Russia’s Strategy

Russia’s approach to war planning, particularly concerning the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, has often been misinterpreted. The Russian strategy exhibits remarkable tactical prowess, maturity, and calculated decision-making. By drawing Ukraine into a prolonged state of attrition, Russia aims to exhaust Ukrainian resources while incrementally advancing its positions. This accumulative push allows Russia to secure territorial gains and serves a strategic purpose by creating a buffer zone and gaining leverage in negotiations. Additionally, Russia’s strategy of gradual advance serves to root out the potential for insurgency within the territories it seeks to control. By consolidating their positions methodically, Moscow aims to preemptively address any potential resistance or insurgency from local populations, which helps maintain control over the newly acquired territories with the priority of stabilizing the regions under Russian control.

The Russian strategy evolved over the early course of the operation, which was intended to reign in the Ukrainian regime out of its NATO ambitions and the ethnocultural cleansing of the Donbas region, but not to occupy or annex Ukrainian territory per se. But as the narrative from Western countries became more entrenched with hostility and delusional opportunism to use Ukraine to degrade Russia permanently, the Russian strategy shifted to the gradual bleeding and destruction of Ukrainian military capabilities, including its projection of power and threat.

Hence, fundamentally, Russia has never completely aimed at capturing Ukrainian territory in a grand scenario. Russia also knew that such a strategy would be militarily frivolous in terms of tactical, operational, and strategic goals. However, it was also not in its long-term political interests and was fraught with significant risks. Russia is not fighting the war the Soviet Union had during WWII. Neither is Russia the Soviet Union, nor are the historical contexts or exigencies under which it operates similar to or necessitates conducting itself based on what might have been relevant almost eighty years ago! Russia also never had the military manpower at the outset of the Special Military Operation or even today to roam across Ukraine. And it has to preserve a significant portion of its forces to protect itself from potential ongoing aggression from NATO and its multiple allies close to Russian territory.

Ukrainian Forces

Ukraine’s force structure is always difficult to understand because of its tendency to form ad hoc battlegroups and its practice of fragmenting forces into resident brigade commands. In fact, ORBAT and force distribution in Ukraine are in a league of their own. As a result, the AFU’s organization and force generation are often more opaque and difficult to understand than Russia’s, for example. Whereas Russia uses conventional army-level groups, Ukraine has no organic commands over the brigade level. The chains of higher command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are extraordinarily flexible and irregular entities. Ukraine’s entire fighting organization is an improvised mixture and modification around established formations. That aspect applies especially to its highest field commands down to the brigade level. The AFU field command system’s most conspicuous anomaly is its absence of any division-level (and higher) formations. Ukraine started abolishing the Division around a decade ago in a forced restructuring.

The German Kampfgruppe units during WWII were used as a contingency against front disarray, severe losses, and replacements. They were ad-hoc combat units formed during World War II by the German Army, often composed of infantry, armor, and supporting elements for specialized tasks or missions. The AFU idealization of all-level Kampfgruppen is bizarrely unique. That said, the primary picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings,” vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) in Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south: Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always tricky, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. Ukrainian Army-level formations are absent because they simply do not exist, and such arrangements prove to be a pressing challenge for any formal military establishment.

War Doctrine

But, as the Operation evolved, Russia rather quickly devised a strategy of destroying Ukraine’s Military and, by extension, degrading its NATO sponsors through long-term attrition, where the territorial battles have been used as opportunities to demolish Ukrainian forces little by little, as death by a thousand cuts over an extended period and across a vastly stretched battlefield where killing the enemy and destroying its equipment is the primary goal no matter how limited the amount of territory actually gained.

As far as Russia’s War Doctrine in Ukraine is concerned, Russia is committed to positional attrition warfare as this maximizes the asymmetry of their advantage. This depletes the firepower of not only the Ukrainian Armed Forces but also of NATO members without engaging in direct conflict with them. Russian Armed Forces iron out Ukrainian defenses with artillery and then push forward into pulverized defenses. As Ukraine continues to funnel units to refill positions, they play into the hands of the Russian Military. Noting the importance of deploying fresh operational reserves as a crucial element of any counterattack, Russia keeps the burn rate at the front high. It degrades Ukraine’s ability to form reserves and continues to place immense pressure on Ukraine and NATO, not solely in terms of seizing territory but in terms of attrition, chipping away infrastructure, and creating a cumulative impact on Ukraine’s overall fighting capability. Kiev’s position is untenable as they may be able to fight effective static defense from prepared positions. Still, they cannot reverse Russian gains or respond to new breakthroughs without a combined arms reserve. Any serious effort by Ukraine to retrieve the fortified cities will divert the scarce trained manpower and equipment, thus squashing any attempts of offensive campaigns. They are also currently exhausted to the point where they lack combat-effective combined arms reserve units. Furthermore, such units have been unable to maneuver efficiently due to fuel shortages and incessant Russian artillery and air strikes.

Russia’s Advances

Russia is slowly advancing on almost every axis of the theater, which has both strategic and tactical implications, as the Ukrainians are being forced to burn reserves while being prevented from rotating and reconstituting their forces, as well as a precise operational formulation. Russia’s maneuver scheme must be kept in mind regarding its minimum end-state objectives: to capture the remaining Donbas city agglomerations (around Slovyansk) around Kramatorsk Although the war and Russia’s military ambitions may not end there.

