Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is an emerging concept that most modern militaries worldwide are working to integrate into their warfighting doctrines. The key domains encompassed in the concept include the physical domains—land, maritime, air, and space—the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which includes cyberspace, and the cognitive/human domain. Unlike the integration and coordination achieved by joint forces in the existing system, MDO aims to deter and defeat adversaries in operations below armed conflict, during armed conflict, and in the post-conflict phase of returning to competition.

At a time when the United States and China are experimenting with various facets of the concept, either overtly or through proxies by providing them technologies, India found an opportunity through Operation Sindoor to test and validate its warfighting concepts and technologies. It was the first instance of non-contact kinetic warfare in which the Indian military achieved the desired political aim without mobilising its formations or physically crossing borders—neither by troops nor by aircraft. India showcased its Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence technology and demonstrated its prowess in both offensive and defensive capabilities—drone-centric warfare, resilient and responsive air defence, long-range precision weapons, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare. Operation Sindoor has established a new benchmark in India’s fight against terrorism and set a new parameter and “new normal” for future operations.

The book is structured in two parts: Part I – Multi-Domain Operations Concept and Part II – Operation Sindoor: Appraisal. The United States pioneered the development of the Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept in 2015–16, which later evolved into the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept by December 2018. Although the MDO concept is yet to mature into a fully functional warfighting doctrine, it now guides the transformation and modernisation of the US Armed Forces and their peers. China is known to be mirroring the same with its own “Chinese characteristics.”

Part I covers the evolution of the concept in the United States and China, defines the concept primarily derived from US philosophy, explores China’s All-Domain Operations concept, examines limitations of the MDO framework, and discusses India’s challenges and options.

In Part II, after explaining the genesis of India’s problem with Pakistan, the author appraises Operation Sindoor against the backdrop of the MDO concept. Although multiple domains were addressed during Operation Sindoor through coordination and integration among the armed forces and various government departments and agencies, the MDO framework as a concept remains a distant goal. Regarding Pakistan, much of its response was propaganda through influence operations. The author effectively debunks Pakistan’s claim of downing five to six Indian fighter jets on Day One of Operation Sindoor by exposing glaring errors in the technological hypothesis developed by Mr. Michael Dahm, which was widely cited by magazines and newspapers supporting Pakistan’s false narrative.

Drone-centric warfare, multi-layered and integrated air defence, and target-centric warfare employing precision weapons—visible aspects of Operation Sindoor—are covered in comprehensive detail for both India and Pakistan. The dominant role played by Aatma Nirbharta (self-reliance) in defence and the success achieved by indigenous weapons strengthened the government’s resolve to promote it further, a theme well-articulated in the book. The space, EMS, and human domains have also been given due significance.

The hallmark of the book lies in the author’s lucid exposition of Bharat’s strategic culture, which inspires its military ethos. He emphasises that India’s values are indigenous and not borrowed from any other country.

This book, the result of extensive and detailed research by Brigadier (Dr.) Rajeev Bhutani, could not have come at a more opportune time—when nations are actively developing and transforming their forces around the MDO concept. It will be of immense value to military professionals, researchers, scientists and engineers developing defence systems in government, public, and private enterprises, as well as policymakers.

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• Integrating friendly and

• Interdicting adversary space capabilities.

But this is not the Army’s first space vision. In fact, the Army’s original space policy dates back 65 years, to its inaugural 1959 policy-crafted at the outset of the first space age.

US Army’s Space Vision

The Army will integrate friendly joint and coalition space capabilities and interdict adversary space capabilities in support of ground force commanders.

The Army’s next fight will occur across multiple domains. Successful operations in and through the space domain will be critical to our success. Space has become more important as both enabler and dependency to our Warfighting. Commanders at all echelons have access to, rely on, and can be observed by the space-based assets of allies and competitors alike. Commanders must understand that space capabilities start and end on the ground and be fully aware of their importance in planning and operations. This means that understanding commercial, military, and scientific space platforms directly correlate to our ability to conceal and protect friendly ground forces across the entire battlespace, from home station to assembly areas, and from assembly areas to objectives. Simply put, we will be operating under constant surveillance and must invest in the knowledge and forces to counter threat space systems and enable our own space systems.

