IS-K has claimed responsibility for a string of high-profile attacks in Pakistan, underscoring the growing threat it poses to the predominately Muslim nation of some 220 million people.

In the deadliest attack, an IS-K suicide bomber blew himself up inside a Shiite mosque in the northwestern city of Peshawar on March 4, killing at least 64 people and wounding scores of others. It was the most lethal attack in Pakistan in nearly four years.

Since it first emerged in 2015, Islamic State’s local affiliate in Afghanistan has focused its violent campaign within that country, fighting against Afghan and foreign forces as well as the Taliban, a rival militant group.

Experts believe IS-K militants have moved from their bases in Afghanistan and established cells in major Pakistani cities, RFE/RL reported.

The IS-K assaults have provoked fear and alarm in Pakistan, which has also witnessed a dramatic surge in attacks by the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a rival extremist group that has close ties with the Afghan Taliban.

IS-K has already carried out five attacks this year. On March 8, IS-K claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb that killed five members of the security forces and wounded 28 people others in southwestern Pakistan.

The growing attacks prompted Moazzam Jah Ansari, the police chief in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to declare IS-K a “bigger threat to peace and security in the province compared to the TTP”.

Many IS-K fighters are former members of the TTP, which was thrown into disarray and driven out of its bases in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal belt by a massive military offensive in 2014.

But the TTP soon found itself fighting turf wars with the Afghan Taliban. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the rivalry has intensified.

The Afghan militants have waged a nationwide hunt for IS-K members and even targeted the country’s small Salafi minority to curb alleged support for the group from among its members.

Underscoring the rivalry, the Afghan Taliban condemned IS-K’s deadly attack in Peshawar. The TTP, meanwhile, said that such attacks do not align with its jihad, or holy war, in Pakistan.

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Calls for Jihad against China have resurfaced in the Jihadist world. As Taliban strives to gain brownie points in the good books of the Chinese, the Islamic Khorasan (IS-K) and various jihadi affiliates have called for a jihad on China. These calls for jihad came to light, owing to the Chinese government`s treatment of the Uyghurs and Muslims in the Xingjian Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China.

This became even more apparent, when IS-K claimed responsibility for series of attacks, such as the one on a Shia Mosque in Kunduz province on October 8th and second on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on October 15th. Both attacks were publicly claimed by IS-K. In the wake of such attacks, IS-K called for “Jihad against China” and declared war on Taliban.

Apart from the growing rivalry between IS-K and Taliban over each other’s dominance in the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia, IS-K views Taliban as a traitor to Islam. IS-K believes the Taliban to be a Chinese appeaser rather than a fighter of Islam. This aggression against Taliban, also stems from Taliban`s supposed willingness to deport the Uyghurs from Afghanistan to China, upon the request of the latter. The IS-K supports the Uyghur fighters and also provides safe havens to them. It’s expected that Taliban`s courteousness to China will be received with disapproval of the jihadi affiliates in the region.

The most important factor derived from the recent IS-K orchestrated attacks is that the IS modus operandi has shifted. It has employed a hands-on stance against China compared to its previous not so provocative approach.

Following the Kunduz attack, ISK confirmed the mobilization of Uyghurs. This was the first time when the alliance between IS-K and Uyghurs was affirmed by IS-K on all media platforms. Previously, the Uyghurs were used as anonymous entities in both physical and propaganda warfare by the IS-K. The current proclamation by IS-K, has marked a foreseeable and an imminent threat towards China.

The Kunduz attack by itself pronounced IS-K’s intention at creating a wedge between China and the Taliban. The Kunduz attack came at a critical juncture, when China called for Taliban to sever its ties with Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). TIP has served as a close ally of Taliban and performed most activities under the guidance and approval of the Taliban. After the capture of Kabul, TIP lauded Taliban`s victory and called it “the restoration of Islamic Emirate”. While TIP may share strong allegiance towards Taliban, its resentment towards China cannot be dispelled. After exiting the war theatre, Taliban has been struggling with setting a working administrative, economic and political structure, while still focussing on how it wants to balance its narratives and beliefs socially. In order to be recognized as a legitimate Afghan state under the Taliban rule, the approval and nods of various surrounding nations is imperative for the Taliban.

