The Type 003 carrier is China’s most-advanced warship ever built and its launch has cemented Beijing’s position as a top contender among global shipbuilding industries.​

China’s PLA Navy launched its latest Type 003 aircraft carrier on June 17, 2022, an indicator of Chinese naval shipbuilding prowess, making it the largest warship ever built in the nation.

China now has three aircraft carriers, in addition to over one hundred warships built over the last ten years, exceeding the growth of any navy worldwide.

Displacing 85,000 to 100,000 tons, and over 300 metres in length, the Type 003 is noteworthy for the speed of its development, particularly in skipping two generations of hydraulic and steam technology in its carrier launch technology. Instead, the Type 003 includes an electromagnetic launch system, competing with a more advanced US equivalent. The electromagnetic catapult technology will allow the Type 003 to field different military aircraft, increasing the range and effectiveness of the carrier, according to a US Department of Defence report to Congress.

China is in the process of developing a fourth aircraft carrier capable of nuclear propulsion, with leaked documents indicating that it will be capable of fielding advanced fighters and stealth jets, surveillance and control craft, anti-submarine helicopters and drones.

As China focuses on building its next-generation carrier, it’s also coming up short on aircraft to field them. With at least 22 J-15 carrier-compatible fighter jets, China will need more fighter aircraft if it is to equip two modern carriers, giving rise to expectations of a next-generation aircraft-based fighter to accommodate its new capacities.

A nuclear-capable aircraft carrier would only be limited by the amount of supplies it can carry at sea, and the resilience of its sailors, granting the ability to project force or deny across the world’s seas and coasts.

China’s latest aircraft carrier is not welcome news to US defence officials who also have to contend with the widespread use of satellite imagery and artificial intelligence, making it more difficult for large warships to maintain the advantage of surprise.

AI could allow satellites to quickly identify warship electronic signatures from space, despite scrambling and background noise.

Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System

Fujian’s electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) will accelerate jets taking off at speed, assisting their take-off with such force the aircraft will be able to carry more fuel and weapons, therefore extending the reach and size of the punch the aircraft carrier packs. Early warning aircraft will be able to take off and land more easily, enhancing the carrier’s ability to spot its enemies from further away.

EMALS is also able to launch more aircraft at a greater rate, getting more jets into the air faster than its opponents using older technologies – and is vital for defending itself against incoming attacks.

This latest feature gives the Fujian a significant edge, as only the United States’ latest Ford-class of aircraft carrier is equipped with it. France is slowly developing a similar system and India is examining its feasibility, but outside the US, only China employs this system. Its navy has yet to operate a nuclear-powered carrier, as the US has done for decades. The Fujian is conventionally powered but predictions are that the next one to be built by China will be nuclear-powered.

The first two carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, were ex-Soviet designs; the Liaoning initially bought for scrap from Ukraine and refitted. While antiquated, they have been used to train new generations of naval officers and pilots in the complex science and art of aircraft carrier operations.

This carrier will certainly impact the PLANs maritime capabilities… but it will not significantly impact U.S. warfighting capabilities in the Western Pacific.

The post Fujian – China’s Newest Type 03 Aircraft Carrier appeared first on IMR.

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

• Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

• Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

• Internal unrest in Taiwan;

• Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

• Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

• Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

• Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

China’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

Taiwan’s Options

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments:

1) to a free and democratic constitutional system;

2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other;

3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and

4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people.

Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to generate international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island by placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.

In 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the PRC’s forceful response to then-U.S. Speaker of the House’s delegation to Taiwan in August increased the urgency with which Taiwan is pursuing defense reforms. The PRC’s response to the then-U.S. House Speaker’s visit accelerated the PRC’s ongoing military and gray zone activity toward Taiwan. The PRC’s actions likely intended to establish a new status quo and to place greater operational demands on Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s planned improvements only partially address its defense challenges, and a majority of Taiwan citizens believe that the then-Speaker’s visit and the PLA response were detrimental to Taiwan’s security.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active-duty billets. As of 2021, the MND had accomplished its goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitions to an all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay. However, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness obstacles.

Reservists, conscripts, and civil defense volunteers support the volunteer active duty forces. Taiwan’s number of reserve personnel ranges from one to two million, while there are fewer than half a million conscripts. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization to improve the mobilization of reserves and civilians to support military operations. In 2022, Taiwan implemented this legislation by establishing the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which coordinates a whole-of-society approach to support military operations and disaster prevention and response. In December 2022, Taiwan announced that it would extend the duration of mandatory military conscription service from four months to one year and double conscripts’ monthly salary starting in 2024.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget to support defense acquisitions and strengthen its forces against Chinese pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to be the highest level since 1990. In October 2022, Taiwan proposed total defense spending of about $19 billion for 2023, a 13.9 percent increase from 2022, which will represent about 2.4 percent of Taiwan’s GDP. In January 2022, Taiwan approved an $8 billion multi-year supplemental defense budget to strengthen Taiwan’s air and sea combat capabilities. Over half of Taiwan’s supplemental defense spending will fund missile corvettes and anti-ship weapons, such as the Hsiung Feng missile system. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow to around $230 billion in 2022, about 12 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of China’s defense budget focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force.

Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Specific areas of emphasis in Taiwan’s strategy include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems, domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters and producing the remaining three of a previously planned four transport docks.

The post Taiwan’s Ability to Defend the Mainland appeared first on IMR.

The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike capabilities. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations. The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean- going LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure on Taiwan.

PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities.

