgy the sword of Samurai is, to win in the realities of the 21st Century, they will have to embrace the power of emerging technologies.

Special Moves

In the book ‘The Art of War’, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote: “Do not repeat tactics which gained you victory in the past but let your tactics be modeled by the infinite variety of circumstances.” These words summarize the popular approach of the power players and the Internet has added more variations to this. Today, to conquer a country or to damage its morale, the physical movement of the troops is not necessary as the sieges of narratives (through digital and social platforms) are proving more effective. In such an environment, can we afford to continue pursuing a straight and traditional approach to defending our interests and priorities? Both countries will have to seek their answers soon.

In the Special Strategic and Global partnership of India and Japan, the Government to Government (G2G), Government to Businesses (G2B) and Business to Business (B2B) exchanges are going well but it is our People to People (P2P) exchanges that need a serious push.

Joint Production of Video Games

The Japanese sword saint Musashi wrote “When you have attained the Way of Strategy there will be not one thing that you cannot understand” and “You will see the Way in everything.” Japan is known for its world-class video game industry and the country should be applauded for keeping the spirit of its Samurai warriors alive, in the minds of young Japan through video games/animation characters. From the Way of Samurai (2002) to Ghost of Tsushima (July 2020) Japan has a track record of consistent perfection in producing strategy, action and adventure games. Today, a majority of Japanese youth follow the Western lifestyle/trends but, at the same time, they enjoy the Samurai spirit, too.

An Idea that needs to be developed

The reach and influencing power of technology is real and the two technologically advanced nations like India and Japan will have to start exploring the possibilities of leveraging these capabilities for enhancing the bond between our people.

WYSIWYA Strategy

In computing, the What You See Is What You Get (WYSIWYG) approach has dominated the system designs for many years. Today, we will have to think about designing our strategy with ‘What You See is What You Aim (WYSIWYA)’ kind of approach.

How will kids, who are growing up seeing Superman/Spiderman (and now Avengers), believe that the problems of the Earth can be solved by the Kautilyan approach and Samurai spirit, too? For Kautilya and Samurai to capture the imaginations of our kids, the Japanese video game developers will have to join hands with the Indian technical creative community. Together, the two can design artificial intelligence (AI), virtual reality (VR) and simulation-powered game series, in which, say the two animation characters – a Guru (Kautilya) and a Warrior (Samurai) – can be shown working on a joint mission, such as defending the ancient treasure, culture and other civilizational assets of the region. And they can be shown applying a combination of manoeuvres involving mind, strategy and the spirit of swordsmanship (in well-defined levels of the game). Such close to real-life experiences will make our kids comprehend how the finest minds of the two sides can work together.

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It is certain that the 21st Century smartphone generation cannot grasp the ideas through text and books are not enough to satisfy their curiosity and creative hunger. With the production of such video games, the complex ideas of Kautilya’s Arthashastra, i.e., the elements of sovereignty, six-fold foreign policy (Rajamandala theory), Peace and Wartime scenarios, Adoption of Double policy, marching with the combined powers, different vices and calamities scenarios of a nation, acts of an invader and powerful enemies, consideration about an enemy in the front and rear, strategic means to capture a fortress and secret means to protect the state kind of ideas can be introduced in a simple and understandable way. Kautilya is one of the most successful gurus in our history; he fought the foreign invaders with the power of the mind, knowledge of polity and well-crafted strategies. Our future generations have a right to learn from his teachings.

These moves, when planned on a large scale, can give a much-needed boost to the Japanese video game industry too, which is facing some difficulties since the last few years. With the growing interest of Chinese and American investors in video game markets, it seems that this industry in Japan is struggling with a similar “iPod/iPhone shock” that electronics/mobile phone companies have gone through. Japan’s domestic video game developers, who were once leading the ‘golden age of video game industry’, are now left with only two choices – either adopt the Western ideas/strategies or directly join hands with the foreign producers. Since the last few years, there have been talks regarding the revival of the Japanese video game industry, while the major Japanese video game companies (the leaders of the industry in the past) are selling their stakes to foreign investors. But, at the same time, a community of indie developers (independent video game developers) and hobbyist is also taking shape in Japan, on which hope rests.

The idea of the joint production of video games portraying the Kautilyan approach and Samurai spirit can not only give a different kind of boost to this bilateral partnership but is also productive in the commercial sense.

Superheroes are replacing Samurais

According to the 2015 report of Parrot Analytics (a media analytic firm), Gotham, Arrow, Agent of S.H.I.E.L.D, The Flash, Supergirl, Daredevil, iZombie, Constantine, Ultimate Spiderman and Agent Carter are the top ten most in-demand superheroes in Japan. Gradually, the tricky acts of Daredevils, Spiderman, Supergirls and Agents are replacing the sagas of Samurai Warriors in the land of Samurais. India is in a quite worse position here, we have not provided anything beyond Captain Vyom, Shaktimaan and Baalveer to our kids and now we have a whole generation growing up watching the fantasies of Captain America, Superman, Batman, Hulk, Thor, Wolverine and Ant-Man kinds of conceptions. From the long-term perspective, with the continued absence of an image about our heroes, we will not be able to instill the winning spirit in our future.

