Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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Since the fall of the Ghani Government in Afghanistan and the exit of the US forces from the war theatre, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has exploited this opportunity to attempt its dominance, monopolize Jihad in the Indian subcontinent and turn its low intensity asymmetric warfare into a virtual blitzkrieg approach in the region.

Over the years, IS-K has managed to build an intricate network amongst the locals in the regions where is operates. It has been seen effectively providing support to the Muslim Chinese jihadists and was lately employing Afghan soldiers, intelligence and law enforcement officers, as also the ex-Taliban recruits. Given that the outfit’s aspirations are not only limited to Afghanistan but also to additional plans which may not be aligned with its parent ISIS Central but its own, we have been witnessing an influx of recruits from India joining the IS-K in Afghanistan.

Recruitment Drive in India

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has probed over 37 terror attack cases directly linked with the IS, out of which 31 have been charge-sheeted with 27 accused convicted.

It is clear that IS targets individuals through social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. The individuals, whose ideologies resonate with the outfit, are contacted by the international handlers and are brainwashed into spreading and uploading IS-related content, knowledge on improvised explosives device (IED) making and terror funding. Even translating the IS-related texts to the regional languages is promoted.

In August 2021, an IS recruiter from Bhatkal (Karnataka) was arrested for radicalizing the youth through the ISIS published magazine “Voice of Hind (VOH)”. The magazine was conceived through the collaboration of Al-Qitaal media centre (pro ISIS media outlet) and Junudul Khilafa Al Hind in February 2020. It has, in the past months, elaborately detailed the plans on how to wage Gazwa-e-Hind (part of Pakistan`s plan to bleed India with a thousand cuts), preparations for Jihad and also praised IS terrorists killed as martyrs. Since 2020, the magazine has gained traction by stirring fear or working as a call centre to tap educated and qualified individuals for its propaganda machine.

Earlier, in July 2021, three individuals were arrested from Anantnag, who had close links with the IS. They were responsible for dissemination of false propaganda against India and for radicalizing the youth in Kashmir on the lines propagated by VOH. A large number of digital devices were seized such as mobile phones, secure digital (SD) cards, etc. Fake identities were created and the individuals responsible used several virtual private networks (VPN) to avoid tracking.

Then, in August 2021, VOH edition displayed the newsclips of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) searches, while its editor made a defiant proclamation to increase the circulation “all the more” in the face of probes carried by all investigation agencies. It became evident when the Voice of Hind mentioned the raids in Anantnag, Jammu & Kashmir, that the right targets had been hit. Prior to this, it was assumed that the magazine was circulated from Afghanistan. After the raids it has been confirmed that it has its links in South Kashmir. It is also confirmed the content editors were being recruited from Maldives and Bangladesh.

Content Collation

it is confirmed that the material is “processed, edited and approved in Pakistan.” Region specific content lacing subnational ideologies imbibing Jihad are also part of the propaganda, a philosophy IS-K uses to participate in the local conflicts and to radicalize one actor against the other, if not the whole state. In order to promote the propaganda, area specific content and material is also being made available in Tamil, Bengali and Malayalam.

Campaign Against Idolatry

The IS propaganda thrives on the success of increased sub-nationalism in the Southern States in India and caters to the likes of all those in favour of the caliphate and an all-Muslim state, marginalizing all Hindus. In a recent issue published by VOH, an image of a decapitated Shiva with the ISIS black flag on its cover went viral in the social media. The VOH captioned it as “It is time to break the false Gods.”

The idol on the cover resembles the idol of Shiva statue in the Murudeshwara temple in Karnataka and has raised concerns. ISIS has been notorious for attacking and destroying various archaeological and heritage sites. The idea to erase history or existence of a culture has been a part of their jihadist plans or of what they view as their narrative of Jihad. For years, ISIS has made efforts to go through extreme selective theological lengths to define their narrative on iconoclastism (destruction of idols).

This could be discerned from one such narrative it spread after destruction of the Palmyra features in Syria. The ISIS magazine Dabiq carried a double spread of the images of the destroyed Palmyra site, while its French edition, Dar-al-Islam, quoted the text “Baal is a false divinity for which people sacrificed their children as indicated in the Old Testament. But, by the Grace of Allah, soldiers of the Caliphate destroyed it.” The entire act of destruction of the heritage sites was justified as combating “shirk” – the sin committed by practicing polytheism or worshipping idols other than Allah. ISIS views its approach as cleansing of Islam through the establishment of the caliphate, while returning to the roots of Islam (a view which is contested worldwide by the Muslim community). However, it does not eliminate the threat and the “built in brutality” it inflicts towards the non-Muslims. The recent attacks on the mosques in Kandahar, Kabul and Kunduz are a clear indication of the extremist attitude ISIS is maintaining towards its narratives, where it refuses to even identify with the beliefs of Shias or Muslims, who remain different from them. It prefers to eradicate them.

Given the pictures of decapitated Shiva statue have gone viral on social media platforms, this comes as no surprise but as confirms the ISIS aspirations in India. It is imperative to exercise caution in face of this looming and persistent threat. It is expected that IS-K, like its parent IS Central, will replicate a common strategy to wipe out other religious iconography and heritage sites. This can exacerbate communal tensions in India.

Hate-filled Newsletters

In December 2021, VOH has upped its antics and has published another inflammatory hate-filled propaganda in its Vol 23 issue – Hinduism, In the Mire of Delusion. The issue attacks Hinduism as the nullifier of Islam, calls to take back Babri Masjid, makes suggestions to kill and terrorize Hindus calling it the verdict of Allah “Jihad for the sake of Allah.”

The 15-page newsletter reiterates its hate for Hindus and killing of all Kuffars worldwide. An excerpt from the magazine reads “on the mainland of India, the sons of Ghaznavi and Ibn Qasim, who subjugated the subcontinent to the rule of Islam. Whose swords chopped the heads of the Somnaths, the idols in the temples trembled and fell face down at the sound of their footsteps.”

