Session 1 – Inaugural Session

The seminar was inaugurated by Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ. The welcome remarks were given by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, Director General, CAPS. This was followed by an industry perspective provided by Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst & Young. The guest speakers also released the EY-IMR knowledge paper on Air & Missile Defence.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra commenced his introductory statements by addressing the protracted conflict in Ukraine, which has persisted for sixteen months, despite the substantial casualties incurred by both opposing factions. The vulnerabilities manifest themselves through the widespread deployment of tanks, drones, large ships, cruise missiles, and aircraft, which are strategically withheld from entering technical zones due to the presence of formidable air defence systems. The concept of air Denial has been surpassed by both parties involved. Hence, the conflict has once again underscored the significance of the air and missile defence systems. Several key lessons can be derived for India from this conflict, including the imperative of maintaining unhindered supply chains and promoting domestic manufacturing. Additionally, he emphasised the significance of counter-drone technology, which encompasses various tools such as kinetic interception and electromagnetic interdiction. According to Air Marshal Chopra, India is currently developing medium and long-range surface-to-air missiles. However, there is a need to expedite the advancement of cost-effective iterations of missiles and unmanned aircraft. The speaker proposed that the private sector is making significant strides in the field, exemplified by the Kalyani missile creation. This missile was developed through a partnership between Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd and DRDO, and its production involved collaboration with various players in the Indian industry, including both public and private sector entities and MSMEs. The author emphasised the government’s initiatives to promote indigenisation, encompassing both the public and commercial domains.

Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ gave the Inaugural Address. He addressed the crucial capabilities of the air defence and missile system in various contexts, including times of peace, periods of uneasy peace, and even in times of war. The activation of this capability is the initial step, while its deactivation is the final action. In certain instances, it persists consistently. It offers both deterrence and the assurance needed to execute air operations. The system encompasses numerous interconnected components and sub-systems that encompass monitoring, control, and the ability to make decisions for destruction swiftly. He highlighted critical advancements in air defence during the last decade while focusing on reducing the size of systems and sub-systems and the increasing lethality of weapons and Unmanned systems, encompassing both offensive and defensive capabilities. He emphasised the evolving nature of operations, which were formerly limited to land but have since expanded into the air and are now expanding into space. He stressed the necessity of successfully encountering the threats. India’s capacity to cope with threats needs jointmanship as well as an exhaustive capability. The endeavour is to be made not in isolation but as a team. Therefore, the diverse range of threats necessitates an air defence system that can enhance capabilities and multiply abilities multiple-fold. This will entail utilising expedited, reliable, and fortified decision-making mechanisms alongside a fusion of active and passive sensors to generate a comprehensive representation. He concluded by emphasising the interaction between a user and a manufacturer during the initial stages of development of any system is crucial to the smooth transmission of situational awareness and the successful incorporation of the decision-making tool.

Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst and Young, provided the defence industry perspective. He stated that the Indian Air Force was responsible for safeguarding the entirety of the nation’s airspace, which encompasses the island territories and offshore facilities and falls within the jurisdiction of the air defence identification zone. In order to effectively safeguard the expansive airspace, it is imperative to implement a strategy that involves the proactive positioning of surface-to-air missiles, the utilisation of countermeasures against advanced technologies, the establishment of surveillance systems and radar networks, as well as the deployment of short-range surface-to-air missiles to deter and neutralise aerial incursions. Col Kuber emphasised the significance of the heightened dissemination of quantum technologies, the integration of quantum into military operations, and the transformative impact it will have on the character of warfare. The speaker provided an explanation regarding the distinction between quantum and linear phenomena, highlighting the pervasive nature of the former in contrast to the latter. During his discourse, he also referred to the hypersonic glide vehicles. In order to effectively address the issue, it is advisable to develop an anti-missile capability that facilitates the straightforward identification of these entities. The speaker concluded his discourse by comparing the escalating military expenditures of the United States and China and subsequently deliberated on the appropriate course of action for India considering this development. In order to augment its capabilities, the government has pursued collaboration with the private sector to develop advanced weaponry. It will be stipulated to be productive.

SESSION 2 – EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES

Session 2 was chaired by Air Vice Marshal Tarun Chaudhry, Asst Chief of Air Staff Ops (Projects), Air HQ. He emphasised technology’s importance in shaping a conflict’s contours. Therefore, it is essential for all parties involved to acknowledge and adapt to new challenges brought about by technological advancements in the context of warfare. He underlined the need to develop an appropriate industrial environment for research and development to quickly provide the essential equipment or solutions. Here, timeframe and R&D efforts are of utmost importance.

Gp Capt Prashant Arora, Air HQ, discussed the ‘Lessons in AD from the Russia-Ukraine War.’ As part of the philosophies/concept of operations, he highlighted the DEAD/SEAD missions conducted by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which allowed the Ukrainians to mount an effective air defence response. Russian forces employed Kh-31 and Kh-58 ARMs extensively against Ukrainian ground-based air defence weapons. The Ukrainians also utilised customised MiG-29s equipped with AGM-88 HARM with success.

