Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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Since the fall of the Ghani Government in Afghanistan and the exit of the US forces from the war theatre, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has exploited this opportunity to attempt its dominance, monopolize Jihad in the Indian subcontinent and turn its low intensity asymmetric warfare into a virtual blitzkrieg approach in the region.

Over the years, IS-K has managed to build an intricate network amongst the locals in the regions where is operates. It has been seen effectively providing support to the Muslim Chinese jihadists and was lately employing Afghan soldiers, intelligence and law enforcement officers, as also the ex-Taliban recruits. Given that the outfit’s aspirations are not only limited to Afghanistan but also to additional plans which may not be aligned with its parent ISIS Central but its own, we have been witnessing an influx of recruits from India joining the IS-K in Afghanistan.

Recruitment Drive in India

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has probed over 37 terror attack cases directly linked with the IS, out of which 31 have been charge-sheeted with 27 accused convicted.

It is clear that IS targets individuals through social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. The individuals, whose ideologies resonate with the outfit, are contacted by the international handlers and are brainwashed into spreading and uploading IS-related content, knowledge on improvised explosives device (IED) making and terror funding. Even translating the IS-related texts to the regional languages is promoted.

In August 2021, an IS recruiter from Bhatkal (Karnataka) was arrested for radicalizing the youth through the ISIS published magazine “Voice of Hind (VOH)”. The magazine was conceived through the collaboration of Al-Qitaal media centre (pro ISIS media outlet) and Junudul Khilafa Al Hind in February 2020. It has, in the past months, elaborately detailed the plans on how to wage Gazwa-e-Hind (part of Pakistan`s plan to bleed India with a thousand cuts), preparations for Jihad and also praised IS terrorists killed as martyrs. Since 2020, the magazine has gained traction by stirring fear or working as a call centre to tap educated and qualified individuals for its propaganda machine.

Earlier, in July 2021, three individuals were arrested from Anantnag, who had close links with the IS. They were responsible for dissemination of false propaganda against India and for radicalizing the youth in Kashmir on the lines propagated by VOH. A large number of digital devices were seized such as mobile phones, secure digital (SD) cards, etc. Fake identities were created and the individuals responsible used several virtual private networks (VPN) to avoid tracking.

Then, in August 2021, VOH edition displayed the newsclips of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) searches, while its editor made a defiant proclamation to increase the circulation “all the more” in the face of probes carried by all investigation agencies. It became evident when the Voice of Hind mentioned the raids in Anantnag, Jammu & Kashmir, that the right targets had been hit. Prior to this, it was assumed that the magazine was circulated from Afghanistan. After the raids it has been confirmed that it has its links in South Kashmir. It is also confirmed the content editors were being recruited from Maldives and Bangladesh.

Content Collation

it is confirmed that the material is “processed, edited and approved in Pakistan.” Region specific content lacing subnational ideologies imbibing Jihad are also part of the propaganda, a philosophy IS-K uses to participate in the local conflicts and to radicalize one actor against the other, if not the whole state. In order to promote the propaganda, area specific content and material is also being made available in Tamil, Bengali and Malayalam.

Campaign Against Idolatry

The IS propaganda thrives on the success of increased sub-nationalism in the Southern States in India and caters to the likes of all those in favour of the caliphate and an all-Muslim state, marginalizing all Hindus. In a recent issue published by VOH, an image of a decapitated Shiva with the ISIS black flag on its cover went viral in the social media. The VOH captioned it as “It is time to break the false Gods.”

The idol on the cover resembles the idol of Shiva statue in the Murudeshwara temple in Karnataka and has raised concerns. ISIS has been notorious for attacking and destroying various archaeological and heritage sites. The idea to erase history or existence of a culture has been a part of their jihadist plans or of what they view as their narrative of Jihad. For years, ISIS has made efforts to go through extreme selective theological lengths to define their narrative on iconoclastism (destruction of idols).