The issue furthers urges its readers to carry Dawah activities on social media as “internet is cheap,” to raise the flags of jihad on streets, spread the word by uploading through USBs and use necessary security means to remain untraceable online.

Amidst these nefarious suggestions, an entire page is dedicated to “O Muwahhid take back Babri Masjid from the Hindus.” The entire section directly attacks the Jews and the Hindus, stating the “unholy alliance” between the Jews and the Hindus must be attacked. It talks of genocide and brute force to be utilized against the non-Muslims. While the entire section uses derogatory slander for non-Muslims, it provokes its readers to fight against the sons of “Khilafah” by painting a sorry picture of the jihadists, a bait easily to be bitten by the ISIS sympathizers.

It is not hard to foresee a radicalized youth playing into the hands of such inflammatory narratives, which not only spread hate but dispels the notion of secularism or diversity of India and seeks to ignite communal hatred and riots.

George Orwell said “The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history”. Hence, it is not farfetched to think the ISIS modus operandi relies heavily on its propaganda warfare while executing its plans physically. While conventional war may or may not be on the horizon, the war of perception continues to be waged daily. The proof lies in the virulent content of this IS propaganda organ, VOH.

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Over the last several decades, many Wahhabi organisations developed, flourished and survived in India. Most escaped the reach of our agencies and the strategic community, either because of lack of sufficient knowledge or lack of adequate political will to tackle them. The most prominent feature of such organisations is the legal umbrella under which they operate. They often work under the garb of rights ad charity groups, NGOs and religious institutions. However, internally they work to radicalise the demography selected by them, which is across faiths. This leads to polari sation, fuels hatred and causes germination of fundamentalist terrorist ideologies. A sophisticated network of organisations managed to thrive despite the heavy machinery of the Indian state.

Case of So-called Charities

The role of external support to such organisations is the most potent driving factor in the spread of radical ideologies in India. For instance, the import of Saudi endorsed hard-line Wahhabi ideology in the 1980s sprouted the seed of extremism in the Kashmir Valley. In the most recent example, the Middle East Forum, a Philadelphia-based organisation, came across a massive cache of documents associated with Qatar-based Sheikh Eid Bin Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association, also referred to as Eid Charity. It is claimed that Eid Charity, perhaps out of ignorance of the nature of the donees, funnelled millions of dollars since 2008-09 into India, funding organisations associated with the Wahhabi school of thought that is in fact antithetical to Islam. Eid Charity came under global scrutiny in 2013 when one of its founders, Abd Al-Rahman al-Nu’aymi, was named as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGTs) by the US Department of Treasury. He was sanctioned for providing financial and material support to Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Somalia. The association also works with other charity groups in Qatar, such as Qatar Charity and Foundation Sheikh Thani Ibn Abdullah for Humanitarian Services (RAF). Donations made by these are under investigation in the US and elsewhere. Qatar needs to avoid falling into the FATF “Grey List” in the manner that its close allies Pakistan and Turkey have.

Investigation of documents revealed over 1,200 transactions made to India either directly under the name of Eid Charity or through individualistic contributions. A total of QR 28.492855 million (USD 7.82 million approx.) were transferred to eight organisations in India. The money was distributed for projects ranging from direct financial support within the Muslim community to other religious and community action programs such as building/supporting mosques and building handpumps.

The Kerala-based Salafi Philanthropic Society, registered as Salafi Charitable Trust Narikkuni, received the largest cache of funds, involving around USD 4.9 million between 2008-17. This charity group is run by another Qatar-based charity group mentioned earlier, RAF. The RAF is run by a royal family member of Qatar and was black-listed for terror financing by Arab nations in 2017. The Foundation has serious charges levied against it, including funding Al Qaeda affiliated groups Al Nusra in Syria and arming Muslim-Brotherhood-backed fighters in Sudan. It denies such charges.

A large part of the money received by Salafi Charitable Trust was meant to be directed towards individual financial assistance within the poor Muslim population. Money was also given for projects such as countrywide distribution/promotions of Hijab. Dr Hussain Madavoor runs the trust as its chairman. He is one of Kerala’s most prominent religious figures and vice president of one of Kerala’s largest faith-based organisations, Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen (KNM), which has tried to project itself as a progressive group over the years.

In a video message posted on Facebook in 2018, Dr Madavoor supported Peace Education Foundation and its founder and managing director, M.M. Akbar. Peace Education Foundation has been on the radar of security agencies since 2016 when it came to public notice that several ISIS recruits from Kerala had an association with the foundation. Akbar is known for his controversial speeches and is often called “Zakir Naik of Kerala”, another Islamic preacher absconding from India on terrorism and money laundering charges. Akbar was arrested in 2017 while trying to fly to Qatar on the charges of radicalising school children through alleged radical content in Peace-funded schools.

In an audio message released by ISIS-KP, Abdul Rashid Abdullah, the mastermind behind the ISIS module in Kerala and former employee at Peace Foundation, claimed that there are ISIS supporters among the teachers and parents of Peace schools. He also alleged that during a public interview, the group tried to conceal the identity of at least two former employees of Peace Foundation who travelled to Afghanistan to join ISIS-KP.

During our investigation, it was found that Eid Charity funded an organisation named Peace Education Centre. It is hard to ascertain the identity of this organisation, which almost received all the funds in the name of financial support to an orphanage. However, the only possible link could be with the Peace Education Foundation mentioned above, which runs several educational and charitable institutions for orphans. If Peace Education Foundation received money from Eid Charity, it would be the most direct evidence of Eid Charity funding organisations in India that are alleged to be involved in radicalisation activities.

Eid Charity’s second-largest reserve of funds to India is transferred in the name of Symposium Educational Charitable Society. This organisation received around USD 2.01 million, yet our investigation disclosed no traces of any organisation with such a name in the public domain. Following the transactions, it came into notice that the money was transferred for projects mainly in the Siddharthnagar district of the northern state of Uttar Pradesh. A large sum of this money was given to Al-Farooq Group based in the Itwa area of the district. This group is directly funded by Eid Charity and is known for its dismissive stand against Sufi Islam, which is widely practised in India. The Itwa area also harbours other organisations with foreign backing, propagating fundamentalist Wahhabi interpretations that are intolerant towards non-Wahhabi Muslim sects.

