Pakistan military’s 2018 gamble to install the former Pakistan cricketer-turned politician, Imran Khan, flopped with the ousting of the former prime minister and his government in 2022. Along with the arrests of Imran Khan, his wife and several of his party workers, many serving military officers of various cadres were also interrogated and arrested on numerous charges.

Recently, on 12 August 2024, the former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed was arrested by the Pakistan military. The Supreme Court ordered the arrest of the former chief. He was charged with misconduct, corruption and for abetting in political interference. Since then, court martial proceedings have been launched against him.

“Complying with the orders of Supreme Court of Pakistan . . . the process of Field General Court Martial has been initiated and Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) has been taken into military custody,” the Pakistan army stated. Since the conception of Pakistan, its military has been infamous for having influence over the country’s politics.

According to various reports presented against Hameed, there were allegations against him for allegedly harassing the owner of Islamabad’s ‘Top City’ housing scheme and society. Besides him, three other retired officers have been detained by the military in relation to Hameed’s case. But an important element to factor in, amidst all the said charges, is the undeniable close affiliation the former spy master has shared with the ousted prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan.

Khan has dismissed the charges against him as “frivolous and politically motivated,” even though he was forced to serve time in a jail for a year.

However, the appellate courts have since reversed, invalidated or suspended the charged convictions due to the lack of substantial evidence. But, the authorities in Islamabad seemed determine to file new cases against Khan in order to keep him in jail. Hence, the determination of the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen Asim Munir to contain the political turbulence and to nail Imran Khan’s cronies should be no surprise with the arrest of his “top dog” spy master, Faiz Hameed.

The Former ISI Spy Chief, PMLN and the State

Lt Gen Faiz Hameed served as the 24th Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) from 2019 to 2021. He is known as the “India baiter” and Imran Khan’s affiliate.

It was reported that post-Taliban’s take over of Afghanistan in 2021, the chief had paid a visit to Kabul. The visits of the DG ISI had been clandestine in the past. However, it was not the case with his trip to Kabul. Several images of Lt Gen Faiz and Pakistan’s Ambassador Mansoor Ali Khan, having tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel, surfaced on the social media. The purpose of Hameed’s visit was to seek “peace and stability” in Afghanistan and to get the first-hand account of the ground situation in Afghanistan. Despite the statements made by the former DG ISI, it was confirmed that the objective of his visit was to meet with the top Afghan leadership and certain foreign envoys in Kabul. Even though no official details were divulged at the time, it later came to light that the chief had brokered peace between the Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Baradar network.

The main promoter of Taliban had been Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, who was also in favour of the Haqqani Network when the fight to take over Kabul erupted between the warring factions. The ISI has been reported in the past to have utilized the Haqqani Network to orchestrate attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul as well as to sway the Sunni Pashtun force in a direction inclined to Pakistan. Additionally, under Hameed’s command’s, reports of the induction of Pakistan Army regulars in the anti-resistance operations against the Resistance Force, led by Commander Amrullah Saleh in Panjshir Valley, were conducted.

It was inferred, that Pakistan’s consistent aid to Taliban rose from their desire for a strategic depth in Afghanistan, while nurturing an outfit such as Taliban to act as ISI’s puppet to curb the possible terror threats, which it incurs from Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, the tables have turned since then. The disillusionment of the Pakistani government of controlling the Afghan Taliban shattered with Taliban’s lackadaisical and undetermined effort in fostering a peace deal with TTP and Pakistan. The TTP later called off the ceasefire with Pakistan in 2022. The negotiations were carried out between a delegation led by Faiz Hameed and TTP leaders in Khost, Afghanistan. Under the negotiations, corps commanders of TTP, Muhammed Khan and Muslim Khan were released. Since then, TTP has ravaged Pakistan with their persistent attacks.

Besides the TTP threat, Pakistan was also hopeful with regards to the Pakistan-Afghan border areas, which even though are demarcated by the Durand Line, still remain as areas of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans view the border as an artificial entity and do not recognize the Durand line agreement, which Pakistan inherited post-1947. Afghanistan has claimed certain areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a part of their territory and views Pakistan as the illegal occupiers of their land. Hence, there have been several border skirmishes between the security forces of both nations. Pakistan’s relations with China and the presence of Chinese immigrants in the area have also served as reason for mistrust amongst the local habitants in these regions, who view the Chinese presence as a form of planned displacement of their communities to accommodate the Chinese, with exploitation of their land. Several attacks were orchestrated on Chinese citizens, who were assigned to Sino-Pakistan projects by various insurgents and militant outfits. Later on, at the behest of China, Pakistan decided to carry out a large scale military operation – Azm-i-Istehkam – to neutralize the threats especially around the Durand Line. This has resulted in rallies and ‘jirgas’ (tribal councils) being held in many cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) due to the fear of mass displacement.

