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		<title>India Achieves World’s Highest Military Bunker by 3D Printing </title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/india-achieves-worlds-highest-military-bunker-by-3d-printing/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2025 12:40:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Industry News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[3D printing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Additive Manufacturing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IIT Hyderabad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Project PRABAL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Simpliforge Creations]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>India has successfully completed the world&#8217;s highest 3D printed military bunker at an altitude of 11,000 feet in Ladakh, through Project PRABAL, led by Simpliforge Creations and IIT Hyderabad in collaboration with the Indian Army. This innovative structure was constructed in just five days, utilizing a custom-engineered concrete mix designed to withstand extreme high-altitude conditions, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/india-achieves-worlds-highest-military-bunker-by-3d-printing/">India Achieves World’s Highest Military Bunker by 3D Printing </a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India has successfully completed the world&#8217;s highest 3D printed military bunker at an altitude of 11,000 feet in Ladakh, through Project PRABAL, led by Simpliforge Creations and IIT Hyderabad in collaboration with the Indian Army. This innovative structure was constructed in just five days, utilizing a custom-engineered concrete mix designed to withstand extreme high-altitude conditions, including low oxygen and sub-zero temperatures. The project exemplifies the effective partnership between academia and industry, showcasing India&#8217;s growing capabilities in additive manufacturing and rapid infrastructure deployment in challenging environments. It marks a significant advancement in defense preparedness, establishing a precedent for future applications of 3D printing technology in military infrastructure and potential off- world construction projects, demonstrating India&#8217;s resolve to leverage cutting-edge technology in strengthening its strategic capabilities.</p>
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		<title>China says ready to work with India for better ties</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/china-says-ready-to-work-with-india-for-better-ties/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Dec 2022 05:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[line of actual control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security Advisor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tawang sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wang Yi]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=15070</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In his first comments after the latest round of talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, on 25 December, that China is ready to work with India for the “steady and sound growth” of bilateral ties and the two countries are committed to upholding stability at the border areas. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/china-says-ready-to-work-with-india-for-better-ties/">China says ready to work with India for better ties</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his first comments after the latest round of talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, on 25 December, that China is ready to work with India for the “steady and sound growth” of bilateral ties and the two countries are committed to upholding stability at the border areas.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His comments come days after Indian and Chinese military commanders held a&nbsp;fresh round of talks&nbsp;on December 20 to resolve the remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh – the first high-level talks after troops of the two sides&nbsp;clashed in Tawang sector&nbsp;of Arunachal Pradesh on December 9.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Addressing a symposium on the international situation and China’s foreign relations in 2022, Wang said: “China and India have maintained communication through the diplomatic and military-to-military channels, and both countries are committed to upholding stability in the border areas… We stand ready to work with India in the direction toward steady and sound growth of China-India relations.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Wang, along with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, is the Special Representative of the India-China boundary mechanism which has remained dormant in the current standoff.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India and China have held 17 rounds of talks so far to resolve the standoff. A joint statement issued last Thursday after the 17th round, said the talks were “frank and in-depth” and “in line with the guidance provided by the leaders of the two countries to work for the resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&nbsp;“In the interim, the two sides agreed to maintain the security and stability on the ground in the Western sector,” it said, referring to the eastern Ladakh region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In September, Indian and Chinese troops disengaged in the Gogra-Hot Spring area, the last of the acknowledged “friction points” that were discussed over 16 rounds of Corps Commander level talks that began in June 2020, after Chinese incursions at several points weeks earlier.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tensions in Ladakh continue over the presence of Chinese troops in Depsang, intrusions in Demchok and the rapid Chinese infrastructure build-up, including two bridges over&nbsp;Pangong Tso&nbsp;that will reduce Chinese mobilisation time on the lake’s southern bank.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indian and Chinese&nbsp;troops clashed in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector&nbsp;in the early hours of December 9, assaulting each other with sticks and canes in their closest encounter since the deadly Galwan incident in eastern Ladakh in June 2020.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Asked whether the incident in Arunachal Pradesh was raised during the talks, the MEA spokesperson had refrained from giving a direct response. “We can all speculate but since I don’t have a confirmation, I am not going to be able to confirm that. We did talk about, to be honest, the Western sector. So if it has not been raised, I wouldn’t be surprised. Let me not make a comment either,” he had said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&nbsp;“We have been emphasising that our soldiers will stand firm to guard our frontiers. So I don’t want to say anything beyond that,” he had said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his lengthy address on China’s diplomatic work, Wang, who was elevated to the ruling Communist Party of China’s (CPC) political bureau during the recent party Congress, focused more on China’s troubled ties with the US and burgeoning relations with Russia, despite the&nbsp;Ukraine&nbsp;war.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“We have deepened good-neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation with Russia, and made China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination more mature and resilient,” Wang said. “Over the past year, China and Russia have firmly supported each other in upholding respective core interests, and our political and strategic mutual trust has been further consolidated,” he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Wang also spoke about China’s opposition to “bloc confrontation”. Beijing has always opposed the Quad grouping comprising the US, India, Australia and Japan, as well as the AUKUS alliance of the US, Australia, and the UK.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“We have continued to reject bloc confrontation and zero-sum competition, and maintained strategic stability in relations with other major countries,” Wang said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He said the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have projected a resounding voice for global equity and justice, and injected strong impetus into global economic recovery and development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Wang also briefly touched on China’s ties with Pakistan, saying the two countries have “continued to firmly support each other, uphold the invaluable all-weather strategic partnership, and consolidate the iron-clad friendship”.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Can There Be Rapprochement Between The Two?</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-the-two/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maj Gen Ravi Arora]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Aug 2022 07:05:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neighbourhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Border Meeting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Nepal]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[China-Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China-Sri Lanks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Galwan clash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Galwan Valley]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India’s Encirclement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[line of actual control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[neighbourhood]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=14858</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Part 2 &#8211; The Galwan Clash and India’s Encirclement READ ALSO:&#160;Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 1) The Galwan Clash A border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted on 5 May 2020. The face-off escalated after the Galwan Valley clashes. On 15 June 2020, Chinese troops, estimated to be more than 250, attacked a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-the-two/">Can There Be Rapprochement Between The Two?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-part-2-the-galwan-clash-and-india-s-encirclement">Part 2 &#8211; The Galwan Clash and India’s Encirclement</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>READ ALSO:</strong>&nbsp;<a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-india-and-china-part-1/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 1)</a></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Galwan Clash</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted on 5 May 2020. The face-off escalated after the Galwan Valley clashes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 15 June 2020, Chinese troops, estimated to be more than 250, attacked a group of 50 Indian soldiers who were inspecting the progress of the Chinese withdrawal from the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley. The encounter ended in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undeclared number of Chinese troops, and led to a prolonged standoff between the two sides.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There had not been a single death from hostilities at the LAC in over 45 years — since 1967 &#8211; despite several hundred Chinese LAC violations annually.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Current Situation is not promising.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 16th Border Meeting was held on 17 July 2022, a step-by-step de-escalation was agreed but very little progress has been made.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The stated Indian position has been that until and unless there is peace and tranquility on the border, overall China-India relations cannot much progress. So far, India has remained reluctant to engage China normally in the bilateral context.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Beijing has repeatedly said that border standoff does not represent the entirety of China-India relations, while New Delhi has maintained that peace along the frontier is essential for the two countries to work together.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chinese violations the LAC in all sectors are growing in frequency &#8211; up to 660 LAC violations by the PLA in 2019. There is an uncommon level of hostility, including fist-fighting and rock throwing that were rare prior to 2017.