The Ukrainian PSU’s innovative and flexible air defence systems have prevented the Russian VKS from dominating the sky. Russia’s VKS employed the S-400 in Belarus and Crimea to illustrate its practical air defence doctrine. The surface-to-air missile system of the S-400 was effective at bringing down aircraft. Russian aircraft were forced to fly at low altitudes due to the Ukrainians’ effective use of the S-300 SAM and SA-11. The Pechora system was an effective anti-aircraft armament for the Ukrainians. As part of the anti-missile/SOWs operation, it is impossible to intercept Russian Tochka-U and Iskander missiles due to a lack of adequate interceptor missiles. Between 80% and 90% of Ukrainian missiles were intercepted by the Russian S-400. Intercepting Russian “Zircon,” “Vanguard,” and “DF-ZF” hypersonic cruise missiles during anti-hypersonic operations is complex. He stated that the Russian VKS Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) had little effect on the efficacy of the air defence network. Active AD capability and passive AD measures against missiles/ SOWs/ HCMs/HGVs are essential for assuring survivability. AWACS and AEW&C are crucial enablers for AD Operations. The development of future AD capabilities must be prioritised, and plans must account for detecting and eliminating low RCS threats.

Brig Manish Kumar, Brig AAD Ops, Army HQ, discussed the ‘Emerging Air Threat: Challenges to Ground Based Air Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) from Recent Conflicts.’ He addressed the concept of air threat in its state of being and air threat in its manifestation. Air threats encompass various factors, including numerical strength, quantity, aircraft types, capabilities, operational ranges, refuelling capabilities, and tactical approaches. “Air Threat Manifestation” refers to the strategic process of developing and implementing measures to mitigate air defence risks. The manifestation of air threats necessitates the management of stand-off threats, limited stand-off threats, and dynamic threats. He emphasised the increase in the variety of air attack instruments and the expansion of the range of potential threats, including remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAs) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Additionally, they mentioned the emergence of futuristic air threats such as hypersonic and hyper glide technologies, as well as surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they noted the resurgence of conventional dumb bombs, explicitly referring to rocket-boosted kinetic energy (REK) weapons and gliding munitions. According to Brig Manish Kumar the VKS air operation in Russia is limited to the Central Military District (CSFO) and activities related to air defence. The initial chapter operations yielded successful outcomes. The initial attacks were limited to Stand Off Launches utilising Kh series Cruise Missiles and ARMs. However, they were effectively countered by the Ukrainian S-300 air defence systems. Moreover, the SHAHED-136 introduction was employed in Ukraine. The term “three-layer air defence” is a misnomer. Each layer must be designed to address a specific type of threat. To address various levels of threat, encompassing stand-off threat, limited stand-off threat, and dynamic threat, it becomes imperative to implement a comprehensive array of mitigation measures. He identified the prerequisites for comprehensive air defence solutions, which include low radar cross-section (RCS) surveillance, low-level surveillance, and stealth surveillance. The layout challenges faced by the defence industry encompass several key aspects, including the miniaturisation of components, the management of electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility in limited spaces, the ability to handle multiple targets simultaneously, and the development of cost-effective electronic identification friend or foe (IFF) solutions.

Sh Vasudev Ramakrishna, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, discussed the ‘New Developments in Radars for Detection, Tracking Threats and Targeting.’ He deliberated on radars concerning air and ballistic missile defence. Modern radar systems possess various applications, encompassing areas such as ballistic missile defence, air defence, weapon designation, reconnaissance, commercial utilisation, weather monitoring, and interplanetary investigations. The radar may be categorised as surveillance radars, which possess a mechanical rotation fixed RPM, offer volumetric search capabilities, have fixed target update intervals, and exhibit limited range and angular resolution as well as accuracies; track radars, designed for tracking a single target, have limited search capabilities; and multiple radars for diverse threats, which are specialised in their respective functions and have limited programmability. To construct a unified multifunction radar system in the future, it will be necessary to address various components of radar sub-systems, including waveform agility (such as low pulse repetition frequency and medium pulse repetition frequency, as well as target radar cross-section estimation), as well as the programmability of radar modes (such as air defence and ballistic missile defence).

SESSION 3 – EMERGING THREATS, SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION

Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani, Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired session 3. He emphasised the importance of hypersonic weapons and the difficulties faced by current countermeasures in addressing them. In contrast to ballistic missiles that can be easily intercepted and monitored, identifying hypersonic missiles poses a significant challenge. To effectively tackle these challenges, it is imperative to embrace technological advancements.

Air Commodore SM Paranjpe, Team Ldr, Project AD Services Interface Gp, Air HQ addressed the challenges associated with ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as stand-off weapons. He gave an account of the historical background of hypersonics, with particular emphasis on ‘The Great Extinction Event’ that occurred approximately 66 million years ago, resulting in the extinction of all dinosaur species. It also emphasised the historical, contemporary, and prospective dimensions of hypersonic weaponry; and furnished an extensive account of the fundamental principles underlying hypersonic velocities, elucidating various attributes of hypersonics, ultrasonics, supersonics, and related phenomena. He elucidated the distinct challenges associated with stand-off weapons by examining the ballistic trajectory and orbital trajectory within the classification of ballistic armaments. He discussed the tactical obstacles associated with air defence, specifically focusing on four key aspects: being situated beyond the radar horizon and at a low altitude, operating at high altitudes and speeds, flying at low altitudes and high speeds, and possessing small or stealthy characteristics. He gave insight into the origins of the challenges, specifically highlighting the Anti-Hypersonic Weapons Technology Challenge and the requisite scientific expertise. He concluded by directing attention towards the main points to be learned and the actions being implemented to address them, categorising them into three distinct areas: Technology, Organisation, and Operations.

