A major change in American foreign policy was brought about by Donald Trump’s reelection as president, which had an effect on international alliances, economic stability, and security dynamics. Nine key challenges that characterize America’s new foreign policy environment under Trump’s leadership are examined in this essay.

Allies Believing less in American leadership

The United States has been putting its own interests ahead of those of its longstanding allies under Trump. Traditional allies like Canada, Europe, Japan, and South Korea have lost faith as a result of this change. These countries are beginning to wonder if they can depend on the United States for economic and military assistance. Trump’s transactional approach to alliances, in which he frequently demands monetary reimbursement for U.S. military deployment and security promises, is partially to blame for the decline in confidence.

This approach was frequently expressed by Trump himself, who said, “The United States has been taking advantage for far too long.” Our allies must make the payment. NATO must take greater accountability for its own defense. Trump’s “America First” philosophy is evident in this statement, as he directly ties financial contributions to U.S. military support. Tensions were raised by his repeated criticism of NATO allies-especially Germany and France-for failing to achieve defense budget goals, which furthered the perception that the United States was prioritizing financial gains over international alliances.

Concerns about this strategy have been voiced by world leaders.

Unpredictability and Short-Termism

In reaction to U.S. unpredictability, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, “Europe must take its fate into its own hands,” suggesting a possible move toward more autonomous European security capabilities.

Unpredictability and short-termism are hallmarks of Trump’s foreign policy. Both allies and enemies are now uncertain as a result of his capricious acts, which include putting tariffs on China, Canada, and Mexico and challenging defense agreements. Other countries find it difficult to develop long-term plans because they are unable to forecast how the United States will respond to world events.

Regarding this topic, one of Trump’s most well-known statements was, “Trade wars are good, and easy to win.” His short-term, direct approach to international relations is best illustrated by this statement, which he made amid his trade battle with China. Markets are volatile as a result of his unconventional economic policies, which have caused panic throughout the world. Leaders of the European Union and other allies were left scrambling to comprehend U.S. goals and modify their strategy in response to these words.

French President Emmanuel Macron, on the other hand, stated that “the world cannot longer rely on the United States alone to maintain peace and security.” This opinion highlights the ambiguity brought about by Trump’s erratic choices as well as the general apprehension among European leaders regarding the future of American leadership in the world.

Global Panic and Trade Imbalances

Global markets are uneasy due to the new U.S. policy, which include reciprocal tariffs. Because they foresee recessionary pressures in the U.S. economy, foreign investors are cautious about U.S. obligations. A global trade war has resulted from Trump’s “America First” trade strategy, which has affected economies all around the world and called into question the fundamentals of free trade.

Trump’s forthright remarks about trade demonstrate his combative approach: “We are the piggy bank of the world, and we have been taken advantage of for years. Time for a fair deal now. In an attempt to combat what he saw as unfair trade practices, he imposed unilateral tariffs on China, Mexico, and the European Union. However, these actions also led to retaliatory actions that affected U.S. exports and increased economic instability worldwide.

Concerns about the trade war have been expressed by world leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, who said, “The trade war must stop, and both sides must start respecting international rules and norms.” Global dissatisfaction with Trump’s protectionist policies, particularly their disruption of long-standing trade frameworks, is reflected in this statement.

Possible Conflict in Military Partnerships

Allies like Japan are worried about whether the United States would uphold its security commitments in light of Trump’s position on NATO and military treaties. Although the United States has always been a pillar of NATO, Trump’s remarks regarding burden sharing and possible exit have raised questions. As a result, military alliances are being reevaluated, and European countries are being urged to become more independent.

In 2018, Trump made a particularly telling statement about NATO: “NATO is obsolete, and we should have pulled out long ago.” European leaders became alarmed by this and started thinking about other security arrangements in case U.S. involvement decreased. The idea that the United States will not always be left to shoulder the majority of defense obligations was strengthened by his frequent calls for NATO countries to fulfill 2% defense budget targets.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, on the other hand, stated that “NATO remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security, and its future is in the hands of its member states.” His remark demonstrated the alliance’s will to stand firm in the face of Trump’s demands that allies increase their financial contributions.

North Korea and China’s Strategic Concessions

Strategic compromises made by Trump in an effort to negotiate on his terms have the potential to erode U.S. allies and increase Taiwan’s vulnerability. He uses a combination of negotiation and force with China and North Korea, which could lead to agreements that jeopardize the interests of regional allies. This has raised concerns about what allies can do to protect their economic and security interests beyond flattery and compromises.

Trump’s unrestricted desire to meet with Kim Jong-un of North Korea caused controversy. Trump famously declared, “I get along well with Kim Jong-un. I think we can work something out.” However, detractors claimed that this strategy diminished South Korea’s security concerns and gave North Korea more confidence.

“The trade war between China and the United States is unnecessary, and we both need to find a balanced solution that benefits both nations,” said Chinese President Xi Jinping in a statement about U.S.-China ties. His remarks expressed concern over Trump’s unpredictable handling of such delicate issues while also reflecting the ongoing talks between the two nations.

America’s Allies Must Become Stronger

Allies are encouraged to create independent military infrastructure, establish new alliances, and reconsider their economic plans in light of the ambiguity surrounding U.S. promises. To combat global dangers without depending entirely on the United States, this entails investing in regional security frameworks and diversifying trading partners.

Ursula von der Leyen, the German defense minister, underlined that Europe needs to be more accountable for its own security. The United States is no longer our exclusive option.

Discussions regarding European defense autonomy, including possible partnerships with other nations like China and Russia, as well as the development of autonomous security frameworks, have increased as a result of this sentiment.

Concerned about the United States’ withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific area, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan said, “Japan must work to ensure its security, with or without U.S. support.” This illustrates Japan’s increasing recognition that, given the ambiguity surrounding U.S. promises, it could need to strengthen its own military capabilities.

Retaliatory Actions Regarding American Economic Policies

Allies may think about retaliating against US trade policy with economic leverage. Controlling “choke points” in trade lines, which carry a large amount of America’s imports, such as nuclear fuels, metal supplies, and medications, may be one way to do this. Negotiations with the United States may benefit from such actions.

Trump’s trade policies have drawn criticism from the European Union. “The EU will take action to defend its interests against unilateral U.S. tariffs, but we still hope for dialogue and constructive relations,” said EU President Ursula von der Leyen. Her remarks highlight the EU’s attempts to uphold its economic interests while criticizing the US for its trade policies.

Iran also adopted a more assertive posture under President Hassan Rouhani, declaring, “We will use our oil exports as leverage against the U.S. sanctions.” We will take action if the United States violates international agreements. This comment highlights the dangers of a worldwide economic stalemate as well as the increasing use of economic retaliation against the United States.

Europe Must Close the Gaps in Its Armed Forces

In reaction to changes in U.S. policy, Europe is expected to increase its joint debt in order to fund its defense expenditures and potentially make investments in its own nuclear deterrent. It will take years to close these gaps, though, and will involve large expenditures for strategic planning and military modernization. European countries are already debating ways to take on more defense-related responsibilities, which could lessen dependency on the United States.

