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Pakistan’s Khushab nuclear complex, located in Punjab province, sits at the heart of the country’s weapons-grade plutonium production effort. This facility stands apart from standard nuclear power plants, thanks to its specialized heavy-water-moderated reactors – four in total – that collectively produce significant amounts of both plutonium and tritium, two essential ingredients for modern nuclear weapon designs. Estimates suggest that Pakistan currently maintains a stockpile of around 170 nuclear devices, each requiring on the order of 10 grams of tritium to achieve boosted fission yields. By leveraging short irradiation cycles, uranium metal fuels, and potentially lithium-6 doping, these reactors can generate not only the desired high-purity ²³⁹Pu (weapons-grade plutonium) but also tritium-albeit at levels that may be constrained by operational inefficiencies.

A pivotal enabler in this setup is heavy water (D₂O), produced onsite using hydrogen sulfide (H²S) exchange technology. Heavy water allows the use of natural or low-enriched uranium, making the process more flexible and cost-effective for weapons purposes. Additionally, these reactors can be tuned to shorter burnups – around 5-6 MWd/kg – to keep the plutonium at ²³⁹Pu 90 wt%. Tritium emerges from two main pathways: neutron capture in deuterium (within the D₂O) and irradiation of lithium-6 (either in targets or doped into reactor elements). Because tritium decays at a rate of 5.6% per year, Pakistan must replenish its stockpile constantly to keep existing warheads operational, which, in turn, shapes how Khushab’s reactors might be run-whether in single-batch modes or partial/ continuous recycling to maximize throughput of weapons-usable materials.

This article:
1. Examines the Khushab Reactors’ Design and Operation
•              Outlining the four heavy-water reactors, their typical power ranges, and why short-cycle irradiation is crucial for achieving weapons-grade plutonium.
•              Highlighting the importance of uranium metal fuel and describe how its properties facilitate rapid breed-out of ²³⁹Pu .
2.            Explore Heavy-Water Production and Lithium-6 Doping
•              Detailing the hydrogen sulfide exchange process that supplies Khushab’s heavy water.
•              Explaining the use of lithium-6 targets or doping, illustrating how tritium is generated in tandem with plutonium.
3.            Analyzing Tritium Requirements for an Arsenal of 170 Devices
•              Demonstrating how tritium’s half-life drives annual replenishment needs for existing warheads.
•              Presenting a more realistic tritium production range (down 30-35% from theoretical maxima) and show how this impacts the number of additional weapons each year.
4.            Quantify the Potential for New Warhead Production
•              By comparing the available plutonium output and the leftover tritium to calculate 3-5 new boosted devices per annum.
•              Discussing how short reactor cycles, frequent refueling, or partial reloads can amplify or constrain these figures.

By piecing together these reactor operations, fuel cycles, and radioactive by-products, we gain a clearer view of how Pakistan sustains and potentially expands its nuclear arsenal. The Khushab complex emerges as a technically sophisticated enterprise that, through judicious use of heavy water, uranium metal fuel, and lithium doping, can co-produce high-quality plutonium and tritium. Understanding these processes, along with the numbers that shape arsenal maintenance and growth, remains central to grasping the full scope of Pakistan’s nuclear posture.

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Operational Layout: Three Modes of Khushab Reactor Operations
One of the distinctive features of the Khushab heavy-water reactors is their flexibility in how they can be fueled and operated. Depending on Pakistan’s objectives-tritium production for boosting to maximizing weapons grade Plutonium production-each reactor can be run in a specific mode. These modes differ in terms of fuel cycle length, lithium-6 doping, and burnup levels. Below is an outline of the three principal modes:

1. Baseline “Clean Core” Mode
Objective: Higher burnup for somewhat more conventional operations, not aimed at producing weapons-grade plutonium.
A.            Fuel & Burnup
•              Typically uses low-enriched uranium (could be 3.5-4% ²³⁵U) or even natural uranium, depending on design.
•              Operates with longer irradiation cycles (e.g.12-18 months, analogous to some commercial or research reactors) to extract more energy per kilogram of fuel.
•              The resulting plutonium has a higher concentration of ²⁴⁰Pu and other heavier isotopes (e.g. ²⁴¹Pu), making it unsuitable for weapons-grade needs.
B.            Tritium Production
•              Primarily from neutron capture in deuterium within the heavy-water moderator; lithium doping is minimal or absent.
•              Yields moderate amounts of tritium-tied to total neutron flux and operational conditions-but significantly less than a dedicated tritium-focused cycle.
C.            Fuel Recycling
•              Often a once-through approach or partial reload for experimental or civilian use.
•              This mode is not optimized for short discharge or high Li doping, so the impetus for reprocessing for weapons material is low.
Outcome:
•              A “clean core” yields relatively higher burnup but non-weapons-grade plutonium.
•              Tritium production is secondary, mostly a side effect of heavy-water usage, rather than a targeted outcome.

2.            “Tritium Core” Mode
Objective: Maximize tritium output-especially if the goal is to build or maintain boosted fission devices.
A.            Fuel & Li-6 Doping
•              The reactor can still use standard or lightly enriched uranium.
•              Lithium-6 doping (via targets) is significantly increased, so a greater fraction of neutrons produce ³H  (tritium).
B.            Cycle Length & Burnup
•              Can vary: some operators maintain a moderate cycle to strike a balance between tritium generation and overall reactor output.
•              Plutonium is still produced but has higher isotopic contamination (more ²⁴⁰Pu, ²⁴¹Pu  ) because the fuel remains in the core longer.
C.            Tritium Handling
•              Larger emphasis on tritium recovery and purification (through dedicated tritium extraction systems).
•              If the moderator or coolant is heavily doped with Li-6, specialized facilities are needed to capture the tritium.
Outcome:
•              High tritium yield due to lithium captures, but plutonium is not weapons-grade (longer irradiation times degrade the ²³⁹Pu  purity).
•              Useful when the operator’s main concern is sustaining or expanding tritium stockpiles.

3.            “Co-Production Core” Mode
Objective: Simultaneously produce weapons-grade plutonium (90% ²³⁹Pu) and significant tritium in one cycle.
A.            Short Irradiation for Pu
•              The fuel (often uranium metal for efficient breeding and short residence) is discharged at low burnup (e.g., 5-6 MWd/kg).
•              This ensures the plutonium remains high in   ²³⁹Pu content, avoiding excessive ²⁴⁰Pu  buildup.
B.            Enhanced Li-6 Doping
•              To drive up tritium production, operators may incorporate additional Li-6.
•              Each short cycle yields a batch of both high-purity plutonium and a notable quantity of tritium (recovered post-irradiation).
C.            Frequent Refueling / Partial Reload
•              Because burnup is capped so low, the reactor must be refueled more often (possibly every few months).
•              This leads to frequent shutdowns or continuous on-power refueling (if the reactor design allows).
•              Spent fuel is quickly reprocessed to extract the newly bred ²³⁹Pu .
Outcome:
•              Achieves both nuclear weapons materials in a single reactor cycle.
•              Less efficient in terms of energy production (since the fuel is discharged prematurely).
•              Typically the best approach for maximizing warhead potential:  90% ²³⁹Pu  plus tens of grams to over a hundred grams of tritium per year (depending on the reactor size and doping).

ALSO READ: NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Nuclear Dynamics in South Asia

How These Modes Impact Khushab’s Output
A.            Mode Selection is Driven by Objectives
•              Pakistan can switch between or balance these modes across its four Khushab reactors, depending on whether it prioritizes straightforward electricity/research (clean core), high tritium (tritium core), or co-producing tritium and weapons-grade plutonium (co-production core).
•              In practice, open-source assessments suggest co-production might be favored if the goal is to maintain a steady stream of both quality plutonium and sufficient tritium.
B.            Material Throughput
•              For co-production or tritium-focused modes, the reactors see frequent short cycles  -> more fresh or recycled fuel required.
•              Single-batch or partial reload patterns ensure ²³⁹Pu is extracted before significant neutron capture forms unwanted isotopes (²⁴⁰Pu, etc.).
C.            Arsenal Growth
•              Recent estimates place Pakistan’s arsenal at 170 nuclear devices.
•              If co-production is pursued, each Khushab reactor can yield a certain fraction of the required plutonium plus tens of grams of tritium per year, enough to maintain existing warheads (due to tritium decay) and produce 3-5 new devices annually in aggregate-depending on operational efficiency and doping strategies.

By adjusting among these three modes, Khushab’s operators effectively control the balance of weapons-grade plutonium, tritium yield, and overall burnup. This operational flexibility is what makes the Khushab complex central to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program-allowing shifts in strategy as material needs evolve.

Tritium Requirements and Warhead Production Potential
An integral part of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program revolves around managing tritium ³H – a short-lived isotope essential to boost the yield of fission warheads. Because tritium decays relatively quickly, maintaining and expanding a tritium stockpile becomes a continuous operational concern. This section explores how Pakistan’s estimated arsenal of 170 devices might drive ongoing tritium needs and how Khushab’s production fits into meeting those demands while still enabling the manufacture of new warheads.
A.            Existing Arsenal: Decay and Annual Replenishment
•              Tritium has a half-life of 12.32 years, meaning it decays at about 5.6% per year. Consequently, each device loses a fraction of its original T load annually.
B.            Annual Top-Up Needs
•              Each device’s 10 g T inventory diminishes by around 0.56 g per year (5.6% of 10 g).
•              Multiplied by 170 devices, the entire arsenal loses an estimated 95 grams of T annually.
•              Replacing that 95 g is necessary to keep the boosted warheads at full potency.
C.            Role of Purity
•              It is crucial that only high-purity tritium-free of contaminants-is used in warheads.
•              Because tritium often needs re-extraction and purification, Pakistan’s actual annual requirement may be somewhat higher than 95 g to account for processing losses.