Sh Nandakumar S, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, gave an insight into ‘the OTH Radar for Peninsular & Chinese Front: a Perspective.’ Considering that OTH Radars operate at high frequencies, he emphasised their value. He compared the two Over Horizon (OTH) Radars, such as the Surface Wave OTH (SW OTH) and the Sky Wave OTH (SKW OTH). He emphasised the examination of OTH Radar, specifically highlighting various countries such as Iran, the United Kingdom, the United States, Romania, and Israel and the respective radar systems they possess. He presented an analysis of a separate survey pertaining to the Skywave Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Radar, specifically focusing on the United States. He emphasised the various sub-systems of the SkW OTH Radar, including transmitters, receivers, and Tx Antennas, as well as the techniques and technologies employed within these sub-systems. According to the research conducted by Sh Nandakumar S, developing a Skywave Over-the-Horizon Radar (SkW OTHR) for specifically identified locations is feasible. He emphasised the development of Ionosphere modelling is imperative for SkW OTHR. He proposed that the implementation of the Frequency Management System should be completed within a time-frame of approximately five years. He discussed the advancement of the Surface Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) for the Indian Navy, specifically in the Gujarat Peninsula, which is nearing completion. It is anticipated that the radar system will become operational within a year. Additionally, Nandakumar highlighted the forthcoming development of the Two-L shape (180* Coverage) SkW OTHR for Sea/Air Surveillance, which is expected to be completed within a time-frame of 5-7 years. This technological advancement is anticipated to provide the Indian Armed Forces with enhanced capabilities to assess the Chinese front. 

SESSION 4 – AIR DEFENCE COUNTERMEASURES

Air Vice Marshal PV Shivanand, Asst Chief of Air Staff (Air Defence), Air HQ chaired the session. He highlighted that conventional air defence was designed to detect certain airborne flight objects. In recent times, there have been changes in the basic detection capability; and multiple new threats challenge the domain of air defence. We need to address it on priority.

Wg Cdr KJ Antony, Joint Director AD, Air HQ, presented his views on ‘Countering Stealthy Aerial Threats.’ His presentation centred around four fundamental domains pertaining to the attainment of stealth capabilities. These domains encompassed the concept of stealthy aerial threats, their potential ramifications on air operations, as well as the strategies employed to counteract such threats, encompassing both existing and future technologies. He perceived stealth as a fusion of technological elements aimed at evading or prolonging the process of detection. For example, stealth aircraft must possess minimal signatures across various electromagnetic (EM) spectrum domains, including radar, infrared, acoustics, and visual signature. In order to attain stealth capabilities in a fighter aircraft, it is imperative to strike a delicate equilibrium between the attributes of stealth, manoeuvrability, and cost-effectiveness. The individual emphasised that achieving stealth or low observability can be accomplished by reducing radar cross-section, minimising infrared signature, and diminishing visual signature. He classified stealthy aerial threats into three categories: airborne platforms that employ stealth technology, threats with low radar cross-section (RCS) or low observability, and threats that do not require line-of-sight (LOS) engagement, such as terrain-hugging missiles and ballistic missiles. In order to address the challenge posed by covert airborne threats, the individual in question proposed the implementation of an anti-stealth system capable of functioning autonomously or in conjunction with other systems. This system would utilise multiple sensors to generate a comprehensive air situation depiction, thereby enhancing the likelihood of successful detection. Ultimately, he emphasised the importance of space-based systems to mitigate the risks posed by stealth aerial threats in forthcoming times.

Cdr Viraat Shiggaon, Cdr Staff Requirements, Naval HQ, explained the ‘AD Countermeasures: Naval Perspective.’ He focused on the growing dangers in the maritime sphere and the accompanying advances in AD technology of the future. While marine air defence (AD) is generally comparable to other services, the sea presents unique obstacles. Cooperative engagement is made possible by both long- and medium-range SAMs. The evolution of modern air defence weaponry is motivated by the changing geopolitical landscape. It serves as an anti-access/area-denial mechanism. Since its final velocity is so incredible, it cannot be stopped by traditional AD systems. The use of decoys and MIRVs increases the difficulty of engagement. The topic of the operations of unmanned vehicles and swarm drones was discussed. It is a low-priced A2/AD weapon that regular armies and insurgents can deploy. He discussed potential future technologies for naval air defence, focusing on “the electromagnetic railgun,” which is affordable and can engage supersonic targets at extended ranges; “laser/microwave weapons,” which can engage hypersonic weapons/anti-drone systems; and “anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) interceptors,” which can engage ASBMs during both the boost and re-entry phases. He ended by stressing the importance of indigenisation, the introduction of cutting-edge technology and innovations, and the creation of counter-technologies.

Brig. OP Vaishnav, AAD Dte, Army HQ explained ‘Countering Unmanned Aerial Threats – Future Roadmap.’ He focused on how the aerial danger posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has changed over time. UAS include anything from tiny quad/hexa copters to huge fixed-wing military UAVs. There are three levels of threat – superficial, intermediate, and severe. He pointed out that India’s rivals on both sides can now produce and build unmanned aerial systems on their own. The Burraq, Barq LGB, Wingloong-10, CH-4, Shahpar-2, and Sharp Sword are among the dangerous autonomous weapon systems they want to modernise with. Surveillance, identification, and tracking; microprocessors or calculating a firing solution; and interdiction were the three pillars he emphasised under the Counter UAS system pillars.

