Cost Ratios. The second aspect is the skewed ratio between cost to the attacker and defender. One Shahid drone costs about $10,000. Hence, Iran spent about $3.5 million on its attack, whereas, Israel had to fire off over $1.3 billion worth of anti-ballistic missiles, Patriots, MR SAMs and Iron Domes in just one night. This attack was with around 320 drones/ missiles. What if the next attack comes with 1,500 drones/ missiles and more? Iran claims that it has not yet used its hypersonic Fateh missiles in the last attack.

Iran’s Escalation Management and Control. Viewed in hindsight, Iran has shown tremendous strategic patience and ability to exercise escalation control. It has delivered a potent, strategic message of deterrence. “Pile up all the layers of air defence, get the US, British and French to help you with 200 fighters, but the simple fact is, that we will get through.” That was the essence of Iran’s deterrence message. It is said that Iran had sent signals to USA via UAE and intelligence channels that it was not interested in any further escalation that would involve the United States. Its sovereignty had been blatantly violated and under Article 51 of the UN Charter, it would exercise its right to retaliate. Yet it gave adequate notice to prevent uncontrolled escalation. It took 13 days to respond. It hit only three military targets. There were no attacks on civilian targets or infrastructure. It virtually sabotaged the military success of its own attack by this virtue signaling, but that did enable escalation control and dominance. It sent a clear deterrent message via the missile strikes that got through the very dense and layered air defences. It sent a clear message that it could and would get through, and not tolerate any violation of its sovereignty.

American Escalation Control Measures

For its part, the United States seemed equally keen that the issue should not escalate to a regional war. There was no way Iran could prevail in any conflict with US and Israel. However, it was capable of inflicting serious damage and pain.

It could hit Israel and the oil fields in the Middle East, it could block the Strait of Hormuz and send oil prices skyrocketing giving a big hit to the global economy. The US was in an election year and President Biden could not afford a rise in price of oil that would affect transportation costs and increase not only prices of fuel but also increase prices of food triggering an inflationary spiral.

The US strategic reserve of oil itself was down to just 17 days. The US interest would not be served by any escalation in the Middle East. As such, the US efforts were to put psychological pressure on Iran.

It sent back a second carrier battle group to the Mediterranean. It sent in General Korella, Chief of the US Central Command to coordinate missile defense measures. It tried to force Iran to recalibrate costs and limit or scale down its options.

READ MORE: ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR – Hamas Leadership, Setup and Capabilities

When all this dissuasion failed and Iran fired off three salvos of some 320 drones and missiles, both the US and Israel were surprised at the scale of this attack. However, due to ample warning and preparation time, the US theater ballistic missile defence grid and Israel’s formidable air defences were able to shoot down 97 to 98 per cent of the incoming projectiles.

The US and Western media now tried to entirely play down effectiveness of the attack. The fact was that drones were just decoys. The ballistic missiles had successfully penetrated the three most well -defended targets on planet Earth.

The US and Israel tried to play down the attack as a damn squib. The US intentions seemed to be to stop Israel from escalating by any significant retaliation. Joe Biden even suggested that it was a defensive victory for Israel and they should leave it at that.

He even suggested that should Israel go for serious retaliation, it would have to do it alone and the US would not take part. However, it was evident that due to the pressure of domestic politics, Netanyahu would simply have to respond in some way. The US tried to find a way out by suggesting to Iran that Israel would just mount a token strike and it should not escalate further.

Iran’s reaction was sharp. It was determined to react in a major way, whatever the scale of the provocation, it said. Attacks on its territory were simply not acceptable and Iran wanted no part in any dumb charade or fixed match. In many ways, the situation had closed parallels with the India-Pakistan post-Pulwama scenario. India simply had to retaliate to the terror strike but was keen to do it in a manner that would prevent a sharp escalation, maybe even to the nuclear level. Iran has rejected any suggestion that it permit Israel the luxury of a token strike. Netanyahu has been under major pressure from the United States and the Western allies not to escalate. However, the key factor was domestic political pressure that did force Netanyahu to do something, perhaps, more than tokenism.

Scott Ritter says it was a political and not a military decision. The Israeli war cabinet was split with three voting members against it while the hardliners were all for a massive response on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Netenyahu was under tremendous pressure from US and other Western allies to eschew a response or go in for tokenism. It is said that for 48 hours he refused to take any calls.

So, what could have been Israel’s response options and how would the escalatory spiral unfold? That was the key issue in the looming global crisis. Could an escalatory spiral be managed? What were the off-ramps for Iran?

Matrix of Israeli Response Options. Let us now examine what was the matrix of Israeli response options to Iran’s very massive missiles strike. For a long time, Israel had viewed Iran’s nascent nuclear capability as an existential threat. It was very keen to do an Osirak redux, that is, repeat its attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor with Iran. The problem in that was that to mount a credible and effective attack, it needed United States support in terms of satellite imagery, US air-to-air refueling aircraft, US help in getting permissions to overfly Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is doubtful if Iran could inflict any meaningful damage in a purely stand-alone mode. Even that was likely to provoke a regional war. As was evident, it is easy to start wars, far more difficult to end them.

So what then was the matrix of Israeli overt response options?

