Victory for the Russians could now well be a consolidation of the areas they have annexed through the September 2022 referendum in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. As for Ukraine, it says that the liberation of all those areas as well as Crimea is the victory they are seeking.

In the meantime, the conflict is increasingly looking like a proxy war between the US and Russia. This has been underscored by US President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Kyiv. And now, amidst US warnings against aiding the Russian war effort, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to visit Moscow in April.

The fighting grinds on. Neither side appears to have the wherewithal to compel the other side to concede. Despite their vast size and resources, the Russians have made trivial gains in their most recent offensives in the Donbas region. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are absorbing the attacks and waiting to launch their own offensive towards Mariupol.

The huge gap in the goals of the two antagonists makes any kind of a compromise difficult.

One solution is an outright and immediate ceasefire that freezes the conflict where it is. Probably, that is the point that both are aiming for this summer through their fresh offensives.

Each side may have to accept a tattered victory — Ukraine demonstrating its ability to take on the Russians, the latter indicating their determination to hold on to territories seized from Ukraine.

The larger picture also remains fuzzy. If Europe has managed to deal with its energy challenge through the winter of 2022, Russia, too has successfully used its oil and gas profits to ride out the difficulties its economy faced after the invasion and the western sanctions.

But income from energy, which provides 40 per cent of the Russian government’s income, is falling and could drop 25 per cent in the coming year as western sanctions sharpen their bite.

Meanwhile, the global community is at last getting worried that a prolongation of the conflict has dangerous, unpredictable consequences. Already, the world has had to pay an unanticipated price for what was thought to be a purely European affair.

The past year has seen significant geopolitical developments with implications not just for Russia but also its key friend China. The consolidation of the western alliance has derailed Chinese calculations in Europe. For Beijing, as for Moscow, relations with countries like Germany and those in central and eastern Europe are important from the economic and political perspectives.

Now, they support the US hard line on Russia, and China’s ‘no-limits’ partnership is not playing well in Europe. Even Japan has been forced to take major steps to re-arm and alter its pacifist policy and has made it clear that it will not accept the Chinese use of force in Taiwan.

There are three potential peace-making plans in the works:

China’s self-serving 12-point peace plan revealed at the Munich Security Conference was aimed at the European opinion, yet it undermined itself by Chinese diplomats blaming the war on western support to Ukraine. Beijing’s next moves could be revealed when Xi visits Russia later this year. So far, the response to the 12-point plan has been underwhelming.

The second potential peacemaker is India. New Delhi has been hoping to use the G20 presidency to find a leadership role in global affairs. India has been carefully feeling its way ahead and has maintained a neutral stance till now, one that is reluctantly accepted by the US and the EU.

However, India’s most recent vote of abstention at the UN General Assembly meeting on February 24 was a bit of a non sequitur. In its long-winded explanation of vote, it expressed concern over the loss of lives and destruction that the war had brought and spoke of the importance of international law and territorial integrity of states. It also invoked the Prime Minister’s statement that “today’s era is not an era of war.”

Yet, it abstained on a resolution calling for a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine” that passed 141 to seven against with 32 abstentions.

The G20 is unlikely to provide a platform for any putative Indian move on Ukraine. The Chinese insistence on keeping the word ‘war’ out of the joint communiqué of the G20 finance ministers last week suggests that Beijing will work to ensure that India does not cut into the diplomatic space it is possibly seeking to create for itself on Ukraine.

A third and potentially important route to dialogue has been opened up by the reported move of France, the UK and Germany to offer Ukraine a pact that would supply advanced weapons and assistance to Ukraine, but not the full benefits of a NATO membership. The idea is to enable a Ukrainian offensive as a prelude to negotiations which may involve a loss of some Ukrainian territory. The European move would also be a guarantee of sorts for the future security of Ukraine.

There is no report of the US signing on to the European plan. In Kyiv, Biden offered unconditional support without any talk of negotiations. But it is unlikely that the Europeans will move without American concurrence.

Of all the moves, this may be the most fruitful since the Europeans are crucial to Ukraine’s fight against Russia and minus their support, the Ukrainians will find the going difficult. As they say, he who pays the piper calls the tune. (Manoj Joshi, ORF)

The post Three potential peace-making plans on Ukraine in the works appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 1 here

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

After initial SEAD strikes on 24 February (the first day of the offensive) a large train of Mi-28 transport and Hokum attack helicopters was seen flying towards the Hostamel airport. It was attacked by air and missile strikes and possibly also by MBRLs. Elements of an air assault formation (possibly one of the Guards airborne divisions) landed and seized the Antonov airport at Hostamel. The giant Ukrainian AN-225 transport aircraft (the world’s largest) was destroyed in the fighting here. As per standard practice, military experts expected them to hold an airhead (to fly in reinforcements and supplies) and await a land link-up with the tank columns of the 41st Army that were crossing over from Belarus border. Given the distance of approximately some 150 kms, the link-up would at best have taken 2-3days. However, what followed was somewhat unorthodox and confusing. Instead of holding the airhead, the airborne troops left it and charged straight for Kiev some 23 kms away. Reportedly, the 141 Motorised National Guards Brigade under Chechen Maj Gen Magomed Tusaev charged into Kiev. They were surprised by the stiff resistence and the Javelins and artillery took a heavy toll. Reportedly, they lost some 58 armoured vehicles to the ATGMs and the Chechen Maj Gen was killed. Finding the Hostomel airfield unoccupied the Ukrainians recaptured it, thus, denying the airhead for flying in reinforcements and logistics supply. Apparently, this coup de main operation was planned at the highest level because President Putin himself called upon Ukrainian forces to surrender. Later, he personally praised the sacrifice of the paratroopers. There definitely was a major failure of intelligence here. On what intelligence basis was such a bold operation launched on the enemy capital? It could not be based merely on the expectation that the Ukraine forces would not fight and surrender tamely? That cannot be the basis of operational planning and there seemed to be no fall back option or Plan B in this coup de main operation. It seemed to be based on very subjective parameters and assumptions.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The Russian advance began on multiple thrust lines. As assessed by IMR, it was a full scale invasion option. Rapid progress was made in first 3-4 days with spear heads covering over 150 kms to reach the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to siege warfare – surrounding cities, isolating the entry and exit routes and pounding cities savagely with rockets, cruise missiles and conventional artillery. Humanitarian corridors were agreed on by both sides to let civilians flee the cities. Some 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced and over 3.5 to 5 million have been forced to flee to Poland and other neighboring countries. The pace of operations has been slowed down greatly partly due to need for logistical pauses and very heavy and dogged resistance by the Ukrainian army, which used their Javelins ATGMs and Strella SAMs  to cause fairly substantial attrition. However the simple ground reality is that neither US nor NATO are putting boots on ground nor will they enforce any No-Fly Zones. So, theoretically, Russia has all the time in the world to methodically and steadily but surely grind down the Ukraine military in a meat-grinder war of attrition, which could carry on for months. The longer it lasts the more Ukraine will suffer. Unfortunately, it will also have a fearful impact on the global economy that was staging a tenuous recovery from Covid. Let me now cover the operations in the Northern, Eastern and Southern sectors in detail.