“Europe must develop its own defense capability,” said French President Macron. We cannot wait for every security issue to be led by the United States. This was a clear request for Europe to improve its military prowess and reconsider its reliance on American defense.

The Need for a Different International System

The need for Europe and Asia to establish a new security structure separate from the United States is increasing as a result of America’s withdrawal from long-standing alliances. This could entail new alliances and regional cooperation centered on mutual security assurances and common interests. A counterbalance to the dominance of superpowers like China and Russia, such an alternate order would aid in regional stabilization.

Xi Jinping, the president of China, has often called for a more multipolar global order. “We need to shift toward a more equitable and balanced global governance structure,” he stated. Without any one power controlling the others, nations must work together on an equitable basis. His comments demonstrate China’s increasing desire to establish a new global order where the United States has less sway.

Prospects for the Future

Global alliances and security institutions are expected to undergo additional changes in the upcoming years. The ability of countries to innovate and adjust to the changing geopolitical environment will determine how well they can handle these changes. Other areas must think about how to preserve stability and foster collaboration in a world where established alliances are being reassessed as the United States continues to uphold its “America First” strategy.

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Unsavoury Advices

On 22 March, China sent unsavoury advice to the Philippines over its decision to further boost bilateral relations with the US. The reasons cited by Secretary Blinken while in Manila, was China’s “provocative actions” in the region, the US diplomat was confident that it would “promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.” These assertions were just too much for Xi’s strategists to swallow comfortably. Naturally, with growing tension in the regional waters particularly around the contested Spratly Island, China views this as an ‘unnecessary intervention’ from the US. China also felt unhappy with the news from Japan that it plans to convert its 16 seaports and airports into dual-use military infrastructure. Global Times in a commentary on 29^th March termed the Japanese action as “Japan’s resurgence of militarism”. It appeared particularly infuriated that the new plans are actively promoted by the US in line with its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Not long back China had sent detailed advice on how Taiwan should plan and conduct its national election. In fact, it termed them as a regional election in its territory of Taiwan. From time to time, China has felt like advising many countries about their domestic policies. The list included major countries like Australia and India as well. Its ‘pearls’ of advice to India have special considerations about the conduct of diplomacy, foreign trade, state-to-state relations, multilateral military exercises, and of course, a list of restricted locations that must remain out of bounds in any case. China does not restrict its ‘advisories’ to comments from the Foreign Office but mostly it is pursued in great earnest by its state agencies and deeply controlled media.

ALSO READ: Chinese Influence Operations

The world has a great spectacle to witness the Chinese interference in the just concluded Taiwan national election where China pushed its state machinery to create a massive disinformation campaign discrediting the Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling alliance, and promoting its choice of candidates. It offered free trips to the mainland for a ‘better understanding’ of the perspective. When the election drew closer it even sent muffled threats to voters to ‘choose carefully’ as it imposed import restrictions under the garb of trade investigations.

In an aggressive show of strength, its fighters continue to breach the Median Line over the Taiwan Straits, once assumed as a sacrosanct air boundary between China and Taiwan. Its ships have dangerously attacked and blocked tiny Philippine boats with water cannons knocking them out of action on multiple occasions. It continues to send its ‘fishing boats’ further deeper into Senkaku Island raising alarms of territorial violation from the Japanese. Significantly, China conducts its affairs the way it desires, at the same time expecting everyone else to follow its directives. That’s being closest to how one can define the word hypocrites!

Raising Security Concerns

Countries in the neighbourhood of China not only feel threatened by its continued aggressive behaviour but are extremely worried about deteriorating future course. Japan’s National Security Council presented a very disturbing picture of the growing Chinese threat to Japan’s sovereignty. It was highlighted that with its current capacity, Japan would not be able to sustain a conflict with China. This strongly drove Japan to find a fix which was illustrated when they changed their national security outlook in December 2022 and dispensed with terms like Self Defence Force enshrined in Article 9 of their constitution. This was one of the reasons why Japan was so interested in getting NATO to set its foot there through a first-of-a-kind ‘Liaison Office’. Australia on the other hand was another major neutral power which decided it was time to ‘change course’. It boosted its defence investments, critically planned to adopt new platforms like nuclear submarines and almost rushed into the security grouping of AUKUS along with the UK and the US.

Deepening security concerns from China also took their toll on ASEAN. For the first time it decided to institute a dedicated commission for dialogue and discussion under the collective security approach for its members. Privately many ASEAN members have expressed alarming concerns over China’s hostile approach towards them. At one time ASEAN had entirely focussed on China to draw economic benefits, but the dramatic change in the situation demands credible management of security vulnerabilities with the same country. China has somehow been successful in creating a serious security quandary among almost all its neighbours. In global geopolitics unpredictability and unsavoury approaches are highly despised. It pushes countries further to find newer ways to preserve their sovereignty and dignity.

In such an unstable environment, countries joining hands in a promising formal security alliance is surely not out of context. If that happens, it will be a watershed moment for Asia and a point of no return. Xi’s chosen advisors may hurriedly dismiss such a scenario, and clearly, it is not an easy choice anyway. However, the perception is – they may be doomed if they choose and surely doomed if they don’t. It is a dark reality about China’s bloated ambitions and sadly for it, early signs of countries coming together have already begun to show!

Unmistakable Similarities

Existing home truths point to unmistakable similarities between Asian security challenges and what Europe was going through at the fag end of the Second World War. Noticeably, China is striving to get the aura of the erstwhile Soviet Union. In the near term, it wanted to be counted as ‘equal’ to the US while carrying a secret ambition of soon replacing it as the most powerful country in the world. The hanging fear of war among European nations at that time seemed replaced by a growing security threat among many Asian countries today. A pre-security alliance before NATO already existed in the form of the ‘Brussels Pact’, whose charter was to ensure “Collective Self-Defence” for its five members. Asia has already witnessed the formation of QUAD and AUKUS with a deep security undertone;

The US formed an integral part of NATO since its inception while it held special relations with the UK. In the Asian context, the US already maintains a strong presence both politically and militarily, while it holds special relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Soviets have tried to strengthen their influence with Eastern Europe. China does not have that buffer but it has someone like North Korea which is much more powerful than maybe what Belarus is for Russia today. A formal alliance like NATO in Asia may not be imminent but it may also be just a ‘few events’ away.

Asian Security Alliance

If and when the deteriorating security environment dictates the formation of a formal alliance, say an ‘Asian Security Alliance’(ASA), the driving purpose would only be to ensure ‘collective security’ for its members. It would be undoubtedly looking for the NATO construct as an inspiration, especially the nuances of Article 5 and Article 10, which define the alliance’s commitment to security for its members and modalities for membership. However, it would also present an opportunity to incorporate measures ab initio which are seen as creating hurdles and conflict within NATO today. The existing ingredients definitely indicate that an ASA would probably be a reality sooner than later while being a much-improved version of NATO, offering better security resolutions.