Taliban now faces the challenge of appeasing nations like China, on whom it first declared war versus the loyalist jihadi groups, who fought beside them for years against nations like China. The displacements of the Chinese Muslim citizens, their killings and also the concentration camps for Uyghur for the so called “rehabilitation against jihadism” conducted by China, spells top priority on the list of most jihadists (who view themselves as saviours of Islam). So, any alliance with China is regarded by the jihadists as “bloodying” of one`s own hands with the blood of their people.

The possible re-emergence of TIP, therefore also becomes a security concern for China and especially when IS-K and AL Qaeda have declared Jihad on China.

In the light of such development, in the IS propaganda magazine “Voice of Hind”, IS-K has asked to avenge the deaths and treatments of all Muslims, who they believe have been murdered, tortured and sexually exploited by the Chinese. By doing so, they believe “to put the light of Islam in China”.

The Jihadist spider spins its web around China

For years the Islamic State has tried to use Afghanistan as a spring board to launch its own Jihad in the region. The current circumstances provide a perfect opportunity to monopolize and expand the jihad in the Indian subcontinent and in areas surrounding Afghanistan. By becoming the de-facto voice of Uyghurs, the ISK hopes to be the voice of Jihad in Central Asia.

Having a concurring view with the world in regards to the treatment meted out to the Chinese Muslims by Beijing, the IS-K has managed to strengthen its image as a saviour in some jihadist circles with apparent loss of face for China.

 In July 2014, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, named China “first” amongst the 20 listed countries to wage Jihad on and as a location to establish the caliphate. The focus was on the “extreme torture and degradation of Muslims in East Turkmenistan” (Xingjian province in China). This was followed with propaganda videos, audios and print materials in support of the Uyghurs by the Isis Central (parent body of IS).

In 2014, following Baghdadi’s call for jihad on China, Al Qaeda also declared war on China. In its magazine “Resurgence”, it critically outlined China`s Uyghur policies.

With the Jihadist world gaining momentum to wage Jihad on China, the pressure to recruit the locals and fighters from Central Asia became a priority. Since then, IS- Central and Islamic state Khorasan (IS-K) have both simultaneously tried to recruit Asian fighters from Central Asia. Over the years, several Chinese jihadists have joined the ranks of IS in Syria, while some were also invited to coalesce with IS. While the IS central were initially focused on negotiating with ETIM, the Huis who itched for mobilization of Hui insurgency in China also aligned with IS-K. IS used this opportunity to establish an ad-hoc group – The Gansu Hui Group.

The founder of the Gansu Hui, Abu Abdul Ali Turkistani travelled to Pakistan to form a new group, which was tasked with recruiting Chinese Muslims. The Gansu Hui group, though not recognized as the “component” IS group, was eventually acknowledged under ISK by the parent IS central. Despite being called Gansu Hui group; it doesn’t field a majority of Gansu members and compliments a large number of Uyghurs. The group since its conception has brokered many negotiations and talks with the Chinese Muslims, ETIM, IJU and IMU and also Al Qaeda. An intricate yet a complex web of a jihadist network was spun with in and around China. By 2014, the Afghan authorities had already identified IS as a threat, however no efforts were made by China to participate actively with the Anti-ISIS Afghan authorities or the US led coalition forces. This catered to more jihadi affiliates associating without joining or being consolidated within IS such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajikistan), Islamic Jihadi Union (IJU), Islamic Movement of Turkmenistan (IMT), East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement 9ETIM), Harkat Islami Tajikistan and Islamic Jihad Renaissance party of Tajikistan (IJRPT)

During this phase, many outfits such as IJRPT strengthened their ties with IS, while AQ was clearly side-lined. By 2016, IS-K had a major influence in the decision making of IJRPT and had doubled its funding to the outfit compared to IMU, who was also funding IJRPT. It was safe to assume, IJRPT functioned like an auxiliary branch for ISK.