• Option One. Attack Nuclear Facilities of Iran. Iran has five major nuclear enrichment facilities at Natanz, Arak, Faradeh, Isfahan and Bordei. The main facility at Natanz is well dug in and is in a steep valley in the Zagros mountains, which is very difficult to attack. Ishfahan is the main nuclear processing centre. Israel’s options were to use the Jericho missiles or the F -35 or the F -15E fighters. These would of course need air-to-air refueling and they could possibly have attacked with stand-off cruise missiles and deep penetration retarder bombs that could pierce underground bunkers, (joint direct attack munitions). Iran had fairly good S-300 Russian SAMs based air defences and the F-35 or F-15E would definitely take some losses. Maj Gen Ahmed Hagatalab of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in charge of defending Iran’s nuclear facilities, had publicly warned that if Israel hit these, Iran would retaliate and target Israel’s nuclear facilities.

• Option Two. Attack Ballistic Missile Production Facilities. So far Israel regarded the nascent nuclear facilities of Iran as an existential threat. The Israeli military spokesman, Adm Daniel Hagare conceded that they had underestimated Iran’s ballistic missiles capability. This was in fact a real and present danger. Their storage facilities are in deep underground bunkers that would be difficult to attack, but the production centers could be targeted and one of them was, in Isfahan.

• Option Three. IRGC Headquarters Bases. The most logical target system would be the IRGC, that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Headquarters, barracks, bunkers and weapons storage facilities. It would be the most justifiable target system in Iran.

• Option Four. Iran’s Petrochemical Facilities and Export Terminals. Iran’s oil exports provided the financial support to build huge missile arsenals and fund a proxy war against Israel via the Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and the Shia militias in Iraq and Iran. Iran’s war waging capabilities could be seriously hit if its oil export sector was targeted. There were the main ports at Bandar Abbas, etc, which could be primary targets in such an attack.

These were the main overt military options for Israel to strike in response to the Iranian military strike of 13 April. They could also use electromagnetic bombs to create EMP or electromagnetic pulses to fry up electronic circuits and destroy command control and communications in the critical areas. There were also media reports circulated that if Israel had to go it alone, it would seek air bases in Aizerbaijan to hit Iran from the north unexpected direction.

Covert Options. Given the tremendous US pressure on Israel to prevent escalation, Israel would most likely have to resort to a significant offensive against Hezbollah but confine the attacks in Iran to the covert level only. These would include possibly terrorist attacks by Baluch and Kurd insurgents, use of cyber warfare or (Stutnex redux) or use drones to strike these targets. Israel could also carry out covert action to destabilize and overthrow the Iran regime of the Ayatollahs but that would have to be a long-term covert action project in concert with the CIA. These could be the precise response options that could obviate Iranian retaliation and triggering a major escalatory spiral in the Middle East. Oil prices were already at $90 a barrel. A full-scale Iran-Israel war in the Middle East could send the oil prices skyrocketing through the roof and create a global economic crisis of major proportions That was in no one’s interest.

Israel’s Response Strike on 18 April. Israel mounted its counter-attack finally on 18 April, just five days after Iran’s missile strike. There was a lot of ambiguity and disinformation let lose in the media. The Israelis did not announce that they had carried out an attack, but explosions were reported in the sky over Isfahan. The Iranians equally seemed keen to play down the scale of the Israeli attacks. They said that a number of drones, (hand-held quad-copters of very limited range) had been seen flying over Tabriz and over Isfahan. Why Isfahan? Isfahan is the home base of the Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter-bomber squadrons. It is also the home base of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps unit. It has an S-300 missile battery and reportedly also production facilities for missiles and drones. The targets that the Israelis actually struck was the S-300 missile battery and they claim to have damaged one of its radars that are used for fire control. Next day, pictures in the US media indicated that satellite surveillance had picked up the destruction of one of the Iranian radars in the S-300 missile battery which was struck by the drones. When Iran was quite clear that there had been no missile, oblique, cruise missile strikes or fighter-bomber attacks and it had been confined merely to hand-held drones, it seemed to relax and opened its air space which it had closed earlier. Similar small drone attacks had been done by the Ukrainian intelligence agents from the vicinity of Moscow with hand-held drones to strike some targets, largely for psychological impact. This was the precise, very limited nature of the Israeli response option and Iran seemed to be quite relieved. They played it down totally, and in fact, the Iranian foreign minister went to the extent of retorting to reporters, “What strike? What attack?” They said these were just infiltrators who had come in with handheld quadcopters and tried to launch them to create a media event. They understood that Israel was under tremendous pressure from the United States and the Western allies not to respond in a major way, and it had refrained from such a major provocation. So Iran has been very cautious and very pragmatic. It refused to get drawn in, refused to escalate, and for the time being, the crisis in the Middle East seems to have been averted. How long that will hold is a matter of conjecture and we will have to wait and watch.

