During the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, the risks of nuclear weapon use or a nuclear accident at nuclear plants in Zaporizhzhia, occupied by Russia, and Kursk have been repeatedly highlighted. Russia has frequently threatened to use nuclear weapons, the latest instance being on February 24, 2026, when it accused the UK and France of helping Ukraine acquire nuclear capability and warned that such actions could trigger a confrontation between nuclear powers. Later, between 18 and 20 May 2026, Russia and Belarus conducted joint nuclear exercises involving missile units and strategic forces practicing nuclear weapon delivery and deployment. Such threats have emanated since the start of the conflict from various levels of the Russian government and military, including President Putin. Immediately after the invasion of Ukraine, Putin ordered Russia’s military on 27 February 2022 to put its deterrence forces, which include nuclear weapons, on “special alert.” On September 21 of the same year, he reiterated his threat to use all types of weapons, asserting that it was not a bluff. This clearly shows that his threats so far had not been taken seriously or lacked credibility, as they were driven by battlefield reversals and a shortage of military personnel in the invasion’s initial stages.

Russia’s nuclear threats reduced in 2023 when its military operations were achieving favourable results, another reason for their low credibility. However, nuclear rhetoric picked up again in 2024, including exercises simulating “theatre” or regional nuclear attacks, in contrast to “strategic” nuclear exercises simulating war with the US. Russian threats have been so frequent and unceasing that they no longer make headlines in Western media. Their recurrence has eroded credibility, rendering them ineffectual. These provocative articulations are assessed to be inconceivable, exaggerated, routine, discordant, and implausible.

The intent of these threats appears to be imposing restraint and influencing Western decisions. Russia has essentially reinforced two red lines for the West: first, the unacceptability of direct involvement and deployment of NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine; second, deterring and constraining the West from providing military aid to Ukraine, specifically offensive weapons platforms that could threaten Russian territory. In the first case, the US and NATO leaders have been extremely cautious and avoided direct resistance to Russia’s invasion. While military assistance was slow initially, it picked up gradually. The West has disregarded Russia’s warnings and provided Ukraine with weapon systems explicitly opposed by the Kremlin, including tanks, drones, and long-range missiles. On August 1, 2024, the first batch of long-awaited F-16 jets arrived in Ukraine, significantly bolstering its air force. Ukraine has since carried out aerial strikes deep into Russian territory, even hitting oil refineries in Siberia. Earlier, it forced Russia to scale down its Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2026 in Moscow due to security concerns. Despite its red lines being violated, Russia has avoided striking NATO territory. This reflects the continued effectiveness of strategic mutual nuclear deterrence among parties to the conflict.

Historically, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by either side has not been taken seriously. During the Cold War, NATO planning envisaged immediate use of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Soviet attack in Europe, to hedge against conventional asymmetry. Yet, nobody assigned a high probability to this option. Similarly, the Soviets remained largely hostile to the idea that nuclear war could be fought in a highly limited manner, such as small-scale battlefield exchanges for bargaining purposes.

India does not face a major nuclear threat from large nuclear powers—the US and Russia—or the medium-sized nuclear forces maintained by the UK and France. Its major adversaries are China and Pakistan. China is the first and only nuclear weapon state recognized under the NPT to have maintained an official NFU policy continuously since it first acquired nuclear weapons in 1964. Since then, it has shown no proclivity for nuclear blackmail or coercive diplomacy based on nuclear threats. While a full-blown war initiated by China to resolve the boundary issue is unlikely in the short term, limited conflict due to escalation of local issues on the LAC could occur, as seen in Eastern Ladakh in 2020. As long as nuclear capabilities remain, China’s intentions can change at any time.

Pakistan’s case is entirely different. It considers the threat from India existential and inimical to its very idea of nationhood. Its strategic thought process is based on proactive and pre-emptive actions. Nuclear weapons give Pakistan the confidence to face a larger neighbour with asymmetry in military, economic, and industrial capacity. It professes that nuclear weapons reduce the probability of conventional conflict. Accordingly, it has a declaratory doctrine of “first use,” and lately has been advocating “early use” as part of strategic signalling to India. It has also alluded to ambiguous territorial, infrastructure, and economic red lines. Ambiguity and irrationality reinforce the deterrence value of nuclear threats. Pakistan seeks to deter India at all levels of war—nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional—while denying India the same equation. It has regularly resorted to nuclear sabre-rattling in past conflicts to influence Indian decision-makers, as demonstrated during the Kargil War, Operation Parakram, surgical strikes across the LC, the Balakot air strikes, and recently Operation Sindoor.