Northern Sector

The Russian forces attacked in the Northern sector toward Kiev the capital and Kharkiev (former capital and financial hub which had the T- 80 tank factory here).

Kiev. The 41st Army charged across the Belarus border towards Kiev on two thrust lines west of the Dnieper river, while elements of 36the Army advanced along the east bank towards Chernobyl nuclear plant and further on to Hostomel airport. These thrust lines made very rapid initial progress and in just 2-3 days were on the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, operations slowed down to try and isolate and then besiege Kiev, while they carried out precise Iskander TBMs and Kalibr cruise missiles strikes and limited bombardment by MBRLs. They made a few probes towards Kiev city centre but were repulsed. The satellite imagery on 4th/5th day of war showed a huge 65 km long convoy stretched on the road to Kiev. This included assault tank echelons, which should have been moving cross country but were stuck to the road due to the slush and mud caused by the spring thaw. The convoy remained stuck like that for a couple of days. Had the Ukrainian Air Force been active, this would have led to a disaster but apparently the convoy was well protected by the slant range of the S-400 missiles from Belarus and remained largely unscathed. It did not seem as if the Russians were planning to fight in the streets of Kiev, which were heavily defended by Javelin ATGMs and Stinger SAMs and would have entailed heavy troop casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population. Some experts felt this was a deception operation designed to keep the world’s attention riveted towards Kiev, while they made major advances in the East (Donbas) and the south sea coast. Cruise missiles were used to destroy the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant and oil storage depots. Strangely, almost no attacks were made by aircraft or cruise missiles on key command and control targets like the Presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. This, to my mind, is a cardinal mistake of this war – the failure to target the top political and military leadership of Ukraine in a pinpoint and concerted manner.

Sumy. The 20th Army elements advanced on to Sumy and surrounded and bombed the city heavily.

Kharkiev. The 6th Army mounted heavy and sustained attacks on Kharkiev. It was surrounded and pounded to rubble. The tank manufacturing plant was destroyed by cruise missile strikes and bitter fighting took place on the streets. The Russians claim to be in control of the city but this is disputed by the Ukrainians.

Eastern Sector

This was the scene of major hostilities since 2014 and daily exchanges of artillery and mortar fire were taking place along the line of contact (LOC). Russians claim that Ukraine had massed some 60,000 of its best troops opposite Donbas and were planning to launch an offensive to take back the 30 per cent or so of the territories of the break-away districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was under Russian control. Attacks in this sector, therefore, were largely frontal and heavily contested. As per the Russians, it was to pin down Ukrainian forces in the North and not let them reinforce this sector that attacks were launched concurrently on Kiev and Kharkiev in the North.

•  The Russian 8th Army mounted fierce attacks on the Lukansk district and, by end of March, claimed to have liberated some 93 per cent of its territory.

•  The Russian 49th Army mounted fierce attacks on Donetsk district and, by end of March, claims to have liberated 56 per cent of its area. It also mounted operations towards Mariupol to link up with troops operating out of Crimea to establish a land corridor for Crimea.

•  In Phase II of the Russian operation they could complete the capture of the entire Donbas region and possibly try and encircle and annihilate the 60,000 or so Ukrainian troops operating against the Donbas region by encircling them from North and South in a major pincer movement.

Southern Sector

This encompasses the coast of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The three major ports here are Sevastopol (already with Russia on lease since decades) and now part of Russian occupied Crimea. The other major ports are Odessa and Mariupol. Russian Marines and Army made the most impressive gains here and have almost cut off Ukraine from the sea and made it a land locked state.

•  The Russian 58th Army and the Marines have advanced on Mariupol, laid siege to it and reduced the city to rubble by very heavy bombardment and missile strikes. The Russians claim to be in control of Mariupol, though Ukrainians claim that pockets of resistance remain. Mariupol and Kharkiev are the two major cities where the Russians have employed their standard tactics of capturing cities and the firepower used has been fearful. The land link up of Crimea with Donbas is now complete and is a major and significant gain.

•  The Russian 22nd Army and Marine elements advanced on and Quickly captured the coastal port city of Kherson (the first major city with a population of 300,000) that fell to the Russians. They then moved on and surrounded the port city of Mykolyiv and pounded it fiercely. Parts of the city have fallen to the Russians. Army elements and Marines have also advanced and captured the nuclear power plant complex of Zhaporizhzia. This is the largest nuclear plant in Europe with 6x 950 MW reactors (only one functional). They have also captured the Aneshader nuclear plant which has 25 per cent of the power generation capacity of the whole of Ukraine. Thus, almost all nuclear facilities in eastern Ukraine are now under Russian control.