Eastern Theatre Command

The Eastern Theater Command consists of a joint headquarters, a joint logistics support center (JSLC) from the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, a PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) service component, a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) service component, a PLA Navy (PLAN) service component, and a PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) service component. Within Eastern Theater Command these units these are the Nanjing headquarters, Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Facility, Eastern Theater Command Ground Forces, Eastern Theater Command Air Force, Eastern Fleet, and Base 61. It’s HQ is at Nanjing

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) component of Eastern Theater Command is composed of three major units: The 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Army.

71st Group Army headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, is composed of six combined-arms brigades and seven support brigades.

2nd Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

35th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

160th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

235th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

178th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

179th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

71st Army Aviation Brigade

71st Artillery Brigade

71st Air Defense Brigade

71st Special Operations Brigade

71st Service Support Brigade

72nd Group Army

The 72nd Group Army headquartered in Huzhou City, Zhejiang Province, consists of the below units.

10th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

5th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

124th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

85th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

90th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

72nd Army Aviation Brigade

72nd Artillery Brigade

72nd Air Defense Brigade

72nd Special Operations Brigade

72nd Service Support Brigade

The 73rd Group Army headquartered in Bantou, Jimei District, Xiamen City, of Fujian Province consists of the below units.

86th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

14th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

91st Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

145th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

3rd Light Combined-Arms Brigade

73rd Army Aviation Brigade

73rd Artillery Brigade

73nd Air Defense Brigade

73rd Special Operations Brigade

73rd Service Support Brigade

PLA Air Force

The Eastern Theater Command Air Force is

contd on page 19

The PLA’s Posture Against Taiwan

contd from page 16

composed of the following units.

8th Fighter Brigade

9th Fighter Brigade

25th Fighter Brigade

40th Fighter Brigade

41st Fighter Brigade

78th Fighter Brigade

83rd Fighter Brigade

85th Fighter Brigade

95th Fighter Brigade

10th Bomber Division

28th Bomber Regiment

29th Bomber Regiment

30th Bomber Regiment

76th Air Regiment

77th Air Regiment

93rd Regiment

Unidentified drone attack brigade

PLA Navy

Eastern Theater Command Navy (East Sea Fleet)

Ningbo Fleet Headquarters

Shanghai Naval Base

Xiangshan Naval Base

Zhoushan Naval Base

Fujian Naval Base

1st Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

2nd Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

Coastal Defense Brigade (Fujian)

13th Coastal Defense Division, (Jinjiang, Quanzhou)

31st Pontoon Bridge Brigade

PLA Naval Air Force

1st Air Division (Shanghai)

17th Air Regiment (Changzhou)

5th Independent Bomber Regiment (Changzhou)

4th Naval Aviation Brigade (Taizhou)

11th Air Regiment (Ningbo)

18th Air Regiment (JH-7)

PLA Rocket Force

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) component of Eastern Theater Command is Base 61 in Huangshan, Anhui, which has 611 to 618 Brigades armed as follows:

611 Brigade        DF-21A Chizhou

612 Brigade        DF-21/DF-21A Jingdezhen

613 Brigade        DF-15B Shangrao

614 Brigade        DF-11A/DF-17 Yong’an

615 Brigade        DF-11A Meizhou

616 Brigade        DF-15    Ganzhou

617 Brigade        DF-16    Jinhua

618 Brigade        Unknown            Unknown

The post The PLA’s Current Posture Against Taiwan appeared first on IMR.

8 Feb 2024: Taiwan Straits

On 8 Feb 2024, China commenced a series of low-level air and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These gradually increased in scope and scale. By early Mar 24, the PLAAF was sending almost 100 aircraft a day into the ADIZ (air defence identification zone) of Taiwan. The PLA Navy was regularly practising live fire drills in the waters around Taiwan. There were planted articles in the Chinese media saying these military exercises were to deter hotheads in Taiwan from making a Declaration of Independence. Solid intelligence had been received that this was likely. An announcement was made about a major amphibious exercise scheduled for mid or end-Apr that year. The aim of these exercises was to de-sensitise the Taiwanese defence forces as well as the Americans to high levels of military activity. In mid-Mar 24, a former presidential candidate made an impassioned speech condemning the president of Taiwan. He asked for the president’s impeachment and demanded that Taiwan declare Independence forthwith. He screamed, “China is trying to scare us with these endless war drills. This weak government is caving in. Enough is enough. ROC is a sovereign, democratic state. We declare our Independence from the hegemonistic Chinese regime now.”

Base 311 of the Strategic Support Forces Command dealing with Taiwan, went into overdrive. This statement was denounced in shrill terms on Chinese media and by the Chinese foreign minister himself. Chinese embassies in all major countries went into an overdrive with strident condemnation. The Chinese social media went berserk. The US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was concerned enough to call his Chinese counterpart. “What’s happening? “he asked.

“Oh, don’t be alarmed General, these are just the usual noises we have to make to keep hotheads in Taiwan in line,” he soothed. Meanwhile, editorials in Global Times warned, “Let Taiwan not trifle with the mainland. China is a very powerful country.”

8 Apr 2024. Off the Coast of Taiwan.

In early Apr 2024, the met and tide conditions were just right. President Xi gave his final nod. The aircraft carrier battle group led by Liaoning steamed off for exercises in the East China Sea. The newest Fujian CV-18 aircraft carrier with its battle group sailed off for north of Taiwan. It had 70 J-15 aircrafts with an AEW on board. The Shandong CV-17 aircraft carrier battle group sailed for the South China Sea, also for exercises. Large flotillas led by Rinhai-class cruisers started moving out for exercises to off the coast of Fujian for an amphibious landing drill. As a precaution, the US Navy started staging forward one of its aircraft carrier battle groups.

