China has been pursuing a strategy to acquire influence in small island nations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a massive infrastructure development project that aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through a network of roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure projects.

In the IOR, China has been investing in infrastructure projects, such as building ports and airports, in small island nations like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Pakistan. These investments have been met with both praise and criticism, with some seeing them as a way to boost economic development and connectivity, while others see them as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of these projects, as well as the potential for debt-trap diplomacy. Additionally, there are concerns that these projects may not serve the best interests of the host countries and could lead to increased dependence on China.

China has also been increasing its presence in the IOR through its naval and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

Influence in Sri Lanka

China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka through a variety of means. One key way has been through infrastructure development projects, particularly those associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These projects include the construction of ports, airports, and highways, and are aimed at boosting economic development and connectivity in Sri Lanka.

One of the most notable infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka is the development of the port of Hambantota, which China has invested in and now operates. This has been met with criticism from some, as the port has been seen as a debt trap for Sri Lanka, and has raised concerns about China’s increasing control over strategically important infrastructure in the country.

China has also been investing in other infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka such as the Colombo International Financial City, and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport.

Another way China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka is through trade and investment. China is one of Sri Lanka’s top trading partners and investors, which has helped to boost the small island nation’s economy.

China has also been increasing its presence in Sri Lanka through its military and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters around the island nation and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

China’s Debt Trap

There are concerns that China has trapped Sri Lanka in a debt trap through infrastructure development projects, and that this may give China strategic advantages in the IOR, which could threaten India’s security. The Sri Lankan government, however, denies these claims and China has denied the use of debt-trap diplomacy.

One example is the development of the port of Hambantota. In 2010, Sri Lanka agreed to a deal with China to develop the port, which included a loan from China for $361 million. However, the port failed to generate enough revenue to cover the loan payments and Sri Lanka was unable to repay the debt. In 2017, as a result, Sri Lanka was forced to lease the port to China for 99 years to repay the debt.

This has raised concerns that the port, which is located close to India’s southern coast, could be used for military purposes by China, giving it a strategic advantage in the IOR and potentially threatening India’s security.

Another example is the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which were built with Chinese loans but have also failed to generate enough revenue to repay the debt.

Critics argue that this is a pattern of “debt-trap diplomacy” by China, in which it provides loans for infrastructure projects to developing countries, and then, when those countries are unable to repay the debt, uses that as leverage to gain control over strategically important assets.

It is worth noting that Sri Lanka has denied that this is the case and that it has not fallen into a debt trap. Furthermore, China has denied using debt-trap diplomacy, stating that the projects were agreed upon mutually and that the loans were offered on commercial terms.

India’s concerns over Chinese influence

India has expressed concerns over China’s increasing influence in Sri Lanka, particularly in the areas of infrastructure development and military presence.

One of the main concerns is the Hambantota port, which India sees as a potential military threat as it is located close to India’s southern coast. India fears that China may use the port for military purposes.

India has also been concerned about the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, as it sees these projects as a way for China to gain greater economic and strategic control over Sri Lanka.

India is also worried about China’s growing military presence in Sri Lanka, as Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have been increasingly patrolling the waters around the island nation. This has raised concerns that China may be seeking to assert its military and economic power in the region.

India has responded to Chinese influence in Sri Lanka by increasing its own engagement with the island nation, through economic and development assistance, and by strengthening its own military presence in the IOR.

Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over the increasing frequency of Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka. These visits, which have occurred several times in recent years, are seen as a potential threat to India’s security and strategic interests in the IOR.

One concern is that these submarine visits could give China a military advantage in the region, as submarines are equipped with advanced stealth technology and can be used for a variety of purposes, including reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and power projection.

Another concern is that these visits could be part of a larger strategy by China to establish a foothold in the IOR.

India has also raised concerns about the potential for these submarine visits to be used for espionage or sabotage, as submarines are able to operate covertly and can access sensitive areas undetected.

In response to these concerns, India has also been building stronger ties with other countries in the region, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

Chinese spy ship visit to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over Chinese spy ship visits to Sri Lanka, as these ships are equipped with advanced surveillance technology and can be used for intelligence gathering and monitoring activities in the IOR.