At present, there are several main axes of advancement: On the central axis of the front, the Russian thrusts on the Avdiivka axis and the Chasiv Yar axis converge on the crucial Ukrainian hub of Konstytinivka, capturing which is a prerequisite for any serious effort to advance on Kramatorsk.

Simultaneously, Russian forces exert ongoing pressure on the northern front, employing a gradual squeeze tactic on the city of Kupyansk at the apex of the Oskil line and advancing towards Lyman along the Zherebets axis. These maneuvers aim to establish a foothold towards the strategic objective of Kramatorsk, contingent upon Russian control of the north bank of the Donets River up to the Izyum confluence with the Oskil.

In the southern sectors, Russia expands its zone of influence following the capture of Marinka, likely intending to build momentum towards Kurakhove, thereby placing the Ukrainian stronghold of Ugledar in a precarious position. Ugledar’s proximity to Russian rail lines vital for the land bridge amplifies its strategic significance, prompting Russian efforts to seize it. Additionally, Russian forces target the Ukrainian-held Robotyne salient, a remnant of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. While these assaults serve to tie down Ukrainian forces, they also aim to preempt any Ukrainian aspirations to utilize Robotyne as a launching point for future offensives towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations serve both attritional purposes and the strategic neutralization of Ukrainian staging areas. The overarching operational scenario indicates Moscow is gaining offensive momentum across the entire theater. This trend undermines Ukrainian combat effectiveness by impeding rotation, regeneration, and lateral troop movements while depleting Ukraine’s already limited reserves.

Sustaining the War Effort

The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition – a grueling campaign marked by relentless assaults against entrenched defenses, where concrete, steel, and explosives dictate the tempo. Ukraine confronts a stark reality: Russia’s military buildup nears critical mass, tipping the scales decidedly in Moscow’s favor. Initially strengthened by a substantial shell inventory, Ukraine’s arsenal benefitted from meticulous resource management and international aid, notably from the United States and South Korea. However, sustained high-intensity combat depleted much of these reserves, leaving Ukrainian forces grappling with a critical shortage of artillery ammunition.

Ukraine has sought to expand its production capabilities to sustain its war effort, primarily in Europe and the United States. Yet, this strategy encounters formidable obstacles: sluggish industrial ramp-up, production targets insufficient to match Russia’s onslaught, and logistical hurdles such as barrel scarcity. The United States has fared better in ramping production, slated to deliver approximately 500000 shells in 2024. Europe faces various problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus-driven decision-making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also makes manufacturers hesitant to invest significantly in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”

Ukraine’s ammunition shortfall remains dire even if the USA and Europe meet their delivery targets. Optimistically, combined efforts might yield 1.3 million rounds annually, equating to a modest daily allocation-insufficient for sustained offensive operations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Reznikov’s assertion of needing nearly 12000 shells daily underscores the magnitude of the challenge. While this figure may be aspirational, conservative estimates suggest Ukraine requires at least 200000 shells monthly to maintain a functional military posture. However, with current projections, Ukraine faces an uphill battle in amassing the requisite stockpile for intensified offensives. Artillery barrels deteriorate with prolonged use, typically lasting around 2500 shots for a howitzer. Consequently, assuming sustained firing rates as desired by Reznikov, Ukraine would face the wearing out of approximately 125-150 guns per month. Complicating matters further, Ukraine operates at least 17 different artillery platforms. Meanwhile, Russia’s shell production capacity has been significantly underestimated. Domestic Russian production has surged, with Estonian estimates indicating around 3.5 million shells produced in 2023, which is expected to increase to 4.5 million in 2024. Russia has considerable capability to sustain a firing rate of up to 12000 shells per day, with reserve surge capacity. Even if European production surges as anticipated, there remains a substantial advantage for Russia, potentially reaching a ratio of 3-1 or even 5-1 in artillery firepower. This advantage is compounded by Western reports of increased Russian production of advanced strike systems such as cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs, boasting greater power and range. Recent publications, such as those from the Royal United Services Institute, highlight Russia’s capacity to deliver significant numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, and missiles, further solidifying its military dominance.

The most important question is simple: whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is, of course, the German-Soviet War. Even though the Third Reich enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. During the Battle of Kursk, Hitler even quipped that the loss ratios should predict an imminent German victory. Loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation. Estonian intelligence estimates underscore Russia’s ability to continually train, equip, and deploy additional troops, outpacing current loss rates. RUSI further emphasizes the growth in Russian forces deployed in Ukraine, from 360000 to 470000 over the last year, highlighting the formidable challenge Ukraine faces. Russian force generation continues to grow steadily over time rather than merely replenishing losses.

In contrast, Ukrainian forces face increasing manpower shortages, with under-strength brigades tasked with increasingly demanding operations. It’s evident that Ukrainian reserves are dwindling, as highlighted in Avdiivka, where brigades from other fronts were hastily deployed, indicating a lack of strategic reserves. The elite 3rd Assault Brigade was even committed in the final stages of the battle to stem the tide. Meanwhile, units like the 110th Mechanized engaged for months, suffered significant attrition due to the inability to rotate out. In contrast, Russia conducts regular troop rotations while Ukrainian forces remain on the front lines due to a shortage of replacements.

The Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves: “After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian Army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”

What to Expect?

In the near term, one could expect Russia to progress toward the following intermediate operational goals:

•   Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Novomikhailovka and Toretsk

•   An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk

•   Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liquidation of the Ugledar salient

•   Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient

While 2022 witnessed initial successes for Ukraine, 2023 saw missed opportunities despite ample Western assistance. Instead, Ukraine exhausted valuable resources in defending Bakhmut and futilely attacked a well-prepared Russian defense in the south. With Russian force generation rising inexorably, Ukraine faces the looming threat of strategic defeat. To avert this, Ukraine must pursue a radical mobilization plan bolstered by increased support from its allies. However, Ukraine lacks the capacity to train and equip its forces independently. Without substantial NATO assistance, a total mobilization risks escalating casualties without significant gains. Yet, even maintaining current levels of aid is challenging amidst waning international support and domestic crises in crucial NATO member states.

2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and quickly supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax, and the war turns in an evident and irreversible way against Ukraine. As Steve Harris of Iron Maiden remarked in one of the most iconic songs of the band, “The sands of time for me are running low…”, Kiev has almost no time and resources to ‘orchestrate’ (special courtesy Wagner PMC) any meaningful offensive operations. Of course, once substantially degraded, the Ukrainian regime and its allies would be at Russia’s mercy in shaping the postwar era in Ukraine, both politically and territorially. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated that industry, manufacturing & the physical economy have always been relevant, and newly emerging powers such as India must grasp this insight to develop a broadly industrialized economy in the wake of a real two-front threat and a rewarding prospect of becoming a serious global power. That said, the window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine and now opens wide for Russia. In this sense, one must appreciate how a few meters in this theatre equals hundreds of miles relative to the grand old wars of the previous century. The heinous attack at the Crocus City Hall marks the beginning of a new phase in the conflict. March 2024. Not very far from Fontainebleau, a windy dawn at Brussels unfolds skies seven and a half decades old. The sun struggles to pierce through the misty haze, and the approaching summer months carry the weight of a hot war.

The post MILITARY HISTORY: Kursk, Manchuria and Russo-Ukrainian War (Part 2) appeared first on IMR.

Montgomery himself said it best. When asked what it would take for the Red Army to break through to the Atlantic, he simply answered: “Shoes.”

As the dust now settled on the conclusion of World War II, Western European leadership was anxious about a potential tactical challenge – a communist-led land invasion. The USSR had emerged from the conflict as a formidable power, while its former European allies were weakened after the War. Yet, to understand the gravity of this situation, we must rewind our clocks by seven years to the onset of WWII itself. The Second World War had an odd symmetry in that it ended much the same way it started: with a well-drilled, technically advanced, and operationally ambitious army carving apart an outmatched foe. Of course, the major phase of the war began with Germany’s swift devastation of Poland, which rewrote the book on mechanized operations. The Soviet Union’s equally totalizing and fast victory of Manchuria in August 1945 marked the end of the war, or at least the final major land campaign.

To provide proper context, it is essential to tell the tale of the Battle of Kursk before proceeding with Manchuria. In the challenging spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht faced a daunting situation. Army Group South’s efforts to reach the Caucasus had been in vain, and the aftermath of the Stalingrad defeat required a monumental effort led by Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein to salvage the Army. With Soviet forces outnumbering the Germans twofold on the eastern front and having a significant advantage of reserve troops, the odds were stacked against the Germans. The Red Army’s superiority in tube and rocket artillery further compounded the challenges. Manstein’s successful counterattack in Central Ukraine had pushed the Soviets back, regaining key cities like Kharkov and Belgorod. However, a planned offensive towards Kursk had to be canceled due to weaknesses in the German formations further north, which resulted in the Soviets occupying a significant bulge centered around Kursk.

Battle of Kursk

The plan was to have armies from Army Group Center and Army Group South attack the base of the bulge, meet at the rear, and encircle the Soviet forces within. However, Manstein faced obstacles with the mud season halting operations during the spring thaw, causing both sides to pause and regroup. German intelligence believed the USSR could deploy 40 fresh divisions in Kursk. In reality, they deployed 800 divisions! The Red Army planned to fill the bulge with troops and artillery, denying the Wehrmacht any possibility of encirclement. This demonstrates the importance of operational reserves in warfare. However, it is also crucial to note that a clash of tanks occurred at Prokhorovka, where the powerful Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army aimed to counterattack against the approaching SS spearhead, leading to a close-range tank-on-tank combat. However, the clash resulted in a tactical debacle for the Soviet tank army, as they launched an ill-advised frontal assault against technologically superior German vehicles. The technological gap between the German Big Cats – the Panzer V Panther, and the Tiger proved to be serious opponents for the Soviet tanks. Although, the battle at Prokhorovka did not greatly alter the course of the larger Kursk operation, as the German attack failed to break through the heavily fortified Soviet defenses. But this was a clarion call for the Soviet military planners.

