The United States killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a strike in Afghanistan on 31 July, President Joe Biden announced, calling it a moment of justice for families of 2,977 people killed in September 11, 2001 terror attack. Biden said Zawahiri had been the mastermind behind or played a key role in attacks on the USS Cole and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

It was the biggest blow to the militant group since its founder Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon who had a $25 million bounty on his head, helped coordinate the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

Zawahiri died after a US drone strike in the Afghan capital Kabul. US intelligence determined with “high confidence” through multiple intelligence streams that the man killed was Zawahiri. He was killed on the balcony of a “safe house” in Kabul that he shared with other members of his family. No other casualties occurred.

There were rumors of Zawahiri’s death several times in recent years, and he was long reported to have been in poor health.

In a statement, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that a strike took place and strongly condemned it, calling it a violation of “international principles.”

His death raises questions about whether Zawahiri received sanctuary from the Taliban following their takeover of Kabul in August 2021. US officials said that senior Taliban officials were aware of his presence in the city and said the United States expected the Taliban to abide by an agreement not to allow al Qaeda fighters to re-establish themselves in the country.

The drone attack is the first known US strike inside Afghanistan since US troops and diplomats left the country in August 2021. The move may bolster the credibility of Washington’s assurances that the United States can still address threats from Afghanistan without a military presence in the country.

Zawahiri succeeded bin Laden as al Qaeda leader after years as its main organiser and strategist, but his lack of charisma and competition from rival militants Islamic State hobbled his ability to inspire spectacular attacks on the West.

Until the US announcement, Zawahiri had been rumoured variously to be in Pakistan’s tribal area or inside Afghanistan.

The senior US official said finding Zawahiri was the result of persistent counterterrorism work. The United States identified this year that Zawahiri’s wife, daughter and her children had relocated to a safe house in Kabul, then identified that Zawahiri was there as well.

With other senior al Qaeda members, Zawahiri is believed to have plotted the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole naval vessel in Yemen which killed 17 US sailors and injured more than 30 others, the Rewards for Justice website said.

He was indicted in the United States for his role in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and wounded more than 5,000 others.

Both bin Laden and Zawahiri eluded capture when US-led forces toppled Afghanistan’s Taliban government in late 2001 following the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States.

Operational Details

Speculation is rife that the United States may have used Hellfire R9X, a warhead-less missile, which is used in finely targeted attacks. The Hellfire R9X first appeared in 2017 when al-Qaeda senior leader Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was killed. What suggests the use of the missile is that pictures showed no signs of explosion. Over time, the missile has earned names like “flying ginsu,” after a famous 1980s television commercial for ostensibly Japanese kitchen knives, and “ninja bomb”.

In his address, Biden pointed out that there was no harm done to the family members of Zawahiri in the precision strike, and no civilians bore any injuries.

Pakistan

Zawahiri’s presence in a guest house in Kabul, reportedly owned by interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani’s close aide, became a subject of intense curiosity, given Sirajuddin’s chief patron — the Pakistan deep state.

Al Qaeda After al-Zawahiri

Not as charismatic as Osama bin Laden (OBL), Al Qaeda (AQ) chief Zawahiri remained in his shadows. After OBL’s killing in a US Navy Seal operation in Pakistan in 2011, few experts believed that Zawahiri could hold the network together. However, since 2011, the AQ network has grown across the world, especially in Syria, Mali, Somalia, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, disseminating its puritanical ideology, money and expertise to local militant groups. This happened despite the huge popularity of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria amongst radical Muslim youth. The ISIS had also set up a physical Caliphate — a long-cherished goal of international jihad espoused by the AQ.

Under Zawahiri, the AQ network seems to have changed its strategic direction and its branches currently operate more like independent insurgencies — such as through the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and Al-Shabab in Somalia. The crucial question is whether the AQ, post-Zawahiri, will lose momentum or whether the collective core leadership that seems to have been quietly working post-OBL could provide a leader as well as offer continuity.