•  While the world’s interest was riveted on Kiev, the Russians have made the most impressive advances in the South and have captured almost all the major seaports of Ukraine and cut off its access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. If Russians could induct fresh troops here they could drive up north along both banks of the Dnieper river and partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts along the Dnieper river. This could well be attempted by the Russians in Phase II of the operations.

Major Outcomes and Lessons Learnt So Far

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine is now in its second month. It began as a swift war of manoeuvre but now has turned into an inexorable attrition nightmare. Western propaganda is trying to claim it as a pyrrhic victory for Ukraine, which they armed very heavily with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs, which they claim had won the war in Afghanistan. These claims are over-hyped. Certainly, these defensive missiles have, to an extent, slowed down Russian operations and have been used to target their follow-on and logistics echelons. However, in no way can these tactical defensive weapons by themselves win the war for Ukraine. They can only serve to prolong it.

The American aim seems to be to prolong this war for a couple of months to humiliate Putin and impose maximum attrition on his war machine. This amounts to fighting the Russians till the last Ukrainian man or building standing. In the bargain, no one seems to care for the highly adverse impact on the global economy that has been struggling to recover from the impact of Covid pandemic. Nor does this approach show any sensitivity to the cost of human suffering of the people of Ukraine who have been callously dumped by the West.

The expenditure rate of these Javelins and Stingers missiles has been enormous. Zelinsky now wants 500 of these per day at an estimated missile replacement cost of $39 million per day. It is virtually impossible for even US and NATO to supply at such lavish scales.

Russian interdiction has now destroyed many oil storage depots, ammunition dumps, tank and aircraft manufacturing plants in Ukraine. They have captured all the Ukrainian nuclear plants in east Ukraine and control the water supply and power to most cities. Sadly, it is doubtful how long the Ukrainians can last in the face of such heavy punishment.

In a pure war of attrition, Russia is bound to prevail. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the war more in Russia’s favour. No amount of Western propaganda of an impending collapse of material and moral support for the war in Russia can hide this basic military fact. They may win the war on television and captive social media, the ground reality, however, will inexorably shift in Russia’s favour. In a meat grinder war of pure attrition Russian missile power, air power and fire power will prevail. Abraham Lincoln’s words – “You can fool all of the people some of time; you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all the people all the time” – may come back to haunt these shrill spin masters.

Russian force usage has been very uncharacteristically restrained. Whether this stems from cultural factors or a Russian apprehension that this war is likely to spread and escalate remains to be seen. They are clearly retaining their most advanced weapon systems for a time when they apprehend that they may have to fight NATO and American forces. So, we have not heard the last of this conflict and that is worrying. The Russians are clearly apprehending a widening and escalation of this conflict and are clearly husbanding their cutting edge resources. We have seen no T- 14 Armata tanks or active protection systems in this conflict despite the very dense anti-tank environment.

Traditionally, Russians maintain momentum by employment of fresh second and third echelons, which are carefully kept out of the battle for when the first echelons will run out of steam. Will Phase II see an induction of fresh troops and more material? That will depend on Russia meeting its minimal objectives – they say these have largely been met.

The use of the Russian air force has been rather limited. This failure to press home air superiority has needlessly extended this conflict.

Meteorological factors like the spring thaw and slush were not given adequate Importance.

Use of tactical ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles (Kalibr) have been Impressive and very effective. Over 1000 of them have been used in this war for pin-point destruction of targets.

Biden’s talks of Ukrainian sovereignty and calls for regime change in Russia are rather hypocritical and contradictory.

Economic sanctions could backfire if the dollar stops being the world currency for oil trade. Sanctions will hit Europe very hard and cause stagflation in the US economy.

Information and media war will be covered in a separate article.

Read Part 1 here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 2 here

Gerasimov’s Hybrid War vs Traditional Russian War Doctrines

A few days before the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, IMR had done an in house war-game (Feb 2022 issue). Based upon known Russian doctrines and recent demonstrated combat performance in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – we had forecast that Russian likely war aims would be to seriously wreck Ukraine as a functional military state and attempt regime change. They would advance on multiple thrust lines but seek to retain ground only in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the East and Crimea and the coastal areas in the South. These would be terrain objectives that would be retained at any cost. Russia had a huge advantage in airpower, missile power and traditional artillery firepower. Its T-72 and T-90 tanks were clearly superior to the Ukrainian T-80 and T-64 tanks especially in optronics and night fighting capabilities.

The signature Russian way of war has been to use massive fire assaults to create shock and awe and, thereby, economise on force levels and military lives. This was most evident in World War II, when Stalin called artillery the God of war and quipped that quantity generates its own quality. Russian forces have traditionally relied on echelonment of forces. Second and third echelon forces were kept in reserve and used to maintain relentless momentum in any offensive once the first echelon was used up or petered out. Based on this anchor premise, most military observers felt that Russia could achieve these objectives in 10 days (two to three weeks at best) in Ukraine. This war, however, has now entered its second month.

The Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare. The Chief of Russian General Staff Gen Velary Gerasimov had enunciated a whole of government doctrine for warfare based on a combination of hard and soft power in 2013. This entailed use of regular and irregular forces (conventional and sub-conventional forces) and coherent use of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, disinformation, political, diplomatic and economic tools to gain victory. Based on this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Russians had made impressive use of hybrid warfare in 2014 to foment insurgencies in Russian speaking areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. They captured significant chunks of these provinces (around 30 per cent), which declared themselves as independent (a la Abhkazia and Osettia in Georgia). Just before this conflict Russia recognized these as independent states. Hybrid war had worked very well so far in both Georgia and Ukraine.