In the following years, IMU also forged an alliance with IS. Prior to the official announcement made by its leader, Osman Ghazi in 2015, IMU had already started supporting IS-K while it continued to receive funding from Al Qaeda. It avoided most Taliban propagandas and even refused to openly raise the issue of disappearance of Mullah Omar (co-founder of Taliban) in 2011.

It is apparent, the declining credibility of Taliban can also be linked to the lack of confidence which most groups felt in regards to the Taliban`s Quetta Shura. The leader of the Quetta Shura was far from present and the orders received by the outfits came from the Peshawar Shura and Miran Miah Shura. This reduced the influence of the Quetta Shura, whose workings presented to be unreliable, eventually losing the jihadi faith in the workings of Taliban. As a result, most jihadi networks aligned themselves with the IS-K.

 Importantly, Taliban suggesting the ban of outfits like IMU also triggered many jihadist outfits, especially IS-K who shares strong alliance with IMU.

However as of 2017, IMU splintered off, the Osman Ghazi group was absorbed by IS-K, while the mainstream IMU partially merged with IS-K and there were also others who have remained pro Al Qaeda and served Al Qaeda interests. Despite the developments, it is reported that IS-K managed to increase in cadre as of August 15th following the US exit from Afghanistan. Many fighters from Taliban, owing to the reasons mentioned above and the soldiers from Afghan forces, who remained unemployed and left to be hunted by Taliban are seen seeking employment with IS-K. This provides a great threat.

A militarily trained soldier or an intelligence officer with an acumen for waging warfare in the Afghan topography, will provide a strong resistance against any security force combatting terrorism in this region.

Many Islamic nations, who are assumed to covertly fund and train fighters for jihad are also using their stature to keep the power play going against China, regardless of the repercussions on the Afghan soil.

Over the years, China has blamed Turkey for having done nothing to prevent the resupply of fighters to ISIS and for aiding the Chinese Uyghurs to transit into Syria and Iraq to train with the Al Qaeda, ISIS and other Jihadi Affiliates.

Beijing believes, Turkey has its links with the East Turkestan Movement (ETIM) and East Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association and for the terror attacks on the Chinese.

Jacob Zenn, a counter terrorism expert also pointed the Turkish Links to the Uyghur terrorism group called Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), which is known to run its network in Istanbul for recruitment of the Chinese Islamic fighters against China.

Despite all the allegations against Turkey, its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed a shocking attitude recently.

Erdogan is known to have a staunch stand against the mistreatment of Muslims and the rise of Islamophobia. In the view of the anti-China protesting Uighur community in Turkey, the Turkish President remained silent on the atrocities inflicted on the Uyghurs by China.

In the past, Erdogan gained fame for lambasting the west for its insensitivity to the Muslims, the current change of heart seemed to have baffled some. It appears, the Turkish president`s voice of reason like many remains selective when it affects the geopolitical and economic interests of Turkey, especially in the face of the Chinese fury. This incident has raised many questions in regards to Erdogan ‘s loyalty to the Muslim populous versus his boot licking attitude towards China.

It is evident, all central Asian groups have been drawn to ISIS`s commitment to Jihad. As long as AQ also continues to fund some outfits, the output would heavily be determined based on priority, while postponing the Jihad in Central Asia to some extent. But this may be debatable in recent future, given how fastidiously and quickly outfits like IS-K has been progressing with many donors queued to finance it. As for China, the jihadi spider has spared no effort in weaving its threads to against China.

It remains yet to be seen how China will actively participate in the “war on terror” or continue to fund and support nations like Pakistan who are the terror factories of such jihadist designs.

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Since the fall of the Ghani Government in Afghanistan and the exit of the US forces from the war theatre, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has exploited this opportunity to attempt its dominance, monopolize Jihad in the Indian subcontinent and turn its low intensity asymmetric warfare into a virtual blitzkrieg approach in the region.

