READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced.

The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. Even before the pandemic set in, wolf warrior diplomacy emerged in 2017 characterised by the use of confrontational rhetoric by Chinese diplomats and coercive behavior. It was tied to Xi Jinping’s political ambitions and foreign policy inclinations. There was a backlash and a realignments have begun to take place to keep China in check.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic China has sparred with Malaysia and Vietnam, with Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, threatened Taiwan, revoked Hong Kong’s autonomy, chased Japanese fishing boats, traded barbs with the US and is now challenging India at the Line of Actual Control.

Territorial Fronts

China has opened four territorial fronts in the last decade, deploying coercive tactics 1) in the East China Sea, 2) South China Sea, 3) China-India border, and 4) toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation.

The China-India border was once thought to be among the more stable of these fronts. What is surprising is that China has taken up all these fronts at the same time.

China has increased domination in affairs outside its borders along with modernisation of its armed forces to conduct operations in the western Asian region and to protect its eastern seaboard from US carriers and bombers

China has increased its role in the Indian Ocean by building naval bases and also making incursions using its navy and the naval militia flotilla

China has fortified and militarised islands in the South China Sea as well as the Sea of Japan.

Aggressive Behaviour

China has thrown its weight around across the globe in the last three years, unmindful of whom it offended.

Early in 2020, Chinese officials escalated their “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aggressively and undiplomatically attacked countries and individuals they believed had slighted China.

In April 2020, China retaliated against Australia’s call for an inquiry into the origins and spread of the coronavirus by launching a trade war.

In July 2020, Beijing imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong designed to crush the pro-democracy movement.

China was aggressive as well in its dealings with Taiwan as the Trump administration strengthened its ties with Republic of China.

China also continued its systematic repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang.

The Chinese communist state with capitalist characteristics has become a country developed enough to export small and big products and weapons to the developing world. China has become the factory of the world, with its cheap labour.

But by end 2020, China was convinced that it was winning its economic contest with the West and it embraced steps designed to decouple its economy from the West on its own terms.

China is also trying to control a number of small nations through debt trap strategy.

What is China Doing Against India?

On the Indian borders, a deadly bloody clash took place, on 15 June 2020, for the first time in 45 years, during the period of lockdown, in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and an unknown number of PLA soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat. No shots were fired. I will return to this later.

Till 2020, China’s aggressive attitude was mainly focused on the South China Sea but now it’s turned in India’s direction.

Besides creeping up into India territories, China is trying to surround India by getting involved in its neighbouring countries.

PLA Navy ships have increased their forays into the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines and destroyers have been docking in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

China is also strengthening airbases in Xinjiang and Tibet, some of which are for both civilian and military use.

India, by contrast, has always played it very cautiously with its powerful neighbour. It’s never made a statement on minorities in Xinjiang, an extremely delicate subject for the Chinese. Similarly, when it comes to Hong Kong, India has not uttered even a murmur.

India obviously has to play it super-carefully with its powerful and super-aggressive neighbour which has an economy that is about five times India’s.

India-China Relations in Brief

India gained independence in 1947 and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC on 1 October 1949. India was the first non-communist nation in Asia to establish diplomatic relations and recognize PRC as the legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan on 1 April 1950.

In 1950 China marched into Tibet and, in 1954, India signed an agreement recognising Tibet as part of China. In 1959 the Dalai Lama escaped and sought political asylum in India. Today, a Tibetan govt-in-exile functions from India. China is extremely sensitive about the Dalai Lama’s political activities.

Border disputes resulted in a short but traumatic war for India on 20 Oct 1962. In the north, China occupied Aksai Chin in 1957 and has not vacated it since then. Instead it made an all-weather highway through it to Xinjiag. In the East, it reached the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov 1962 and withdrawing.

India has strengthened its defences and infrastructure on the Chinese border and also modernised its armed forces. So have the Chinese. There have been agreements to open the Nathula Pass in the East for symbolic local trade and a route for annual pilgrimage by Indians to Mount Kailash in Tibet.

During bilateral visits, agreements for maintaining peace on the Line of Actual Control and Confidence Building measures have been signed.

There have been some significant border stand-offs

* The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks

* In September 2014 People’s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in Chumar sector.

* In June 2017 Chinese troops began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India’s ally Bhutan. This posed a security threat to India’s narrow Siliguri corridor. The stand-off ended in August 2017, when both sides agreed to disengage in Doklam.

* On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La in  Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.

India’s China Policy

As I said earlier, When India recognised the PRC on 1 April 1950, it broke off relations with Taiwan and also recognised Tibet as a part of China. Adhering to its One China policy was understandable provided India-China relations were stable. Delhi is aware that, any deviation or even a hint of deviation from this policy has an immense psychological impact on China, especially since India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile.

