Imran Khan, who was elected as the 22nd prime minister of the country, on 18 August 2018, lost a no-confidence vote in the parliament and, on 11 April 2022, Shehbaz Sharif took oath as Pakistan’s new prime minister. Pakistan’s general elections are due in 2023. Hence, Sharif has just a year in office.

Since its formation 75 years ago, the country has had democratically elected governments for only 53 years. In these 53 years, 19 men and one woman have been prime minister, two of them more than once, and not a single one has ever completed a five-year term. The first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, lasted the longest—four years and 63 days—before he was assassinated.

In his first speech at the national assembly as prime minister, Sharif brought up Kashmir. Claiming that the valley was red with the blood of the Kashmiri people since the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, he said that Pakistan would continue to “raise its voice for Kashmiri brothers and sisters at every forum…they will be provided diplomatic support, we will give them moral support”.

This is as per formula. No Pakistani prime minister can start off without making some belligerent noises about Kashmir. He cannot afford to be seen as being moderate on this issue.

No matter how hard Pakistan’s politicians try to equate India and Pakistan, India is light years ahead of Pakistan economically, technologically, and on every sociological parameter. If the world ever thinks of Pakistan, it is as a hub of Islamist terrorism.

Pakistan’s army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who allegedly played a big part in Khan’s removal, also seems pragmatic, if one goes by his public utterances. “Pakistan will benefit if we improve ties with India,” he said recently. In February last year, he agreed to a ceasefire on the Line of Control and the ceasefire has held. He perhaps realizes that a military engagement with India makes no sense for Pakistan, given the many other problems the country faces.

Pakistan’s powerful military has traditionally controlled foreign and defence policy, thereby limiting the impact of political instability. India is aware of the dynamic of civil-military imbalance in Pakistan and the risk of blowback from the military establishment against India whenever there is momentum for bilateral cooperation.

Pakistan’s Economy

Pakistan’s current account deficit is around 4 per cent of GDP. Pakistan owes $122 billion—a third of its GDP—to various multilateral organisations and nations like China and Saudi Arabia. Foreign currency reserves, already depleted, seem to be now in free fall—in March, they dropped 30 percent from $16.2 billion to $11.3 billion. Interest rates are 12.25 per cent.

Terrorism

The number of terror attacks—and attacks on security forces—by the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, has actually increased since Imran Khan, the army and the ISI celebrated the (original) Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August last year.

The TTP has strong links with the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and has the tacit support of the Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan remains on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money-laundering and terrorist-financing watchdog, precariously perched above the black list. After the 2+2 meeting between the defence and external affairs ministers of India and the US, on 12 April, the two countries issued a joint statement asking Pakistan to take “immediate, sustained, and irreversible action” to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks and called for the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack and the 2016 Pathankot attack to be brought to justice.

Afghanistan

Ties between Pakistan’s ISI and the Afghan Taliban have loosened in recent years. The Taliban government is facing an economic and humanitarian crisis due to a lack of money and international isolation.

Tensions have risen between the Taliban and Pakistan’s military, which has lost several soldiers in attacks close to their mutual border. Pakistan wants the Taliban to do more to crack down on extremist groups and worries they will spread violence into Pakistan. That has begun to happen already.

Imran Khan, who was less critical of the Taliban over human rights than most foreign leaders, is no longer there to support the Taliban.

China-Pakistan

The only piece of good news for them seems to be that China has reiterated that it considers Pakistan an “all-weather strategic cooperation partner” and “iron-clad brother” and praised Sharif’s commitment to the $60-billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

The CPEC was actually conceptualised and launched under Pakistan’s two established political parties, both against Khan. Shehbaz Sharif struck deals with China directly as leader of the eastern province of Punjab. Sharif will defend and push the corridor.

United States-Pakistan

Pakistan is not a priority for President Joe Biden, who is grappling with the war in Ukraine, unless it led to mass unrest or rising tensions with India. Since the military calls the shots on the policies that the U.S. really cares about, i.e. Afghanistan, India and nuclear weapons, internal Pakistani political developments are largely irrelevant for the U.S. Khan had blamed the United States for the current political crisis, saying that Washington wanted him removed because of his Moscow trip.