Sh Amit Kumar, Scientist F, PGAD, DRDO, presented his views on ‘Countering the Threat from Ballistic and Hypersonic Missiles and Stand-off Weapons.’ The increased range and precision of ballistic missiles, their potential use by non-state actors, and the diffusion of ballistic missile technology were all issues he brought up, as was the danger posed by ballistic missiles in the Indian subcontinent, he said. India needs a ballistic missile defence system because of its no-first-use (NFU) nuclear strategy. Ballistic, subsonic, and supersonic cruise missiles are the current go-to options for delivering warheads across vast distances. Using hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and MARVs by adversaries is a common strategy for countering and penetrating missile defences. An emerging danger is the hypersonic glide vehicle. Low altitude gliding, high manoeuvrability, re-targeting area, and high cross-range capability to plan the glide path allow it to penetrate enemy ballistic missile defence while engaging time-critical targets like ballistic missile launch pas/silo, deeply buried command centres, air bases, warships, and tactical targets.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), Director General, CAPS, delivered his closing remarks at the conclusion of the ideation sessions. Air Marshal Chopra commended the astute presentations and notable presence of all panellists, as well as the intellectually stimulating questions posed by the audience.

The seminar ended with a Vote of Thanks by Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor Indian Military Review.

The post EVENT REVIEW—Air & Missile Defence India 2023 appeared first on IMR.

The themes of eight sessions included emerging technologies and industry capabilities, air threat, integrated air defence battle, communications for the air defence battle, research & development (R&D) and ‘atmanirbharta’ in air defence.

Inaugural Session

Welcome Address. Lt Gen Sunil Srivastava, Director, CENJOWS gave the opening remarks with the salience of Air & Missile Defence in protection of national assets and during both defensive and offensive operations. He stressed that the deliberations were important especially in view of emerging challenges with new weapons, war fighting concepts and impending establishment of IADC.

Inaugural Address. Lt Gen AP Singh, Director General Army Air Defence (AAD) gave the inaugural address and talked about  air and missile threats, which, unlike in the past, have become potent and unpredictable. He highlighted the following issues:-

We are experiencing rapid change in technology in sensors and air defence weapons systems. In particular the stealth technology and unmanned vehicles present a formidable challenge.

Air defence equipment cost intensive and needs to be replaced in a phased manner, bearing lifecycle costs in mind.

Legacy equipment, therefore, needs to be sustained and upgraded.

Communication is the bed rock of air defence operations, which should be integrated, instant and real time.

The control of operations needs decentralization with distributed responsibility.

Work is in progress by both, Army and Air force to collate and present inputs of all sensors on one integrated platform.

Industry should offer solutions to upgrade/ modify legacy weapons.

Special Address. Air Mshl SP Wagle, Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (DCIDS) (Capability Development), gave a special talk. He mentioned that the current phase of reorganization into IADC would end the hitherto single service fragmented approach to air and missile defence. He highlighted the following issues:-

 The concept of operations and training has to change with integrated air defence operations.

To counter the emerging air and missile defence challenges, new weapons have either been acquired or are in process of being procured by the three services to beef up our air defence in all areas.

Rapid development of weapon technology means faster obsolescence of existing weapons. This poses a challenge in view of budget constraints.

Present day threat comprises a mix of disruptive and low technology weapons.

In the current warfighting scenario, even a weak country possessing low tech weapons can challenge a stronger nation. 

Expensive missiles/ weapons cannot be viable options to intercept / neutralize the low-tech weapons.

Since traditional threats will continue to exist with non-traditional threats, we have to develop capability to tackle both.

Industry’s R/D should keep focus on the current threats.

Use of Artificial Intelligence can shorten the OODA loop and enable safe operations without fratricide.

Access new technology to neutralize new threats such as unmanned / Hypersonic weapons and cruise missiles.

Besides active measures, passive measures and decoys still have great relevance.

Collaborative and joint approach by all stake holders in air defence is the way ahead.

Capacity of Indian Industry. Col KV Kuber, Director Defence & Aerospace, gave out the Industry Perspective. He said that Indian Industry had acquired skill and capacity to build sensors, missiles and tactical weapons and their ammunition for the armed forces. Several indigenous industries like Tata Advanced Systems, Adani, Reliance, Bharat Dynamics, Kalyani Group, BEL, BDL, etc, the have technology and capacity to meet the India’s air defence needs. But, still a lot needs to be done especially to tackle emerging threats in unmanned vehicles, hypersonic, stealth and cyber and electromagnetic domains.

Sessions and Speakers

Air Mshl Anil Chopra, Director Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired Session 2, the theme of which was Industry Capabilities. Ravi M, Bharat Dynamics Ltd. spoke on the work being carried out by BDL to manufacture missiles and the technologies available to them. Rann Marom, VP Business Development India, Rada Electronic Industries, spoke on his company’s capabilities, Abhishek Agarwal, Sr Manager, Saarloha Advanced Materials spoke on “Making India Self-reliant in Defece and Aerospace.”

Air Vice Marshal Makarand Ranade, ACAS Ops (Space), Air HQ chaired the session, the theme of which was “Contours of the Air Threat”. Gp Capt S Dhankhar, from Air Ops Branch, Air HQ spoke on “The Threat from Stand-off and Precision Attack.” Col Rajneesh Suyal, Col Weapons & Systems, Army Design Bureau spoke on “Emerging Threat from UAVs/ Drones.” Cdr Gokul Suresh, Cdr Aircraft Acquisition, ACNS (Air), Naval HQ spoke on “The Air & Missile Threat to Naval Assets.”