Manchuria

Now, Manchuria is one of the many forgotten fronts of the War despite being among the oldest. The Japanese had been meandering in Manchuria since 1931, consolidating a pseudo-colony and puppet state ostensibly called Manchukuo, which served as a launching pad for more than a decade of Japanese incursions and operations in China. For a brief period, the Asian land front had been a key pivot of world affairs, with the Japanese and the Soviet Red Army fighting a series of skirmishes along the Siberian-Manchurian border and Japan’s brutal 1937 invasion of China, which was an indicator of the impending global war. However, circumstances had pulled attention and resources in other directions, particularly the events of 1941, with the outbreak of the German-Soviet War and the Great Pacific War. After a few years, as a significant geopolitical pivot, Manchuria was relegated to the background and became a lonely, forgotten front of the Japanese Empire until 1945.

Among the many topics discussed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 was the Soviet Union’s long-delayed entry into the war against Japan, opening an overland front against Japan’s mainland colonies. Although it seems relatively obvious that Japanese defeat was inevitable, given the relentless American advance through the Pacific and the onset of regular strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands, there were concrete reasons why Soviet entry into the war was necessary to hasten Japanese surrender. More specifically, the Japanese continued to harbor hopes late into the war that the Soviet Union would choose to mediate between Japan and the United States, negotiating a conditional end to the war that fell short of total Japanese surrender. Soviet entry into the war against Japan would dash these hopes. The Soviet Union’s overrunning of Japanese colonies in Asia would emphasize to Tokyo that they had nothing to fight for. Against this backdrop, the Soviet Union spent the summer of 1945 preparing for one final operation to shatter Japan in Manchuria.

The Soviet maneuver scheme was tightly choreographed and well-conceived – representing in many ways a type of encore, perfected demonstration of the operational art that had been developed and practiced at such a high cost in Europe. The strategic plan involved utilizing the unique geography of Manchuria, which extended into the Soviet Union’s borders. The plan was designed to rapidly and efficiently attack several rail and transportation hubs situated in the Japanese rear. These hubs were identified as Qiqihar, Harbin, Changchun, and Mukden, and the aim was to secure them quickly and effectively. By rapidly bypassing the main Japanese field armies and converging on transit hubs in the rear, the Red Army effectively isolated all the Japanese armies from each other and from their lines of communication to the rear, effectively slicing Manchuria into a host of separated pockets.

It is important to acknowledge that the Japanese faced insurmountable odds in resisting the attack. The Soviet force was overwhelmingly equipped with manpower and resources-three fronts consisting of over 1.5 million men, 5000 armored vehicles, and tens of thousands of artillery pieces and rocket launchers. The Japanese were facing an uphill battle from the onset. Imperial Japan (including Manchurian proxy forces) had a paper strength of perhaps 900000 men, but the vast majority of this force was unfit for combat. Virtually all of the Japanese Army’s veteran units and equipment had been steadily transferred to the Pacific in a cannibalizing trickle-a vain attempt to slow the American onslaught. Accordingly, by 1945, the Japanese Kwantung Army had been reduced to a lightly armed and poorly trained conscript force suitable only for police actions and counterinsurgency against Chinese partisans.

There was nothing for the Japanese to do. The Kwantung Army had far less of a fighting chance in 1945 than the Wehrmacht had in the spring of that year. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets broke through everywhere at will when they began the assault on 9th August. Soviet armored forces comfortably overran Japanese positions, which were armed primarily with archaic, low-caliber antitank weaponry that could not penetrate Soviet armor even at point-blank range. By the end of the first day, the Soviet pincers were driving far into the rear. The offensive demonstrated the Red Army’s extreme proficiency in organizing enormous operations and moving at high speeds. By August 20 (after only 11 days), the Red Army had reached the Korean border and captured all their objectives in the Japanese rear, in effect completely overrunning a theater that was even larger than France. Many of the Soviet spearheads had driven more than three hundred miles in a little over a week.

The combat aspects of the operation were ludicrous, given the totalizing level of Soviet overmatch. Red Army losses hardly breached the 5-digit mark, which is inconsequential for an operation of this scale. What was genuinely impressive – and terrifying to alert observers – was the Red Army’s clear demonstration of its capacity to organize colossal operations in scale, both in the size of the forces and the distances covered. Soviet forces would begin a formal withdrawal from Manchuria and Korea in 1946. Still, as they receded, they left in their wake consolidated and well-supported communist political machines, including the Workers Party of Korea under Chairman Kim Il Sung and the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong. The Soviet Union presented something of a unique geopolitical triple threat. In its own right, it had astonishing state capacity to field massive armies and roll them over continent-sized spaces. It had a proven model of effective political institutions that could allow local communist parties to establish powerful political monopolies.

All of these powers had been on full display in Asia, with the lightning advance, the rapid consolidation and funneling of resources to local communist parties, and the durable North Korean and Chinese party states that were left behind once the Red Army withdrew. To make matters even worse, this powerful Soviet expansion apparatus was now precariously forward deployed deep in the heart of Europe, with the Soviet frontier pushing all the way into Central Germany. The fear that the Soviet Union would replicate its Manchurian exploits in Europe became the foundational anxiety of the Cold War – predating both Soviet atomic weapons and, by extension, the fear of nuclear war. As early as 1947, France and the United Kingdom began signing joint defense pacts, which expanded to include Belgium and the Netherlands with the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, bringing about the short-lived “Western Union Defense Organization” (WUDO). It was clear, however, that such a limited alliance structure would be utterly inadequate in the event of war with the Soviet Union. France and Britain were degraded, threadbare powers in no place to fight yet another major war.