The Dalai Lama has a huge following amongst Tibetans the world over. He is a demi-God. One word from the Dalai Lama can cause riots and self immolations in Tibet.

Since the Ladakh standoff, India has stopped using the term One China policy. India has also become more open in supporting the Dalai Lama thus challenging China’s core beliefs.

Disputes  with India

For ease of understanding, the India-China border can be divided into three areas – western sector, middle sector, and eastern sector as shown on this map.

Western Sector

This sector comprises the area between Ladakh to Tibet and the Kunlun mountain range and also extends from Wakhan (Afghanistan edge) to the Karakoram Pass, thereafter following the alignment of the Kunlun mountain range.

The border length of the western sector is 1,597 kms. India’s claim is based on the Treaty of 1842 which was signed between the representative of Maharaja Gulab Singh, former ruler of J&K, with Lama Gurusahib of Lhasa and the representative of the Chinese emperor.

It needs to be understood that China was ruled by the Qing dynasty till 1911 before it was replaced by Chinese nationalists led government, called the Republic of China or ROC in 1912. In 1949, power shifted to the People’s Republic of China or PRC.

At various times in history the British drew lines on the map to depict the border in Aksai Chin as they saw fit. The Johnson Line is shown in grey dashes on the outer edge of Aksai Chin. The McCartney Line is shown in Green. The final line was the Johnson Line of 1912, which India followed after it got Independence and it when it published the map of the area in 1954.

By all standards, this area is the most challenging task for the border negotiations. The China-Pakistan collusivity, Karakoram highway, CPEC corridor and the renewed infrastructure development with increased settlement of the civil population has further reduced the flexibility of negotiations. China Land Border Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, has already changed the tenets of territorial disputes to sovereignty disputes.

Middle Sector

This comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. This is the least disputed sector and covers 545 km of Indian borders. Except for one large claim in the Barahoti sector in Uttarakhand, other claims and counterclaims are minuscule.

Eastern Sector

The eastern sector conventionally refers to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, but both these states have Bhutan separating them. Though Sikkim has a land border of only 220 km and has been witness to both the 1962 as well as 1967 Nathula-Chola conflicts, the situation has normalised a lot after it joined the Indian state on May 16, 1975.

China finally recognised Sikkim as part of India in 2003 in a reciprocal statement by India to re-emphasise Tibet being part of China. An understanding with Bhutan will also be essential for the resolution.

Direct discourse between the British and Tibetans continued till 1908. In 1911, in the last year of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans revolted and asked for British intervention.

A tripartite conference was held at Shimla between the representatives of British India (McMohan), Tibet and China. Deliberation commenced in November 1913 and the McMohan Line was drawn and initialed by all the three representatives in the draft document on April 27, 1914. This document was not formally signed by Chinese representatives in the main document.

The land border, as per this line, covers a length of 1,126 km. This document was finally signed by Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.

The border in Arunachal Pradesh, as per the McMohan Line, has been a part of China’s formal offer for border settlement but not by itself. It has been proposed only in lieu of seeking a concession in the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. The LAC also has a large number of areas of differing perceptions which remain a cause of regular skirmishes or local conflicts.

There have been Efforts to Resolve Disputes

A Special Representatives mechanism was institutionalised between India and China for talks on the boundary question. The 22nd edition of talks was held in New Delhi in December 2019. The SR talks have developed a three-part role — the original mandate of searching for a political settlement to the boundary question, management of borders, and a forum for strategic dialogue.

One important achievement to their credit is the the agreement of 2005 on political parameters and guiding principles for the boundary settlement.

On the substanbtial issue of the boundary disputes there has been no traction. There is not even an agreement of which maps to use while discussing the each other’s positions.

Water Sharing Disputes

Besides territorial disputes, India and China have water sharing disputes.

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India.

India’s formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and river-water interests.

India has concern with China’s water–diversion, dam–building and inter–river plans. Moreso, in a conflict, India fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the “great bend before the Brahmaputra river enters India.

China does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing; nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

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China sees democratic Taiwan as a breakaway province, but Taiwan sees itself as a sovereign state, with its own constitution, military, and elected leaders.

Taiwan’s status is a red line for Beijing, a part of what it regards as its unimpeachable territorial integrity. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has repeatedly said that it would use military force to prevent any move towards formal independence by Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province.

The US has called China’s latest warning “unfortunate”, adding that tensions did not need to lead to “anything like confrontation”.

What’s behind the China-Taiwan divide?

Analysts say Beijing is becoming increasingly concerned that Taiwan’s government is moving the island towards a formal declaration of independence and it wants to warn President Tsai Ing-wen against taking steps in that direction.