Additionally, the refoulement of Afghans back to their homeland from Pakistan has also sparked further tensions between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan government is of the view that many Afghan refugees may be sleeper cells or individuals involved in organized crimes. The inhibitions arising from the growing TTP threat and other offshoots remain to be a strong reason for Pakistan’s preventive course of action. Pakistan has blamed Kabul for being lenient in their approach towards the TTP and has blatantly made accusations of Taliban allowing the anti-Pakistan elements to carry out operations from Afghanistan, while also providing safe havens to them.

Furthermore, with Pakistan struggling economically, the decision for refoulement of undocumented Afghans has been considered prudent and imperative by Islamabad.

With the evolving political developments, dotted with several security and political threats erupting from Imran Khan’s PTI party opposing and clashing with the newly installed prime minister Shehbaaz Shariff’s PML-N, it was expected of the COAS Gen Aseem Munir to employ pre-emptive measures to wrest control over the state of affairs with the favoured political government installed by the military in power.

As a handpicked candidate of Imran Khan, Fiaz Hameed has been acknowledged for his involvement in Khan’s PTI party rioting across Pakistan on 9 May 9, 2023. This move was enough to upset Islamabad, given that PTI workers barged into and torched the official residence of the IV Corps commander in Lahore and also attempted to force themselves into the army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Further reports of Hameed providing counsel to Khan after taking premature retirement from the army, also suggested of his abetment in the May 9 riots in 2023, which has been regarded as an anarchy against the military institution.

Additionally, Nawaz Sharif also asserted that Gen Hameed had colluded with few generals and individuals from higher judiciary to impeach him from power in 2017.

In 2017, Hameed became infamous for orchestrating anti-blasphemy protests against the PML-N government by the far-Right group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.

“The arrest of former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed sends a clear signal to those still on the fence – there will be no compromise, no exceptions. Fall in line or face the consequences. The writing is on the wall,” stated Baqir Sajjad Syed, the national security correspondent of the influential Dawn newspaper.

Apart from various charges against Hameed, his personal swipe at the COAS Gen Munir for being a Shia in hopes of dismantling the Saudi-Pakistan relations and expecting the response to remove Munir or halt his appointment also, may have fanned the growing conflagration.

The Military Institution Always Wins in Pakistan After years of impunity, the reign of the former chief ended with the military usurping back its socio-economic and political control. The COAS, Gen Munir seems to have solidified his position with the removal of the puppet government set by the former COAS Gen Javed Qamar Bajwa. He has also carried out a witch hunt against the associates and close affiliates of Imran Khan. The arrest of Gen Bajwa’s former ISI spymaster also has been made into an example for those who would conspire against the current military regime. It would be no surprise if the security of the former COAS may also be under threat.

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Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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According to reports from Kabul, the Chaman border crossing was evacuated, and medical emergency declared as more than 15 civilians were injured in heavy machine gun and mortar firing by both TTP fighters and Afghanistan Taliban. The clashes erupted after Pakistan Army ostensibly tried to repair the border fence forcing both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban to retaliate. As many as seven Pak nationals were killed in cross-border shelling by the Taliban earlier in December.

With series of clashes erupting all along the Af-Pak border, the Taliban experiment is proving to be costly for the Pakistan government in Islamabad and its deep state in adjoining Rawalpindi. While the Taliban government occupied Kabul on August 15, 2021, with the help of then Pakistan ISI chief Gen Faiz Hameed, a protégé of then PM Imran Khan Niazi, the ultra-conservative Sunni Pashtun government has turned against its once upon a time handlers and started targeting the Republic.

The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan has taken Islamic radicalization in Pakistan to a different level with a large section of public wanting that Islamic Republic should be turned into Emirate with Sharia law akin to Afghanistan. Although Pakistani deep state thought that Taliban would push the TTP to compromise with Rawalpindi and lead to indefinite ceasefire, the radical extremist group broke the ceasefire on November 28 and asked its cadre to carry out attack in the entire Republic.

Even though then Pakistan PM Imran Khan Niazi praised the Taliban occupation of Kabul by calling it “throwing off their shackles of slavery” under two decades of US occupation, the Sunni Pashtun force is today totally at odds with Islamabad as it refuses to recognize the Durand Line as the border. The Taliban have made it amply clear that it does not recognize the British drawn Durand Line as it divides the Pashtun community and hence they want Pashtun dominated areas on Af-Pak border to be under control of Kabul.

