With the advent of new technologies that have enabled new domains of warfare, the Indian Armed Forces must begin exploring how to exploit multi-domain operations as opposed to just land, air and maritime domain.

Cyber, Space and the Electromagnetic spectrum did not exist during previous conflicts.

Distributed, multi-domain and joint all domain operations (MDO and JADO) are fast becoming the defining doctrines of this new era.

Essentially, they are the synchronisation of aircraft, ground forces and vehicles, satellites and ships, their systems and all sources of data. Together they deliver a complete picture of the battlespace and empower personnel – in theatre or command – to quickly make decisions that drive action.

Cyberspace is a critical element of this new age of combat; as the electromagnetic spectrum itself – a string of frequencies from radio to microwaves, visible light, X-rays and gamma rays which transmit data – may become. The US, UK and others are looking ever more closely at it.

For future MDOs, artificial intelligence and machine learning will play a critical role, helping decipher data, determine its operational relevance and then present informed options for decision-making jointly across all Services.

If the Army can bring them together along with manoeuvre warfare, which is the Army’s strength, and integrate them at the time and point of choosing, this can open windows of domain superiority leading to denial of access and areas.

For example, Cyberspace can provide opening in the air domain by taking air defence weapons offline, which will then create openings for land and maritime, leading to a new level of complication for the enemy.

For example, when the enemy is engaging you with artillery or you are being engaged from the air, another domain brings in its effects to bear and neutralises the threat. It means you have to look at what equipment you need, what kind of network you need, what kind of training you need, and a lot of interoperability and inter-connectivity.

Cyber is ubiquitous across the battlefield and warfare. The Army has not yet made a beginning to use this domain to facilitate own operations or to disrupt the enemy’s. It does not have cyber forces. Cyber advisories and guidelines do not make up doctrines or methods to adopt in operations, much less in an integrated manner with other domains.

Russian forces have very expertly used the cyber domain to facilitate targeting with their artillery against Ukrainian ground forces demonstrating the ability to take action in one domain and produce an effect or dominate another domain.

The US Navy and Air Force are working on new technologies and capabilities through programmes like Project Overmatch and the Advanced Battle Management System, respectively. Together both forces have developed more than a dozen projects they are collaborating on, bringing all domains together to share and utilise information and assess and respond in synergy.

In the UK, this is being addressed by what the MoD calls the Digital Backbone, a digital transformation programme that will allow information sharing and communication regardless of the hardware being used.

We must at least learn from events in Ukraine, evolve our concepts, map out a phased delivery approach and experiment.

Air-Land Battle doctrine, once the flavour of studies at the Army War College involved two domains – air and land. That alone will not work in the future.

The Armed Forces are not currently organized or trained in this manner. The Training Commands of the three Services have a role and responsibility to integrate these capabilities.

Multi-domain warfare is something on which the Indian Armed Forces have to start at the very beginning and approach it from a joint aspect. Single service approach will just not do.

The goal is to better enable the Services to fight together effectively in all domains simultaneously, to present multiple dilemmas for the enemy. That will mean looking at how do we organize, how to equip and how to train to do that.

A new mindset is needed to enable multi-domain action.

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“The less there is to justify a traditional custom, the harder it is to get rid of it”
― Mark Twain,The Adventures of Tom Sawyer

The military tank was born to counter the stagnation of trench warfare during the Great Wars. Defences based on trenches, protected by anti-personnel measures like wire obstacles, minefields, booby-traps, et al, brought warfare to a grinding halt. Soldiers died more of disease and boredom than from gunshots. Emergence of the tank infused fresh impetus to the battlefield, rendering trenches and anti-personnel obstacle systems as redundant as a man’s nipples. The consequent return of “manoeuvre” to the battlefield resulted in new tactics, doctrines and weapon-systems from the 1920s to 1980s.