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The trends suggest LAC standoffs are growing more hostile, more frequent, longer in duration, and are receiving more media coverage and international attention, potentially restricting both sides&#8217; room for manoeuvre.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is a substantial massing of military forces in Ladakh to positions near the LAC.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Why Did China Resort to Aggression?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Some of the likely reasons are discussed below</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Infrastructure Development. There has been an acceleration of Indian infrastructure development near the LAC in an attempt to close a substantial deficit with China there.&nbsp; In April 2019, India completed work on the critical Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road running parallel to the LAC in Ladakh, stretching all the way to its northernmost outpost at Daulet Beg Oldi. More recently, India began building east-west feeder roads from DSDBO to its forward outposts near the LAC. This year, India was also reportedly engaged in efforts to improve road infrastructure at Pangong Lake.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has attempted to pressure India to halt infrastructure activities. India refused to heed China&#8217;s calls; the PLA applied military pressure. Only this time with more troops, more equipment, more locations, more pressure, and one potentially bold attempt to change the status quo at Pangong Lake.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India continues to construct and modernize over 60 “strategic roads” along the LAC, with an expected completion date of 2022.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Galwan River area has now become a hotspot because it is where the LAC is closest to the new road India has built along the Shyok River to DBO – the most remote and vulnerable area along the LAC in Ladakh.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Major Power Diplomacy. China tried to woo India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making it a key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative. India declined.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China&#8217;s Neighborhood Strategy. China wants to effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties.&nbsp; It wants to have a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Blame for Pandemic. China believed that India was catalyzing resentment against Beijing over poor handling of the pandemic that originated in Wuhan. India took over as the chair of the WHO executive Board on 22 May 2020 and it had a say in the probe into the origins of the pandemic and Taiwan&#8217;s participation in the 72nd session of the World Health Assembly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Internal Dissent. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced one of the biggest crises since the party came to power in 1949 because of dissatisfaction in handling the pandemic and the consequent surge in economic distress. At the NPC plenary, President Xi&#8217;s expected message was conciliatory to the domestic audience, while the international assertion was to be robust and defiant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Restrictions on Chinese investments. The Chinese government took offence to India&#8217;s new rule notified in early April 2020 that blocked Chinese companies from acquiring Indian firms without government approval. The Indian government decided that all procurement orders of Rs 200 crore or less could not go to foreign companies. It could discourage cheap exports from China. Since the clash, India has also banned 224 Chinese Apps and a few dozen Chinese companies are facing tax evasion scrutiny including ZTE, Huawei, One Plus, Xiaomi and Vivo.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Change of J&amp;K Status. India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution on Jammu &amp; Kashmir, which provided the province special status and autonomy on 5 Aug 2019. J&amp;K was made a Union Territory directly administered from Delhi. China described India&#8217;s move as “unacceptable”, undermining its “sovereignty” — even raised the issue at the UN Security Council. Frequent calls have been made by Indians to integrate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit- Baltistan as these territories rightfully belong to India. China is concerned about these demands since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is part of the &#8216;China Dream&#8217; and the Karakoram Highway passes through these Indian territories to Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India&#8217;s Accelerating Partnership with the US. China is concerned with India&#8217;s increasing and growing proximity to the US which it belives is aimed at countering China. Some of the developments which have taken place are</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Major Non-NATO Defense Partner with all basic enabling agreements in place.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Over $20 billion in defense sales to India MQ-9B unmanned aerial systems; P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, C-130J transport aircraft, C-17 planes, MH-60R multi mission maritime helicopters, AH-64 Apache helicopters, CH-47 Chinook helicopters)</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Institutionalised 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (2018)</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Quad Initiative (March 2021).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Exemption from buying the S-400 Triumf AD systems from Russia</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Malabar joint exercises</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Close collaboration in Covid-19 response</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Counterterrorism Joint Working Group</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Homeland Security Dialogue</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">•&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Counter Narcotics Working Group</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The Ukraine War</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Apart from conventional military capabilities, China&#8217;s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">India&#8217;s Encirclement By China</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New Delhi has numerous other concerns regarding China&#8217;s activities in almost all of India&#8217;s neighbouring countries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today, China with its unmistakable clout in South and Southeast Asia has used its economic-political-military influence, in intensifying its ties with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Maldives causing Indo-China political and security discord.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the US annual report &#8220;Military and Security Developments Involving the People&#8217;s Republic of China (PRC) 2020&#8221; the Pentagon says that in addition to the Chinese military base in Djibouti, China is seeking to set up military logistics facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In addition, China is considering to base its military logistics and infrastructure in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China is using the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative first announced in 2013, to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While China finances the developmental projects in target countries, information about its loaning operations are kept secretive and vague. Consequently, governments of BRI countries end up being completely unaware of the amount of money that they owe to China when contracts expire since loans extended to Chinese state-owned companies, banks, special purpose vehicles, joint ventures, and private sector institutions. The terms and conditions of the loans give China the right to use the finished projects and land as collateral if the latter were to default on loan repayments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Potentially, these projects, when taken over could provide a global PLA military logistics network to interfere with military operations against China and support its own offensive operations as the Chinese global military objectives evolve.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Let us look at Chinese inroads into India’s neighbouring countries.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Myanmar</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Myanmar is also part of BRI and likely to face the Chinese Debt Trap. There is also a lack of trust on the Myanmar side, due to China&#8217;s historical role in supporting rebel groups in Myanmar.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China and Myanmar share a 2,227-kilometer-long border. They have a boundary protocol signed in 1961, to conduct joint inspections every five years. But this has only occurred twice—in 1984-86 and 1992-95. A dispute over the border between Myanmar&#8217;s northern Shan State and China has simmered since 2008. Parts of the 200 km fence built by China have been pulled down by locals. The Chinese government is pushing Myanmar to implement the long-delayed Belt and Road Initiative projects and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Chinese townships are coming up inside Myanmar border areas administered by Wa authorities. The expansion of Chinese influence is obvious.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The CMEC will terminate at a new deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar&#8217;s Rakhine state. Some analysts have raised fears that the port could someday be used as a base or access point by the PLA.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has a maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island in Myanmar. The Chinese Army is also building a base on Small Coco Island in the Alexandra Channel between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea north of India&#8217;s Andaman Islands. These two islands, which have been leased to China since 1994.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Bangladesh</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China is considered as an &#8216;all-weather friend&#8217; of Bangladesh &#8211; Their ties cover geopolitical, economic spheres and defence ties form a key area of their relationship.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bangladesh forms part of China&#8217;s Belt and Road Initiative-BRI. But all is not well between their ties. China tends to interfere with Bangladesh&#8217;s foreign relations matters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jimming, on May 10, 2021, warned Dhaka against joining the QUAD and said that if Bangladesh did so, it will “substantially damage” bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China accounted for around 74 percent of Bangladesh&#8217;s arms imports between 2010– 2019 including submarines.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Bhutan</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bhutan shares an over 400-km-long border with China and the two countries have held over 24 rounds of boundary talks in a bid to resolve the dispute.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bhutan and China issued a 1988 Joint Communique on the Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary and signed agreement on the maintenance of peace, tranquillity and status quo in the Bhutan-China Border areas in Kunming in April 2021.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China is using all tactics available to it for twisting Bhutan&#8217;s arms. China has established new villages roads and military or police outposts in disputed Bhutanese territory.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chinese game plan is probably to exchange it for another disputed pocket around Doklam, in western Bhutan at the cost of India&#8217;s security.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China seems to have managed to effectively lower India&#8217;s influence in Bhutan.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Nepal</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China is trying to succeed in replacing India as the key economic as well as security partner for Nepal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China&#8217;s main interest in Nepal has always been led by its concerns over Tibet. 