With the Taliban government refusing to act as proxy of Rawalpindi, Pakistan is still to recognize the Emirate of Afghanistan despite Islamabad being the chief promoter of the Sunni group for the past three decades. Instead, it is using terror groups like so-called Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) and other terror groups to destabilize the Taliban government in Kabul. It is the same extremist forces which are also trying to spread instability and radicalization in the Central Asian Republics much to the chagrin of Russia.

While India has reached out to Taliban as part of its historic commitment to help the Afghan people notwithstanding the political regime in power, the strategic depth game of Pakistan against India has gone awry with the Sunni Pashtun not interested in fighting proxy wars for Rawalpindi headquarters. With Pakistan’s western borders heating up due to regular clashes with TTP and Afghan Taliban, Islamabad’s plan has gone all topsy-turvy.

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Intriguingly, each one of these allegations could be true. Imran has been on a course of confrontation with the army, blaming it — and the US — for his ouster. The attack could be the handiwork of religious fanatics, too — the would-be assassin has said that he wanted to kill Imran because he was ‘misleading’ people and the loudspeakers of his cavalcade were interfering with the aazan. And though it would be uncharitable to believe that it was a staged attack, there are many who believe this to be true.

The attack on Imran took place exactly a week after two Generals, representing the army and the ISI, declared that the army ‘as an institution has decided that it would stay out of politics.’ This claim is being treated with scepticism, and there are reports of there being pro-Imran and anti-Imran factions in the army. Indeed, it is believed that Imran could not have been so critical of the army if he did not have the backing of a few powerful Generals. India, ‘closely monitoring the situation’, would hope for democracy to prevail in Pakistan because military rule has been disastrous for that country, and detrimental to peace in the neighbourhood.

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The use of Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPG) in the Mohali terror attack, on 9 May, and the smuggling in of US military hardware abandoned in Afghanistan into Kashmir expands the horizon of Pakistan’s proxy war against India.

The arrest of gangster Lawrence Bishnoi, the masterminded behind the May 29 murder of Punjabi rapper Sidhu Moosewala and his gang members unravelled many conspiracies Bishnoi is partly responsible for a flurry of activity that has begun on the diplomatic and security front.

The unassuming Bishnoi heads a transnational network of criminals that spreads from Moga in Punjab to safe-houses in Pakistan, all the way up to Canada. According to the Punjab Police, he runs an international extortion racket, headed by Satinderjit Singh alias Goldy Brar in Canada and Harjot Singh Gill in the US.

The Bishnoi gang, though, is just one piece of the foreign-based gangster puzzle. A common link between the gangsters in India and those in Canada and the west is Harwinder Singh Sandhu, aka Rinda—a Pakistan-based gangster-turned-terrorist who allegedly masterminded the RPG attack on the Punjab Police’s intelligence headquarters in Mohali.

Rinda is wanted by the Punjab Police in 22 cases and by the Maharashtra Police in two. He is said to be in Pakistan now, under a fake identity with an Indian passport, reportedly sheltered by Pakistan-based terrorist groups and the Inter-Services Intelligence.

With all this coming to light, security officials say that the old Khalistan-ISI nexus is far from dead; only the original leadership, nurtured by the ISI, has grown old, and a new team had to be created. This new group consists of at least 34 new faces—including Bishnoi and Brar—who are based in the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and some other European countries. The new set has stylish branding and westernised names like Brothers Keepers, Hell’s Angels and Red Scorpions.

According to investigators, the Bishnoi gang, Rinda and the Canadian gangsters have several meeting points.

Hardeep Singh Nijjar of the Khalistan Tiger Force—against whom there are at least 10 FIRs in Punjab and Haryana, and who is on the National Investigation Agency’s wanted list—is learnt to be living in Surrey, British Columbia, on a Canadian passport.

The Indian government has reportedly sent dossiers to different countries with proof against these men, but they are yet to consider extradition.

Veteran Canadian Broadcasting Corporation journalist Terry Milewski said his country does not see the Khalistani-terrorist nexus as a serious problem. The gangster activities are dealt with as “routine police problems”.

In Canada, certain politicians are against defining the [Khalistan] problem as a national security threat. That does not match Delhi’s expectations. But the fact remains that Canada safeguards freedom of speech and, legally, the country is correct to say that merely advocating a separate Sikh state and shouting ‘Khalistan Zindabad’ is not a crime.”

Most gangsters on India’s wanted list are Canadian citizens and, unless they commit a crime on Indian soil, Indian authorities cannot ask for their deportation or extradition. Western countries have also quoted their privacy laws for not sharing any information about citizens in their countries, even if they have links in Punjab. The other problem is the vast legal paperwork that comes into play, in each case, to prove the identity of the accused. Many have taken political asylum with new identities

But when some stray bullets hit people of the host country, a crackdown becomes inevitable. The July killing of Ripudaman Malik—who was acquitted in the 1985 Air India terror bombing case—has caught the attention of the Canadian police. Malik, a Canadian citizen, was keen on exposing the nexus between the ISI and Khalistani groups. He was unguarded as he enjoyed the freedom Canada was offering him. Days later, on July 24, Brothers Keepers member Meninder Dhaliwal and his friend Sat Gill were shot dead in a police encounter.