READ MORE : ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR – Hamas Ideology and Gaza Politics

India’s Response Options. The simple fact is, what can India do? Like the rest of the world, a major conflict in the Middle East would considerably harm India’s interests. Any oil shock can have a major negative impact on the Indian economy. India has very friendly relations with both Israel and Iran and as such it would be very well placed if it has to play a mediatory role. I am not sure what mediatory role has so far been played behind the scenes, but I do not see any overt evidence of India taking such an initiative, (though we did have talks with Iran to get our crew released from the ship that the Iranian Navy had hijacked in the Red Sea). We will have to keenly wait and watch as to how events unfold in the Middle East. For the time being the world has pulled back from the brink of a disaster. From a military analyst point of view, we have a new form of war which is now fairly well established in all the battles that we have seen recently, whether in the Russia-Ukraine war or in the Middle East. The emphasis is shifting primarily to missile and drone strikes rather than manned air strikes. I would again like to reiterate that China was first off the starter blocks to create a Rocket Force after Gulf War I and II. It had feverishly started the construction of its Strategic Rocket Force as far back as the 1990s. It now has the biggest rocket arsenal in the world. It has also invested very heavily in drones of all shape and sizes. Therefore, we will have to study in very great detail the Iran-Israel missile clash and draw very pertinent lessons for our own context. Specifically, we will have to re-examine how much emphasis is to be put on manned air forces and how much onto the unmanned drones and missiles. The balance increasingly seems to be shifting in favour of drone and ballistic missile arsenals coupled with cruise missiles. We will have to gear up our military-industrial complex to churn out these drones/missiles in very large numbers to cater for intensive firing rates in actual combat. The Iran missile strike had deliberately been pared down for minimal impact to tamp down chances of escalation. A purposeful and destructive strike would have required some 1,500 drones and missiles for a similar target set. The accuracy and lethality of such unmanned systems is rising exponentially and Iran has just demonstrated their ability to penetrate even the densest Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD). We are living through a new Revolution in Military Affairs. Pakistan is still stuck largely with its F-16s for retaliation. It is China that we will have to watch closely and match in numbers, throw-weight, accuracy and ability to penetrate dense AD environments.

The post IRAN-ISRAEL – An Analysis of Israel’s Response appeared first on IMR.

It all started with Israel’s attack on Iran’s consulate in Syria on 1 April. Iran retaliated with a massive 320 drone-cum-missile barrage on 13 April, which left the world stunned with its scope and scale. There were fears of a massive war in the Middle East that could torpedo the global economy. For the time being, this threat has abated and the world can breathe a sigh of relief, but for how long remains to be seen.

Missile Power vs Air power

There is a wider professional military debate that has been ongoing since the start of the war in Ukraine. What is the inter-se emphasis that armed forces should place on missile/ drone power vs manned air power? This is a seminal question of allocation of resources that must now be seriously addressed. After Gulf War I & II, where Iraq had used Scud missiles to hit back at USA’s far superior airpower, China had drawn its lessons. Today, it has the largest Rocket Force in the world, which India, Taiwan, Japan and Philippines, etc, must all worry about.

The Israelis have traditionally placed very heavy emphasis on airpower and that has been the key to their technological-military superiority in the region. They could hit any country or non-state actor anywhere in the Middle East without any chance of effective response. Not anymore. We are witnessing a military paradigm shift in the region. Missiles and drones have caused a dramatic escalation of stakes. Even the Russian Air Force, though vastly superior to the Ukrainian Air Force in qualitative and quantitative terms, has been fairly restrained in its operations due to the sheer density of the air defences. Most of its attacks have been stand-off attacks with cruise missiles fired from own side of the border. It is only now that Russian Air Force has become more active over the tactical battle area with its Glide Toss Bombs (FAB- 2000 and 3000).

Density of AD Coverage: Israel vs Ukraine

There is also the aspect of force to space ratio. Israel is a small country with just 27,000 sq kms of area to defend. Ukraine is over 6,07,000 sq kms. Flight times from Russia for drones and missiles are far shorter. They are much longer in the case of Israel and so warning/ reaction times are far greater. Hence, military professionals in India must closely watch these ongoing missile wars and prepare accordingly. We will have to drastically enhance our drone and missile power, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. We will have to re-examine our allocation of resources to manned vs unmanned attack platforms. Air defenses are increasingly becoming more lethal. Missile-cum-drone wars are, therefore, the future. The Chinese have a head start in this respect and we have reason to be concerned. That is why, the recent Israel-Iran missile war has serious and pertinent lessons for us and we must examine these in depth. Israeli armed forces are very innovative and we must study the counter-measures they evolve. So let us now analyze the recent Iran-Israel conflict for immediate lessons learnt.

1 April Israeli Strike

On 1 April, Israel’s F-35 jets struck the Iranian consulate in Syria. Technically, under the Vienna Convention, that was sovereign Iranian territory. From their intelligence gathering facility in the Golan Heights, they had been tracking Iranian IRGC commanders on the way to Damascus for a conference. It is noteworthy that they did not attack them outside the consulate, but struck while they were in conference within the building. Some 11 Iranians, including three top commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were killed. These included Gen Hossein Salami, top commander of IRGC, and two other Brigadier Generals. There was speculation that the Israeli strike was deliberately designed to provoke Iran into a rash action that would justify Israeli retaliation of far greater intensity at its nascent nuclear capability. If that was the plan, it had apparently worked.

Israeli Miscalculation?

However, subsequent events do not bear out this deliberate provocation narrative. Rather, it now seems that Israel miscalculated. It had assumed that Iran would not react to the consulate strike but evidentially, it was quite mistaken. The recent resignation of the Israel’s Military Intelligence (Aman) chief on 22 April seems to confirm this. Though his resignation letter refers to the failure to predict/ forestall the 7 October strike, the timing of the resignation seems to suggest that the Iran strike was also a possible causative factor. Apparently, the intelligence chief had said Iran would not respond to an attack on its consulate. The timing of his resignation seems to confirm this major miscalculation thesis.