Tritium Production at Khushab
A.            Reduced Output Estimates
•              Under ideal “co-production” mode, open-source estimates once placed the four Khushab reactors’ total tritium capacity near 200 g per year.
•              However, factoring in operational inefficiencies (maintenance downtime, suboptimal lithium doping, partial cycles), a 30-35% reduction is realistic.
•              This lowers the annual production to around 130-140 g across all four reactors.
B.            Meeting the Arsenal’s Replenishment
•              If Khushab provides  130-140 g T per year, then 95 g must go to replace decayed tritium in existing warheads.
•              That leaves  35-45 g surplus T for expansion or other strategic reserves.
C.            Tritium Extraction & Handling
•              Whether produced via lithium-6 doping (in metallic Li targets or Li-bearing coolant) or as a by-product of heavy-water operation, tritium must be removed from reactor systems.
•              Dedicated tritium recovery facilities (and possibly enrichment systems) are needed to purify T to weapons-grade quality.
•              This adds complexity and expense but is essential for ensuring a reliable supply of boost-quality tritium.

Plutonium and the Production of New Warheads
A.            Plutonium Availability
•              Short burnups (5-6 MWd/kg) at Khushab produce weapons-grade plutonium with  90 wt%  ²³⁹Pu.
•              Aggregate annual output from the four reactors can reach tens of kilograms of Pu-enough for several warheads if each requires 5-8 kg.
B.            Tritium-Driven Bottleneck
•              Even if plutonium is plentiful, tritium often becomes the limiting factor for assembling new boosted warheads.
•              With an estimated 35-45g leftover per year (after replenishing the existing stockpile), the amount of new weapons possible depends on each warhead’s T load.
C.            3-5 New Devices per Year
•              A typical boosted device might again use 10 g of tritium.
•              Given 35-45g of surplus, 3-4 new warheads per year are comfortably supported.
•              Some slight year-to-year variance (e.g., improved Li-6 doping or improved reactor uptime) might push this figure to 5 in especially productive periods.

Through these interwoven processes, Khushab’s reactors uphold Pakistan’s capacity to maintain an existing arsenal of 170 devices, each reliant on regular tritium top-ups, while still enabling an incremental growth in warhead count of 3-5 new boosted devices per year. The precise output each year hinges on reactor uptime, doping strategies, and reprocessing throughput-but in broad terms, this arrangement presents a robust pathway to sustaining and modestly expanding a plutonium-based, boosted weapon program.

Technical Underpinnings: Uranium Metal Fuel, Heavy Water Production, and Lithium-6
The Khushab reactors derive their unique dual-production capability-of weapons-grade plutonium and tritium-from a combination of fuel choices, moderator technology, and isotopic doping. This section delves deeper into these critical elements, explaining why uranium metal is chosen over typical uranium oxide, how heavy water is produced and utilized, and the significance of lithium-6 in enhancing tritium yields.
1.            Uranium Metal Fuel
a.            Why Metal Fuel Instead of Oxide
•              Higher Density: Uranium metal has a greater density of fissile atoms compared to uranium oxide (UO₂), which can favor faster conversion of ²³⁸Pu into ²³⁹Pu.
•              Rapid Neutron Economy: Short-cycle or low-burnup reactors benefit from a more reactive core at startup. Metal fuel offers improved thermophysical properties (higher thermal conductivity, more favorable neutronics) for breeding.
•              Easier Fuel Fabrication for Weapons-Grade Goals: When the objective is to discharge fuel early (at 5-6 MWd/kg) to preserve a high fraction of ²³⁹Pu, metal fuel rods can be replaced more readily without the complexities associated with longer-burnup oxide fuels.
b.            Drawbacks and Handling
•              Corrosion Sensitivity: Uranium metal can be more reactive with coolants and requires protective cladding (e.g., Zircaloy or stainless steel).
•              Higher Fabrication Cost: Producing and shaping metal fuel assemblies is more specialized than standard reactor-grade UO₂.
•              Weapons-Focused: The tradeoff is that metal fuel is far less efficient for electrical power generation at high burnups but is excellent for short, intense plutonium production cycles.
2. Heavy Water (D₂O) Production at Khushab
a.            Role of Heavy Water
•              Key Moderator: D₂O has a low neutron absorption cross section, making it ideal for fueling with natural or slightly enriched uranium.
•              Higher Conversion Ratio: The superior neutron economy means more neutrons survive to convert ²³⁸Pu  into ²³⁹Pu.
•              Tritium By-Product: As neutrons interact with deuterium nuclei, a fraction of them form tritium (3H), especially over multiple reactor cycles.
b.            Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S) Exchange Process
•              Industrial Setup: Pakistan relies on exchange towers where chemical equilibrium between hydrogen sulfide gas and liquid water progressively enriches deuterium.
•              Scalability: Multiple units and large volumes of H₂S allow for a steady throughput of deuterium, eventually yielding high-purity heavy water.
•              Onsite Integration: The Khushab site is believed to have its own heavy-water production facility, ensuring a domestic, uninterrupted supply crucial for fueling short cycles repeatedly.
c.             Moderator Management
•              In specialized “tritium core” or “co-production core” modes, operators may carefully monitor D₂O purity (removing contaminants, including the trace buildup of tritium) to maintain the moderator’s reactivity while also recovering the tritium.
3. Lithium-6 for Tritium Enhancement
a.            Capture Reaction
•              ⁶Li+n→α+³H: Lithium-6 has a high cross section for thermal neutrons, making it a potent driver for tritium production.
•              Metallic Targets or Coolant Doping: Li-bearing targets can massively boost T output. This approach is especially favored if the reactor runs in a “tritium” or “co-production” mode.
b.            Facility Requirements
•              Tritium Recovery: Post-irradiation, the tritium must be extracted-either from the coolant or from discrete target elements. This process demands specialized handling and radiochemical processing to achieve the high purity needed for weapons usage.
•              Cost & Complexity: Lithium doping adds extra costs and engineering overhead, but it allows operators to meet the arsenal’s T needs (both for replacing decayed tritium in existing warheads and for fueling new devices).
c.             Synergy with Heavy Water
•              While D₂O alone can produce some tritium via, ²H + n → ³H adding Li-6 significantly increases total tritium yield.
•              This synergy is pivotal in the “co-production” mode, ensuring there is enough T to match the volume of newly produced weapons-grade plutonium.

In essence, Khushab’s choice of uranium metal fuel, reliance on onsite heavy-water production, and selective use of lithium-6 doping are tightly interwoven strategies. They maximize plutonium quality and tritium yields, ensuring that Pakistan can both sustain its arsenal of 170 boosted devices over time and incrementally expand it by an estimated 3-5 new warheads per year in a “co-production” operational regime.

Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Fuel Cycle Management
While the Khushab reactors themselves lie at the core of Pakistan’s weapons-material generation, reprocessing of the discharged fuel is what ultimately unlocks the produced plutonium. In parallel, specialized tritium extraction processes ensure that any ³H generated-whether via lithium-6 targets or the heavy-water moderator-is recovered at sufficient purity for weaponization. This section explains how spent fuel reprocessing undergirds the entire cycle, from short core irradiation to final warhead production.
A.            Why Reprocessing Is Crucial
a.            Extracting Weapons-Grade Plutonium
•              When fuel is discharged at 5-6MWd/kg burnup, the newly formed ²³⁹Pu still resides within a matrix of other isotopes, fission products, and unburned uranium.
•              Chemical separation is necessary to isolate plutonium from this highly radioactive mix.
•              Pakistan’s known or suspected reprocessing sites (e.g., the New Labs facility at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology) handle this critical step.
b.            Closing the Loop
•              Because the short cycle discards fuel while most of its fissile potential remains untapped (intentionally so, to keep ²³⁹Pu pure), reprocessing recovers unburned uranium and the newly created plutonium.
•              If operators choose, they can blend the recovered uranium-now possibly enriched with some plutonium-back into fresh fuel elements, continuing the cycle.
c.             Resource Efficiency
•              Continuous or partial reloads, combined with reprocessing, drastically reduce the amount of fresh enriched uranium needed each year to maintain Khushab’s production tempo.
•              While not as resource-efficient as commercial high-burnup reactors, it is optimal for weapons purposes.
B.            Recovering Tritium from Heavy Water and Li-6 Targets
a.            Tritium Extraction Systems
•              When reactors are doped with lithium-6, a significant fraction of   will be created directly in targets or in Li-bearing coolant sections.
•              Specialized tritium extraction facilities (chemical or cryogenic separation steps) are required to separate the ³H from other hydrogen isotopes.
•              Heavy-water cleanup can also yield T, but only if there is an attached tritium recovery plant.
b.            Purification for Weapons Use
•              Weapons-usable tritium needs to be virtually free of other isotopes (especially ²H) and contaminants.
•              Techniques may involve vacuum distillation, isotopic exchange columns, or cryogenic distillation. These are expensive and demand meticulous handling protocols.
c.             Inventory Management
•              Given the short half-life (12.32 years), reprocessing staff must track how much T is lost over time and ensure just-in-time transfers from the reactor/coolant loops to storage before decay lowers its effective concentration.
•              The synergy of frequent reactor refueling and regular extraction cycles helps keep a steady flow of fresh T ready for warhead assemblies.
C. Short Refueling Cycles: Operational Footprint
a.            Batch vs. Continuous Replenishment
•              Batch Refueling: The reactor is shut down at the end of a short (100-200 day) run, all fuel is removed, and fresh or recycled fuel is loaded.
•              On-Power Refueling: Possible in some PHWR designs, where spent bundles are swapped out gradually so that the core remains critical without lengthy outages.
b.            Frequent Fuel Transfers
•              Whether batch or continuous, the net result is significantly more frequent spent fuel transfers to reprocessing sites than in a typical commercial reactor.
•              This heightened traffic in spent fuel casks or reprocessing shipments is a key indicator that short-burnup cycles-and thus weapons-grade objectives-are underway.
D.            Closing the Weapons Cycle
a.            Plutonium Metal Conversion
•              Once separated, plutonium nitrate or oxide solutions undergo further chemical processing to yield plutonium metal-the form typically needed for nuclear warhead cores.
•              Pakistan’s specialized metallurgical and chemical labs oversee these final steps, ensuring the Pu meets the design specifications of the warhead.
b.            Warhead Assembly
•              After plutonium metal and high-purity tritium are secured, warhead components (e.g., implosion systems, neutron initiators) are brought together in specialized weaponization facilities.
•              This final assembly is presumably integrated with delivery vehicles-ranging from short-range ballistic missiles to cruise missiles-forming the operational deterrent force.
c.             Annual Production Outlook
•              Frequent reprocessing + short cycle ->  a steady, if modest, throughput of  60+kg WGPu annually and  130-140g T (under realistic conditions).
•              Enough to sustain 170 existing devices and produce 3-5 new warheads each year, reinforcing Pakistan’s incremental arsenal growth policy.

