These tanks will be used to counter Chinese deployment of a large number of similar armoured columns along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Sources in the defence and security establishment told ThePrint that the Army has finalised the general staff quality requirements and will approach the defence ministry in September for the Acceptance of Necessity (AON) — the first step that will set the project rolling.

The Army is looking at a light tank with a maximum weight of 25 tons — with a margin of 10 per cent— with the same firepower as its regular tanks, but also armed with Artificial Intelligence (AI), integration of tactical surveillance drones to provide a high degree of situational awareness and loitering munition, along with an active protection system.

An active protection system is designed to protect vehicles from anti-tank guided missiles and projectiles away from combat vehicles.  

The Army also wants the light tank to be amphibious, so it can be deployed across riverine regions and even the Pangong Tso lake in Eastern Ladakh.

The project has been named ‘Zorawar’ after Zorawar Singh Kahluria — a military general who served under Jammu’s Raja Gulab Singh —known as the ‘conquerer of Ladakh’.  

“We will approach the defence ministry for AON as early as next month. This would be an indigenous project which will be designed and manufactured in India. We hope to have the production of a prototype and beginning of trials in three years from the sanction of the project,” a source said. 

Sources further said that the proposed conversion of the Vajra-tracked self-propelled artillery into a light tank has been shelved because it won’t be able to meet the weight criteria that the Army is looking for. 

They added that the 25-ton weight is the maximum that can allow for the tanks to be airlifted in high-altitude zones.

China’s light tank deployment gave them an advantage

Sources said that the Ladakh stand-off with China has shown that armoured columns are one of the most prominent factors in defining the operational capability of the land forces. 

Army sources admitted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had inducted a large number of technologically modern, “state of art” tanks, which were being employed operationally as a mix of medium and light tanks with high power-to-weight ratios. 

The increased threat on the northern borders is likely to remain a threat in the foreseeable future, sources further said, adding that while the Army had also deployed its T-90 and T-72 tanks — surprising the Chinese — lighter tanks would mean faster deployment and increased mobility in mountainous terrain.

The Army currently operates three different types of tanks with the latest being the Arjun Mk 1A, which weighs a massive 68.5 tons. The T-90 weighs about 46 tons and the T-72 about 45 tons.

“Tanks were primarily designed for operations in plains and desert terrain and have their own limitations when employed in High-Altitude Areas (HAAs). They face a similar handicap when employed in the marginal terrain of the Rann of Kutch,” another source told ThePrint.

“It is, therefore, an operational necessity to procure light tanks to overcome the limitations faced by medium battle tanks and equip the Indian Army for all contingencies in HAA, marginal terrain and island territories, besides its utilisation in the plains, semi-deserts, and deserts,” the source added.

Sources explained that the setbackthat the world supply chain has experienced in defence-related component supplies because of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has impacted both manufacturing and sustenance of the foreign fleet of tanks that India is currently holding. 

It’s therefore essential to design and develop the light tank indigenously for the Indian Army, they added.

The sources made it clear that India will not be going in for the Russian Sprut light tanks, but added that they are looking for something with similar capabilities. 

The Modi government had in March this year given in-principle approval for the indigenous design and development of light tanks for mountain warfare. 

This move sealed the prospect of possible induction of the Sprut tanks that the Russians had offered to India during Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s Russia visit in 2020. 

Past history of Indian light tank deployment 

The Army has in the past successfully employed light tanks as force multipliers in multiple battle engagements in the past. 

This includes the deployment of Stuart tanks of the 254 Indian Tank Brigade in the Battle of Kohima in World War II, at Naushera, Jhangar, Rajauri, and most successfully, at Zojila in the Indo-Pak War 1947-48.

The AMX-13 tanks were deployed at Chushul and Bomdila in 1962 and in Chammb in 1965.

The amphibious PT-76 light tanks were deployed successfully in 1971, with the tanks leading the race to Dacca. 

The AMX-13 and PT-76 tanks were phased out in the 1980s after the focus of the Army shifted primarily to the western borders, resulting in the conversion of PT-76 units to the T-72 profile. 

