Relations between Russia and the United States, long strained, have worsened even further since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. In February, Moscow pulled out of the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with Washington.

Speaking at an event entitled “A World Without START: What’s Next”, Ryabkov said there was “no question” of Russia restoring the treaty for now, criticising what he called Washington’s “hostile course” towards Moscow.

“I wouldn’t want to dive into a discussion about whether the likelihood of a nuclear conflict is high today, but it is higher than anything we have had for the past few decades, let’s put it that way,” the Interfax news agency quoted him as saying.

Ryabkov said Russia was committed to keeping the world “safe and free” from the threat of nuclear war, but added later that business could not continue as usual, given that Moscow was now “in a de facto state of open conflict with the United States”.

A year on since the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has repeatedly accused Washington of directly participating in the conflict by supplying weapons to Kyiv, while casting the war as a battle for Russia’s very survival.

Both the United States and Russia – by far the world’s largest nuclear powers – have said that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought, but the conflict in Ukraine has raised fears of a direct confrontation with the West.

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In a televised address to the Russian people on 21 September, Putin explicitly raised the specter of a nuclear conflict. Despite being regarded as a very low likelihood scenario, the potential implications of such a scenario are huge.

This article tries to give the reader-at-large an idea about what is involved in launching a tactical nuclear strike.

The push for partial mobilization is bound to escalate the situation in Ukraine. Losses are mounting exponentially and with the influx of inexperienced conscripts who lack any meaningful knowledge of the weapon systems would further make the situation even more dire.

There is no justification to use nuclear weapons in a conflict with a non-nuclear state. But according to Russia, the only feasible way to put an end to the conflict is to use nuclear weapons. The chances of a nuclear device detonation have become uncomfortably high.

Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces possess a wide variety of nuclear weapons platforms and devices. Russia currently has approximately 6000 warheads. They vary in their yield and the safety mechanisms. Most of the devices are equipped with a standard dialable yield system, which according to the target can be adjusted. They also possess a wide variety of platforms to deliver the said devices ranging from ICBMs to artillery shells.

As per the Russian state, current conflict would call for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Ukrainian advances all the up to the border of Russia. The most important factor is the launch time preparedness. The long range ballistic missiles are at the highest level of readiness. The inherent problem of long range liquid fueled missiles meant that they had to be fueled immediately before launch, this was solved by the R-36 series which were fueled only once, when they are placed in the silos. After that the missiles are ampulised/sealed and kept in this state ready for launch. As a result, the time needed to wind up the guidance system’s gyroscopes became the main constraint on launch readiness rather than the several hours that the missile previously needed to launch.

R-36M missiles were the first liquid-fuel missiles that used a so-called cold launch method, in which the missile main engine did not start until the missile had been ejected from the silo by a special charge: a pressure accumulator. This launch method reduced the heat and acoustic load on the missile and allowed the fuller use of silo volume.

The development of the automated system of combat management and the introduction of third-generation missile systems with on-board computers provided the RVSN the technological capacity to remotely alter missile flight assignments and alter nuclear force use scenarios in response to changing circumstances. Since the flight trajectory of missiles moving along the combat route must constantly be recalculated as the location of the launchers changes, the adoption of fourth-generation systems (the R-36M2, RT-23UTTH, and Topol) provided the capability for quick retargeting, which was crucial in the case of mobile systems. Therefore, there were no new technological challenges while changing the targeted coordinates.

During the pre-war time silo-based missiles would have been reprogrammed with “neutral” flight assignments (aimed at targets in the ocean). Fourth-generation systems are now on combat duty with zero flight assignments. These changes were largely symbolic, however, because it takes no more than a few minutes to retarget systems in accordance with operational plans for their use.

It is the tactical systems that require more time for getting ready to be deployed on the battlefield. Russia has many of them. The warhead must be prepared, mated to the desired platform (usually cruise missiles but in some cases smaller warheads can be mated to the S-300/400 series to deny the airspace to the enemy).

From transporting the warhead to the location, calibrating the gyroscopes (if the device has them), programming the detonation yield, testing the on board power system and finally mating the device to the platform on the appropriate bus. This will take several hours and will be detected by satellites, drones and people.

For instance, if Russia wishes to deploy the Nuclear weapon from a ground based launcher to detonate above the Black Sea/forward areas of Donetsk. It is highly likely the platform of choice is going to be a Mig-31. It is important to know that the control of the missile launch will be remote and may not be in the hands of the pilot.

If they choose to use a ground based launcher(static or mobile), it is highly likely the following steps will be followed :

1. The General Staff gives the proper directives to the armed forces’ services regarding the use of nuclear weapons when the decision to use nuclear weapons has been taken and the precise scenario for their use has been determined.

2. The Central Command Center of the General Staff (which serves as the Supreme High Command Central Command Center) transmits the necessary authorization codes and unlocks certain launchers to issue the command to employ nuclear weapons.

3. The combat management signal for the Rocket Forces initially travels to the Strategic Rocket Forces Central Command Center before being forwarded to the regiments whose launchers are to be employed.