Transition from Hybrid War to Regular Warfare. The key question here is – when on 24 Feb President Putin announced his decision to launch a “Special Operation” in Ukraine with the stated aim of destroying Ukraine’s military potential and carrying out De-Nazification, was he not making a direct transition from hybrid war now to full scale conventional war? From 2017 onwards, the US had been heavily arming Ukraine with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In July 2021, US, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian troops had held a joint military exercise in Ukraine (Ex Three Swords). This entailed over 1200 troops and 200 tanks and armoured vehicles along with air power elements. Tactics to counter a Russian attack had been worked out in detail. Russian sources indicate that plans were being hatched to mount an invasion of the Russian held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and concurrently ask for membership of NATO. This would involve US and NATO troops in this conflict. It was this exercise that had convinced President Zelinsky that, if Russia attacked, US & NATO forces would come to his aid. In December 2021, in yet another provocation Ukraine and USA co-hosted a major naval exercise (code named Op Sea Breeze) on the Black Sea in which 34 nations’ navies took part. American B-52 bombers made practice nuclear bombing runs against Russia and a ramming incident almost happened between a Russian destroyer and a British naval vessel.

Finally, in December 2021 itself, US and Ukraine foreign ministers signed the US–Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership that was said to be guided by the 2008 Bucharest Summit (where the idea of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was first mooted). By end-Dec 2021, Ukraine was a de facto member of NATO for all practical purposes and Russia was apprehending an attack on the separatist held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some 60,000 Ukrainian troops were massed against this Donbas region. That is why Russia had begun mobilizing its forces on the Ukrainian border in a massive exercise of compellence deigned to seek written guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and no offensive weapons would be deployed in 14 East European countries that had joined NATO. (In December 2021 itself, Putin had written to President Joe Biden clearly seeking these written guarantees).

To be credible, any such compellence exercise has to be structured for a seamless transition to actual kinetic operations. When that finally happened on 24 February 2022, the level of combat had clearly to shift from hybrid warfare to full-fledged conventional military operations with a clear option to cross the tactical nuclear threshold if USA or other NATO countries intervened. The continuation of the hybrid war mindset after onset of full scale military operations was, in hindsight, a clear miscalculation. This highlights the tension between the Gerasimov Hybrid War Doctrine and the traditional Russian way of war. This mismatch between the two mindsets has characterized this conflict. In trying to win the information war you cannot afford to lose or impede the outcome of the ground war.

Force Restraint

From the very outset of this war, the Russian campaign has been characterised by a surprising degree of restraint that flies in the face of the traditional Russian way of war. This has always relied on mass and scale – especially in the use of suppressive fires. From the purely military point of view massive suppressive fires were badly needed to neutralise huge numbers of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and Stinger shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been liberally supplied to Ukraine. Most military analysts were, therefore, surprised to find a near total absence of the Russian Air Force (VKS) for extended and extensive bombing campaigns. Even more surprising was the near total absence of large scale artillery and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) fire assaults on cities and built up areas – especially in the initial stages of the war.

The Russian first phase SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) campaign was confined to just one single day. Contrast this with the US 40-day air campaign in Iraq and the 80-day air interdiction campaign by the US and NATO in Yugoslavia. Given troops to task calculations, the overall Russian force level deployed was far too less to cater for the reduction/ isolation of some 15 or more cities, unless use of heavy fire power was envisaged. Besides, there was a near total absence of Russian cutting edge equipment like T-14 Alamty tanks and even Active Protection Systems (APS) on the T-72 and T-90 tanks employed (despite the dense anti-tank environment they had to operate in). Like the Egyptians had done in 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Russians seemed to prefer to operate under the area denial umbrella of their Triumf S- 400 missiles deployed in Belarus and Russia proper. Though the S- 400s have worked quite well, this denied the Russian troops the heavy air support they could easily have counted on – given the air power asymmetry between the two sides.

So what explains this baffling and most uncharacteristic force usage restraint by the Russians?

Cultural Factors and Intelligence Failure

There is a widespread belief that Putin was misled by his intelligence (FSB) to seriously under estimate the degree of resistance that the Ukrainian armed forces would put up. It was mentioned that, perhaps, accurate intelligence was available but senior FSB officers lacked the moral courage to put it up to Putin. They only tried to reinforce his dominant perception that, like in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine itself in 2014, the opposition would fold up and surrender without a fight. There is indeed some truth in this premise. The Russians went in for just a one-day air campaign and even as the 41 Combined Arms Army was heading for Kiev from the Belarus border, an air assault formation (perhaps elements of a Guards airborne division) captured the Antonov Hostamel airport (just 23 kms from Kiev) in a brilliant coup de main operation. Military experts now expected them to hold this airhead till link up by the land-based tank columns moving in from Belarus. Given the 150 kms they had to cover, this could have been done in two or three days. To everyone’s surprise the airborne forces left the air base and charged up to Kiev, the capital, even as Putin demanded that Ukraine surrender. The Ukrainian’s put up stiff resistance and recaptured the vacated Hostomel air base. The airborne forces almost walked into a trap as it were. No operation can be premised on the expectation that the enemy will just surrender. There does seem to have been a major intelligence failure of humanint or even a deliberate trap.

Most Russian military officers I have spoken to have stressed that this nostalgic perception of people to people relations was not just confined to President Putin but was a widespread cultural blind spot in the entire Russian military. Many Russians and even people of Belarus have relations in Ukraine and Kiev indeed was once a important centre of Russian culture. As such, there was a clear cut and widespread desire to restrict force usage against kindred people. This cultural constraint cum Intelligence error tended to make military planning clearly subjective in the initial phase of the conflict. The Indians and Pakistanis too were once one people culturally and linguistically. Yet they have, since1947, fought four major wars and one long hybrid war in J&K. This has been characterised by particular viciousness on Pakistan’s part.

DETAILED ANALYSIS – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Phase One – Coercive Deployment

The Russian command level HQ at Varyinch (80kms from Donbas) seemed to be the controlling HQ for this operation. Tanks, missile launchers and artillery were moved from the far-eastern military districts of Siberia to raise two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs are equivalent of Indian corps). These were the 4th and 20th CAAs. Of Russia’s 12 CAAs, some 11 were deployed around Ukraine. Another estimate felt that out of some 170 Battalion Tactical Groups some 87 were used against Ukraine. In numerical terms this amounted to some 1,50,000 troops that were subsequently raised up to 1, 90,000.in terms of troops to task analysis, if encirclement/capture of 10-15 Ukrainian cities was involved, this force level was clearly inadequate. It could only make sense if it intended to use heavy air power and suppressive artillery fire power to carry out this task and compensate for low force levels.