Army space professionals, at echelon, will lead the effort to increase understanding and integration of friendly joint and coalition space capabilities into our operations and activities while simultaneously interdicting the adversary’s use of space based, and space enabled capabilities. To do this, highly trained Army Soldiers and Civilians must be organized, have the right resources, kit, authorities, and expertise to:

• Integrate friendly joint, coalition, and commercial space capabilities in support of all Army Warfighting Functions to include positioning, navigation, and timing; deep sensing; beyond line-of-sight communications; force tracking; environmental monitoring; space domain awareness; and geospatial information.

• Interdict adversary space capabilities by delivering necessary fires and effects at echelon to protect friendly forces from observation and targeting by counter-satellite communications, counter-surveillance and reconnaissance, and navigation warfare operations.

To fight at echelon in and through space means employing the next generation of tactical terminals to leverage multi-orbit satellite communications services and access space-enabled tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to meet deep sensing requirements. By fusing the data from multiple space-based sensors, in coordination with the intelligence community, the Army can deliver targetable intelligence to enable long-range precision fires, movement and maneuver, and command and control. These space capabilities, layered with stratospheric, high-altitude balloons and long endurance, semi-autonomous fixed-wing aircraft, can provide redundant and complementary capabilities for the theater to increase resiliency of the U.S. and Allied space architecture in a denied, disrupted, intermittent and Limited bandwidth environment. Mobile ground and aerial platforms demonstrate the potential to deliver space interdiction fires to deny adversary access to space capabilities, and disrupt their command and control, navigation, targeting and intelligence collection. Forward-postured Multidomain Task Forces, employing Army space interdiction forces alongside cyber operations and electronic warfare enablers, will disintegrate adversary anti-access and area-denial systems. Simultaneously, Theater Strike Effects Groups can synchronize and deliver Army space interdiction fires in support of theater targeting objectives.

Army space professionals are critical to Army Preparedness-to setting theaters, supporting deterrence, and enabling multidomain operations. Forward-stationed Army space organizations conduct continuous operational preparation of the environment during campaigning to help set conditions to defeat layered defenses and open contested theaters in crisis and conflict. These organizations build partnerships with close, highly capable allies to increase interoperability. Positioning Army space operators in theater with cyber and special operations forces allows for convergence, amplifying lethality and contributing to deterrence. Army space integration also supports and spans across all Army Branches and Warfighting Functions to build and navigate the multidomain common operating picture. For example, Army Signal integrates satellite communication services from the Department of Defense and external agencies to establish the networks vital to multidomain operations. The networked enterprise provides force tracking services to ensure joint and combined situational awareness, contributing to information advantage. Additionally, Army Intelligence leverages space-based assets to provide geospatial, signal, and all-source intelligence, enabling the Army and joint space interdiction fires necessary for multidomain operations.

Expeditionary, scalable, and mobile Army space formations, empowered by flexible command relationships at echelon, should move alongside and keep pace with ground combat formations to protect the force and enable the Army to deploy, fight and win decisively against any adversary.

Developing new space capabilities, organizations, and trained professional Soldiers to deliver effects for Army maneuver forces is critical to multidomain operations. Rapid proliferation and tactical application of competitor space capabilities will erode the advantages that ensure U.S. land dominance. To counter this challenge, current and future Army space integration and interdiction capabilities must enable multidomain operations for the Army.

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A well-supported network is required for integrated cooperation that can share information and data across all domains. Using dual-use satellites to create a secure information network is one possibility.

As per the US Army’s perspective on MDO, no service can conduct multi-domain operations alone. The conduct of operations by a joint force or anything resembling multi-domain operations is challenging since it is dependent upon common understanding of the situational awareness amongst Services. The US military is still coming to grips with its efforts to raise MDO into joint all domain operations.