There was a great outrage and angst in Iran. Embassy is sovereign space and it was a direct affront to its sovereignty. Iran now considers itself a strong military power, courtesy its large arsenal of drones, cruise and over 3,000 missiles of various types.

Did Israel warn the US of this attack? It now emerges that this was done just minutes before the strike. In fact, it has been reported that US defense secretary Austin Lloyd called up the Israeli defense minister to complain that lack of adequate warning could have put US installations in Middle East at risk. US and Iran, meanwhile, stepped up backchannel negotiations to ensure that there would be no major flare up and escalation due to Iran’s impending retaliation. But Iran was adamant that it would have to react because its sovereign territory had been hit.

US Dissuasion Efforts

The US now made significant efforts to dissuade Iran from any major escalatory step. It made all efforts to make Iran recalculate and limit its response. In fact, it sent in its massive carrier battle group of the Eisenhower to the Mediterranean. General Korella, Chief of US Central Command, personally went to Israel to coordinate defensive actions to face such a missile attack. The simple fact is that Iran refused to be deterred or cowed down with these menacing preparations. It was desperate to demonstrate that it had the will and resolve to respond in a way that would underline its significant military power. Yet, it took deliberate steps at the same time that would limit the success of its own missile strike. Its aim was to make a strong statement of will and intent and underline its capacity to do deterrent damage, without crossing a threshold that would invite a devastating US-Israeli response.

Iran’s Missile Strike

Iran took 13 days to respond to the consulate provocation. When it did, Iran surprised the United States, Israel and the world with the scale and intensity of its response. This was a significant missile operation and deserves to be studied in detail for pertinent lessons. Unmanned missiles are rapidly overtaking manned air strikes as the weapon system of choice the world over. The Ukraine War bears ample testimony to this trend. The Iranian attack came in three distinct waves:-

•             First Wave. The slower moving Shahid drones, (speed 185 kmph) were launched late at night on 13 April 2024. They were launched from multiple directions from Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These would take about 4 to 5 hours to reach Israeli airspace. US satellites picked up this swarm of drones and alerted Israel and the world. President Joe Biden rushed back to the White House to huddle with his National Security Council (NSC) staff and monitor the operations in real time. Some 200 US, British and French fighters were scrambled to shoot down these drones before they entered Israeli airspace. US naval assets in the Mediterranean and Red Sea provided the sensor data to monitor and shoot down this drone swarm. The Shahid drones were based on GPS guidance. The Israelis simply shut off GPS guidance over Israel to spoof these drones. It is noteworthy that all Shahid drones purchased by Russia and used so extensively in Ukraine, have been retrofitted with GLONASS Russian navigational system, precisely for this reason. The drone swarms seemed headed for Golan Heights, Dimona nuclear facility and Southern Israel, as per initial estimates.

•             The Second Wave. A second wave of some 30 Paveh cruise subsonic cruise missiles with a flight time of 1 to 2 hours were launched by Iran. These had speeds varying between 500 to 600, kmph and a range of some 1000-1500 kms. These had much heavier warheads. Reportedly, some did get through. They were timed to arrive along with the drones. These were designed to strike Israeli AD locating and fire control radars and weapon systems. It is reported that they did hit two Iron Dome launchers and possibly a SAM battery. These have not been confirmed by Israel.

•             Third Wave. This third wave was the most lethal. It comprised of 120 Sahab Medium Range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) of 1500 km range. Their flight time to Israel was just 15 minutes. The Iranians claimed that the drones were largely inexpensive decoys designed to fool and overwhelm the Israeli defences. Most of the drones were based on GPS guidance systems. The Israelis simply switched off GPS guidance over their territory and the Americans spoofed the GPS guidance systems over Iraq and Syria. The Israeli’s layered air defences now came into action. These included Arrow 2 and 3 ABM systems along with Thaad, Patriots, David Sling, MR SAMs and Iron Dome tactical systems. These achieved a formidable 97 to 98 percent kill rate. This is not surprising, as even Ukraine has claimed kill rates varying from 70 to 90 percent using combination of S-300 surface-to-air missiles, Patriots and Stingers.

Analysis of Strike

One fact that has been lost sight of in the hoopla over the near total kill rate of Israeli air defences is that despite their formidable nature, many Iranian ballistic missiles did get through and hit their targets. These targets, especially the Nevatim Air Base were hit. This is Israel’s major air force base in southern Israel. It is claimed that F-35 and/or F-15E fighter jets from the base had carried out the air strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria on 1 April.

Nevatim Air Base is one of the most heavily defended locations on planet Earth. It has an X-band ANTP-Y-2 Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar. This base is linked with the US Anti-Ballastic Missile (ABM) defense architecture with its HQ at Colorado. This in turn is linked to the US early warning satellite network that can pick up missile launches from anywhere around the globe. It is also linked to the US computational and communication systems as also the shooters.

A technical analysis indicates that these ballistic missiles had a booster rocket that propelled the warheads separately. Anti-ballistic missile systems then targeted the body of the missile permitting the explosives to get through. These also released decoys to fool the Iron Dome system. Iran claims that many of these ballistic surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) got through. Video recordings do show seven major impacts and blast explosions. It is apparent that some more were perhaps able to penetrate Israel’s formidable air defence system. This is a very significant development.