India-Pakistan

Imran Khan’s ambition was to normalise relations with India and play cricket. Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa also spoke about burying the past and focusing on geo-economy. Kashmir is a core issue in its National Security Policy, though Pakistan has tied itself in knots over it, especially after India annulled Article 370. In August 2019, following the approval of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill in Parliament, which revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, further tension resulted between the two countries, with Pakistan downgrading diplomatic ties, closing its airspace, and suspending bilateral trade with India.

Pakistan, today, is desperate to begin a formal dialogue with India which ceased in January 2013 after the beheading of an Indian soldier in J&K. Islamabad is also pressing New Delhi to participate even virtually in the SAARC summit, in abeyance since 2016. India is not budging. India is inflexible and has taken the position “no talks till cross-border terrorism stops.”

When Khan became the prime minister, while speaking at the United States Institute of Peace, he admitted to Pakistan having 40-50,000 terrorists who had fought in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In 2021, after Khan had called the Modi government ‘fascist, unleashing Islamophobia’, India rebutted: ‘The neighbour is an arsonist disguised as a fire-fighter…’

The current cease-fire on LoC — which does not preclude a two-front situation — is the result of one of the many effective back channels.

On Siachen, speaking at the Army Day 2022 media conference, Army Chief Gen Naravane said that demilitarisation of Siachen was possible once Pakistan agreed to marking the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map. In 1988, 1992 and 2006, the two countries came within a whisker of demilitarisation.

Past Attempts at Normalisation

After inaugurating the new Afghan parliament building in Kabul on 25 December 2015, prime minister Narendra Modi, on the way back, unexpectedly landed in Lahore—the political bastion of prime minister Nawaz Sharif – for Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding. The symbolism of an Indian leader setting foot in Pakistan for the first time in 11 years, was unmissable. It riled the military establishment.

India, under Modi, has vigorously pursued a ‘neighbourhood first’ foreign policy. Modi’s vision is to integrate South Asia into a cooperative common space. The deep state in Pakistan pushed back against the attempted normalization of relations with India. Sharif had been ousted once before in a military coup in 1999 for being a ‘traitor’ who came under Indian pressure to withdraw Pakistani troops during the Kargil War. It was clear that the military-intelligence complex in Pakistan calls the shots and reins in politicians who try to cooperate with India.

Former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had also undertaken a bus journey from Amritsar in India to Lahore in February 1999 and was welcomed with open arms by prime minister Sharif. Vajpayee had hailed it as ‘a defining moment in South Asian history,’ but soon thereafter, the Pakistani military infiltrated into Kargil without Sharif’s knowledge and in the two-and-half-month war that followed, India lost 500 of its troops to throw out the infiiltrators.

By 2020, Sharif was in self-imposed exile. He blamed it on the deep state in Pakistan

The Pakistani jihadi attack on the IAF base at Pathankot, on 1 Januray 2016, was undertaken to derail the nascent Modi–Sharif peace process.

Future Prospects

India and Pakistan announced, in February 2022, an agreement to renew the 2003 ceasefire. India’s escalating military confrontation with China provided reason to try and stabilise the Pakistan frontier. But the continuation depends on Islamabad addressing Delhi’s core concerns on cross-border terrorism.

While Kashmir remains at the top of Pakistan’s agenda, it seems open to reviving commercial ties. It announced an intent to import sugar and cotton from India, but the Commerce Ministry’s decision was ostentatiously reversed by Imran Khan by declaring that “Pakistan can’t trade with India when Kashmir was bleeding”.

Islamabad is stuck with preconditions — reversing India’s constitutional changes in Kashmir — it has set for a renewed dialogue with Delhi.

Not talking to Pakistan has few domestic political costs to Delhi. Pakistan will have to lift the preconditions for engagement with India. Gen. Bajwa’s second term as army chief ends in November 2022 amidst sharpening civil-military differences. A lot will depend upon his successor.