Air Vice Marshal PK Srivastava, former Director Bharat Dynamics Ltd and VP L&T chaired the session, whose theme was “Emerging Air Defence Technologies.” Gp Capt KB Mathews, Gp Capt Ops AD GE, Air HQ spoke on “Challenges of Integrated AD Battle and Air Space Management.” Col HK Parashar, of Army Air Defence Directorate spoke on “Low level threat in the Tactical Battle Area and its neutralisation.” Cmde Alok Ananda, Cmde Naval Ops, Naval HQ spoke on “The Air Defence Battle at Sea.”

This was followed by a Special talk by Lt Gen Rajeev Sabharwal, former SOC-in-C on “Communications: A decisive catalyst for the realisation of an Integrated Air Defence Command.”

This was followed by another Special Talk by Lt Gen (Dr) VK Saxena, former DG Army Air Defence, on “Missiles & Strategic Systems.”

Another session on “Emerging Air Defence Technologies” was chaired by Brig Jagdeep Dahiya, former Commander Air Defence Brigade. Gp Capt Saurabh Gupta, of Air Defence Branch, Air HQ spoke on “Lessons from recent aerial engagements in regional conflicts.” Col R Sathya Narayanan, of Army Air Defence Directorate gave a talk on “Lessons for ground-based air defence engagements in contemporary conflicts.”

A session on “Research & Development” was chaired by Air Mshl Rajeev Sachdeva, former DCIDS (Ops), HQ IDS. Sheik Althaf, Scientist G, LRDE, DRDO gave a talk on “Latest developments in AD Radar.” PK Tewari, Scientist F, DRDL, Hyderabad spoke on “Missile-based AD weapon systems.” Dr PN Dwivedi, Scientist F, RCI, DRDO, Hyderabad gave an “Overview of Ballistic Missile Defence.”

The last session on “Atmanirbharta in Air Defence” was chaired by Lt Gen Kuldeep Singh, former DG Army Air Defence. Air Vice Mshl Narmdeshwar Tiwari, ACAS (Plans), Air HQ spoke on “Ongoing and planned procurements and indigenous efforts.” Cdr Inder Kumar Singh, Dte of Staff Requirements, Naval HQ spoke on “Ongoing and planned procurements and indigenous efforts.”

Air Mshl LK Malhotra, former SASO Eastern Air Command gave the Valedictory Address. Lt Gen Sunil Srivastava, Director, CENJOWS gave the Closing Remarks and Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor Indian Military Review gave the Vote of Thanks.

Key Issues Needing Attention

Some key issues which came to the fore during the deliberations by the speakers were: –

Air Defence faces omni present and multifarious threats, from unmanned vehicles, hypersonic weapons, cruise missiles. What should be the Air Defense response to counter these multifarious threats?

Comments. Neutralizing multifarious and complex threats is a challenge. A multi-layered defence and joint network-centric approach can provide credible detection and defence against the aircraft threats. Presently, there is no credible defence against the hypersonic missiles/ glide vehicles. Russian S-400 AD system which will be inducted in India has the capability to intercept hypersonic vehicles as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. However, as defence technology progresses, counter measures will emerge. Technologies such as directed energy weapons, particle beams and other non-kinetic weapons will be likely options for an effective defence against hypersonic missiles.

The air threat particularly in the Tactical Battle Area is complex and challenging.

Comments. The integrated realtime air situation picture will enable quick reaction against the multifarious threats in the TBA while ensuring the safety of own aircraft. Secure communications with redundancy will have to be ensured.

A low technology adversary too can present a challenge to a technologically superior nation.

Comments. Use of relatively cheap rockets and unmanned vehicles in the recent conflicts has brought focus on these weapons. An integrated air picture from the visual and electronic sensors and use of combination of hard and soft kill options would provide effective defence against these threats. Presently, Israeli Iron Dome type of systems are the only answer for the unguided rockets, which are also effective against unmanned platforms. But it is not cost-effective against unguided rockets. R&D for cheaper non-kinetic, multi-use options must continue to neutralize such threats.

It is not possible to change/ replace all legacy weapons due budgetary constraints.

Comments. Upgradation/ modification of the existing weapon systems will ensure that we continue using them with the modern weapon systems.

How do we tackle the emerging ISR and combat drone threats that manifest in different sizes and shapes ranging from very small to large and with less detectability due to low RCS and low velocity?

Comments. For unmanned platforms, a combination of defensive actions like Kinetic and Directed Energy weapons and other non-kinetic measures will have to be employed to neutralize them. DRDO is alive to the challenge. It has already developed an anti-drone system to tackle the drone threats. More anti-drone solutions will emerge in due course with the ongoing iDEX innovations.

Will futuristic Integrated Air Defence Command shorten the OODA loop?

Comments. Real time integrated air situation picture with identification will be available to air defence units at all times. This will ensure that all air borne threats are challenged, diverted or destroyed by suitably chosen air defence weapons without any loss of time.

How will a common air picture be ensured to fight air defence battle?

Comments. All sensors of the three Services and civil agencies will be integrated through IACCS, which carries out multi-sensory tracking and generates a collated composite air picture with identification of all detections for an integrated air and missile defence.

How centralized command and control and decentralized execution of operations will be ensured by the IADC?

Comments. IACCS of Indian Air Force will be linked in real time with Akashteer communication of the Indian Army and Trigun of Indian Navy. This will ensure that all speech and data exchange will take place between them in real-time at designated hierarchy. As a result of this, it will be possible to have centralized control of operations while allowing decentralized execution of tasks.