Overall Drones/Missiles Fired by Iran

Admiral Daniel Hagare, Israel’s official military spokesman stated that Iran had fired a total of 320 drones/missiles. These included 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 surface-to-surface missiles. This was a formidable strike with huge number of drone swarms to overwhelm the Israeli air defence system and act as decoys. The amazing fact is Iran’s SSM missiles were able to penetrate this formidable and very dense AD cover at all three military targets attacked. It is speculated that Iran’s first wave of drones were designed to make Israel light up its detection and fire control radars. The second wave of cruise missiles then targeted these air defence batteries. It was stated that they were able to destroy two Iron Dome launchers. The third wave of ballistic missiles had separating booster propelled warheads and decoys that enabled the warheads to get through the Israeli air defences.

Iran’s Main Targets

Let us now examine the impact at each of the three bases targeted by Iran.

Iran confined its counter-attacks to three primary military targets that had been involved in the attack on its consulate. A target analysis is essential. The three targets were:-

•             Nevatim Air Base. This is Israel’s major Air force base in southern Israel. Iran claims that F-35 jets from this air base had struck the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. It is one of the most heavily defended places on planet Earth, as mentioned earlier. It has the best layered AD system in the world with Arrow 2 & 3 ABMs, Thadd ABMs, Patriots, David Sling and Iron Dome. Despite this formidable air defence, the shock was that 5 out of 7 Iranian ballistic missiles got through to this most heavily defended target in the world. Two of the war heads hit the runway and caused huge craters. The others hit storage facilities. If some eight such war heads had hit the runway, the air base would have been out of commission for some time. The real surprise was that despite 72 hours warning to the densest air defence target on planet Earth, these missiles (five of them) had managed to hit the primary target. It was part of deterrence signaling by Iran. Yet the Iranians had done it skilfully by giving adequate warning and virtue signaling of their intent not to escalate any further. They deliberately curtailed the amount of physical damage to prevent escalation. There were reports in the media that 72 hours prior to the Iran missile strike, Director CIA Willam Burns had met senior Iranian officials in a third country to work out a kind of deal to prevent escalation spinning out of control.

•             The Ramon Air Base. This is also the most heavily protected place on the planet with dense and layered air defences like at the Nevatim Air Base. Even here, some Iranian missiles were able to get through, leading to shock and concern in both US and Israel.

•             The 8200 Signal Intelligence Collection Unit. This unit in the Golan Heights also has an X-band ANTP-Y2 OTH radar and elaborate signal intelligence equipment jointly manned by Israel and CIA operatives. Once again, this is closely networked with the American anti-ballistic missile defence architecture with its array of satellites, sensors on US Aegis class destroyers and heavily defended by layered air defence systems.

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When adjusted for Israel’s population size, this attack by Hamas was worse than what 9/11 was for the United States. The attack, on a Jewish holiday, was the darkest day in Jewish history since the Holocaust. Hamas murdered Israeli civilians in cold blood, raped and beheaded victims, and took at least a hundred Israeli hostages to Gaza. Hamas fighters killed babies and parents in their homes. Partygoers at a music festival were slaughtered.

After an estimated 2,000 Hamas fighters breached the Israel-Gaza border in 29 different places, the Israeli security establishment allowed a narrative to form that it had very little or no intelligence about the invasion.

A full reckoning will require months if not years of investigation. Meanwhile, Intelligence failures can arise in at least four different ways:

•             Through a breakdown of intelligence collection

•             Through a failure of analysis

•             Failure on the part of decision makers to listen to intelligence provided.

•             When sufficient distance is not maintained between intelligence and policymaking, so that intelligence becomes politicised.

Before Hamas’s attack on Israel, there was, self-evidently, a failure of Israeli intelligence collection. Israeli intelligence, principally Shin Bet and Israeli military intelligence, failed to discover Hamas’s plot from their human intelligence or technical intelligence sources in Gaza. This is surprising since Gaza is one of the most intensely surveilled places on earth.

Hamas resorted to low-tech, old-fashioned, tradecraft that foiled Israeli high-tech capabilities. Its attack was only known to a small number of commanders, who gave orders by word of mouth avoiding live feeds of the border. Israel did not detect whispers of the attack beforehand. Movement near the border zone was a daily occurrence. Use of bulldozers and civilian trucks was common in Gaza. Hamas snipers took out Israeli electronic sensors. Hamas also apparently used electronic cyber capabilities to jam communications of Israeli commands.

There may have also been a failure of analysis. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was a textbook example of intelligence failure. This time there was a similar analytical failure before Hamas’s assault.

Political Failure

It is not known how much or what intelligence, if any, Israel’s premier, Benjamin Netanyahu, was given before the attack. If it is true that Egyptian intelligence provided the Israeli government with a warning, was it overlooked? Or did Israel’s divided domestic politics contribute to intelligence being ignored?

On October 9, Egyptian intelligence said publicly that it had given Israel repeated high-level warnings of a pending attack before the Gaza-based Hamas struck, including a direct phone call from Cairo’s intelligence minister to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in late September. US intelligence also warned its own policymakers of unusual Hamas activity and of a general increased threat from Hamas based on multiple streams of intelligence.

Underestimating Hamas’s Capabilities

The assessment about Hamas appears to have been dismissed for three key reasons. First, a belief that Hamas did not have the capabilities to carry out the attack, nor the intention to do so because it would fall outside of their historic pattern of behaviour.