Successor to al- Zawahiri

The most obvious name being discussed to succeed Zawahiri was that of another Egyptian, Saif al-Adel, who was believed to be in charge of external operations. However, given regular reports of his connections “within” Iran, he may not be the “ideal face” to succeed Zawahiri. Some regional leaders, such as from Al Shabab, may be acceptable, given the recent series of “successes” of this branch. The oldest branch, the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is the key source of chief ideologues of jihad, may be used to prop up a cleric as the next AQ Amir in order to lower the profile for some time while keeping the propaganda around the “martyrdom” of Zawahiri going.

Saif al-Adel is on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists. The agency mentions on its website that al-Adel was born on April 11, though his birth year is either 1960 or 1963. He has used aliases like Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi, Seif Al Adel, Ibrahim Al-Madani. The FBI has announced a reward of $10 million for any information about him. Saif al-Adel is an Egyptian ex army officer and a founding member of Al Qaeda. He had joined the precursor terror group Maktab al-Khidmat in 1980s.

A second possible successor is Yezid Mebarek, known as Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb since 2020. An Algerian citizen, Mebarek ran media operations for AQIM, using a 2013 video to call for global attacks against French interests after Paris sent troops to help quash a militant insurgency in Mali.

A third potential successor is Moroccan-born national Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi. He is wanted for questioning by the FBI in connection with his membership in Al-Qaeda. He studied software programming in Germany before moving to Afghanistan where he was selected to manage al Qaeda’s main media wing, said the FBI. The son-in-law of Zawahiri, he is a senior Al Qaeda leader.

Doha Agreement Violated

The Taliban had promised in the 2020 Doha Agreement on the terms of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan that they would not harbour al-Qaida members. Nearly a year after the US military’s chaotic pullout from Afghanistan, al-Zawahri’s killing raises questions about the involvement of Taliban leaders in sheltering a mastermind of the 9/11 terror attacks and one of America’s most-wanted fugitives.

The Taliban and the US are accusing each other of violating the agreement. But the real question is: Was the Taliban involved in providing intel on Zawahiri for some benefit that would show up in the future, or did intra-Taliban rivalry lead to cooperation against the Haqqani Network? There is a third scenario — of the Pakistan deep state having provided the intel to show the Taliban in a bad light and curry favour with the US, especially in order to deal with the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has caused much violence against Pakistan forces.

Since the Haqqani Network has been mediating talks between the TTP and the Pakistan army, the strike has surely cast doubts about the safety of the TTP leaders who visit Kabul for meetings. Given the links between the Haqqanis and the Pakistani deep state, it is unlikely that the TTP would continue talks, which in any case have not prevented attacks on the Pakistani forces. The TTP has already started accusing the Pakistan army of providing a base to the US for the drone strike. Thus, much more violence is expected in the Af-Pak region in the coming weeks and months.

Zawahiri and India

In 2014, the AQ launched the Al Qaeda In Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the outfit’s South Asia branch. The inaugural video carried an old clip of OBL and a message of Zawahiri appointing a relatively unknown Indian radical Asim Umar, who had fled to Pakistan decades ago. In recent times, the group has posted many videos focused on India, especially on Kashmir. Some of these clips have featured Zawahiri. With his elimination, as well as that of Umar and a few “known” Pakistani faces of the AQIS earlier, the propaganda against India is likely to lose momentum for now. However, since the AQIS is an Af-Pak-based group, it may rebuild itself with support from the Pakistan deep state.

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New Delhi had evacuated its envoy to Afghanistan, Rudrendra Tandon, and 175 other officials posted in the Embassy of India in Kabul on August 17, 2021 – just two days after President Ashraf Ghani’s government collapsed in the wake of a swift military campaign by the Taliban. India had also evacuated its officials posted in its consulates in other cities in Afghanistan weeks before the country was taken over by the Taliban.

New Delhi sent a delegation of officials, led by its senior diplomat J P Singh, to Kabul, in early August, to oversee the delivery operations of India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

New Delhi, however, has been having back-channel contacts with the Taliban over the past few years as it had anticipated that the Sunni Islamist militia could eventually return to the governance structure in Kabul after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, thus giving its mentor Pakistan a strategic edge against India.

India over the past few months also sent food and medicines to Afghanistan as humanitarian assistance, which was distributed through the UN agencies.