India is worried that these visits could be used to gather intelligence on India’s naval movements and military capabilities, as well as on its economic and political activities in the region. The Indian government is also concerned that these visits could be used to interfere with its trade and energy security in the region.

India is also worried about the potential for these spy ships to support the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could be used to assert China’s military and strategic interests in the region.

Chinese military aid to Sri Lanka

China has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance. This aid has been provided to help Sri Lanka improve its defense capabilities and maintain internal security.

China has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

China’s military aid to Sri Lanka has been met with both praise and criticism. Some have welcomed it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others have criticized it as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of this aid, as well as the potential for it to be used to support human rights abuses by Sri Lankan government.

Indian military aid to Sri Lanka

India has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance, which has been motivated by its desire to promote stability in the region and to counterbalance the influence of other countries. The aid has been met with mixed reactions, with some seeing it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others view it as a way for India to exert greater influence in the region.

India has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security. Some of the prominent items of military aid have been:

Small arms and ammunition. India has provided small arms such as rifles and pistols, as well as ammunition to Sri Lanka to help improve its defense capabilities.

Artillery. India has provided artillery equipment, such as howitzers and mortars, to Sri Lanka to help improve its artillery capabilities.

Naval vessels. India has provided naval vessels, such as patrol boats and fast attack craft, to Sri Lanka to help improve its maritime security capabilities.

Radars and surveillance equipment. India has provided radars and other surveillance equipment to Sri Lanka to help improve its coastal and maritime surveillance capabilities.

Training and technical assistance. India has provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

India has also been concerned about the potential for terrorism and extremism in Sri Lanka, and has provided aid to help Sri Lanka combat these threats.

The post Sri Lanka in China’s Trap appeared first on IMR.

Rivalry in the Indian Ocean

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

The map alongside shows the major sea routes between East and West and the choke points on the Sea Lanes of Communications. India, with its unique peninsular shape jutting into the Indian Ocean makes it the biggest player in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Indian Ocean Region stands out for its economic potential and riches, as follows:

•   28 states (21 are members of the IOR Assn)

•   17.5% of global land area

•   35.0% of the world’s total population (2.6 bn of which 1.3 bn Indian)

•   16.8% of all oil reserves

•   27.9% of all natural gas reserves

•   35.5% of global iron production

•   17.8% of world gold production

•   28% of global fish capture

•   Major sea routes connecting East and West

•   50% of world’s sea-borne oil

•   23 of the world’s top 100 container ports

China seems to be on its way to building a global alliance system of its own.  China aspires to equal and eventually surpass America.

It is well known that China has increased strategic engagement and military exchanges with Russia, Pakistan, and Iran.

Next are South-east Asian nations including Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos as well as states further afield such as Egypt and Brazil.

However, China has a formal mutual defence treaty only with North Korea. Pakistan is like a client state. Compared to China, US alliances involve mutual defence clauses, extensive troop-basing agreements, and joint military capabilities.

Many friendly countries also fear China’s rise. There is a trust deficit. Except Russia, most have deepened ties with China primarily for economic reasons including New Zealand.

From Brown to Blue Waters

The establishment of a naval logistics facility in Djibouti in 2017 was justified by the Chinese government claiming that it will support peacekeeping operations, the protection of overseas citizens, anti-piracy operations, and protection of regional BRI-related investments.

The PLAN commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012, its second and third aircraft carriers are afloat. Since then it has deployed Type 55 guided-missile cruisers, Type 52C/D destroyers and Type 54A frigates for anti-piracy operations.

It is also expanding its fleet of replenishment and auxiliary vessels, including oilers, salvage and rescue ships, hospital ships, and transport vessels.

China has increased its military-related engagements with countries in the IOR. Its aggregate number of outbound naval port calls and international military exercises began rising dramatically in 2013.

Both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines have undertaken patrols in the Indian Ocean and made port calls at friendly countries.’

Chinese Navy Buildup

The Chinese have other priorities such as Taiwan and Japan before they can come to Indian Ocean. And if they try to deploy a carrier, India is capable enough to handle them.

Nevertheless, China has been constructing aircraft carriers at a fast pace with a projected plan to operate 10 carriers by 2050. At present their third and most advanced aircraft carrier is being built with the first one, Liaoning, being commissioned in 2012 and second, Shandong, in 2019.