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In his report released, on 3 February, on ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, the secretary general said the “best way” to promote stability and future international support was for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power.

“The Taliban are showing efforts to present itself as a caretaker government. The movement, however, has yet to form governing structures that reflect the country’s ethnic, political and geographic diversity and include women. Efforts are constrained by the lack of resources and capacity, as well as an ideology that clashes in many ways with international norms of governance,” he said.

The report added that Afghanistan was experiencing a massive economic contraction. “The best way to promote stability and future international support is for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that characterised its previous experience in power,” Guterres said.

Al Qaeda Still Present

In another report “The 29th edition of the UNSC’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team” the United Nations Security Council said that terror group al-Qaeda’s Indian subcontinent affiliate has retained a presence in at least six provinces of Afghanistan and has approximately 200-400 fighters, including Indian nationals.

The report, which was released, on 7 February, was prepared by a UNSC group that monitors counter-terrorism sanctions targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

“[Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent] retains a presence in Afghanistan, in the provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Paktika and Zabul, where the group fought alongside the Taliban against the ousted government. AQIS is estimated to have between 200 and 400 fighters, mainly from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan,” it said.

The 22-page report, signed by UNSC Committee Chair and Norwegian national Trine Heimerback, also stated that contrary to media reports, Aslam Farooqi, former leader of the Islamic State faction Islamic State — Khorasan Province (ISKP), and alleged mastermind of the March 2020 terror attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, had “escaped” from an Afghanistan prison and “subsequently rejoined the group in a senior capacity”.

Terror Groups Have More Freedom Now

“There are no recent signs that the Taliban has taken steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters in the country. On the contrary, terrorist groups enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in recent history. However, Member States have not reported significant new movements of foreign terrorist fighters to Afghanistan,” the report said. “Primary kinetic threat” in the eyes of the Taliban, contextualising some of the conflicting reporting on ISKP attacks in Afghanistan and the alleged killing of Farooqi. The Uyghur extremist group East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has also backed the Taliban government, the report added.

Islamic State Gaining Ground in West Africa

The report also broadened its focus beyond Afghanistan to track terrorist activity and developments on a global scale, with West Africa representing a particular region of concern where the Islamic State is gaining ground, and Southeast Asia a “bright spot” with ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates suffering defeats. In conflict zones like Iraq, ISIS “has evolved into a primarily rural insurgency” while al-Qaeda allies and affiliates continue to control northwestern Syria.

“Both Indonesia and the Philippines reported significant gains in countering threats from ISIL and Al-Qaida affiliates in the South-East Asia region, leading to an overall decline in terrorist activity and some optimism that the operational capability of the groups may be significantly degraded,” the report revealed, adding that lone-wolf attacks are still an ongoing risk.

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Since the US evacuation, IS-K has claimed many attacks in Afghanistan. According to U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) an aggregate of 77 attacks were recorded, directly or indirectly claimed by or attributed to IS-K from January through April 2021. It was reported that ISIS was responsible for the deaths of at least 124 civilians during the first half of 2021, according to another UNAMA report. Some of the major attacks in first half of 2021 included:

• May 8th: A car bombing and two other explosions resulting in deaths of 85 people and casualties over 275 at Sayed ul Shuhada High School for girls. The targeted group was the Hazara, who were the attendees. According to U.S. intelligence, ISIS was responsible while Afghan President Ashraf Ghani held the Taliban responsible.

• June 8th: ISIS claimed another attack, ISK gunmen killed 11 men and injured 15 others at a camp near Shaikh Jalal village in northern Baghlan province.

• August 26th: ISIS carried out twin bombings outside Kabul airport that killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members as mentioned earlier.

• October 8th: IS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shia Mosque in Kunduz province, killing more than 72 civilians.

• October 15th: This was followed by another attack on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on Oct 15th. 63 civilians were killed and dozens were left injured during the Friday prayer.