NATO has served one great purpose – its members haven’t seen a major war for more than half a century. This will be one of the most important stimulations towards the formation of the ASA. However, ASA must look to ensure its actions are – ‘time relevant’, unlike NATO it must dispense with the condition of ‘unanimity’. It should be able to undertake timely preventive military action with say even a 2/3rd majority, while punitive military actions could be undertaken with a 3/4th majority. Such an arrangement would obviate a ‘decision dilemma’ within the organisation which at critical times could be purposefully induced by the prime adversary through the weakest link and prevent unanimity from ever coming across, eventually defeating the entire raison d’être of the alliance.

ALSO READ: China’s Cyber Ranges for Attack and Defence

The membership should remain ‘by invite’ and only for those who meet the strict requirements to which its members are supposed to commit especially funding and national military spending. To give strength to this multi-nation grouping, it may propose that each member must get into a bilateral security commitment as a prerequisite to join the grouping. First, it would remove the scope of conflict among members, and second, it would fully commit them in the time of need removing all scope of geopolitical influences. It would enhance every member’s confidence that their national security challenges will be addressed promptly and cannot keep waiting for phoney approvals from the UNSC or unanimity of views. Such security arrangements are probably becoming more relevant as the UN has become hostage to a select few who continue to stall popular action time and again by their veto. This would create a new powerful grouping taking its place as a major pole, simultaneously addressing the yearning for multipolarity in global affairs. It will considerably diminish the idea of the sole superpower and prevent the urge for global policing.

Global Realities

In the existing dynamics, the ASA appears much more capable of stabilising the security situation in the Asian theatre. It will allow every member irrespective of their size and potential to better commit its national resources for its people without ever having to worry about bullying by anyone. It will definitely not be against anyone and remain very attractive for everyone! The charter would make it possible for even Taiwan and China to be members simultaneously, as long as both commit to abide by the bilateral security commitment of ‘no war’ and coming to fully help the other in case of any threat. Those who would find it ‘uncomfortable to join’ will have no locus standi to criticise it, as the entry though conditional, is ‘not denied’ for anyone. The global realities have given one prominent message to all that practice of shadow boxing and cold war tactics only create greater complications, sucking in more and more resources. A plain-vanilla grouping is what addresses the problem, especially against wayward adversaries and unpredictable proxies. When the scale of reprisal and fear of suffering become obvious it would create invisible guard rails keeping lunatics on globally accepted behavioural norms. Pundits in China must be strategising their next move to have a greater destabilising impact upon their chosen adversary, but they must also remain watchful, their every act is only pushing the tiniest of countries to gain stronger resolve to stand up and guard their national pride. China may end up being the greatest contributor towards the creation of an eventual security alliance like ASA, without ever qualifying as a member of the same!

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Russia attacked Ukraine with a force of just 1,50,000. Ukraine had 2,50,000 men in arms to start with. Later it mobilised fully to field about 5,50,000 men. Given that most of the fighting was in heavily built-up areas, the force ratios were badly skewed to start with. Despite this, it was amazing that the Russian forces encircled Kiev, secured almost 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donetsk provinces and secured a land corridor to Crimea. They captured all Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov. Odessa was the only port left with Ukraine. Having met most of his minimal objectives, Putin started peace negotiations mediated by Turkiye. As a goodwill gesture he withdrew his forces from Kiev. The western media painted this as a rout of Russian forces. The Russian force was overstretched and exhausted after six months of fighting. By Jul-Aug 2022 the Ukrainians launched a much-heralded counter offensive in Kherson. The Russians had to pull out troops from Kharkiev to face this attack. The US satellites saw this gap. Americans encouraged Ukrainians to attack here even as Russian forces were withdrawing to the line of the Orkill river. On paper, this Ukrainian offensive looked like a brilliant Blitzkrieg and as it hit thin air and made rapid progress.

There was an outcry in Russia. Sergei Markov, and other pro-war Russians exhorted Putin to stop this strange phoney war (semi- war) in Ukraine and start a real war that Russia could win easily. Putin was forced to mobilise 3,00,000 reservists. The Syrian war combat vet, Gen Suvorvikin began construction of the three-tiered defence line using Russian construction companies. This 1200 km long Maginot line had deep minefields, anti-tank ditches and dragon teeth. Russia had realised that given the present state of technology, the advantage was clearly with the defender.

Operations in 2023

Meanwhile, the US and Nato helped create 9 new Ukrainian brigades equipped with a mish-mash of Leopard and Challenger tanks along with Bradley ICVs and Strykers. These were brand new formations and not combat-hardened troops. Ukrainians raised their 9th and 10th Strike Corps for the much-advertised counter-offensive in which they claimed they would throw Russians out of all captured territories. This Spring counter-offensive was finally launched on 4 June 2023. The attacks came in Zaporizhzhi and Bakhmut sectors.

There was strong difference of opinion between the Americans and Ukrainians about this splitting of forces. The Russian plan was based upon the Kursk battle of 1943, when the Russians had let the German Panzers attack first, inflicted heavy casualties with artillery and combat aviation and then switched to a major counter-offensive. The Russians had manned their first line with Spetsnaz troops, ATGMs and drones, who could vector down airstrikes and artillery fires. The Ukrainian attacks were led by mine-clearing trawl tanks and ploughs. This caused the attacking columns to bunch up and take heavy casualties. The Russians used their Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopters armed with the 7-10 km range Vykhir anti-tank missiles to destroy the Leopard and Challenger tanks from stand-off ranges. Su-24 ground attack aircraft and Russian artillery took a very heavy toll of attacking formations. Remotely delivered mines rapidly closed minefield safe-lanes behind trawl tanks. Most attacks could not make it even to the first Russian defence line.

By end-Jun, the Ukrainian offensive by their 9 Strike Corps had ended in a fiasco. There was great deal of recrimination between the Americans and Ukrainian generals. The Americans called the Ukrainians “casualty averse”. They berated them for frittering effort away in Bakhmut. When the Ukrainians resisted, the Americans forced Zelenskyy to sack his defence minister Reznikov and most top officials in the ministry. Investigations were launched into corruption scandals. Finally, in Aug, the Ukrainians resumed the offensive in Zaporizhzhia with their fresh 10 Corps. Under US pressure, they moved out some troops from Bakhmut, to this sector. They claimed to have breached the first defence line in Robotinye. The Russians also pulled out formations from their own Kupiansk counter-attack to plug this breach. Heavy losses were inflicted by Russian combat aviation, artillery and drones. Soon, this second corps-sized offensive also petered out with heavy losses. The new innovation was heavy Ukrainian investment in counter-battery (CB) fires to supress Russian artillery.

To draw media attention away from the glaring failure of the Ukrainian ground offensive, the Americans put pressure on the Ukrainians to mount major air attacks on the ports in Crimea and HQ of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet using Storm Shadow and Spice (French) cruise stand-off attack missiles. One Kilo-class submarine and a landing ship were damaged. Ukraine also mounted drone attacks on Moscow and other Russian cities. Though tactical damage was minimal, the psy ops value of these attacks was considerable and served to distract attention from the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Meanwhile, Russia has conscripted some 2,70,000 additional troops and is readying for its major counter-offensive. Generals in Moscow have been urging Putin to expedite this offensive so as to seize and retain the initiative. So far, there are no clear indications of when this would materialise. This will, in all probability, be a winter offensive as the current campaign season is drawing to a close. Meanwhile, Russian retaliatory attacks on Kiev, Odessa and other cities have started to target the power grid, so Ukraine will have a miserable winter ahead. This battle will certainly stretch to 2024. However, the US NATO strategy of a long war to exhaust Russia may backfire. Already NATO members like Poland are feeling the fatigue and US funding has been halted temporarily.