The 41st CAA was sent for a 10-day exercise to Belarus. This positioned it to strike directly at Kiev. After termination of the exercise it was retained there itself. The Ukrainian forces were organized into 14 armoured, airborne and mechanized brigades and had mobilised a large territorial militia and also called up reservists. The defender, thus, clearly outnumbered the attackers but the Russians had an overwhelming technological edge.

In December 2021, President Putin had written a letter to President Joe Biden demanding written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe. However, the dominant perception in USA and Europe seemed to be that Russia was bluffing and this force posturing was just a coercive military deployment to compel NATO to negotiate a new security architecture in Europe. The Ukrainians themselves were most nonchalant about the Russian deployment and dismissed it as bluff and bluster to Indian students who took their advice and did not evacuate in time. With modern satellite surveillance each and every tank, gun and truck could be picked up with ease. No force concentration can be hidden in this day and age. What can be kept secret is the intention. Was the force just posturing or would it really strike? It must be said that the Russians were able to keep this secret well and Russian maskirovka (deception) operations were highly successful in keeping the world guessing.

Putin gave ample chance for a diplomatic solution till the very end. This delayed the offensive and caused it to run into the spring thaw, which generates slush and mud and impedes cross country manoeuvre. As part of information operations the Americans tried to leak Russian military plans in the media and announced 16 February as the D Day. This, perhaps, forced Russia to delay the operation. It was finally launched a week later on 24 February with a near formal declaration of war (a special operation) to destroy Ukraine’s military potential and de-Nazify the country. Russia officially recognized the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and cited their full liberation as the primary territorial objective. It must be noted that from 2014 onwards the Ukrainians had deployed some 60,000 of their best troops in this region and attacking them directly would have amounted to a rather costly frontal attack on a very live line of contact. Hence, any Russian operation would have to advance along multiple thrust lines that would tie down and divide Ukrainian forces and mask the main objective. So, was Kiev then a deception operation as subsequently claimed? This merits further analysis. However, after the initial surprise, the Russian forces quickly readjusted to the changed scenario and now carried out their operations with far greater deliberation and with due caution. They changed their overall operational design from rapid manoeuvre to set piece siege operations and increasingly greater use of suppressive fires.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

As stated, the Americans had carried out a 40-day air campaign in Iraq for SEAD and interdiction of enemy communications and infrastructure including destruction of Republican Guards armoured reserves. In Yugoslavia, the air campaign had extended for over 80 days. Hence, most military observers were baffled when the Russian Air Force finished its SEAD campaign in a single day. The Russian Air Force (VKS) used MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters as also SU-27 and SU-30s along with SU-25SM fighter bombers. Given that Ukrainians had extensively deployed Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, bulk of attacks would have had to be from mid- to high-altitudes (to stay out of the shoulder-fired SAM envelope). This would necessitate use of PGMs for ground attack.

It is not known what percentage of munitions employed were PGMs or just plain gravity bombs, which can be quite inaccurate. The bulk of damage, however, was done by the 9K720 Iskander short range ballistic missiles (200 miles range). These were equipped with decoys to degrade enemy air defences and the Ukrainian S-300, Tor and Buk SAMs failed to intercept any of these. The Kalibr and Klub cruise missiles were also used extensively. Russians claimed to have struck 11 enemy airfields, destroyed 18 radars and a number of S-300 missile batteries on this first day itself. In hindsight, these claims appear exaggerated and the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) seems to have been flawed.

Many Ukrainian fighters escaped by moving out to western Ukraine and some are said to have flown out to Romania before the Russian attack. Many S-300 batteries also were dispersed initially. They survived and were active much later in the course of the fighting. The Russians seemed to have relied heavily on the area denial capability of their S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems. From Belarus these downed a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter at a range of 150 kms over Kiev, setting a world record for the distance of engagement. The impression one gets is that like the Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Russians were more inclined to rely upon the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) capability of their Triumph missile systems. These were apparently quite effective as is proved by their ability to protect a 65 km long convoy of assault tanks and other vehicles for days on the outskirts of Kiev. But this also ruled out much air support by the Russian air force due to closure of air space. This was badly needed to suppress the swarms of Javelin ATGMs and the Stingers. These kept taking pot shots throughout the campaign. The Ukrainians were advised by the Americans to ambush rear/ logistics echelons and they appear to have taken their toll. The road axes were not protected adequately due to a paucity of infantry. Amazingly, the Russian air force was largely absent from the skies over Ukraine, after the initial day’s SEAD attacks.

The Russia-Ukraine War (Part 2) click here

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If Putin decides to go to war what options does he have? To empirically analyse these options let us take a look at past precedents – namely the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the capture of Crimea in 2014.

Georgia 2008. The CIA had started its series of colour revolutions In Eastern Europe to spread democracy. Under that pretext anti-Russian regimes were being installed on the Russian borders. Putin was elected in Russia in year 1999. In 2003, a pro-West President Shaakashvilli took power in Georgia. Georgian territory posed serious threat to Russian Muslim underbelly of Chechenya. In April 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, it was announced that NATO would welcome inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine. This was a clear Russian red line. Russia began massing troops on the borders of Georgia. It encouraged Russian separatists in Abkhazia and Ossetia to intensify their actions. Russian separatists in Osettia began to shell Georgian villages. Georgia now made the mistake of launching ground assaults in Osettia and captured the separatist stronghold of Takshanvali. This was the precise pretext the Russians were looking for. Their troops were in position and, on 8 August, they launched a massive counterattack. It began with a major cyber attack and electronic warfare operations to jam communications. The Russian 58th Army attacked across the mountains via the Roki tunnel and cleared all of Osettia and took some more territory ahead. Concurrently, the Russian Black Sea fleet blockaded the coast of Georgia and Russian troops made amphibious landings in Abkhazia. They quickly moved inland and cleared the whole of Abhkazia. They moved beyond that province and seized the cities of Zugdidi, Senaki, Poti and Gori. By 12th August, it was all over and the French negotiated a ceasefire. Russia recognized Osettia and Abhkazia as independent states. They vacated all other Georgian territory. This was the first war in Europe in the 21st century.