Defence research & development (R&D) buzzed with development of the tank, from a vehicle that neutralised trench-warfare to an instrument of “manoeuvre force”. This gave birth to supporting elements like armoured personnel carriers (APC), self-propelled (SP) guns, armoured engineering vehicles, mobile command posts, etc. The tank, starting as a supporting tool for infantry in 1917, became a primary arm for battle by the 1940s, needing support from other arms, including the evolving air dimension. The tank reached its pinnacle of glory in the plains of Europe and the deserts of North Africa during World War II under the baton of battle-conductors like Rommel and Guderian.

The tanks immediately caused evolution of anti-tank measures – anti-tank tactics, anti-tank obstacles, anti-tank weapons and even anti-tank tanks. Anti-personnel minefields added anti-tank minefields; trenches graduated to ditch-cum-bunds (DCB), anti-tank weaponry extended from hand-held rocket-launchers to jeep-mounted recoilless (RCL) guns, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), anti-tank artillery and anti-tank bombs from aircraft. Tank technology responded by countered with improved armour, mobility and firepower. Reactive and Cobham armour provided added protection against shaped-charges and kinetic-energy projectiles. Alas, every improvement in armour design increased the tonnage of the tank, necessitating bigger engines, further adding to the weight. The tank gradually lost its race to anti-tank measures. Tank designs shifted focus on passive self-defence. Their aura of offence and shock-effect all but evaporated. Now a tank is more a damsel-in-distress than a knight in shining-armour rescuing one.

A tank is not a cosy place to be in. Cramped spaces, extreme temperatures, dust, noise and a jolting ride are a tankman’s lot. It is not just a weapon system; it also serves as home to the crew during battle. When anti-tank tactics demanded low-silhouette designs, tank’s interiors became even more cramped.

The 1970s doctrine “better to maim than kill” reduced the rifle calibre from 7.63mm to 5.56mm, burdening the enemy with evacuation, treatment and life-long sustenance of the soldier rather than a hasty battlefield burial. Similarly, disablement of a tank appeared far more beneficial than its destruction. A hit that damaged its innards, rattled the crew and killed even one of its vital systems – traction, gunnery, navigation, communication – was a bigger liability than its total destruction.

The tank, sadly, was born under unfavourable stars. Unbeknown to Capt Levavasseur, who in 1903 in Paris, conceptualized lecanon autopropulseur, the primogenitor of today’s tank; some 6,000 km away in Kitty Hawk, USA, Wright Brothers were innocently devising the future arch nemesis of the seminal tank – the aircraft. The uses of the airplane against the tank – starting with conventional bombs, progressing to anti-tank bomblets and then on to multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) to target a squadron of tanks with just one missile – became grossly unfair to the tank. Later, anti-tank helicopters, were able to engage tanks in close-quarter-battles, unlike the fighters. Tank’s countermeasures to all this were as ineffective as all the perfumes of Arabia were on Lady Macbeth’s hands.

Tank is not only the biggest target on the battlefield, it is also tardy and rather blind, with limited riposte capability. Pinpoint satellite surveillance, coupled with smart, extremely accurate, weapon-delivery systems, made tanks’ survivability even more questionable. While satellite-surveillance eliminated tank-hides, disrobing them of all camouflage, smart missiles took pot-shots at them even in moonless nights. The tank was as helpless and exposed as that skinny-dipping girl who finds her clothes stolen at a public beach. A US study in the 1980s concluded in a 14:1 kill-ratio between an anti-tank helicopter and a tank, ie, 14 tanks would die before the helicopter was shot down. Even this shooting of the helicopter was NOT by tanks but by supporting weapon-systems. Another NATO study determined a tank’s life as four hours on an active battlefield, making the 24-hour lifecycle of the Ephemeral Mayfly seem like eternity. Much anti-tank water has flown in R&D labs since those studies, making a tank’s longevity comparable to that of a Chinese toy.