0600 hours, 8 Apr 2024. An intense barrage of DF-11, DF-15 and DF-16 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs 500-700 kms range), Navy anti-ship cruise missiles and YJ-12A supersonic cruise missiles, hit the presidential palace and Ministry of Defence, in Taipei. They also targeted three airfields, six radar stations and some major communication nodes. The president and senior officials were whisked away to safety in the nick of time. One General however, was wounded. At 0630 hours, a second wave of ballistic and cruise missiles hit the remaining air bases and radar stations and three major ammunition dumps and fuel storage tanks. A third wave of missiles struck airfields and radar stations again after an interval of 10 minutes.

Special Forces Operations. Meanwhile, six small teams of PLA Special Forces had landed on the coast of Taiwan via submarines and rubber dinghies well before dawn. They now raided the land-based cruise missile sites of the Taiwanese Navy that could target any invasion force. They succeeded in destroying four sites. The other teams were spotted by civilians and rounded up by the Taiwanese Army.

Air and Maritime Air Operations

0645 hrs, 8 Apr 2024. Some 200 fighter jets of the PLA Air Force crossed the median line and headed straight for Taiwan airfields from the Western direction. They were led by J-20 Stealth aircraft armed with BVR missiles. Just 10 minutes later, 60 aircraft took off from the aircraft carrier Fujian along with an AEW aircraft to help in the expected air-to-air combat with the Taiwan Air Force. Fierce air battles erupted as the dazed Taiwanese fighters rose up to challenge the invaders. The J-20s shot down eight F-16 and two Mirages. The F-16s downed one J-20 and three J-11s with their ARAAM missiles. The Chinese fighters from the Fujian did better, as all attention had been diverted towards the PLA Air Force fighters coming from the west. The Navy fighters bombed the target air bases. When they were returning, some brave Taiwanese F-16s and Mirages scrambled up to engage them. In the ensuing air battle five Mirages and two F–16 fighters were shot down for the loss of three J-15s.

0700 hours, 8 Apr 2024. President Xi Jinping went on TV and radio to broadcast a message. He said, “We had patiently and peacefully tried for re-unification of the motherland but to no avail. We recently received very disturbing intelligence that renegades on the island were trying to declare Independence. Such statements have now indeed been made in Taipei. We have still showed great restraint. Today, the Strategic Rocket Forces have made purely demonstrative strikes on Taiwan along with our PLA Air Force and Naval aviation. To seek reunification of the renegade island with the motherland, we are now announcing an air and maritime blockade of the island with immediate effect. We do not want any further escalation. This is purely an internal matter of China and no other country has any right to intervene. China is a peace loving country and would like to resolve it peacefully. We call upon authorities in Taiwan to commence negotiations at once for peaceful re-unification. That will resolve the crisis

0715 hours, 8 Apr 2024. Crisis Room, White House. Washington.

Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the President and NSA. The president was shaken. “I thought we had defused it. We now have three wars on our hands. Do we want the third?” he asked.

“Mr President, we will have to react. Doing nothing will seriously erode our credibility,” said the grim-faced Chairman JCS.

“Frankly General, if this escalates, how ready are we now for a two-front war?” asked the NSA.

“Ready or not, we have no choice. We simply can’t do nothing. We will have to react,” replied the Chairman JCS obdurately.

“Yes, but can we do it in a way that this doesn’t escalate out of control?” asked the President. The Chairman JCS fell silent. He thought for a bit. Then he said, “Mr President, you could demand that the Chinese immediately call off the blockage and pay compensation for the damage caused in their so called ‘demonstrative’ strike. Meanwhile, we have already told our submarines to stage forward. By tomorrow they should be able to sink one or two major capital ships of the Chinese, as a ‘demonstration’ to start with. One of our aircraft carrier battle groups is already steaming toward the area. I have ordered two more carrier battle groups to set sail immediately,” said the Chairman JCS.

“Sink one or two Chinese warships? Won’t that be a declaration of war, General? asked the NSA.

“Yeah and China is a f—g nuclear armed country. This would be a direct clash, not a proxy war, as in Ukraine,” added the President.

“Sir, we can always say it was not us but one of their own mines they had sown for the blockade. That will put them in a decision dilemma as our carrier battle groups race for Taiwan.”

“What about our carrier battle group already half way? Won’t that get into a mess with their Fujian aircraft carrier or Chinese submarines before your neat subterfuge about mines hitting their ships can confuse them?” asked the President.

The Chairman JCS pursed his lips, “Mr President, that was a deterrence action. The situation has changed drastically now. I can order it to slow down and let other CBGs catch up if you wish to avoid immediate escalation and gain time. That will make the situation a bit more predictable and we won’t blunder into a shooting war right away.”

All three took a deep breath. The President knitted his brows, “OK, do that, I can’t think of anything smarter for the time being,” he said, but he was not liking this whole thing one bit.

1503 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Off North Eastern Coast of Taiwan.

The carrier battle group headed by CV-18 aircarft carrier Fujian had two Rinhai-class cruisers, four Luyang-class destroyers and 6 Jinhai-class frigates. It was the main battle group enforcing the blockade. At 1503 hours on 9 Apr 24, a torpedo struck a Rinhai-class cruiser. There was a massive explosion. The warship caught fire. The ship listed to one side and then sank slowly. Meanwhile, Taiwan scrambled its F-16s and Mirages also to attack this Chinese armada enforcing the blockade. The Taiwan jets were picked both by shore-based J-2000 AWACS and the AEW then in the air from the Fujian. J-15 fighters from the carrier and then a whole host of J-20, J-10 and J-11 aircrafts from the shore-based airfields, swarmed up. A major air battle erupted. The BVRs from the J-20s managed to shoot down 10 Mirages and four F-16s. Three J-15s and two J-10s were shot down in this melee. One Mirage fighter fired an Exocet anti-ship missile and badly damaged a Jiangkai-class frigate of the Chinese Navy. Three American carrier battle groups were now steaming full speed towards Taiwan.