Another organisation named Al Safa Educational, Industrial and Islamic Charitable Society received funds from Eid Charity. Another controversial preacher runs it from Kerala, Maulana Sheikh Meraj Rabbani, who was also arrested in 2010 over hate speech against other Muslim sects, including Barelvis and Sufis. Rabbani was also amongst several radical preachers in Kerala whose speeches allegedly aided the radicalisation of ISIS recruits. Rabbani is also involved in a high-profile Heera Gold fraud case, where he is alleged to have urged people to invest in a Ponzi scheme.

Most interestingly, a large amount of Eid Charity money is transferred to Al Safa in the name of supporting the operation of the Salafi Charitable Trust mentioned above. It shows that money from Qatar is circulated within these Salafist organisations. Many groups may only exist to work as proxy organisations to escape the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies and tax regulatory bodies. This could also be true since other recipients in the Eid Charity list, such as Al-Habib Educational and Charitable Foundation and Relevance Charitable Foundation, are publicly ghost, and our investigation couldn’t find any traces of their existence. These groups may be shell organisations, the most common practice amongst institutions funding global extremism and radicalisation.

Sowing Seeds of Extremism

The whole investigation shows that this funding mechanism has evolved and acquired a sophisticated form over the last several years. The non-uniformity of transactional patterns makes it almost impossible to ascertain the actual purpose for these funds. The money comes under small heads for small-scale undertakings, which are extremely hard to trace and makes it almost impossible to link this money with any nefarious anti-national activity. Most of these organisations have almost no online and popular media presence. Our investigation also couldn’t find any public records of using these funds or any social media promotion of any of the projects, a standard practice of other mainstream charity groups.

Another major cause of concern is the financial support for certain organisations in Kerala. Over the past years, this southern state of India has become the hub of radicalisation and recruitment ground for several transnational extremist groups. Some organisations in Kerala have constantly been accused of supporting violent extremism, and several ISIS recruits from the state have been associated and radicalised through them. Banned Kerala-based Islamist terror groups such as the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and groups like Popular Front of India (PFI) have used hardcore teachings to radicalise youth and recruitment. The fact that raises alarm is that these transactions also match the period when radicalisation and extremist trends in Kerala acquired a steeper trajectory. India has a rich history of progressive Islamic practices for centuries, and an external targeted design promoting extremism could disrupt the social fabric and become problematic for India’s national integrity. The recent decision by Government of India to tighten the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) is a welcome step in this direction. However, much more comprehensive tracking of suspect organisations is needed at the grass-roots level. Indian security and strategic community need to build a holistic approach to eradicate such networks, including through extensive involvement of civil society. Authorities in Qatar need to be made aware that without their knowledge or involvement, the kingdom may follow Turkey and Pakistan on the FATF grey list, given the extensive international investigation into the doings of several of its citizens.

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Relations with Neighbouring Countries

One of the reasons for the expected turmoil in Afghanistan is that several countries in the vicinity are interpreting the post-U.S. power vacuum in Afghanistan as an opportunity.

Iran and Saudi Arabia want to dominate Afghanistan to ensure they stay ahead in the race for regional hegemony. Both are working in coordination to maintain unity among the Taliban who have representatives from various ethnic groups and clans that are expected to jostle for political power.

Afghanistan is in the heart of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia and there cannot be a political vacuum in this unique region.

In August 1998, Taliban forces attacked the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif and killed 10 Iranian diplomats and a correspondent of IRNA, Iranian News Agency. Iran, at the time, supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance that operated mainly out of the Panjshir Valley under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud. However, this time around Iran is not in an axis with India, Russia and Tajikistan in dealing with the Taliban which made the Tehran-Taliban harmony possible.

This time Iran has taken a bold initiative to overcame past bitterness with the Taliban. Iran’s growing confidence in handling the Taliban had been on display since Al Quds force under Qasem Soleimani took interest in building ties with the Taliban. Iran’s Quds Force now under the leadership of Esmail Qaani, who succeeded General Soleimani after his assassination on January 3, 2020 has been building stronger links with the Taliban which has been a cause of concern for Saudi Arabia.

Apart from hosting the Taliban leaders repeatedly in the past, Iran has already shown its goodwill to the Taliban by resuming export of energy to Afghanistan, which is yet to form a formal government. Iranian moves and the Saudi-Pakistan initiatives point to the rivalry between the two regional blocks. The Iranian and Saudi moves on Afghanistan indeed are the real indicators of the shape of the future of Afghanistan.

Ethnic Divisions and Taliban Unity

Despite its current reign over popular imagination, that of a unified whole, united under an Islamic goal, Taliban is not a unitary organisation. It is a collation of a large number of local militia, banded together on ethnic/tribal lines.

It is a moot question as to how the spoils will be distributed between the Pashtun tribes, while the other groups from Jalalabad and Nuristan have also raised their demands. The key differences appear to be on policy with regard to women, education, narcotics, existing source of riches and China, despite its violation of the rights of Uyghur Muslims, anathema to an Islamic Emirate.

What allowed the Taliban to take over — a series of local deals along tribal lines — may well stop them from forming the political coalition necessary to form a government.”

The Helmandis were reported to have taken over the Ministry of Finance on August 17, reflecting their desire to control that ministry, possibly in order to facilitate their control of opium and heroin production in Helmand — the largest producer of opium in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, a week later, Helmandis were appointed, not just as Finance, but also as Ministers of Interior and Defence. This tilts the balance between the rustic, rural, opium-rich Helmandis and the militarily superior Haqqanis.