Second, these beliefs about Hamas were not thoroughly challenged within Israeli intelligence nor through sharing the assessment with international partners who might have had useful intelligence on this.

ALSO READ: ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR – Hamas Leadership, Setup and Capabilities

Third, Israeli defences, be they deeply buried sensors, walls, or automatically defended sections of the border, were considered to be too strong for Hamas.

Israel’s feeling of military superiority could have led to complacency, assuming Hamas would not launch a major attack because Hamas could not defeat Israel. Israel miscalculated both Hamas’s capabilities and its intentions-and its own defense capability.

However, Israeli leaders and other observers were well aware that Tehran had been increasing aid to support Hamas for years. Israel nevertheless very clearly underestimated how much such resources boosted Hamas’s current military capabilities and command and control.

Misunderstanding Hamas’s Intentions

Israeli leaders may have calculated that Hamas would not wage such an attack in part because Israel was providing economic incentives for peace (eg, the transfer of Qatari funding to Gaza).

Hamas has been identified as a religious terrorist group with an antisemitic and millenarian mission of jihad to destroy Israel and kill Jews. Hamas’s rise represents the “Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”

Rather than peace, it is likely that Hamas (and its backers in Iran) wanted war, anticipating a major Israeli military response to its October 7 attack, which it could weaponize in information war against the Israelis to gain sympathy for the Palestinian cause internationally and erode support for Israel.

Hamas very likely wanted to provoke an overreaction by Israel that would impair Arab-Israeli “‘normalization’ in the Middle East,” including the ongoing US-brokered talks for a Saudi-Israeli peace deal that had made progress in 2023.

Hamas’s Denial and Deception

Hamas deceived Israel by giving a public impression that it was not willing to go into a fight or confrontation with Israel while preparing for this massive operation. Second, small cell of Hamas operatives communicated for two years via hardwired phones embedded in the network of tunnels underneath Gaza; avoided using cells phones and computers in order to evade detection.

Preparations for War Concealed

A CNN investigation analyzed propaganda video and satellite imagery that showed expansion of and increased activity at multiple Hamas training camps in Gaza over the past two years.

It is believed that Israeli military intelligence had collected specific information on how Hamas could invade. From observing rehearsals they also had information about the level of violence Hamas terrorists were willing to inflict.

ALSO READ: EDITORIAL – The Hamas Terrorist Attack of 7 October

Evidence suggests that about a year ago Israeli analysts had a copy of the Hamas attack playbook, the Jericho Wall document, which detailed how Hamas fighters would breach the border using paragliders, drones and rockets, and what they would seek to attack.

Comments

This Israeli failure will be relatable for intelligence agencies around the world. Intelligence analysis is difficult to do accurately, and failures can have huge consequences.

There are two elements of an intelligence assessment: the first is what people, skills, finance and equipment does the adversary possess (capabilities) and, second, what does the adversary want to do with these assets (intentions).

If analysts believed that Hamas could not behave in this way, they would tend to look for intelligence that reinforced that view, and exclude intelligence that refuted it. Assumptions and biases need to be constantly challenged.

Intelligence failures can show where agencies have invested too much resource, while under-investing in human intelligence or analytical techniques. These lessons are hard won, and it is a sad reality of intelligence history that strategic failures often act as drivers of reform and improvement.

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The heightened concerns about a potential attack on Saudi Arabia as the Biden administration is criticizing Tehran for its crackdown on widespread protests and condemning it for sending hundreds of drones — as well as technical support — to Russia for use in its war in Ukraine.

“We are concerned about the threat picture, and we remain in constant contact through military and intelligence channels with the Saudis,” the National Security Council said in a statement. “We will not hesitate to act in the defense of our interests and partners in the region.”

One of the officials who confirmed the intelligence sharing described it as a credible threat of an attack “soon or within 48 hours.” No U.S. embassy or consulate in the region has issued alerts or guidance to Americans in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere in the Middle East based on the intelligence. The officials were not authorized to comment publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

Asked about reports of the intelligence shared by the Saudis, Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary, said U.S. military officials “are concerned about the threat situation in the region.”

“We’re in regular contact with our Saudi partners, in terms of what information they may have to provide on that front,” Ryder said. “But what we’ve said before, and I’ll repeat it, is that we will reserve the right to protect and defend ourselves no matter where our forces are serving, whether in Iraq or elsewhere.”

The Wall Street Journal first reported on the Saudis sharing the intelligence earlier on Tuesday.

The U.S. and Saudis accused Iran in 2019 of being behind a major attack in eastern Saudi Arabia, which halved the oil-rich kingdom’s production and caused energy prices to spike. The Iranians denied they were behind the attack.

The Saudis have also been hit repeatedly in recent years by drones, missiles and mortars launched by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen in retaliation for Saudi involvement in the civil war that began there in 2014. Saudi Arabia formed a coalition to battle the Houthis in 2015 and has been internationally criticized for its airstrikes, which have killed scores of civilians.

In recent weeks, the Biden administration has imposed sanctions on Iranian officials for the brutal treatment of demonstrators after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in September while in the custody of Iranian security forces. The administration has also hit Iran with sanctions for supplying drones to Russia for use in its war in Ukraine.