The attacks on 8 and 15 October were claimed by IS-K and carefully planned, with the intention of garnering enough attention while targeting Shias in their homes and centres. ISK being a Sunni group has often reiterated their intention of killing the Shia and Hazara, whom they view as heretics. 10% of the population of Afghanistan is considered to be Shia Muslims, with many also a part of the Hazara community. It is no surprise the attack on Kandahar Mosque were meticulously planned and orchestrated to give a message to the Taliban, owing to the rivalry between the two groups. Kandahar is the second largest city in Afghanistan and also the spiritual birthplace of Taliban.

It is important to note that Taliban had always recognized the threat stemming from the IS-K towards the religious minorities and the ethnic groups in Afghanistan and has failed miserably at adequately preparing for the waves of terror it fore saw. A definite example can be recounted from August 2021 mentioned above. The Taliban officials had consulted with the elders of the Shia community and provided a protective escort on the occasion of Ashura, a Shia religious holiday. Despite the security, IS-K carried attacks erupted not only in the Taliban`s heart land, but the frequency of IS-K claimed attacks only grew since September 2021. Areas around Nangarhar and Kunar, where IS-K primary bases were established saw a flurry of attacks, including a complex attack on a military hospital in which a notable Taliban commander was killed.

Another looming threat emerges from the Afghan soldiers, spies and law enforcement officers who were trained by the US military but are being killed off in the witch hunt carried by Taliban. Left to die and with no means of survival, provides a great opportunity to be recruited by the IS-K.

ISK and Jihad in Khorasan

Jihadism in Khorasan can be attributed to many factors and origins. The Afghan jihad predominantly emerged as a retaliation of the Taliban emirate which was overthrown by a US-led operation in 2001. Since then, the Taliban strove to return to power, even if it required to coerce the previous Afghan governments to cede some of its power to the outfit. After 2001, Afghan jihad played a dominant role in the region of Khorasan, despite few outfits choosing to take part in it.

 After 2014, the influence of the same Afghan jihad became undermined, as many factions were seen disputing and breaking away. Another significant “cause celebre” of Jihadism to further decline can be attributed to the Syrian war since 2011.

However, by the end of 2014, several groups started linking themselves to ISIS. Initially these groups identified themselves as separate identities. This notion soon changed in 2015, when the IS Central’s Chief spokesperson, Abu Muhammed Adnani announced the establishment of Wilayat Khorasan. After the establishment of the Wilayat, the IS-K teams started referring to themselves as Daesh or Daesh Khorasan or Khilafat Islami.

In the south of Afghanistan, a former Taliban leader and a Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mullah Abdul Raoof Khadim, swore his allegiance to ISIS. In the east, Hafiz Sayed Khan raised the black flag of ISIS. Since then, the group faced several heavy military attacks from the Afghan and coalition forces. This led to the death and capture of over “13,000 of its fighters, including five consecutive emirs, or top leaders”.

However, the group has been quite resilient and successful in substituting and replacing its manpower, while profiting in the opportunity of Taliban exiting the war theatre, since August, to expand its outreach. According to several IS-K interviews, IS-K currently operates in areas such as eastern and northern Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. It has already started to absorb many Taliban fighters; Baluchi insurgents and members of various outfits aggrieved with the Pakistani government or share the same ideology as itself or those who choose to seek profits or employment from the illicit dealings found in the region. Interestingly it is reported that IS-K has also succeeded in fostering relationships with outfits which previously worked with the Taliban, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and various others to name a few.

It is imperative to understand that part of the IS-K strategy was to use Afghanistan as a “spring board” for itself in the Khorasan region. Khorasan is a strategically located region with access to Central Asia and at the same time also one of the weakest regions in the area due to the least territorial control from its competitors. From the recent attacks in Kabul and Kunduz, it is becoming apparent that like its parent organization IS-Central, it has started implementing the “Blitzkreig” approach over the insurgent approach, which is to “concentrate force to achieve local superiority” and fastidiously destroy the enemies.