Together, spent fuel reprocessing and tritium recovery provide the crucial last links in Khushab’s nuclear supply chain. Only by extracting and refining the plutonium to metallic form-and concurrently purifying tritium-can the raw output of these heavy-water reactors be transformed into fully assembled, boosted nuclear warheads. This cycle underscores the role that reprocessing plants and specialized tritium-handling facilities play in underpinning Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities.

Conclusion and Outlook
Over the course of these sections, we have traced how the Khushab nuclear complex in Pakistan accomplishes a dual mission of producing weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) and tritium (³H) through carefully managed reactor operations, specialized fuel choices, and systematic reprocessing. By leveraging heavy water moderators, uranium metal fuel, and lithium-6 doping, Khushab’s four heavy-water reactors can employ short irradiation cycles to secure high-purity plutonium (with ²³⁹Pu at 90 wt%) while also accumulating enough tritium to sustain and modestly expand its nuclear arsenal.

Kartikeya Sethi is the Founder CEO of Vel Atomics

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China has been pursuing a strategy to acquire influence in small island nations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a massive infrastructure development project that aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through a network of roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure projects.

In the IOR, China has been investing in infrastructure projects, such as building ports and airports, in small island nations like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Pakistan. These investments have been met with both praise and criticism, with some seeing them as a way to boost economic development and connectivity, while others see them as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of these projects, as well as the potential for debt-trap diplomacy. Additionally, there are concerns that these projects may not serve the best interests of the host countries and could lead to increased dependence on China.

China has also been increasing its presence in the IOR through its naval and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

Influence in Sri Lanka

China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka through a variety of means. One key way has been through infrastructure development projects, particularly those associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These projects include the construction of ports, airports, and highways, and are aimed at boosting economic development and connectivity in Sri Lanka.

One of the most notable infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka is the development of the port of Hambantota, which China has invested in and now operates. This has been met with criticism from some, as the port has been seen as a debt trap for Sri Lanka, and has raised concerns about China’s increasing control over strategically important infrastructure in the country.

China has also been investing in other infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka such as the Colombo International Financial City, and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport.

Another way China has been increasing its influence in Sri Lanka is through trade and investment. China is one of Sri Lanka’s top trading partners and investors, which has helped to boost the small island nation’s economy.

China has also been increasing its presence in Sri Lanka through its military and coast guard vessels, which have been patrolling the waters around the island nation and protecting its shipping lanes. This has raised concerns among other countries in the region and around the world, as it may be perceived as a way for China to assert its military and economic power in the region.

China’s Debt Trap

There are concerns that China has trapped Sri Lanka in a debt trap through infrastructure development projects, and that this may give China strategic advantages in the IOR, which could threaten India’s security. The Sri Lankan government, however, denies these claims and China has denied the use of debt-trap diplomacy.

One example is the development of the port of Hambantota. In 2010, Sri Lanka agreed to a deal with China to develop the port, which included a loan from China for $361 million. However, the port failed to generate enough revenue to cover the loan payments and Sri Lanka was unable to repay the debt. In 2017, as a result, Sri Lanka was forced to lease the port to China for 99 years to repay the debt.

This has raised concerns that the port, which is located close to India’s southern coast, could be used for military purposes by China, giving it a strategic advantage in the IOR and potentially threatening India’s security.

Another example is the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which were built with Chinese loans but have also failed to generate enough revenue to repay the debt.

Critics argue that this is a pattern of “debt-trap diplomacy” by China, in which it provides loans for infrastructure projects to developing countries, and then, when those countries are unable to repay the debt, uses that as leverage to gain control over strategically important assets.

It is worth noting that Sri Lanka has denied that this is the case and that it has not fallen into a debt trap. Furthermore, China has denied using debt-trap diplomacy, stating that the projects were agreed upon mutually and that the loans were offered on commercial terms.

India’s concerns over Chinese influence

India has expressed concerns over China’s increasing influence in Sri Lanka, particularly in the areas of infrastructure development and military presence.

One of the main concerns is the Hambantota port, which India sees as a potential military threat as it is located close to India’s southern coast. India fears that China may use the port for military purposes.

India has also been concerned about the Colombo International Financial City and the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, as it sees these projects as a way for China to gain greater economic and strategic control over Sri Lanka.

India is also worried about China’s growing military presence in Sri Lanka, as Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have been increasingly patrolling the waters around the island nation. This has raised concerns that China may be seeking to assert its military and economic power in the region.

India has responded to Chinese influence in Sri Lanka by increasing its own engagement with the island nation, through economic and development assistance, and by strengthening its own military presence in the IOR.

Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over the increasing frequency of Chinese submarine visits to Sri Lanka. These visits, which have occurred several times in recent years, are seen as a potential threat to India’s security and strategic interests in the IOR.

One concern is that these submarine visits could give China a military advantage in the region, as submarines are equipped with advanced stealth technology and can be used for a variety of purposes, including reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and power projection.

Another concern is that these visits could be part of a larger strategy by China to establish a foothold in the IOR.

India has also raised concerns about the potential for these submarine visits to be used for espionage or sabotage, as submarines are able to operate covertly and can access sensitive areas undetected.

In response to these concerns, India has also been building stronger ties with other countries in the region, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

Chinese spy ship visit to Sri Lanka

India has expressed concerns over Chinese spy ship visits to Sri Lanka, as these ships are equipped with advanced surveillance technology and can be used for intelligence gathering and monitoring activities in the IOR.

India is worried that these visits could be used to gather intelligence on India’s naval movements and military capabilities, as well as on its economic and political activities in the region. The Indian government is also concerned that these visits could be used to interfere with its trade and energy security in the region.

India is also worried about the potential for these spy ships to support the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could be used to assert China’s military and strategic interests in the region.

Chinese military aid to Sri Lanka

China has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance. This aid has been provided to help Sri Lanka improve its defense capabilities and maintain internal security.

China has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

China’s military aid to Sri Lanka has been met with both praise and criticism. Some have welcomed it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others have criticized it as a way for China to gain strategic footholds in the region and exert greater influence.

Critics have also raised concerns about the sustainability and feasibility of this aid, as well as the potential for it to be used to support human rights abuses by Sri Lankan government.

Indian military aid to Sri Lanka

India has provided military aid to Sri Lanka in the form of equipment, training, and technical assistance, which has been motivated by its desire to promote stability in the region and to counterbalance the influence of other countries. The aid has been met with mixed reactions, with some seeing it as a way to help Sri Lanka improve its defence capabilities and maintain internal security, while others view it as a way for India to exert greater influence in the region.

India has provided a range of military equipment to Sri Lanka, such as artillery, small arms, and naval vessels. It has also provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security. Some of the prominent items of military aid have been:

Small arms and ammunition. India has provided small arms such as rifles and pistols, as well as ammunition to Sri Lanka to help improve its defense capabilities.

Artillery. India has provided artillery equipment, such as howitzers and mortars, to Sri Lanka to help improve its artillery capabilities.

Naval vessels. India has provided naval vessels, such as patrol boats and fast attack craft, to Sri Lanka to help improve its maritime security capabilities.

Radars and surveillance equipment. India has provided radars and other surveillance equipment to Sri Lanka to help improve its coastal and maritime surveillance capabilities.

Training and technical assistance. India has provided training and technical assistance to Sri Lankan military personnel in areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and maritime security.

India has also been concerned about the potential for terrorism and extremism in Sri Lanka, and has provided aid to help Sri Lanka combat these threats.

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READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 1)

The Galwan Clash

A border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted on 5 May 2020. The face-off escalated after the Galwan Valley clashes.

On 15 June 2020, Chinese troops, estimated to be more than 250, attacked a group of 50 Indian soldiers who were inspecting the progress of the Chinese withdrawal from the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley. The encounter ended in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undeclared number of Chinese troops, and led to a prolonged standoff between the two sides.

There had not been a single death from hostilities at the LAC in over 45 years — since 1967 – despite several hundred Chinese LAC violations annually.

The Current Situation is not promising.