This could be discerned from one such narrative it spread after destruction of the Palmyra features in Syria. The ISIS magazine Dabiq carried a double spread of the images of the destroyed Palmyra site, while its French edition, Dar-al-Islam, quoted the text “Baal is a false divinity for which people sacrificed their children as indicated in the Old Testament. But, by the Grace of Allah, soldiers of the Caliphate destroyed it.” The entire act of destruction of the heritage sites was justified as combating “shirk” – the sin committed by practicing polytheism or worshipping idols other than Allah. ISIS views its approach as cleansing of Islam through the establishment of the caliphate, while returning to the roots of Islam (a view which is contested worldwide by the Muslim community). However, it does not eliminate the threat and the “built in brutality” it inflicts towards the non-Muslims. The recent attacks on the mosques in Kandahar, Kabul and Kunduz are a clear indication of the extremist attitude ISIS is maintaining towards its narratives, where it refuses to even identify with the beliefs of Shias or Muslims, who remain different from them. It prefers to eradicate them.

Given the pictures of decapitated Shiva statue have gone viral on social media platforms, this comes as no surprise but as confirms the ISIS aspirations in India. It is imperative to exercise caution in face of this looming and persistent threat. It is expected that IS-K, like its parent IS Central, will replicate a common strategy to wipe out other religious iconography and heritage sites. This can exacerbate communal tensions in India.

Hate-filled Newsletters

In December 2021, VOH has upped its antics and has published another inflammatory hate-filled propaganda in its Vol 23 issue – Hinduism, In the Mire of Delusion. The issue attacks Hinduism as the nullifier of Islam, calls to take back Babri Masjid, makes suggestions to kill and terrorize Hindus calling it the verdict of Allah “Jihad for the sake of Allah.”

The 15-page newsletter reiterates its hate for Hindus and killing of all Kuffars worldwide. An excerpt from the magazine reads “on the mainland of India, the sons of Ghaznavi and Ibn Qasim, who subjugated the subcontinent to the rule of Islam. Whose swords chopped the heads of the Somnaths, the idols in the temples trembled and fell face down at the sound of their footsteps.”

The issue furthers urges its readers to carry Dawah activities on social media as “internet is cheap,” to raise the flags of jihad on streets, spread the word by uploading through USBs and use necessary security means to remain untraceable online.

Amidst these nefarious suggestions, an entire page is dedicated to “O Muwahhid take back Babri Masjid from the Hindus.” The entire section directly attacks the Jews and the Hindus, stating the “unholy alliance” between the Jews and the Hindus must be attacked. It talks of genocide and brute force to be utilized against the non-Muslims. While the entire section uses derogatory slander for non-Muslims, it provokes its readers to fight against the sons of “Khilafah” by painting a sorry picture of the jihadists, a bait easily to be bitten by the ISIS sympathizers.

It is not hard to foresee a radicalized youth playing into the hands of such inflammatory narratives, which not only spread hate but dispels the notion of secularism or diversity of India and seeks to ignite communal hatred and riots.

George Orwell said “The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history”. Hence, it is not farfetched to think the ISIS modus operandi relies heavily on its propaganda warfare while executing its plans physically. While conventional war may or may not be on the horizon, the war of perception continues to be waged daily. The proof lies in the virulent content of this IS propaganda organ, VOH.

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Since the US evacuation, IS-K has claimed many attacks in Afghanistan. According to U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) an aggregate of 77 attacks were recorded, directly or indirectly claimed by or attributed to IS-K from January through April 2021. It was reported that ISIS was responsible for the deaths of at least 124 civilians during the first half of 2021, according to another UNAMA report. Some of the major attacks in first half of 2021 included:

• May 8th: A car bombing and two other explosions resulting in deaths of 85 people and casualties over 275 at Sayed ul Shuhada High School for girls. The targeted group was the Hazara, who were the attendees. According to U.S. intelligence, ISIS was responsible while Afghan President Ashraf Ghani held the Taliban responsible.

• June 8th: ISIS claimed another attack, ISK gunmen killed 11 men and injured 15 others at a camp near Shaikh Jalal village in northern Baghlan province.

• August 26th: ISIS carried out twin bombings outside Kabul airport that killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members as mentioned earlier.