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In a statement cited by Russian state news agencies, the Russian embassy said the “bloodshed, next round of escalation and resulting military and political consequences for the European continent and the entire world”, that would come about from the sending of advanced fighter jets to Ukraine would be on London’s conscience.

“Russia will find a way to respond to any unfriendly steps taken by the British side,” TASS quoted the embassy as saying.

Moscow has repeatedly accused the West of “dragging out” the conflict in Ukraine by supplying Ukraine with billions of dollars worth of advanced military equipment.

Kyiv and the West says the hardware has been crucial in helping them fight back against what they call Russia’s illegal war of aggression.

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“The South China Sea is now becoming one of those regions where NATO is not averse, as they once did in Ukraine, to escalating tensions,” Lavrov told a news conference.

“We know how seriously China takes such provocations, not to mention Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and we understand that NATO’s playing with fire in these regions carries threats and risks for the Russian Federation. It is as close to our shores and to our seas as Chinese territory,” he said.

Lavrov said that was why Russia was developing military cooperation with China and conducting joint exercises.

“The fact that NATO members under the leadership of the United States are trying to create an explosive situation there, in the wake of Europe, is well understood by everyone,” he said.

Lavrov did not provide evidence to back his assertions, but alluded to the formation of the AUKUS alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia.

He also accused NATO of trying to drag India into what he called an anti-Russian and anti-Chinese alliance at a time when he said the West was attempting to squeeze out Russian influence.

When asked about Lavrov’s remarks, India’s UN Ambassador Ruchira Kamboj said: “We are a country that stands tall and proud and stands tall and proud on its own.”

“In the course of the conflict in Ukraine, we have been very clear and consistent right from the outset – we have spoken in one voice that we are for peace. Peace is also a side,” she also told reporters in New York. 

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Assuming the missile has left the silo and is on the way to the target, the questions arise where it will strike and what would be the damage done. The target and the yield will be the focus of this article.

The ability to select the yield according to the target is a big advantage and will be fully utilized by the planners/commanders of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Given below are the possible targets which the rocket forces might choose to target.

Destinations :

1.   Kiev
2.   Odessa
3.   Forward areas of Donetsk
4.   Black Sea
5.   Kherson

The yield would vary according to the targets enumerated above.

Kyiv : This target might have been on the list since days before the starting of the war. In order to eliminate the political leadership and top military commanders, Russia might use a more precise weapon of choice. The civilian losses will be extremely high if such an option is exercised. The yield of the device used for this might be under 100KT as they would be primarily targeting the leadership(civil and military) which is stationed underground.

Odessa : Russia might choose to go after the port in Odessa to permanently cripple Ukrainian exports. To go through with this, they might employ a device under 50KT.

Forward Areas of Donetsk : They might utilize the warheads with yield less than 25 KT to stop the advances of the Ukrainian army. They might use several of them on the battlefield. This would permanently deny the Ukrainians advance through the region.

Black Sea : The target which would most likely be hit would be No. 4 Black Sea. A detonation above the black sea would serve three purposes : i) Send a signal to all the parties to back out from Southern Ukraine and stall the counter offensive ii) Limit the amount of backlash and condemnation Russia will receive from the international community. iii) A detonation above the Sea will drastically limit the fallout and since wind might pick up towards the Russian side, they would be much safer. In this case, they might go ahead with a device with a yield exceeding 100KT, possibly 250KT to send a bigger message.

Kherson : This region might be of interest to the ground forces of both sides. They have been fighting fierce battles for the past many weeks. To cut off the Ukrainian reinforcements and the front line troops and to keep the artillery out of the reach of the rest of the region, they might target Ukrainian military detachments with smaller 10-15KT warheads in several locations.

Impact and Aftermath

A detonation over the Black Sea will have the least amount of damage to human life and practically no fallout. Russia might get chided by the international community and even the neutral parties will raise alarm and criticize the action. But that would be it. It will serve to scare Ukraine and NATO and will stop the counter offensive. Russia will be able to hold out much longer. The Russian military might be sent further to consolidate the gains and take over the vacated territories. Peace negotiations will start with terms favorable to Russia.

However, employing this device over Kyiv would entail a much more difficult situation for all. The Russians might have defeated Ukraine completely but winning the war will be pyrrhic. Civilian casualties would be very high. The high radiation fields will make rescue operations almost impossible.

This act will serve to distance all close allies of Russia and will further isolate Russia. Western nuclear forces would be ready for further escalation and prepare for pre-emptive strikes on Russian positions. There might be a possibility of severing Kaliningrad from the rest of Russia. Extensive conventional strikes by Western air forces would render Russian air defence ineffective and they will proceed to neutralize Russian nuclear platforms and command centres, the only option would be a fully fledged World War or Nuclear War.

A strike on Odessa would earn Russia the ire of the entire world. It will not only cripple Ukraine’s ability to export its produce but complicate issues like food security. This will serve to isolate Russia from Africa, Turkey and even China. Only conventional means would be used by Ukraine to deploy even more advanced western weaponry on Russians positions in Ukraine. NATO presence could be seen in Ukraine after such a strike in order to deter further nuclear strikes. Crimea would be cut off from the Russian Federation. As per the escalation vortex, cyber and space options will be employed by the West but they might not retaliate in a nuclear way. Crippling attacks on the Central government, military services and nuclear command and control centres would limit Russia’s options. The Russian economy would be in a complete disarray without the possibility of ever recovering.

Battlefield engagements on the front lines in Donetsk and Kherson will stop the advance of Ukrainian troops. It would inflict major military losses on Ukraine. The fallout would be immense and the region will become inhabitable for many centuries to come. Russian troops might advance in the fields of high radiation with specialized equipment and platforms. They would not be able to consolidate the gains due to radiation. This action will cause immediate cessation of all hostilities but Russia will suffer from the fallout, additional sanctions and a non-existent economy. Ukraine will have to give up the claim to its territories in the East and South. Retaliation will not stop there, the Russian Navy will face the brunt and lose its entire Black Sea fleet along with several submarines. Strong disapproval would be forthcoming from countries which may be neutral (China) in the form of sanctions from them as well.

In the end, the desired result is the de-escalation of the situation. Dialogue should be the way forward.

Assessment and Possibilities

In view of the foregoing, what are the possibilities about the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.

In an interview with 60 Minutes, US President Joe Biden was asked what he would say to Russian President Vladimir Putin if he considered using tactical nuclear weapons. His response was “Don’t. Don’t. Don’t. It would change the face of war unlike anything since World War II.” In a televised address to the Russian people on September 21, Putin explicitly raised the specter of a nuclear conflict by saying, “Those who try to blackmail us with nuclear weapons should know that the weathervane can turn and point towards them.”