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India said in a UN Security Council (UNSC) debate, on 25 January,  that member states are fully aware that Pakistan has a long history of harbouring, helping, and actively supporting terrorists during a UNSC debate on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict.” Underscoring the threat of terrorism to civilians, Counsellor in India’s Permanent Mission to the UN, R Madhu Sudan said that the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terror attack continue to have Pakistan’s support.

The Indian Counsellor made these remarks after a Pakistani diplomat misused the platform provided by the UN to “propagate false and malicious propaganda” against India. “This is not the first time that a Pakistani representative has used a UN platform to spread false and malicious propaganda against my country, attempting in vain to divert the world’s attention away from the sad state of his country where terrorists have free reign and the lives of ordinary people, particularly minorities, are turned upside down,” he said.

“This is a country that has been identified as a global terrorist sponsor and holds the world record for hosting the most terrorists sanctioned by the Security Council.” So much so that today’s terrorist attacks all around the world have their origins in Pakistan in some way or another,” he claimed.

Madhu Sudan reminded the Security Council that Pakistan’s prime minister and foreign minister had been chastised for aiding terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden, but they continue on their merry way.

“Today, we’re talking about civilian protection. Terrorists pose the greatest threat to civilians. As we previously stated, the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terror incident continue to enjoy the support of the state she represents,” he continued.

The Indian Counsellor reaffirmed that “the entire Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh were, are, and always will be an integral and inalienable part of India, irrespective of what Pakistan representation feels… We call upon Pakistan to promptly quit all regions under its unlawful occupation.

“Madhu Sudan stated that India wishes to have normal and friendly ties with all countries, including Pakistan, and that it is committed to amicably resolving any unresolved concerns, as per the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.

“However, any genuine debate can only take place in a free of terror, animosity, and violence environment. Pakistan is responsible for creating such an environment. India would continue to take robust and decisive action until then.

On the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, Madhu Sudan reiterated that the entire J&K and Ladakh were, are and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India, irrespective of what Pakistan representative believes. “We call upon Pakistan to immediately vacate all areas under its illegal occupation,” the Indian Counsellor said. .

“However, any meaningful dialogue can only be held in an atmosphere free of terror, hostility and violence. The onus is on Pakistan to create such a conducive atmosphere. Till then, India will continue to take firm and decisive steps to respond to cross border terrorism,” he added.

No Common Definition of Terrorism

The United Nations member states have failed themselves by continuing to procrastinate on concluding a comprehensive convention against international terrorism, India has said, voicing concern that the global body has neither agreed on a common definition of terrorism nor crafted a well-coordinated policy to tackle the global scourge and dismantle its enabling networks.

Speaking in the UNGA meeting to consider the Report of Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation, Second Secretary in India’s Permanent Mission to the UN Dinesh Setia, on 24 January, said: “Our inability to seriously address terrorism, the most dangerous of scourges faced by states and societies since the World War II, casts doubt on the relevance of the organisation for the very people whom the Charter of the United Nations obliges us to protect”.

“The United Nations has yet to agree on a common definition, let alone craft a coherent well-coordinated policy to tackle terrorism and dismantle its enabling networks. We have failed ourselves by continuing to procrastinate on concluding a comprehensive convention against international terrorism,” he said.

India proposed a draft document on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN in 1986 but it has not been implemented yet as there is no unanimity on the definition of terrorism among the member states.

The Indian diplomat further said that the effectiveness, relevance and longevity of any institution lie in its dynamic character and ability to adapt itself to the changing times.

“As long as the key organs of the organisation remain anchored in a governance structure frozen in the past, the crisis of legitimacy and performance will persist,” Setia said.

Lamenting that four decades have gone by since the inscription of the item on the reform of the Security Council on the agenda of the General Assembly, Setia called on member states to strive to ensure that this year is the one that finally delivers some concrete progress with regard to a Security Council and a United Nations that reflect the realities of the contemporary world.

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A “decent interval” between US withdrawal and Taliban’s return, which the US had hoped for, did not happen leading to a messy withdrawal. Yet, Biden maintained that his decision was the right one.