IAF and MDO

The IAF does not already have in place its integrated air defence system (IADS) where the most dominant sensor, i.e., the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) is intermeshed with airborne and land-based radar networks. The meaningful IADS would need to be extended to other battlefield and shipborne sensors and made more robust with ground-based air defence systems. The combination of manned and unmanned aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, surface to surface systems, shipborne systems, electronic jammers and cyber systems will have to be, thus, well conceived. For example, SEAD attack could be carried out on the enemy air defence system either by using aerial bombing or cyber-attack on routers, data base, computers or displays or a combination depending on the effects desired. In network centric warfare, the time compression in decision making and consequent force application is pivotal for a winning result.

Leveraging Air Power and Space Domain in MDO.

There is a convergence of the Army and Navy towards leveraging air power in the future conflict. Multiple agencies from air, space, sea and ground sensors are collecting huge data in the battlefield which is the essence of MDO. It entails joint air domain and joint C4ISR. MDO involves multiple forces – surface, marine surface, sub-surface, air, space, missile force, cyber, electro-optical, and various other agencies, including the government. It is for surveillance, battle assessment, command and control, navigation, synchronisation in time and space.

There is a need to have kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite capability, space-based laser electronic warfare can also affect air and surface operations. The key to MDO is ambiguity, and the advantage that satellites provide, in influencing the space, which then becomes another battleground.

Land Warfare Doctrine

The Land Warfare Doctrine propagates deterrence by denial, especially against China’s layered defence and offensive capabilities. India’s Land Warfare Doctrine has set out the case for emerging technologies such as AI and directed-energy weapons. These have the potential to be the foundation for India’s efforts to develop MDO and act as a bulwark against A2AD technologies. MDO will also permit Indian defence forces to pursue Indian national security objectives by compensating for any weaknesses in certain domains. This can be done by combining capabilities in others and producing asymmetric returns and avoiding the unnecessary diffusion and scattering of assets.

MDO at Sea

MDO at sea has four domains and three enablers – sea and land , under-sea, and air domain – all battle winning factors. The electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyber are the three enablers. MDO, as conceived today are fundamental extension of air-land battle. The Navy and Air Force have the air-sea battle, which becomes the joint axis in the manoeuvre. real time networking and command & control  are the two main challenges in MDO.

Integration of Networks

An encrypted data link architecture for net-centric warfare across each domain would be best suited tool for such a task. To facilitate information sharing for enhanced situational awareness, such a network system would need to have a high degree of connectivity and take the least time to establish an accurate common operational picture.

There is a need to combine aspects of network-centricity, combat cloud and combined fires to build a connect between sensing and targeting across domains. Also, there is a need to define the grid construct of the sensing, information, effects and command grids, as well as, layer them to receive, process, store and communicate information over the network. In other words, quick and secure exchange of tactical data like pictures, text messages, imagery and digital voice in real time to be used by combatants/platforms /entities in each domain.

For MDO, the Indian armed forces must evolve the conceptual understanding of strategies, operations, communications mechanisms, enabling policies, C2 styles, force as well as support structures.

Integration of Cyber Domain

Integration of the cyber domain into the Armed Forces Joint Doctrine and operational concepts is required to be effective in regular as well as irregular wars in, from and through cyber space. Our enemies will leverage technological advances to blend space and cyber operations as the battlefield acquires a multi-domain complexion. Structuring multi-domain warfare capability through a Net-Centric structure will not be easy and will require defining the roles and responsibilities, nature of information to be exchanged, connectivity and the degree of coupling of capability across domains. Success, as with any new military concept, will depend on the leadership’s commitment to change and to accord a forceful direction to bring disparate Service interests and functional areas (space, air, sea, land and cyber) together to function through a common network.

Enhancing Jointness through MDO

A joint force certainly facilitates cross-domain synergy, but a single service should also have cross-domain capabilities to some extent. In a joint force, cross-domain synergy creates and exploits symmetrical advantages. Indian Armed Forces have embarked on this challenging route recently and much work needs to be done. Our forces need to focus on their core expertise, including focus in the new military domains.