The majority of the experts believe that the possibility that Putin will use a tactical nuclear weapon is low but is growing. As Putin runs out of options and feels worried about losing the war, the threat of nuclear escalation rises.

Some of them assessed that such an event is quite probable as a means of sending the Ukrainians a signal they should stop fighting and start talking, if not capitulate entirely. The experts assessed that the only reason Putin would take such a drastic action would be to force Kyiv to stop fighting and agree to Russian conditions.

However, some of the experts believed such a possibility remains highly improbable. According to them, “the Russian leadership has very little to gain from a military standpoint and everything to lose with regards to strategic consequences.”

In addition, the experts view such a possibility as a complete sea change in the course of the war. It would embolden the Ukrainian population even more, potentially shift opinions in Russia itself, and lead the international community into uncharted territory regarding the proper response. Some of the experts argued that such a decision would drastically diminish, if not eliminate, the remaining support Russia has in Europe and the world.

Experts believe that Putin is aware of the consequences of such a decision and is not deterred from using such a weapon. As one expert put it, Putin “is almost completely sure that the Western powers will never strike Russia with nukes because of the war in Ukraine,” and is therefore undeterred by a Western response.

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India’s neutral stand is mainly because all the key protagonists in the crisis are India’s close allies. Hence, India’s unaligned and diplomatic efforts. Possible support to Russia might hamper India’s relations with the NATO countries, including USA.

India’s stand on Ukraine has been appreciated within the country and by other countries, notably Pakistan, whose prime minister Imran Khan too appreciated India’s role and policies.

India-Russia relationship still continues to remain strong. Russia has been a significant supplier of military equipment. India is also procuring the S-400 Triumf Missile from Russia, despite strong US opposition.  A new ten-year defence pact between the two countries was being discussed. India-Russia annual trade is also worth about $10 billion. India’s support to Ukraine may mean Russia developing stronger ties with China and Pakistan. That can be a real-time threat to India’s national security.

Ukraine has consistently taken anti-Indian position in the United Nations, be it in terms of voting against India in UNSC after 1998 nuclear tests, voting for UN intervention in Kashmir after abrogation of Article 370 or in terms of selling military equipment to Pakistan to use against India.

India wants de-escalation of the crisis, but only through arbitration or conciliation. Thus, considering all the angles to this crisis, India is adopting the strategy to solve this dispute keeping in mind that any country’s national interest is above the overall global interest.

The US has managed to get most countries on its side, and the United Nations resolution condemning the Russian invasion has been supported by many countries. Countries like India chose to abstain from the vote due to a strong and continuing linkage with Russia, and due to considerations of what such a vote will imply to the geopolitics of the region.

The immediate impact is, of course, adverse due to high oil prices and investor nervousness. India has a very large oil deficit and also a current account deficit. The latter needs a continuous supply of foreign investor dollars to plug that deficit. On food security, India is on a strong footing. Its military capabilities are significantly inferior to China, mainly due to a resource constraint. But the level of preparedness and the advantage of terrain means that the asymmetry is considerably reduced.

The US will soon have to think about the more important geopolitical alignment and strategy around its bigger rival, China. So far, the Quad formation (with the US, India, Japan and Australia) has not delivered any tangible benefits to India. But the strategic importance of India could grow. It is conceivable that in a new configuration, the Americans will value an alignment with India more than the reverse. India, too, has a strong trade and investment relationship already. If its domestic economy shows steady and consistent high growth, it can become important to the US when dealing with a strong China.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng attacked the Quad thus, “No country should pursue its so-called absolute security at the expense of other countries’ security.” He drew a parallel between the situation in Ukraine — according to him, a result of “the NATO strategy of eastward expansion” — and the several provocations perceived by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. The analogy does not hold. Amid recent geopolitical developments, India’s foreign policy priorities and the ties fostered with members of the Quad are holding fast.

The Quad is a response to China’s rising ambitions, which have manifested in the form of occupying islands and trying to control sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its activities along the Line of Actual Control with India.

Both the Japanese and Australian prime ministers reportedly discussed the situation in Ukraine with prime minister Narendra Modi, and did not insist that India echo their position.

The post EDITORIAL – India’s Balancing Act appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 1 here

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

After initial SEAD strikes on 24 February (the first day of the offensive) a large train of Mi-28 transport and Hokum attack helicopters was seen flying towards the Hostamel airport. It was attacked by air and missile strikes and possibly also by MBRLs. Elements of an air assault formation (possibly one of the Guards airborne divisions) landed and seized the Antonov airport at Hostamel. The giant Ukrainian AN-225 transport aircraft (the world’s largest) was destroyed in the fighting here. As per standard practice, military experts expected them to hold an airhead (to fly in reinforcements and supplies) and await a land link-up with the tank columns of the 41st Army that were crossing over from Belarus border. Given the distance of approximately some 150 kms, the link-up would at best have taken 2-3days. However, what followed was somewhat unorthodox and confusing. Instead of holding the airhead, the airborne troops left it and charged straight for Kiev some 23 kms away. Reportedly, the 141 Motorised National Guards Brigade under Chechen Maj Gen Magomed Tusaev charged into Kiev. They were surprised by the stiff resistence and the Javelins and artillery took a heavy toll. Reportedly, they lost some 58 armoured vehicles to the ATGMs and the Chechen Maj Gen was killed. Finding the Hostomel airfield unoccupied the Ukrainians recaptured it, thus, denying the airhead for flying in reinforcements and logistics supply. Apparently, this coup de main operation was planned at the highest level because President Putin himself called upon Ukrainian forces to surrender. Later, he personally praised the sacrifice of the paratroopers. There definitely was a major failure of intelligence here. On what intelligence basis was such a bold operation launched on the enemy capital? It could not be based merely on the expectation that the Ukraine forces would not fight and surrender tamely? That cannot be the basis of operational planning and there seemed to be no fall back option or Plan B in this coup de main operation. It seemed to be based on very subjective parameters and assumptions.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The Russian advance began on multiple thrust lines. As assessed by IMR, it was a full scale invasion option. Rapid progress was made in first 3-4 days with spear heads covering over 150 kms to reach the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to siege warfare – surrounding cities, isolating the entry and exit routes and pounding cities savagely with rockets, cruise missiles and conventional artillery. Humanitarian corridors were agreed on by both sides to let civilians flee the cities. Some 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced and over 3.5 to 5 million have been forced to flee to Poland and other neighboring countries. The pace of operations has been slowed down greatly partly due to need for logistical pauses and very heavy and dogged resistance by the Ukrainian army, which used their Javelins ATGMs and Strella SAMs  to cause fairly substantial attrition. However the simple ground reality is that neither US nor NATO are putting boots on ground nor will they enforce any No-Fly Zones. So, theoretically, Russia has all the time in the world to methodically and steadily but surely grind down the Ukraine military in a meat-grinder war of attrition, which could carry on for months. The longer it lasts the more Ukraine will suffer. Unfortunately, it will also have a fearful impact on the global economy that was staging a tenuous recovery from Covid. Let me now cover the operations in the Northern, Eastern and Southern sectors in detail.