The Taliban captured Kabul on 15 August almost 20 years after the U.S. launched its global war on terror. The city of roughly 5 million people fell to the Islamist insurgents without even a fight while Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and the Americans abandoned their Embassy and rushed to Kabul airport.

The Afghan Army soldiers did not fight. Police abandoned their stations. Former Northern Alliance warlords left the country. And the government crumbled like the proverbial house of cards.

The reversal is an embarrassing consequence of misjudging the viability of Afghan government forces — by the US military as well as intelligence agencies — which in some cases chose to surrender their vehicles and weapons rather than fight.

President Biden owned up to no mistake in his decision to end the longest war in the history of the United States. But he rued, with a patronising contemplation, that even two decades of support failed to turn the Afghan military into a force capable of securing its own country. “We gave them every tool they could need. We paid their salaries. Provided for the maintenance of their airplanes,” Biden said.

“We gave them every chance to determine their own future. What we could not provide was the will to fight for that future,” he said. “One more year, or five more years, of U.S. military presence would not have made a difference if the Afghan military cannot or will not hold its own country”, Biden said, justifying his stand seeking to put an end to “an endless American presence in the middle of another country’s civil conflict”.

It was a war against one of the most resilient fighter forces of the world to secure indemnity from future terrorist attacks and, perhaps, to teach them a hard lesson. A stock-taking in May 2018, however, revealed that not only have the Taliban, the Haqqani network and Al Qaeda made a successful comeback, but also that ISIS has gained a foothold in the country.

Disorderly Evacuation

The incompetence was staggering. Bagram was closed, thus eliminating every possibility of an orderly evacuation. Intelligence assessments were delusional. The evacuation was left to the last day. Visas were not processed or the right people identified. The airport was not prepared.

The whole strategy was an exercise in virtual politics. First, the creation of a virtual Afghan government. It is not surprising that the Taliban moved with such confidence and speed when they were the ones best placed to understand they were not fighting a real army or a real state, but rather a fiction or a ghost projected from Washington on to the screen of Afghanistan.

Even days before the fall of Kabul, the understanding among European ambassadors in the city was that Washington would honour its commitment to provide security for the embassies in the green zone with a residual military force. That commitment had been formally made and people took it seriously. But it too was dropped, and just as suddenly.

America’s Failure

The myth of American impermeability was demolished. For generations, the United States rested on the illusion that it could, when it wanted to, isolate itself from the troublesome world beyond its frontiers.

Unarguably the most powerful military and economic power in history suffered a body blow by a group of individuals attached to a non-state actor, the al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden.

The largest military industrial complex on Earth, with the most powerful intelligence system synergised with real-time information from allies across the world, had failed to recognise the potency of the threat posed by al-Qaeda, and to neutralise it in time.

America’s response was not just swift but ferocious and almost overwhelming in its design, to the point that the use of force seemed to be intended to demonstrate the almost unlimited might of American hegemonic power.

The swift attack on Afghanistan, the dispatching of the Taliban, the building of an almost unprecedented global coalition (“you are with us or you are against us”), a consensus within the UN, the neutralisation of the core of al-Qaeda and ultimately, the killing of Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, demonstrated that America was willing to be unforgiving in dealing with those responsible for 9/11.

There was no terrorist attack of consequence on the US since 9/11. But a wasted war in Iraq (in the futile search for weapons of mass destruction) — and enlarging the mission in Afghanistan, from defeating al-Qaeda to building democracy and civil society to finally handing over power to the Taliban was supremely ironical.

Billions Spent on the Afghan Army

Of the approximately $145 billion the US government spent trying to rebuild Afghanistan, about $83 billion went to developing and sustaining its army and police forces, according to the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, a congressionally created watchdog that has tracked the war since 2008. The $145 billion is in addition to $837 billion the United States spent fighting the war, which began with an invasion in October 2001.

But the Afghan security forces collapsed so quickly and completely — in some cases without a shot fired — that the ultimate beneficiary of the American investment turned out to be the Taliban. They grabbed not only political power but also US-supplied firepower — guns, ammunition, helicopters and more.