Though pro-Khalistani elements account for only a fraction of the Indian community in Canada, they have an outsized influence in community affairs. They gain legitimacy by acting as vote banks in various foreign countries, and remain a potent force that is being tapped by anti-India elements.

There was just a minuscule lot that demands a separate Khalistan today. The Khalistan Referendum by Sikhs for Justice has been an utter failure in India and abroad. So, the issue has completely failed as a geopolitical matter.

The need is for strategic and diplomatic cooperation to weed out the criminal elements, funded by global terror groups, who are trying to disturb the social fabric of all countries involved.

Also, with Indian intelligence now claiming that the gangster-terror groups have co-opted the human trafficking and narcotics networks—thereby adding more money and muscle power—it is a wake-up call for all parties involved.

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On the other side of the International Border (IB) in Punjab, the ISI has made the drone centres operational with the help of smugglers and terrorists. Sources in the Border Security Force (BSF) stated they have received intelligence that heightened drone activity is being noticed at several Pakistani border outposts across the IB from Ferozepur and Amritsar.

“Pakistan is using ‘dummy drones’ for weapons, drugs and explosives. Across the border near Khemkaran, smugglers fly drones with the help of Pak Rangers,” the sources said.

Terrorists and smugglers are loading explosives, arms and ammunitions in these dummy drones to evade Indian security forces and transport the contraband into border states like Punjab. They are increasingly using GPS-control drones for their nefarious operations.

In light of this threat, the BSF has sounded an alert regarding drone activity from the Pakistani side of the fence. It is also installing anti-drone systems at specific, sensitive points on the Punjab border. ‘Drone hunting teams’ have been deployed to shoot down enemy UAVs.

According to sources, 53 drone incursions were noticed on the border so far this year. Security forces shot down these Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) on nine occasions and recovered explosives and drugs from them.

The BSF has reportedly seized about 1,150 kg of drugs at the Punjab border in the last three years. Between January and April this year, 150 kg narcotics, including a massive haul of heroin, was intercepted by the BSF.

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The account, identified as fb.com/shaanti.patel.89737, which appears in the name of Shanti Patel, contaminated the systems in order to gain unauthorised access to the restricted data of the computer resources, they added.

The leak using Facebook and other apps first came to notice when Andhra Pradesh police launched an investigation into the matter based on source information in June 2020. It was one of the incidents that prompted the army to issue a directive on July 9, 2020 asking all its officers and soldiers to delete 89 social networking, micro-blogging and gaming apps including Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat among others from their devices.

NIA has now taken up the investigation on the basis of Andhra Pradesh police case to look into national and international linkages of the suspects and ramifications of data theft on the national security.

One of the officers cited above said the central anti-terror probe agency will look into the matter under Official Secrets Act (OSA), Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), Information Technology Act and conspiracy to wage a war against India as sensitive data may have been accessed by the suspects, who worked for the ISI. It is not known yet what kind of information was accessed using the malware installed on the devices of defence personnel.

Describing the modus operandi, an officer said “the ISI hackers posing as Facebook ‘Shanti Patel’ account befriended Indian defence personnel and then engaged with them through a private messenger chat on the internet.”

“The suspects spread the malware by displaying them as folder with attractive photographs of women,” this officer said.

Investigation has revealed the malware was being spread from an unknown location in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Earlier, NIA investigated a naval spy ring run by ISI, which used social media accounts to honey trap sailors for collecting sensitive and classified information regarding locations/movements of Indian naval ships and submarines in eastern naval command at Vishakhapatnam, and other defence establishments in 2018-19. At least 15 persons were arrested in the case and a charges sheet was filed in June 2020.

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Imran Khan, who was elected as the 22nd prime minister of the country, on 18 August 2018, lost a no-confidence vote in the parliament and, on 11 April 2022, Shehbaz Sharif took oath as Pakistan’s new prime minister. Pakistan’s general elections are due in 2023. Hence, Sharif has just a year in office.

Since its formation 75 years ago, the country has had democratically elected governments for only 53 years. In these 53 years, 19 men and one woman have been prime minister, two of them more than once, and not a single one has ever completed a five-year term. The first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, lasted the longest—four years and 63 days—before he was assassinated.

In his first speech at the national assembly as prime minister, Sharif brought up Kashmir. Claiming that the valley was red with the blood of the Kashmiri people since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, he said that Pakistan would continue to “raise its voice for Kashmiri brothers and sisters at every forum…they will be provided diplomatic support, we will give them moral support”.