Northern Sector

The Russian forces attacked in the Northern sector toward Kiev the capital and Kharkiev (former capital and financial hub which had the T- 80 tank factory here).

Kiev. The 41st Army charged across the Belarus border towards Kiev on two thrust lines west of the Dnieper river, while elements of 36the Army advanced along the east bank towards Chernobyl nuclear plant and further on to Hostomel airport. These thrust lines made very rapid initial progress and in just 2-3 days were on the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, operations slowed down to try and isolate and then besiege Kiev, while they carried out precise Iskander TBMs and Kalibr cruise missiles strikes and limited bombardment by MBRLs. They made a few probes towards Kiev city centre but were repulsed. The satellite imagery on 4th/5th day of war showed a huge 65 km long convoy stretched on the road to Kiev. This included assault tank echelons, which should have been moving cross country but were stuck to the road due to the slush and mud caused by the spring thaw. The convoy remained stuck like that for a couple of days. Had the Ukrainian Air Force been active, this would have led to a disaster but apparently the convoy was well protected by the slant range of the S-400 missiles from Belarus and remained largely unscathed. It did not seem as if the Russians were planning to fight in the streets of Kiev, which were heavily defended by Javelin ATGMs and Stinger SAMs and would have entailed heavy troop casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population. Some experts felt this was a deception operation designed to keep the world’s attention riveted towards Kiev, while they made major advances in the East (Donbas) and the south sea coast. Cruise missiles were used to destroy the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant and oil storage depots. Strangely, almost no attacks were made by aircraft or cruise missiles on key command and control targets like the Presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. This, to my mind, is a cardinal mistake of this war – the failure to target the top political and military leadership of Ukraine in a pinpoint and concerted manner.

Sumy. The 20th Army elements advanced on to Sumy and surrounded and bombed the city heavily.

Kharkiev. The 6th Army mounted heavy and sustained attacks on Kharkiev. It was surrounded and pounded to rubble. The tank manufacturing plant was destroyed by cruise missile strikes and bitter fighting took place on the streets. The Russians claim to be in control of the city but this is disputed by the Ukrainians.

Eastern Sector

This was the scene of major hostilities since 2014 and daily exchanges of artillery and mortar fire were taking place along the line of contact (LOC). Russians claim that Ukraine had massed some 60,000 of its best troops opposite Donbas and were planning to launch an offensive to take back the 30 per cent or so of the territories of the break-away districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was under Russian control. Attacks in this sector, therefore, were largely frontal and heavily contested. As per the Russians, it was to pin down Ukrainian forces in the North and not let them reinforce this sector that attacks were launched concurrently on Kiev and Kharkiev in the North.

•  The Russian 8th Army mounted fierce attacks on the Lukansk district and, by end of March, claimed to have liberated some 93 per cent of its territory.

•  The Russian 49th Army mounted fierce attacks on Donetsk district and, by end of March, claims to have liberated 56 per cent of its area. It also mounted operations towards Mariupol to link up with troops operating out of Crimea to establish a land corridor for Crimea.

•  In Phase II of the Russian operation they could complete the capture of the entire Donbas region and possibly try and encircle and annihilate the 60,000 or so Ukrainian troops operating against the Donbas region by encircling them from North and South in a major pincer movement.

Southern Sector

This encompasses the coast of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The three major ports here are Sevastopol (already with Russia on lease since decades) and now part of Russian occupied Crimea. The other major ports are Odessa and Mariupol. Russian Marines and Army made the most impressive gains here and have almost cut off Ukraine from the sea and made it a land locked state.

•  The Russian 58th Army and the Marines have advanced on Mariupol, laid siege to it and reduced the city to rubble by very heavy bombardment and missile strikes. The Russians claim to be in control of Mariupol, though Ukrainians claim that pockets of resistance remain. Mariupol and Kharkiev are the two major cities where the Russians have employed their standard tactics of capturing cities and the firepower used has been fearful. The land link up of Crimea with Donbas is now complete and is a major and significant gain.

•  The Russian 22nd Army and Marine elements advanced on and Quickly captured the coastal port city of Kherson (the first major city with a population of 300,000) that fell to the Russians. They then moved on and surrounded the port city of Mykolyiv and pounded it fiercely. Parts of the city have fallen to the Russians. Army elements and Marines have also advanced and captured the nuclear power plant complex of Zhaporizhzia. This is the largest nuclear plant in Europe with 6x 950 MW reactors (only one functional). They have also captured the Aneshader nuclear plant which has 25 per cent of the power generation capacity of the whole of Ukraine. Thus, almost all nuclear facilities in eastern Ukraine are now under Russian control.

•  While the world’s interest was riveted on Kiev, the Russians have made the most impressive advances in the South and have captured almost all the major seaports of Ukraine and cut off its access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. If Russians could induct fresh troops here they could drive up north along both banks of the Dnieper river and partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts along the Dnieper river. This could well be attempted by the Russians in Phase II of the operations.

Major Outcomes and Lessons Learnt So Far

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine is now in its second month. It began as a swift war of manoeuvre but now has turned into an inexorable attrition nightmare. Western propaganda is trying to claim it as a pyrrhic victory for Ukraine, which they armed very heavily with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs, which they claim had won the war in Afghanistan. These claims are over-hyped. Certainly, these defensive missiles have, to an extent, slowed down Russian operations and have been used to target their follow-on and logistics echelons. However, in no way can these tactical defensive weapons by themselves win the war for Ukraine. They can only serve to prolong it.

The American aim seems to be to prolong this war for a couple of months to humiliate Putin and impose maximum attrition on his war machine. This amounts to fighting the Russians till the last Ukrainian man or building standing. In the bargain, no one seems to care for the highly adverse impact on the global economy that has been struggling to recover from the impact of Covid pandemic. Nor does this approach show any sensitivity to the cost of human suffering of the people of Ukraine who have been callously dumped by the West.

The expenditure rate of these Javelins and Stingers missiles has been enormous. Zelinsky now wants 500 of these per day at an estimated missile replacement cost of $39 million per day. It is virtually impossible for even US and NATO to supply at such lavish scales.

Russian interdiction has now destroyed many oil storage depots, ammunition dumps, tank and aircraft manufacturing plants in Ukraine. They have captured all the Ukrainian nuclear plants in east Ukraine and control the water supply and power to most cities. Sadly, it is doubtful how long the Ukrainians can last in the face of such heavy punishment.

In a pure war of attrition, Russia is bound to prevail. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the war more in Russia’s favour. No amount of Western propaganda of an impending collapse of material and moral support for the war in Russia can hide this basic military fact. They may win the war on television and captive social media, the ground reality, however, will inexorably shift in Russia’s favour. In a meat grinder war of pure attrition Russian missile power, air power and fire power will prevail. Abraham Lincoln’s words – “You can fool all of the people some of time; you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all the people all the time” – may come back to haunt these shrill spin masters.