The requirement of a light tank capability, which had proved in the past to be a battle-winning factor for the Indian Army in mountainous and riverine terrain, had been voiced on numerous occasions since 1982, sources said.

“Current threat scenario and the contours of the likely future wars have thrown up new challenges for which the Indian Army has to be prepared. The equipment profile of tanks in the Indian Army must have the versatility and flexibility of medium and light platforms,” a third source said.

Sources said that a lightweight agile platform with a high power-to-weight ratio with substantial firepower, protection, surveillance, and communication capabilities is essential to provide the Army the versatility to execute operations in varying terrain against diverse threats and equipment profiles of adversaries. 

“Armoured Fighting Vehicle-Indian Light Tank (AFV-ILT) offering capability for multiple employment options along with niche technologies is, therefore, an operational imperative,” one of the sources cited above said.  

(Edited by Uttara Ramaswamy)

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On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the Changpa tribes of Tibet, on the north bank of the lake. Till 1958, the fort and the premises marked the Sino-Indian border where the Indian Army had an observation post. The Chinese overran the area in 1958 and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) now runs nearly 20km west of Khurnak.

India has been closely monitoring Chinese activity in Khurnak since January, but could not do much as the construction was happening within the territory under Chinese control. The first bridge, which was completed in April, is being used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to transport construction equipment to build the second bridge.

Latest satellite images show that the new bridge is bigger and wider—it is 450m long and 10m wide—and is meant for faster movement of not just troops and vehicles, but even tanks. It is expected to be ready by July. The bridge will cut the distance from Rudok—the PLA’s main base servicing its deployments in the Pangong area—to the LAC to about 50km, from the existing distance of over 200km.

Background

India and China have been locked in the border row since April-May 2020, and despite disengagement of soldiers at Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake and Gogra, the two sides still have around 60,000 troops each and advanced weaponry deployed in the Ladakh theatre.

In May 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a brawl near Pangong Tso, causing serious injuries to both sides. A month later, a deadly clash in the Galwan valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel Santosh Babu. It was the first time in nearly five decades that fatalities were reported on the LAC, and it triggered massive deployment of troops and heavy weapons by both armies.

As of now, military disengagement has only taken place in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso (both banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs area. The Indian army wants PLA to first restore April 2020 status quo ante in PPT 15 and then resolve the patrolling issues in Depsang Bulge  (south of DBO sector) and the Charding Nulllah Junction in Demchok. Till the time these military objectives are achieved, New Delhi is in no mood to normalize ties with Beijing.

Importance of Pangong Tso

Pangong Tso is a 130-km-long lake, approximately one-third of which is in India and the remainder in China with width varying from one to five km is a major obstacle. The water body is of immense strategic importance as it offers suitable avenue for undertaking major operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Khurnak Fort in 1958 and later in 1959 also established a camp at Maldo- Spanggur Lake area, South of Pangong Tso.

During the 1962 war, Chinese offensive to clear Indian defensive localities on the Northern Bank was launched from Khurnak Fort garrison on October 22. The Chinese were able to capture Indian positions from Sirijap right up to Finger 2 in just two days. However, for progressing operations south of Pangong Tso, PLA had to take a tactical pause of more than three weeks as it had to circumvent the lake to concentrate forces at Rudok.

Second Bridge

The Chinese are constructing another bridge over Pangong Tso; adjacent to the one built few months earlier in the Khurnak Fort area, barely 25 km east of the LAC. It is a double-span bridge, capable of ferrying heavier equipment like tanks and artillery guns. China’s overdrive to upgrade infrastructure, both military and civil, part of ‘dual use’ policy, all along the LAC indicates its larger design with serious ramifications.

In May 2020, PLA’s aggression in Pangong Tso area was confined to the northern side only. When the Indian Army occupied the Kailash Range South of Pangong Tso on the night of August 29-30, 2020 as counter to the Chinese actions, PLA was again handicapped due to the constraints of shifting troops from north to the south of Pangong Tso. To obviate this, China has now gone on to build twin bridges at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso, which cuts down the distance to Rudok by almost 150 km and movement time from 10 to barely 3 hours.