There are also contradictory reports of Helmandis/Kandaharis and Haqqanis taking over control of the security of Kabul, both sets of factions not very keen to cooperate on sharing the spoils of war. This regionalisation, added to ethnic factionalism, makes this coalition very difficult to build.

Multiple other schisms are emerging, including the absence of representation of the northerners, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras — main beneficiaries of the past two decades and with a large presence in Kabul’s 5-6 million population. The more the Taliban beat common people on the streets with chains and with every single wanton killing, they are to be seen as an occupational force by these segments, making their victory tenuous.

There are other groups too – al-Qaeda, IS-Khorasan, Uighurs (ETIM), Uzbeks (IMU), Tajiks (Khatiba Imam al Bukhari) and Pakistani groups such as the TTP, LeT, JeM, Jamaat ul Ahraar, Lashkar-e-Islam and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. All of them have linkages with Taliban fighters on the ground but power-sharing negotiations may end up pitching them on opposite sides.

Al Qaeda

The Taliban government was ousted by a U.S.-led intervention following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States masterminded by al Qaeda leaders based in Afghanistan, and 20 years of warfare followed.

The Taliban had provided al-Qaeda with sanctuary while it ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. The US invaded and overthrew the Taliban after it refused to turn over al-Qaida leaders following the Sept. 11, 2001 attack. During the course of the 20-year US war, al-Qaeda was vastly diminished, but questions have arisen about its future prospects.

In a February 2020 agreement with the Trump regime, Taliban leaders pledged not to support al-Qaeda or other extremist groups that would threaten the US. But US officials believe the Taliban maintain ties to al-Qaeda, and many nations, including Gulf Arab states, are concerned that the Taliban’s return to power could open the door to a resurgence of al-Qaeda influence.

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The appointment of Salbi as Baghdadi’s official successor and Nasser Qardash’s confession during his interrogation at the hands of the Iraqi authorities, however, reveal numerous details regarding ISIS’ current and future strategy after the loss of its physical caliphate in the Middle East in March 2019. As the world and India reel from coronavirus, post-Baghdadi ISIS has spent its time quietly regrouping and re-strategising its comeback. This will have major security-related and geostrategic consequences for India, especially given the added blow dealt by Cyclone Amphan in Bengal and the looming threat of resurgent Pakistani Inter-Serrvices Intelligence (ISI)-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir – the so-called ‘The Resistance Front’ (TRF) attempting to pick up the pieces of the Pakistan-sponsored jihadist movement in the Valley.

Growing non-Arab and ISIS’ Focus on Kashmir and Bengal

Salbi’s appointment itself came as a surprise, given his ethnic background – which also provides clues regarding the Islamic State’s implied focus on acquiring influence in regions such as India, which lie beyond the Arab world. Despite US President Donald Trump’s tweet in November 2019, claiming that he had received information regarding Baghdadi’s new successor, it was only in January 2020, when Western and regional espionage efforts identified Salbi, an ethnic Turkmen hailing from the town of Tal Afar in northern Iraq as the new leader of ISIS. The appointment of a non-Arab to a position of such stature is as significant as it is unprecedented. Global jihadist organisations, such as ISIS, have often been believed to use radicalised non-Arab Muslims as foot-soldiers, with ethnic Arabs usually holding the most important positions. A 2015 report by Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) pointed out that Chinese, African and South Asian ISIS fighters in the erstwhile ‘caliphate’ faced discrimination by the predominantly Arab ISIS Police Force, or the hisbah. Divisions exist even within the ethnic Arabs in such terrorist organisations, with the CIA predicting in the immediate aftermath of Osama Bin Laden’s death that his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri as a North African Arab, “would have difficulty maintaining the loyalty of Al-Qaeda’s Gulf Arab followers.”

The appointment of a non-Arab like Salbi, therefore, indicates that ISIS after Baghdadi is willing to take unprecedented and unexpected steps to rebuild. More importantly, however, the appointment of a non-Arab as ISIS’ new leader indicates that the terrorist organization will now renew its focus on non-Arab parts of the Muslim world, which includes India. Thus, the symbolism of Salbi’s appointment as the new emir of the so-called caliphate should not be understated as ISIS attempts to expand its influence beyond the Middle East with a key focus on India. The attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) patrol party in Anantnag by the Islamic State (IS) in Jammu & Kashmir (ISJK) in April 2020 should, therefore, be read in the above context of the Turkmen Salbi leading ISIS into the 2020.

ISIS’ deepened interest in India, however, predates Salbi’s leadership, with radicalised young Indian Muslims travelling to Iraq and Syria to fight for the erstwhile caliphate as early as 2014/15. ISIS’ establishment of wilayahs in West Bengal, Bangladesh and Kashmir in May 2019 came just two months after the loss of its physical territory in March 2019 and a month after the horrific Easter attacks in Sri Lanka by its affiliate there. Such developments highlight that ISIS will target Indians in its quest to prove that it remains a serious player in the global jihadist arena, especially as it focuses efforts on deepening domestic networks in the country. It is also worth noting that just a day after Trump’s tweet on ISIS’ new leader on 1 November 2019, ISIS’ Bangladesh wilayat pledged allegiance to Salbi – among the first of ISIS’ international wilayats to do so. This is deeply significant, given that the wilayat also includes the Indian state of West Bengal. It further underscores post-Baghdadi ISIS’ increased interest in the Indian subcontinent as an area to expand in and its targeting of West Bengal to make headway into India’s heartland. This strategy may be achieved through alliances with local jihadist groups like Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).

Salbi’s Desperation on India

Yet, the symbolism of Salbi’s appointment obscures his deeper psychological worry regarding his new position – his desperation.