Russian force usage has been very uncharacteristically restrained. Whether this stems from cultural factors or a Russian apprehension that this war is likely to spread and escalate remains to be seen. They are clearly retaining their most advanced weapon systems for a time when they apprehend that they may have to fight NATO and American forces. So, we have not heard the last of this conflict and that is worrying. The Russians are clearly apprehending a widening and escalation of this conflict and are clearly husbanding their cutting edge resources. We have seen no T- 14 Armata tanks or active protection systems in this conflict despite the very dense anti-tank environment.

Traditionally, Russians maintain momentum by employment of fresh second and third echelons, which are carefully kept out of the battle for when the first echelons will run out of steam. Will Phase II see an induction of fresh troops and more material? That will depend on Russia meeting its minimal objectives – they say these have largely been met.

The use of the Russian air force has been rather limited. This failure to press home air superiority has needlessly extended this conflict.

Meteorological factors like the spring thaw and slush were not given adequate Importance.

Use of tactical ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles (Kalibr) have been Impressive and very effective. Over 1000 of them have been used in this war for pin-point destruction of targets.

Biden’s talks of Ukrainian sovereignty and calls for regime change in Russia are rather hypocritical and contradictory.

Economic sanctions could backfire if the dollar stops being the world currency for oil trade. Sanctions will hit Europe very hard and cause stagflation in the US economy.

Information and media war will be covered in a separate article.

Read Part 1 here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 2 here

Gerasimov’s Hybrid War vs Traditional Russian War Doctrines

A few days before the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, IMR had done an in house war-game (Feb 2022 issue). Based upon known Russian doctrines and recent demonstrated combat performance in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – we had forecast that Russian likely war aims would be to seriously wreck Ukraine as a functional military state and attempt regime change. They would advance on multiple thrust lines but seek to retain ground only in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the East and Crimea and the coastal areas in the South. These would be terrain objectives that would be retained at any cost. Russia had a huge advantage in airpower, missile power and traditional artillery firepower. Its T-72 and T-90 tanks were clearly superior to the Ukrainian T-80 and T-64 tanks especially in optronics and night fighting capabilities.

The signature Russian way of war has been to use massive fire assaults to create shock and awe and, thereby, economise on force levels and military lives. This was most evident in World War II, when Stalin called artillery the God of war and quipped that quantity generates its own quality. Russian forces have traditionally relied on echelonment of forces. Second and third echelon forces were kept in reserve and used to maintain relentless momentum in any offensive once the first echelon was used up or petered out. Based on this anchor premise, most military observers felt that Russia could achieve these objectives in 10 days (two to three weeks at best) in Ukraine. This war, however, has now entered its second month.

The Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare. The Chief of Russian General Staff Gen Velary Gerasimov had enunciated a whole of government doctrine for warfare based on a combination of hard and soft power in 2013. This entailed use of regular and irregular forces (conventional and sub-conventional forces) and coherent use of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, disinformation, political, diplomatic and economic tools to gain victory. Based on this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Russians had made impressive use of hybrid warfare in 2014 to foment insurgencies in Russian speaking areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. They captured significant chunks of these provinces (around 30 per cent), which declared themselves as independent (a la Abhkazia and Osettia in Georgia). Just before this conflict Russia recognized these as independent states. Hybrid war had worked very well so far in both Georgia and Ukraine.

Transition from Hybrid War to Regular Warfare. The key question here is – when on 24 Feb President Putin announced his decision to launch a “Special Operation” in Ukraine with the stated aim of destroying Ukraine’s military potential and carrying out De-Nazification, was he not making a direct transition from hybrid war now to full scale conventional war? From 2017 onwards, the US had been heavily arming Ukraine with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In July 2021, US, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian troops had held a joint military exercise in Ukraine (Ex Three Swords). This entailed over 1200 troops and 200 tanks and armoured vehicles along with air power elements. Tactics to counter a Russian attack had been worked out in detail. Russian sources indicate that plans were being hatched to mount an invasion of the Russian held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and concurrently ask for membership of NATO. This would involve US and NATO troops in this conflict. It was this exercise that had convinced President Zelinsky that, if Russia attacked, US & NATO forces would come to his aid. In December 2021, in yet another provocation Ukraine and USA co-hosted a major naval exercise (code named Op Sea Breeze) on the Black Sea in which 34 nations’ navies took part. American B-52 bombers made practice nuclear bombing runs against Russia and a ramming incident almost happened between a Russian destroyer and a British naval vessel.

Finally, in December 2021 itself, US and Ukraine foreign ministers signed the US–Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership that was said to be guided by the 2008 Bucharest Summit (where the idea of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was first mooted). By end-Dec 2021, Ukraine was a de facto member of NATO for all practical purposes and Russia was apprehending an attack on the separatist held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some 60,000 Ukrainian troops were massed against this Donbas region. That is why Russia had begun mobilizing its forces on the Ukrainian border in a massive exercise of compellence deigned to seek written guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and no offensive weapons would be deployed in 14 East European countries that had joined NATO. (In December 2021 itself, Putin had written to President Joe Biden clearly seeking these written guarantees).

To be credible, any such compellence exercise has to be structured for a seamless transition to actual kinetic operations. When that finally happened on 24 February 2022, the level of combat had clearly to shift from hybrid warfare to full-fledged conventional military operations with a clear option to cross the tactical nuclear threshold if USA or other NATO countries intervened. The continuation of the hybrid war mindset after onset of full scale military operations was, in hindsight, a clear miscalculation. This highlights the tension between the Gerasimov Hybrid War Doctrine and the traditional Russian way of war. This mismatch between the two mindsets has characterized this conflict. In trying to win the information war you cannot afford to lose or impede the outcome of the ground war.

Force Restraint

From the very outset of this war, the Russian campaign has been characterised by a surprising degree of restraint that flies in the face of the traditional Russian way of war. This has always relied on mass and scale – especially in the use of suppressive fires. From the purely military point of view massive suppressive fires were badly needed to neutralise huge numbers of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and Stinger shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been liberally supplied to Ukraine. Most military analysts were, therefore, surprised to find a near total absence of the Russian Air Force (VKS) for extended and extensive bombing campaigns. Even more surprising was the near total absence of large scale artillery and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) fire assaults on cities and built up areas – especially in the initial stages of the war.

The Russian first phase SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) campaign was confined to just one single day. Contrast this with the US 40-day air campaign in Iraq and the 80-day air interdiction campaign by the US and NATO in Yugoslavia. Given troops to task calculations, the overall Russian force level deployed was far too less to cater for the reduction/ isolation of some 15 or more cities, unless use of heavy fire power was envisaged. Besides, there was a near total absence of Russian cutting edge equipment like T-14 Alamty tanks and even Active Protection Systems (APS) on the T-72 and T-90 tanks employed (despite the dense anti-tank environment they had to operate in). Like the Egyptians had done in 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Russians seemed to prefer to operate under the area denial umbrella of their Triumf S- 400 missiles deployed in Belarus and Russia proper. Though the S- 400s have worked quite well, this denied the Russian troops the heavy air support they could easily have counted on – given the air power asymmetry between the two sides.

So what explains this baffling and most uncharacteristic force usage restraint by the Russians?