Ukraine 2014 – The Capture of Crimea. US persisted with its colour revolutions. In February 2014, as part of the Orange Revolution the pro-Russian President Yankovich of Ukraine was deposed and fled to Russia. His successor once again began to talk of joining NATO. Russia saw a clear violation of its red line in Ukraine. Russian forces were already in the leased naval base of Sevastapole. On 28 February, Russian troops moved in swiftly and occupied the whole of Crimea without a shot being fired. They held a referendum and, by 18 March, had simply incorporated Crimea into Russia. Concurrently, they backed Russian separatists in Donbas region and instigated revolts in the Oblasts of Dontsk and Luhansk. A number of Russian troops in civil clothes but with heavy weapons also moved into these rebel provinces, almost like a repeat of Georgia. What was noteworthy was the speed and decisive nature of this operation. Russia had clearly asserted its red lines in Ukraine and enforced them in a swift coup de main operation. The US and NATO could do nothing.

The Current Crisis

The current crisis stems from Putin’s determination to make the altered military realities count on ground in Europe. As Prof Meershimer says, Putin is seeking to change the entire post Cold War security architecture in Europe and enforce a Monroe doctrine variant. He is seeking written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO and assurances about non-stationing of offensive weapons in the countries drafted into NATOin the last two decades. Towards this end, he has forward deployed some 1,90,000 troops around Ukraine. Next, he went ahead and recognized the breakaway provinces of Dontesk and Luhansk in a clear escalatory move that underlines his determination. But, were Dontesk and Luhansk his red lines? What are his military options in case diplomacy fails to deliver on what he had demanded? US and NATO have already refused to give written assurances and asserted that Ukraine as a sovereign state has the right to choose its form of government and what treaties it will join.

This amounts to a deadlock and, if talks break down, what will a military invasion of Ukraine look like? There are primarily three options:-

Georgia Redux. The Ukraine scenario today is remarkably similar to the situation in Georgia in 2008. Like Abkhazia and Osetta, the two Russian speaking states of Dontesk and Luhansk have separatists in full scale revolt. Russia has also sent in its troops in muftis inside. Firing incidents have started on the borders of these two provinces. Russia has already recognized their independence and troops have started moving in. In this option Russian troops would move beyond the Line of Contact to the border of these provinces. So a Georgian redux style operation could see occupation of and  escalation in these two  districts . While troops from Donbas are engaging Ukranian troops on the border frontally, Russian forces from Crimea would hit them in the rear. This would consolidate occupation of these two provinces and certain other territories to give tactical depth to these states.

Limited War Option. What next will depend on what Ukraine does militarily. Any military response would provide the pretext/justification of what would follow next. There are two option limited war or full scale offensive. Limited war would see Russian forces from the East making a dash for Kharkiev (former capital of Ukraine). Forces from Crimea would advance upon the port city of Mariopole. Naval landings could be mounted to seize the port city of Odessa. Thus, Ukraine would be cut off from the sea and become a landlocked country dependant on Russia. This option entails fighting in built-up areas to secure cities and capturing and holding ground. This can cause heavy casualties and take a lot of time as cities can be defended street by street.

Fullscale War Option. Prof Meershimer, noted political scientist of the University of Chicago, feels that Russia will not aim to seize and defend territory in Ukraine (as it could get bogged down in an Afghanistan like quagmire). The Russian aim would be simply to wreck Ukraine as a functional state. Towards this end, this could unfold with massive cyber attacks and electronic warfare strikes to paralyse communications. The Russians would rapidly gain air and naval supremacy and commence operations with massive air strikes, cruise missile and tactical ballistic missile strikes. Massive artillery suppressive fires will be used to destroy anti-tank missile and shoulder-fired SAMs. The main attack will come from Belarus and aim straight for Kiev – the capital city. Key command and control centres (presidential palace, Ministry of Defence and Interior, Parliament, etc) would be knocked out. Concurrently, forces from the East would go for Kharkiev and the breakaway provinces of Dontesk and Luhansk. Naval landings would seek to seize the port cities of Odessa and Mariopol. It would be a swift blitzkrieg style operation that will encircle and bypass major centres of resistance and inflict heavy damage by air and missile strikes and heavy fire assaults. The aim would be not to capture and hold Ukranian territory but wreck Ukraine as a functional state. The operation should not last more than one week. At the end of it Russians could declare a unilateral cease fire and withdraw from most of Ukranian territory less the districts of Dontesk and Luhansk, which will now be independent states.

So which option will Russia take? One view is that since whichever option is adopted US and West will impose economic sanctions- Russia might prefer a massive Full scale option to impose regime change in Kiev. That would highlight Russian military power and capacity and would deter any further adventurism against Russia . West has Imposed only the first tranche of graded sanctions yet  and is waiting to see the option Russia will take finally. Will Russia be satisfied with just the breakway provinces of Dontesk and Luhansk (which were never its stated) red lines? Or will it go for limited or full scale invasion? it all depends on  the risk taking  appetite of Putin.

Western Options – Need for a Strategic Response

So far, Western nations have stated that crippling economic sanctions would be imposed and have rushed token forces to other East European states that have earlier joined NATO. Economic sanctions could include:-

•  Close Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. This incidentally would cause enormous economic losses to Germany also.

•  Impose blocking sanctions on large Russian banks, energy and defence companies and energy projects.

•  Sanctions on Russian Oligarchs and their families.

•  Impose restrictions on secondary markets in Russian bonds.

•  Exclude Russia from Swift global electronic payment system based in Belgium. This would be a last resort option.