Having succeeded al-Baghdadi, who had led the Islamic State since 2010, Salbi has a large power vacuum to fill. His aforementioned non-Arab ethnicity may also play a role in fuelling his desperation to achieve large-scale, television-worthy attacks to bolster his image as a suitable successor to Baghdadi as he seeks to bring the predominantly Arab leadership of ISIS under his direct control. However, this is easier said than done. 2019 saw ISIS lose its physical caliphate in the Middle East as well as much of the infrastructure required for such large-scale attacks following Baghdadi’s death. Hence, ISIS has attempted to play up lone-wolf attacks after Salbi’s takeover. The London Bridge stabbings in November 2019, perpetrated by a home-grown terrorist with roots in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the Streatham stabbings in South London in February 2020, followed by the attacks on boats belonging to the Maldivian Navy in April 2020 were all incidents for which ISIS claimed responsibility. However, these have all been fairly low-intensity attacks compared to the carnage that ISIS was known for causing in major cities during its heyday, from the 2015 Paris attacks to the 2016 Brussels airport bombing and the 2017 Manchester arena suicide attack. Salbi’saforementioned desperation to prove himself is coupled with his growing interest in the Indian subcontinent as an area of expansion.

A recurring characteristic of most famous terrorist leaders in the modern age has been their ability to carry out large-scale attacks that gain media attention whenever they seek to establish their outfit’s name on the global arena. Prior to 9/11 and just days after he declared his famous 1998 fatwa against the USA, Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda carried out a bomb blast at the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. Salbi has not done so in the months after his appointment – and given his aforementioned complex regarding his position and the murmurs against him in the Arab ranks of the Islamic State’s leadership – he is looking for an opportunity to establish himself as an appropriate or even greater successor to Baghdadi, on the same level as him and Bin Laden.

The lone-wolf attacks that ISIS has sponsored or carried out also provide inkling regarding ISIS targets in India or Indian national interests. The fact that the London Bridge attacker Usman Khan was of Pakistani-origin and had at one time planned to achieve ‘first-hand’ experience in conducting terror attacks in Kashmir before setting up a madrassa in PoK, helps provide a glimpse of ISIS’ plans to foment terror in post-Article 370 and 35A Kashmir. ISIS’ attack on naval boats in the Maldives is also extremely relevant to Indian national security. The attacks on naval boats are ISIS’ signal to India and China too – both nations are vying for naval influence in the Maldives. Furthermore, given the Maldives’ proximity to Lakshadweep, which ISIS had attempted infiltrating from Sri Lanka in May 2019, it is crucial that South Block consider any ISIS activity in Maldives from a national security perspective.

More recently, ISIS attempted to exploit communal rioting and civil unrest in India to attempt establishing a foothold in the country. In February 2020, ISIS, specifically its sub-unit the Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP), which operates in Afghanistan and South and Central Asia began circulating cherry-picked images of the Northeast Delhi riots to instigate communal tension in the country and widen its recruitment pool. The next month, in its second issue of Voice of Hind, ISKP attempted to continue fanning the flames of communal tension by calling for lone-wolf attacks on policemen and Indian Army officers using “vehicle attacks, knife and axe attacks, arson and poisoning.” This highlights two issues. One, that ISIS under Salbi has firmly targeted India as its next base of operations. Two, that Salbi’s above mentioned desperation, which had earlier translated into lone-wolf attacks in the UK and the Maldives, will soon manifest in India as a result of this desperation. Delhi Police’s arrest of an ISKP-linked Kashmiri couple who had been instigating the riots in February underscores the fact that ISIS aims to use domestic unrest in India as a tool to grow in strength.

Ramifications of the Central Asian Connection

As an embattled and humiliated US withdraws from the wastes of Afghanistan, it leaves ISIS with an opening to expand its influence in Central Asia. Expansion into Central Asia, which ISIS had already achieved to a certain extent under Baghdadi, was forecast to accelerate under Salbi, who himself is of Central Asian ethnicity (Turkmen). This has major security repercussions for India, since Central Asia is India’s opening into Afghanistan and Pakistan, and provides a key source of fighters for the ISI-backed Afghan Taliban.

The ISKP-sponsored attacks in Tajikistan, in particular, are of concern. Among the first ISIS-sponsored attacks under Salbi’s leadership took place in Tajikistan in November 2019, with an ambush on a Tajik checkpoint on the country’s border with Uzbekistan. The location of the attack holds particular significance. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an ISKP-affiliate, provides ISIS with fighters to use in Afghanistan and Pakistan – the attack was hence a signal to the Uzbek government that Tajikistan was being looked at as a base for ISIS movements targeting the Central Asian heartland in Uzbekistan.

This is particularly worrying from an Indian perspective. Tajikistan is home to Farkhor Air Base, India’s only overseas military base. Given its history of providing anti-Islamist fighters in neighbouring Afghanistan with shelter and medical aid in the 1990s (the Indian Air Force medical facility at Farkhorwas where Ahmad Shah Massoud, the ‘Lion of Panjshir’ and the leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Front breathed his last in 2001) and coupled with ISKP’s above mentioned encouragement of attacks on Indian military installations, the Farkhor Air Base will most probably become a key target of attack by the ISIS in the near future. Hence, our political leadership and the MEA must start formulating steps to protect Indian soldiers and military infrastructure on the base at the moment.

The post Revival of ISIS and Security Implications For India (Part 1) appeared first on IMR.

All four suicide bombers, who attacked Dharamshala, were killed by Afghan security forces after nearly six hours of fighting. There were about 150 people inside the temple.

Even while the grieving Afghan Sikhs were cremating the victims , a bomb exploded nearby creating further scare in the area.

The massacre was the second ISIS attack on a religious minority in March; a gathering of the predominantly Shia Hazara ethnic minority was also attacked earlier this month, with more than 30 people killed.

Islamic State’s (IS) Amaq media claimed the Kabul gurudwara attack was a “revenge for the Muslims in Kashmir.” Indian security analysts believe that the sophistication of the well planned attack on the gurudwara had characteristics of a more evolved, well trained IS-K.

A spokesman for the Taliban, which signed a withdrawal deal with the US government, on 29 February, and is moving towards intra-Afghan talks, was quick to deny any responsibility in the killings.