The Cold War

The beginning of the Cold War can be best identified as a sequence of events in 1948 and 1949, which together represented the breakdown of the post-war Soviet-American cooperation in Europe and the consolidation of the power blocs that would characterize the Cold War. In those intervening years after the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook a series of actions designed to consolidate their positions in Europe according to the postwar settlement. The US rehabilitated Western Europe under the Marshall Plan, while the USSR forbade Eastern bloc countries from participating. There was thus a certain degree of symmetry as both the USSR and the United States consolidated the two spheres of Europe, creating a sharp split down the spine of the continent. The US intervened in Greece to prevent a communist takeover, followed by a Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet abandonment of the Allied Control Council ended any joint administration in occupied Germany. The situation worsened with the attempted communist putsch in Berlin and the Soviet blockade of the German capital, leading to the Berlin airlift. The formation of NATO in April 1949 was a response to the deteriorating security situation. The Soviet Union predictably followed with the Warsaw Pact a few years later. The Cold War was on.

The doctrines established during the Cold War have persisted to a significant extent in the present tactical situation in Europe. NATO’s expansion has not helped ease these considerations. The balance between evolving military technologies and the constraints of available resources continues to shape contemporary military strategies in the European theater.

Modern-day Russia has overcome its Kurskian deficiencies by arming itself with some of the world’s most advanced weaponry and establishing an elaborate, yet normative means of use.

However, a notable departure from historical precedents such as Kursk and Manchuria is Russia’s manpower limitation. This has impacted its ability to swiftly conduct large-scale Manchurian offensives in Ukraine. This scarcity of manpower has influenced Russia’s tactical decision-making, leading to a more calculated approach to strategic dynamics.

The post MILITARY HISTORY: Kursk, Manchuria and the Russo-Ukrainian War (Part 1) appeared first on IMR.

This is one of the outcomes of a multi-year collaborative historical research project published recently. The findings of the project were presented at the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China on 23 June.

“China’s pre-1949 official historical records clearly show that, before the PRC invaded Tibet in 1950, Tibet was never part of China. Sadly, today many governments incorrectly believe this ridiculous lie, and this is part of the reason why many western democracies fail to provide adequate support for upholding Tibet’s sovereignty,” said Hon-Shiang Lau, Retired Chair Professor, City University of Hong Kong, in his testimony before the Commission.

He also presented maps from the Ming and Qing dynasties to prove that Tibet was never part of a Chinese empire and that, therefore, the PRC’s claims to unify China by annexing Tibet are baseless.

He mentioned that there are two important foundation concepts behind this theme, which are –

Foundation A: “There is an abundance of authentic and reliable pre-1949 Chinese official historical records. The PRC-version of “Chinese history” is very different from the version of “Chinese history” reflected in these pre-1949 official Chinese records, and Foundation B: “we use a comprehensive range of objective criteria to examine whether Tibet was part of China. Thus, to judge whether Tibet was part of China during China’s Ming dynasty, we use official classical Chinese records to examine”.

Another witness, Michael van Walt van Praag, Professor of International Law and Executive Chairman of Kreddha, stated clearly that Tibet was not historically part of China and denied their claim to Tibet from ancient times.

The professor also accused the international community, including the US, of falling in line with China’s historical narrative that Tibet has always been part of China.

The Professor said, “Contrary to what the People’s Republic of China claims and to what many people take for granted, Tibet was historically not a part of China. This is one of the outcomes of a multiyear collaborative historical research project that I recently completed and published.”

“This is relevant and requires our attention because the PRC government has made an agreement on its version of history a precondition to Sino-Tibetan negotiations, which have been in deadlock now for 12 years. More fundamentally, the PRC bases its entitlement to Tibet solely on its assertion that Tibet has been an integral part of China since antiquity. Whether or not Tibet was historically a part of China, therefore, determines whether the PRC has the legitimacy to rule Tibet or not. And that, in turn, informs the international community’s obligations and responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan conflict,” he added.

Professor Praag furthered that the international community was wrong in believing that the Sino-Tibetan conflict is an internal affair, as China illegally invaded Tibet in 1950, according to International Law.

Tenzin Tethong, Former Tibetan government official and Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to North America, testified regarding the challenges faced by the Tibetan Central Administration and His Holiness the Dalai Lama in maintaining contact with the Chinese government.

Ellen Bork, Contributing Editor, American Purpose, highlighted the use of propaganda by the Chinese government and their use of state-owned media to popularize a false narrative about Tibet and its intentions.

Ellen Bork added, “More than 70 years after the invasion, Tibet remains a high priority, for the Chinese Communist Party. This priority is evident in the attention and resources the Party devotes to surveillance, repression, and control, to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s goal of Sinicizing religion, the exploitation of natural resources, and building up military forces along Tibet’s border with India.” (ANI)

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1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE is yet another masterpiece in the galaxy of books on military history being brought out every second or third year by the Dehra Dun-born acclaimed military historian Shiv Kunal Verma. It is by far the most eloquent account of the 1965 War and “it sets the bar in military writing,” say some of the critics. 

While India was still licking its wounds from the disastrous 1962 War against the Chinese, a belligerent and somewhat overconfident Pakistan decided to wrest Kashmir from India. To test the waters, it launched its initial military probes into the Rann of Kutch between February and May of 1965; India strongly responded. However, by the end of July, India gave in to the dictates of the UN, and stood down the troops it had mobilized in the Punjab and Kargil sectors in response to the Rann of Kutch ‘skirmishes’.