4. The on-duty staff must input the authorizing codes and launch the missiles when the order to employ weapons and the authorizing codes have been sent. The command and control system also allows for the capability of firing missiles without the involvement of personnel on lower levels directly from the Supreme High Command Central Command Center.

5. Automated launch preparations begin as soon as the launcher receives the launch command. The response time—the period of time between the transmission of the launch command and the actual launch—depends on the missile and launcher, as well as their condition at the moment the command is received.

6. Prior to launch, the missile’s guidance system must be activated (the switch to onboard power supply, the activation of the gyros, etc.), and the first-stage propulsion system (or the pressure accumulator in a cold-launch system) must be ignited.

7. When the launch command is received, the transporter-launcher (ground or rail) stops, the launcher is secured in the soil with hydraulic supports, and the canister containing the missile is raised to a vertical position. After this, the pressure accumulator is ignited and the missile is fired from the canister.

Part 2 will cover the launch to detonation and aftermath

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Before the attack on Ukraine, the five nuclear-haves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France — had reached agreement that the use of nuclear weapons could be justified only as a purely defensive measure in response to a nuclear or large-scale conventional attack. In January 2022, those five countries issued a joint statement affirming that “a nuclear war must never be fought and can never be won.” A month later, Russia invaded a non-nuclear country, Ukraine, and threatened nuclear attacks against anyone who tried to help that country.

President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have been ominously threatening to use nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine. The long-range ballistic missiles deployed on land and on submarines are Russia’s only nuclear weapons available for immediate use.

In 2021, during a training exercise involving about 200,000 troops, the Russian army practiced launching a nuclear assault on NATO forces in Poland. An intentional or inadvertent Russian attack on a NATO country could be the beginning of World War III.

If Russia decides to attack Ukraine with “tactical” nuclear weapons, the transportation to military bases, mating with cruise or ballistic missiles, loading on planes, etc will observed by the US in real time.

President Joe Biden has made clear that any use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be “completely unacceptable” and “entail severe consequences.”

Likely Scenarios

Russia might use a nuclear weapon by
• Detonation over the Black Sea, causing no casualties but demonstrating a resolve.
• A decapitation strike against the Ukrainian leadership.
• A nuclear assault on a Ukrainian military target.
• The destruction of a Ukrainian city, causing mass civilian casualties.

US Response

According to The New York Times, the Biden administration has formed a Tiger Team of national-security officials to run war games on what to do if Russia uses a nuclear weapon.

Biden administration’s strategy is of “deliberate ambiguity.” But everyone hopes that some form of back-channel diplomacy is secretly being conducted. The Russians have probably been given a message about how harshly the US might retaliate if they cross the nuclear threshold. But misunderstandings, miscommunications, and mistakes can lead to a nuclear catastrophe.

Some experts feel that if Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, American nuclear retaliation should be the last resort. Instead, the US should opt for horizontal escalation, solely with conventional weapons. Russia’s Black Sea fleet might be sunk in retaliation, and a no-fly zone could be imposed over Ukraine, even if it meant destroying anti-aircraft units on Russian soil.

During the summer of 2016, the US national-security team secretly staged a wargame in which Russia invades a NATO country in the Baltics and then uses a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon against NATO forces to end the conflict on favorable terms. The security team reached widely divergent conclusions about what the United States should do. Some decided that the United States had no choice but to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Choosing a suitable nuclear target proved difficult, however. One committee recommended a nuclear attack on Belarus—a nation that had played no role whatsoever in the invasion of the NATO ally but because it was a Russian ally.

Others argued that retaliating with a nuclear weapon would be a huge mistake. It would be more effective to respond with a conventional attack, they recommended, and turn world opinion against Russia for violating the nuclear taboo.

Any nuclear attack on Ukraine would inspire global condemnation, especially from countries in Africa and South America, continents that are nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has long supported “negative nuclear assurances” and promised in 2016 “unconditionally not [to] use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones.”

Others preferred “a muscular diplomatic response” to the nuclear strike, not a nuclear or conventional military response, combined with some form of hybrid warfare. The United States could launch a crippling cyberattack on the Russian command-and-control systems tied to the nuclear assault and leave open the possibility of subsequent military attacks.

Tactical Weapons

During the Cold War, the United States based thousands of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in NATO countries and planned to use them on the battlefield in the event of a Soviet invasion. In September 1991, President George H. W. Bush unilaterally ordered all of America’s ground-based tactical weapons to be removed from service and destroyed. The United States was developing precision conventional weapons that could destroy any important target without breaking the nuclear taboo. But Russia never got rid of its tactical nuclear weapons.

The weakness of Russia’s conventional forces compared with those of the United States, Perry suggests, and Russia’s relative advantage in tactical weapons are factors that might lead Putin to launch a nuclear attack in Ukraine. Russia may be able to destroy a military target without much radioactive fallout, without civilian casualties, and without prompting a strong response from the United States. There would be an international uproar, but it would not last long.

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