Satellite imagery shows the new bridge is being constructed parallel to the first bridge, which is narrower and was completed in April. The first bridge is being used to move equipment such as cranes needed to build the second one, which will be capable of accommodating larger and heavier vehicles such as tanks.

Both structures are located across the narrowest section of the 134-km-long lake. They will cut the distance between Chinese troop positions on the north bank to a key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Rutog, on the eastern end of the lake, by around 150 km.

Kailash Range

On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, India took control of several key heights lying vacant since 1962, including Rezang La, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Maggar Hill of the Kailash range, overlooking China’s Moldo garrison.

The military assessment is that not only does the twin bridge cut the road loop to Rudog base but also allows for faster deployment were India to enact the August 29-21, 2020, action by suddenly occupying heights on the south banks of the lake. The Indian military action during that period not only took the PLA by surprise but also forced China to settle for military disengagement on both banks of the lake with the creation of buffer zones.

Fingers on the Pangong Tso

On the strategic front, the confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces at Pangong Tso is largely on the eight spurs—called ‘Fingers’ in military parlance—jutting out of the Chang Chenmo range, an eastern extension of the Karakoram Range which ends at the north bank of Pangong Tso. Traditionally, India exerted control up to Finger 4 and has claimed up to Finger 8 from where the Indian perception of the LAC starts. India has a permanent position near Finger 3 (named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded Param Vir Chakra after the 1962 war), while China maintains a base east of Finger 8. But over the years, China steadily encroached upon Indian territory. Both sides have now reached an agreement giving India control up to Finger 4 and the rest to China.

Heavy Deployment

Both the armies are matched in deployment across the LAC with Chinese armour and rocket regiments stationed at Rudog base, south of Pangong Tso, and at Xiadullah in the restive Xinjiang military region. The PLA Air Force has stationed its fighters and bombers at Gar Gunsa across Demchok and at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang.

The Indian Army is also fully deployed along the LAC with roads and bridges that can accommodate tanks or armoured personnel carriers all the way up to Daulet Beg Oldi and as many as seven bridges coming up on Galwan river to handle any military emergency.

Until May 2020, Pangong Tso had only minimal military presence. Only one company each of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police were deployed in the area. Now, the entire lake is militarised. The PLA is converting its temporary ammunition dumps, helipads and surface-to-air missile positions into permanent ones. Its soldiers are equipped with howitzers, T-15 light tanks, and Type-81 assault rifles and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers. The PLA has augmented its manpower by deploying two new divisions from the Xinjiang Military District, with elements of motorised infantry, armoured, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments.

On the Indian side, nearly 20,000 troops guard the region, armed with Bofors howitzers and BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles. Armoured columns of T-90 and T-72 tanks are stationed behind. Several news posts with additional deployment and bunkers have come up. A large number of additional battalions have been moved to Ladakh from the western sector. To patrol the lake, Indian Army’s new boats, capable of cruising at a speed of nearly 40kmph with around 20 soldiers, are deployed. Built by Goa Shipyard exclusively for the Army, these advanced boats can be modified to fit light weapons if needed.

The ITBP, the force responsible for guarding the India-China border, too, has made significant enhancements. It has deployed close to 40 per cent additional troops in the area. New border outposts are being created along with infrastructure development of barracks and accommodations for better living conditions, while existing outposts are being further strengthened with additional men and machines. 

Another major problem confounding the security planners is that unlike most other hotspots along the LAC, Pangong Tso is also a popular tourist destination. Pangong Tso and its surroundings were opened up for visitors in the early 1990s, and it became famous after the climax of the 2008 Bollywood movie 3 Idiots, starring Aamir Khan, was filmed near the lake. Ironically, the movie was equally popular in China.

Comments

While the twin bridges in Khurnak Fort area are  beyond the LAC perception of India and hence technically on territory that the PLA occupied in 1959,  Chinese soldiers continue to be forwardly deployed on patrolling point 15, which is in Kugrang Heights and en-route the shortest path from Panging Tso to Galwan Valley.

China’s strategic intent is clear: it plans to keep the positions it recently captured in the Pangong area.