1700 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Joint Operations Room. Beijing.

All members of the CMC and the entire top hierarchy of the PLA were in attendance. The Commander PLA Airforce briefed first. “In yesterday’s air battles we had shot down a total of 18 F-16s and 7 Mirages for a loss one J-20, three J- 10s and three J-11s (ratio 25:7). Today, the Taiwanese Air Force tried to attack our blockading force. In the combined air battle, we have shot down 10 Mirages and 8 F-16s. The enemy managed to shoot down three J-15s and two J-10 fighters (ratio 18 : 5). Overall, Taiwan has lost 43 jet fighters to our 12,” he said.

Commander PLA Navy briefed next. “Comrades, the most important development today is that an American nuclear submarine, fired a torpedo and sank our Rinhai-class cruiser. This is a major loss and is an act of war on part of the Americans. The Taiwanese Air Force mounted a major attack on our Fujian carrier battle group enforcing the blockade but was driven off with huge losses. One of our guided missile Jiangkai-class frigates was, however, damaged. We are now at war with USA and I recommend that we immediately fire DF-21D salvos on his three advancing carrier battle groups and stop them before they join battle.”

“Just one second,” Gen Zhang Youxia interjected. “I just got a call from the US Chairman JCS to say that they have no submarines in that area and this seems an accident caused by our own mines laid for the blockade.”

The Commander of PLA Navy went red in the face. “That’s a blatant lie. We must hit back immediately.”

“How do you want to do that?” asked President Xi Jinping.

Admiral Miao, member CMC spoke up. “As the Commander PLAN has rightly said, we must immediately engage the American aircraft carrier battle groups with non-stop salvos of DF-21D anti-ship missiles, till we draw blood. Meantime, we must not lose time and immediately attack the American bases in Okinawa and Guam. Otherwise, US and Japanese fighters and bombers from there, could hit our blockading forces and our cities on the east coast. Shanghai would be a prime target. Comrade President, this is not the time to hesitate. Hit back before we are hit hard. We must pre-empt the Americans.”

President Xi Jinping’s face was taut with tension. He swallowed hard and then took a few sips of water from his glass. He turned to Gen Zhang Youxia. “Comrade Zhang?” he queried.

“The Admiral is right. But that means full scale war that could go right up even to the nuclear level. So let’s pause and think now. The fact that the Americans have disowned their submarine attack on our Rinhai cruiser, tells me they are not keen to escalate. Maybe, they are also looking for a way out. We have amply shaken them up for now. Should we de-escalate and begin negotiations for a peaceful merger of Taiwan now? Or will that be too soon? Problem is, a day later may simply be too late.”

The question hung unanswered in the tense air of the Joint Operations Room in Beijing. All anxious faces turned towards the President of China.

The post The Invasion Unfolds appeared first on IMR.

30 Jun 2023. White House. Washington.

Director CIA, William Burns asked for a most urgent meeting with President Joe Biden on 30 Jun 23. Director CIA pointed out that the Ukrainian counter-offensive had stalled badly and they had taken heavy losses.

“But you already told me that”, the president interjected. The Director CIA took a deep breath. “But what I’m about to tell you is far worse, Mr President. In fact, it is explosive.” The president looked at him in surprise.

“Mr President, we have received very hard intelligence that China has preponed its time line for attack on Taiwan. We understand that this will go in now in Apr 2024.”

“What? The president was genuinely alarmed. “How do we know this?”

The Director CIA pursed his lips. How much could he reveal now, he wondered to himself. “Mr President, firstly, these are the clear battle indications:-

• The Chinese are rapidly reducing their holdings of US treasury bonds and securities. They are trying to cut down dollar holdings of their forex reserves. They have drawn lessons from how we simply seized 300 billion dollars worth of Russian forex reserves.

• They are building up their gold reserves.

• They are building up stocks of fuel and food. In fact, even during Covid, they refused to touch their food reserve stocks.

• They are building up their blood banks for military hospitals.

• The PLA has been carrying out increasingly more realistic exercises. They have already practised enforcing a blockade and gaining air and maritime control over and around Taiwan. Next year, they are planning a full-fledged joint island landing campaign exercise which could easily be turned to actuals.”

“All of that still doesn’t give us an exact timeline” said the president impatiently.

“Exactly, Mr President. I took this time to come to you because we wanted to be very certain. But we now have solid human intelligence that the CMC has decided to attack in Apr 2024.”

“How solid?” asked the president.

“I would say rock solid, Mr President.” The President got up in agitation.

“I say we call an immediate meeting with the Chairman JCS and Secretary of State.”

“Mr President, can’t we delay that a bit. It would endanger those very highly-placed sources who have risked their necks to share this.”

“You have given me this explosive bit of intelligence and expect me to sit on it? Talking about a two-front war is one thing, fighting a two-front war is quite another. No, we can’t afford this. We need to head this off preferably. We need to de-escalate right away. Go on a charm offensive,” the president said in considerable agitation.

Consequent to this exchange, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, made two efforts to resume talks with Beijing. This was followed up by Secretary of Treasury Janet Yallen, who went to Beijing and virtually pleaded with the Chinese not to get rid of their US treasury bonds. The way she kow-towed in Beijing had to be seen. Finally, the 100-year old former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the author of the US–China reproachment in the 1970s, himself made a visit to Beijing to placate the Chinese leadership.