The main challenges which are foreseen in conduct of MDO includes collusion of our adversaries across the complete spectrum, technology driven ISR capabilities to achieve situational awareness, investment in development of disruptive technologies which have changed the character of war and building fully networked joint command & control structures across all domains. To achieve convergence and to overcome the challenges, it is recommended that joint Multi-Domain Task Forces be created to train and build a cohesive force and build capacities & capabilities towards modernisation in achieving cohesion.

Theaterisation: Way Ahead in Achieving Convergence

There is a need to upgrade existing capacity significantly in the newer domains of cyber, space and human cognition as the mastery of traditional domains of land, air and sea no longer suffice. A typical MDO engagement which is enabled by low orbit technologies, a tri-service combat cloud, a cyber strike, a swarm of offensive drones to take on the counter attacking forces? Therefore, mere structure corrections will not be enough but other cognitive corrections are important along the route to jointmanship. There is a need to create a new kind of mindset and HR skills as investment in softer layers of hard power is a reality – faster the better. The key to decision-making in MDO is harnessing disruptive technologies to create a combat cloud with integrated networks. What is also critical are critical for achieving cohesion in MDO is civil-military fusion, inter-agency cross-pollination, strategic partnerships and a whole of nation approach. MDO is not an option but it is a reality that must be adopted

Cohesion through Convergence of a Joint Force in MDO

It is extremely difficult to capture the exact nature of a future war with definite certainty. It could be assumed that the future war will be multi-dimensional and multi -domain wherein our enemies will tend to blend conventional or asymmetric and hybrid capabilities across all domains, thereby compelling us to re-examine existing military concepts and doctrines. There is a need to incorporate the advanced technologies in a command and control system. A multi-domain connection is necessary if one has to integrate and exploit information from multiple sources, including sensors, databases, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance to formulate an integrated response.

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Multi Domain Operations (MDO) refers to a military concept that aims to integrate operations across multiple domains, including land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace. The goal of MDO is to create a more efficient and effective way of conducting military operations, leveraging the advantages of each domain to gain a decisive advantage over the enemy.

Key Aspects

One of the key aspects of MDO is the integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities across multiple domains. This allows military forces to gather and analyze information from various sources in real-time, enabling them to make more informed decisions and respond to threats more quickly.

Another important aspect of MDO is the integration of weapons systems across multiple domains. For example, a sea-launched missile might be guided by data from an air-borne sensor, or a ground-based drone might be controlled by a command center located in space. This integration allows military forces to use the strengths of each domain to achieve their objectives, whether that be precision strikes, reconnaissance, or the delivery of supplies and personnel.

MDO also requires close coordination between different branches of the military, as well as between military and civilian agencies. This requires effective communication, as well as the development of common operating procedures and technologies.

The central idea is to prevail by competing successfully in all domains short of conflict, thereby deterring a potential enemy. If deterrence fails, the following might be the way forward:

• Penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems (layered and integrated long-range precision-strike systems, littoral anti-ship capabilities, air defenses, and long-range artillery and rocket systems) to enable strategic and operational maneuver
• Dis-integrate—disrupt, degrade, or destroy A2/AD systems to enable operational and tactical maneuver
• Exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve operational and strategic objectives by defeating enemy forces in all domains.
• Re-compete—consolidate gains across domains and force a return to competition on favorable terms.

The Potential of MDO

Multi Domain Operations (MDO) has the potential to significantly expand the capabilities of command and control (C2) in several ways:

Enhanced situational awareness: By integrating information from multiple domains, MDO provides military commanders with a more comprehensive and accurate picture of the battlefield, allowing them to make informed decisions and respond to threats more quickly.

Decentralized decision-making: MDO allows for more decentralized decision-making, with lower-level commanders able to make decisions based on real-time information and guidance from higher-level commanders. This can lead to faster and more flexible responses to rapidly changing battlefield conditions.