25,000 Tibetans live in Nepal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chinese have always considered Nepal the soft underbelly of Southern Tibet and are now determined to keep it under their influence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under a Marxist government, Nepal is trying to reshape its ties with China as a possible counterweight to India by proposing extension of their railway network from Tibet to Nepal, infratsructure projects and providing land link to Chinese ports.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nepal as a buffer is important for India but India is losing its clout in Nepal to China.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Sri Lanka</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sri Lanka joined China&#8217;s BRI with several projects but now Colombo has fallen into the premeditated scheme of a Chinese debt trap, paying off its loans through debt-equity swaps to creating extra-jurisdictional Special Economic Zones.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An often-cited example of the &#8216;debt-trap diplomacy&#8217; is the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, where the local government was forced to sign the port away on a 99-year lease after failing to repay Chinese loans.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For India, Lanka is an island that can be transformed into a veritable enemy aircraft carrier anchored on her doorstep, within strike range. Sri Lanka is also a potential kick-off point for an Antarctica mission at some future point.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Maldives</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Maldives is barely 70 nautical miles away from Minicoy island in India&#8217;s Lakshadweep archipelago and 300 nautical miles away from India&#8217;s west coast.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Until 2017, Maldives was part of the Indian security grid receiving defence and economic assistance from India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2013, after Abdulla Yameen came to power, Xi visited Maldives. Maldives joined the Maritime Silk Road and the two nations inked a free trade agreement. Chinese infrastructure projects flourished. Maldives accumulated a debt of nearly $3.1 billion (GDP $4 billion). There have been speculations about a possible Chinese naval base in Maldives. However, since Ibrahim Mohamed Solih came to power as president in 2018 after defeating Yameen, India has been prioritized over China.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Pakistan</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China&#8217;s &#8220;irreplaceable, all-weather friend&#8221; Pakistan is China&#8217;s biggest arms buyer, counting for nearly 47% of Chinese arms exports.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has established ammunition factories, provided technological assistance and modernised existing facilities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chinese Chengdu J-10B fighter and Low to Medium Altitude Air Defence System (LOMADS) LY-80 has been supplied to the Pakistan Air Force. The Chinese have provided technology to manufacture JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, AWACS systems and Al-Khalid tanks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China is the largest investor in Pakistan&#8217;s Gwadar Deep Sea Port, which is located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China played a major role in the development of Pakistan&#8217;s nuclear infrastructure, such as in building the Khushab reactor (for production of plutonium) and the completion of the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex and plutonium reprocessing facility.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China inroads in&nbsp; Pakistan/Sindh/Baluchistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, under the garb of BRI and strategic importance attached by it to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are an open secret.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India’s Opposition to CPEC. India has not endorsed the CPEC because it passes through the contested Gilgit-Baltistan region that remains, according to India, under the illegal occupation of Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is crucial for China to gain control over the Gilgit-Baltistan region (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir PoK), as the region borders the Xinjiang province of China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">CPEC would link Pakistan&#8217;s southern Gwadar port in Balochistan on the Arabian Sea to China&#8217;s western Xinjiang region. It also includes plans to create road, rail and oil pipeline links to improve connectivity between China and the Middle East.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gwadar port, located on the Arabian Sea, will allow China to have a say in global energy economics as the country can use a naval base to hold control over the maritime traffic passing between West Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>READ ALSO:</strong> <a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-india-and-china-part-3/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? (Part 3)</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-the-two/">Can There Be Rapprochement Between The Two?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? &#8211; Part 1</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-india-and-china-part-1/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maj Gen Ravi Arora]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jul 2022 06:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neighbourhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aksai Chin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arunachal Pradesh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brahmaputra river]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China-India border]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chumar sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CPEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dalai Lama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Depsang standoff]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Doklam Nathu La]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[East China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Galwan Valley clash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China Territorial Disputes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karakoram highway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[line of actual control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MacMahon Line]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[One China Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PLA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tibetan government in exile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wolf warrior diplomacy]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Part 1 &#8211; India-China Relations and Territorial Disputes READ ALSO:&#160;Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2) Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced. The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-india-and-china-part-1/">Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? &#8211; Part 1</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Part 1 &#8211; India-China Relations and Territorial Disputes</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>READ ALSO:</strong>&nbsp;<a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-the-two/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. Even before the pandemic set in, wolf warrior diplomacy emerged in 2017 characterised by the use of confrontational rhetoric by Chinese diplomats and coercive behavior. It was tied to Xi Jinping&#8217;s political ambitions and foreign policy inclinations. There was a backlash and a realignments have begun to take place to keep China in check.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since the outbreak of the pandemic China has sparred with Malaysia and Vietnam, with Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, threatened Taiwan, revoked Hong Kong&#8217;s autonomy, chased Japanese fishing boats, traded barbs with the US and is now challenging India at the Line of Actual Control.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-territorial-fronts">Territorial Fronts</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has opened four territorial fronts in the last decade, deploying coercive tactics 1) in the East China Sea, 2) South China Sea, 3) China-India border, and 4) toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The China-India border was once thought to be among the more stable of these fronts. What is surprising is that China has taken up all these fronts at the same time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has increased domination in affairs outside its borders along with modernisation of its armed forces to conduct operations in the western Asian region and to protect its eastern seaboard from US carriers and bombers</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has increased its role in the Indian Ocean by building naval bases and also making incursions using its navy and the naval militia flotilla</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has fortified and militarised islands in the South China Sea as well as the Sea of Japan.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Aggressive Behaviour</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has thrown its weight around across the globe in the last three years, unmindful of whom it offended.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Early in 2020, Chinese officials escalated their “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aggressively and undiplomatically attacked countries and individuals they believed had slighted China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In April 2020, China retaliated against Australia&#8217;s call for an inquiry into the origins and spread of the coronavirus by launching a trade war.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In July 2020, Beijing imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong designed to crush the pro-democracy movement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China was aggressive as well in its dealings with Taiwan as the Trump administration strengthened its ties with Republic of China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China also continued its systematic repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chinese communist state with capitalist characteristics has become a country developed enough to export small and big products and weapons to the developing world. China has become the factory of the world, with its cheap labour.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But by end 2020, China was convinced that it was winning its economic contest with the West and it embraced steps designed to decouple its economy from the West on its own terms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China is also trying to control a number of small nations through debt trap strategy.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What is China Doing Against India?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the Indian borders, a deadly bloody clash took place, on 15 June 2020, for the first time in 45 years, during the period of lockdown, in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and an unknown number of PLA soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat. No shots were fired. I will return to this later.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Till 2020, China&#8217;s aggressive attitude was mainly focused on the South China Sea but now it&#8217;s turned in India&#8217;s direction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Besides creeping up into India territories, China is trying to surround India by getting involved in its neighbouring countries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">PLA Navy ships have increased their forays into the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines and destroyers have been docking in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China is also strengthening airbases in Xinjiang and Tibet, some of which are for both civilian and military use.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India, by contrast, has always played it very cautiously with its powerful neighbour. It&#8217;s never made a statement on minorities in Xinjiang, an extremely delicate subject for the Chinese. Similarly, when it comes to Hong Kong, India has not uttered even a murmur.