• October 8th: IS-K claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shia Mosque in Kunduz province, killing more than 72 civilians.

• October 15th: This was followed by another attack on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on Oct 15th. 63 civilians were killed and dozens were left injured during the Friday prayer.

The attacks on 8 and 15 October were claimed by IS-K and carefully planned, with the intention of garnering enough attention while targeting Shias in their homes and centres. ISK being a Sunni group has often reiterated their intention of killing the Shia and Hazara, whom they view as heretics. 10% of the population of Afghanistan is considered to be Shia Muslims, with many also a part of the Hazara community. It is no surprise the attack on Kandahar Mosque were meticulously planned and orchestrated to give a message to the Taliban, owing to the rivalry between the two groups. Kandahar is the second largest city in Afghanistan and also the spiritual birthplace of Taliban.

It is important to note that Taliban had always recognized the threat stemming from the IS-K towards the religious minorities and the ethnic groups in Afghanistan and has failed miserably at adequately preparing for the waves of terror it fore saw. A definite example can be recounted from August 2021 mentioned above. The Taliban officials had consulted with the elders of the Shia community and provided a protective escort on the occasion of Ashura, a Shia religious holiday. Despite the security, IS-K carried attacks erupted not only in the Taliban`s heart land, but the frequency of IS-K claimed attacks only grew since September 2021. Areas around Nangarhar and Kunar, where IS-K primary bases were established saw a flurry of attacks, including a complex attack on a military hospital in which a notable Taliban commander was killed.

Another looming threat emerges from the Afghan soldiers, spies and law enforcement officers who were trained by the US military but are being killed off in the witch hunt carried by Taliban. Left to die and with no means of survival, provides a great opportunity to be recruited by the IS-K.

ISK and Jihad in Khorasan

Jihadism in Khorasan can be attributed to many factors and origins. The Afghan jihad predominantly emerged as a retaliation of the Taliban emirate which was overthrown by a US-led operation in 2001. Since then, the Taliban strove to return to power, even if it required to coerce the previous Afghan governments to cede some of its power to the outfit. After 2001, Afghan jihad played a dominant role in the region of Khorasan, despite few outfits choosing to take part in it.

 After 2014, the influence of the same Afghan jihad became undermined, as many factions were seen disputing and breaking away. Another significant “cause celebre” of Jihadism to further decline can be attributed to the Syrian war since 2011.

However, by the end of 2014, several groups started linking themselves to ISIS. Initially these groups identified themselves as separate identities. This notion soon changed in 2015, when the IS Central’s Chief spokesperson, Abu Muhammed Adnani announced the establishment of Wilayat Khorasan. After the establishment of the Wilayat, the IS-K teams started referring to themselves as Daesh or Daesh Khorasan or Khilafat Islami.

In the south of Afghanistan, a former Taliban leader and a Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mullah Abdul Raoof Khadim, swore his allegiance to ISIS. In the east, Hafiz Sayed Khan raised the black flag of ISIS. Since then, the group faced several heavy military attacks from the Afghan and coalition forces. This led to the death and capture of over “13,000 of its fighters, including five consecutive emirs, or top leaders”.

However, the group has been quite resilient and successful in substituting and replacing its manpower, while profiting in the opportunity of Taliban exiting the war theatre, since August, to expand its outreach. According to several IS-K interviews, IS-K currently operates in areas such as eastern and northern Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. It has already started to absorb many Taliban fighters; Baluchi insurgents and members of various outfits aggrieved with the Pakistani government or share the same ideology as itself or those who choose to seek profits or employment from the illicit dealings found in the region. Interestingly it is reported that IS-K has also succeeded in fostering relationships with outfits which previously worked with the Taliban, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and various others to name a few.

It is imperative to understand that part of the IS-K strategy was to use Afghanistan as a “spring board” for itself in the Khorasan region. Khorasan is a strategically located region with access to Central Asia and at the same time also one of the weakest regions in the area due to the least territorial control from its competitors. From the recent attacks in Kabul and Kunduz, it is becoming apparent that like its parent organization IS-Central, it has started implementing the “Blitzkreig” approach over the insurgent approach, which is to “concentrate force to achieve local superiority” and fastidiously destroy the enemies.