At least 270 people have been killed and 14,000 arrested during the protests, according to the group Human Rights Activists in Iran. Demonstrations have continued, even as the feared paramilitary Revolutionary Guard has warned young Iranians to stop.

U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia have also been strained after the Riyadh-led alliance of oil producing nations, OPEC , announced in October that it would cut production by 2 million barrels per day starting in November.

The White House has said it is reviewing its relationship with the Saudis over the move. The administration said the production cut is effectively helping another OPEC member, Russia, pad its coffers as it continues its war in Ukraine, now in its ninth month.

White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby on Tuesday reiterated that the administration remains concerned that Iran may also provide Russia with surface-to-surface missiles.

“We haven’t seen that concern bear out, but it’s a concern we have,” Kirby said.

Even as the U.S. and others raise concerns about nefarious Iranian action, the administration has not ruled out the possibility of reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which was brokered by the Obama administration and scrapped in 2018 by the Trump administration.

The U.S. special envoy to Iran, Robert Malley, said on Monday that the administration was not currently focused on the deal, which has been stalled since August.

Still, Malley refused to declare the deal dead and said the administration “makes no apology” for “trying to do everything we can to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”

The pact, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, would provide Tehran with billions of dollars in sanctions relief in exchange for the country agreeing to roll back its nuclear program to the limits set by the 2015 deal. It includes caps on enrichment and how much material Iran can stockpile and limits the operation of advanced centrifuges needed to enrich.

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What may have started as a communal clash, soon escalated into a full scale conflict as Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched a fusillade of 2300 rockets and mortars at Israel. As expected, retaliation followed with Israel striking strongly with its Air Force and going primarily for command and control targets (house of head of Hamas, Chief engineer, Cyber warfare head and Commander of Rocket forces)with casualties on both sides. However, the number of fatalities in Israel were considerably less than expected, as the incoming rockets were intercepted by Israel`s Iron Dome Defence system. The Iron Dome was developed by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems in collaboration with Elta systems, which is famous for producing radars and missiles.

A decade since its first deployment in Beersheba, the Iron Dome has known to have intercepted some 4,300 rockets and missiles in several weather conditions with 90 per cent success rate as reported by various military sources and Rafael Advanced Defence Systems. The Iron Dome is an effective, multi mission, mobile, short range air defence system. The system was created to counter short range rockets and 155mm artillery shell threats with ranges up to 70km. The effectiveness of the system lies in reducing the collateral damage by strategically placing it in various locations, this as we know has proved successful against the recent attacks in the past week.

The Iron Dome is capable at detecting, analysing and intercepting threats, which also includes C-RAM, precision guided missiles, UAV`s, Cruise missiles and air breathing threats. The Iron Dome batteries include a radar system, a command system and three to four launchers. Each launcher carries twenty interceptor missiles. Other features of the system include, vertical launch interceptors, several steering fins for high mobility along with electro optics receptors, warhead and proximity fuse and compatibility with various radar and detection systems. I-Dome`s special war heads allow the projectile targets to be detonated in the air. After the target is detected and identified, the path of the rocket is analysed by the Iron dome radar monitors while the system’s BMC calculate the possible point of impact. Once the target is confirmed as the threat, the system commands the interceptors to be launched while detonating the target in a neutral area.

Currently, one unit of Iron Dome is priced at over $50 million while the cost to build one interceptor Tamir missile is $80,000. The rocket costs $1000 only. ELM 2084 MMR is a 3D AESA radar which functions in the S-band frequency. According to the radar’s manufacturer, the ELM 2084 has a target capacity of “up to 1100 targets for air surveillance purposes.” The ELM 2084 is also used as the fire control radar for Israel’s David Sling missile defence system.

The Israel Defence Ministry has used the Iron Dome for the protection of its Northern and Southern borders. It is also worth mentioning, Israel`s doctrine against high trajectory weapons is based on various kinds of defence, from active to passive defences, which involves the interception of rockets and missile by Iron Dome, David`s Sling, the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 miisiles. Recently, the Iron Dome system was tested in March 2021 in southern Israel and it had successfully performed at intercepting and destroying the existing and incoming threats.

The Iron Dome Defence system, background and its Development

Israel had seen many rocket attacks, from the shelling of Galilee pan handle towns in the 70`s to the second Lebanon war in 2006, following the consistent attacks from the Gaza strip. The constant threats appearing from the Hezbollah and the Hamas was a huge factor for the consideration of having an air defence system such as the Iron dome.

The development of the system was initiated in 2005 by Brig. Gen. Dr Danny Gold (Head of Defence Ministry`s Research and Development Unit), however the project received a favourable boost post the second Lebanon war in 2006 by the Israeli Government. By February 2007, Defence Minister Amir Peretz nominated Iron Dome as Israel’s defence against this short-range rocket threat. In early 2011, the final tests of the system were concluded. On March 28th 2011, the first battery was deployed to Beersheba, the second battery within a week was deployed to Ashkelon. On April 7th, 2011 the Iron Dome shot down its first incoming rocket from the Gaza strip. The first two batteries were initially funded by Israel alone.

In 2010, President Obama, recognizing the threats by Hezbollah and Hamas on the state of Israel, announced that he would provide 205 million dollars in his 2011 budget from the US congress to expedite the development of the Iron Dome. This was the first American investment in the Israeli project. By 2016, US committed $5 billion to its development costs. According to experts, a total of 13 Iron Dome batteries are required to defend the entire territory of Israel. Currently 10 batteries are deployed. Israel plans to increase them to 15 batteries in near future. In August 2019, the US Army decided to procure two Iron Dome batteries to augment its own short-range missile defence capabilities. 