In contrast, India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the twin pillars of NFU and minimum credible deterrence, resulting in massive retaliation in response to a nuclear attack. India believes that nuclear weapons deter only nuclear war and are of strategic relevance, not for warfighting. Suggestions have been made in recent years to revise the doctrine, abandon NFU, and incorporate “first use.” The main arguments advanced include the complex regional security environment and technological advances that may degrade the potency of a second strike.

Deterrence is widely accepted as a psychological construct rather than an end in itself. It should inspire fear, where the perceived cost of deterrence breakdown outweighs the benefits of war as a dispute resolution instrument. Even if a nation declares NFU, no one will trust that it will remain committed to NFU if its vital interests are at stake. A degree of calculated ambiguity in a nuclear doctrine is essential for credibility. Restraints on nuclear war are mainly intellectual, ethical, and doctrinal. During the Cold War, the USSR could not have invaded Western Europe even if the US had a declaratory NFU policy. Importantly, it is against the national interest of responsible and status quo powers like India to weaken the nuclear threshold. Conventional attacks are largely considered within the rules of international behaviour in a jus ad bellum situation, such as punitive conventional retaliation by India in response to high-profile terrorist incidents. The possibility of escalation or total eruption makes it unlikely that either side could achieve decisive victory in a limited war by using nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the existence of nuclear weapons cannot be downplayed, and they may be used in extreme cases by a nuclear-capable state. Threats to use nuclear weapons will continue to be made repeatedly to deter and influence adversary decision-making by playing mind games. Under the nuclear overhang, space for conventional operations exists, though its extent remains undefined and can be expanded by the side exercising escalation dominance. Moreover, deterrence is not static; it requires active escalation management throughout a crisis. Therefore, lessons from recent conflicts, particularly the Russia–Ukraine war, reinforce the enduring relevance, resilience, and credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine in maintaining strategic stability.

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Russia’s invasion has killed thousands of people, displaced nearly 10 million, and raised fears of a wider confrontation between Russia and the United States – by far the world’s biggest nuclear powers.

Within days of Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, Putin put the country’s deterrence forces – which include nuclear arms – on high alert, citing what he called aggressive statements by NATO leaders and Western economic sanctions against Moscow.

Russia’s deputy foreign minister said, on 10 May, that a decision on the possible use of nuclear weapons was clearly set out in Russia’s military doctrine, when asked if Russia would rule out a preemptive tactical nuclear strike on Ukraine. “We have a military doctrine – everything is written there,” Alexander Grushko was quoted by state news agency RIA as saying.

Russia’s official military deployment principles allow for the use of nuclear weapons if they – or other types of weapons of mass destruction – are used against it, or if the Russian state faces an existential threat from conventional weapons.

The decision to use Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, the biggest in the world, rests with the Russian president, currently Vladimir Putin.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns said, on 7 May, that Putin believes he cannot afford to lose in Ukraine and cautioned that the West could not ignore the risk of the use of tactical nuclear weapons by Moscow.

“We don’t see, as an intelligence community, practical evidence at this point of Russian planning for a deployment or even use of tactical nuclear weapons,” Burns said. He cautioned, though, that “the stakes are very high for Putin’s Russia.”

Circumstances for Strike

Russia has accused However NATO countries of a “hybrid” confrontation that now “dangerously balances on the edge of open military clash.””Such a move would be able to trigger one of the two emergency scenarios described in our doctrine,” as per Russian strategists, adding “if Western countries try to test our resolve, Russia will not back down.”

Nuclear brinkmanship from Putin has been unprecedented. He ordered a snap nuclear wargame before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons if it determines the West’s intervention in the conflict goes too far.

As the conflict drags on, and Russia’s conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it is willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war.