Now, drones and swarms, are waiting to be tested against battle-tanks. Too small to be visible or counter-attacked, drones can sight and illuminate tanks for effective engagement by a plethora of anti-tank weapons. Swarms, still in nascent stage of development, shall prove lethal against all targets, tanks being the easiest. If all roads led to Rome, all weapons seem directed at the tank! In short, the 100-year old concept of battle-tank to overcome anti-personnel obstacles and trench warfare has achieved only that. It has long outlived its use-by-date. Persisting with it is like retaining swords for the infantry.

Future wars shall not see manoeuvre battles a la North Africa Campaign of WW2, when armoured formations raced up and down the Sahara in manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre moves, avoiding conflict and achieving little by way of military victory. The real heroes were the logistics services that fed, fuelled and re-armed these forces. Future wars shall be swift, surgical and hugely destructive. The military aims of the wars shall be met within days. Maybe, even before armoured formations can reach their unloading ramps, missing all action, like the late spectator in a boxing bout that ends in a 15-second knock-out. The future battlefield shall also not be astride the border, entailing classic bridgehead-battles. It shall encompass the entire country, courtesy of the long reach, accuracy and potency of modern weapons, coupled with thread-needling surveillance even in darkness. Global diplomacy would avert full-scale wars in the future, for fear of mass destruction. If there is no war, tanks are not required even more; if there is a war, they may not reach the battlefield or be decimated easily thereon. In summary, tanks are useful today only if prefixed with the word Think!

Armoured formations are not designed to hold ground, the basic prerequisite of a military victory. Infantry is still required to plant that victorious flag – a task no other arm can claim to do. Thus, armoured corps has as much been a supporting arm for the infantry as have been classical supporting arms. Infantry’s “Queen of the Battle” claim is often topped by tankmen, claiming to be “King of the Battle”. They forget the allusion here is to Chess, where a Queen is by far the most powerful piece and the King, a weak, slow-moving liability, needing protection even from pawns. The likeness between tank and King is rather ironic. Little wonder, tanks have not played a crucial role in armed conflicts anywhere in the world since 1971. Many armies of the world are actively considering disbandment of the tank while retaining tank-derivatives like APCs, SP guns, armoured engineering vehicles, bridge-laying tanks, armoured command-posts etc. India could pioneer the trend.

Tanks in India’s Context

Terrain. India has a nearly 15,000 km land-border with seven countries. India’s 6,200km borders with Afghanistan, China, Nepal and Bhutan are mountainous; the borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar are either jungle (1,600km) or riverine (4,100km); all largely unsuited for tank deployment. Only about 50% of the 3,300 km border with Pakistan is suitable for armour warfare. This is about 10% of India’s land border. Ironically, the tank worthy portion of the Indo-Pak border is also the least disputed border territory of India. None of the sensitive and disputed border areas of India lend themselves to mechanised warfare. India has 65 armoured regiments for a 1,650 km tankable border but one aircraft-carrier for its 7,500 km coastline and over 12,000 km of maritime responsibility.

Nature of Operations. The Indian Army has seen four types of operations, viz, wars, low-intensity conflicts (LIC), counter-insurgency operations (CI Ops) and aid-to-civil-authority (ACA). Excepting the wars of 1965 and 1971, armoured formations have played a supporting or an inconsequential role, since 1947. This is not to stigmatise these units; they are just not designed for roles other for than full-blown wars. Their training and equipment are not conducive to ground-holding, patrolling or other tasks in CI Ops, LIC or ACA operations. The bridgehead battle, the raison d’être for tanks, requires all the other-arms jointly paving the way for an armour breakthrough across an anti-tank obstacle system. Armoured formations then attack from the rear, widening the breach and enable infantry formations to capture enemy territory. This task of crossing an obstacle system and attacking from the rear (turning enemy’s defences) can be done faster and with fewer casualties, by troop-carrying helicopter gun-ships with support from attack-helicopters, artillery and air force. Tanks are, obviously, the most unsuitable weapons to use against an obstacle system, designed to stop tanks.