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India obviously has to play it super-carefully with its powerful and super-aggressive neighbour which has an economy that is about five times India&#8217;s.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">India-China Relations in Brief</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India gained independence in 1947 and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese People&#8217;s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC on 1 October 1949. India was the first non-communist nation in Asia to establish diplomatic relations and recognize PRC as the legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan on 1 April 1950.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 1950 China marched into Tibet and, in 1954, India signed an agreement recognising Tibet as part of China. In 1959 the Dalai Lama escaped and sought political asylum in India. Today, a Tibetan govt-in-exile functions from India. China is extremely sensitive about the Dalai Lama&#8217;s political activities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Border disputes resulted in a short but traumatic war for India on 20 Oct 1962. In the north, China occupied Aksai Chin in 1957 and has not vacated it since then. Instead it made an all-weather highway through it to Xinjiag. In the East, it reached the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov 1962 and withdrawing.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-full"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="600" height="679" src="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Claim-lines-in-Aksai-Chin.jpg" alt="Claim lines in Aksai Chin" class="wp-image-14405" srcset="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Claim-lines-in-Aksai-Chin.jpg 600w, https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Claim-lines-in-Aksai-Chin-265x300.jpg 265w, https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Claim-lines-in-Aksai-Chin-371x420.jpg 371w" sizes="(max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Claim lines in Aksai Chin</figcaption></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India has strengthened its defences and infrastructure on the Chinese border and also modernised its armed forces. So have the Chinese. There have been agreements to open the Nathula Pass in the East for symbolic local trade and a route for annual pilgrimage by Indians to Mount Kailash in Tibet.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During bilateral visits, agreements for maintaining peace on the Line of Actual Control and Confidence Building measures have been signed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There have been some significant border stand-offs</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">* The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">* In September 2014 People&#8217;s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in Chumar sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">* In June 2017 Chinese troops began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India&#8217;s ally Bhutan. This posed a security threat to India&#8217;s narrow Siliguri corridor. The stand-off ended in August 2017, when both sides agreed to disengage in Doklam.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">* On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La in&nbsp; Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">India&#8217;s China Policy</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As I said earlier, When India recognised the PRC on 1 April 1950, it broke off relations with Taiwan and also recognised Tibet as a part of China. Adhering to its One China policy was understandable provided India-China relations were stable. Delhi is aware that, any deviation or even a hint of deviation from this policy has an immense psychological impact on China, especially since India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Dalai Lama has a huge following amongst Tibetans the world over. He is a demi-God. One word from the Dalai Lama can cause riots and self immolations in Tibet.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since the Ladakh standoff, India has stopped using the term One China policy. India has also become more open in supporting the Dalai Lama thus challenging China&#8217;s core beliefs.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Disputes&nbsp; with India</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For ease of understanding, the India-China border can be divided into three areas &#8211; western sector, middle sector, and eastern sector as shown on this map.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Western Sector</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This sector comprises the area between Ladakh to Tibet and the Kunlun mountain range and also extends from Wakhan (Afghanistan edge) to the Karakoram Pass, thereafter following the alignment of the Kunlun mountain range.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The border length of the western sector is 1,597 kms. India&#8217;s claim is based on the Treaty of 1842 which was signed between the representative of Maharaja Gulab Singh, former ruler of J&amp;K, with Lama Gurusahib of Lhasa and the representative of the Chinese emperor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It needs to be understood that China was ruled by the Qing dynasty till 1911 before it was replaced by Chinese nationalists led government, called the Republic of China or ROC in 1912. In 1949, power shifted to the People&#8217;s Republic of China or PRC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At various times in history the British drew lines on the map to depict the border in Aksai Chin as they saw fit. The Johnson Line is shown in grey dashes on the outer edge of Aksai Chin. The McCartney Line is shown in Green. The final line was the Johnson Line of 1912, which India followed after it got Independence and it when it published the map of the area in 1954.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By all standards, this area is the most challenging task for the border negotiations. The China-Pakistan collusivity, Karakoram highway, CPEC corridor and the renewed infrastructure development with increased settlement of the civil population has further reduced the flexibility of negotiations. China Land Border Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, has already changed the tenets of territorial disputes to sovereignty disputes.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Middle Sector</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. This is the least disputed sector and covers 545 km of Indian borders. Except for one large claim in the Barahoti sector in Uttarakhand, other claims and counterclaims are minuscule.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Eastern Sector</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The eastern sector conventionally refers to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, but both these states have Bhutan separating them. Though Sikkim has a land border of only 220 km and has been witness to both the 1962 as well as 1967 Nathula-Chola conflicts, the situation has normalised a lot after it joined the Indian state on May 16, 1975.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-full"><img decoding="async" width="600" height="351" src="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/McMahon-Line-and-Eastern-Sector.jpg" alt="McMahon Line and Eastern Sector" class="wp-image-14406" srcset="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/McMahon-Line-and-Eastern-Sector.jpg 600w, https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/McMahon-Line-and-Eastern-Sector-300x176.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">McMahon Line and Eastern Sector</figcaption></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China finally recognised Sikkim as part of India in 2003 in a reciprocal statement by India to re-emphasise Tibet being part of China. An understanding with Bhutan will also be essential for the resolution.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Direct discourse between the British and Tibetans continued till 1908. In 1911, in the last year of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans revolted and asked for British intervention.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A tripartite conference was held at Shimla between the representatives of British India (McMohan), Tibet and China. Deliberation commenced in November 1913 and the McMohan Line was drawn and initialed by all the three representatives in the draft document on April 27, 1914. This document was not formally signed by Chinese representatives in the main document.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The land border, as per this line, covers a length of 1,126 km. This document was finally signed by Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The border in Arunachal Pradesh, as per the McMohan Line, has been a part of China&#8217;s formal offer for border settlement but not by itself. It has been proposed only in lieu of seeking a concession in the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. The LAC also has a large number of areas of differing perceptions which remain a cause of regular skirmishes or local conflicts.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There have been Efforts to Resolve Disputes</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Special Representatives mechanism was institutionalised between India and China for talks on the boundary question. The 22nd edition of talks was held in New Delhi in December 2019. The SR talks have developed a three-part role — the original mandate of searching for a political settlement to the boundary question, management of borders, and a forum for strategic dialogue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One important achievement to their credit is the the agreement of 2005 on political parameters and guiding principles for the boundary settlement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the substanbtial issue of the boundary disputes there has been no traction. There is not even an agreement of which maps to use while discussing the each other&#8217;s positions.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Water Sharing Disputes</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Besides territorial disputes, India and China have water sharing disputes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-full"><img decoding="async" width="600" height="395" src="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Rivers-from-Tibet-flowing-into-India.jpg" alt="Rivers from Tibet flowing into India" class="wp-image-14407" srcset="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Rivers-from-Tibet-flowing-into-India.jpg 600w, https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Rivers-from-Tibet-flowing-into-India-300x198.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Rivers from Tibet flowing into India</figcaption></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India&#8217;s formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and river-water interests.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India has concern with China&#8217;s water–diversion, dam–building and inter–river plans. Moreso, in a conflict, India fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the &#8220;great bend before the Brahmaputra river enters India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing; nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>READ ALSO:</strong> <a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-the-two/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/can-there-be-rapprochement-between-india-and-china-part-1/">Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? &#8211; Part 1</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>China building bridges over Pangong Tso</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2022 07:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Maj Gen Deepak Mehta On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/china-building-bridges-over-pangong-tso/">China building bridges over Pangong Tso</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By Maj Gen Deepak Mehta</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the Changpa tribes of Tibet, on the north bank of the lake. Till 1958, the fort and the premises marked the Sino-Indian border where the Indian Army had an observation post. The Chinese overran the area in 1958 and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) now runs nearly 20km west of Khurnak.