Afghan and Western security agencies believed that the strike was ordered by Quetta Shura of Taliban at the behest of Pakistani deep state with the larger motive of driving out India from Afghanistan. The entire operation was code-named Blackstar by the Pakistan intelligence, which used the Haqqani network led by Taliban’s deputy commander Sirajuddin Haqqani and elements of LeT.

Sikhs in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s tiny Sikh community is one of few religious minorities in the country, protected by law but frequently targeted by extremists and subject to discrimination. Thirty years ago it was 500,000 strong, but after decades of conflict and the rise of the Taliban – who ordered Sikhs to wear yellow armbands – many sought asylum in India and the community was thought to have been reduced to about 300 families.

In 2018 a convoy of Sikhs and Hindus travelling to meet the president, Ashraf Ghani, was targeted by an Islamic suicide bomber.

Pakistan’s Proxy ISKP

One of the terrorists killed by the Afghan security forces has been identified as Mohsin (with several aliases), 29, from Kerala. He was reportedly a school dropout who left for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) more than two years ago and found his way into Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).

Pakistan’s involvement in Mohsin’s training was also apparent from the video that was released soon after the attack. It mimicked what is typically heard from terrorists in similar situations in Kashmir. He also spoke in Urdu, the language used by Pakistan for training and handling terrorists.

IS-K is a branch of ISIS. Khorasan is a historical region comprising the present territories of north-eastern Iran, much of Central Asia, parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. IS-K came into existence in 2015, with defectors from the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP). It is active in the border region of eastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan.

In November 2019, after a two-month-long operation, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), supported by Popular Uprising Forces and the United States Air Force, killed 50 terrorists and more than 250 ISKP members surrendered. They were mostly Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, Jordanian, Kazakhs, Maldivians, Tajiks and Uzbeks.

IS-Khorasan, which attacked Kabul gurdwara, is led by 43-year-old Mawlawi Aslam Farooqi , an ex- Lashkar-e-(LeT) Taiba man. LeT is proscribed by the UN as a terrorist organisation and is linked to the Pakistani security establishment. It is a loose conglomerate of several jihadist tanzeem with differing targets and aims. The group’s relations with the Taliban, and with Pakistan, are critical elements in its still evolving identity.

Farooqi took charge of the IS-KP in April 2019, according to a report submitted to the UN Security Council in July 2019 by a UN committee that monitors Daesh (or Islamic State), al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The report said Farooqi (also spelt Faruqi), who had been previously in charge of IS-K operations in the Khyber region on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, was promoted to the leadership in place of Mawlawi Zia ul-Haq in April 2019.

Aslam Farooqi was arrested by Afghan authorities on 5 April. Pakistan was quick to ask Afghianistan to hand over Farooqi to it for anti-Pakistan activities in Afghanistan. A Pak Foreign Office statement said the Afghanistan ambassador to Pakistan was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convey Pakistan’s views with regard to the arrest of Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K) leader Farooqi, which was announced on April 5.

In his book The Islamic State in Kohrasan – Afghanistan, Pakistan and the new Central Asian Jihad, Antonio Giustozzi, a well known academic who has written extensively on the IS and Afghanistan, has provided a detailed account of the rise of Farooqi in IS-K. Giustozzi says Farooqi was chosen as the “governor of Khorasan” by the military shura of IS-K on May 22, 2018, a year earlier than what the UN report says. Two months later, in July 2018, IS-K claimed an attack on a convoy of Sikhs and Hindus in Jalalabad, in which 19 people were killed, 13 of them Sikhs.

Pakistan seems to be using IS-K to get a free-run against India’s interests intensify its proxy war against India. It is particularly helpful to Pakistan that IS-K has recruits from India among other countries.

In February 2020, Islamic State’s new digital magazine, Sawt-ul-Hind, (Voice of Hindustan), referred to the communal violence in northeast Delhi to incite Muslims in India, “Democracy is not going to save you…only Sharia implemented in its purity in the shade of Khilafah (the caliphate) can now save you.”

In a combined reference to the US-Taliban agreement and the Delhi riots, Al-Qaeda’s wing, Ghazwat-ul-Hind (Conquest of India) said, “these glorious times when the crusaders army in Khorasan have signed the final document of their defeat and in such a hopeful season when Indian Muslims have decided not to bear the atrocity and oppression of Hindu polytheist groups”, and that the jihadists in Kashmir will be energised by these events.

Haqqani Network

According to counter-terror analysts, the Haqqani network comprises mainly of Zardan tribe based in Nangarhar, Khost, Nuristan and Kunar provinces, which is in direct conflict with the miniscule Sikh community over land in Jalalabad and trade in Kabul.

On July 1, 2019, the Haqqani network targeted the Sikh community in Jalalabad as they came to meet President Ashraf Ghani during his visit to Nangarhar province. In both cases, the Islamic State was allowed to take credit for the attack.

Comments

The Taliban’s operational leadership is now in the hands of Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani group, which has been blamed for several attacks on Indian targets, including the 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul. The Taliban have denied having anything to do with the gurdwara attack, and Pakistan has condemned it strongly. Who, really, is the IS-K in Afghanistan is a question that security experts have been asking for some time now.

Some analysts were puzzled over why the LeT would target the Sikh community at a time when, according to these officials, Pakistan has gone out of its way to woo this Indian minority group, especially since mid-2018, through the Kartarpur Corridor initiative.

Pakistan is setting sights on forcing India out of Afghanistan post withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan. With Taliban, Haqqani network, LeT and JeM all under control of the Pakistani deep state, Afghanistan again will provide strategic space to its terrorist arm for controlling Kabul and hitting at Kashmir.

Some estimates indicate that since 2016, around 100 people from India, mostly from Kerala, have joined the ISIS. Some of them travelled to the Gulf, and from there into the folds of ISIS in Iraq-Syria, and Afghanistan.