A decree signed by Putin on June 2, 2020, said Russia views its nuclear weapons as “exclusively a means of deterrence”. It repeats the phraseology of the military doctrine but adds details about four circumstances under which a nuclear strike would be ordered. These include reliable information of a ballistic missile attack on Russia and an enemy’s attack “on critical state or military installations of the Russian Federation, the incapacitation of which would lead to the disruption of a response by nuclear forces.”

US Intelligence Assessment

Putin could view the prospect of defeat in Ukraine as an existential threat to his regime, potentially triggering his resort to using a nuclear weapon, a top US intelligence official has warned. The warning came in an assessment from intelligence chiefs briefing the Senate on worldwide threats.

The Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, told the Senate’s Armed Services Committee that Putin would continue to brandish Russia’s nuclear arsenal in an attempt to deter the US and its allies from extending further support for Ukraine.

The Russian leader would not use a nuclear weapon until he sees an existential threat to Russia or his regime, Haines argued.

But she added that he could view the prospect of defeat in Ukraine as constituting such a threat, the report said.

“We do think that [Putin’s perception of an existential threat] could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine, and that Nato in effect is either intervening or about to intervene in that context, which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine,” Haines told the committee hearing.

She added that the world would probably have some warning that nuclear use is imminent.

The prediction for Ukraine is a long, gruelling war of attrition, which could lead to increasingly volatile acts of escalation from Putin, including full mobilisation, the imposition of martial law, and if the Russian leader feels the war is going against him, endangering his position in Moscow even the use of a nuclear warhead, the report said.

Putin, who has repeatedly expressed resentment over the way the West treated Russia after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, says Ukraine has been used by the United States to threaten Russia.

He justified his Feb. 24 order for a special military operation by saying Ukraine had persecuted Russian speakers and the United States was keen to enlarge the NATO military alliance in a way that would endanger Russia.

The Likelihood

IMR’s assessment of the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons, most likely scenario and US response is given below.

Putin is more likely than not to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine if he faces devastating defeat. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate tools of last resort; any rational leader would consider using them if his or her regime (or life) were on the line.

Putin presumably expects his threats will induce NATO to abandon Ukraine. However, if he believes he is facing defeat or a costly stalemate—or has a chance of success through sharp escalation—there is some risk he will carry out his threats.

If Russian forces suffered a humiliating defeat in the campaign to control Donbas, Putin could be pressed by hardliners to deliver on his nuclear threats; but he is unlikely to do so, since this would only galvanize a harsh US and allied response without providing any significant military advantage.

Most Likely Use Scenario

Washington and Moscow have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe.The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. The treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or “battlefield,” nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles, according to public estimates.

Putin would seek to create fear instead of rage. Thus, nuclear weapons would be used in Ukraine rather than on NATO territory, and they would be used against military, not civilian, targets. Any attack would likely involve detonating half a dozen low-yield air bursts (in order to minimize fallout) against well-entrenched Ukrainian military positions.

Putin might begin with the ostentatious movement of nuclear forces, such as sending weapons to Russia’s Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. He could order a “demonstration” or possibly a detonation at a Russian test range.

Putin may hope that just by crossing the nuclear threshold, he would so shock Ukraine and its Western backers—and so terrify allied publics—that they would back down rather than risk further escalation.

The risk of nuclear use through a mistake or blunder is higher than through intent. Many Russian battlefield systems are dual-capable and also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. It could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option. It is difficult to know if the S-300 battery packs a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.

Likely US and Allied Response

One possible response to Putin’s nuclear use would be to negotiate some kind of resolution in which all parties could declare Potemkin victories and find a solution before nuclear weapons are used.

If the Russian attack caused little damage, NATO might first try to issue an ultimatum with the aim of reaching a settlement on the Alliance’s and Ukraine’s terms.

A non-nuclear military response (eg, conventional strikes on military bases and infrastructure in Russian territory) would probably not be decisive and would appear inadequate to many.

Defending Ukraine may simply not worth risking a nuclear escalation. But there are also serious implications of not doing it. Absence of a US nuclear response would gravely weaken the credibility among both friends and adversaries of the entire strategy of deterring nuclear attack through the prospect of US nuclear retaliation.

If Putin resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies would need to respond quickly and decisively to ensure that Putin paid a heavy price for crossing the nuclear threshold.

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