Criticism of the Iron Dome defence system

Apart from Iron Dome, another system similar to it is owned by the United states – the Centurion System, which is based on Phalanx anti-ship missile defence system. The Centurion was used to intercept rockets and mortars at short-range using fast moving 20mm canon. It has served extensively in protecting US forces and assets in the Iraqi “Green Zone” under US command.

On the level of technology, several arguments had also erupted against the Iron dome

1.             The inability of the system to deal with very short-range targets, whose range may be less than 5-7km and also its inability to shoot down mortar shells.

2.             The critics argued, since the threats also included mortar shelling, the defence ministry should have favoured acquisition of already existing systems such as the Centurion and the Sky Guard (was proposed by Northrop Grumman based on the Nautilus tactical laser system. The development of the system is complete but remains non-operational)

3.             There is also a speculation that the Iron Dome system may face difficulty combating the rockets launched at flat trajectories.

4.             The cost of the interceptor missiles is high, use of two interceptor missiles on one target could also raise costs and difficulty for Israel to acquire more interceptor missiles in a prolonged conflict.

5.             Also, the system faces a “saturation point”, its inability to engage beyond a certain number of threats could lead to a defence breach. 

Operational Criticism

According to the Iron Dome developers, the defensive foot print of one battery extends up to 100 square kilometres, however its competitors believe it is far less. This would prove difficult to protect an entire population of a town or city, unless many batteries are deployed.

This would also cause many citizens to be evacuated to bunkers or shelters, while an extensive damage to the areas will be predictable. The purchase of the interceptors is also limited, so the decision to protect a select populations would have to be made. So, this poses the question if such an expensive defence system would be apt for Israel. The debate on whether to rely too much on the Iron Dome defence system vs focusing on simply protecting the strategic facilities is often raised. No doubt the Iron Dome is a tactical and technological success, but does it equate to leak – proof defense?

We must bear in mind, over the years Hezbollah has managed to acquire and improve the ranges of their missile systems. The weapons in their possession are statistically distributed as they are also expensive. Since it would defeat the purpose to attack strategic facilities as the damage would be negligible, the focus would be deviated to using them against waging terror on the civilians. However, the Iron Dome doesn’t give the option of securing the entire population.

 Hence the critics believe, deploying an active defence system for civilian protection would defeat the purpose as the system cannot protect all. Their suggestions have stressed on deploying the systems for protecting the strategic facilities, as it would be futile to prevent some damage no matter how negligible and which may be incurred by the country from the rocket attacks.

Iron Dome, IDF and defending the Offense

IDF security concept has relied consistently on their three pillars of “deterrence, early warning, and decisive battlefield victory (hachra’a in Hebrew)”. It has stringently followed an offensive tactic over defence tactics. By ensuring its strong offensive power it has deterred enemies from attacks and strengthening its advance intelligence networks, it has managed to detect early threats when deterrence fails.

The subject of defensive power made the talks in 1960`s, when Israel expressed its interest in procuring the Hawk surface-to-air missile system from the US. A stiff opposition was met at the highest bureaucratic and military ranks. Some military commanders accused this move as the agenda of the political lobbies to back away from offensive operations which may account to a sure shot victory or a fast affirmative decision. The other argument was to spend on planes which would serve the purpose of both offensive and defensive roles.

Eventually, 5 Hawk missile batteries were acquired and they proved to be cohesive to the existing offensive plan by protecting Israeli air force facilities, while maintaining the IAF deterrence and first strike capabilities.IDF BG (res.) Dr. Meir Finkel in his article, “Iron Dome – the New Maginot Line,” has laid a strong comparison between the defensive systems and the defensive fortifications line built by France in the 1930`s to ward off the Germans. The Maginot line had consumed about 6% of the French budget which took away the much-required funds for its offensive capabilities. Finkle stated the same can be applied in the context of the Iron dome, which would lead to “the creation of false security and the atrophy of the army’s offensive thinking”.

The concept of strong defence capability to strengthen the offense soon crept in post the Hezbollah`s success in maintaining Katyusha rocket attacks in the second Lebanon war in 2006. In 2007, the Meridor Committee on Israel’s National Security Doctrine integrated defence as the fourth pillar in their national security doctrine. This year the Israeli government approved Iron Dome as Israel’s answer against the short-range rockets.

Conclusion

Israel has come to be one of the first amongst the nations to use an anti-Rocket system to protect its civilian population and it certainly isn’t a surprise, given the number of attacks this nation has suffered. It is logical for Israel to invest extensively in the Iron Dome defence systems, but the quandary may arise when it may come to limiting the funds invested in its defensive ability without hurting the IDF’s offensive capabilities.

Looking at the range of the considerations to invest in the Iron Dome defence systems, it appears the decision to acquire the anti-rocket system was a smart one. Israel’s solution to the rockets attacks comes with a controversy but it is still regarded as a technological breakthrough, which Israel should be proud of. Israel’s defense in the latest round of casualties has been impressive and yet Israel has hit back hard with its Air power to hit the Hamas command and control and propaganda elements and imposed prohibitive costs.

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