The only feasible response is to have reciprocal infrastructure development in areas controlled by India. For instance, despite strident Chinese opposition, India went ahead with building several bridges on the Shyok River and in Daulat Beg Oldi in the past couple of years.

The Indian side has conveyed its expectations regarding the military standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Chinese side, including foreign minister Wang Yi, and will continue to take the matter forward in order to find a solution though talks.

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In his nearly three-hour “candid” talks with visiting Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, external affairs minister S Jaishankar asserted that restoration of normalcy in ties will require restoration of peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

Wang flew into Delhi from Kabul on 24 March evening in an unannounced trip in the first highest-level visit to India by a Chinese leader after the border standoff in eastern Ladakh erupted nearly two years ago.

At a media briefing shortly after his talks with Wang, Jaishankar said: “If we are both committed to improving our ties then this commitment must find full expression in the ongoing disengagement talks.”

Describing the current situation as a “work in progress”, he also said that relations between India and China have been “disturbed” as a result of the Chinese actions in April 2020.

“So long there are very large deployments, border situation is not normal. We still have ongoing friction areas, have made progress in resolving some friction areas including Pangong Tso. Our discussion today was how to take this forward,” he said.

The border issue is understood to have figured prominently in the meeting between Wang and Doval too. Both sides agreed on the importance of early and complete disengagement in remaining areas to allow bilateral ties to take their natural course. They also stressed the need to continue positive interactions at diplomatic,military levels for restoration of peace, sources said.

Wang also met National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who pressed insisted on an early and complete disengagement of troops in Ladakh, a source with knowledge of the discussions said. “The continuation of the present situation is not in our mutual interest,” the source quoted Doval as telling Wang.

“Restoration of peace and tranquillity will help build mutual trust and create enabling environment for progress in relations,” Doval added.

New Delhi has made it abundantly clear that it cannot be “business as usual” with China until the border stand-off is resolved on mutually acceptable terms.

‘Allow Indian students to return’

Jaishankar also raised with his Chinese counterpart the issue of return of Indian students to China to resume their studies and hoped that Beijing will adopt a “non-discriminatory approach” on it.

“I took up strongly the predicament of Indian students studying in China who have not been allowed to return, citing Covid restrictions. We hope that China will take a non-discriminatory approach since it involves the future of so many young people,” Jaishankar said.

“Minister Wang Yi assured me that he would speak to the relevant authorities on his return on this matter. He also recognised the particular concerns that medical students have in this difficult situation,” he said.

A large number of Indian students had come back to India when China has closed down all universities following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. China had restricted travel by suspending visa and residence permits from March 27, 2020, in view of the pandemic.

‘There should be immediate ceasefire in Ukraine’

The two ministers agreed on the need for an immediate ceasefire and a return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue to defuse the war in Ukraine.

“Wang Yi presented the Chinese understanding, the Chinese view of the situation developed there and the developments pertaining to it, and I presented the Indian view,” Jaishankar said.

The external affairs minister said both sides discussed their respective approaches and perspectives and agreed that diplomacy and dialogue must be the priority.

“I think, the Indian view, many of you may have heard me speak about it yesterday in Parliament as well. And obviously, what he said was his view and what I said was my view, but where we had a common element was that both of us agreed on the importance of an immediate ceasefire as well as a return to diplomacy and dialogue,” he said.

The external affairs minister said in Parliament on 24 March that India’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been “steadfast and consistent” and that it wants resolution of the conflict through talks.

India has not criticised Russia yet for its invasion of Ukraine and also abstained from voting at the UN platforms in condemning the Russian attack.

China has close ties with Russia and it has been giving signals about its willingness to assist Moscow in offsetting the impact of economic sanctions announced by the US and other Western countries following the Russian attack on Ukraine.

Wang’s Kashmir remarks at OIC meet discussed

The external affairs minister said that the remark made by Chinese foreign minister at the OIC meet, which had sparked a strong response from New Delhi, featured in their talks.

Jaishankar said he conveyed to Wang that India hopes that China would follow an independent policy in respect to New Delhi and will not allow its policies to be influenced by other countries.