This is as per formula. No Pakistani prime minister can start off without making some belligerent noises about Kashmir. He cannot afford to be seen as being moderate on this issue.

No matter how hard Pakistan’s politicians try to equate India and Pakistan, India is light years ahead of Pakistan economically, technologically, and on every sociological parameter. If the world ever thinks of Pakistan, it is as a hub of Islamist terrorism.

Pakistan’s army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who allegedly played a big part in Khan’s removal, also seems pragmatic, if one goes by his public utterances. “Pakistan will benefit if we improve ties with India,” he said recently. In February last year, he agreed to a ceasefire on the Line of Control and the ceasefire has held. He perhaps realizes that a military engagement with India makes no sense for Pakistan, given the many other problems the country faces.

Pakistan’s powerful military has traditionally controlled foreign and defence policy, thereby limiting the impact of political instability. India is aware of the dynamic of civil-military imbalance in Pakistan and the risk of blowback from the military establishment against India whenever there is momentum for bilateral cooperation.

Pakistan’s Economy

Pakistan’s current account deficit is around 4 per cent of GDP. Pakistan owes $122 billion—a third of its GDP—to various multilateral organisations and nations like China and Saudi Arabia. Foreign currency reserves, already depleted, seem to be now in free fall—in March, they dropped 30 percent from $16.2 billion to $11.3 billion. Interest rates are 12.25 per cent.

Terrorism

The number of terror attacks—and attacks on security forces—by the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, has actually increased since Imran Khan, the army and the ISI celebrated the (original) Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August last year.

The TTP has strong links with the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and has the tacit support of the Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan remains on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money-laundering and terrorist-financing watchdog, precariously perched above the black list. After the 2+2 meeting between the defence and external affairs ministers of India and the US, on 12 April, the two countries issued a joint statement asking Pakistan to take “immediate, sustained, and irreversible action” to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks and called for the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack and the 2016 Pathankot attack to be brought to justice.

Afghanistan

Ties between Pakistan’s ISI and the Afghan Taliban have loosened in recent years. The Taliban government is facing an economic and humanitarian crisis due to a lack of money and international isolation.

Tensions have risen between the Taliban and Pakistan’s military, which has lost several soldiers in attacks close to their mutual border. Pakistan wants the Taliban to do more to crack down on extremist groups and worries they will spread violence into Pakistan. That has begun to happen already.

Imran Khan, who was less critical of the Taliban over human rights than most foreign leaders, is no longer there to support the Taliban.

China-Pakistan

The only piece of good news for them seems to be that China has reiterated that it considers Pakistan an “all-weather strategic cooperation partner” and “iron-clad brother” and praised Sharif’s commitment to the $60-billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

The CPEC was actually conceptualised and launched under Pakistan’s two established political parties, both against Khan. Shehbaz Sharif struck deals with China directly as leader of the eastern province of Punjab. Sharif will defend and push the corridor.

United States-Pakistan

Pakistan is not a priority for President Joe Biden, who is grappling with the war in Ukraine, unless it led to mass unrest or rising tensions with India. Since the military calls the shots on the policies that the U.S. really cares about, i.e. Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons, internal Pakistani political developments are largely irrelevant for the U.S. Khan had blamed the United States for the current political crisis, saying that Washington wanted him removed because of his Moscow trip.

India-Pakistan

Imran Khan’s ambition was to normalise relations with India and play cricket. Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa also spoke about burying the past and focusing on geo-economy. Kashmir is a core issue in its National Security Policy, though Pakistan has tied itself in knots over it, especially after India annulled Article 370. In August 2019, following the approval of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill in Parliament, which revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, further tension resulted between the two countries, with Pakistan downgrading diplomatic ties, closing its airspace, and suspending bilateral trade with India.

Pakistan, today, is desperate to begin a formal dialogue with India which ceased in January 2013 after the beheading of an Indian soldier in J&K. Islamabad is also pressing New Delhi to participate even virtually in the SAARC summit, in abeyance since 2016. India is not budging. India is inflexible and has taken the position “no talks till cross-border terrorism stops.”

When Khan became the prime minister, while speaking at the United States Institute of Peace, he admitted to Pakistan having 40-50,000 terrorists who had fought in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In 2021, after Khan had called the Modi government ‘fascist, unleashing Islamophobia’, India rebutted: ‘The neighbour is an arsonist disguised as a fire-fighter…’

The current cease-fire on LoC — which does not preclude a two-front situation — is the result of one of the many effective back channels.

On Siachen, speaking at the Army Day 2022 media conference, Army Chief Gen Naravane said that demilitarisation of Siachen was possible once Pakistan agreed to marking the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map. In 1988, 1992 and 2006, the two countries came within a whisker of demilitarisation.