At present common training of the air defence personnel of Army, Navy and Air force is not carried out.

Comments. Syllabus relevant to the role of each Service should be formulated. This is important to develop common understanding of the air defence processes and procedures.

Why did Armenia suffer heavy losses as compared to Azerbaijan in Nagorno – Karabakh conflict? What are lessons for us?

Comments. Employment of passive defence measures such as camouflage, dispersal of vital assets, use of decoys, blackout and firefighting are relevant against both manned and unmanned threats, since it is still not easy to strike or collect ISR data when target area is well camouflaged. Armenia ignored this vital principle and suffered heavy losses. These measures are relevant in our context too.

Adversaries will use of Cyber and EW measure to blunt our air defences.

Comments. Adversaries may precede attacks by disrupting our command-and-control network and jamming/ saturating our sensors. We, therefore, must train and frequently exercise our operators to discern and operate using alternate measures of communication and detection and employ anti-jamming measures to burn through and detect the threats.

Networks and Communications for Integrated AD Command.   

Lt Gen Rajeev Sabharwal argued that the present communication architecture linking sensors, shooters and decision makers is platform centric, tightly coupled, linear and hierarchical, ie, very stove-piped. He stated that the requirement was to have loosely coupled smart entities, which are sensor/ shooter agnostic, akin to a “publish/ subscribe” topology. Such a system will be asynchronous in time & space, with data accessible/ available to the entitled user anywhere, anytime.

The system should have Low Probability of Interception (LPI), Low Probability of Detection (LPD) and Anti-Jamming features.

Networked links between Akashteer (IACCS at JADC) and Trigun (IACCS at MOC) were recommended. RASP should be available to Army and Naval users in real time. Applications should be network agnostic – IACCS, Akashteer, Trigun should be hosted at national level at Central Data Centres (CDC)/ Designated Service Data Centres and at the theatre level at Theatre Data Centres. There will be integrated data flow to CDS/ NCP. Data sharing mechanism between services data centres to be finalised, as also Common Security framework.

The present networking is only in the physical domain, but needs to be extended to the ‘Social Domain’ (ie any decision maker, any sensor, any shooter) in a “functional”, pan-India Integrated AD Comd. The decision making has to be collaborative.

The network integrates all physical domains (Land, Sea, Air, Space) – Inter- and Intra- domains. Sensors, Cloud, Decision Makers, Shooters (Independent of orgnisation Services) geographic locations, platforms.

AD entities of the 3 Services from tactical to strategic levels must be integrated. IAF, Navy and Army should migrate to NFS as media. NFS Nodes will be linked through voice switches and data centres of services.

Seamless intra-Service communications demand common equipments and trained manpower.

All applications should run on AI engines and data analytics.

Recommendations

Following recommendations have been made:

Since the threat from drones is common to the three Services, a common strategy/plan should be worked out to neutralize these threats. Automation and Artificial intelligence will further make this threat potent. Own “swarming” counter-threats should be developed concurrently.

Communication of three Services should be linked for real time speech and data transfer at the designated level for centralized command and control and effective execution of air defence tasks.

Upgradation/ modification of the legacy air defence weapons should be taken up urgently.

A Joint Air defence directive should be issued before IADC becomes functional.

A relevant joint air defence training strategy should be formulated for the personnel of three Services.

Coordination should be carried out with DRDO and other research agencies to find viable solutions for the new and emerging low cost threats.

A strategy should be devised for neutralization of the ballistic/ cruise and hypersonic threats. Indigenous Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and planned induction of NASAM, S-400 system will give capability to tackle these threats. Since the IADC will have the centralized air picture and wherewithal and trained personnel, IADC is the most suited for strategic missile defence.

IACCS links must be extended to the deployed army and naval sensors for generation of composite picture at the earliest.

The threat of stealth fighter/ bombers is a reality in our area, Hence, induction of low frequency/ quantum radars, which can detect such threats are needed particularly in the forward areas.

Army legacy AD weapons like L70, ZSU 23, and fire control radars should be modified/ upgraded to enable these to tackle the new emerging threats.

Both active and passive measures are important steps to neutralize/ divert the threats, even when the    attacks are guided by high-tech navigational aids and targeting systems and carry PGMs.

Cyber and EW action on our command-and-control network and sensors in all probability will precede and/or occur during the manned and unmanned air attacks by the adversary Hence, continuous upgradation of anti-cyber and ECCM must be become part of training curriculum and be practised in the joint exercises.

IADC, when established, should be entrusted with ballistic missile defence since composite air situation is available in which BMD sensors too could be integrated to warn of the ballistic and cruise missile threats.

DRDO has displayed excellent capability in indigenous strategic missiles. We still need to develop long range, medium range, short and QRSAMs.

De-conflicting defensive counter-air responsibilities between proposed IADC and Theatre Commands calls for detailed deliberation.

Valedictory Address

Air Mshl LK Malhotra, covered the highlights of the whole r. He suggested that we need not reinvent the weapon systems. Wherever possible, we should seek transfer of technology and carry out indigenous manufacturing of the weapon systems.

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The Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme consists of a multi-layered system to protect India from ballistic missile attacks. Phase 1 has been successfully tested and completed and deployment awaits final official permission. Phase 2 is under development.

The system consists of two land and sea-based interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. The two-tiered shield should be able to intercept any incoming missile launched from 5,000 kilometres away. The system also includes an overlapping network of early warning and tracking radars, as well as command and control posts.