Over the years, IS-K has managed to build an intricate network amongst the locals in the regions where is operates. It has been seen effectively providing support to the Muslim Chinese jihadists and was lately employing Afghan soldiers, intelligence and law enforcement officers, as also the ex-Taliban recruits. Given that the outfit’s aspirations are not only limited to Afghanistan but also to additional plans which may not be aligned with its parent ISIS Central but its own, we have been witnessing an influx of recruits from India joining the IS-K in Afghanistan.

Recruitment Drive in India

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has probed over 37 terror attack cases directly linked with the IS, out of which 31 have been charge-sheeted with 27 accused convicted.

It is clear that IS targets individuals through social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. The individuals, whose ideologies resonate with the outfit, are contacted by the international handlers and are brainwashed into spreading and uploading IS-related content, knowledge on improvised explosives device (IED) making and terror funding. Even translating the IS-related texts to the regional languages is promoted.

In August 2021, an IS recruiter from Bhatkal (Karnataka) was arrested for radicalizing the youth through the ISIS published magazine “Voice of Hind (VOH)”. The magazine was conceived through the collaboration of Al-Qitaal media centre (pro ISIS media outlet) and Junudul Khilafa Al Hind in February 2020. It has, in the past months, elaborately detailed the plans on how to wage Gazwa-e-Hind (part of Pakistan`s plan to bleed India with a thousand cuts), preparations for Jihad and also praised IS terrorists killed as martyrs. Since 2020, the magazine has gained traction by stirring fear or working as a call centre to tap educated and qualified individuals for its propaganda machine.

Earlier, in July 2021, three individuals were arrested from Anantnag, who had close links with the IS. They were responsible for dissemination of false propaganda against India and for radicalizing the youth in Kashmir on the lines propagated by VOH. A large number of digital devices were seized such as mobile phones, secure digital (SD) cards, etc. Fake identities were created and the individuals responsible used several virtual private networks (VPN) to avoid tracking.

Then, in August 2021, VOH edition displayed the newsclips of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) searches, while its editor made a defiant proclamation to increase the circulation “all the more” in the face of probes carried by all investigation agencies. It became evident when the Voice of Hind mentioned the raids in Anantnag, Jammu & Kashmir, that the right targets had been hit. Prior to this, it was assumed that the magazine was circulated from Afghanistan. After the raids it has been confirmed that it has its links in South Kashmir. It is also confirmed the content editors were being recruited from Maldives and Bangladesh.

Content Collation

it is confirmed that the material is “processed, edited and approved in Pakistan.” Region specific content lacing subnational ideologies imbibing Jihad are also part of the propaganda, a philosophy IS-K uses to participate in the local conflicts and to radicalize one actor against the other, if not the whole state. In order to promote the propaganda, area specific content and material is also being made available in Tamil, Bengali and Malayalam.

Campaign Against Idolatry

The IS propaganda thrives on the success of increased sub-nationalism in the Southern States in India and caters to the likes of all those in favour of the caliphate and an all-Muslim state, marginalizing all Hindus. In a recent issue published by VOH, an image of a decapitated Shiva with the ISIS black flag on its cover went viral in the social media. The VOH captioned it as “It is time to break the false Gods.”

The idol on the cover resembles the idol of Shiva statue in the Murudeshwara temple in Karnataka and has raised concerns. ISIS has been notorious for attacking and destroying various archaeological and heritage sites. The idea to erase history or existence of a culture has been a part of their jihadist plans or of what they view as their narrative of Jihad. For years, ISIS has made efforts to go through extreme selective theological lengths to define their narrative on iconoclastism (destruction of idols).