IS-K`s Aims

• Prominence in Khorasan: One of the immediate goals of IS-K was to embed itself in pockets of Khorasan. In the initial stage, at its most vulnerable, it failed at coexisting in the region as it was heavily laden with TTP, Taliban, the Afghan and the Pakistani groups. Their small numbers made it less viable to gain traction and prove their visibility to their recruits and donors who were seeking new experiments to fund. The IS-K propaganda was further subdued and their efforts at raising local taxes was banned, perhaps to avoid friction with Taliban and TTP. Given such a scenario, the outfit for a long time refrained from challenging any military force in the past.

• Shopping for Funding: In order to gain funding, the idea was to sell a jihadist cause, which would set well with the donors and present the outfit funds for its existence. In the past, the group promised radical Chinese Muslim groups that it planned to commence its operations in China. This was later linked to the funds which IS-K acquired from the private donors in the Arab Gulf for the very same project pitched to the Chinese Muslim groups. The familiarity with the Huis in Syria and Iraq prompted the IS central to conceive this project while viewing Han China as the new arena for waging jihad. The IS Central too, managed to build close relations with the Uyghurs of ETIM over the years and has succeeded in attracting many recruits from the Chinese Muslim communities. Even though China does not fall under IS-K’s territorial responsibility, the group continues to nurture the Chinese Muslims in Khorasan while utilizing the funds collected on behest of the community. The relation with the Huis is also strongly maintained despite the amicable relation IS-K shares with the Turkestan Islamic Party. It is evident, IS has been keen on Huis and intends to aid in the formation of a jihadist Hui movement in China.

• Retaliating for Syria: Retaliating against Iran gained an important premise compared to targeting the western targets for their intervention in Iraq and Syria. This philosophy applied to any affiliate of Iran. Russian assets in Afghanistan and Central Asia also served as targets and this provided IS-K to be useful to IS Central.

• Establishing safe havens for its fighters and forming an army: Setting up safe havens for its group was clearly imperative for ISK, in order to host its leaders from the central if required and for sustaining its existence from the growing repression it was to face from Taliban. In 2016, the ISK chiefs stated the plans to establish a primary safe haven in Kunar. In order to set their plan in motion the ISK fighters had tried to build a close rapport with the local communities and chiefs to use the area as a safe operating ground. IS-K, on the same line with its parent organization has constantly intended to develop facilities for organizing a centralized hybrid military force for quick deployment of well-trained fighters to out manoeuvre adversaries and disperse them when required.

• Garnering and mobilizing local support to dominate Jihad in Khorasan: Initially ISK had little to no support from the local communities except from specific jihadist groups and clerical networks. In order to increase its outreach, ISIS started par taking in local disputes, reinvigorating conflicts especially the sectarian ones, while attempting to lead any conflict which would help in overthrowing the previous Kabul government or any central Asian regimes.

It is clear that ISK intends to eventually over throw the Taliban regime and substitute it with its rule, as it has intended in Iraq and Syria. Its aspirations largely lay with the strategy laid by IS central. It has been effectively absorbing fighters from Taliban and various insurgent if not jihadist groups. This is also the primary reason why Tehran was not supportive of Kabul Taliban reconciliation, fearing it would only strengthen ISK. The IS-K strategy has remained coherent throughout the years, it aims at the maximizing pressure in areas where the resistance is weakest and polarizing violence IS-K’s aims to some extent have resonated with its parent organization the IS-Central, but have often seen fluctuating as well. Regardless of being called a franchise of the IS-Central, IS-K has on various occasions strategically established safe havens for its leaders and command centres, proving that it was more than a replicated clone of the IS- Central in form of anti-Shia campaign. Its efforts at Re-launching and expanding sectarian conflicts in Khorasan is a well-known IS-K strategy, which it continues to implement to create a social constituency for itself among a Sunni population and to implant itself in the political crevices of countries such as Iran, Pakistan and India as well. It poses a very high profile threat to India and will have to be watched closely.

