On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the Changpa tribes of Tibet, on the north bank of the lake. Till 1958, the fort and the premises marked the Sino-Indian border where the Indian Army had an observation post. The Chinese overran the area in 1958 and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) now runs nearly 20km west of Khurnak.

India has been closely monitoring Chinese activity in Khurnak since January, but could not do much as the construction was happening within the territory under Chinese control. The first bridge, which was completed in April, is being used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to transport construction equipment to build the second bridge.

Latest satellite images show that the new bridge is bigger and wider—it is 450m long and 10m wide—and is meant for faster movement of not just troops and vehicles, but even tanks. It is expected to be ready by July. The bridge will cut the distance from Rudok—the PLA’s main base servicing its deployments in the Pangong area—to the LAC to about 50km, from the existing distance of over 200km.

Background

India and China have been locked in the border row since April-May 2020, and despite disengagement of soldiers at Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake and Gogra, the two sides still have around 60,000 troops each and advanced weaponry deployed in the Ladakh theatre.

In May 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a brawl near Pangong Tso, causing serious injuries to both sides. A month later, a deadly clash in the Galwan valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel Santosh Babu. It was the first time in nearly five decades that fatalities were reported on the LAC, and it triggered massive deployment of troops and heavy weapons by both armies.

As of now, military disengagement has only taken place in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso (both banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs area. The Indian army wants PLA to first restore April 2020 status quo ante in PPT 15 and then resolve the patrolling issues in Depsang Bulge  (south of DBO sector) and the Charding Nulllah Junction in Demchok. Till the time these military objectives are achieved, New Delhi is in no mood to normalize ties with Beijing.

Importance of Pangong Tso

Pangong Tso is a 130-km-long lake, approximately one-third of which is in India and the remainder in China with width varying from one to five km is a major obstacle. The water body is of immense strategic importance as it offers suitable avenue for undertaking major operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Khurnak Fort in 1958 and later in 1959 also established a camp at Maldo- Spanggur Lake area, South of Pangong Tso.

During the 1962 war, Chinese offensive to clear Indian defensive localities on the Northern Bank was launched from Khurnak Fort garrison on October 22. The Chinese were able to capture Indian positions from Sirijap right up to Finger 2 in just two days. However, for progressing operations south of Pangong Tso, PLA had to take a tactical pause of more than three weeks as it had to circumvent the lake to concentrate forces at Rudok.

Second Bridge

The Chinese are constructing another bridge over Pangong Tso; adjacent to the one built few months earlier in the Khurnak Fort area, barely 25 km east of the LAC. It is a double-span bridge, capable of ferrying heavier equipment like tanks and artillery guns. China’s overdrive to upgrade infrastructure, both military and civil, part of ‘dual use’ policy, all along the LAC indicates its larger design with serious ramifications.

In May 2020, PLA’s aggression in Pangong Tso area was confined to the northern side only. When the Indian Army occupied the Kailash Range South of Pangong Tso on the night of August 29-30, 2020 as counter to the Chinese actions, PLA was again handicapped due to the constraints of shifting troops from north to the south of Pangong Tso. To obviate this, China has now gone on to build twin bridges at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso, which cuts down the distance to Rudok by almost 150 km and movement time from 10 to barely 3 hours.

Satellite imagery shows the new bridge is being constructed parallel to the first bridge, which is narrower and was completed in April. The first bridge is being used to move equipment such as cranes needed to build the second one, which will be capable of accommodating larger and heavier vehicles such as tanks.

Both structures are located across the narrowest section of the 134-km-long lake. They will cut the distance between Chinese troop positions on the north bank to a key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Rutog, on the eastern end of the lake, by around 150 km.

Kailash Range

On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, India took control of several key heights lying vacant since 1962, including Rezang La, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Maggar Hill of the Kailash range, overlooking China’s Moldo garrison.

The military assessment is that not only does the twin bridge cut the road loop to Rudog base but also allows for faster deployment were India to enact the August 29-21, 2020, action by suddenly occupying heights on the south banks of the lake. The Indian military action during that period not only took the PLA by surprise but also forced China to settle for military disengagement on both banks of the lake with the creation of buffer zones.

Fingers on the Pangong Tso

On the strategic front, the confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces at Pangong Tso is largely on the eight spurs—called ‘Fingers’ in military parlance—jutting out of the Chang Chenmo range, an eastern extension of the Karakoram Range which ends at the north bank of Pangong Tso. Traditionally, India exerted control up to Finger 4 and has claimed up to Finger 8 from where the Indian perception of the LAC starts. India has a permanent position near Finger 3 (named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded Param Vir Chakra after the 1962 war), while China maintains a base east of Finger 8. But over the years, China steadily encroached upon Indian territory. Both sides have now reached an agreement giving India control up to Finger 4 and the rest to China.