Strategic Response

Writing in the 11 February issue of the Foreign Affairs magazine, Michael McFaul has made the eminently reasonable suggestion that USA should not respond knee jerk and tactically by offering defensively minimal concessions to stave off the crisis. Instead, President Biden should seize the diplomatic initiative with a grand strategic and comprehensive bargain for enhancing European security. This would be analogous to the Helsinki Accord of 1975. This would resuscitate and amend defunct arms control agreements and provide the bigger framework of European security of which Ukraine per se, would only be a sub set. USA has low strategic stakes in Ukraine and is playing a losing hand.

A number of respected American pundits of geopolitics (to include Henry Kissinger, Prof Meershimer and Stephen P Cohen) have been advising America to not drive Russia into Chinese arms and not take on these two major powers together. In fact, Kissinger had said, “It should be settled maxim of US foreign policy never to take on more than one major Asian power at a time.” China is the real peer competitor of the USA in the long term. It has almost matching economic power and is fast catching up in military power. It will prove to be far more dangerous than Russia could ever be with its economic constraints. It would be prudent for America to designate its main threat clearly. If it is China, it makes eminent strategic sense to seek détente with one while going full steam to contain the other. Nixon had done that by a détente with Mao’s China when USSR was the main threat. Today, the situation is reversed and a détente with Russia makes eminent sense. It will allow the USA and the West to focus its energies on China. The desire to take on China and Russia together sounds macho, but is highly unrealistic. Given Biden’s disastrous performance against Afghanistan the world would be forgiven for being somewhat skeptical. That, however, is the problem. Only a self-assured and confident leader would refrain from knee jerk, tactical responses and think strategic and long term. Where monthly popularity ratings decide responses it would be overly optimistic to expect such a clear headed response from President Biden. Post Afghanistan he has little room for manoeuvre.

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The roots of the current military crisis in Ukraine can be traced back to the events surrounding the breakup of the former USSR. The USSR was one of the two superpowers in the bi-polar era. However, it was a wounded giant that had, in fact, not really recovered from the staggering manpower and material losses of World War II. Its economy was highly dependent on export of oil and gas. America engaged it in a geo-economic competition. It started the Star Wars arms race. In the 1980s, the USA made a deliberate effort to bring down the prices of oil globally by engineering an oil glut. Oil prices went into free-fall ($10- 30 a barrel) and severely derailed the Soviet economy. Afghanistan added to the hemorrhaging.

The USSR was an over militarized state. By 1990, it simply collapsed from what Paul Kennedy calls economic overreach and imperial over-stretch. A superpower went down without a shot being fired and the world was shocked. A uni-polar global order, now led by America and the West, came into being. The Soviet Union splintered with many of its republics in Eastern Europe and Central Asia seceding. There was chaos in Russia and it struggled to restore order.

NATO Expansion

The West had initially promised that there would not be even an inch of NATO expansion in Eastern Europe (US Foreign Secretary James Baker’s assurance to Gorbachov). All these verbal assurances, however, were violated with impunity. As a result of Russian military and economic weakness, NATO expanded eastward in four distinct phases:-

Phase One 1990. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic – three former Warsaw pact countries joined NATO.

Phase Two 2004. Seven countries to include Estonia, Latavia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovenia followed suit.

Phase Three 2009. Albania and Croatia joined NATO.

Phase Four 2017-2019. Montenegro and Macedonia followed suit. Thus, by 2019, some 14 countries in Eastern Europe had Joined NATO.

President Vladimir Putin of Russia rapidly started closing the conventional military gap. By 2008, Russia hit back hard in Georgia and then in 2014 it captured Crimea in Ukraine. The present crisis has really been precipitated by the clear change in military-technical capabilities, which have altered the local conventional military power balance in Eastern Europe. Putin is now determined to change the security architecture in Europe to reflect these military realities and has virtually issued demarches to the US and NATO to renegotiate the security equations in Europe. He has mobilized the largest number of troops on the border of Ukraine in a clear coercive deployment, a use of force without war to re-negotiate security terms in Europe. If he can do it without war it would suit him eminently. The danger is that if he does not get the outcomes he seeks, he is fully prepared and ready to go to war.

In a clear escalation, the Russian Duma recommended recognition of Dontesk and Luhansk provinces in Ukraine, where Russian separatists are fighting and, on 21 February, Putin duly announced recognition of these two states. Economic sanctions did not deter him as he feels Russia’s core strategic interests are involved and he has articulated his red lines so publically that there is no chance of him recalling his troops without enforcing his red lines. He would lose great face domestically and internationally and he simply cannot afford that. Putin has acted decisively as he is fully prepared for the next steps in the military escalation ladder.

Military – Technical Factors

It is my contention that these sea-saw in the fortunes of Russia and the West can be traced back to the swings in the conventional military power balance between the two blocks from 1990 to date. These were largely focused on gaining superiority in air power and anti-air defenses. From World War II onwards, air superiority had become a decisive war winning factor. The Korean War saw a stalemate in air power and that shaped the stalemate on the ground. The Vietnam War saw US war planes and helicopters taking huge losses (over 3400 lost) from rudimentary Soviet Air defences and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Americans deeply studied these and learnt major lessons. They began to make a serious bid to regain air superiority. They learnt from Israeli experiences in the 1967 and 1973 Conflicts.

By 1973, low level Russian SAM-6 and SAM-7 missiles had inflicted fearful losses to aircraft flying at the low level to evade radar. Meanwhile, USA had fielded a number of new fourth-generation fighters like F-15, F-16 and F-18 as also the AWACs and AEWs. Then came the precision guided munitions (PGMs) by 1990, which created a significant military technical revolution (Revolution in Military Affairs) with far reaching impact. These enabled aircraft to bomb from mid and high altitude without losing accuracy. Thus, they could stay out of the low firing SAM envelopes. The US demonstrated this in the first war against Iraq, when Soviet-era weapons were decimated and air power paved the way for a decisive victory.