The PAD was tested in November 2006, followed by the AAD in December 2007. With the test of the PAD missile, India became the fourth country to have successfully developed an anti-ballistic missile system, after United States, Russia, and Israel. The system has undergone several tests but system is yet to be officially commissioned.

Out of about a dozen interceptor missile tests, about ten of them were successful, where they destroyed an incoming missile, mimicking the path emanating from an enemy country. These interceptions took place in a direct, hit-to-kill mode, pulverising the enemy missile in mid-flight in exo-atmosphere (above an altitude of 40 km) and in endo-atmosphere (below an altitude of 30 km). In January 2020, the first phase of BMD programme was completed. After the government’s approval to install the missile shield for the national capital it will take three to four years to install shield.

System Configuration

The deployed system would consist of many launch vehicles, radars, Launch Control Centres (LCC) and the Mission Control Centre (MCC). All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network.

The MCC is the software intensive system of the ballistic missile defence system. It receives information from various sources such as radars and satellites which is then processed by ten computers which run simultaneously. The MCC is connected to all other elements of the defence through a WAN. MCC performs target classification, target assignment and kill assessment. It also acts as a decision support system for the commander. It can also decide the number of interceptors required for the target for an assured kill probability. After performing all these functions, the MCC assigns the target to the LCC of a launch battery. The LCC starts computing the time to launch the interceptor based upon information received from a radar based on the speed, altitude and flight path of the target. LCC prepares the missile for launch in real time and carries out ground guidance computation.

After the interceptor is launched, it is provided target information from the radar through a datalink. When the interceptors close onto the target missile, it activates the radar seeker to search for the target missile and guides itself to intercept the target. Multiple PAD and AAD interceptors can be launched against a target for high kill probability.

Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) Exercise

On 27 November 2006 a PAD missile successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II Missile at an altitude of 50 km. The Prithvi-II ballistic missile was modified successfully to mimic the trajectory of M-11 missiles.

On March 6, 2009 DRDO carried out a second successful test of the PAD interceptor missile. The target used was ship launched Dhanush missile which followed the trajectory of a missile with range of a 1,500 km. The target was tracked by Swordfish (LRTR) radar and destroyed by the PAD at 75 km (47 mi) altitude.

On March 6, 2011 DRDO successfully test-fired interceptor missile from AAD, which destroyed a ‘hostile’ target ballistic missile, a modified Prithvi, at an altitude of 16 km over the Bay of Bengal.

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is an anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in the endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. AAD is single stage, solid fuelled missile. Guidance is similar to that of PAD: it has an inertial navigation system, midcourse updates from ground based radar and active radar homing in the terminal phase. It is 7.5 m tall, weighs around 1.2 tons; and has a diameter of less than 0.5 m.

On 6 December 2007, AAD successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II missile acting as an incoming ballistic missile enemy target. The endo-atmospheric interception was carried out at an altitude of 15 km. The AAD with the help of midcourse updates and its terminal seeker manoeuvred itself towards the target. The AAD scored a direct hit at an altitude of 15 km and at a speed of Mach 4.

Due to two successful interceptor missile tests carried out by India, the scientists said that the AAD missile could be modified into a new extended range up to 150 km.

On 15 March 2010, AAD interceptor missile test was aborted, as the target missile deviated from its path and plunged into the sea. But on 26 July 2010, AAD was successfully test-fired. Again, on 6 March 2011, the interceptor AAD missile achieved the desired result with precision. The interceptor missile had its own mobile launcher, secure data link for interception, independent tracking and homing capabilities and sophisticated radars.

On 10 February 2012 and on 23 November 20212, the AAD was again successfully test-fired

Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar

Swordfish is the target acquisition and fire control radar for the BMD system. The Swordfish Radar, derived from the Israel GreenPine Radar, is a L band Radar.  L band Radar is not a imaging radar.  It is unable to discriminate decoys.

The Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) has a range of 600 to 800 km and can spot objects as small as a cricket ball. The DRDO has upgraded the capacity of Swordfish to 1,500 km. The variant is called Super S Cruise missile defence.

Defence Against Cruise Missiles

Defending against an attack by a cruise missile is similar to tackling low-flying manned aircraft and hence most methods of aircraft defence can be used for a cruise missile defence system. The AAD will be able to handle a cruise missile intercept.

In order to ward off the threats of nuke-tipped cruise missile attack India has a new missile defence programme which will be focused solely on intercepting cruise missiles.

India has also acquired airborne radars like EL/W-2090 AWACS to ensure detection of cruise missiles in order to stay on top of the threat.

The naval version of the Barak-8 long-range anti-air and anti-missile naval defence system developed jointly by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and DRDO has the capability to intercept incoming enemy cruise missiles and combat jets targeting its warships at sea.

The Indian Air Force and Indian Army have inducted a variant of Barak 8 missile to meet its requirement for a medium-range surface-to-air air defence missile. The Akash missile defence system also has the capability to “neutralise aerial targets like fighter jets, cruise missiles and air-to-surface missiles”.

XRSAM (eXtra-long Range Surface to Air Missile) is a long-range mobile surface to air missile defence system under development by DRDO. The missile system will have a range of 250 km against fighter jets, 350 km against cruise missiles, sea skimming anti-ship missiles, AWACS and mid-air refuelers and will be capable of bringing down ballistic missiles and stealth fighters in the terminal stage. The naval version of the missile will also developed to supplement the LR-SAM missile in the Indian Navy.