Heavy Deployment

Both the armies are matched in deployment across the LAC with Chinese armour and rocket regiments stationed at Rudog base, south of Pangong Tso, and at Xiadullah in the restive Xinjiang military region. The PLA Air Force has stationed its fighters and bombers at Gar Gunsa across Demchok and at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang.

The Indian Army is also fully deployed along the LAC with roads and bridges that can accommodate tanks or armoured personnel carriers all the way up to Daulet Beg Oldi and as many as seven bridges coming up on Galwan river to handle any military emergency.

Until May 2020, Pangong Tso had only minimal military presence. Only one company each of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police were deployed in the area. Now, the entire lake is militarised. The PLA is converting its temporary ammunition dumps, helipads and surface-to-air missile positions into permanent ones. Its soldiers are equipped with howitzers, T-15 light tanks, and Type-81 assault rifles and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers. The PLA has augmented its manpower by deploying two new divisions from the Xinjiang Military District, with elements of motorised infantry, armoured, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments.

On the Indian side, nearly 20,000 troops guard the region, armed with Bofors howitzers and BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles. Armoured columns of T-90 and T-72 tanks are stationed behind. Several news posts with additional deployment and bunkers have come up. A large number of additional battalions have been moved to Ladakh from the western sector. To patrol the lake, Indian Army’s new boats, capable of cruising at a speed of nearly 40kmph with around 20 soldiers, are deployed. Built by Goa Shipyard exclusively for the Army, these advanced boats can be modified to fit light weapons if needed.

The ITBP, the force responsible for guarding the India-China border, too, has made significant enhancements. It has deployed close to 40 per cent additional troops in the area. New border outposts are being created along with infrastructure development of barracks and accommodations for better living conditions, while existing outposts are being further strengthened with additional men and machines. 

Another major problem confounding the security planners is that unlike most other hotspots along the LAC, Pangong Tso is also a popular tourist destination. Pangong Tso and its surroundings were opened up for visitors in the early 1990s, and it became famous after the climax of the 2008 Bollywood movie 3 Idiots, starring Aamir Khan, was filmed near the lake. Ironically, the movie was equally popular in China.

Comments

While the twin bridges in Khurnak Fort area are  beyond the LAC perception of India and hence technically on territory that the PLA occupied in 1959,  Chinese soldiers continue to be forwardly deployed on patrolling point 15, which is in Kugrang Heights and en-route the shortest path from Panging Tso to Galwan Valley.

China’s strategic intent is clear: it plans to keep the positions it recently captured in the Pangong area.

The only feasible response is to have reciprocal infrastructure development in areas controlled by India. For instance, despite strident Chinese opposition, India went ahead with building several bridges on the Shyok River and in Daulat Beg Oldi in the past couple of years.

The Indian side has conveyed its expectations regarding the military standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Chinese side, including foreign minister Wang Yi, and will continue to take the matter forward in order to find a solution though talks.

The post China building bridges over Pangong Tso appeared first on IMR.

Chief of Army Staff Gen MM Naravane, on January 12, replying to a question submitted in advance, said, “We are not averse to the demilitarization of the glacier but the pre-condition for that is to accept the AGPL. Pakistan has to accept what are their positions and what are ours, and both of us have to sign on the dotted line before any kind of disengagement takes place.”

Stalemate in Talks

There have been 13 rounds of talks on the demilitarisation of Siachen, the last one at Rawalpindi in June 2012. After almost a ten-year hiatus, Gen Naravane’s statement shows that there is no progress.

India has been insisting on the marking of the current positions that the Army holds on maps that are to be ratified by both sides. This will establish Indian territorial control along the Saltoro range. On the other hand, Pakistan has been reluctant to authenticate Indian positions as it will legitimise India’s ‘illegal act’ of violating the Simla Agreement by occupying an area that was under Pakistan’s administrative control. The crux of the matter is that neither side is willing to make any territorial compromise.

After the fifth round of talks in June 1989, the joint statement stated: “There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chance of conflict.” This was a direct result of Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto’s political intervention in attempting to find a solution on Siachen.

The sixth round in 1992 carried forward the discussions of 1989, and this was the second time that an agreement was almost reached. However, there was no political acceptance by then-Prime Minister Narsimha Rao to ratify the agreement. In 2006, a draft agreement was drawn up for a phased, mutual withdrawal and joint monitoring of a demilitarised zone at Siachen.