Past Attempts at Normalisation

After inaugurating the new Afghan parliament building in Kabul on 25 December 2015, prime minister Narendra Modi, on the way back, unexpectedly landed in Lahore—the political bastion of prime minister Nawaz Sharif – for Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding. The symbolism of an Indian leader setting foot in Pakistan for the first time in 11 years, was unmissable. It riled the military establishment.

India, under Modi, has vigorously pursued a ‘neighbourhood first’ foreign policy. Modi’s vision is to integrate South Asia into a cooperative common space. The deep state in Pakistan pushed back against the attempted normalization of relations with India. Sharif had been ousted once before in a military coup in 1999 for being a ‘traitor’ who came under Indian pressure to withdraw Pakistani troops during the Kargil War. It was clear that the military-intelligence complex in Pakistan calls the shots and reins in politicians who try to cooperate with India.

Former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had also undertaken a bus journey from Amritsar in India to Lahore in February 1999 and was welcomed with open arms by prime minister Sharif. Vajpayee had hailed it as ‘a defining moment in South Asian history,’ but soon thereafter, the Pakistani military infiltrated into Kargil without Sharif’s knowledge and in the two-and-half-month war that followed, India lost 500 of its troops to throw out the infiiltrators.

By 2020, Sharif was in self-imposed exile. He blamed it on the deep state in Pakistan

The Pakistani jihadi attack on the IAF base at Pathankot, on 1 Januray 2016, was undertaken to derail the nascent Modi–Sharif peace process.

Future Prospects

India and Pakistan announced, in February 2022, an agreement to renew the 2003 ceasefire. India’s escalating military confrontation with China provided reason to try and stabilise the Pakistan frontier. But the continuation depends on Islamabad addressing Delhi’s core concerns on cross-border terrorism.

While Kashmir remains at the top of Pakistan’s agenda, it seems open to reviving commercial ties. It announced an intent to import sugar and cotton from India, but the Commerce Ministry’s decision was ostentatiously reversed by Imran Khan by declaring that “Pakistan can’t trade with India when Kashmir was bleeding”.

Islamabad is stuck with preconditions — reversing India’s constitutional changes in Kashmir — it has set for a renewed dialogue with Delhi.

Not talking to Pakistan has few domestic political costs to Delhi. Pakistan will have to lift the preconditions for engagement with India. Gen. Bajwa’s second term as army chief ends in November 2022 amidst sharpening civil-military differences. A lot will depend upon his successor.

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These religious setups have mushroomed within 10 km from the Nepal border and also across the border in the Nepal side, leading to demographic change in some parts of the border areas in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, the report has said.

Quoting intelligence inputs, officials said that in the last three years, the number of mosques has gone up from 760 in 2018 to 1,000 in 2021, while the number of madrasas has risen from 508 in 2018 to 645 in 2021 in Nepali territories, officials said.

The sources in the security grid said that these religious setups are being been funded by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other anti-India organistions working abroad. The officials in the security forces have admitted that the size and grandeur of these mosques and madrasas itself indicate foreign fundings, and apart from the ISI, these religious houses also get fundings from Arab countries.

The security officials deployed on the India-Nepal border said that these centres have been instigating anti-India sentiments and they also give shelter to criminals active in the border areas of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

“These areas have also seen a spurt of smuggling of fake Indian currency notes and narcotics, and there is no extradition treaty agreement with Nepal,” a government official said.

Officials in the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar governments have also admitted that criminals often take shelter in these religious places after committing crimes as the India-Nepal border is unfenced and porous. The Integrated Check Posts have been set up on the major roads but the village roads leading to Nepal are unguarded, they added.

India shares 1,751-km borders with Nepal along Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim, while Uttar Pradesh shares a 570-km border with Nepal and has 35 border police stations. Similarly, Bihar and West Bengal also share 726 km and 100 km border with Nepal, respectively.

“The majority of construction of mosques, madrasas and mosque-cum-madrasas have been flagged in Uttar Pradesh’s border districts of Maharajganj, Siddharth Nagar, Balrampur, Bahraich, Shravasti, Pilibhit and Khiri, while Kishanganj and Araria in Bihar and Panitanki town of Darjeeling district in West Bengal have seen such rise in last three years,” an official in the central security grid said.

In recent years, the Himalayan state has been used by Pakistan-based terror groups as safe havens and the Indian agencies have substantial evidences as to how the Nepalese banks have also been playing a crucial role in terror-funding against India.

In 2019, the Uttar Pradesh Police had busted an international terrorism funding racket linked to Nepal’s central bank and they claimed the involvement of Indian nationals who used to bring money from Nepal and use it to fund terrorist activities in the country.