“Did the issue of what Minister Wang Yi said at the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) Conference come up? Yes, it did. I referred to it. I explained to him, why we found that statement objectionable. It was a subject discussed at some length. There was a larger context as well,” Jaishankar told reporters.

“I conveyed that we hope that China would follow an independent policy in respect of India and not allow its policies to be influenced by other countries and other relationships,” said Jaishankar.

3,500 km long border, varied perceptions

The India-China border, stretching from Arunachal Pradesh in the east to Ladakh, is largely undemarcated. Both sides claim vast swathes of each other’s territory, primarily due to differences in perception about the exact location of the Line of Actual Control.

The border remained largely peaceful since the war of 1962, barring occasional skirmishes- until June 2020.

A violent clash erupted over a Chinese incursion into Indian territory and preventing Indian border patrols. 20 Indian soldiers were martyred when PLA troops attacked with hand-held weapons. Several reports said the Chinese side also suffered at least 35 casualties. However it has never been officially acknowledged by China.

Both sides deployed large number of troops and heavy weaponry in the region following the Galwan clash. The resulting stand-off has not been fully resolved, even after 15 rounds of military-level talks.

Growing trade, and the imbalance

Trade remains heavily tilted in Beijing’s favour. India’s trade deficit with China is the largest it has with any county, and the imbalance has been steadily widening.

The exports from India to China have increased from $10.17 billion in 2016-17 to $21.19 billion in 2020-21. The imports from China have increased from $61.28 billion to $65.21 billion during the same period.

More than 100 Chinese companies, including state-owned enterprises and electronics manufacturers that have come to dominate the country’s mobile phone market, operate in India.

Since the Galwan clash of 2020, New Delhi has tightened the screws on Chinese players by increasing scrutiny of investments or imports and banning some mobile apps.

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Sources said the bridge is being constructed more than 20 km east of Finger 8 on the lake’s north bank – India says Finger 8 denotes the LAC. The bridge site is just east of Khurnak Fort in Rutog county where the PLA has frontier bases. There is a frontier defence company at Khurnak Fort, and a water squadron further east at Banmozhang.

Since the military standoff began in May 2020, India and China have not only worked to improve existing infrastructure, but have also built several new roads, bridges, landing strips along the entire frontier.

Pangong Tso, an endorheic lake, is 135 km long, of which more than two-thirds is under Chinese control. Khurnak Fort, close to where China is building the new bridge, is near the halfway mark of the boomerang-shaped lake.

Historically a part of India, Khurnak Fort has been under Chinese control since 1958. From Khurnak Fort, the LAC is considerably west, with India claiming it at Finger 8 and China claiming it at Finger 4.

The north and south banks of the lake were among the several friction points that surfaced after the start of the standoff. Before India and China pulled back troops from the north and south banks in February 2021, the area had seen massive mobilisation and the two sides even deployed tanks, barely a few hundred metres apart in some locations.

Towards the end of August 2020, India outmanoeuvred China to capture the previously unoccupied heights of the Kailash Range on the south bank of the lake.

Indian troops positioned themselves on the peaks there, including Magar Hill, Gurung Hill, Rezang La, Rechin La, and this allowed them to dominate the strategic Spanggur Gap — it can be used for launching an offensive, as China had done in 1962 — and also gave them a view of the PLA garrison at Moldo.

Indian troops had also positioned themselves above the Chinese troops in the Fingers area on the north bank. During this scramble for the heights, shots had been fired by both sides, a first in over four decades.

Troops from the two countries remained on these heights through the harsh winter months. The significance of these positions was one of the main factors that compelled China to negotiate a pullback.

Both countries agreed to a pullback from the north bank of the lake, and positions on the Kailash Range in the Chushul sub-sector south of Pangong Tso.

Sources said that the new bridge built by China will allow it to mobilise its troops faster in this area, hoping to prevent a repeat of what happened in August 2020.

China has been developing infrastructure in the entire region since the start of the standoff — it is still to be resolved. The widening of roads, building of new roads and bridges, new bases, airstrips, advance landing bases, etc are not restricted to the eastern Ladakh region, but are happening across the three sectors of the India-China boundary.