Similarly, Currently, PLANSF operates a fleet of 66 submarines which include nuclear as well as conventional submarines. 7 Ballistic missiles submarines are in service (8 more are planned).

Future Prospects

So, Can China and India come to an understanding on the territorial disputes between them?

Will India and China accommodate each other’s spheres of interest and spheres of influence?

Finally, Can India and China get along in the future?

When it comes to territorial claims, the problem with China is that it conjures up the boundaries of the Qing Dynasty to show all of Tibet, parts of J&K and Arunachal Pradesh. But that is the Chinese version of history and Chinese maps.

However,  findings of a project report presented on 23 Jun 2022 at the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China conclude that Tibet was never a part of China before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded it in 1950. Maps from the Ming and Qing dynasties were presented to prove that Tibet was never part of a Chinese empire.

On the question of territorial disputes, the first requirement is to restore the status quo ante on April 2020. India has been consistently maintaining that peace and tranquillity along the LAC were key for the overall development of the bilateral ties.

India and China have held 15 rounds of military talks so far to resolve the eastern Ladakh row. As a result of the talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process last year on the north and south banks of the Pangong lake and in the Gogra area.

In September 2022, before the SCO summit in Samarkand on 16 September 2022, both sides agreed to further disengagement.

Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the LAC in the sensitive sector.

China seems to be exploring a new India strategy that rests on exhibiting its strength advantage (by normalizing border conflicts like the Galwan Valley clash) alongside tactical cooperation (by ensuring that there isn’t a complete breakdown in bilateral ties and keeping the door open for working together when it is in Chinese interest).

At the same time, escalation of tensions or a full-scale conflict is carefully averted so that the United States, whom China considers its principal adversary, does not get to reap a benefit from the situation.

It must be noted that since 1962, the Indian Army is deployed on the Chinese borders vary of any land grab by the Chinese as happened in Sumdorong in 1986. Despite 22 rounds of talks between the SRs no progress worth its name has been made in resolving the territorial disputes.

In the Western Sector, ie, Aksai Chin, the Chinese have made the Sinkiang highway and have planned another one. All creeping forward actions in Ladakh are to protect the new highway from Indian threats. They are unlikely to give up their claims in this area at all.

China is in possession of the Shaksgam Valley ceded illegally by Pakistan to China in 1963. This was also done at China’s request to give depth and for the security of the Karakoram highway.

In fact, the Chinese would like to destroy the road infrastructure and the landing strips made close to the LAC in Ladakh to deny it to Indian forces.

In Southern Ladakh, the Pangong Tso area provides avenues for the Chinese advance to Leh. For tactical reasons, the Chinese will never agree to give up their claims in that area.

In the Eastern Sector, China claims the whole of Arunachal province as Southern Tibet. They have never recognised the McMahon Line as the border between India and Tibet. But indications have been given that they could be amenable to a trade off based on settled populations. It remains to be seen what they mean by settled populations since when residents of Arunachal apply for visas to visit China they issue them on separate paper slips and not on their Indian passports claiming that residents of Arunachal are citizens of China.

Expanding the scope of China’s interests further, Beijing’s Western Development Strategy, its BRI or Two Oceans Strategy, that is, China’s own version of Indo-Pacific, aimed at connecting the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies under Chinese leadership and opening up a dedicated Indian Ocean exit for China, rests heavily on India.

India’s cooperation can secure Chinese gains of vital geopolitical and economic consequences, and its non-cooperation can pose the biggest hurdle to China’s South Asia strategy and advancement of its Indian Ocean footprints.

But to solicit this Indian cooperation, China is unwilling to pay a strategic cost or make any real tradeoff, such as accommodating India’s concerns or aspirations on the disputed border or South Asia or concerning its membership of international organizations.

Deep down, China recognizes India as a key threat that can intercept its energy lifelines, has the potential to replace it in global supply chains, and can compete with China in various international bodies, thereby challenging China’s ability to achieve an “overwhelming power advantage in Asia.”

China may well ask, “What if India manages to get these concessions from China, but still chooses to cooperate with the United States?”

India’s membership of the QUAD, with its political, military, and economic implications also makes China vary of India.