This could be discerned from one such narrative it spread after destruction of the Palmyra features in Syria. The ISIS magazine Dabiq carried a double spread of the images of the destroyed Palmyra site, while its French edition, Dar-al-Islam, quoted the text “Baal is a false divinity for which people sacrificed their children as indicated in the Old Testament. But, by the Grace of Allah, soldiers of the Caliphate destroyed it.” The entire act of destruction of the heritage sites was justified as combating “shirk” – the sin committed by practicing polytheism or worshipping idols other than Allah. ISIS views its approach as cleansing of Islam through the establishment of the caliphate, while returning to the roots of Islam (a view which is contested worldwide by the Muslim community). However, it does not eliminate the threat and the “built in brutality” it inflicts towards the non-Muslims. The recent attacks on the mosques in Kandahar, Kabul and Kunduz are a clear indication of the extremist attitude ISIS is maintaining towards its narratives, where it refuses to even identify with the beliefs of Shias or Muslims, who remain different from them. It prefers to eradicate them.

Given the pictures of decapitated Shiva statue have gone viral on social media platforms, this comes as no surprise but as confirms the ISIS aspirations in India. It is imperative to exercise caution in face of this looming and persistent threat. It is expected that IS-K, like its parent IS Central, will replicate a common strategy to wipe out other religious iconography and heritage sites. This can exacerbate communal tensions in India.

Hate-filled Newsletters

In December 2021, VOH has upped its antics and has published another inflammatory hate-filled propaganda in its Vol 23 issue – Hinduism, In the Mire of Delusion. The issue attacks Hinduism as the nullifier of Islam, calls to take back Babri Masjid, makes suggestions to kill and terrorize Hindus calling it the verdict of Allah “Jihad for the sake of Allah.”

The 15-page newsletter reiterates its hate for Hindus and killing of all Kuffars worldwide. An excerpt from the magazine reads “on the mainland of India, the sons of Ghaznavi and Ibn Qasim, who subjugated the subcontinent to the rule of Islam. Whose swords chopped the heads of the Somnaths, the idols in the temples trembled and fell face down at the sound of their footsteps.”

The issue furthers urges its readers to carry Dawah activities on social media as “internet is cheap,” to raise the flags of jihad on streets, spread the word by uploading through USBs and use necessary security means to remain untraceable online.

Amidst these nefarious suggestions, an entire page is dedicated to “O Muwahhid take back Babri Masjid from the Hindus.” The entire section directly attacks the Jews and the Hindus, stating the “unholy alliance” between the Jews and the Hindus must be attacked. It talks of genocide and brute force to be utilized against the non-Muslims. While the entire section uses derogatory slander for non-Muslims, it provokes its readers to fight against the sons of “Khilafah” by painting a sorry picture of the jihadists, a bait easily to be bitten by the ISIS sympathizers.

It is not hard to foresee a radicalized youth playing into the hands of such inflammatory narratives, which not only spread hate but dispels the notion of secularism or diversity of India and seeks to ignite communal hatred and riots.

George Orwell said “The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history”. Hence, it is not farfetched to think the ISIS modus operandi relies heavily on its propaganda warfare while executing its plans physically. While conventional war may or may not be on the horizon, the war of perception continues to be waged daily. The proof lies in the virulent content of this IS propaganda organ, VOH.

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Since the US evacuation, IS-K has claimed many attacks in Afghanistan. According to U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) an aggregate of 77 attacks were recorded, directly or indirectly claimed by or attributed to IS-K from January through April 2021. It was reported that ISIS was responsible for the deaths of at least 124 civilians during the first half of 2021, according to another UNAMA report. Some of the major attacks in first half of 2021 included:

• May 8th: A car bombing and two other explosions resulting in deaths of 85 people and casualties over 275 at Sayed ul Shuhada High School for girls. The targeted group was the Hazara, who were the attendees. According to U.S. intelligence, ISIS was responsible while Afghan President Ashraf Ghani held the Taliban responsible.

• June 8th: ISIS claimed another attack, ISK gunmen killed 11 men and injured 15 others at a camp near Shaikh Jalal village in northern Baghlan province.

• August 26th: ISIS carried out twin bombings outside Kabul airport that killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members as mentioned earlier.

• October 8th: IS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shia Mosque in Kunduz province, killing more than 72 civilians.

• October 15th: This was followed by another attack on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on Oct 15th. 63 civilians were killed and dozens were left injured during the Friday prayer.