The 16th Border Meeting was held on 17 July 2022, a step-by-step de-escalation was agreed but very little progress has been made.

The stated Indian position has been that until and unless there is peace and tranquility on the border, overall China-India relations cannot much progress. So far, India has remained reluctant to engage China normally in the bilateral context.

Beijing has repeatedly said that border standoff does not represent the entirety of China-India relations, while New Delhi has maintained that peace along the frontier is essential for the two countries to work together.

Chinese violations the LAC in all sectors are growing in frequency – up to 660 LAC violations by the PLA in 2019. There is an uncommon level of hostility, including fist-fighting and rock throwing that were rare prior to 2017.

The trends suggest LAC standoffs are growing more hostile, more frequent, longer in duration, and are receiving more media coverage and international attention, potentially restricting both sides’ room for manoeuvre.

There is a substantial massing of military forces in Ladakh to positions near the LAC.

Why Did China Resort to Aggression?

Some of the likely reasons are discussed below

Infrastructure Development. There has been an acceleration of Indian infrastructure development near the LAC in an attempt to close a substantial deficit with China there.  In April 2019, India completed work on the critical Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road running parallel to the LAC in Ladakh, stretching all the way to its northernmost outpost at Daulet Beg Oldi. More recently, India began building east-west feeder roads from DSDBO to its forward outposts near the LAC. This year, India was also reportedly engaged in efforts to improve road infrastructure at Pangong Lake.

China has attempted to pressure India to halt infrastructure activities. India refused to heed China’s calls; the PLA applied military pressure. Only this time with more troops, more equipment, more locations, more pressure, and one potentially bold attempt to change the status quo at Pangong Lake.

India continues to construct and modernize over 60 “strategic roads” along the LAC, with an expected completion date of 2022.

Galwan River area has now become a hotspot because it is where the LAC is closest to the new road India has built along the Shyok River to DBO – the most remote and vulnerable area along the LAC in Ladakh.

Major Power Diplomacy. China tried to woo India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making it a key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative. India declined.

China’s Neighborhood Strategy. China wants to effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties.  It wants to have a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region.

Blame for Pandemic. China believed that India was catalyzing resentment against Beijing over poor handling of the pandemic that originated in Wuhan. India took over as the chair of the WHO executive Board on 22 May 2020 and it had a say in the probe into the origins of the pandemic and Taiwan’s participation in the 72nd session of the World Health Assembly.

Internal Dissent. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced one of the biggest crises since the party came to power in 1949 because of dissatisfaction in handling the pandemic and the consequent surge in economic distress. At the NPC plenary, President Xi’s expected message was conciliatory to the domestic audience, while the international assertion was to be robust and defiant.

Restrictions on Chinese investments. The Chinese government took offence to India’s new rule notified in early April 2020 that blocked Chinese companies from acquiring Indian firms without government approval. The Indian government decided that all procurement orders of Rs 200 crore or less could not go to foreign companies. It could discourage cheap exports from China. Since the clash, India has also banned 224 Chinese Apps and a few dozen Chinese companies are facing tax evasion scrutiny including ZTE, Huawei, One Plus, Xiaomi and Vivo.

Change of J&K Status. India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution on Jammu & Kashmir, which provided the province special status and autonomy on 5 Aug 2019. J&K was made a Union Territory directly administered from Delhi. China described India’s move as “unacceptable”, undermining its “sovereignty” — even raised the issue at the UN Security Council. Frequent calls have been made by Indians to integrate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit- Baltistan as these territories rightfully belong to India. China is concerned about these demands since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is part of the ‘China Dream’ and the Karakoram Highway passes through these Indian territories to Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea.

India’s Accelerating Partnership with the US. China is concerned with India’s increasing and growing proximity to the US which it belives is aimed at countering China. Some of the developments which have taken place are

•             Major Non-NATO Defense Partner with all basic enabling agreements in place.

•             Over $20 billion in defense sales to India MQ-9B unmanned aerial systems; P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, C-130J transport aircraft, C-17 planes, MH-60R multi mission maritime helicopters, AH-64 Apache helicopters, CH-47 Chinook helicopters)

•             U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative

•             Institutionalised 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (2018)

•             Quad Initiative (March 2021).

•             Exemption from buying the S-400 Triumf AD systems from Russia

•             Malabar joint exercises

•             Close collaboration in Covid-19 response

•             Counterterrorism Joint Working Group

•             Homeland Security Dialogue

•             Counter Narcotics Working Group

The Ukraine War

With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.

India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis.

The PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.

Apart from conventional military capabilities, China’s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.

India’s Encirclement By China

New Delhi has numerous other concerns regarding China’s activities in almost all of India’s neighbouring countries.

Today, China with its unmistakable clout in South and Southeast Asia has used its economic-political-military influence, in intensifying its ties with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Maldives causing Indo-China political and security discord.

According to the US annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 2020” the Pentagon says that in addition to the Chinese military base in Djibouti, China is seeking to set up military logistics facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In addition, China is considering to base its military logistics and infrastructure in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan.

China is using the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative first announced in 2013, to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.

While China finances the developmental projects in target countries, information about its loaning operations are kept secretive and vague. Consequently, governments of BRI countries end up being completely unaware of the amount of money that they owe to China when contracts expire since loans extended to Chinese state-owned companies, banks, special purpose vehicles, joint ventures, and private sector institutions. The terms and conditions of the loans give China the right to use the finished projects and land as collateral if the latter were to default on loan repayments.

Potentially, these projects, when taken over could provide a global PLA military logistics network to interfere with military operations against China and support its own offensive operations as the Chinese global military objectives evolve.

Let us look at Chinese inroads into India’s neighbouring countries.

Myanmar

Myanmar is also part of BRI and likely to face the Chinese Debt Trap. There is also a lack of trust on the Myanmar side, due to China’s historical role in supporting rebel groups in Myanmar.

China and Myanmar share a 2,227-kilometer-long border. They have a boundary protocol signed in 1961, to conduct joint inspections every five years. But this has only occurred twice—in 1984-86 and 1992-95. A dispute over the border between Myanmar’s northern Shan State and China has simmered since 2008. Parts of the 200 km fence built by China have been pulled down by locals. The Chinese government is pushing Myanmar to implement the long-delayed Belt and Road Initiative projects and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Chinese townships are coming up inside Myanmar border areas administered by Wa authorities. The expansion of Chinese influence is obvious.

The CMEC will terminate at a new deep-water port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Some analysts have raised fears that the port could someday be used as a base or access point by the PLA.

China has a maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence station on Great Coco Island in Myanmar. The Chinese Army is also building a base on Small Coco Island in the Alexandra Channel between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea north of India’s Andaman Islands. These two islands, which have been leased to China since 1994.

Bangladesh

China is considered as an ‘all-weather friend’ of Bangladesh – Their ties cover geopolitical, economic spheres and defence ties form a key area of their relationship.

Bangladesh forms part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative-BRI. But all is not well between their ties. China tends to interfere with Bangladesh’s foreign relations matters.

Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jimming, on May 10, 2021, warned Dhaka against joining the QUAD and said that if Bangladesh did so, it will “substantially damage” bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China.

China accounted for around 74 percent of Bangladesh’s arms imports between 2010– 2019 including submarines.

Bhutan

Bhutan shares an over 400-km-long border with China and the two countries have held over 24 rounds of boundary talks in a bid to resolve the dispute.

Bhutan and China issued a 1988 Joint Communique on the Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary and signed agreement on the maintenance of peace, tranquillity and status quo in the Bhutan-China Border areas in Kunming in April 2021.

China is using all tactics available to it for twisting Bhutan’s arms. China has established new villages roads and military or police outposts in disputed Bhutanese territory.

The Chinese game plan is probably to exchange it for another disputed pocket around Doklam, in western Bhutan at the cost of India’s security.

China seems to have managed to effectively lower India’s influence in Bhutan.

Nepal

China is trying to succeed in replacing India as the key economic as well as security partner for Nepal.

China’s main interest in Nepal has always been led by its concerns over Tibet. 25,000 Tibetans live in Nepal.

The Chinese have always considered Nepal the soft underbelly of Southern Tibet and are now determined to keep it under their influence.

Under a Marxist government, Nepal is trying to reshape its ties with China as a possible counterweight to India by proposing extension of their railway network from Tibet to Nepal, infratsructure projects and providing land link to Chinese ports.

Nepal as a buffer is important for India but India is losing its clout in Nepal to China.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka joined China’s BRI with several projects but now Colombo has fallen into the premeditated scheme of a Chinese debt trap, paying off its loans through debt-equity swaps to creating extra-jurisdictional Special Economic Zones.

An often-cited example of the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ is the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, where the local government was forced to sign the port away on a 99-year lease after failing to repay Chinese loans.

For India, Lanka is an island that can be transformed into a veritable enemy aircraft carrier anchored on her doorstep, within strike range. Sri Lanka is also a potential kick-off point for an Antarctica mission at some future point.

Maldives

Maldives is barely 70 nautical miles away from Minicoy island in India’s Lakshadweep archipelago and 300 nautical miles away from India’s west coast.

Until 2017, Maldives was part of the Indian security grid receiving defence and economic assistance from India.

In 2013, after Abdulla Yameen came to power, Xi visited Maldives. Maldives joined the Maritime Silk Road and the two nations inked a free trade agreement. Chinese infrastructure projects flourished. Maldives accumulated a debt of nearly $3.1 billion (GDP $4 billion). There have been speculations about a possible Chinese naval base in Maldives. However, since Ibrahim Mohamed Solih came to power as president in 2018 after defeating Yameen, India has been prioritized over China.