Pakistan then launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August 1965 imagining it to be its Brahmastra. It deployed nearly 12,000 trained Mujahids in multiple groups, each named after historical plunderers of the sub-continent. Confident that it had the superior armour like M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks and better fighter planes such as F-86 Sabres and F-104 Starfighters, and better submarines than India, the Pakistanis expected that in the event of an expanded war, the Indians would collapse just as they had against China in NEFA three years previously,” Verma writes in the Introduction.

Focus shifts to International Border

However, contrary to the Pakistan’s expectations, India firmly repulsed the attack and cut off its entry and exist points into the Kashmir Valley by capturing the Haji Pir Bulge. Operation Gibraltar thus fizzled out. Stung by its reverses, Pakistan then launched Operation Grand Slam in September 1965 in Chhamb and Jaurian. The resultant Indian counter-attack saw the focus shift to various other sectors – Lahore, Barki, Kasur [Khem Karan], Fazilka, Sialkot, and Barmer – on the international border. With the rival Air Force formations getting involved almost simultaneously, the Armed ‘Skirmishes’ turned into a full-scale war.

Continuing the narrative, Verma writes, “As they had in 1962, the junior officers and men of the Indian Armed Forces admirably acquitted themselves despite the on-the-fly reorganization of Forces, lack of intelligence, obsolete equipment, and lackluster military leadership. What could have ended in victory instead culminated in a stalemate. Official Indian figures put the total number of causalities at 12,714, out of which 2,763 were killed, 8,444 wounded, and 1,507 missing. An estimated 2,000 casualties occurred after the Ceasefire, raising questions about the effectiveness of the UN as a global Peacekeeping body. Neutral observers put the Pakistani deaths at over 5,000. The conflict ended when the Tashkent Agreement was signed by the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan on 10 January 1966, agreeing to observe the ceasefire lines and withdraw their respective armed personnel to positions that they had held before 5 August 1965.”

However, the Tashkent agreement was not without an accompanying tragedy; within hours of its signing, India’s diminutive Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack.

A scion of an Army family, Shiv Kunal together with his better half Dipti Bhalla,  enjoys the unique distinction of having worked in conjunction with all the three Wings of the Indian Armed Forces over the past two-and-a-half decades producing short films on military-related issues. Their documentary ‘The Standard Bearers’ on the National Defence Academy (NDA) turned out to be a classic in its own genre. 

I wonder why Shiv Kunal and others of his ilk attribute the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as the culmination of the ‘skirmishes’ that had continuously taken place in the Runn of Kutch between the two countries during April to September 1965. On the contrary, these so called ‘skirmishes’ in the Kutch region were meant to test India’s preparedness, and were a prelude to a well planned strategy aimed at completing the half-finished job in the erstwhile princely state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Fortuitously, Shiv Kunal’s 1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE by virtue of its rich content has emerged as an excellent text book for the students of military history. Propitiously, the incumbent Commandant at the Shimla-based Army Training Command Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla, a ‘man of letters’ himself, would gladly consider prescribing it as a text book for the entrance examinations of the various Courses as also at the military training institutions like Indian Military Academy, National Defence Academy, Rashtriya Indian Military College et al.  

The Book running into 557 pages including 48 pages of colour photographs and maps with hardcover weighs about a kilogram. Its entire content is in a small font that is not easy on the eye. It would, perhaps, be better in two volumes.

1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE undoubtedly provides a definitive account of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Raj Kanwar

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Demand for Indianisation

‘Indianisation’ of the Indian Army is truly an oxymoronic term, yet it marked a very important phase in our pre-Independence history when far-sighted nationalists in the Governor General’s Legislative Assembly pressed for recruitment of Indians into the officer corps. Hithertofore, the Indian Army was manned by Indians, but invariably led by the British. As Stephen Cohen says: “Motilal Nehru, Jinnah, Sivaswamy Iyer, Amarnath Jha, and later H.N. Kunzru, were not only interested in Indianising the officer corps and promoting equalitarian recruitment to the ranks, they were also concerned with the nationalization of the Indian military.”
The clamour for Indianisation and the Indian Army’s stellar performance in World War I made the British take a few hesitant steps before establishing the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College (now Rashtriya Indian Military College – RIMC), Dehra Dun in 1922, which prepared selected boys (mostly scions of loyal landowners and nobility) for admission to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst (UK) where they were trained to join the army as King’s Commissioned Indian Officers (KCIOs), though in miniscule numbers. Among the early KCIOs were legends like Field Marshal Cariappa (the first Indian to head the Indian Army) and General Thimayya.

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Indian dis-satisfaction at the slow pace of officer intake led to the creation, in 1932, of the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun, to train Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs) to command only Indian troops in army units selected for Indianisation. Newly commissioned Indian officers posted to these units would, of course, not have any white officer under their command. Sandhurst intake ended. The IMA was to achieve complete Indianisation of the officer corps in a leisurely 75 years! Fittingly, amongst the first batch to pass out was Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who, in 1969 became the first Indian Army Chief to be trained at IMA. (This batch also gave Army Chiefs to Pakistan – Mohammad Musa, and Burma – Smith Dun).