The attacks on 8 and 15 October were claimed by IS-K and carefully planned, with the intention of garnering enough attention while targeting Shias in their homes and centres. ISK being a Sunni group has often reiterated their intention of killing the Shia and Hazara, whom they view as heretics. 10% of the population of Afghanistan is considered to be Shia Muslims, with many also a part of the Hazara community. It is no surprise the attack on Kandahar Mosque were meticulously planned and orchestrated to give a message to the Taliban, owing to the rivalry between the two groups. Kandahar is the second largest city in Afghanistan and also the spiritual birthplace of Taliban.

It is important to note that Taliban had always recognized the threat stemming from the IS-K towards the religious minorities and the ethnic groups in Afghanistan and has failed miserably at adequately preparing for the waves of terror it fore saw. A definite example can be recounted from August 2021 mentioned above. The Taliban officials had consulted with the elders of the Shia community and provided a protective escort on the occasion of Ashura, a Shia religious holiday. Despite the security, IS-K carried attacks erupted not only in the Taliban`s heart land, but the frequency of IS-K claimed attacks only grew since September 2021. Areas around Nangarhar and Kunar, where IS-K primary bases were established saw a flurry of attacks, including a complex attack on a military hospital in which a notable Taliban commander was killed.

Another looming threat emerges from the Afghan soldiers, spies and law enforcement officers who were trained by the US military but are being killed off in the witch hunt carried by Taliban. Left to die and with no means of survival, provides a great opportunity to be recruited by the IS-K.

ISK and Jihad in Khorasan

Jihadism in Khorasan can be attributed to many factors and origins. The Afghan jihad predominantly emerged as a retaliation of the Taliban emirate which was overthrown by a US-led operation in 2001. Since then, the Taliban strove to return to power, even if it required to coerce the previous Afghan governments to cede some of its power to the outfit. After 2001, Afghan jihad played a dominant role in the region of Khorasan, despite few outfits choosing to take part in it.

 After 2014, the influence of the same Afghan jihad became undermined, as many factions were seen disputing and breaking away. Another significant “cause celebre” of Jihadism to further decline can be attributed to the Syrian war since 2011.

However, by the end of 2014, several groups started linking themselves to ISIS. Initially these groups identified themselves as separate identities. This notion soon changed in 2015, when the IS Central’s Chief spokesperson, Abu Muhammed Adnani announced the establishment of Wilayat Khorasan. After the establishment of the Wilayat, the IS-K teams started referring to themselves as Daesh or Daesh Khorasan or Khilafat Islami.

In the south of Afghanistan, a former Taliban leader and a Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mullah Abdul Raoof Khadim, swore his allegiance to ISIS. In the east, Hafiz Sayed Khan raised the black flag of ISIS. Since then, the group faced several heavy military attacks from the Afghan and coalition forces. This led to the death and capture of over “13,000 of its fighters, including five consecutive emirs, or top leaders”.

However, the group has been quite resilient and successful in substituting and replacing its manpower, while profiting in the opportunity of Taliban exiting the war theatre, since August, to expand its outreach. According to several IS-K interviews, IS-K currently operates in areas such as eastern and northern Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. It has already started to absorb many Taliban fighters; Baluchi insurgents and members of various outfits aggrieved with the Pakistani government or share the same ideology as itself or those who choose to seek profits or employment from the illicit dealings found in the region. Interestingly it is reported that IS-K has also succeeded in fostering relationships with outfits which previously worked with the Taliban, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and various others to name a few.

It is imperative to understand that part of the IS-K strategy was to use Afghanistan as a “spring board” for itself in the Khorasan region. Khorasan is a strategically located region with access to Central Asia and at the same time also one of the weakest regions in the area due to the least territorial control from its competitors. From the recent attacks in Kabul and Kunduz, it is becoming apparent that like its parent organization IS-Central, it has started implementing the “Blitzkreig” approach over the insurgent approach, which is to “concentrate force to achieve local superiority” and fastidiously destroy the enemies.