Pakistan

China’s “irreplaceable, all-weather friend” Pakistan is China’s biggest arms buyer, counting for nearly 47% of Chinese arms exports.

China has established ammunition factories, provided technological assistance and modernised existing facilities.

The Chinese Chengdu J-10B fighter and Low to Medium Altitude Air Defence System (LOMADS) LY-80 has been supplied to the Pakistan Air Force. The Chinese have provided technology to manufacture JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, AWACS systems and Al-Khalid tanks.

China is the largest investor in Pakistan’s Gwadar Deep Sea Port, which is located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.

China played a major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, such as in building the Khushab reactor (for production of plutonium) and the completion of the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex and plutonium reprocessing facility.

China inroads in  Pakistan/Sindh/Baluchistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, under the garb of BRI and strategic importance attached by it to China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are an open secret.

India’s Opposition to CPEC. India has not endorsed the CPEC because it passes through the contested Gilgit-Baltistan region that remains, according to India, under the illegal occupation of Pakistan.

It is crucial for China to gain control over the Gilgit-Baltistan region (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir PoK), as the region borders the Xinjiang province of China.

CPEC would link Pakistan’s southern Gwadar port in Balochistan on the Arabian Sea to China’s western Xinjiang region. It also includes plans to create road, rail and oil pipeline links to improve connectivity between China and the Middle East.

Gwadar port, located on the Arabian Sea, will allow China to have a say in global energy economics as the country can use a naval base to hold control over the maritime traffic passing between West Asia.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochement Between India and China? (Part 3)

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Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has already shown how unexpected shocks can drive the international situation in unexpected directions. Moreover, China has serious liabilities that could impair its ability to compete with the United States. Some of these have been posited by Chinese analysts and commentators, but others can be deduced by analysis. The most-important vulnerabilities highlighted by Chinese leaders center on the country’s domestic situation.

China continues to face severe economic imbalances, problems of corruption, regional unrest, and daunting demographic challenges. In terms of international attributes, China suffers from a position of disadvantage as the rising power. It has a weaker leadership role in multilateral venues and an inferior influence on global discourse than the incumbent power, the United States. China’s defense strategy has drawbacks as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains an unattractive partner for many countries, especially in Asia. And the military’s lack of power-projection capabilities limits its ability to provide the public security goods that helped make U.S. global leadership so successful. These vulnerabilities suggest advantages for the United States, but they also underscore areas that China could address in coming years if it hopes to improve its competitive position. One final point deserves emphasis. The most-critical factors that will determine the outcome of U.S.-China competition are fundamentally domestic.

Which side can build the more technologically innovative and prosperous economy, flourishing and well-governed society, and durable and responsive politics will likely be the side to gain a decisive advantage in competition. A thorough analysis of the potential trajectory of U.S.- China competition would examine such variables closely, but such a task lies beyond the scope of this analysis. The importance of domestic policy should nonetheless be borne in mind when analyzing the international and defense dimensions of competitive strategies.

The research carries several implications for U.S. decision-makers and the Department of Defense (DoD). The first is the enduring importance of strengthening America’s network of alliances and partnerships. China recognizes this network to be a tremendous strategic advantage for the United States, one that Beijing has struggled to match. This analysis has underscored the importance of initiatives undertaken by the past two presidential administrations to shore up U.S. influence and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific remains a critical domain of U.S.-China competition, and its importance for the broader global competition merits emphasis. U.S. policies that facilitate China’s consolidation of influence and leadership in the Indo-Pacific could simply accelerate Beijing’s efforts to challenge U.S. leadership at the global-systemic level.

The importance of areas outside the Indo-Pacific and of developing countries as constituencies for international leadership deserves emphasis as well. China’s cultivation of client states and influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America could directly affect the ability of the United States to compete in the Indo-Pacific. As one example, Chinese success in consolidating influence with vital energy suppliers in the Middle East could affect the ability and willingness of countries like Japan and India to support measures that constrain Chinese power. The need to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo- Pacific may need to be balanced by the need to uphold U.S. credibility as a global leader. At the very least, closer coordination between competitive strategies both within and outside the Indo-Pacific will be imperative. In terms of developing countries, China’s lack of allies leaves it in a weak position to challenge the United States. Washington could strengthen its hand further by bolstering its relationships with those states that have only recently experienced substantial growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Given the long-term trends favoring the rise of the “non-West,” cultivation of support in the developing world appears prudent in any case.

While multilateral organizations and institutions for global governance have endured considerable criticism for their many failings and inefficiencies, this research has concluded that engagement with those entities will remain an important component of U.S.-China competition. Greater U.S. investments in shaping and reinvigorating international institutions and multilateral venues can help consolidate U.S. influence and restrain Chinese challenges. In some cases, this may involve initiatives to grant China more influence and extend cooperation. The goal here, as in other areas, is to weaken the force of Chinese criticisms by demonstrating responsive, effective U.S. leadership, thereby reducing the incentive for other countries to back Beijing’s efforts to renovate those organizations in ways that harm U.S. interests. In terms of defense strategy, the posited strategy has emphasized the importance of deterrence, crisis management, and military diplomacy in the competition. As presented in this report,  China’s defense strategy could expand the geographic range of potential crisis situations and contingencies. Along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) routes and as part of the effort to expand a network of client states worldwide, China has a strong incentive to offer arms sales, military training, and other forms of assistance. Such transactions have been increasing in recent years. In coming years, China may take on even more security responsibilities to protect its BRI investments. An imperative to demonstrate its credibility as a patron to client nations could incentivize PLA forces to carry out more-frequent acts of military diplomacy that coerce U.S. allies or partners, or even to contemplate the development of alliance-like obligations.

These possibilities suggest that the U.S. military faces a compelling need to bolster conventional deterrence and invest in capabilities to ensure the superiority of the armed forces in the future. A focus on traditional deterrence through conventional military superiority remains the bedrock of any security strategy to counter China. A robust U.S. military capability to defend its interests and those of its allies and partners provides a critical source of U.S. credibility as a leader in the Indo-Pacific. A strong conventional military capability is also essential for incentivizing regional powers, such as Japan, Vietnam, and others, to resist Chinese coercion and demands. By contrast, clear evidence that the United States had lost the military advantage could persuade other countries to either adopt a position of tacit submission and accommodation to Chinese demands or step up a potentially destabilizing arms race to shore up their defense.

Ensuring the capability to deter China in the short term will remain critical, but investment to ensure long-term advantage will be critical as well. Sustaining investment in the future capabilities of the U.S. military will be essential not just for ensuring the long-term credibility of U.S. deterrence, but also for bolstering America’s position in the broader competition. Finding ways to better protect U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific but also in the cyber, space, and other domains can backstop broader competitive efforts. DoD may need to maintain a significant presence in the Middle East and other theaters to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Strengthening U.S. conventional capabilities and investing in a technologically advanced future force remain critical tasks. But military diplomacy could assume greater importance, too. The diplomatic struggle for influence and leadership suggests that the U.S. military could play an important role in incentivizing cooperation with the United States and helping countries resist unreasonable Chinese demands. U.S. experience in military advisory missions and assistance can help strengthen diplomatic partnerships and counter Chinese influence efforts. The provision of public goods, such as security for key shipping lanes and humanitarian aid in the face of disaster, can help maintain the appeal of the United States as the global leader.

As the competition intensifies, U.S. military planners may need to expand the portfolio of possible contingencies involving China. The flashpoints between the United States and China today may not be flashpoints in the future, or they may coexist alongside new ones. Scenarios involving Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and cyberspace tend to occupy the concerns of military planners today, but these issues may be augmented by new ones that arise from China’s efforts to exert greater leadership, especially along its BRI routes and with client states on other continents. As just one illustration, China’s willingness to court Iran despite U.S. sanctions raises the possibility over time of proxy conflicts between forces backed by China and those by the United States in the Middle East. The more that China assumes the role of patron for client states, the higher the likelihood that, at some point, PLA forces or Chinese-backed host nation forces could engage in hostile acts against parties aligned with the United States.

The appeal and feasibility of Chinese military efforts to resolve longstanding issues, such as Taiwan, may need to be reexamined through the lens of the broader competition as well. From Beijing’s perspective, the potential cost and risk of escalation in war increase the more the competition with the United States intensifies. Thus, it is in China’s interest to delay the resolution of Taiwan’s status and that of other disputed regions until it has prevailed in its competition with the United States. This might mean that Beijing tolerates a stable cross-strait relationship premised on Taiwan’s rejection of formal independence so long as the United States retains the international upper hand and a credible military intervention option. Other PLA missions may be more pressing for the near term. However, the calculus could change, should China succeed in gaining a decisive competitive advantage in international and regional leadership and in its military posture near Taiwan. Similarly, China may regard as satisfactory a continued reliance on gray-zone tactics that incrementally change the status quo within the first island chain in a low-risk manner while it prioritizes efforts to weaken the U.S. position in Asia and elsewhere. To maximize deterrence and the protection of U.S. interests, the defense and foreign policy dimensions of any U.S. competitive strategy may need to be even more closely coordinated.

Any Chinese deliberation on how to tailor the controlled use of force in any confrontation involving U.S.-backed forces would carry serious risks, of course. The dangers of escalation and miscalculation paradoxically underscore the importance of finding ways for both countries to cooperate and ease tensions as a component of successful competition. The development of a strategy that includes some degree of reassurance and cooperation could help stabilize the competition and reduce risks of miscalculation and dangerous incidents. Moreover, as the international security environment experiences more fragmentation and breakdown, collaboration between the world’s two largest powers could prove nearly unavoidable in any case.