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India has been closely monitoring Chinese activity in Khurnak since January, but could not do much as the construction was happening within the territory under Chinese control. The first bridge, which was completed in April, is being used by the People&#8217;s Liberation Army (PLA) to transport construction equipment to build the second bridge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Latest satellite images show that the new bridge is bigger and wider—it is 450m long and 10m wide—and is meant for faster movement of not just troops and vehicles, but even tanks. It is expected to be ready by July. The bridge will cut the distance from Rudok—the PLA&#8217;s main base servicing its deployments in the Pangong area—to the LAC to about 50km, from the existing distance of over 200km.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-background">Background</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India and China have been locked in the border row since April-May 2020, and despite disengagement of soldiers at Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake and Gogra, the two sides still have around 60,000 troops each and advanced weaponry deployed in the Ladakh theatre.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In May 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a brawl near Pangong Tso, causing serious injuries to both sides. A month later, a deadly clash in the Galwan valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel Santosh Babu. It was the first time in nearly five decades that fatalities were reported on the LAC, and it triggered massive deployment of troops and heavy weapons by both armies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As of now, military disengagement has only taken place in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso (both banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs area. The Indian army wants PLA to first restore April 2020 status quo ante in PPT 15 and then resolve the patrolling issues in Depsang Bulge&nbsp; (south of DBO sector) and the Charding Nulllah Junction in Demchok. Till the time these military objectives are achieved, New Delhi is in no mood to normalize ties with Beijing.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Importance of Pangong Tso</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pangong Tso is a 130-km-long lake, approximately one-third of which is in India and the remainder in China with width varying from one to five km is a major obstacle. The water body is of immense strategic importance as it offers suitable avenue for undertaking major operations. The People&#8217;s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Khurnak Fort in 1958 and later in 1959 also established a camp at Maldo- Spanggur Lake area, South of Pangong Tso.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During the 1962 war, Chinese offensive to clear Indian defensive localities on the Northern Bank was launched from Khurnak Fort garrison on October 22. The Chinese were able to capture Indian positions from Sirijap right up to Finger 2 in just two days. However, for progressing operations south of Pangong Tso, PLA had to take a tactical pause of more than three weeks as it had to circumvent the lake to concentrate forces at Rudok.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Second Bridge</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chinese are constructing another bridge over Pangong Tso; adjacent to the one built few months earlier in the Khurnak Fort area, barely 25 km east of the LAC. It is a double-span bridge, capable of ferrying heavier equipment like tanks and artillery guns. China&#8217;s overdrive to upgrade infrastructure, both military and civil, part of &#8216;dual use&#8217; policy, all along the LAC indicates its larger design with serious ramifications.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In May 2020, PLA&#8217;s aggression in Pangong Tso area was confined to the northern side only. When the Indian Army occupied the Kailash Range South of Pangong Tso on the night of August 29-30, 2020 as counter to the Chinese actions, PLA was again handicapped due to the constraints of shifting troops from north to the south of Pangong Tso. To obviate this, China has now gone on to build twin bridges at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso, which cuts down the distance to Rudok by almost 150 km and movement time from 10 to barely 3 hours.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Satellite imagery shows the new bridge is being constructed parallel to the first bridge, which is narrower and was completed in April. The first bridge is being used to move equipment such as cranes needed to build the second one, which will be capable of accommodating larger and heavier vehicles such as tanks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both structures are located across the narrowest section of the 134-km-long lake. They will cut the distance between Chinese troop positions on the north bank to a key People&#8217;s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Rutog, on the eastern end of the lake, by around 150 km.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Kailash Range</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, India took control of several key heights lying vacant since 1962, including Rezang La, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Maggar Hill of the Kailash range, overlooking China&#8217;s Moldo garrison.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The military assessment is that not only does the twin bridge cut the road loop to Rudog base but also allows for faster deployment were India to enact the August 29-21, 2020, action by suddenly occupying heights on the south banks of the lake. The Indian military action during that period not only took the PLA by surprise but also forced China to settle for military disengagement on both banks of the lake with the creation of buffer zones.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Fingers on the Pangong Tso</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the strategic front, the confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces at Pangong Tso is largely on the eight spurs—called &#8216;Fingers&#8217; in military parlance—jutting out of the Chang Chenmo range, an eastern extension of the Karakoram Range which ends at the north bank of Pangong Tso. Traditionally, India exerted control up to Finger 4 and has claimed up to Finger 8 from where the Indian perception of the LAC starts. India has a permanent position near Finger 3 (named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded Param Vir Chakra after the 1962 war), while China maintains a base east of Finger 8. But over the years, China steadily encroached upon Indian territory. Both sides have now reached an agreement giving India control up to Finger 4 and the rest to China.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Heavy Deployment</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both the armies are matched in deployment across the LAC with Chinese armour and rocket regiments stationed at Rudog base, south of Pangong Tso, and at Xiadullah in the restive Xinjiang military region. The PLA Air Force has stationed its fighters and bombers at Gar Gunsa across Demchok and at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian Army is also fully deployed along the LAC with roads and bridges that can accommodate tanks or armoured personnel carriers all the way up to Daulet Beg Oldi and as many as seven bridges coming up on Galwan river to handle any military emergency.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Until May 2020, Pangong Tso had only minimal military presence. Only one company each of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police were deployed in the area. Now, the entire lake is militarised. The PLA is converting its temporary ammunition dumps, helipads and surface-to-air missile positions into permanent ones. Its soldiers are equipped with howitzers, T-15 light tanks, and Type-81 assault rifles and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers. The PLA has augmented its manpower by deploying two new divisions from the Xinjiang Military District, with elements of motorised infantry, armoured, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the Indian side, nearly 20,000 troops guard the region, armed with Bofors howitzers and BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles. Armoured columns of T-90 and T-72 tanks are stationed behind. Several news posts with additional deployment and bunkers have come up. A large number of additional battalions have been moved to Ladakh from the western sector. To patrol the lake, Indian Army&#8217;s new boats, capable of cruising at a speed of nearly 40kmph with around 20 soldiers, are deployed. Built by Goa Shipyard exclusively for the Army, these advanced boats can be modified to fit light weapons if needed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ITBP, the force responsible for guarding the India-China border, too, has made significant enhancements. It has deployed close to 40 per cent additional troops in the area. New border outposts are being created along with infrastructure development of barracks and accommodations for better living conditions, while existing outposts are being further strengthened with additional men and machines.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another major problem confounding the security planners is that unlike most other hotspots along the LAC, Pangong Tso is also a popular tourist destination. Pangong Tso and its surroundings were opened up for visitors in the early 1990s, and it became famous after the climax of the 2008 Bollywood movie 3 Idiots, starring Aamir Khan, was filmed near the lake. Ironically, the movie was equally popular in China.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Comments</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While the twin bridges in Khurnak Fort area are&nbsp; beyond the LAC perception of India and hence technically on territory that the PLA occupied in 1959,&nbsp; Chinese soldiers continue to be forwardly deployed on patrolling point 15, which is in Kugrang Heights and en-route the shortest path from Panging Tso to Galwan Valley.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China&#8217;s strategic intent is clear: it plans to keep the positions it recently captured in the Pangong area.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The only feasible response is to have reciprocal infrastructure development in areas controlled by India. For instance, despite strident Chinese opposition, India went ahead with building several bridges on the Shyok River and in Daulat Beg Oldi in the past couple of years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian side has conveyed its expectations regarding the military standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Chinese side, including foreign minister Wang Yi, and will continue to take the matter forward in order to find a solution though talks.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/china-building-bridges-over-pangong-tso/">China building bridges over Pangong Tso</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>India Could Face a More Belligerent China</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/india-could-face-a-more-belligerent-china/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neighbourhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arunachal sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[belligerent China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[border standoff]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CAATSA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China-containment strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[line of actual control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LOAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peoples Liberation Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PLA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[S-400 Triumf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Ukraine War has shifted attention and focus of the West, away from the Indo-Pacific, from China’s rise and the threat China poses to the existing world order. India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis. The Indian and Chinese armies have [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/india-could-face-a-more-belligerent-china/">India Could Face a More Belligerent China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Ukraine War has shifted attention and focus of the West, away from the Indo-Pacific, from China’s rise and the threat China poses to the existing world order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis. The Indian and Chinese armies have been locked in a border standoff since May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. Since then, the two sides held several rounds of military and diplomatic which have only resulted in partial disengagement of troops from friction points.