IS-K`s Aims

• Prominence in Khorasan: One of the immediate goals of IS-K was to embed itself in pockets of Khorasan. In the initial stage, at its most vulnerable, it failed at coexisting in the region as it was heavily laden with TTP, Taliban, the Afghan and the Pakistani groups. Their small numbers made it less viable to gain traction and prove their visibility to their recruits and donors who were seeking new experiments to fund. The IS-K propaganda was further subdued and their efforts at raising local taxes was banned, perhaps to avoid friction with Taliban and TTP. Given such a scenario, the outfit for a long time refrained from challenging any military force in the past.

• Shopping for Funding: In order to gain funding, the idea was to sell a jihadist cause, which would set well with the donors and present the outfit funds for its existence. In the past, the group promised radical Chinese Muslim groups that it planned to commence its operations in China. This was later linked to the funds which IS-K acquired from the private donors in the Arab Gulf for the very same project pitched to the Chinese Muslim groups. The familiarity with the Huis in Syria and Iraq prompted the IS central to conceive this project while viewing Han China as the new arena for waging jihad. The IS Central too, managed to build close relations with the Uyghurs of ETIM over the years and has succeeded in attracting many recruits from the Chinese Muslim communities. Even though China does not fall under IS-K’s territorial responsibility, the group continues to nurture the Chinese Muslims in Khorasan while utilizing the funds collected on behest of the community. The relation with the Huis is also strongly maintained despite the amicable relation IS-K shares with the Turkestan Islamic Party. It is evident, IS has been keen on Huis and intends to aid in the formation of a jihadist Hui movement in China.

• Retaliating for Syria: Retaliating against Iran gained an important premise compared to targeting the western targets for their intervention in Iraq and Syria. This philosophy applied to any affiliate of Iran. Russian assets in Afghanistan and Central Asia also served as targets and this provided IS-K to be useful to IS Central.

• Establishing safe havens for its fighters and forming an army: Setting up safe havens for its group was clearly imperative for ISK, in order to host its leaders from the central if required and for sustaining its existence from the growing repression it was to face from Taliban. In 2016, the ISK chiefs stated the plans to establish a primary safe haven in Kunar. In order to set their plan in motion the ISK fighters had tried to build a close rapport with the local communities and chiefs to use the area as a safe operating ground. IS-K, on the same line with its parent organization has constantly intended to develop facilities for organizing a centralized hybrid military force for quick deployment of well-trained fighters to out manoeuvre adversaries and disperse them when required.

• Garnering and mobilizing local support to dominate Jihad in Khorasan: Initially ISK had little to no support from the local communities except from specific jihadist groups and clerical networks. In order to increase its outreach, ISIS started par taking in local disputes, reinvigorating conflicts especially the sectarian ones, while attempting to lead any conflict which would help in overthrowing the previous Kabul government or any central Asian regimes.

It is clear that ISK intends to eventually over throw the Taliban regime and substitute it with its rule, as it has intended in Iraq and Syria. Its aspirations largely lay with the strategy laid by IS central. It has been effectively absorbing fighters from Taliban and various insurgent if not jihadist groups. This is also the primary reason why Tehran was not supportive of Kabul Taliban reconciliation, fearing it would only strengthen ISK. The IS-K strategy has remained coherent throughout the years, it aims at the maximizing pressure in areas where the resistance is weakest and polarizing violence IS-K’s aims to some extent have resonated with its parent organization the IS-Central, but have often seen fluctuating as well. Regardless of being called a franchise of the IS-Central, IS-K has on various occasions strategically established safe havens for its leaders and command centres, proving that it was more than a replicated clone of the IS- Central in form of anti-Shia campaign. Its efforts at Re-launching and expanding sectarian conflicts in Khorasan is a well-known IS-K strategy, which it continues to implement to create a social constituency for itself among a Sunni population and to implant itself in the political crevices of countries such as Iran, Pakistan and India as well. It poses a very high profile threat to India and will have to be watched closely.