The Participation of Women Power

During prime minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Japan in September 2014, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe shared his vision of achieving a society in which the women can shine and he said that in this Japan must advance the cooperation with India. Modi echoed the sentiment and he also proposed the idea of establishing a parliamentary association of Indian and Japanese women. The active participation of women from both sides could give a much-needed push to people-to-people (P2P) exchanges.

In the social-cultural environment there are several similarities between the Indian and Japanese women while in the religious context, India and Japan worship the same goddesses with different names such as Maa Saraswati, who is recognized in Japan as the goddess Benzaiten and Maa Laxmi as the goddess Kichijoten. Our women can add the elements of desire, dedication and depth to the vision of the two countries, which is crucial at this stage. To shape their engagements, a Joint Women Forum can be initiated which will act as a platform to represent the voice of the Asian women at large. Unlike other women forums, here the participants will not restrict their discussions to their community issues alone, rather the women of India and Japan will discuss the broader vision related to national interests and how Asian societies can come closer at different levels.

Later, the women belonging to different walks of life and from other ASEAN members can also be encouraged to take part. When women come together, families and societies will naturally draw closer.

Traditional Sector

In traditional sectors, the current status of India-Japan’s Special Strategic and Global Partnership can be defined with three Ds – Dialogues, Delegations and Deliberations. In the recent exchanges between the foreign ministers of India and Japan, on the sidelines of the Quad meet, some encouraging developments have taken place, such as the finalization of the Memorandum of Cooperation in Cyber-security and discussions regarding the expansion of this bilateral partnership in third countries.

Space Technology

In the Space technology domain since 2012, talks regarding joint missions have been underway and some of these concluded with the finalization of joint missions such as ISRO and JAXA’s joint Lunar Polar Exploration Mission (LUPEX), which is expected to be launched in the next 3 to 4 years. In March 2019, the India-Japan Space Dialogue was held in Delhi, in which the delegations consisting of security and space department representatives participated. In 2018, during his Japan visit, Modi initiated the inter-governmental discussions around it and, a few months back, an India-Japan joint study group was formed to explore the technicalities related to the joint lunar mission.

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The developments on such joint space missions will carry on at their pace but in parallel to those moves, the two countries can initiate some knowledge exchange activities between the young space enthusiasts of both sides. India has a rich heritage of astronomical discoveries and ancient Indian astronomy is still a matter of research across the world. For centuries, with a consistent curiosity, the Western world and their dedicated faculties are exploring the advanced astronomical findings of ancient India (which are often called the most precise documents of space-related computations). But India never promoted such curiosity among its Asian allies.

To make our kids look beyond NASA and sci-fi movies, the two countries can set up a forum where the young minds (preferably from secondary schools and colleges) would gather and get themselves familiar with the great ancient Indian astronomers and mathematicians like Aryabhata, Varahamihira, Bhaskara, Brahmagupta, Parameshvara, Madhava of Sangamagrama, Sankara Narayana, and Govindasvami and others. Such forums can meet frequently to explore subjects such as the Aryabhata’s ‘Aud Ayaka system’, or Varahamihira’s Pancasiddhantika, Surya-Siddhanta, Vasishtha Siddhanta, and Vishnudharmottara Purana and many other ancient Indian astronomical texts.

There is a general conception that there is no ancient constellation mythology in Japan but Japanese authors like Takashi Katsumata have challenged this notion with various evidences from the Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters, 712) and the Nihon Shok (The Oldest Chronicles of Japan, 720) in their papers/ books. Several different interpretations of stars exist in Japanese culture and Japan has produced many brilliant astronomers too. Their discoveries and findings will encourage young minds. This culture, once initiated by India and Japan, can be promoted with other ASEAN partners.

Cyber Security

Similar to space technology, cyber is another area where cooperation talks have been going on for long. In February 2019, the two countries conducted the fourth cyber dialogue. Earlier, in 2012, 2017 and 2018, similar exchanges had taken place mainly centered on knowledge/experience sharing, risk resolution and prevention. It is quite unusual that in cyber security-related interactions between India and Japan, due emphasis has not been given to any proactive measure for the serious cyber challenges that the two countries are facing. The frequency of our cyber exchanges is similar to that of the space domain, only the size of delegations becoming more diverse and large each time.

We need to understand that the security of the critical infrastructure is crucial for a nation. An attack on the critical infrastructure can cause much more severe damage than any conventional terror attack can. Japan is one of the most active partners of many of our critical infrastructure projects and it will be an added advantage if we cooperate in their security. In the recent India-Japan foreign ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, both sides have finalized the text of the cyber security agreement, for promoting cooperation in capacity building, R&D, security and resilience in the areas of critical information infrastructure, 5G, Internet of Things, AI, among others. We need to add active industry participation in cyber security exchanges that can help in evolving some concrete measures.

There are other important sectors of cooperation such as naval engineering, biotech, medicines/pharma, solar energy and the possibility of merging Japanese hard power (electronics/computing parts) with Indian soft power (software system/services) to produce future-oriented products, etc.

The only test of the India-Japan partnership is to end the legacy of hesitation, doubt and unfamiliarity, as Modi often says that “Our past has desired us to stand together. Our present is encouraging us to work together.”

(Note: The first part of this article “India and Japan Can Show the Right Path” has been published in the Sep 2020 issue).

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