The chief of dreaded terror organisation Indian Mujahideen, Yasin Bhatkal, and his aide Asadulah Akhtar, who were from Pokhra in Nepal, were hiding there after carrying out a series of bomb blasts in India in 2013. Bhatkal was arrested on August 2013 from the Nepal border near Motihari in East Champaran district in Bihar.

Describing the enormity of the security threat posed by these religious setups in Nepal, retired IPS officer Vijay Shankar Singh said that these setups are being funded by the ISI, and the Government of India needs to speak to the Nepal government immediately to stop anti-India activities.

“India needs to focus on re-strengthening its ties with Nepal, which has been a natural ally of India historically. We have the ‘Beti- Roti’ relation with Nepal from hundred years ago, there is a matrimonial relationship between families residing in the border areas of Bihar and UP with Nepalese people,” Singh said.

He also said that the proposed rail and road connectivity from China has also changed Nepal’s allegiance towards China and the Communist-backed government in the Himalayan nation has almost dumped India.

In recent times, Pakistan and China supported Nepal financially in many infrastructure projects which has led to a swift change in alliance with these countries.

Nepal, the land-locked country, was totally dependent on India for import but recently China has promised a 417 km long rail link up to Kathmandu from the Chinese section Shigaste.

Beijing and Kathmandu signed a treaty in 2016 to build a rail link to Nepal under China’s Belt and Road Initiatives. A ‘Friendship Highway’ of 806 km is being constructed to connect Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, with Nepal border which is about to be completed soon.

Citing his experience as Senior Superintendent of Police in eastern Uttar Pradesh districts, Singh said that the Indian security agencies need to keep an eye on the people who frequently visit these mosques and madarsas and the Indian government needs to use diplomatic channels to stop these activities along the India-Nepal border.

He also said that the majority of the population in both the countries are in favour of having smooth relations as they are historically and culturally associated with each other.

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Pakistan has solicited funding for the Taliban, bankrolled Taliban operations, provided diplomatic support as the Taliban’s virtual emissaries abroad, arranged training for Taliban fighters, recruited skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planned and directed offensives, provided and facilitated shipments of ammunition and fuel, and on several occasions apparently directly providing combat support.

The Pakistan government has repeatedly denied that it provides any military support to the Taliban in its diplomacy regarding its extensive operations in Afghanistan.

In direct violation of U.N. sanctions Pakistan’s army and intelligence services, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), contributed to making the Taliban a highly effective military force. Pakistan’s notoriously porous border with Afghanistan facilitated the transshipment of men and materiel.

History of Military Support

Pakistan has a history of military support for different factions within Afghanistan, extending at least as far back as the early 1970s. During the 1980s, Pakistan, which was host to more than two million Afghan refugees, was the most significant front-line state serving as a secure base for the mujahidin fighting against the Soviet intervention.

Pakistan also served, in the 1980s, as a U.S. stalking horse: the U.S., through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), granted Pakistan wide discretion in channelling some $2-3 billion worth of covert assistance to the mujahidin, training over 80,000 of them.

Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, serving and former Pakistani military officers continued to provide training and advisory services in training camps within Afghanistan and eventually to Taliban forces in combat.

In addition, Pakistan promoted the emergence of a government in Afghanistan that would reduce Pakistan’s own vulnerability to internal unrest by helping to contain the nationalist aspirations of tribes whose territories straddle the Pakistani-Afghan border.

Pakistan also sought to quell local support for Afghanistan’s ambitions of redrawing the Durand line. Thus, Pakistan came to throw its support behind the Hizb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun-dominated group that espoused an Islamist rather than nationalist agenda. Because the U.S. granted Pakistan wide discretion in channelling its covert assistance to the mujahidin based in Pakistan, Pakistan was able to give Hikmatyar the lion’s share.

Strategic Depth

Throughout the war against the communist government and Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan asserted a mix of internal and external concerns. The ISI and Pakistan army sought leverage against the hostile neighbour on its eastern border, India, by giving Pakistan “strategic depth.”

Pakistan has always wanted Afghanistan as strategic depth against India. An Afghanistan that facilitated those connections and provided Pakistan with a base to pursue its objectives in Kashmir would give it greater security against India. It has also been part of the ‘Great Game’ against India. Pakistan believes that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will eliminate Indian threat through Afghanistan.

With strategic depth, Pakistan can retreat into Afghanistan if India attacks. Second, they can rain their missiles on India from Afghanistan. And third, they can utilize jihadis from Afghanistan to launch a new jihad in Kashmir.

The New Taliban

Islamabad believes that it has the Taliban by the scruff of the neck, a term once used by Pakistan’s Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, during the time of the Kargil operations.