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With the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (IS) group has threatened to usher in another violent phase. There has been a sudden uptick in IS attacks since the Taliban takeover on 15 August.

Two deadly bombings have hit Kabul. One was outside the airport at the height of evacuations before the U.S. exit that killed 169 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members. Another deadly bombing, on 8 October, in the northern province of Kunduz killed 46 worshippers inside a mosque frequented by Shiites. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Afghanistan-based arm of the terrorist organisation, has claimed responsibility. Earlier, on October 3, a bomb targeted a memorial service being held for the mother of the Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, in a Kabul mosque, killing five. All these attacks suggest that the IS-K’s ability to strike has grown. Other deadly IS attacks have struck in the capital, Kabul, and provinces to the east and north, while smaller-scale attacks target Taliban fighters almost daily.

Now that the US and the international presence is mostly gone, the IS was going after the state, which is now the Taliban.

Hatred Towards Shiias

The IS’s doctrinal hatred towards the Shias is known. In Iraq and Syria, it systematically targeted Shias, who it calls “rejectionists” of faith, and used such attacks to mobilise the support of Sunni hardliners and trigger sectarian conflicts.

Long Rivalry

Both the Taliban and IS advocate rule by their radical interpretations of Islamic law. But there are key ideological differences that fuel their hatred of each other. The Taliban say they are creating an Islamic state in Afghanistan, within the borders of that country. The Taliban downplay IS’s capabilities and dismiss them as a fringe group with no mainstream appeal.
IS says it is the Islamic State, a global caliphate that it insists all Muslims must support. It is contemptuous of the Taliban’s nationalist goals and doesn’t recognize them as a pure Islamic movement. For similar reasons, IS has long been a staunch enemy of al-Qaida.

Both the Taliban and IS advocate particularly harsh versions of Islamic Shariah law and have used tactics like suicide bombers. But when it ruled territory in Syria and Iraq, IS was even more brutal and carried out more horrific punishments than the Taliban did.

IS emerged in Afghanistan in 2015 with the name Islamic State in Khorasan Province, at a time when the group was at its peak, controlling much of Iraq and Syria. It drew members from Afghan and Pakistani militants, including a wave of Taliban defectors.

The group initially found support among Afghanistan’s small Salafist movement in eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. The Salafis had largely been marginalized by the Taliban, and by connecting with the rising IS, the Salafist movement found a means to establish military strength.
But IS’s brutal ways have since led some Salafi clerics to voice opposition. In the years after its emergence, IS was badly hurt by military setbacks at the hands of the Taliban and by U.S. airstrikes, before surging again the past year.

End Game

The IS’s immediate aim is to destabilize the Taliban and shatter the group’s image as a guardian of security.
For now, its strategy is slow and methodical. It is reaching out to tribes and other groups to recruit from their ranks while stamping out dissent among moderate Salafis and carrying out jailbreaks, assassinations, and attacks on Taliban personnel.
The Taliban are also strong and can uproot IS on their own, even without the backup of U.S. airstrikes that nearly eliminated IS. The IS — unlike the Taliban during their insurgency — do not have access to safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.
The Taliban have rejected cooperating with the U.S. against IS.

IS’s future trajectory in Afghanistan will depend largely on its ability to recruit more members and win over large segments of the population. Since their inception, they have been poaching Taliban members.

Comments

While both groups have used tactics of terror, the IS-K is a pan-Islamist jihadist outfit, while the Taliban are largely a Pashtun nationalist militancy. The rise of the IS-K poses multiple challenges to the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan, which many in Afghanistan and Pakistan saw as a solution to the country’s security woes. On one side, their promise to provide security looks hollow. Afghanistan’s cities under the Taliban remain as insecure as they were under the previous Islamic Republic. On the other hand, even if the Taliban, under pressure from Afghanistan’s donors and the public, want to make some concessions on the many restrictions already imposed, they would come under pressure from the more extremist IS-K, which says the Taliban are not Islamic enough. For the people of Afghanistan, who are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, the war that started 40 years ago continues, no matter who is in power in Kabul.

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