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With the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (IS) group has threatened to usher in another violent phase. There has been a sudden uptick in IS attacks since the Taliban takeover on 15 August.

Two deadly bombings have hit Kabul. One was outside the airport at the height of evacuations before the U.S. exit that killed 169 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members. Another deadly bombing, on 8 October, in the northern province of Kunduz killed 46 worshippers inside a mosque frequented by Shiites. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Afghanistan-based arm of the terrorist organisation, has claimed responsibility. Earlier, on October 3, a bomb targeted a memorial service being held for the mother of the Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, in a Kabul mosque, killing five. All these attacks suggest that the IS-K’s ability to strike has grown. Other deadly IS attacks have struck in the capital, Kabul, and provinces to the east and north, while smaller-scale attacks target Taliban fighters almost daily.

Now that the US and the international presence is mostly gone, the IS was going after the state, which is now the Taliban.

Hatred Towards Shiias

The IS’s doctrinal hatred towards the Shias is known. In Iraq and Syria, it systematically targeted Shias, who it calls “rejectionists” of faith, and used such attacks to mobilise the support of Sunni hardliners and trigger sectarian conflicts.

Long Rivalry

Both the Taliban and IS advocate rule by their radical interpretations of Islamic law. But there are key ideological differences that fuel their hatred of each other. The Taliban say they are creating an Islamic state in Afghanistan, within the borders of that country. The Taliban downplay IS’s capabilities and dismiss them as a fringe group with no mainstream appeal.
IS says it is the Islamic State, a global caliphate that it insists all Muslims must support. It is contemptuous of the Taliban’s nationalist goals and doesn’t recognize them as a pure Islamic movement. For similar reasons, IS has long been a staunch enemy of al-Qaida.

Both the Taliban and IS advocate particularly harsh versions of Islamic Shariah law and have used tactics like suicide bombers. But when it ruled territory in Syria and Iraq, IS was even more brutal and carried out more horrific punishments than the Taliban did.

IS emerged in Afghanistan in 2015 with the name Islamic State in Khorasan Province, at a time when the group was at its peak, controlling much of Iraq and Syria. It drew members from Afghan and Pakistani militants, including a wave of Taliban defectors.

The group initially found support among Afghanistan’s small Salafist movement in eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. The Salafis had largely been marginalized by the Taliban, and by connecting with the rising IS, the Salafist movement found a means to establish military strength.
But IS’s brutal ways have since led some Salafi clerics to voice opposition. In the years after its emergence, IS was badly hurt by military setbacks at the hands of the Taliban and by U.S. airstrikes, before surging again the past year.

End Game

The IS’s immediate aim is to destabilize the Taliban and shatter the group’s image as a guardian of security.
For now, its strategy is slow and methodical. It is reaching out to tribes and other groups to recruit from their ranks while stamping out dissent among moderate Salafis and carrying out jailbreaks, assassinations, and attacks on Taliban personnel.
The Taliban are also strong and can uproot IS on their own, even without the backup of U.S. airstrikes that nearly eliminated IS. The IS — unlike the Taliban during their insurgency — do not have access to safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.
The Taliban have rejected cooperating with the U.S. against IS.

IS’s future trajectory in Afghanistan will depend largely on its ability to recruit more members and win over large segments of the population. Since their inception, they have been poaching Taliban members.

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While both groups have used tactics of terror, the IS-K is a pan-Islamist jihadist outfit, while the Taliban are largely a Pashtun nationalist militancy. The rise of the IS-K poses multiple challenges to the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan, which many in Afghanistan and Pakistan saw as a solution to the country’s security woes. On one side, their promise to provide security looks hollow. Afghanistan’s cities under the Taliban remain as insecure as they were under the previous Islamic Republic. On the other hand, even if the Taliban, under pressure from Afghanistan’s donors and the public, want to make some concessions on the many restrictions already imposed, they would come under pressure from the more extremist IS-K, which says the Taliban are not Islamic enough. For the people of Afghanistan, who are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, the war that started 40 years ago continues, no matter who is in power in Kabul.

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