The return of great-power competition after decades of unchallenged U.S. global primacy has introduced new challenges and risks. Washington enters the contest burdened by fiscal strains, domestic political polarization, and competing international and domestic priorities. These constraints raise the imperative of developing effective strategies that allocate resources efficiently and effectively. The derivation of a Chinese strategy can, hopefully, provide a useful tool for that important task.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

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This was seen as a foreign policy move that has not yet been taken by China or Russia, both of which have close strategic and economic ties with these five countries. With growing Chinese footprints in these countries in both the defence and security segment as well as the economic sphere, it has become imperative for India to have a “robust foothold” there, sources said.

India, which considers the Central Asian countries part of its “extended neighbourhood”, firmed up plans to hold the summit meeting when the foreign ministers of these countries visited New Delhi in December 2021 for the third round of the India-Central Asia Dialogue.

India had invited the presidents of the five Central Asian nations as chief guests at the Republic Day celebrations, which was to be followed by a summit meeting, but the plans were cancelled due to the spiralling third wave of the Covid pandemic.

PM Narendra Modi’s Address

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, addressing the virtual summit featuring presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyz Republic, on 27 January, talked about an ‘ambitious vision’ for the future.

In his initial remarks at the Summit, Modi said, “We all are concerned about the Afghan situation and this makes cooperation between India and Central Asia all the more important for regional stability and security.”

The prime minister called for defining an ambitious vision for cooperation between India and Central Asia in the coming years.

Mutual cooperation between India and Central Asia is essential for regional security and prosperity, Modi said.

Modi had paid a visit to all Central Asian countries in 2015. Subsequently, there have been exchanges at high levels at bilateral and multilateral forums.

The event was held to commemorate 30 years of the establishment of India’s diplomatic relations with these nations, witnessed unanimity on taking cooperation to the next level for boosting regional connectivity and security. The leaders agreed on considerably enhancing India-Central Asia trade, which is only about $2 billion at present, nowhere near China’s over $40 billion.

The prime minister and the five presidents decided to set up a joint working group on Afghanistan, with a broad consensus emerging on issues such as combating terrorism and drug trafficking.

Increased Significance

In July 2015, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit all Central Asian countries to boost strategic and trade ties. He also met the leaders of these countries in 2018 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting that was held in Qingdao. However, the strategic importance of the five Central Asian countries “has increased” ever since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021. New Delhi believes these countries will prove to be beneficial for India in having some sort of a channel open with the Taliban regime that is currently in power in Kabul, they said, even as the Modi government has started sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

Ties between India and Central Asia started taking a decisive turn as the US government signed the so-called peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020, and fears began to mount about Afghanistan in the aftermath of the NATO’s pullout. Prior to that India mostly looked at Central Asia from the perspective of energy ties.

As India closed all its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan, it also took the initiative to host the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue in November 2021, which was chaired by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. All security chiefs from the five Central Asian nations attended the meeting along with Russia and Iran, to send a message to the Taliban government.

Chinese Influence

New Delhi’s Central Asian outreach assumes significance amid China’s efforts to strengthen ties with these nations that are part of the eight-member SCO, which also includes India. What gives Beijing a geopolitical edge is the fact that it shares borders with three of the five countries.

Two days before the India summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping interacted with Central Asian leaders and announced an assistance of $500 million to support livelihood programmes in these former Soviet bloc countries. He also listed several big projects of strategic importance that had been completed, including the China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline, the China-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway and the China-Tajikistan expressway. In a bid to counter the Chinese challenge, India has extended a $1-billion line of credit for infrastructure development projects and offered to provide more training slots and scholarships to meet the requirements of Central Asian countries.

After the recent unrest in Kazakhstan, Russia sent troops there as part of a peacekeeping mission to restore order, while China firmly backed the beleaguered nation’s efforts to curb violence.

Background

“The inception of the India-Central Asia Dialogue at foreign ministers’ level, the 3rd meeting of which was held in New Delhi from 18 to 20 December 2021, has provided an impetus to India-Central Asia relations,” said an official statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs.

“The participation of the secretaries of National Security Councils of Central Asian countries in the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan held in New Delhi on 10 November 2021 outlined a common regional approach on Afghanistan,” it added.

The issue of maintaining close ties with the Central Asian countries, when it comes to Afghanistan, was something that was also discussed between Prime Minister Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the India-Russia Summit held in December 2021.

Besides, India is also keen to strengthen trade and energy ties with the Central Asian countries with a focus on increasing connectivity. New Delhi has pushed for the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the TAPI (Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India) pipeline for natural gas during the summit.

Comments

The summit is a huge stride for India’s diplomacy and is a first step to carve out its zone of influence.

India should know what it wants out of the Central Asian region and use its influence accordingly. Countries with interests in Central Asia have their own groupings and connect: China from economic (BRI), Russia from strategic (CSTO), Turkey from ethnic (Turkic Council), and the Islamic world from the religious (OIC) It would be befitting for India to give a poignant cultural and historical perspective to the region through a summit-level annual meet. The aims are different – targeting Russia, sabotaging China’s BRI, thrusting Islamisation, economic linkages, military cooperation, trade, lobbying, etc.

Since the region is a critical lynchpin to India’s security policy, the summit will have a waterfall impact to facilitate India’s multifaceted approach towards the region. Central Asia carries no specific stance towards any country, with the exception of Russia. While their strategic visions are often  opaque, they are wary of China.

For three decades, Central Asia remained a cauldron of outside actors. Today, the main security provider to the region is Moscow, which considers Central Asia as its ‘near abroad.’

After the US forces left Afghanistan overnight, the Islamists too have been eyeing to launch their holy jihads to establish new Khilafats there. Regional analysts have estimated that some 8,000 ISIS and Takfiri extremists have been waiting in North Afghanistan to infiltrate across the 2,245 km long porous border.

While leaders of all five states of the CAR have visited India, yet, India’s commercial success has been negligible at a paltry $1.4 billion trade in 2019.

In 2017, India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) but SCO is only a sluice gate to regulate the Russian and Chinese and prevent them from dominating the region. Moscow tends to use it for regulating India-China tensions.

India’s civilisational influence and still enjoys a range of attributes. The Ferghana Valley was India’s crossing-point (to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) on the Great Silk Road to connect with China and Europe. Buddhism spread to the rest of Asia from here. This can be the basis of an annual summit. A string of cultural events highlighting the facets of medieval culture, art and painting, including Sufi traditions, should be highlighted.

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India said in a UN Security Council (UNSC) debate, on 25 January,  that member states are fully aware that Pakistan has a long history of harbouring, helping, and actively supporting terrorists during a UNSC debate on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict.” Underscoring the threat of terrorism to civilians, Counsellor in India’s Permanent Mission to the UN, R Madhu Sudan said that the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terror attack continue to have Pakistan’s support.

The Indian Counsellor made these remarks after a Pakistani diplomat misused the platform provided by the UN to “propagate false and malicious propaganda” against India. “This is not the first time that a Pakistani representative has used a UN platform to spread false and malicious propaganda against my country, attempting in vain to divert the world’s attention away from the sad state of his country where terrorists have free reign and the lives of ordinary people, particularly minorities, are turned upside down,” he said.

“This is a country that has been identified as a global terrorist sponsor and holds the world record for hosting the most terrorists sanctioned by the Security Council.” So much so that today’s terrorist attacks all around the world have their origins in Pakistan in some way or another,” he claimed.

Madhu Sudan reminded the Security Council that Pakistan’s prime minister and foreign minister had been chastised for aiding terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden, but they continue on their merry way.

“Today, we’re talking about civilian protection. Terrorists pose the greatest threat to civilians. As we previously stated, the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terror incident continue to enjoy the support of the state she represents,” he continued.

The Indian Counsellor reaffirmed that “the entire Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh were, are, and always will be an integral and inalienable part of India, irrespective of what Pakistan representation feels… We call upon Pakistan to promptly quit all regions under its unlawful occupation.

“Madhu Sudan stated that India wishes to have normal and friendly ties with all countries, including Pakistan, and that it is committed to amicably resolving any unresolved concerns, as per the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.

“However, any genuine debate can only take place in a free of terror, animosity, and violence environment. Pakistan is responsible for creating such an environment. India would continue to take robust and decisive action until then.

On the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, Madhu Sudan reiterated that the entire J&K and Ladakh were, are and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India, irrespective of what Pakistan representative believes. “We call upon Pakistan to immediately vacate all areas under its illegal occupation,” the Indian Counsellor said. .

“However, any meaningful dialogue can only be held in an atmosphere free of terror, hostility and violence. The onus is on Pakistan to create such a conducive atmosphere. Till then, India will continue to take firm and decisive steps to respond to cross border terrorism,” he added.

No Common Definition of Terrorism

The United Nations member states have failed themselves by continuing to procrastinate on concluding a comprehensive convention against international terrorism, India has said, voicing concern that the global body has neither agreed on a common definition of terrorism nor crafted a well-coordinated policy to tackle the global scourge and dismantle its enabling networks.

Speaking in the UNGA meeting to consider the Report of Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation, Second Secretary in India’s Permanent Mission to the UN Dinesh Setia, on 24 January, said: “Our inability to seriously address terrorism, the most dangerous of scourges faced by states and societies since the World War II, casts doubt on the relevance of the organisation for the very people whom the Charter of the United Nations obliges us to protect”.