The Taliban captured an array of modern military equipment when they overran Afghan forces who failed to defend district centers. Bigger gains followed, including combat aircraft, when the Taliban rolled up provincial capitals and military bases with stunning speed, topped by capturing the biggest prize, Kabul.

The US failure to produce a sustainable Afghan army and police force, and the reasons for their collapse, will be studied for years by military analysts. The forces turned out to be hollow, equipped with superior arms but largely missing the crucial ingredient of combat motivation.

What the Afghans received in tangible resources they lacked in the more important intangibles. Morale, discipline, leadership, unit cohesion are more decisive than numbers of forces and equipment.

By contrast, Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgents, with smaller numbers, less sophisticated weaponry and no air power, proved a superior force. US intelligence agencies largely underestimated the scope of that superiority, and even after President Joe Biden announced in April he was withdrawing all US troops, the intelligence agencies did not foresee a Taliban final offensive that would succeed so spectacularly.

Before April, the Afghan government troops were slowly but steadily losing the war. When they learned that their American partners were going home, an impulse to give up without a fight “spread like wildfire.”

The United States tried to develop a credible Afghan defense establishment on the fly, even as it was fighting the Taliban, attempting to widen the political foundations of the government in Kabul and seeking to establish democracy in a country rife with corruption and cronyism. Year after year, US military leaders downplayed the problems and insisted success was coming. Others saw the handwriting on the wall.

Some elements of the Afghan army did fight hard, including commandos whose heroic efforts are yet to be fully documented. But as a whole the security forces created by the United States and its NATO allies amounted to a “house of cards” whose collapse was driven as much by failures of US civilian leaders as their military partners.

The Afghan force-building exercise was so completely dependent on American largesse that the Pentagon even paid the Afghan troops’ salaries. Too often that money, and untold amounts of fuel, were siphoned off by corrupt officers and government overseers.

President Ashraf Ghani lacked the political dexterity required to navigate political complexities, the political skill and temperament to cohere and glue the mosaic of Afghanistan, including varied Pashtun tribes. In the end, he could not inspire his well-equipped army which was no match to the Taliban, whose ideological inspiration comes from a potent mix of Pashtun nationalism and extremist version of Deobandi Islam.

Failure to Understand Complexities

America failed because of its deep cultural misunderstanding of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has suffered deeply from decades of civil war, religious extremism, drug mafia, neighbouring interference (Pakistani shares 2,500 miles of porous border), poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and the presence of different ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal, and political groups antagonistic to each other for centuries. It was compounded by the fact that the Taliban insurgency was indigenous and from the largest ethnic group (Pashtun) while the Kabul Government was largely being ‘made up of minorities’.

Many Pashtun leaders and intellectuals regret how their lands have been transformed into a staging ground for a global conflict. Pashtun nationalism is a potent force and Pashtuns are not only the predominant ethnic group in much of Afghanistan’s south and east, but are also a major ethnic group in Pakistan’s north and west. The reason for Afghanistan being often monikered as the “land of the Pashtuns” is because Afghan identity has historically been synonymous with “Pashtun” however much the outside world labels its people regardless of ethnic origin and tends to conflate an Afghan national identity with the Pashtun identity.

Phases of the War

Four presidents share responsibility for the missteps in Afghanistan that accumulated over two decades. But only President Joe Biden will be the face of the war’s chaotic, violent conclusion.

Under the command of President George W. Bush, American forces stormed into Afghanistan soon after the terror attacks on a hunt for bin Laden while trying to disrupt al-Qaida’s ability to conduct further assaults on the West. There was immediate success: The Taliban were routed, the terror group disrupted.

But after that came the grinding second phase of the war and a surge of troops from President Barack Obama in 2009. Though Obama later moved to reduce the number of troops, the volume of insurgent attacks and civilian causalities prevented a full drawdown.

Trump mulled meeting the Taliban at Camp David on an earlier Sept. 11 anniversary, only to back away from the idea amid an uproar. But he announced that the U.S. would pull all its forces out by May 2021, an agreement Biden honoured and delayed only slightly.

Biden has argued for more than a decade that Afghanistan was a kind of purgatory for the United States. He found it to be corrupt, addicted to America’s largesse and an unreliable partner that should be made to fend for itself. His goal was to protect Americans from terrorist attacks, not building a country. A majority of Americans favoured bringing troops home.