Improved command and control communications: MDO requires the development of new and more robust communication systems that can operate across multiple domains, allowing for better coordination and collaboration between military units.

Increased agility and responsiveness: By integrating capabilities across multiple domains, MDO enables military forces to respond more quickly and effectively to evolving situations. This can give military commanders greater flexibility to respond to rapidly changing conditions, and to take advantage of new opportunities as they arise.

Enhanced integration of civilian and military efforts: MDO also has the potential to better integrate the efforts of military and civilian agencies, such as law enforcement, disaster response organizations, and others. This can lead to more effective and coordinated responses to a wider range of security and humanitarian challenges.

Overall, Multi Domain Operations has the potential to significantly expand the capabilities of command and control by providing military commanders with enhanced situational awareness, more flexible decision-making, improved communications, increased agility and responsiveness, and better integration of civilian and military efforts.

Joint Structure and Combined Operations

Advanced technology is rapidly changing the operating environment. Technology breaks down traditional barriers and extends range: cyberattacks and electronic warfare have physical impact. Previously unchallenged domains, such as air, are now vulnerable to short-range threats from the ground, as well as advanced anti-access/area denial equipment. Multi-domain battle creates opportunity in one domain using the capabilities of others, including nontraditional domains such as cyber and space.

Today, actors like transnational groups and regional powers operate outside traditional borders and in nontraditional domains, which the combatant command structure does not readily accommodate. Effective commands should not be solely regional, but mission-driven, leveraging and coordinating a diversity of capabilities. These new combatant commands would be determined to counter specific current threats. They would mirror today’s commands on the surface but would be unrestrained by the current geographic definitions — allowing commanders to focus on the threat regardless of physical areas of responsibility.

Multi Domain Operations/Battle concept articulates future combined arms operations. In doing so, it prepares forces for the increased jointness required to achieve effects across multiple domains, including new ones such as cyber. Doctrinal innovation also often galvanizes organizational innovation. The philosophical underpinnings of multi-domain battle should be used to design a new combatant command structure.

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Advanced technology is rapidly changing the operating environment. Technology breaks down traditional barriers and extends range: cyberattacks and electronic warfare have physical impact. Previously unchallenged domains, such as air, are now vulnerable to short-range threats from the ground, as well as advanced anti-access/area denial equipment. Multi-domain battle creates opportunity in one domain using the capabilities of others, including nontraditional domains such as cyber and space.

Multi Domain Operations in the Indian context are still at the academic stage of understanding. It is an emerging concept. A clear understanding is required about how the armed forces, as part of a joint force, will operate, fight, and campaign successfully across space, cyberspace, and the domains of air, land, and maritime against adversaries.

It is still evolving even in the United States. The U.S. Army concept for multi-domain combined arms operations at echelons above brigade is grappling with the challenges in the expanded multi-domain operations framework and how future armed forces gain and maintain the initiative across the competition continuum, the full range of military operations, and each unique area of operations (AOR) to meet those challenges.

The MDO concept relies heavily on each Service to embrace joint integration and collaboration despite barriers and hesitations that make such cooperation difficult. It is only after jointness is achieved that multi-domain operations can be effective. Historical approaches to achieving superiority in the air, land, and sea domains may no longer be valid.

To be ready for the next war, the armed forces must effectively innovate and adapt concepts, equipment, and training. The future battlefield will be one where integration into joint and multinational forces is a prerequisite for victory.

Three elements that help define the desired effects of MDO are: joint integration, technology, and people. Integration and interdependence lie at the heart of multi-domain concept.

We need to think and shape how land forces might conduct future operations under the multi-domain battle concept.

There is a clear evolutionary link between MDO and previous concepts like Air Land Battle and Joint Operations.

The Army must adapt to meet the requirements for a future force operating in a multi-domain environment.

The IAF does not already have in place its integrated air defence system (IADS) where the most dominant sensor, i.e., the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) is intermeshed with airborne and land-based radar networks. The meaningful IADS would need to be extended to other battlefield and shipborne sensors and made more robust with ground-based air defence systems. The combination of manned and unmanned aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, surface to surface systems, shipborne systems, electronic jammers and cyber systems will have to be well conceived.