India will never approve of China’s BRI initiative since it has become clear that the real purpose is to help China gain access to strategic infrastructure and potential bases in India’s neighbourhood.

India’s Options

India would do well to come to terms with and perhaps leverage its increasing strategic value to China.

By taking a leaf out of China’s own playbook and consistently emphasizing India’s fundamental and growing importance in influencing Chinese strategic outcomes Indian policymakers can potentially extract greater concessions and conciliation.

The Tibetan govt-in-exile, the Dalai Lama’s succession, Taiwan, QUAD, BRI, its naval power projection in the South China Sea, its leadership role in global organisations, US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) (aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative in low and middle-income countries), India’s own growing bilateral relations and relevance with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Iran, SAARC countries and the clout offered by a growing economy and market size are levers that India can use against China.

India must also consider the following steps to dissuade China from precipitating problems for India: –

• Improvement in geopolitical, cultural. and military relationships with BIMSTEC and other Countries in IOR.

• Make tangible investments in the countries in IOR,  for strengthening their infrastructure and meet their military needs, to mitigate their overdependence on China.

• Appreciate the importance of India’s relationship with Russia and initiate measures to reassure Russia to fortify that relationship.

• Upgrade capabilities of its defence forces and Coastguard on priority.

Conclusion

My conclusion is that:

The on-going Sino-Indian border crisis has revealed that China has little respect for India’s long-standing efforts to freeze the status quo along the two countries’ disputed frontiers or for New Delhi’s cautious efforts to avoid the appearance of balancing against Beijing.

Rather, it has chosen to expand its control over new parts of the Himalayan borderlands through brazen actions that confront India with the difficult choice of either lumping its losses or escalating through force, if the negotiations presently under way yield meagre returns.

It has forced India to join the rest of Asia in figuring out how to deal with the newest turn in China’s salami-slicing tactics, which now distinctively mark its trajectory as a rising power.

Over the centuries China looked up to Buddhist India. A millennium later, India held Imperial China in great regard. Today, China does not see India as a fellow great power. From a position of strength China does not see the need to accommodate India.

The opposite applies to India. From a position of weakness India feels it cannot afford to accommodate China without loss of standing and strategic autonomy.

Compared to the enormous disparities in economic strength, India and China are not as far apart in military strength. Given the stopping power of the Himalaya and the maritime distances, the imbalance is less daunting.

There will be more Ladakhs. China is likely to be more aggressive on Arunachal Pradesh, which is strategically more important because it’s rich in resources.

China’s comprehensive national power is about seven times that of India. Until India substantially closes the power gap, there’s little prospect of a lasting rapprochement.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

The post Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? (Part 3) appeared first on IMR.

Admiral Kumar, who took over as chief of naval staff on November 30, was addressing his first press conference ahead of Navy Day observed on December 4.

“When there were tensions at the northern borders, our ships were out for mission-based deployment. All other ships were ready for any escalation in the situation,” the new navy chief said, adding, “we kept their (Chinese) ships under close surveillance, which we continue to do even now.”

He added, “Any of their ships coming on deployment, we keep a watch on them. We maintain a fairly good maritime domain awareness in our area of responsibility.”

Last year, amid heightened tensions in eastern Ladakh between India and China, the navy had deployed a large number of ships in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) from its eastern fleet.

Admiral Kumar further said the Chinese navy had been present in the Indian Ocean since 2008, and three to eight of their ships were deployed in the region at any given time.

He also said the Chinese navy had built 138 ships in the last 10 years and, in terms of naval assets, it had emerged as the largest navy globally. Talking about expansion plans of the Indian navy, Admiral Kumar said over a period of time, it had evolved from 33 ships to a 130-ship force.

Discounting any comparison to the growing Chinese navy, he said the Indian Navy was a potent and well-balanced force. “We don’t go into bean counting or develop capabilities in response to a particular country. We develop capability based on our maritime interests,” he said, adding, “therefore, our planning and preparedness is to ensure preservation of our maritime interests.”

The navy chief further said the Indo-Pacific region was of great importance to India. “We have about $200-billion trade passing through and have our diaspora staying in littorals in the region,” he said.

The post Navy Keeping Close Watch on Chinese Ships in Indian Ocean Region appeared first on IMR.