Casualties and Costs

Over 20 years, the Afghanistan War cost over $2.26 trillion or $ 300 mn per day. 2,500 US soldiers, 4,000 civilians (serving US forces) and 1,145 NATO and coalition troops died. Moere than 20,000 were injured. The medical cost in the long run was $ 300-500 billion.

Since 2001, an estimated 160,000 people had been killed in the war in Afghanistan, of which some 65,000 were Afghan security forces, 44,000 Afghan civilians, 42,500 Taliban fighters and other insurgents, 424 humanitarian aid workers, 67 journalists and media workers are a part.

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An Islamist group with a medieval mindset and modern weapons defeated the world’s most powerful country. The U.S. can say in its defence that its mission was to fight al-Qaeda and that it met its strategic objectives. But in reality, after spending 20 years in Afghanistan to fight terrorism and rebuild the Afghan state, the U.S. ran away from the battlefield, embarrassing itself and leaving its allies helpless.

US President Joe Biden has accused the Afghan government and military of allowing the Taliban to overrun the war-torn country. This unconvincing self-justification cannot conceal the all-pervading sense of betrayal: America simply left Afghanistan in the lurch. By his own admission, the US spent more than $1 trillion in two decades, ostensibly to train and equip the 300,000-strong Afghan military force. So, why did this ‘incredibly well-equipped’ force capitulate so tamely to the Taliban?

Biden’s contention that the US had ‘planned for every contingency’ does not hold water in the light of the chaotic and messy pullout, even as he has deigned to concede that the Taliban takeover happened ‘more quickly’ than anticipated.

America’s unwillingness to take Pakistan to task for helping the Taliban run riot has been plainly visible all along.

Measured by its stated objectives and international consequences, the global war on terror has failed strikingly. Bin Laden’s elimination might have provided a trophy to display, but Islamist terrorism and religious extremism got a tremendous boost with the rise of the Islamic State in parts of Iraq and Syria, and after its elimination, the pronounced spread in Africa of extremist movements affiliated with the al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Islamist terrorism has viciously struck Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and has targeted Southeast Asia. Europe has suffered dramatic terrorist attacks and an influx of refugees, with political and social consequences marked by the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment and right-wing nationalist forces.

The gap between the objectives of America’s war on terror and actual achievement is clear in our region. The terrorists have neither been defeated nor their organisations destroyed, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Despite Pakistan’s state sponsorship of terrorism, not only against India but also against US forces in Afghanistan, the US has looked to Pakistan to facilitate its withdrawal from Afghanistan through its Taliban links, allowing it in the process to obtain its longed for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan against India. The US has failed to “abolish terrorist sanctuaries and havens” in Pakistan, or to compel an unwilling Pakistan to act against the Haqqani group, which now controls Afghanistan’s interior ministry. Ironically, whereas the US acted to destroy the Islamic State in West Asia, it has handed over a state to the Taliban, with the new Afghanistan government liberally composed of UN-designated terrorists. Ironically, Islamist extremists and terrorists have taken over a country without any democratic process with the consent of an America committed to democratic values.

The US war on terror has been selective, marred by double standards, equivocations and geopolitical motives. The stated goal was not to make only America safe, but eliminate the terrorist threat globally as part of America’s leadership role. The way it has withdrawn from Afghanistan has created doubts on whether it will honour its commitments elsewhere, leading countries to hedge. Europe sees the withdrawal as a foreign policy disaster for the western alliance. India is less safe with the Taliban-Pakistan takeover of Afghanistan under the accommodating umbrella of the US.

The US must reflect on its inability to successfully see through wars, despite its enormous military capability. This has implications for its west European and East Asian allies, as well as the Arabs, who depend on the US military to protect themselves.

The Kabul fiasco will undoubtedly affect the US ability to mobilise coalitions against a common cause. With a hostile Iran and Afghanistan, the newly proposed US quadrilateral in Central Asia is a non-starter.

The Americans are unlikely to forgo the ability to intervene in such a key region at some future date. But for that you need an America that can learn the right lessons, overcome domestic divisions and avoid the perils of group-think that afflict large parts of Washington.