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So far, India has walked the diplomatic tightrope between the US and Russia, given its own strategic compulsions. Warding off pressure from the US and its European allies to strongly oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is a matter by itself. India hopes that purchase of the five S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile squadrons, under the $5.43 billion (Rs 40,000 crore) contract inked with Russia in October 2018, was an “urgent national security requirement” to counter aggressive neighbours like China and Pakistan. Hence, the US will not impose sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), which seeks to prevent countries from buying Russian weapons, by mounting a major diplomatic-military campaign with both the Trump and Biden administrations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the China front, India will need to keep an eagle-eye on the annual exercises of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in March-April along the 3,488-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) and be “prepared for any contingencies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In addition to the stalemate along the LAC, the IA could face the emergence of another front on its western flank from China’s ‘willing’ affiliate Pakistan, with the aim of dividing India’s already overstretched forces and equally strained financial and equipment resources.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As it is, the PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Apart from conventional military capabilities, China’s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;China’s latest demonstration of physically moving one of its disabled satellites into the graveyard orbit is bringing in newer threats in the race to weaponise the space domain, a domain hitherto considered relatively safe,” IAF chief Air Chief Marshal V R Chaudhari said at a seminar on 24 February.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-quad-s-focus">Quad&#8217;s Focus</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Furthermore, the inchoate and nebulous preemptive deterrent instrumentality like the naval-focused Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, initiated in 2007-08 as a China-containment strategy, and one which included Australia, Japan and the US, has, in its new avatar, proven ineffectual in discouraging Beijing’s adventurism in Ladakh. Besides, all four Quad members are now preoccupied with dealing with the fallout from Ukraine’s invasion and bracing themselves for a unified China-Russia front, in which the latter’s military technology, expertise and know-how would be more aggressively mated and advanced by a financially flush and industrially forward Beijing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India should now forcefully use its considerable diplomatic clout and its deep friendships on all sides to end the conflict and stabilise the region. The additional advantage in such a solution would be to persuade India’s strategic partners including its Quad partners to turn back their focus on China and the Indo-Pacific.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Beijing-Moscow Axis</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ongoing confusion over the war in Ukraine could impact the LAC situation, as sanctions could drive Moscow into a ‘Chinese embrace’. In that case, India would have to deal with the PLA threat by itself. And to do so it needs to summarily and significantly augment its economic and military capabilities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India could well end up facing the brunt of this deadly security partnership between Moscow, Beijing and Islamabad. Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on February 25, within hours of the latter having ordered his army’s mobilisation against Kyiv, was ‘significant.’ It had firmly secured Putin’s eastern flank, with the exception of India, which had opted to remain neutral. It is apposite to recall that Putin lifted sanctions on Pakistan in 2014, sold it Mi-35M Hind-E attack helicopters and conducted joint exercises with its army near Peshawar in October 2018.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India’s ‘nightmare scenario’ is&nbsp; &#8211; Washington deciding to confront a greater threat from Russia in its European backyard than from China, and opting for a strategic accommodation with Beijing. Or the US conceding Chinese dominance in Asia to safeguard its European flank from an expansionist Russia.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">India&#8217;s Options</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India needs to forge long-term alliances with advanced materiel producing countries to eventually replace Russian equipment, in addition to ‘realistically’ beefing up its domestic defence manufacturing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The government’s disjointed and ad hoc approach to fostering military capability development has to stop. The MoD needs to optimise scarce financial resources and focus on immediate security threats and not on optics, like the recent strident official announcement that Indian industry had indigenised the manufacture of assorted military-grade nuts and bolts.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Instead of half-baked measures, India must make self-reliance in military requirements a concrete national mission, along with a special thrust on space, cyberspace and special operations. Moreover, a robust nuclear deterrence is required to deter all adversaries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ongoing situation on northern Borders warrants the Indian Army to re-align the operational tasking of its reserve formations to focus on the northern borders and refine warfighting capabilities in high altitude mountainous terrain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India uneasily awaits the next Chinese misadventure on its borders. Unlike Ukraine, India is alone.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/india-could-face-a-more-belligerent-china/">India Could Face a More Belligerent China</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Army Chief Raises Possibility of Demilitarization</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Feb 2022 06:13:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neighbourhood]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Policy & Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AGPL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Daulat Beg Oldi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DBO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Demilitarization of Siachen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Depsang plains]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Importance of Siachen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karakoram range]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[line of actual control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NJ 9842]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Op Meghdoot]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Occupied Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rimo Glacier]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saltoro range]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shaksgam valley]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Siachen Glacier]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Simla Agreement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sub Sector North]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yarkand Valley]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=12622</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Should Siachen Glacier Be Held at All Costs? Chief of Army Staff Gen MM Naravane, on January 12, replying to a question submitted in advance, said, “We are not averse to the demilitarization of the glacier but the pre-condition for that is to accept the AGPL. Pakistan has to accept what are their positions and [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/army-chief-raises-possibility-of-demilitarization/">Army Chief Raises Possibility of Demilitarization</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-should-siachen-glacier-be-held-at-all-costs">Should Siachen Glacier Be Held at All Costs?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chief of Army Staff Gen MM Naravane, on January 12, replying to a question submitted in advance, said, “We are not averse to the demilitarization of the glacier but the pre-condition for that is to accept the AGPL. Pakistan has to accept what are their positions and what are ours, and both of us have to sign on the dotted line before any kind of disengagement takes place.&#8221;</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Stalemate in Talks</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There have been 13 rounds of talks on the demilitarisation of Siachen, the last one at Rawalpindi in June 2012. After almost a ten-year hiatus, Gen Naravane&#8217;s statement shows that there is no progress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India has been insisting on the marking of the current positions that the Army holds on maps that are to be ratified by both sides. This will establish Indian territorial control along the Saltoro range. On the other hand, Pakistan has been reluctant to authenticate Indian positions as it will legitimise India&#8217;s &#8216;illegal act&#8217; of violating the Simla Agreement by occupying an area that was under Pakistan&#8217;s administrative control. The crux of the matter is that neither side is willing to make any territorial compromise.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After the fifth round of talks in June 1989, the joint statement stated: “There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chance of conflict.” This was a direct result of Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto&#8217;s political intervention in attempting to find a solution on Siachen.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The sixth round in 1992 carried forward the discussions of 1989, and this was the second time that an agreement was almost reached. However, there was no political acceptance by then-Prime Minister Narsimha Rao to ratify the agreement. In 2006, a draft agreement was drawn up for a phased, mutual withdrawal and joint monitoring of a demilitarised zone at Siachen.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Importance of Siachen</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lt Gen V R Raghavan, who served as the Director-General of Military Operations, wrote in his book Siachen: Conflict without End: “It is apparent that neither India nor Pakistan secures a strategic advantage by contesting the possession of the Saltoro range. Neither also faces a military threat to the territory it occupies in Jammu and Kashmir from over the Saltoro range…A strategic veneer is given to what is actually a political necessity for continuing the conflict.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the other hand, the area is bound by Pakistan to the west, the Chinese Shaksgam valley to the North, and the Sub Sector North (SSN) of Ladakh to the east, where the People&#8217;s Liberation Army (PLA) is confronting the Indian Army in the Depsang plains. If military collusion between Pakistan and China is to occur, this is the area where it is most likely to happen.</p>