Peacetime Deployment and Mobilisation

In peacetime, armoured formations must be stationed far away from border areas for obvious reasons. When required, these formations need to be mobilised to their operational areas by rail. Other modes of transportation over long distances are neither viable nor available. Compared to infantry formations, move of armoured formations is hugely demanding in railway resources, time consuming in loading and off-loading and extremely vulnerable from air and ground. A tank is never more useless than when loaded for transport. A sitting duck is far safer than a tank in transit, like that cake with “Eat Me” invitation for Alice in Wonderland. Also, mobilisation of formations cannot be hidden in today’s satellite-surveillance scenario. What is worse, the tanks cannot be offloaded just anywhere. They require special ramps at designated rail-heads, away from the operational area and under constant enemy surveillance. An armoured division would require more than a week to be operationally effective after rail resources are provided to it.

Maintenance and Logistics. A tank costs between ₹40 to 60 crores, weighs 40 to 70 tons, consumes 30 to 40 litres of diesel per km and damages paved roads and agricultural fields on the move. It is a complex machine with myriad systems – engines, transmission, traction, cooling, hydraulics, gunnery, communications, navigation, et al. It requires periodic maintenance and special tools. Like an aircraft, a tank becomes unfit-for-war if any of its systems is unserviceable. Onsite maintenance requires special repair-teams with matching mobility and protection. Tank casualties cannot be left in the field for the sake of regimental honour and require special arrangements for evacuation. The spares are costly and unique to the model of the tank. Tank ammunition, because of less demand, proves costlier, per capita, than artillery ammunition.

Training. All defence services train regularly to be ready for battle at the drop of a hat or rise of a balloon. Tank crews are unable to do realistic training with tanks owing to limited training mileage. Tanks need to be transported to the ranges for firing and manoeuvre training. This involves the entire rigmarole of expensive mobilisation discussed above. Training on mock-ups and simulators does not provide the kind of experience and confidence actual manoeuvre of tank-formations in dusty, noisy and obstacle-ridden environment does. No regiment commander, since 1971, has seen his 40-odd tanks operating together in a battlefield situation or its simulation. How can a regiment operate in war without ever training in peace; unless firing at the ranges and manoeuvering at troop-level is considered adequate?

A tank is an expensive equipment, not just to procure – to maintain, transport and operate as well. The A vehicles alone of an armoured division consume about 16,000 litres of diesel for every kilometre of travel. The case rests itself. Still, in matters of national defence the swaying argument is not whether we can afford but whether we can afford NOT to. Time was when India’s army had to afford tanks. From hindsight, that time lapsed 50 years ago. To continue with tanks now means forfeiting Economy of Effort as a Principle of War. Persisting with tanks because of past achievements is like including Gavaskar for India’s next West Indies’ tour. The invaluable sword had similarly to be banished when gunpowder was discovered. Change is inevitable, especially if it is tactically and economically compelling. Our romance with tanks is understandable. It is a lot like attachment to stuff in the attic; that we never use but cannot throw away. Once thrown, the cleanliness and space availability are abundantly refreshing.

Recommendations

Time has come to prune the tank from Army’s inventory. Armoured divisions must be shed immediately. Armoured regiments integral to infantry divisions, for deserts and plains, may be retained. Armoured regiments in other divisions must be shed. Independent armoured brigades may be retained as an army reserve. Supporting equipment, viz, SP artillery, mechanised engineer vehicles, command posts, communication vehicles, etc, can be useful assets for the existing combat commands. Manpower and equipment from disbanded armoured formations can fill vacancies in infantry and mountain divisions. Steel for and from tanks can be more usefully utilized on warships and artillery, both sorely deficient in our inventory.

In this context, India’s recent decision to convert 61 Cavalry from a horse cavalry to a tank regiment is as unthought-out as teenage pregnancy and as retrograde as going from AK-56s back to swords. If anything, horses are more useful than tanks, both in war and in peace. Anybody heard of tank-polo ?

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