“The United Nations has yet to agree on a common definition, let alone craft a coherent well-coordinated policy to tackle terrorism and dismantle its enabling networks. We have failed ourselves by continuing to procrastinate on concluding a comprehensive convention against international terrorism,” he said.

India proposed a draft document on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN in 1986 but it has not been implemented yet as there is no unanimity on the definition of terrorism among the member states.

The Indian diplomat further said that the effectiveness, relevance and longevity of any institution lie in its dynamic character and ability to adapt itself to the changing times.

“As long as the key organs of the organisation remain anchored in a governance structure frozen in the past, the crisis of legitimacy and performance will persist,” Setia said.

Lamenting that four decades have gone by since the inscription of the item on the reform of the Security Council on the agenda of the General Assembly, Setia called on member states to strive to ensure that this year is the one that finally delivers some concrete progress with regard to a Security Council and a United Nations that reflect the realities of the contemporary world.

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Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 2)

RAND Corpn completed a research in Aug 2020, sponsored by the Office of the US Secretary of Defense, exploring possible international and defense strategies that China might employ to outcompete the United States and achieve a position of international primacy. The posited strategies, although created by the authors (TIMOTHY R. HEATH, DEREK GROSSMAN, ASHA CLARK), are framed by findings regarding Chinese political processes, concepts, policies, and national goals.

The purpose of the analysis was threefold: to support U.S. planning and decision-making, to educate readers about China’s strategy and policymaking process, and to spur discussion about the stakes and nature of the competition.

Here is an Executive Summary.

U.S.-China relations have entered a new phase characterized by sharpening competition. As the gap in comprehensive national power has narrowed, Beijing’s pursuit of national revitalization has coincided with a deepening of tensions with the United States over long-standing disputes regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the U.S. military presence in Asia. In addition, new points of contention, including China’s crackdown on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and escalating feuds over trade and technology have pushed bilateral ties to their worst condition in decades. Even shared threats, such as the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, have proved to be occasions for the two sides to trade accusations and compete for influence. The unsettled relationship between the world’s two largest economies has unnerved the international community. More ominously, observers anxiously warn of the risk that the intensifying rivalry could follow a well-established pattern of conflict between rising and status quo great powers.

Chinese authorities frankly acknowledge the inevitability of competition but reject the notion that conflict is inevitable. This perspective suggests that Beijing recognizes the importance of having a

balanced and nuanced competitive strategy that avoids disastrous missteps. No official Chinese document that outlines a strategy for managing competition with the United States is known to exist. If it does exist, its contents have not been made available to the public, nor should we expect Beijing to publish them, given the sensitivity of the topic. Yet the questions that any such strategy might have addressed remain imperative. How should we understand Beijing’s approach to the competition with the United States? What might be Beijing’s desired end state for the bilateral relationship? What does success in the competition mean to China? What foreign policy and defense-related objectives regarding the United States might China have? What might Beijing view as vulnerabilities in its approach? This research aims to shed light on such questions.

Focusing on the foreign policy and defense dimensions of the competition, the authors propose with this research to make three contributions.

First and foremost, we intend the report to serve as a planning tool by positing international and defense strategies that could allow China to outcompete the United States. Such a tool could facilitate U.S. government efforts to formulate its own strategies and policies to protect U.S. interests. Second, the analysis is meant to educate readers on how the Chinese view the competition with the United States.

In hopes of more closely approximating how Beijing might actually conceptualize the competition, the authors aim to reflect a Chinese perspective as much as possible. Third, we seek to raise awareness and encourage greater public debate about the stakes of a U.S.-China competition that has expanded in scope and complexity.

Because the authors seek to present competitive strategies from a Chinese perspective, we rely primarily on unclassified Chinese documents. U.S.-China relations remains a topic of intense interest among Chinese officials and analysts. An enormous volume of official documents, commentaries, and scholarly writings has examined the relationship from many angles. This literature provides an important resource for discerning key themes and ideas in Chinese policy and debates. As much as possible, the team from the RAND Corporation has sought to adhere to the same authoritative sources and intellectual materials that Chinese officials would draw from to develop any foreign policy or defense strategy document. In addition to these documents, the authors also examined Western reporting and  academic scholarship on issues related to the U.S.-China competition.

As presented by the authors, China’s international strategy aims to establish the country’s primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. It also seeks to establish Chinese leadership of the international order. However, China’s contest for global leadership need not wait until after it has secured regional primacy. The strategy proposes that China pursue both at the same time, underpinned by the notion that progress toward either regional- or global-level objectives could enable progress toward the other. If successful, China will have surpassed the United States to become the paramount regional power and the leading global power. However, China’s international leadership would bear little resemblance to the forms exercised by previous global leaders such as the United States and Great Britain. Exercising a partial global hegemony centered principally on Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, Chinese international leadership would be characterized by a reliance on finance, diplomatic engagement, and security assistance to exercise influence while maintaining a modest overseas military presence.

As posited by the authors, China’s standard for successful competition with the United States thus entails the following conditions by midcentury:

(1) War with the United States is avoided, although this does not exclude the possibility of militarized crises or conflicts of a limited scope (e.g., proxy wars);

(2) The United States respects China’s authority as the global leader, even as the United States remains a powerful, but clearly inferior, nation;

(3) The United States largely refrains from harming Chinese interests;  

(4) China has established primacy across much of Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, principally through patronage of client states;

(5) U.S. primacy has been reduced to the Americas, although it may still maintain a military, economic, and diplomatic presence worldwide;

(6) The United States and China manage their differences according to norms upheld by China; and

(7) The two cooperate on shared concerns on terms defined largely by the Chinese.

The consequences of Chinese success in strategic competition could be severe for the United States. Sitting astride the heart of the global economy, Beijing would be well situated to privilege its needs and those of its clients over those of the United States and its allies.

This situation would likely entail a deleterious downgrading in the prospects for the United States. Poorly positioned to unseat China or easily reverse its own flagging fortunes, the United States could face dwindling economic prospects, international marginalization, and a diminishing ability to shape global affairs.

The international strategy presented seeks to achieve this end state through peaceful methods, although it does not rule out the possibilities of militarized crises or even conflicts of a limited scope, such as proxy wars. The core of the proposed international strategy is a reliance on China’s economic prowess and diplomatic maneuver to put Beijing into a position of advantage from which it cannot be dislodged by the United States. Regarding major powers, the posited strategy seeks to ensure the United States and Europe remain divided in their approach to China while Russia cooperates closely as a junior partner.

The Asia-Pacific region remains a priority area, and the strategy envisions Beijing weakening U.S. alliances, expanding its own network of client states, renovating and leading regional multilateral institutions, and deepening the region’s integration into a Chinese-led economic, political, and technological order. Beijing regards the developing world as a key constituency for its international leadership, and the strategy posited here aims to build a network of client states across Eurasia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Chinese success in establishing itself as a principal arbiter in Middle Eastern affairs, as the main sponsor of Africa’s economic development, and as a major partner in Latin America could result in a severe weakening in the strategic position of the United States as a global leader and undercut its position in the Indo-Pacific theater as well. In the multilateral domain, the strategy envisions a broad effort to shape rules, norms, and agendas to favor the interests of China and its clients at the expense of the United States.

Beijing’s global governance strategy similarly aims to bolster China’s influence and delegitimize that of the United States in appropriate venues. For each section of this chapter, the authors have proposed objectives for the 2035 time frame that could guide the development of relevant criteria against which China’s progress could be assessed. An appendix offers some sample subobjectives that could be used to evaluate Chinese progress toward relevant objectives.

Defense strategy plays an important but supplementary role to the proposed Chinese international strategy. A complementary defense strategy would aim to constrain Washington’s ability to forestall or prevent its own eclipse by building a superior Chinese military that renders the risks of military conflict intolerably high in the Asia-Pacific theater. The defense strategy also aims to deter the United States from challenging China in any contingency along its periphery and provide support to gray-zone activities that incrementally change the status quo at the expense of the United States and its allies. A major military responsibility would be to support diplomatic efforts to shape a favorable international environment by building strong security ties with client states and discrediting or weakening the appeal of the United States as an alternative. The defense strategy also raises the possibility of engaging in proxy or other more-limited conflicts to protect the interests of client states and demonstrate the superiority of Chinese power. To address concerns about the risks of miscalculation and escalation in any incident involving the United States, however, the defense strategy emphasizes the importance of preventing conflict, managing crisis, and strict control of military forces by civilian authorities in any contingency. At the same time, the strategy leaves open the possibility for cooperation with the U.S. military on shared security threats. The strategies depicted in this research should not be construed as predictions of how the competition may evolve. Whether China can prevail is hardly predetermined, and the United States continues to enjoy many strategic advantages. The outlook is further complicated by the sheer variety and types of factors—some of which may not be well understood today—that could affect the trajectory of the competition.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 2)

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Moscow-hosted an international meeting to discuss the Afghan crisis with Taliban leaders and delegates from 10 countries, including China, Pakistan, Iran and India, on 20 October, in an effort to boost its influence across Central Asia. The talks came after Putin warned that Islamic State (IS) fighters were converging on Afghanistan.

The talks followed a G20 summit on Afghanistan — held on 12 October — to help the country avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the wake of the power shift there.

Russia’s Concerns

Russia is concerned about the impact of the Taliban seizing to power in Afghanistan in the wider region. Moscow has moved to engage the Taliban, but has stopped short of granting recognition to the group which is banned as a “terrorist” organisation in Russia. Unlike Western countries that rushed to evacuate diplomats following the fall of Kabul on August 15, Russia has kept its embassy there open.