It is, therefore, important that immediate measures must be taken to limit this new virus being unleashed by Pakistan-ISI. First, India needs to institute measures to keep a vigil on its workforce in the Gulf countries, to safeguard their men being recruited by ISIS and other terrorist groups. Second, India must be even more mindful for the need for social cohesion, as its politico-economic-religious fault lines are being exploited for propaganda and potential recruitment. Third, India must work together with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Central Asian Republics, to check the IS-K.

Intra-Afghan Talks in Trouble

Taliban will not take part in intra-Afghan talks until the Afghan government releases about 5,000 of their prisoners, it said on 2 March, presenting a partial end to the truce and a major possible barrier to ending the war.  The statement came as a bombs went off during a football match the same day in Khost in eastern Afghanistan, killing three people and injuring 11 others.

The limited truce between the Taliban, US and Afghan forces preceded the signing of a landmark deal between the insurgents and Washington in Doha on 29 February. The agreement sets out a timetable for foreign forces to quit Afghanistan within 14 months, subject to Taliban security guarantees and a pledge by the insurgents to hold talks with the Kabul government. Under the accord, the two sides are committed to working towards the release of combat and political prisoners as a confidence-building measure.

Prisoners’ Release

The Taliban announced they would resume attacks against Afghan forces, a day after President Ashraf Ghani warned he was not committed to a key clause in the Doha deal involving the release of thousands of Taliban prisoners. The agreement calls for up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners to be freed in exchange for up to 1,000 Afghan government captives by March 10. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, not involved in the talks, has rejected that demand.

Ghani’s government was not part of the Doha accord, so while the agreement states that the “United States commits to completing this goal” of releasing the Taliban prisoners, it is unclear how that can happen if Kabul is on board. Any prisoner release is “not in the authority of the US, it is in the authority of the Afghan government,” Ghani said.

“It could be included in the agenda of the intra-Afghan talks, but cannot be a prerequisite for talks.” The Taliban had, until now, refused to negotiate with Ghani’s administration – which they considered a US puppet regime – but the withdrawal agreement hinges on Kabul and the insurgents reaching a separate peace deal through “intra-Afghan” negotiations.

The Taliban believe that the Americans have committed to securing the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for 1,000 Afghan soldiers held by the Taliban before any intra-Afghan negotiations commence. They have termed as unsatisfactory the phased release that Ghani has proposed viz 1,500 before the talks commence and the remaining 3,500 to be released in batches of 500 every two weeks after the start of direct talks between the Taliban and a negotiating team appointed by the Afghan government, and the further condition that prisoners released provide a written pledge not to return to fighting.

Iran’s Stand

Iran also dismissed the US-Taliban agreement saying that the US had no legal standing to sign an agreement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. “Iran welcomes any initiative that helps to secure stability and peace in Afghanistan, but that will only be possible through domestic talks and by taking into consideration the interest of Afghanistan’s neighbours,” Iran’s foreign ministry said.

It may be in America’s interest, and that of its allies, including principal regional ally India, to continue supporting the people of Afghanistan and their government with badly needed aid. This may help moderate the Taliban, who may now be expected to call the shots and dominate other political trends. Perhaps this will help keep Afghanistan on its version of the democratic track.

Funding

Funding of Afghan security will play a role in the success of the peace deal. The United States Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, governed by a US-Afghan agreement, pays for equipping and running Afghanistan’s security forces. The ASFF was about $4.9 billion annually, reduced to about $1 billion from the current $6.5 billion. The Trump administration the Taliban know that maintaining this level of funding till 2024 is not likely, particularly when there are no foreign troops present.

India can have a role to play in this if in the changed context it is able to persuade all Afghans, including the Taliban, that its friendship is for the people of Afghanistan and not any particular political dispensation. Only such an outlook on India’s part can keep Afghanistan out of Pakistan’s pernicious grip even when the Taliban are in command.

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The role of Big Tech in challenging the idea of democracy, idea of government and the idea of the nation itself in the battlefields of public opinion is one of the most crucial and least discussed subjects of our time.

Today, we are observing a strange scenario where Google search algorithms can be corrected on demand (from Muslim community) to display the desired results on the search of words like “Jihad” and “Sharia” but newsfeeds  on a democratically elected government’s decisive moves – from Article 370 to Ayodhya verdict to CAA – can never be sorted to reflect the truth, balanced and real information. Big Tech platforms like Facebook, which supports “voice and free expression” can openly assure full support to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for their brutal blasphemy laws but when the security agencies of democratic countries like India seek their cooperation in decrypting terrorists’ communications and ask for data on potential national security threats, they play the weird “privacy” card. On one such hearing on privacy rights (October 2019) India’s Attorney General KK Venugopal told the Supreme Court that “a terrorist cannot claim privacy,” and these Big internet platforms “can’t come into the country and say we will establish a non-decryptable system.”

From many years, headlines about China’s counterfeiting and hacking capabilities and its censorship on internet/US tech products have caught attention the world over. From 2016, Russia’s attempts to influence U.S. elections have also been subject of popular discussion but, in between all these somewhere, serious threats that Big tech products (Google, Facebook, Twitter, etc) can pose to national security, often get ignored.

There is a need to remember that, in 2014, Islamic State’s invasion of Iraq launched with the Twitter hash tag #AllEyesOnISIS, which later become its key propaganda machine and ISIS leveraged these popular tech platforms particularly Facebook and Twitter as its key instruments. From recruiting terrorists to calling foreign fighters (from some 100 countries) and to making Islamic State’s propaganda viral across the continents, these apps had facilitated almost everything.

These Big Tech platforms proudly claim that their goal is to provide the “power of voice” to billions of people across the world but does that claim give an excuse and scope for the exploitation of the same platforms by the terrorist elements too. Jihadist use of Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, etc. is a hugely debated issue and with each passing year new dimensions are emerging – merely discussing them as they come to notice is not sufficient.