Even in close air support, with introduction of multi-role assets, there is a necessity for multi-domain operations with a better understanding of how to maximize the flexibility and capability that airpower provides when applying multi-role platforms.

India’s Land Warfare Doctrine has set out the case for emerging technologies such as AI and directed-energy weapons. These have the potential to be the foundation for India’s efforts to develop MDO and act as a bulwark against A2AD technologies.

MDO at sea has four domains and three enablers – sea and land , under-sea, and air domain – all battle winning factors. The electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyber are the three enablers.

ARTRAC and the Training Commands of the Air Force and Navy have a pivotal role in providing inputs collaboratively, to integrate and converge their individual land and air domain capabilities in order to create the merged multidomain capabilities that will be required for success in future combat.

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With the advent of new technologies that have enabled new domains of warfare, the Indian Armed Forces must begin exploring how to exploit multi-domain operations as opposed to just land, air and maritime domain.

Cyber, Space and the Electromagnetic spectrum did not exist during previous conflicts.

Distributed, multi-domain and joint all domain operations (MDO and JADO) are fast becoming the defining doctrines of this new era.

Essentially, they are the synchronisation of aircraft, ground forces and vehicles, satellites and ships, their systems and all sources of data. Together they deliver a complete picture of the battlespace and empower personnel – in theatre or command – to quickly make decisions that drive action.

Cyberspace is a critical element of this new age of combat; as the electromagnetic spectrum itself – a string of frequencies from radio to microwaves, visible light, X-rays and gamma rays which transmit data – may become. The US, UK and others are looking ever more closely at it.

For future MDOs, artificial intelligence and machine learning will play a critical role, helping decipher data, determine its operational relevance and then present informed options for decision-making jointly across all Services.

If the Army can bring them together along with manoeuvre warfare, which is the Army’s strength, and integrate them at the time and point of choosing, this can open windows of domain superiority leading to denial of access and areas.

For example, Cyberspace can provide opening in the air domain by taking air defence weapons offline, which will then create openings for land and maritime, leading to a new level of complication for the enemy.

For example, when the enemy is engaging you with artillery or you are being engaged from the air, another domain brings in its effects to bear and neutralises the threat. It means you have to look at what equipment you need, what kind of network you need, what kind of training you need, and a lot of interoperability and inter-connectivity.

Cyber is ubiquitous across the battlefield and warfare. The Army has not yet made a beginning to use this domain to facilitate own operations or to disrupt the enemy’s. It does not have cyber forces. Cyber advisories and guidelines do not make up doctrines or methods to adopt in operations, much less in an integrated manner with other domains.

Russian forces have very expertly used the cyber domain to facilitate targeting with their artillery against Ukrainian ground forces demonstrating the ability to take action in one domain and produce an effect or dominate another domain.

The US Navy and Air Force are working on new technologies and capabilities through programmes like Project Overmatch and the Advanced Battle Management System, respectively. Together both forces have developed more than a dozen projects they are collaborating on, bringing all domains together to share and utilise information and assess and respond in synergy.

In the UK, this is being addressed by what the MoD calls the Digital Backbone, a digital transformation programme that will allow information sharing and communication regardless of the hardware being used.

We must at least learn from events in Ukraine, evolve our concepts, map out a phased delivery approach and experiment.

Air-Land Battle doctrine, once the flavour of studies at the Army War College involved two domains – air and land. That alone will not work in the future.

The Armed Forces are not currently organized or trained in this manner. The Training Commands of the three Services have a role and responsibility to integrate these capabilities.

Multi-domain warfare is something on which the Indian Armed Forces have to start at the very beginning and approach it from a joint aspect. Single service approach will just not do.

The goal is to better enable the Services to fight together effectively in all domains simultaneously, to present multiple dilemmas for the enemy. That will mean looking at how do we organize, how to equip and how to train to do that.

A new mindset is needed to enable multi-domain action.

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