Cultural Factors and Intelligence Failure

There is a widespread belief that Putin was misled by his intelligence (FSB) to seriously under estimate the degree of resistance that the Ukrainian armed forces would put up. It was mentioned that, perhaps, accurate intelligence was available but senior FSB officers lacked the moral courage to put it up to Putin. They only tried to reinforce his dominant perception that, like in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine itself in 2014, the opposition would fold up and surrender without a fight. There is indeed some truth in this premise. The Russians went in for just a one-day air campaign and even as the 41 Combined Arms Army was heading for Kiev from the Belarus border, an air assault formation (perhaps elements of a Guards airborne division) captured the Antonov Hostamel airport (just 23 kms from Kiev) in a brilliant coup de main operation. Military experts now expected them to hold this airhead till link up by the land-based tank columns moving in from Belarus. Given the 150 kms they had to cover, this could have been done in two or three days. To everyone’s surprise the airborne forces left the air base and charged up to Kiev, the capital, even as Putin demanded that Ukraine surrender. The Ukrainian’s put up stiff resistance and recaptured the vacated Hostomel air base. The airborne forces almost walked into a trap as it were. No operation can be premised on the expectation that the enemy will just surrender. There does seem to have been a major intelligence failure of humanint or even a deliberate trap.

Most Russian military officers I have spoken to have stressed that this nostalgic perception of people to people relations was not just confined to President Putin but was a widespread cultural blind spot in the entire Russian military. Many Russians and even people of Belarus have relations in Ukraine and Kiev indeed was once a important centre of Russian culture. As such, there was a clear cut and widespread desire to restrict force usage against kindred people. This cultural constraint cum Intelligence error tended to make military planning clearly subjective in the initial phase of the conflict. The Indians and Pakistanis too were once one people culturally and linguistically. Yet they have, since1947, fought four major wars and one long hybrid war in J&K. This has been characterised by particular viciousness on Pakistan’s part.

DETAILED ANALYSIS – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Phase One – Coercive Deployment

The Russian command level HQ at Varyinch (80kms from Donbas) seemed to be the controlling HQ for this operation. Tanks, missile launchers and artillery were moved from the far-eastern military districts of Siberia to raise two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs are equivalent of Indian corps). These were the 4th and 20th CAAs. Of Russia’s 12 CAAs, some 11 were deployed around Ukraine. Another estimate felt that out of some 170 Battalion Tactical Groups some 87 were used against Ukraine. In numerical terms this amounted to some 1,50,000 troops that were subsequently raised up to 1, 90,000.in terms of troops to task analysis, if encirclement/capture of 10-15 Ukrainian cities was involved, this force level was clearly inadequate. It could only make sense if it intended to use heavy air power and suppressive artillery fire power to carry out this task and compensate for low force levels.

The 41st CAA was sent for a 10-day exercise to Belarus. This positioned it to strike directly at Kiev. After termination of the exercise it was retained there itself. The Ukrainian forces were organized into 14 armoured, airborne and mechanized brigades and had mobilised a large territorial militia and also called up reservists. The defender, thus, clearly outnumbered the attackers but the Russians had an overwhelming technological edge.

In December 2021, President Putin had written a letter to President Joe Biden demanding written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe. However, the dominant perception in USA and Europe seemed to be that Russia was bluffing and this force posturing was just a coercive military deployment to compel NATO to negotiate a new security architecture in Europe. The Ukrainians themselves were most nonchalant about the Russian deployment and dismissed it as bluff and bluster to Indian students who took their advice and did not evacuate in time. With modern satellite surveillance each and every tank, gun and truck could be picked up with ease. No force concentration can be hidden in this day and age. What can be kept secret is the intention. Was the force just posturing or would it really strike? It must be said that the Russians were able to keep this secret well and Russian maskirovka (deception) operations were highly successful in keeping the world guessing.

Putin gave ample chance for a diplomatic solution till the very end. This delayed the offensive and caused it to run into the spring thaw, which generates slush and mud and impedes cross country manoeuvre. As part of information operations the Americans tried to leak Russian military plans in the media and announced 16 February as the D Day. This, perhaps, forced Russia to delay the operation. It was finally launched a week later on 24 February with a near formal declaration of war (a special operation) to destroy Ukraine’s military potential and de-Nazify the country. Russia officially recognized the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and cited their full liberation as the primary territorial objective. It must be noted that from 2014 onwards the Ukrainians had deployed some 60,000 of their best troops in this region and attacking them directly would have amounted to a rather costly frontal attack on a very live line of contact. Hence, any Russian operation would have to advance along multiple thrust lines that would tie down and divide Ukrainian forces and mask the main objective. So, was Kiev then a deception operation as subsequently claimed? This merits further analysis. However, after the initial surprise, the Russian forces quickly readjusted to the changed scenario and now carried out their operations with far greater deliberation and with due caution. They changed their overall operational design from rapid manoeuvre to set piece siege operations and increasingly greater use of suppressive fires.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

As stated, the Americans had carried out a 40-day air campaign in Iraq for SEAD and interdiction of enemy communications and infrastructure including destruction of Republican Guards armoured reserves. In Yugoslavia, the air campaign had extended for over 80 days. Hence, most military observers were baffled when the Russian Air Force finished its SEAD campaign in a single day. The Russian Air Force (VKS) used MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters as also SU-27 and SU-30s along with SU-25SM fighter bombers. Given that Ukrainians had extensively deployed Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, bulk of attacks would have had to be from mid- to high-altitudes (to stay out of the shoulder-fired SAM envelope). This would necessitate use of PGMs for ground attack.

It is not known what percentage of munitions employed were PGMs or just plain gravity bombs, which can be quite inaccurate. The bulk of damage, however, was done by the 9K720 Iskander short range ballistic missiles (200 miles range). These were equipped with decoys to degrade enemy air defences and the Ukrainian S-300, Tor and Buk SAMs failed to intercept any of these. The Kalibr and Klub cruise missiles were also used extensively. Russians claimed to have struck 11 enemy airfields, destroyed 18 radars and a number of S-300 missile batteries on this first day itself. In hindsight, these claims appear exaggerated and the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) seems to have been flawed.

Many Ukrainian fighters escaped by moving out to western Ukraine and some are said to have flown out to Romania before the Russian attack. Many S-300 batteries also were dispersed initially. They survived and were active much later in the course of the fighting. The Russians seemed to have relied heavily on the area denial capability of their S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems. From Belarus these downed a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter at a range of 150 kms over Kiev, setting a world record for the distance of engagement. The impression one gets is that like the Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Russians were more inclined to rely upon the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) capability of their Triumph missile systems. These were apparently quite effective as is proved by their ability to protect a 65 km long convoy of assault tanks and other vehicles for days on the outskirts of Kiev. But this also ruled out much air support by the Russian air force due to closure of air space. This was badly needed to suppress the swarms of Javelin ATGMs and the Stingers. These kept taking pot shots throughout the campaign. The Ukrainians were advised by the Americans to ambush rear/ logistics echelons and they appear to have taken their toll. The road axes were not protected adequately due to a paucity of infantry. Amazingly, the Russian air force was largely absent from the skies over Ukraine, after the initial day’s SEAD attacks.

The Russia-Ukraine War (Part 2) click here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.