The Second World War derailed British plans to keep Indianisation on a leash. The Indian Army expanded from a pre-WW II strength of 1,89,000 to 2.6 million in 1945 – the largest volunteer army the world has known. Officer strength also expanded exponentially – from around 2,800 in 1939 to 22,000 in 1945, 8,500 being Indians. The Indian Army again amply proved its mettle in three continents and deserves most of the credit for halting the invading Japanese on the borders of India and pushing them back. Thus, when the British departed in 1947, the post-demobilization Indian Army officer corps had a fair number of Indians, though mostly in the lower and middle rungs.

Towards a Professional National Army

It is presumed by some that Indian officers were impervious to the desire for Independence that began sweeping India. This is far from reality and does great dis-service to these pioneering Indians who had to tread a narrow path, facing racism in the Mess and a British officer brotherhood largely hostile to the entry of ‘natives’ in their ranks, yet persevering to emerge as true professionals who laid the foundations of the Indian Army as we know it today – an apolitical, professional national army. Humphrey Evans, General Thimayya’s biographer, records that at the height of the Civil Disobedience Movement, Thimayya and a group of young like-minded officers fired by nationalistic fervour, went to Pandit Motilal Nehru, offered to resign their commissions and plunge into the freedom struggle. Motilal Nehru presciently told them to hang in there: “Nothing would please the British more than your resignations. For thirty years we have fought for army Indianisation. We’re now winning the fight… We’re going to win Independence… sooner or later the British will be driven out. When that happens, India will stand alone. We will have no one to protect us but ourselves. It is then that our survival will depend upon men like you.” And they heeded this sage advice for the future of India.

Partition

Independence also meant Partition. The Army was deeply affected, undergoing the pain of being cleaved into the Indian and Pakistan armies on religious lines, with the concomitant division of manpower and assets in two-thirds to one-third ratio. In the midst of the carnage of Partition, considerable Army attention remained focussed on asset division.

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This had its tragi-comic moments as Pakistani officers’ demands often went to absurd dog-in-the-manger lengths – if there was a thirty volume encyclopaedia, they demanded ten volumes as their rightful share; dinner sets were split; priceless memorabilia sundered. Every large military establishment and most regiments have their own ‘partition lore’. Lieutenant General S.D. Verma describes the process with respect to the Staff College in his memoir ‘To Serve with Honour’. He recounts that the supreme headquarters to oversee the modalities of partitioning army assets, set up in New Delhi under Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, decreed that as Army Headquarters Library was to stay with India, the Quetta Staff College’s library was to go to Pakistan. That left basically the Mess assets to divide. A bone of contention became the Camberley Owl, a lovely silver piece that has a hallowed place in Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. General (then Colonel) Verma, the senior Indian instructor and to-be Commandant of DSSC, India, was able to clinch the argument for the Camberley Owl in India’s favour by pointing out that the Staff College Camberley (UK) had gifted it to ‘The Indian Staff College’ as the inscription said, hence it had to go to India – QED!

Indianisation – The Last Phase

The shedding of British Imperial trappings post-Independence was the third phase of Indianisation and was not without its hiccups and delay. The robust response of the Indian Army to the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir scant months after Independence saw its leadership flower confidently. Yet at the close of the war, when India wished to honour its bravehearts for deeds of gallantry, a peculiar hurdle came in the way – newly independent India and Pakistan were both Dominions of the British Commonwealth, presided over by Governor Generals representing the British Crown. Gallantry awards being approved by the Head of State, when recommendations for gallantry awards were made the British were flummoxed – squirming at the thought of giving the same medals to soldiers of two of their Dominions who had fought against one another! As a matter of fact, even the Indian Independence Medal, instituted in 1948 for grant to all members of the Indian Armed forces who were serving at the time of Independence carries the Ashokan Dharma Chakra (our National symbol) surmounted by the Tudor Crown, carrying the inscription GEORGIUS VI D:G: BRITT:OMN: REX: FID DEF on the obverse and the Ashoka Lions with the inscription INDIAN INDEPEPENDENCE and the date 15th August 1947 on the reverse.

Hence, the Army had to wait till India became a Republic to shed the last vestiges of British rule for the major Indianisation still required. Indian gallantry awards were instituted in 1950 and awarded with retrospective effect from 15 August 1947. A unique custom was introduced post-Independence: the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) invite the officers to the JCOs’ Mess on Independence Day which the officers reciprocate by inviting the JCOs to the Officers’ Mess on Republic Day, thus fostering camaraderie and interaction. Badges of rank and regimental insignia carrying the British crown were Indianised with the Ashoka Lions replacing the crown. The word ‘Royal’ in regimental names was dropped. Latin in regimental mottos like in the Ordnance Corps’ ‘Sua Tela Tonanti’ (To the Warrior his Arms) eventually changed to the Hindi ‘Shastra se Shakti’. Marching tunes which had no resonance with India too were gradually replaced. The Garhwal Rifles changed theirs from the Scottish highlands tune ‘Barren Rocks of Aden’ to the uplifting ‘Badhe Chalo Garhwalio, Badhe Chalo’. ‘Jai Hind’ has become a universal greeting in the Army, as have pride inducing marching tunes: ‘Sare Jahan Se Achcha Hindustan Hamara’.