Chinese Missile Defence

China’s has an advanced anti-satellite programme since 1964. Since its inception, the ASAT program has made progress on the development of three ASAT capable Systems: direct fire, directed-energy weapon, and microsatellites. Tests of these systems have either been directly acknowledged by China, or reported on as ASAT capable. China is pursuing a broad and robust array of counterspace capabilities, which includes direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers, and directed energy weapons.

The US Defense Intelligence Agency has claimed that China has space weapons capable of shooting out satellites during the early stage of a conflict, including anti-satellite missiles, manoeuvring satellites and lasers and electronic jammers.

People’s Liberation Army has formed military units and begun initial operational training with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as ground-launched ASAT missiles.

Anti-Missile Test

Under a test christened “Mission Shakti”, DRDO’s audacious anti-satellite missile test on 27 March 2019, caught the world’s attention. A three-stage missile launched from the APJ Abdul Kalam Island raced towards a satellite called Microsat-R, which was in low-earth orbit a and destroyed it in a direct “hit-to-kill” mode. Microsat-R was orbiting at a velocity of ten km a second at an altitude of 274 km above the earth when the missile intercepted it and blew it to pieces.

The DRDO had developed this satellite which had defence ramifications and ISRO put it into orbit with its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) in January 2019.

An official press release said the anti-satellite test demonstrated India’s “capability to defend its assets in outer space”.

In a televised address to the nation soon after the test was executed, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “Mission Shakti was a highly complex one, conducted at extremely high speed, with remarkable precision. It shows the remarkable dexterity of India’s outstanding scientists and the success of our space programme.” Modi said Mission Shakti was especial for two reasons: India was the fourth country (after the US, Russia, and China) to acquire such a specialised capability and the entire effort was indigenous.

On 28 April 2019, Dr. G. Satheesh Reddy, Chairman, DRDO said during an event of the Aerospace Society of India (AeSI), at Hyderabad, “The ASAT test demonstrated India’s technological capabilities to carry out such a critical mission with a very high degree of precision.” He said that the critical systems including software and sensors for the ASAT test were developed indigenously, and a team of scientists from various specialisations had worked with synergy day and night for six months. The most important challenge during the mission was to ensure that all the systems responded cohesively to ever-changing dynamics, Dr Satheesh Reddy added.

Dr U. Rajababu, Programme Director, AD (Air Defence), said at the meet “the high altitude and high-velocity interception” posed many technical challenges with respect to the development of seekers for early detection of target and trajectory corrections before the target was engaged. When the relative velocity of the systems involved was around 10 km a second, there was a pertinent need for high levels of precision, he said. “The booster [stage in the rocket] needs to provide the requisite velocities, the technologies such as dome-opening, heat-shield etc… need to be precise and smooth, apart from the highly accurate and secured data communications systems. Using accurate sensors and an onboard seeker, the ASAT missile was guided towards the target to ensure direct hit without employing any warhead,” the AesI press release said, quoting Rajababu.

In an informed paper titled “India’s ASAT Test”, published on March 28, 2019, in International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, Rajaram Nagappa, Mrunalini Deshpande, and S. Chandrashekar said: “DRDO has developed, as part of ballistic missile defence, missile interception capabilities. In this process, they would have developed kill vehicles with homing and manoeuvring capabilities. Extending the concept for achieving satellite kill is well within DRDO capabilities. Also, DRDO has ballistic missiles which have the capability of reaching 300 km-altitude for carrying out an interception.  In fact, it can be inferred from the press release that the missile was a two-stage solid propellant missile and the third stage was the kinetic kill weapon. Press reports talk of a three-minute time to hit the satellite. In three minutes, the satellite would have travelled 1350 km. The interception of Microsat-R, representing perhaps an area of two square metres, the related computations and the real-time manoeuvres needed of the war-head indicate the precision achieved in the missile guidance.”

Comments

While India’s demonstration of its ASAT capability is a major milestone in its space history, it is important for India to complement this capability with a robust Space Situational Awareness (SSA) infrastructure, C4ISR capability and related elements. (C4ISR stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance).  Major investments in military space and revamping of the military national security set-up as China, Russia and the US have done should receive some serious attention.

Agni-5 is a 3rd-generation ICBM, It is a solid fuel, road mobile missile. It provides reliable “second strike” capability. Agni V has been developed to offset China’s conventional weapons superiority. Agni with MIRVs can raise concerns in the enemy’s mind that India may have adopted “first-use” policy in its nuclear doctrine.

But while Agni surely enhances India”s credible minimum deterrence posture, it cannot strengthen the posture alone. India also needs to equally focus on aerial and sea-based nuclear delivery platforms – together the three legs would enable India to effectively launch counter and second strike vis-à-vis adversaries. 

In addition, missile systems especially land-based systems would also need to be protected from enemy attacks. That is where India’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) system to intercept incoming enemy missile systems assumes importance. At present the BMD system is mostly to protect counter-value targets. India should concentrate on protecting counter-force targets including land-based missile systems.

BMD can also be used both as an offensive and defensive system. Agni can be used to launch a “first-strike” on the enemy’s nuclear forces and use its BMD system to prevent adversaries’ missile systems to launch a counter-attack on India’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. However, India needs to clearly elaborate its BMD posture in order to avoid any confusion and state that the BMD would be deployed to strengthen India’s “no-first-use” doctrine.

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