IS-K`s Aims

• Prominence in Khorasan: One of the immediate goals of IS-K was to embed itself in pockets of Khorasan. In the initial stage, at its most vulnerable, it failed at coexisting in the region as it was heavily laden with TTP, Taliban, the Afghan and the Pakistani groups. Their small numbers made it less viable to gain traction and prove their visibility to their recruits and donors who were seeking new experiments to fund. The IS-K propaganda was further subdued and their efforts at raising local taxes was banned, perhaps to avoid friction with Taliban and TTP. Given such a scenario, the outfit for a long time refrained from challenging any military force in the past.

• Shopping for Funding: In order to gain funding, the idea was to sell a jihadist cause, which would set well with the donors and present the outfit funds for its existence. In the past, the group promised radical Chinese Muslim groups that it planned to commence its operations in China. This was later linked to the funds which IS-K acquired from the private donors in the Arab Gulf for the very same project pitched to the Chinese Muslim groups. The familiarity with the Huis in Syria and Iraq prompted the IS central to conceive this project while viewing Han China as the new arena for waging jihad. The IS Central too, managed to build close relations with the Uyghurs of ETIM over the years and has succeeded in attracting many recruits from the Chinese Muslim communities. Even though China does not fall under IS-K’s territorial responsibility, the group continues to nurture the Chinese Muslims in Khorasan while utilizing the funds collected on behest of the community. The relation with the Huis is also strongly maintained despite the amicable relation IS-K shares with the Turkestan Islamic Party. It is evident, IS has been keen on Huis and intends to aid in the formation of a jihadist Hui movement in China.

• Retaliating for Syria: Retaliating against Iran gained an important premise compared to targeting the western targets for their intervention in Iraq and Syria. This philosophy applied to any affiliate of Iran. Russian assets in Afghanistan and Central Asia also served as targets and this provided IS-K to be useful to IS Central.

• Establishing safe havens for its fighters and forming an army: Setting up safe havens for its group was clearly imperative for ISK, in order to host its leaders from the central if required and for sustaining its existence from the growing repression it was to face from Taliban. In 2016, the ISK chiefs stated the plans to establish a primary safe haven in Kunar. In order to set their plan in motion the ISK fighters had tried to build a close rapport with the local communities and chiefs to use the area as a safe operating ground. IS-K, on the same line with its parent organization has constantly intended to develop facilities for organizing a centralized hybrid military force for quick deployment of well-trained fighters to out manoeuvre adversaries and disperse them when required.

• Garnering and mobilizing local support to dominate Jihad in Khorasan: Initially ISK had little to no support from the local communities except from specific jihadist groups and clerical networks. In order to increase its outreach, ISIS started par taking in local disputes, reinvigorating conflicts especially the sectarian ones, while attempting to lead any conflict which would help in overthrowing the previous Kabul government or any central Asian regimes.

It is clear that ISK intends to eventually over throw the Taliban regime and substitute it with its rule, as it has intended in Iraq and Syria. Its aspirations largely lay with the strategy laid by IS central. It has been effectively absorbing fighters from Taliban and various insurgent if not jihadist groups. This is also the primary reason why Tehran was not supportive of Kabul Taliban reconciliation, fearing it would only strengthen ISK. The IS-K strategy has remained coherent throughout the years, it aims at the maximizing pressure in areas where the resistance is weakest and polarizing violence IS-K’s aims to some extent have resonated with its parent organization the IS-Central, but have often seen fluctuating as well. Regardless of being called a franchise of the IS-Central, IS-K has on various occasions strategically established safe havens for its leaders and command centres, proving that it was more than a replicated clone of the IS- Central in form of anti-Shia campaign. Its efforts at Re-launching and expanding sectarian conflicts in Khorasan is a well-known IS-K strategy, which it continues to implement to create a social constituency for itself among a Sunni population and to implant itself in the political crevices of countries such as Iran, Pakistan and India as well. It poses a very high profile threat to India and will have to be watched closely.