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1980s and Early 90s: The Genesis

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was facing resistance from the country’s hardline Islamists. Pakistan, then a firm US ally, was apprehensive of the Soviets stretching their influence further south, or even invading Balochistan.

Pakistan, US and Saudi Arabia, with covert financial and arms support to the hardliner militias, ensured a Soviet withdrawal in 1992.

A power sharing deal between various Afghan parties and warlords was ineffective, and four years of Afghan civil war followed.

In the melee and power vacuum, a group of fighters, predominantly Pashto tribesmen in the south coalesced into the Taliban. It also drew Pashto students from seminaries across the border in Pakistan. Under the leadership of its founder Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban spread rapidly throughout Afghanistan.

It promised to liberate Afghanistan from corrupt leadership of warlords, and establish a pure Islamic society.

1999: An ‘Unholy Nexus’

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 linking the Taliban and al-Qaida as terrorist entities and imposing sanctions on their funding.

The move followed a period of ascendancy for al-Qaida and its leader, Osama bin Laden.

The Taliban, which rose from the ashes of Afghanistan’s post-Soviet civil war, provided sanctuary to the Osama-led group for its operations.

2001: War on Terror

The Al-Qaida launched the deadliest terror attacks on US soil by crashing passenger planes into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Close to three thousand people died in the attacks.

Following the terror strikes, US President George W Bush declared a “war against terrorism” and zeroed in on al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.

Days after the attack, Bush signed into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the United States on 9/11. This resolution was later cited by the Bush administration as legal rationale for its decision to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism, including its invasion of Afghanistan.

A US-led offensive over the next couple of months forced Taliban to cede its key strongholds. However, bin Laden escaped to Pakistan during this period.

After the fall of Kabul in November, Hamid Karzai was installed as interim administration head of Afghanistan. Days later, the Taliban regime surrendered Kandahar with its leader Mullah Omar fleeing the city.

2002-2004: A Move Towards Peace

The US-led forces launched attacks against Taliban and al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan, including Operation Anaconda.

In April 2002, Bush called for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and announced “Marshall Plan” for the country. Although, the US never came close to Marshall Plan-like reconstruction spending for Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the US military created a civil affairs framework to coordinate redevelopment with UN and non-governmental organizations and to expand the authority of the Kabul government.

Separately, Pentagon also began shifting military and intelligence resources away from Afghanistan in the direction of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Later that year, Karzai was picked to head the country’s transitional government.

In 2003, the Bush administration announced an end to “major combat” in the country. At this time, there were only 8,000 US soldiers stationed in Afghanistan.

Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan in 2014 after voters turned out to cast ballots in large numbers. He won with 55% of the vote. While his election victory was marred by accusations of fraud by his opponents, the democratic process augured well for a nation which had not gone to the polls since 1969.

2006: Bloody Resurgence

Violence increased across the country during the summer months, with intense fighting erupting in the south in July.

The number of suicide attacks quintupled from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, while remotely detonated bombings more than doubled to 1,677. Despite a string of recent election successes, some experts blamed a faltering central government for the spike in attacks.

In 2007, notorious Taliban military commander, Mullah Dadullah, was killed in a joint operation by Afghan, US and Nato forces in the south of Afghanistan.

By 2008, investigations found that errant fire from a US gunship killed dozens of Afghan civilians in Herat, drawing condemnation from President Hamid Karzai and bolstering Taliban claims that coalition forces are unable to protect the population.

2009: Obama’s New Strategy

Months after assuming the Oval Office, President Barack Obama announced a new strategy for the US war effort, linking success in Afghanistan to a stable Pakistan. The core goal of the strategy: disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and its safe havens in Pakistan and prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

He also sanctioned the deployment of additional US forces to the country. President Karzai welcomed the strategy.

In July, nearly four thousand US Marines launched a major offensive in southern Afghanistan in response to a growing Taliban insurgency. The operation focused on restoring government services, bolstering local police forces, and protecting civilians from Taliban incursion. By August 2009, there were about 60,000-68,000 US forces in Afghanistan.