18 Aug 2023. On board the presidential plane of XI Jinping. Over Nanjing.

President Xi Jinping made a sudden unannounced visit to HQ Eastern Command Nanjing. On the return flight, Director of China’s State Security Bureau (SSB) boarded the plane. He asked for an absolutely one-on-one meeting with the president on the plane. He had some top-class intelligence to share. The president was surprised. Director SSB apologised, “I’m sorry Comrade President. What I have to tell you is so sensitive that I had to arrange this special flight, just in case your office was bugged.”

“What is it,” asked President Xi, nervously.

“Comrade President, we have been betrayed. Our plans to invade Taiwan have been leaked to the Americans.”

“Leaked? By whom?” the president said as his face clouded with anger.

“Comrade president, I don’t know how to say this but your defence minister and foreign minister, no less, have done this treachery.”

“Li Shang Fu and Quiqiang?” The President was amazed. Both were his proteges and he had promoted them out of turn.

“Are you certain?” he asked in shock.

“Sir, before we came to you, we checked and double-checked. This is the sad truth,” the Director SSB said. “It was Li Shang Fu who told the foreign minister and also shared this decision with the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Rocket Forces.”

“This Li Shang Fu!” the President got up from his seat in rage. He immediately sent for Gen Zhang, Vice Chief of CMC. “Put plans for Taiwan on hold immediately, till we clean up this stinking system,” he was almost spluttering in rage. The system was duly cleaned up. The department for Discipline Inspection went into overdrive. First the foreign minister and then the defence minister simply disappeared from public view. The foreign minister, had a torrid affair with a tele- journalist when he was ambassador in USA. He had even fathered a child with her. The defence minister was involved in huge corruption in defence deals and had been compromised. Terse announcements followed weeks of speculation. Both had been sacked.

30 Oct 2023. Top Secret Meeting CMC. Shenyang.

On 7 Oct 2023, the Hamas struck Israel viciously and achieved complete surprise. Some 1,200 Israeli citizens were killed, 3,700 wounded and 250 taken hostage. Israel mobilised 3,00,000 reservists and reacted in rage. They bombed Gaza to rubble and then launched a brutal ground invasion spearheaded by Merkava tanks. In eight weeks, over 11,000 Palestinians were killed and some 23,000 wounded. US despatched two carrier battle groups to the Middle East and rushed in arms and munitions to Israel. On 30 Oct, Xi Jinping called for another top-secret CMC meeting. This time it was held in Shenyang in northern China. The Director of SSB was in attendance to ensure there was no leakage.

The President began with the Director SSB, “Comrade have we managed to clean up our system?

“Comrade Xi, we have purged the system thoroughly. With your support, the traitors at the highest levels have been dealt with,” he said grimly.

Xi just nodded curtly. He turned to Gen Zhang Youxian. “Comrade Zhang, in view of the Israel-Hamas conflict, what is your assessment of the global situation? Does it create a good window of opportunity for our Taiwan contingency?”

Gen Zhang said, “Comrade President, the situation is excellent. America is bogged down now in two wars, not just one. They have sent in two carrier battle groups to the Middle East and a large number of their army reserves are locked up in Europe. Both conflicts will drag on for a long time. 12% of Israel’s population were orthodox Jews who are extreme and don’t want a two state solution. This will likely go up to 32%. Both these conflicts will drag on. I say it is now or never. The correlation of forces will never be as favourable.”

Xi turned to Gen Hi Wei Dong, “Comrade?” he said briefly.

Gen Hi cleared his throat and said, “I agree entirely with Gen Zhang. The Americans know that we know, they know. In this situation they will least expect us to go ahead with the plan. We now need a good deception plan. Let us mount a good charm offensive to soothe American nerves and go right ahead in Apr 2024. We won’t get a more favourable global situation.”

“So what will it be? A full-scale Amphibious invasion, seizing some middle-sized island or a Blockade?”

Gen Hi said promptly, “The Americans are expecting a full scale invasion. So let us start with a joint fire strike on key targets in Taiwan, follow it up with the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy establishing air and maritime superiority. Concurrently, we announce a maritime blockade and if necessary, enforce it for months, till the renegades in Taiwan cave in. Let us learn from Ukraine. Defence today is far more powerful that attack. So, we put in blockade and, thereby, put the onus of attack on the Americans. Let them attack first. It will be best for our information and cognitive warfare theme – “We showed restraint, it is the Americans who were the aggressors.” This will be far less risky option than full scale invasion.”

Adimiral Miao Hua said excitedly, “I do not agree. The Americans will use submarines to break the blockade. If we do not pre-emptively strike their bases in Guam and Okinawa, they will use them to bomb our fleet and our cities on the east coast. Let us not make the same mistake the Russians did at start of Ukraine war. Either we go full on or not at all. Let’s not go to war with mental brakes full on.”

Gen Hi countered, “The amphibious landing phase will be very risky. They will focus on destroying maximum number of our ships as we come in. With US and Taiwanese air power, cruise and anti-ship missiles and drones they could do very great damage. Besides, do we have the full lift capability for carrying four if not all six of our amphibious brigades to make at least two major beach-heads on the western coast of Taiwan?

Adm Miao interjected, “We have been practising with civilian roll–on roll–off (Ro- Ro) with floating causeways. We have 64 of these that have trained for such assaults. Besides we have the largest merchant marine in the world. Even USA cannot lift as many troops as we can.”

“But these huge ships will be sitting ducks for US and Taiwanese anti–ship and cruise missiles. We could win or lose all. Are we prepared to lose all? And don’t forget, even if you do land successfully, you still have to fight through a very mountainous country with lots of built up areas,” Gen Hi countered.

The palpable tension was showing on President Xi’s face. He took a sip of water.

“So, if we blockade Taiwan, how will the Americans react,” he asked.