The USSR had imploded as a result of economic decline and these military technical factors added to Russian weakness. Thereafter, it was a uni-polar world with USA as the sole superpower based on its conventional military superiority in air power. Things began to stabilize in Russia only when Putin took charge around the turn of the century. Slowly, the Russians began to close the air power gap with their Su-27, Su-30 and Su-35 jet fighters along with MiG-29s and their own AWACs and PGMs. Thus, by 2008, we once again saw the Russians asserting themselves in Georgia. The Americans had sought to regain superiority by investing heavily in stealth technology and fielded stealth aircraft like F-22, F-35 fighters and B-2 bombers and beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles for air-to-air combat. The problem was this technology was frightfully expensive and stealth aircraft could not be fielded in large numbers because of cost factor.

Thus, in 2014, we saw Russia again capturing Crimea and seizing parts of Donbas. Today, we are seeing the Impact of the Russian S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems upon the Eastern European battlefield. These air defence (AD) missile systems have radars that can look out to 600 kms and pick up stealth aircraft. They have multiple missiles that can engage enemy aircraft from 40 out to 400 kms. They can achieve Anti Access & Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities and totally deny the airspace over the combat area. This, and a whole host of other weapons, which Russia had tested in Syria have today given it the confidence to decisively challenge the USA and NATO enforced status quo in Eastern Europe and seek a radical re-structuring of the security architecture in Europe. This is a decisive inflexion point and the crisis in Ukraine is a direct outgrowth of the shift in military-technical factors in favour of Russia.

The simple fact is that the USA and NATO have ruled out military retaliationand are relying primarily on economic sanctions to deter Russia. The implications are clear – USA is in no position now to take on Russia militarily in its own backyard. This is what has clearly emboldened Russia to exploit the military–technical advantage it has gained in recent years. It has now gone ahead despite threat of economic sanctions and recognized the Russian majority states of Dontesk and Luhansk giving a fait accompli to US and NATO. However, the crisis is far from over.

Russian redlines were not Dontesk and Luhansk but non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO and no stationing of offensive weapons in the 14 East European nations recently incorporated into NATO. These have not been met and Russia, to my mind, will pursue them doggedly. Are we seeing the multi-polar moment?

Use of Force Without War: Op Parakram Anology

To back his demands Putin had deployed some 1,50,000 Russian troops around Ukraine. To cite an anology – it was like Operation Parakram, India’s massive deployment on Pakistan’s border after the terror attack on its parliament. This is using military deployment for coercion. The aim is to clearly threaten the use of force to achieve tangible results. This is the use of force without war. That is what Russia is doing currently. Will it work? Only if the use of force threat is credible. India lacked a clear military edge over Pakistan then and our political will to wage war was very tenuous. In Russia’s case, they have the military edge locally and their intent to Invade if their demands are not met is deadly serious. The USA and NATO have already thrown in the towel by clearly stating they will put no boots on the ground and restrict themselves to economic sanctions. Russia has now moved troops into Dontesk and Luhansk provinces of Ukraine. Should Ukraine retaliate, Russia will escalate dramatically as its military is fully poised to do so.

Stake Analysis

It is simply a case of stake analysis. Russia has crucial strategic stakes in Ukraine. It is the direct historical invasion route and abuts Russian borders. It has vital mineral reserves like Uranium, Titanium and natural gas, etc. Russia simply cannot afford to let it become part of NATO. It now has the military capability to stop NATO and can wreck Ukraine whenever it wants to. US and NATO can do little more than enforcing economic sanctions. Conversely, America has few strategic stakes in Ukraine except to needle Russia and stop the Nord 2 gas pipeline as part of the famed economic sanctions. Real economics now comes in significantly. The Nord 2 Russian gas will cost Germany $270 per 1000 cubic feet, whereas the American gas will cost them a $1000 per 1000 cubic feet. The US, perhaps, would be happy to see a war in Ukraine, which stops the Nord 2 gas and forces Germany to buy from USA. France and Germany have major economic linkages with Russia and are already very uneasy with the US resolve to push Russia to invade Ukraine for American profit in gas. That is why President Macron of France is making the most energetic efforts to stop the war.

What about Russia? Its stakes in Ukraine are simply crucial. Putin has clearly announced Russian red lines. He cannot backtrack. With Chinese help he can deal with western sanctions which will hurt Germany and France equally. The simple fact is that Putin cannot afford a military pull back with no concrete security outcomes. Initially, he seemed inclined to give negotiations a chance. He had written a letter to Joe Biden, in December 2021, spelling out his demands for security restructuring in Europe. In January, he got a reply that seemed rational to the Russian foreign minister Lavrov. Putin decided to give the negotiators a chance. Immediately, the US hardened its stance and began to boast that they had coerced Russia into backing down and that Ukraine had the right to choose its form of government and alliances. Russia simply stopped the withdrawal and increased the number of troops around Ukraine to some 1,90,000. In fact, out of Russia’s 12 Combined Arms Armies (corps) 11 are now deployed around Ukraine. They have staged forward their tanks, self propelled artillery and S-400 and S-500 missile systems. The Su-35 fighter bombers, attack helicopters and Iskander missiles have been deployed. The Russians were carrying out a major military exercise in Belarus with their 41st Army. This was to end on 20 February but Belarus has announced that Russian troops will stay on till NATO forces are in Poland, etc. The forces in Belarus are directly poised to strike at the Ukranian capital of Kiev and destroy the main command and control node. Stepping on the escalatory ladder the Russian Duma recommended that Russia recognise Dontesk and Luhansk. Putin announced that on 21 February, throwing down the gauntlet. Should Ukraine respond militarily it will be the pretext that Russia needs for a limited or partial invasion of Ukraine.

Simply stated, Putin will try his best to get without war the realignment of the security architecture in Europe by his coercive military deployment. If it works, well and good. The point to note is that if it does not, he is determined to go ahead and use major military force to underline his intent. That military reality force is now fully poised on ground.

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