A couple of months later, President Hamid Karzai won another term. However, as concerns over Karzai’s administration grew, the US and other international partners called for improved governance.

In December, President Obama announced a major escalation of the US mission and committed an additional thirty thousand forces to the fight. For the first time in the eight-year war effort, a time frame was put on the US military presence with Obama eyeing troop drawdown by July 2011.

2011: Osama bin Laden Eliminated

Almost 10 years after the deadly 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in Pakistan in May, 2011.

The death of America’s primary target for a war that started ten years ago fueled the long-simmering debate about continuing the Afghanistan war. As President Obama prepared to announce the withdrawal of some or all of the thirty thousand surge troops in July, Congressional lawmakers increasingly called for a hastened drawdown.

2014: US Announces Troop Withdrawal

President Barack Obama announced a timetable for withdrawing most US forces by the end of 2016. He said the drawdown will free resources for counterterrorism priorities elsewhere.

In September, newly-elected president Ashraf Ghani signed a power-sharing agreement with his chief opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, who had mobilized thousands of protestors as he challenged the voting results. The agreement was brokered after intensive diplomacy by US.

Despite the truce, the power struggle between Ghani and Abdullah gave the Taliban strategic heft as it started making gains in the countryside.

In 2015, the Afghanistan government publicly announced that Mullah Omar had died in 2013. Taliban said he died of tuberculosis and his last days were spent in a hideout in Afghanistan.

2017-2018: Trump Hints at Prolonged War

In a policy shift, President Donald Trump said that decisions about US withdrawal will be based on “conditions on the ground” rather than arbitrary timelines.

He also invited India to play a greater role in rebuilding Afghanistan while castigating Pakistan for harboring insurgents.

In the following year, Taliban launched major attacks in Kabul that kill more than 115 people amid a broader upsurge in violence.

The attacks came after the Trump administration stepped up offensive against Taliban with air strikes and troop deployment across rural areas. Simultaneously, the Trump administration cut off security assistance worth billions of dollars to Pakistan for what President Trump called its “lies and deceit” in harboring Taliban terrorists.

2019: Peace Talks Progress

By the end of 2018, the Taliban and US peace talks made major progress with special US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and top Taliban official Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar leading the negotiations.

In 2019, the Taliban sought withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in exchange for a pledge to block international terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil.

In September, Trump abruptly broke off peace talks a week after Khalilzad announced that an agreement had been reached “in principle” with Taliban leaders. In a tweet, Trump said he canceled a secret meeting with the Taliban and Afghan President Ghani at Camp David after a US soldier was killed in a Taliban attack. Taliban warned that the cancellation will cause an increase in the number of deaths.

2020: Road to Peace

In 2020, US envoy Khalilzad and the Taliban’s Baradar finally signed an agreement to pave the way for a significant drawdown of US troops. It included guarantees from the Taliban that the country will not be used for terrorist activities.

The US-Taliban deal did not call for an immediate ceasefire, and in the days after its signing, Taliban fighters carried out dozens of attacks against Afghan security forces. The US responded with an air strike against the Taliban in the southern province of Helmand.

In September, the Taliban representatives and Afghan government officials met face-to-face for the first time in Doha, Qatar, after nearly twenty years of war. Both sides expressed eagerness to bring peace to Afghanistan and establish a framework for Afghan society after US troop withdrawal.

While the Afghan government pushed for a ceasefire, the Taliban reiterated its call for the country to be governed through an Islamic system.

2021: US Troop Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover

President Biden announced that US will not meet the deadline set under the US-Taliban agreement to withdraw all troops by May 1 and instead released a plan for a full withdrawal by September 11, 2021. “It’s time to end America’s longest war,” he said.

Biden said that Washington will continue to assist Afghan security forces and support the peace process. The Taliban said it will not participate in “any conference” on Afghanistan’s future until all foreign troops leave.

Taliban started capturing territories after Biden’s announcement, beginning with the take over of Nerkh district just outside Kabul.

By August, nearly the entire country, except Kabul, came under Taliban control as its fighters took city after city.

On August 15, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani left the country for Tajikistan amid an imminent Taliban takeover.

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