India too has been improving its infrastructure in the border areas. Last year, the Border Roads Organisation completed more than 100 projects in border areas, the majority of which were close to the border with China. India is also improving its surveillance along the entire 3488-km boundary, and has been building new airstrips and landing areas.

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Chinese and Indian troops on the northern and southern shores of Pangong Tso began “synchronized and organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between Corps Commanders when they met on January 24.

According to the disengagement agreement, announced by the two countries, Chinese troops will move back to Finger 8 and Indian troops will pull back to the Dhan Singh Thapa post between Finger 2 and 3 of the northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake. Further, there would be a temporary moratorium on military activities, including patrolling to the traditional areas.

Defence Minister’s Statement

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a statement in the Rajya Sabha, on 11 February, about the “present situation in eastern Ladakh.” A statement was issued by the Chinese Defence Ministry a day before.

He said “I am happy to inform the House today that as a result of our well thought out approach and sustained talks with the Chinese side, we have now been able to reach an agreement on disengagement in the north and south bank of the Pangong Lake.”

As per the agreement, both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner in these areas, he said.

The defence minister assured the House that India has not conceded anything while entering into the disengagement process, adding there are “some outstanding issues” with regard to deployment and patrolling at some other points along the LAC in eastern Ladakh.

Giving details of the pact, the Minister said, “The Chinese side will keep its troop presence in the North Bank area to east of Finger 8. Reciprocally, the Indian troops will be based at their permanent base at Dhan Singh Thapa Post near Finger 3,” he said.

“A similar action would be taken in the South Bank area by both sides. These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both north and south bank area will be removed,” Singh said.

He also informed the Elders that for the time being patrolling by both the armies in that area will not take place till the outstanding issues were addressed in the future military and diplomatic level parley.

“These are mutual and reciprocal steps and any structures that had been built by both sides since April 2020 in both North and South Bank area will be removed and the landforms will be restored. It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides in the North Bank, including patrolling to the traditional areas,” the defence minister said.

Based on this agreement action started from 10 February, he said, on the north and south bank. “It is expected that this will restore the situation to before the standoff of last year,” Singh said. Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed. Singh also mentioned that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since last year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

•             LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.

•             Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.

•             All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the armies should return to their permanent and recognised posts”.

Chinese Statement

Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, had said in a written statement on Wednesday: “The Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the southern and northern bank of the Pangong Tso Lake start synchronized and organized disengagement from February 10.”

“This move is in accordance with the consensus reached by both sides at the 9th round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting,” the Chinese statement said.

Importance of the Region

China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

Further, it was on the south bank of the lake that Indian forces had gained strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, in an action in late August 2020, outwitting the Chinese. Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier. Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap, which is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector. However, India had been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.

The PLA has vacated the features of Helmet and Black Top, South of Pangong Tso Lake, while the Indian Army has come down from the dominating features of Point 5167, Bump and Magar Hill that India seized at the beginning of August.

The disengagement agreement covers only the Pangong Tso Lake sector in Central Ladakh, but makes no mention of Depsang sector, near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in Northern Ladakh, where PLA troops have crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and established themselves 15-18 kilometres inside territory that India has always claimed and patrolled. Since April, the PLA has blocked Indian troops from accessing Patrolling Points 10, 11, 12, 12A and 13 on the LAC.

The Indian Army regards Depsang as a critical sector, since controlling this would provide the PLA with a springboard to capture DBO, cut off India from the Karakoram Pass, and progress operations towards India’s vital Siachen Glacier sector.

While the start of disengagement involves the troops in contact on the front lines in Ladakh, there remain close to 100,000 troops from the PLA and the Indian Army that were deployed behind the front lines as reserves in case fighting broke out. It is likely that these would only be withdrawn after successful disengagement by the troops in contact.

Verification of Disengagement

The Indian Army used drones and high-resolution cameras to check and record dismantling of the Chinese infrastructure at the Pangong Tso Lake in Eastern Ladakh as part of the agreement for disengagement. The process at both northern and southern banks of the lake was completed by 20 February.