<div class="wp-block-image"><figure class="aligncenter size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="600" height="776" src="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Siachen-Glacier-region.jpg" alt="Siachen Glacier region" class="wp-image-12626" srcset="https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Siachen-Glacier-region.jpg 600w, https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Siachen-Glacier-region-232x300.jpg 232w, https://imrmedia.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Siachen-Glacier-region-325x420.jpg 325w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /><figcaption>Siachen Glacier region</figcaption></figure></div>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Shaksgam Valley</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While Gen Naravane spelt out the Indian Army&#8217;s position on the issue, the matter has become far more complicated for national security planners with Pakistan and China proposing a road connecting Yarkand in Sinkiang to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir through Shaksgam Valley, a 5193-square-kilometres territory that Pakistan illegally ceded to China in 1963. The Shaksgam Valley lies in the trans-Karakoram range watershed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Area maps clearly show that Rimo Glacier, Teram Shehr Glacier and the Siachen Glacier are located within the Indian union territory of Ladakh. The adjoining areas of these glaciers are PLA dominated territories like Shaksgam Valley and Yarkand Valley in the north and PoK in the west in addition to the warlike deployments by the PLA in Aksai Chin opposite Daulat Beg Oldi sector in the east. The PLA has a history of aggressive transgressions into what the Army calls sub-sector north and it is adamant in blocking the Indian Army patrols in Depsang Bulge south of DBO.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The proposed Muzaffarabad-Shaksgam-Yarkand Valley road will not only boost the military interoperability between two iron brothers but also pose a two-front threat to Indian forces in the sub-sector north.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian Army controls the Saltoro Ridge that provides ingress into Siachen Glacier since 1984 post-Operation Meghdoot. Siachen Glacier is located in the eastern Karakoram range, just northeast of NJ 9842, where the Line of Control between India and Pakistan ends.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The military situation in the area is quite precarious with China building all-weather access to Pakistan via Karakoram Pass, just 18 km from DBO plateau, and trying to militarily impose India rejected 1959 line on the LAC in Ladakh.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Historical Background</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Siachen is a part of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir (now divided into two Union territories — Jammu &amp; Kashmir and Ladakh), which legally acceded to India on October 26-27, 1947 and has since then been its integral part. This was endorsed by every political party in the land, and both Houses of the Indian Parliament passed an unanimous resolution on February 22, 1994 that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was in the later years of the 1970s that the India side picked up activities by Pakistan in the Siachen area, such as sponsoring international mountaineering expeditions. This would have implied that Pakistan had jurisdiction over this territory. This was also the time when official US maps began to show the LoC as extending right up to the Karakoram Pass on the India-China boundary, which would, in effect, imply that the Siachen glacier fell under the actual jurisdiction of Pakistan. The Chinese followed suit. As a result, roughly 2,300 sq km of territory in this glacier zone came to be shown as under Pakistani control. In response to this encroachment, the Indian Army launched what came to be known as Operation Meghdoot, in 1984, to occupy the Siachen-Saltoro ridge. Pakistani attempts to dislodge the Indian troops from the heights did not succeed though they did occupy and fortify the lower reaches on their side.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Comments</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Brookings scholar Stephen Cohen said: “Siachen is a conflict between two bald men over a comb.” The cost of Siachen expedition over the years has been around 2,150 soldiers killed and 5,000 persons wounded on both sides with an estimated cost of roughly $1 million a day.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Any move to withdraw from our territory will also be a violation of the Constitution by India&#8217;s rulers. The reality is, Siachen can&#8217;t be a discussion point except for its acceptance and recognition as an integral/inviolable part of India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the best of times, India and Pakistan were engaged in what was known as a Composite Dialogue, the agenda for which contained eight items. Siachen and Sir Creek were two issues on which early agreement was possible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is true that the AGPL delineation had been a major sticking point in reaching an agreement on Siachen. However, this matter had been resolved between the two sides, first during bilateral defence secretary-level talks in 1992 and then subsequently in foreign secretary-level talks in 2006. These agreements could not be formalised and implemented due to political reasons.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Can Pakistan or China be relied upon for their diplomatic assurances?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It would be militarily prudent for Indian Army to put the demilitarization of Siachen on the back-burner till such time the Chinese PLA agrees to respect the Ladakh LAC and restores April 2020 status quo ante as well as allow India unhindered rights to patrol Depsang Bulge and Charding Nullah Junction (CNJ) in Demchok sector.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/army-chief-raises-possibility-of-demilitarization/">Army Chief Raises Possibility of Demilitarization</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>India-China 14th round military dialogue fails to move forward</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/india-china-14th-round-military-dialogue-fails-to-move-forward/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jan 2022 07:40:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[14th round]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[boundary talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chushul]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corps Commander-level talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Demchok]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Depsang]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disengagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eastern Ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gogra]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hot Springs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China standoff]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[line of actual control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moldo]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=12096</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The 14th round of India-China Corps Commander-level military dialogue, on 12 January, failed to yield any positive outcomes but both countries decided to work towards mutually acceptable solutions to resolving the Ladakh LAC stand-off. The next round is expected to be held soon to continue the momentum of discussions. The talks took place at the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/india-china-14th-round-military-dialogue-fails-to-move-forward/">India-China 14th round military dialogue fails to move forward</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 14th round of India-China Corps Commander-level military dialogue, on 12 January, failed to yield any positive outcomes but both countries decided to work towards mutually acceptable solutions to resolving the Ladakh LAC stand-off. The next round is expected to be held soon to continue the momentum of discussions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The talks took place at the Chushul-Moldo meeting point, on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The meet concluded at 10.30 pm after 13 hours.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Major focus of the talks was on disengagement in the Hot Springs area. The Indian side was expected to press for disengagement as soon as possible in all the remaining friction points, including resolution of issues in Depsang Bulge and Demchok.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In pure diplomatic language, the talks were constructive without any positive outcome and reaching mutually acceptable solutions is work in progress. This means both the Indian Army and the PLA commanders will continue to engage in future but there is no guarantee on whether the PLA will restore April 2020 status quo ante in Gogra-Hot Springs or resolve the Depsang Bulge or CNJ issue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fact is that the PLA with new border law and rapid military and technological upgradation on their side of the unresolved LAC is converting the 3,488 km line into Line of Control.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">MoD statement</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A statement issued by the Ministry of Defence on Thursday evening said representatives from the defence and foreign affairs establishments of the two sides were present at the meeting. “They agreed that both sides should follow the guidance provided by the state leaders and work for the resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The statements issued by both sides were not as blunt and sharp as those issued after the 13th round of talks on October 10, 2021, when they blamed each other for the failure of the talks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This time, the statement said: “The two sides have agreed to stay in close contact and maintain dialogue via military and diplomatic channels and work out a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest.” It also spoke about agreeing to hold the next round of the commanders’ talks at the earliest. Since June 2020, there have been 14 rounds of talks. Though there has been partial success, troop build-up on either side, for now, shows no signs of getting back to the pre-April 2020 levels. At the talks yesterday, India and China agreed that the two sides would consolidate the “previous outcomes” and take effective efforts to maintain the security and stability on the ground in the western sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The “previous outcomes” mentioned in the statement referred to the disengagement at PP-17, PP-17A, and north and south banks of the Pangong Tso, a 135-km glacial lake. India shares 832-km LAC with China in the eastern Ladakh sector.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-rise-in-tensions">Rise in Tensions</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the corps commander-level talks doing little to ease tensions, the confrontation could likely get worse at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, and that Beijing may not continue with the regular lines of communication.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While India didn’t expect movement on the disengagement plans, owing to China’s recent actions to deploy more troops at the LAC, the commentary from Beijing this time that India had made “unreasonable demands” has prompted strategic sources in New Delhi to believe that this could lead to a ‘Galwan-like’ flare-up.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The sticky issues</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While disengagement has taken place in the Pangong Tso area and at the Gogra Post, a stand-off continues over Patrolling Point 15 (PP15) in Hot Springs, the Depsang Plains and in the Demchok area.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India and China have six to seven hotlines but there has been little progress in the talks. A larger plan to resolve the issue with the establishment of a hotline at the DGMO level remains unfulfilled.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian side clearly failed to persuade the PLA towards disengagement from Gogra-Hot Springs near Kongka La as well as resolving patrolling rights issues in Depsang Bulge in Daulet Beg Oldi sector and Charding Nullah Junction in Demchok sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Indian Army apparently raised the issue of PLA building a bridge over Pangong Tso, east of Srijap Complex, for faster troop deployment and rapid militarisation of the occupied Aksai Chin area by the Chinese Army all along the 597-km Ladakh LAC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There would be no immediate disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point (PP)-15, also known as Hot Springs. Resultantly, Indian forces would stick to their locations and positions at the LAC. Weapons, equipment, tanks, artillery guns and other high technology surveillance systems would also be around. Both sides have some 75,000 troops in the sector.