All armies are tradition-bound institutions, where the old ways are cherished because they give stability and generate pride. In this phase of Indianisation, the sage advice and guidance of much-respected officers like Field Marshal Cariappa was invaluable, ensuring continuity while assimilating change.

Customs evolve. British-era traditions have been adapted to Indian culture. Yet, the ethos of the Indian Army has always been uniquely Indian – Naam (honour of the regiment, army and the country); Namak (loyalty to the regiment and the country); Nishan (upholding the honour of the regiment’s flag) have been the bedrock upon which rests the Indian soldiers’ unswerving commitment – often over and beyond the call of duty. Philip Mason summed up this ethos in the title of the book which he wrote about the Indian Army: ‘A Matter of Honour’. And forever it shall be so.

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Late in 1917, Gen Allenby’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) smashed the Ottoman defences and captured Gaza, and then captured Jerusalem just before Christmas.

Gen Allenby launched his long-delayed attack on 19 September 1918. The campaign has been called the Battle of Megiddo. The Turks were taken by surprise when the British attacked Meggido in a sudden storm.

From there it was decided to march off to Damascus. Two separate Allied columns marched towards Damascus. The first approached from Galilee composed of mainly cavalry, both Indian and Australian while the other column travelled along the Hejaz Railway northwards composed of Indian Cavalry and the ad hoc militia following T.E. Lawrence. Australian Light Horse troops marched unopposed into Damascus on 1 October 1918. The war in Palestine was over.

3rd (Lahore) Indian Division and the 7th (Meerut) Indian Division, both pre-war divisions, participated in the Palestine Campaign and as part of the Palestine Occupation Force. The 1st and 2nd Mounted Divisions, both formed in Egypt in 1918 also served with the Palestine Occupation Force before they were broken up in 1920-21.

The 4th and 5th Indian Mounted Divisions were under the Desert Mounted Corps for exploitation.

The 5th Cavalry Division (Desert Mounted Corps) was assigned the task of capturing Haifa and Acre after several earlier attempts were stopped by strong rearguard positions. A squadron of Mysore Lancers, 15th Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade and a squadron of Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 14th Cavalry Brigade formed the initial attack on an Austrian artillery battery before moving forward with the Jodhpur Lancers and a light car patrol, to attack the main German rearguard position and capture the town.

On 23 September 1918, the Jodhpur and Mysore Lancers of the 15th Imperial Service Brigade were ordered to capture Haifa.

The Jodhpur Lancers charged the Ottoman position, crossing the Acre railway line, but came under machine gun and artillery fire. The charge was further obstructed by quicksand on the river banks, so they manoeuvred to the left onto the lower slopes of Mount Carmel. The regiment secured the position capturing 30 prisoner, two machine guns, two camel guns and opening up an access route into Haifa. The Jodhpur Lancers continued their charge into the town surprising the defenders. Those Mysore Lancers who had been giving fire support to the attacking regiment, mounted and followed them into the town.

Here is an extract from The Story of the Jodhpur Lancers 1885-1952 by Brig MS Jodha.

“On the night of July 13/14, the Jodhpur Lancers moved from divisional reserve into the portion which included the bridgeheads of Mahadat, Hajla and Henu on the River Jordan, relieving Brigadier-General Godwin’s 10 Cavalry Brigade.

“On 14 July, and ‘A’ Squadron of Jodhpur under Captain Panai Singh and Major Reynolds as SSO, crossed at Henu and another Squadron of Mysore Lancers crossed Hajla bridgehead. In the early hours of the morning ‘A’ Squadron of Jodhpur Lancers, after crossing Sangsters Ford of the Wadi El Rameh, was reconnoitering forward when it made contact with the enemy.

“This squadron of Jodhpur Lancers kept working around the enemy’s flank, but it could not leave the crossings over Wadi El Rameh unguarded. The enemy appeared to be about 300 strong and was shelling the crossings and rear areas with four camel guns (77mm) and two 4.2-inch guns.

“At 1210 hours a combined charge was to be carried out on a given signal. The Jodhpur Lancers charged with 125 men (five troops) and Mysore Lancers charged with six troops (also about 125 men). The Mysore Lancers and Sherwood Rangers advanced, at the same time being ably supported by the two squadrons of the Jodhpur and Hyderabad machine gun section which did great damage to the enemy.

“The advance of the Jodhpur Lancers, less two squadrons, was made in line of troop columns up the Wadi Jorfe. On reaching open ground, deployment was made in echelon in extended troops, and the high ground in front was galloped. On reaching here the two squadrons right shouldered and galloped down the left bank of the Wadi Rameh where they rallied.

“Here the toughest fight took place and many individual fine acts took place and much of the enemy was killed and captured and the machine gun section with the help of Hotchkiss guns did great execution.

“On that day, the Jodhpur Lancers won many honours.

“The enemy retreated hurriedly to their original position in the foothill caves of Wadi Rameh, the Hyderabad Lancers following them up and remaining in touch until 1930 hours when they withdrew into reserve west of the Jordan. Jodhpur Lancers and Mysore Lancers each then kept three squadrons across the river to picket the enemy.”

Together, the two regiments captured 1,350 German and Ottoman prisoners, including two German officers, 35 Ottoman officers, 17 artillery guns and 11 machine guns. Their own casualties amounted to eight dead and 34 wounded. Sixty horses were killed and another 83 wounded.

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