President Tsai, however, has repeatedly said that Taiwan is already a independent state, making any formal declaration unnecessary.

On 28 January, Chinese defence ministry spokesman Wu Qian defended the recent military activities near Taiwan, saying they were “necessary actions to address the current security situation in the Taiwan Strait and to safeguard national sovereignty and security”.

“They are a solemn response to external interference and provocations by ‘Taiwan independence’ forces,” he added. “We warn those ‘Taiwan independence’ elements – those who play with fire will burn themselves, and Taiwan independence means war.”

China and Taiwan: The Basics

China and Taiwan have had separate governments since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. Beijing has long tried to limit Taiwan’s international activities and both have vied for influence in the Pacific region. Tensions have increased in recent years and Beijing has not ruled out the use of force to take the island back.

Although Taiwan is officially recognised by only a handful of nations, its democratically elected government has strong commercial and informal links with many countries.

Like most nations, the US has no official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but a US law does require it to provide the island with the means to defend itself.

The new US administration is expected to maintain pressure on China over a wide range of issues including human rights, trade disputes, Hong Kong and Taiwan, amid the deteriorating relationship between the two powers.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, meanwhile, said China should “not underestimate” the island’s determination to defend its sovereignty and uphold freedom and democracy.

What is the history and source of this tension?

The first known settlers in Taiwan are Austronesian tribal people thought to have come from modern day southern China. The island first appears in Chinese records in AD239, when China sent an expeditionary force to explore – a fact Beijing uses to back its territorial claim. After a brief spell as a Dutch colony (1624-1661) Taiwan was administered by China’s Qing dynasty from 1683 to 1895.

From the 17th Century, significant numbers of migrants started arriving from China, often fleeing turmoil or hardship. Most were Hoklo Chinese from Fujian (Fukien) province or Hakka Chinese, largely from Guangdong. The descendants of these two migrations now make up by far the largest population group.

In 1895, following Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Qing government had to cede Taiwan to Japan. After World War Two, the Republic of China – one of the victors – began ruling Taiwan with the consent of its allies the US and UK, after Japan surrendered and relinquished control of territory it had taken from China.

However in the next few years, a civil war broke out in China and the leader at the time Chiang Kai-shek’s troops were beaten back by the Communist armies under Mao Zedong.

Chiang and the remnants of his Kuomintang (KMT) government fled to Taiwan in 1949. This group, referred to as Mainland Chinese and then making up 1.5mn people, dominated Taiwan’s politics for many years, even though they only account for 14% of the population.

Having inherited an effective dictatorship, facing resistance from local people resentful of authoritarian rule, and under pressure from a growing democracy movement, Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, began allowing a process of democratisation, which eventually led to the 2000 election of the island’s first non-KMT president, Chen Shui-bian.

Where are things at now?

Relations between China and Taiwan started improving in the 1980s. China put forward a formula, known as “one country, two systems”, under which Taiwan would be given significant autonomy if it accepted Chinese reunification.

This system was established in Hong Kong to be used as something of a showcase to entice Taiwanese people back to the mainland but over the last year it has come under massive pressure with many analysts already questioning whether it still exists in the city.

In Taiwan, the offer was rejected, but Taipei did relax rules on visits to and investment in China. It also, in 1991, proclaimed the war with the People’s Republic of China on the mainland to be over.

There were also limited talks between the two sides’ unofficial representatives, though Beijing’s insistence that Taiwan’s Republic of China (ROC) government is illegitimate prevented government-to-government contact.

Alarm in Beijing

Beijing became alarmed in 2000, when Taiwan elected as president Chen Shui-bian, who had openly backed “independence”.

Chen was re-elected in 2004, prompting China to pass a so-called anti-secession law in 2005, stating China’s right to use “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan if it tried to “secede” from China.

In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. He sought to improve relations with China, mainly through economic agreements.

In elections in January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen defeated Kuomintang party candidate Eric Chu. She leads the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which leans towards eventual official independence from China.

After Donald Trump won the 2016 US election, she spoke to the president-elect in a phone call, in what was a break with US policy set in 1979 when formal relations were cut. Despite the lack of formal relations, the US has an agreement to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons and has stressed any attack by China would cause “grave concern”.

Throughout 2018, China stepped up pressure on international companies forcing them to list Taiwan as a part of China on their websites and threatening to block them for doing business in China if they failed to comply.

In 2020, Tsai won a second term. By that time, Hong Kong had seen months of unrest with protesters demonstrating against the mainland’s increasing influence – a trend that had many in Taiwan worried Beijing would next set its eyes on Taiwan.

Later that year, China’s implementation of a national security law in Hong Kong was seen by many as a yet another sign that Beijing was becoming significantly more assertive in the region.