Sometime back android users of India have reported an app called “2020 Sikh Referendum” which was made available for download on Google Playstore – the official app store for Android apps. This app was linked to the US-based separatist group “Sikhs for Justice”, which the Indian government had banned in July 2019 for spreading secessionism and carrying out anti-national activities. In November 2019, on similar lines, it came to notice that some Apps at Google Playstorewere spreading literature on ‘Ghazwa-e-hind’ – a Islamic doctrine aimed at the conquest of India, which Pakistani terrorists groups were propagating since several decades. According to some social media users, who first reported this app, more than 5000 users had downloaded that app from the Google Playstore before it came to adverse notice.

Misinformation Campaigns on CAA

One of the most recent examples of these popular tech products’ experiments was seen in India, where, on the issue of amendments in the Citizenship Act, hundreds of people from the Muslim community, backed by Communist Party of India (CPI and CPI-M) and some opposition leaders, put the lives and properties of the common people in danger. The manner in which mobs organized via social media apps terrorized the common people including school going kids, attacked public transportation&railways, burned several buses and private vehicles and attacked the police and security agencies with stones and bricks in different locations – was disturbing for all democratic societies.

During January, security agencies traced more than 5,000 Pakistan-based social media handles, which were involved in actively spreading false propaganda on CAA. Some of them were using deep fake videos of protests to incite communal violence in the country. When violent protests in Jamia Millia Islamia and Jawaharlal Nehru universities broke out, then these Pakistan-backed Twitter handles, Facebook posts and YouTube videos were used widely to spread incitement and hatred against the Indian government and Delhi Police. The problem escalated to an extent that the Ministry of Home Affairs had to issue an advisory to States and Union Territories to act against fake news and rumors on social media.

Pakistan’s Warfare of Narratives

Lately, Opposition parties have repeatedly questioning the Modi government’s decision to shutdown the Internet in Jammu & Kashmir (after the abrogation of Article 370) and tried hard to internationalize the issue but they have completely rejected the alarming incidents, which have shaped a new form of militancy in the region. In promoting militants and their ideas, these popular tech products are playing a key role. Militants do not now need print or electronic media’s support to spread their “Call for Jihad.” They can simply share their videos or pictures on social media platforms and before they come to the notice of the security agencies, they reach thousands of users.

In 2017, nearly 300 WhatsApp groups (each with around 250 members) were caught mobilizing and coordinating with stone-pelters in Kashmir to disrupt the operations of the security forces by attacking them during crucial operations. Due to their in-built end-to-end encryption features, these apps facilitate in the communication/coordination of the militants. In 2013, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) expanded rapidly across all social media platforms and held Social Media workshops at Faislabad, Islamabad and Karachi. In December 2015, LeT chief Hafiz Saeed launched his cyber cell. In April 2017, Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) issued multiple advertisements for social media workshops, which sought volunteers for instigating unrest in the Valley and the cyber team of JuD North Punjab openly posted their campaign posters on Twitter and Facebook with “Join #SocialMedia workshops to know Social Media as an instrument for Kashmir uprise 2k17” kind of statements.

This ‘warfare of the narratives’ has gained new momentum with each passing year. In April 2019, a network of more than 100 Facebook and Instagram pages, run by the employees of the Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) wing of the Pakistani military, was caught spreading anti-India propaganda and intense hate content. By disguising themselves as Kashmir activists’ voices these Facebook and Instagram pages/groups were involved in openly facilitating a coordinated strategy of the Pakistani Army. Some of these accounts had been active for five to six years; they spent dollars on Facebook ads to promote aggressive content against India and were openly mobilizing the followers and support for their radical Islamist ideas but strangely remained unnoticed by Facebook itself.

Even U.S. President Donald Trump has tweeted how US-based Big tech companies have not coordinated with his government and security agencies in dealing with criminals, terrorists and drug dealers. When these companies are ignorant about their home country’s national security concerns can we expect them to take our national security concerns seriously?

Time to Step In

These platforms are now becoming the facilitators of Jihadist actors’ intra-group financing and communication tools. Research conducted by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism highlights how the terrorists use these social media platforms to report about the live status of their operations to their fellow members through pictures, videos, and written statements and to circulate messages among their network.

Launched with the promise of promoting innovation and creativity, these digital and social media products are now the facilitators of lone-wolf attackers. According to a recent study (on 700 terrorists, who took part in 560 attacks in Israel) conducted by Israel’s Public Security Ministry and International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 60 per cent of lone-wolf terrorists, who carried out attacks from 2015 to 2017, posted preliminary information regarding their intentions on social media and close to 95 per cent of the terrorists used social media at least once before carrying out those attacks, which indicates that an absence of fundamental intelligence and monitoring helped these lone-wolf attackers to fulfill their objectives. If these tech companies had coordinated in time with the security agencies many of those attacks could have been stopped.

It is quite evident that the core purposes of these Big Tech products is not business and profit anymore. They have developed a kind of fantasy to control minds through data and algorithms. Their smart business model allows them to keep the information about their original customers in the shadows.

Even after facing embarrassments from across the world on their careless approach towards terrorist and anti-national uses, instead of developing a mechanism of cooperating with the local governments and their security/counter-terrorism agencies these Big Tech companies decided to establish their own independent counter-terrorism body. In 2017, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and Google’s YouTube founded the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), whose mission statement interestingly says the goal is to “prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms.”

Business and technology are crucial for economic growth, and the concept of “freedom of expression” is one of the essential ingredients of a healthy society. But at the same time, no business idea, activity or product should be allowed to disturb the foundational elements that bind a society and nation together, and can never be allowed to challenge national security goals.

The urgency for disrupting the Big Tech is already there. From time to time our industry leaders and defense personnel have raised voices on the need for building our own tech platforms. The monopoly of only a few foreign tech tycoons is neither a good sign for the tech industry nor our national interests. At the same time, we can neither follow a Chinese model of protectionism nor Islamic nations’ rigid approach. A country like India, which has a surplus of young talent, can deal with this challenge in the Indian way. We have the potential to disrupt the tech industry to make it a level playing field. We can remain open and come up with our popular and robust versions in parallel to Google, Facebookand Twitter.

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