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">13th Round</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 13th round of talks had taken place on October 10, 2021 and they ended in a stalemate. Both sides had failed to make any headway in the talks with the Indian Army saying after the dialogue that the “constructive suggestions” made by it were neither agreeable to the Chinese side nor it could provide any “forward-looking” proposals.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In their virtual diplomatic talks on November 18, India and China agreed to hold the 14th round of military talks at an early date to achieve the objective of complete disengagement in remaining friction points in eastern Ladakh.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Continued Stand-off</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both the Indian and PLA armies are locked in a stand-off all along Ladakh LAC since the Chinese Army under instructions from the Central Military Commission under President Xi Jinping decided to unilaterally change the LAC and impose the rejected 1959 cartographical line on the Ladakh LAC in May 2020. Since then the two sides are fully deployed with more than three divisions of troops on each side with missile, rocket, artillery and tank regiments apart from the Air Force being on standby in the hinterland. The PLA by transgressing in Pangong Tso, Galwan, Gogra-Hot Springs area in May 2020 broke the bilateral 1993 and 1996 peace and tranquility agreements signed at the level of heads of states.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both sides gradually enhanced their deployment by rushing in tens of thousands of soldiers as well as heavy weaponry.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process last year in the north and south banks of the Pangong lake and in the Gogra area.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Each side currently has around 50,000 to 60,000 troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the sensitive sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ever since the LAC stand-off began in April-May 2020, both sides have mainly followed a three-tier approach — regular talks at the diplomatic and military levels, along with a dialogue track between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To top all of this, talks were also held between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi. It was Doval and Yang who agreed to a disengagement plan in 2020.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This time the talks failed as the Chinese have replaced Gen. Xu Qiling, who was promoted in July, with Gen. Wang Haijiang, and that as a result a “comfort level” had not been achieved.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/india-china-14th-round-military-dialogue-fails-to-move-forward/">India-China 14th round military dialogue fails to move forward</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>China builds new bridge on Pangong Tso East of Line of Control</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/china-builds-new-bridge-on-pangong-tso-east-of-line-of-control/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[IMR Reporter]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Jan 2022 07:46:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bridge on Pangong Tso]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Finger 8]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China standoff]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[line of actual control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pangong Tso]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=12057</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Continuing with infrastructure build-up on its side of the area near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, China is building a new bridge on Pangong Tso which will provide an additional axis to deploy troops faster between the north and south banks of the lake, and closer to the LAC. Sources said [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/china-builds-new-bridge-on-pangong-tso-east-of-line-of-control/">China builds new bridge on Pangong Tso East of Line of Control</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Continuing with infrastructure build-up on its side of the area near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, China is building a new bridge on Pangong Tso which will provide an additional axis to deploy troops faster between the north and south banks of the lake, and closer to the LAC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sources said the bridge is being constructed more than 20 km east of Finger 8 on the lake’s north bank – India says Finger 8 denotes the LAC. The bridge site is just east of Khurnak Fort in Rutog county where the PLA has frontier bases. There is a frontier defence company at Khurnak Fort, and a water squadron further east at Banmozhang.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since the military standoff began in May 2020, India and China have not only worked to improve existing infrastructure, but have also built several new roads, bridges, landing strips along the entire frontier.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pangong Tso, an endorheic lake, is 135 km long, of which more than two-thirds is under Chinese control. Khurnak Fort, close to where China is building the new bridge, is near the halfway mark of the boomerang-shaped lake.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Historically a part of India, Khurnak Fort has been under Chinese control since 1958. From Khurnak Fort, the LAC is considerably west, with India claiming it at Finger 8 and China claiming it at Finger 4.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The north and south banks of the lake were among the several friction points that surfaced after the start of the standoff. Before India and China pulled back troops from the north and south banks in February 2021, the area had seen massive mobilisation and the two sides even deployed tanks, barely a few hundred metres apart in some locations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Towards the end of August 2020, India outmanoeuvred China to capture the previously unoccupied heights of the Kailash Range on the south bank of the lake.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indian troops positioned themselves on the peaks there, including Magar Hill, Gurung Hill, Rezang La, Rechin La, and this allowed them to dominate the strategic Spanggur Gap — it can be used for launching an offensive, as China had done in 1962 — and also gave them a view of the PLA garrison at Moldo.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indian troops had also positioned themselves above the Chinese troops in the Fingers area on the north bank. During this scramble for the heights, shots had been fired by both sides, a first in over four decades.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Troops from the two countries remained on these heights through the harsh winter months. The significance of these positions was one of the main factors that compelled China to negotiate a pullback.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both countries agreed to a pullback from the north bank of the lake, and positions on the Kailash Range in the Chushul sub-sector south of Pangong Tso.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sources said that the new bridge built by China will allow it to mobilise its troops faster in this area, hoping to prevent a repeat of what happened in August 2020.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has been developing infrastructure in the entire region since the start of the standoff — it is still to be resolved. The widening of roads, building of new roads and bridges, new bases, airstrips, advance landing bases, etc are not restricted to the eastern Ladakh region, but are happening across the three sectors of the India-China boundary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India too has been improving its infrastructure in the border areas. Last year, the Border Roads Organisation completed more than 100 projects in border areas, the majority of which were close to the border with China. India is also improving its surveillance along the entire 3488-km boundary, and has been building new airstrips and landing areas.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/china-builds-new-bridge-on-pangong-tso-east-of-line-of-control/">China builds new bridge on Pangong Tso East of Line of Control</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
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		<title>Indian Navy&#8217;s P8I Moved To Ladakh</title>
		<link>https://imrmedia.in/indian-navys-p8i-moved-to-ladakh/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:48:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily Defence News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[indian navy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ladakh]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://imrmedia.in/?p=2953</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Amidst a protracted and violent face-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Galwan Valley, aircraft spotters have posted an aerial track of the Indian Navy’s Boeing P-8I surveillance aircraft heading towards Ladakh, on social media platforms. An image posted on micro-blogging site Twitter today morning shows a P-8I heading from New Delhi flying over Himachal [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://imrmedia.in/indian-navys-p8i-moved-to-ladakh/">Indian Navy&#8217;s P8I Moved To Ladakh</a> appeared first on <a href="https://imrmedia.in">IMR</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">
<p>Amidst a protracted and violent face-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Galwan Valley, aircraft spotters have posted an aerial track of the Indian Navy’s Boeing P-8I surveillance aircraft heading towards Ladakh, on social media platforms.</p>
<div style="text-align: justify;">An image posted on micro-blogging site Twitter today morning shows a P-8I heading from New Delhi flying over Himachal Pradesh and headed in the direction of the zone of the conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The aircraft is shown at an altitude of 31,000 feet and speed of 440 knots or roughly 800 kmph.</div>
<div style="text-align: center;"><img decoding="async" src="https://cmsimages.tribuneindia.com/gallary_content/2020/6/2020_6$largeimg_238659672.jpg" /></div>
<p>Built on a Boeing 737 airframe, the P-8I is a long-range anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare platform used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions as well as for other critical missions like search-and-rescue, anti-piracy and supporting operations of other arms of the military.</p>
<p>In February this year, Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Bipin Rawat had revealed that the P-8 aircraft had also been deployed to carry out extensive surveillance on the movement and deployment of Chinese troops during the 73-day-long standoff between India and China at Doklam on the tri-junction of India-Bhutan-China in the east in 2017.</p>
<p>The person who had posted Thursday’s image of the Naval P-8I had on Wednesday re-tweeted satellite pictures of escalating build-up of Chinese forces on May 19 showing armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, command posts, trucks and other equipment about 43 km south east of the LAC in Galwan Valley area.</p>
<p>According to sources, the Navy’s P-8Is have been used on surveillance missions in support of the Army in various sectors on earlier occasions, including during the current stand-off in Ladakh as well as in the aftermath of the Pulwama terror attack. They use the synthetic aperture radar, inverse synthetic aperture radar, electro-optic instruments and infrared to map surface areas as well as their onboard electronic warfare suites to scan the electromagnetic domain.</p>
<p>The P-8Is were inducted into the Indian Navy in 2013, Of the 12 aircraft ordered so far, India has received eight, making India the second largest operator of this aircraft in the world. Another four aircraft are on-schedule to be delivered in 2020. The Navy operates these aircraft with Indian Naval Air Squadron 312, The Albatross, at INS Rajali near Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu.</p>
</div>
<p><a href="https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/plane-spotters-post-on-twitter-track-of-indian-navys-surveillance-aircraft-moving-towards-ladakh-100873">Source link </a></p>
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