Gen Zhang Youxia replied, “The US will react first with his nuclear submarines to torpedo our blockading ships. Then, he will surge forward two or three carrier battle groups, maybe even five.”

“Then what do we do?” asked the President.

Gen Zhang replied, “Comrade President, our guided missile Renhai-class cruisers and Luyang-class destroyers have good anti-submarine warfare and anti-air capabilities. Besides, we have our nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines. In addition, our entire PLA Air Force and Marine Aviation will be up in the air. To take care of US carrier battle groups, we will fire salvos of Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles of 2000 km range. The Americans can’t accept casualties. Even if they lose one or two carriers, their ardour to intervene will evaporate quickly.”

There was a total silence in the room. You could cut the air with a knife. President Xi licked his lips to moisten them. His mouth had gone dry with the tension.

“OK, let’s go for the blockade,” he said finally. “But, what will be our pretext?”

“Oh, that is easy, Comrade President. Firstly, presidential elections in Taiwan are on 13 Jan next year. We can always take advantage of any pro-Independence sentiments expressed in the presidential campaign. If that does not work, we have an opposition candidate in our pay – a good agent provocateur. Next year, in March, he will make an impassioned speech denouncing President of Taiwan, ask for her impeachment and demand full Independence now,” said the Director SSB.

President Xi nodded grimly, saying, “Well, if a pro-Independence candidate wins in January elections, we will have very real reason to go in. Comrades, we plan for a blockade next year in Apr 2024. It will give us much better escalation control and lower any risk of catastrophic failure. If the first phase of the blockade goes well, maybe we could still go for full-scale amphibious assault. Let us see how that goes. We have a golden opportunity with the US already bogged down on two fronts. We can’t afford to let this pass. Meanwhile, let’s go on a charm offensive for full scale deception. I’ll go for the summit meeting with President Biden in California as planned on 15 Nov and try to be as nice as possible.” He then concluded the meet.

The post Chinese Leadership Discusses Strategy appeared first on IMR.

16 Feb 2022. Meeting of Central Military Commission (CMC) on Taiwan Question. Beijing

Russia was fully poised to launch its invasion of Ukraine in Feb 22. President Putin had visited China just before the invasion and signed the “friendship without limits” agreement. Xi Jinping had assured Putin of full, tacit support. The Russian invasion could occur anytime now. On 16 Feb 2022, President Xi Jinping had convened a top-secret meeting of the CMC. Once Russia invaded Ukraine, it would create a crisis that would completely tie down the USA and the West. Would that present an ideal opportunity for China to invade Taiwan? Historically, China had exploited the opportunity provided by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, to teach India a lesson while the world was pre-occupied. Was there a similar opportunity coming up? He asked for frank views.

Gen Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of CMC, spoke first. He was one of the last few veterans of the 1979 China-Vietnam war of 1979 still serving, and Xi gave great respect to his views on all matters military. Zhang said, “Comrade President, the West anticipates an invasion of Taiwan earliest in the 2025-27 timeframe. As such, we certainly would achieve strategic surprise if we attack before that. The crucial point is how ready are we today for such a massive operation? My second point is – should we not wait to see how the Russian invasion of Ukraine proceeds? What are the American reactions? Will Russia overcome Ukraine in a 7-10 days’ timeframe, as is being anticipated? The crisis will then dissipate in a very short timeframe. What if Russia fails or gets bogged down? The crisis could then get extended. I say let us wait and watch. It will give us valuable lessons and pointers for our own operation.”

 Xi turned to Gen He Weidong, Second Vice Chairman of CMC. He had been former commander of China’s Eastern Theatre Command and was considered an expert on Taiwan. He said, “I tend to agree with Gen Zhang. It would be most useful and instructive to wait and watch and see how the Russian offensive fares. That will give us clear pointers to how the West will react and we can prepare accordingly.”

President Xi now turned to the CMC members.

Gen Li Shangfu, Defence Minister spoke up next, “Comrades, I don’t think our operations in Taiwan will be contingent upon success or failure of the Russian offensive in Ukraine. A major amphibious invasion of Taiwan will be a very serious decision. Once war in Ukraine distracts global attention, we will have to take a clear cut call and then go firm. A lot of preparations will have to commence now for a major amphibious invasion. The met conditions are ideal in April, May or August each year. You will have to decide, go or no-go and then stick to it firmly. Now is the time to act. We cannot debate forever.”

Gen Liu Zhenli, the Chief of Staff, was a bit irritated by this oblique criticism of Gen Zhang, from someone who had not heard a shot fired in anger. ”Gen Li Shangfu, have we decided it will be a full-fledged amphibious invasion? We all know what the options are:-

• Air and maritime blockade of Taiwan.

• Limited kinetic strikes with missiles and airpower.

• Capture of small or medium sized offshore island or

• Full scale amphibious invasion.

Have we decided which option we will adopt? A lot will depend upon that.” That led to animated discussion on the options. Finally, Chairman Xi said, “Returning to the main theme, it appears to me that it would help to adopt a wait and watch option for now. Let the Russian invasion be for us a trailer, which will uncover Western reactions and counter moves for us.”

20 Jul 2022. Second Meeting of CMC – Taiwan Question. Beijing

The Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced on 22 Feb 2022. It made good progress initially. The Russians reached the outskirts of Kiev and captured 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donbas. They created a land link to Crimea and captured all the ports on the Sea of Azov and Black Sea (less Odessa). However, thereafter they got bogged down. The West imposed severe economic sanctions to cripple the Russian economy. On 20 July, President Xi convened the second meeting of CMC. “Comrades, the Russian offensive in Ukraine seems to have bogged down badly. What has gone wrong? Gen Zhang, you are most combat experienced general here. Can you analyse this for us?