Importance of Siachen

Lt Gen V R Raghavan, who served as the Director-General of Military Operations, wrote in his book Siachen: Conflict without End: “It is apparent that neither India nor Pakistan secures a strategic advantage by contesting the possession of the Saltoro range. Neither also faces a military threat to the territory it occupies in Jammu and Kashmir from over the Saltoro range…A strategic veneer is given to what is actually a political necessity for continuing the conflict.”

On the other hand, the area is bound by Pakistan to the west, the Chinese Shaksgam valley to the North, and the Sub Sector North (SSN) of Ladakh to the east, where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is confronting the Indian Army in the Depsang plains. If military collusion between Pakistan and China is to occur, this is the area where it is most likely to happen.

Shaksgam Valley

While Gen Naravane spelt out the Indian Army’s position on the issue, the matter has become far more complicated for national security planners with Pakistan and China proposing a road connecting Yarkand in Sinkiang to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir through Shaksgam Valley, a 5193-square-kilometres territory that Pakistan illegally ceded to China in 1963. The Shaksgam Valley lies in the trans-Karakoram range watershed.

Area maps clearly show that Rimo Glacier, Teram Shehr Glacier and the Siachen Glacier are located within the Indian union territory of Ladakh. The adjoining areas of these glaciers are PLA dominated territories like Shaksgam Valley and Yarkand Valley in the north and PoK in the west in addition to the warlike deployments by the PLA in Aksai Chin opposite Daulat Beg Oldi sector in the east. The PLA has a history of aggressive transgressions into what the Army calls sub-sector north and it is adamant in blocking the Indian Army patrols in Depsang Bulge south of DBO.

The proposed Muzaffarabad-Shaksgam-Yarkand Valley road will not only boost the military interoperability between two iron brothers but also pose a two-front threat to Indian forces in the sub-sector north.

The Indian Army controls the Saltoro Ridge that provides ingress into Siachen Glacier since 1984 post-Operation Meghdoot. Siachen Glacier is located in the eastern Karakoram range, just northeast of NJ 9842, where the Line of Control between India and Pakistan ends.

The military situation in the area is quite precarious with China building all-weather access to Pakistan via Karakoram Pass, just 18 km from DBO plateau, and trying to militarily impose India rejected 1959 line on the LAC in Ladakh.

Historical Background

Siachen is a part of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir (now divided into two Union territories — Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh), which legally acceded to India on October 26-27, 1947 and has since then been its integral part. This was endorsed by every political party in the land, and both Houses of the Indian Parliament passed an unanimous resolution on February 22, 1994 that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India!

It was in the later years of the 1970s that the India side picked up activities by Pakistan in the Siachen area, such as sponsoring international mountaineering expeditions. This would have implied that Pakistan had jurisdiction over this territory. This was also the time when official US maps began to show the LoC as extending right up to the Karakoram Pass on the India-China boundary, which would, in effect, imply that the Siachen glacier fell under the actual jurisdiction of Pakistan. The Chinese followed suit. As a result, roughly 2,300 sq km of territory in this glacier zone came to be shown as under Pakistani control. In response to this encroachment, the Indian Army launched what came to be known as Operation Meghdoot, in 1984, to occupy the Siachen-Saltoro ridge. Pakistani attempts to dislodge the Indian troops from the heights did not succeed though they did occupy and fortify the lower reaches on their side.

Comments

Brookings scholar Stephen Cohen said: “Siachen is a conflict between two bald men over a comb.” The cost of Siachen expedition over the years has been around 2,150 soldiers killed and 5,000 persons wounded on both sides with an estimated cost of roughly $1 million a day.

Any move to withdraw from our territory will also be a violation of the Constitution by India’s rulers. The reality is, Siachen can’t be a discussion point except for its acceptance and recognition as an integral/inviolable part of India.

In the best of times, India and Pakistan were engaged in what was known as a Composite Dialogue, the agenda for which contained eight items. Siachen and Sir Creek were two issues on which early agreement was possible.

It is true that the AGPL delineation had been a major sticking point in reaching an agreement on Siachen. However, this matter had been resolved between the two sides, first during bilateral defence secretary-level talks in 1992 and then subsequently in foreign secretary-level talks in 2006. These agreements could not be formalised and implemented due to political reasons.

Can Pakistan or China be relied upon for their diplomatic assurances?

It would be militarily prudent for Indian Army to put the demilitarization of Siachen on the back-burner till such time the Chinese PLA agrees to respect the Ladakh LAC and restores April 2020 status quo ante as well as allow India unhindered rights to patrol Depsang Bulge and Charding Nullah Junction (CNJ) in Demchok sector.

The post Army Chief Raises Possibility of Demilitarization appeared first on IMR.