But the Taliban of today are not the naïve Talibs that the Pakistanis created under the leadership of Mullah Omar. This generation are seasoned militants who have sometimes experienced jail and ill-treatment at the hands of the Pakistanis. Islamabad hopes that its control over the Taliban logistics will continue to provide it leverage, as will the presence of its powerful proxy—the Haqqani Network which has been absorbed into the Taliban over the past two decades. But the rapid consolidation of authority over Afghanistan by the Taliban and their outreach to Iran is likely to have upset those calculations.

Pakistan has an uphill task in converting its tactical advantages in Afghanistan into strategic gains. The Pakistan army is now in the driver’s seat in Kabul. But can it drive the Afghan state and society anywhere, let alone in a sensible direction?

It did not come as a surprise that Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), dashed to Kabul after Taliban’s victory to secure his government’s interests. Hamid’s role was also to mediate between different Taliban factions on power-sharing and launch a sustainable new Afghan government.

With Pakistan supported Haqqani group occupying cabinet berths in the new Afghan dispensation, terrorist groups are likely to continue to flourish, rather than be controlled, as globally demanded. The Haqqanis are suspected to be close to the Islamic State (ISIS-K) which launched the suicide attack on Kabul airport. They are also closely associated with Pak-backed terrorist groups, JeM and LeT, which operate in Kashmir. The new Afghan army chief, Qari Fasihuddin, has ties with the ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement). Russian security agencies believe that thousands of ISIS-K cadres are concentrated along Afghanistan’s borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Hence, the world rejected the Afghan government and tended to ignore its populace, pushing this responsibility on to Pakistan. Pakistan is itself in financial doldrums and facing food shortages. It cannot afford to fund and feed an additional 40 million without global support. Pakistan, which should have enforced a globally desired government in Kabul, at least initially, pushed one which it could control, ignoring global demands.

It is possible that Pakistan would have promised to support and fund Afghanistan in return for creating a government which it desires. Now it is saddled with a nation which, though possessing billions of dollars’ worth of US military equipment, lacks basic food stocks and funds to administer the country. Afghanistan may be compelled to export drugs or sell US equipment for immediate financial needs.

The Problem With Durand Line

What the Pakistanis do not realize is that they have a soft underbelly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan is strong enough to destabilise Afghanistan, but not powerful enough to construct a stable political order across the Durand Line.

While the Taliban were beholden to Pakistan for evicting the Soviets from their land, they never recognized the Durand Line as their official border with Pakistan. The Taliban consider the Durand Line as a figment of the British imagination. Afghanistan dearly wants to merge Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with itself. Needless to say the Pakistanis are not happy with this ambition. They want the Durand Line to be recognized as the international border with Afghanistan as soon as possible.

The Durand Line is a legacy of the 19th century Great Game between the Russian and British empires in which Afghanistan was used as a buffer by the British against a feared Russian expansionism to its east.

The agreement demarcating what became known as the Durand Line was signed on November 12, 1893 between the British civil servant Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman, then the Afghan ruler, essentially a British puppet. His agreement with Durand demarcated the limits of his and British India’s “spheres of influence” on the Afghan “frontier” with India.

In reality, the line cut through Pashtun tribal areas, leaving villages, families, and land divided between the two “spheres of influence”. It has been described as a “line of hatred”, arbitrary, illogical, cruel and a trickery on the Pashtuns. Some historians believe it was a ploy to divide the Pashtuns so that the British could keep control over them easily. It also put on the British side the strategic Khyber Pass.

With Independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited the Durand Line, and with it also the Pashtun rejection of the line, and Afghanistan’s refusal to recognise it. Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan joining the United Nations in 1947.

‘Pashtunistan’ — an independent country of the Pashtuns — was a demand made by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan at the time of Partition, although he later resigned himself to the reality of Partition. The proximity of the ‘Frontier Gandhi’ to India was a point of tension between the two countries almost immediately. The fear of Indian support to Pashtun nationalism haunts Pakistan to date, and is embedded in its Afghan policy.

Pakistan’s creation and support for the Taliban is seen by some as a move to obliterate ethnic Pashtun nationalism with an Islamic identity. But it did not work out the way Pakistan had planned. When the Taliban seized power in Kabul the first time, they rejected the Durand Line. They also strengthened Pashtun identity with an Islamic radicalism to produce the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose terrorist attacks since 2007 left the country shaken.

As cross-border tensions peaked in 2017 with several attacks on Pakistani border posts by militants that Pakistan accused Afghanistan of sheltering – while the Afghan government accused Pakistan of giving safe haven to Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network – Pakistan began erecting a fence on the Durand Line. While it may have reduced the movement of militants from Afghanistan into Pakistan, it did little to stop the movement of Afghan Taliban across and back.

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