In the meantime, the US has been intensifying its outreach to Taiwan, reassuring Taipei of its continued support. In September 2020, Washington sent its highest-ranking politician to hold meetings on the island for decades. Beijing strongly criticised the meeting, warning “not to send any wrong signals to ‘Taiwan independence’ elements to avoid severe damage to China-US relations”. During the controversial visit, China conducted a live-fire military exercise in the waterway that separates the island from the mainland.

President Joe Biden’s administration has said its commitment to Taiwan is “rock solid”. In the first few days of Biden’s presidency, Taiwan reported a “large incursion” by Chinese warplanes over two days. Taiwan’s air force moved to warn away the Chinese aircraft and deployed air defence missile systems to monitor the planes. Analysts said China was testing Biden’s support for Taiwan.

How much of an issue is independence in Taiwan?

While political progress has been slow, links between the two peoples and economies have grown sharply. Taiwanese companies have invested about $60bn in China, and up to one million Taiwanese now live there, many running Taiwanese factories.

Some Taiwanese worry their economy is now dependent on China. Others point out that closer business ties makes Chinese military action less likely, because of the cost to China’s own economy.

A controversial trade agreement sparked the “Sunflower Movement” in 2014 where students and activists occupied Taiwan’s parliament protesting against what they call China’s growing influence over Taiwan.

Some Taiwanese vocally support formal independence but most favour the middle ground. Officially, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) still favours eventual formal independence for Taiwan, while the KMT favours eventual re-unification. Opinion polls show only a small minority of Taiwanese support pursuing one or the other at the moment, with most preferring to stick with the current middle ground.

Yet more and more people say they feel Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Support for the DPP increased at the January 2016 election. This was partly because of dissatisfaction with the KMT’s handling of economic matters, from the wealth gap to high housing prices, and partly because of worries that Mr Ma’s administration was making Taiwan too dependent on Beijing.

Comments

The Biden’s administration needs to deter China from greater military coercion of Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan was a war and peace issue for China and a conflict was certainly possible, but both sides have a variety of incentives for the situation not to escalate.

The whole world needed to get serious about what a long term strategic competition between the US and China looked like.

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Gourangalal Das, currently Joint Secretary (Americas) in the Ministry of External Affairs, will be the next envoy to Taiwan.

A formal announcement on the appointment is expected soon. This comes at a time when there are calls within the strategic community for upgradation of New Delhi-Taipei ties. China and the US have also been sparring over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

India does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan because of its One-China policy. It has an office in Taipei to carry out diplomatic functions. It operates under the name of India-Taipei Association, and Das will be its new Director General. He will replace Sridharan Madhusudhanan, also a career diplomat.

Taiwan too has effected a change of guard. East Asian and Pacific Affairs Director-General Baushuan Ger has been named Taiwan’s representative to India, replacing Tien Chung-Kwang who was on the post for seven years at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre in India.

Incidentally, Sun Weidong, China’s ambassador to India, in a statement Friday, underlined: “We need to respect and accommodate mutual core interests and major concerns, adhere to the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.”

In Beijing’s book, any pro-active step by a foreign country with regard to Taiwan, Hong Kong, South China Sea, Tibet and Xinjiang are considered “sensitive” in nature.

India has so far adhered to the One China policy although in December 2010, during then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit, it did not mention support for the policy in the joint communique.

And in 2014, when Narendra Modi became Prime Minister, he invited Chung-Kwang Tien, Taiwan’s representative to India, along with Lobsang Sangay, Sikyong (President) of the Central Tibetan Administration (the Tibetan government-in-exile) to his swearing-in ceremony.

In the MEA, a Joint Secretary who handles India’s ties with the US is considered a key official, together with those dealing with China and Pakistan.

The appointment of Das as envoy to Taiwan comes weeks after the BJP asked two of its MPs, Meenakshi Lekhi and Rahul Kaswan, to attend via virtual mode the swearing-in ceremony of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen on May 20 – a fortnight after the start of the standoff with China on the Line of Actual Control.

From the 1999 batch of the Indian Foreign Service, Das, who is fluent in Mandarin, was in Beijing between 2001 and 2004. He returned as First Secretary (Political) in 2006 and remained there until 2009.

He had also served as a Deputy Secretary handling External Affairs in the Prime Minister’s Office during the tenure of Manmohan Singh. He was retained for the transition in 2014.

As Counsellor (Political) at the Indian embassy in Washington DC, he played a key role during the Prime Minister’s visit in June 2017 when he met US President Donald Trump.

Das returned to New Delhi and was tasked by then Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar to set up the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, the in-house think tank to study China post-Doklam.

During his stint as Joint Secretary (Americas), Indo-US ties grew, including the revival of the Quadrilateral mechanism (between India, US, Japan and Australia).

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