Gen Zhang Youxia said, “Strangely, the Russians opted for invasion “lite” that is so far removed from the standard Russian way of war with emphasis on using overwhelming force and mass. Here, the Russians attacked with just 1,50,000 men, whereas, the Ukrainians were 2,50,000 men to start with and then fully mobilised to get some 5,50,000 men in arms. If most of your fighting was to be in built-up areas, this was a terribly skewed force ratio to start with. The Russians had hoped that technological superiority would help them win, but now they are bogged down badly. Using too little force will just prolong this war. Ukraine has seen the gaps and have now started counter-attacking. The Russians forces are now tired and spread out too thin. I’m really surprised why the Russians are not mobilising. This is war and you can’t afford to fight half–heartedly.”

Lt Gen He Weidong spoke next. “What this war has so clearly demonstrated is that with recent advances in technology – especially satellites, AWACS and drones –  surprise is impossible to achieve. What is worse is, defence today has a very clear advantage over offense. With drones, loitering munitions, precision strike weapons like HIMARS, attacks are becoming prohibitively costly. The attacker has to pay a heavy price, as we have seen.”

Lt Gen Liu Zhenli, the Chief of Staff pitched in. “The Russian attack was overland. They had no major obstacles to cross. If they took such losses, we will have to pause and think. Our offensive will have to cross 80 miles of sea. An amphibious landing is the most complex and difficult operation to execute. It calls for total command of the sea and maritime domain. With the current state of technology, we will have to bear heavy losses and even accept risk of catastrophic failure. I think we may have to postpone our offensive plans and focus on increasing our military power in the meantime.”

Gen Zhang Shengmin, the powerful head of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, spoke next. “However, Russia has been very successful at defeating Western economic sanctions. The major lesson learnt is that we must immediately start reducing our investments in US securities and treasury bonds. We have to reduce our holding of dollars in US banks. Otherwise, like they simply seized 300 billion dollars worth of Russian forex reserves, they could do the same to us. We must strive for de-dollarization of global trade and invest more in gold reserves.”

Admiral Miao Hua, member of the CMC said, “Comrades, Americans have already sensed our hesitation and doubt. They are acting in such a triumphalist manner and trying to rub our noses in the dirt. They are being most reckless. They seem to think that they can take on Russia and China together and defeat us both. I do not think this hubris is justified.”

Chairman Xi Jinping was cautious and risk averse as usual. “Comrades, we have to keep in mind ground realities. Seeing the way Russia has become bogged down in Ukraine, this time does not at all seem opportune to proceed with our Taiwan contingency plans. We will have to pend them for now.”

26 Jul 2022. Emergency Meeting of CMC. Beijing

The American truculence towards China seemed to be rising by the day. They openly threatened China not to supply any weapons to Russia or help it evade the economic sanctions. Now, to further rub Chinese noses in the sand, the Americans announced that Congress Speaker Nancy Pilosi would be visiting Taiwan on 2-3 Aug 22 as part of Congress Member Delegation (CODEL). On 26 July, Xi Jinping summoned an emergency meeting of the CMC. He was really upset.

“Comrades, this is too much. The Americans are sending their Speaker, this Pilosi woman, to Taiwan, deliberately to spite us. We will have to work out how we react to this grave provocation.”

Admiral Miao Hua, spoke up instantly, “Comrade president, you will recall this is precisely what I had warned against in the last CMC meeting. The Americans have sensed our hesitation and caution and are trying now to push us around. This will become intolerable, if we let this pass.”

“So, what do we do?” asked the President.

Gen Hi Weidong, former Eastern Theatre Commander and Taiwan expert of the CMC, said, “Comrade president, we have worked out an effective response short of war. We will hold an exercise of imposing a simulated blockade of Taiwan. Concurrently, we will hold major air and naval exercises to practise seizing maritime and air control in the Strait. We will fire missiles over Taiwan. That will send a clear message.”

Gen Zhang Youxia added, “Simultaneously, let us cut off all military-to-military contacts with America, so no hot line works, and they worry.”

President Xi grunted, “Sounds good. Let’s do it.”

China fired a number of missiles with impact points all around the seas of Taiwan. Dangerously, four of them flew over Taiwan. The PLA Air force launched 250 sorties that crossed into Taiwan’s AIDZ (air defence identification zone) and 13 Chinese naval units sailed around Taiwan to its north, south east and south west, simulating a blockade. For a time, the Americans were worried. They even escorted Nancy Pilosi’s plane with F-16 fighters as it flew into Taiwan. But when nothing more happened, the Americans saw through the Chinese bluff. The response was more hysteria, exercises and nothing more.

The Ukrainians had started launching counter-attacks to take advantage of serious gaps in Russian defence lines. American satellites were picking up these gaps and vectoring the Ukrainian counter-attacks on the harried and over-stretched Russian contingent of forces in Ukraine. The Americans sent yet another delegation to Taiwan.

President Xi Jinping scowled darkly, “Threats don’t work now. We will have to do something real.”

15 Apr 2023. Top Secret CMC Meeting. Beijing

In Sep 2023, in a belated concession to common sense, the Russians finally mobilised 3,00,000 reservists. Gen Suvorvikin, used civilian construction companies to build a formidable, three-tiered Maginot line for the defence of all territories captured in Ukraine. Defence had proved to be the stronger form of war with current technology. Now, the Russians wanted the over-confident Ukrainians to get a taste of their own medicine. Accordingly, in a repeat of their strategy during the Kursk battle in World War II, the Russians deliberately decided to let the Ukrainians attack first, absorb and defeat these attacks and then go on the counter-offensive. The military situation in Ukraine was clearly shifting In Russia’s favour. That was the time that president Tsai Wen of Taiwan decided to visit the US (7 Apr 2023). President Xi Jinping was infuriated. There was no end to American provocations. Meanwhile, Russia was hitting Ukrainian cities with massive barrages of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed drones. The damage was substantive and highly visible on global TV screens.