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With the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (IS) group has threatened to usher in another violent phase. There has been a sudden uptick in IS attacks since the Taliban takeover on 15 August.

Two deadly bombings have hit Kabul. One was outside the airport at the height of evacuations before the U.S. exit that killed 169 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members. Another deadly bombing, on 8 October, in the northern province of Kunduz killed 46 worshippers inside a mosque frequented by Shiites. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Afghanistan-based arm of the terrorist organisation, has claimed responsibility. Earlier, on October 3, a bomb targeted a memorial service being held for the mother of the Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, in a Kabul mosque, killing five. All these attacks suggest that the IS-K’s ability to strike has grown. Other deadly IS attacks have struck in the capital, Kabul, and provinces to the east and north, while smaller-scale attacks target Taliban fighters almost daily.

Now that the US and the international presence is mostly gone, the IS was going after the state, which is now the Taliban.

Hatred Towards Shiias

The IS’s doctrinal hatred towards the Shias is known. In Iraq and Syria, it systematically targeted Shias, who it calls “rejectionists” of faith, and used such attacks to mobilise the support of Sunni hardliners and trigger sectarian conflicts.

Long Rivalry

Both the Taliban and IS advocate rule by their radical interpretations of Islamic law. But there are key ideological differences that fuel their hatred of each other. The Taliban say they are creating an Islamic state in Afghanistan, within the borders of that country. The Taliban downplay IS’s capabilities and dismiss them as a fringe group with no mainstream appeal.
IS says it is the Islamic State, a global caliphate that it insists all Muslims must support. It is contemptuous of the Taliban’s nationalist goals and doesn’t recognize them as a pure Islamic movement. For similar reasons, IS has long been a staunch enemy of al-Qaida.

Both the Taliban and IS advocate particularly harsh versions of Islamic Shariah law and have used tactics like suicide bombers. But when it ruled territory in Syria and Iraq, IS was even more brutal and carried out more horrific punishments than the Taliban did.

IS emerged in Afghanistan in 2015 with the name Islamic State in Khorasan Province, at a time when the group was at its peak, controlling much of Iraq and Syria. It drew members from Afghan and Pakistani militants, including a wave of Taliban defectors.

The group initially found support among Afghanistan’s small Salafist movement in eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. The Salafis had largely been marginalized by the Taliban, and by connecting with the rising IS, the Salafist movement found a means to establish military strength.
But IS’s brutal ways have since led some Salafi clerics to voice opposition. In the years after its emergence, IS was badly hurt by military setbacks at the hands of the Taliban and by U.S. airstrikes, before surging again the past year.

End Game

The IS’s immediate aim is to destabilize the Taliban and shatter the group’s image as a guardian of security.
For now, its strategy is slow and methodical. It is reaching out to tribes and other groups to recruit from their ranks while stamping out dissent among moderate Salafis and carrying out jailbreaks, assassinations, and attacks on Taliban personnel.
The Taliban are also strong and can uproot IS on their own, even without the backup of U.S. airstrikes that nearly eliminated IS. The IS — unlike the Taliban during their insurgency — do not have access to safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.
The Taliban have rejected cooperating with the U.S. against IS.

IS’s future trajectory in Afghanistan will depend largely on its ability to recruit more members and win over large segments of the population. Since their inception, they have been poaching Taliban members.

Comments

While both groups have used tactics of terror, the IS-K is a pan-Islamist jihadist outfit, while the Taliban are largely a Pashtun nationalist militancy. The rise of the IS-K poses multiple challenges to the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan, which many in Afghanistan and Pakistan saw as a solution to the country’s security woes. On one side, their promise to provide security looks hollow. Afghanistan’s cities under the Taliban remain as insecure as they were under the previous Islamic Republic. On the other hand, even if the Taliban, under pressure from Afghanistan’s donors and the public, want to make some concessions on the many restrictions already imposed, they would come under pressure from the more extremist IS-K, which says the Taliban are not Islamic enough. For the people of Afghanistan, who are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, the war that started 40 years ago continues, no matter who is in power in Kabul.

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