A week before the meetimg, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that IS fighters were gathering in Afghanistan to spread into former Soviet republics and eventually Russia. Putin cautioned that around 2,000 fighters loyal to the “Islamic State” had gathered in northern Afghanistan, adding that their leaders planned to send them into neighboring Central Asian countries disguised as refugees.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it clear in the run-up to the Moscow meeting that the discussions would not cover the issue of granting recognition to the Taliban, stressing the need for the group to live up to “expectations” on human rights.
Russia has lauded the efforts of Afghanistan’s Taliban government to improve the national security and political situation but stressed the need for the Islamist group to ensure inclusivity in its governance to achieve a stable peace in the war-torn country.

Lavrov said Moscow believes it’s time to mobilize global efforts to provide Kabul with effective financial, economic and humanitarian assistance to help prevent a humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan.

Lavrov emphasized the importance of respecting human rights and pursuing well-balanced social policies, adding that he discussed those issues with the Taliban before the talks. He added that Russia would dispatch a shipment of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and urged the international community to quickly mobilize resources to prevent a humanitarian crisis.
Russia says its diplomatic offensive to garner support for Kabul stems from concerns continued instability would encourage terrorist groups to threaten security of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region.

Lavrov highlighted those fears while addressing the gathering in Moscow and urged the Taliban to deliver on their pledges of preventing terrorist groups from threatening Russia’s “friends and allies.”

Taliban’s Appeal

This was the Taliban’s most significant international meeting since seizing power over Afghanistan in mid-August. This was the first opportunity for the Taliban to get a hearing in order to get economic aid and international recognition that has eluded since they stormed into Kabul two months ago. Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi, while addressing the meeting, renewed a call for the global community to recognize the new government in Kabul and again demanded the United States unfreeze about $10 billon in Afghan central bank in foreign reserves.

The senior Taliban leader defended his interim government as “already inclusive” and said they would not accept any deal under pressure, according to the text of the speech Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid shared with media.

Washington Absent

The U.S. and other Western countries are working out how to engage with the Taliban without giving them the legitimacy they seek, while facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid to Afghans.
Washington also was invited to the talks in Moscow, but U.S. officials cited logistical reasons for not attending them. United States deputy secretary of the treasury, Adewale Adeyemo said the US Treasury was taking every step it could within its sanctions program to make clear to humanitarian groups that Washington wants to facilitate the flow of aid into Afghanistan.
Chinese officials renewed their resolve to work with the Taliban to help them deal with the economic and humanitarian challenges facing the country.

Charges Against Taliban

The Taliban’s resurgence has stirred international fears of a return to their hardline form of Islamist rule in the 1990s, when they hosted Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda movement and carried out egregious human rights violations, including public stonings and the marginalization of women at work and in schools.

The Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August after the United States and Western countries withdrew all their troops almost 20 years after the Islamist group was removed from power by the U.S.-led military invasion for harbouring al-Qaida planners of terrorist attacks on America.

The Taliban are under fire at home and internationally for reneging on some of their pledges to protect the rights of women and minorities.

The hardline group is also being accused of persecuting members of the ousted Afghan government, charges Taliban officials reject as unfounded and politically motivated propaganda.

Official Statement

Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and five formerly Soviet Central Asian states joined the Taliban in calling for the UN to convene such a conference as soon as possible to help rebuild the country. They said it should take place “with the understanding, of course, that the main burden…should be borne by the forces whose military contingents have been present in this country over the past 20 years.”

At the end of discussions, a statement was issued saying: “Participating countries call on the current Afghan leadership to take further steps to improve governance and to form a truly inclusive government that adequately reflects the interests of all major ethno-political forces in the country.”

The statement also stressed the need for the Afghan leadership to “respect the rights of ethnic groups, women and children.”
While governments around the world, including Russia, have declined to give official recognition to the Taliban government, the communique recognized the “new reality” of their ascent to power.

India’s Role

India will play a key role in the coming days on the all-important question of according recognition to the Taliban, which now finds itself in a weaker position after blasts in mosques on two successive Fridays, in October, claimed about 150 lives.
The Taliban’s credibility as the sole guarantor of security in Afghanistan suffered a blow when three back-to-back bomb attacks at a famous mosque in its spiritual capital of Kandahar killed 47 persons. On 8 October, an explosion in a Kunduz mosque killed over 100 worshippers.

Senior Indian diplomats participated in talks with Taliban in Moscow, on 20 October, along with diplomats from Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, had met Taliban representatives in Doha towards the end of August

India holds a view different from the other participants at the October 20 Moscow talks on providing humanitarian aid but is on the same page as Russia, Iran and China on persuading the Taliban to form an inclusive government and ensure there is no spillover of extremism to other countries.

The interaction of Indian diplomats with the Taliban can help the former take a view on removing their senior ministers from UN blacklisting. India is the chair of the UNSC’s sanctions committee till the end of next year.
After Kabul’s fall in August, India raised questions on the lack of inclusivity in the new Taliban regime, rights of minorities, women and children, and also voiced concern on terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

In March 2021, Moscow hosted an international conference on Afghanistan in which Russia, United States, China and Pakistan released a joint statement, calling on the then-warring Afghan sides to reach a peace deal.

Comments

Russia’s initiative in hosting the talks is part of an effort to boost its influence in the region after the US pullout. Its main fear is the risk of instability in Central Asia, and possible migrant flows and Islamist militant activity directed from Afghanistan.
The concerns have intensified after a series of attacks by the Afghan affiliate of Islamic State — dubbed Islamic State in Khorasan Province after an ancient name for the region — on mosques and other targets that have killed hundreds of people.
Russia fought its own disastrous war in Afghanistan in the 1980s and has close military and political ties with former Soviet Central Asian republics that border Afghanistan.

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With the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (IS) group has threatened to usher in another violent phase. There has been a sudden uptick in IS attacks since the Taliban takeover on 15 August.

Two deadly bombings have hit Kabul. One was outside the airport at the height of evacuations before the U.S. exit that killed 169 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members. Another deadly bombing, on 8 October, in the northern province of Kunduz killed 46 worshippers inside a mosque frequented by Shiites. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the Afghanistan-based arm of the terrorist organisation, has claimed responsibility. Earlier, on October 3, a bomb targeted a memorial service being held for the mother of the Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, in a Kabul mosque, killing five. All these attacks suggest that the IS-K’s ability to strike has grown. Other deadly IS attacks have struck in the capital, Kabul, and provinces to the east and north, while smaller-scale attacks target Taliban fighters almost daily.

Now that the US and the international presence is mostly gone, the IS was going after the state, which is now the Taliban.

Hatred Towards Shiias

The IS’s doctrinal hatred towards the Shias is known. In Iraq and Syria, it systematically targeted Shias, who it calls “rejectionists” of faith, and used such attacks to mobilise the support of Sunni hardliners and trigger sectarian conflicts.

Long Rivalry

Both the Taliban and IS advocate rule by their radical interpretations of Islamic law. But there are key ideological differences that fuel their hatred of each other. The Taliban say they are creating an Islamic state in Afghanistan, within the borders of that country. The Taliban downplay IS’s capabilities and dismiss them as a fringe group with no mainstream appeal.
IS says it is the Islamic State, a global caliphate that it insists all Muslims must support. It is contemptuous of the Taliban’s nationalist goals and doesn’t recognize them as a pure Islamic movement. For similar reasons, IS has long been a staunch enemy of al-Qaida.

Both the Taliban and IS advocate particularly harsh versions of Islamic Shariah law and have used tactics like suicide bombers. But when it ruled territory in Syria and Iraq, IS was even more brutal and carried out more horrific punishments than the Taliban did.

IS emerged in Afghanistan in 2015 with the name Islamic State in Khorasan Province, at a time when the group was at its peak, controlling much of Iraq and Syria. It drew members from Afghan and Pakistani militants, including a wave of Taliban defectors.

The group initially found support among Afghanistan’s small Salafist movement in eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. The Salafis had largely been marginalized by the Taliban, and by connecting with the rising IS, the Salafist movement found a means to establish military strength.
But IS’s brutal ways have since led some Salafi clerics to voice opposition. In the years after its emergence, IS was badly hurt by military setbacks at the hands of the Taliban and by U.S. airstrikes, before surging again the past year.

End Game

The IS’s immediate aim is to destabilize the Taliban and shatter the group’s image as a guardian of security.
For now, its strategy is slow and methodical. It is reaching out to tribes and other groups to recruit from their ranks while stamping out dissent among moderate Salafis and carrying out jailbreaks, assassinations, and attacks on Taliban personnel.
The Taliban are also strong and can uproot IS on their own, even without the backup of U.S. airstrikes that nearly eliminated IS. The IS — unlike the Taliban during their insurgency — do not have access to safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.
The Taliban have rejected cooperating with the U.S. against IS.

IS’s future trajectory in Afghanistan will depend largely on its ability to recruit more members and win over large segments of the population. Since their inception, they have been poaching Taliban members.

Comments

While both groups have used tactics of terror, the IS-K is a pan-Islamist jihadist outfit, while the Taliban are largely a Pashtun nationalist militancy. The rise of the IS-K poses multiple challenges to the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan, which many in Afghanistan and Pakistan saw as a solution to the country’s security woes. On one side, their promise to provide security looks hollow. Afghanistan’s cities under the Taliban remain as insecure as they were under the previous Islamic Republic. On the other hand, even if the Taliban, under pressure from Afghanistan’s donors and the public, want to make some concessions on the many restrictions already imposed, they would come under pressure from the more extremist IS-K, which says the Taliban are not Islamic enough. For the people of Afghanistan, who are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, the war that started 40 years ago continues, no matter who is in power in Kabul.

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