On 30 Apr 23, President Xi Jinping summoned the fourth meeting of CMC on the Taiwan issue. This was a top secret meeting held under very tight security blanket in Beijing.

The president said, “Comrades I am now getting sick and tired of American insults and provocations. Our shows of force are not working at all. We will have to now use actual force like our Russian friends. And, by the way, the Russian military position is far stronger than was painted by American propaganda. They were largely winning this war on TV screens. Now the truth is emerging. The war situation is now finally turning in favour of the Russians. Let us emulate the Russian example and finally take the plunge.”

Gen Zhang Youxia cleared his throat, “Comrade President, I could not agree more with you. We have taken enough bullying from the Americans. America’s military industrial capacity has grown weak in their unipolar era. They have transferred huge stocks of ammunition to Ukraine and locked up their land forces reserves in Europe. This could seriously weaken their capability to react to any crisis over Taiwan. I think it is time to take another look at our decision to defer the Taiwan contingency operations. There are very strong reasons to prepone the time-line for Taiwan. Maybe if we strike in 2024 itself we will achieve full strategic surprise and take advantage of America’s preoccupation with Ukraine.”

Gen He Weidong fully endorsed the views of Gen Zhang. He said, “Comrades our military thinking and planning has been very realistic. We have invested so much in our Strategic Rocket Force and our drones. Both have proved their value in combat in Ukraine. It is time to press home this resource. Today, the PLA Navy is the biggest navy in the world and the PLA Air Force has over 1300 fourth generation aircraft. I say let us strike out boldly and resolutely.”

The Defence Minister Gen Li Shangfu was most enthusiastic. He said, “Comrades let us act in a decisive manner and do it finally. We need to set a firm time line cast in stone and then not dither. That will enable the PLA to prepare in a decisive manner. We must take the firm decision today and stick to it with resolve.”

“So, when do you propose we go in? 2024 or the next year?” asked the president. He was not liking the undertone of criticism in the Defence Minster’s statement.

“Comrade president, I think we should go firm on Apr 2024,” Gen Li Shangfu said emphatically.

There was total silence in the room. One could feel the tension. Finally, Xi Jinping spoke up, “Comrades let us do it. We go firm on Apr 2024. Please plan accordingly.”

The post Events Leading up to the Invasion appeared first on IMR.

Status Quo Continuation. The status quo might persist due to the potential risks and consequences associated with a military conflict. Economic interdependence, global diplomatic pressure, and the uncertainty of the outcome could act as deterrents.

Incremental Escalation. Possibility exists of a gradual increase in tensions or provocative actions, such as military exercises, to test international responses. This incremental approach could allow China to assert influence over Taiwan without a full-scale invasion.

Diplomatic Solution. There is little chance of a diplomatic resolution to the Taiwan issue. International mediation and negotiations could potentially address the concerns of both sides and prevent a military conflict. Diplomatic efforts would likely involve key stakeholders such as the United States and other regional powers.

Military Invasion. While significant risks are involved, shifts in China’s internal politics, nationalist sentiments, or perceived threats to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy could contribute to a more aggressive stance.

All of the conditions that China may consider for undertaking the military invasion of Taiwan are developing fast:

Strategic Calculations. China may consider the global strategic environment and assess whether geopolitical dynamics, regional power balances, or the perceived interests of major powers might provide an opportune moment for an invasion. Changes in the global balance of power could influence China’s calculations.

Internal Stability and Nationalism. While the internal political environment in China is not really stable, if the Chinese government faces domestic challenges, it might use nationalism as a unifying force.

Perceived Weakness of the International Community. China may assess the willingness and capacity of the international community, particularly the United States and its allies, to respond effectively to a military intervention. A perception of disunity, indecision, or reluctance among key players could potentially embolden China.

Economic and Technological Advancements. China’s economic and technological advancements have contributed to its military capabilities, impacting its confidence in successfully executing a military campaign. Advances in areas such as cyber capabilities, space technology, and naval power are important factors.

Information Warfare and Perception Management. China is in a position to employ information warfare and strategic communication to shape international perceptions, control the narrative, and justify its actions.

We at IMR consider that the time is opportune for China to undertake military action and seek the reunification of Taiwan, in that the conditions today can minimize opposition, maximize the chances of success, and reduce the potential risks.

The war in Ukraine and Gaza, couple with developments in the Middle East, are significant global distractions that have diverted the attention of major powers, particularly the United States and its allies, and reduced their capacity or willingness to respond promptly to a Taiwan crisis.

As of September 2023, nearly half of Taiwanese say they prefer independence (48.9%) for the island, while 26.9% seek a continuation of the status quo. 11.8% say they hope for future reunification.

China perceives U.S. power has declined and it is less committed to its security commitments in the region.

We have conjured up a scenario of the invasion of Taiwan in 2024 and how it unfolds is covered in this issue.

The post EDITORIAL – Conditions for the Invasion of Taiwan appeared first on IMR.

Key Takeaways

• Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.

• The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait ? referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan-and training for a Taiwan contingency-likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

• The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

• Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

• Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

• Internal unrest in Taiwan;

• Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

• Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

• Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

• Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign- capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture For A Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades-four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021-in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship-the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities – such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets- to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability To Deter Force

Key Takeaways

• The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.

• To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

 Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure with the 2021 defense budget at NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion)

Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022.

The post Developments In The Taiwan Strait appeared first on IMR.