China had created a military garrison at Finger 7 where 13 jetties were stationed, long range guns were positioned, bunkers were constructed and permanent structures built to accommodate thousands of troops.

Field commanders of both sides met almost on a daily basis to take forward the disengagement process.

Lessons Learnt

India’s intelligence agencies and Armed Forces must remain geared for any adverse development and keep plans ready to prevent China from surprising us, be it occupation of any strategic feature along our Northern borders extending from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh or a repeat of a Galwan like situation proactively.

Back in July 1962, ‘partial’ withdrawal of Chinese troops from Ladakh was a treachery. Barely three months later, China invaded Indian territory.

Restoration of status quo ante on LAC will not only add to Indian Army and Modi government’s military credibility but also persuade President Xi Jinping to restrain his Western Theatre Commander to undertake any military misadventure in future.

China will continue to follow the strategy of engaging the Indian forces on the northern borders in controlled standoffs to create a major dilemma for a possible two-front confrontation and distribution of resources between land and maritime borders.

The Chinese would prefer to keep India engaged in small wars and engagements hampering India’s ambition of rising to the level of a world power from the regional power.

China may also employ hybrid warfare techniques to create internal turbulence in India. It may target India’s ethnic, regional and religious diversity. India must prepare itself against grey zone warfare.

India must continually exercise full strategic autonomy based upon its identified interests and diversify its partnerships while keeping China engaged.

The military has to be modernized through self-reliance and India’s economy has to rise to higher levels of growth.

National and political unity is required to neutralise the Chinese threat, strengthening hard and soft power, internal stability, mature politics, and national resolve.

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The sudden and very significant break-through in this period has been the successful disengagement talks between India and China over the Pangong lake North and South banks. Disengagement started 10 February and was completed by 20th at surprising speed. The eagerness with which the PLA executed the rearward movement could be indicative of two things. First, the PLA has had a very tough time in the Ladakh winter and was keen to pull back troops. The second is, given that India had gained a significant tactical advantage South of the Pangong Tso – China was in a hurry to clinch what it clearly felt was a favourable deal. In fact, there were considerable misgivings that India had given away its strongest bargaining chip very early on in the talks. Indeed, India had gained a significant military advantage by securing the Kailash Range heights of Rezang-La – Rechin La in end-Aug 2020, which enabled us to dominate the Chinese Moldo garrison and the traditional invasion route to Ladakh via the Spangur Gap. The tactical advantages of the South bank far out-weighed those the Chinese army had gained in the north bank. So what was critical was – what would happen next in the other friction points in Depsang, Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and Hot springs area? As expected, the Chinese seem to have dug in their heels there. Initial talks about these have been inconclusive.

It is now time to take stock. What were the Chinese motivations for the sudden and large scale incursions in Eastern Ladakh last year? One surmise is that the Chinese were genuinely perturbed over Indian assertiveness in Jammu & Kashmir as demonstrated by the cross-border air-strike at Balakote, the abrogation of Article 370 and trifurcation of J&K. They had to view this also in relation to India’s major push for long over-due infrastructure development in Eastern Ladakh. This, they felt, posed a threat to their Aksai Chin road as also their China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In my view, this major military coercive exercise was designed to primarily reassure Pakistan that it was not alone and China would definitely step in to aid that beleaguered ally against an increasingly assertive India. The express purpose was to encourage Pakistan to resume its asymmetric warfare in J&K & Punjab. So, this was a large scale coercive deployment exercise designed to brow-beat India and cow it down without a shot being fired.

If so, it largely fail to achieve its purpose. Though India was initially taken by surprise due to the Covid backdrop, it reacted strongly. To begin with, it carried out a rapid counter-mobilization and soon mirror imaged the Chinese deployment. It matched the PLA tank for tank, soldier for soldier and gun for gun. The Air Force also responded aggressively. In fact, India went for emergency induction of some 30 MiG-29 and Su-30 fighters and speeded up induction of Rafales and S-400 SAM systems. India was ready for a fight if China wanted one. Then came the high-profile Galwan clash in June 2020, where China used lethal force and some 20 Indian soldiers were martyred. Though no firearms were used, it was a major incident that trash-canned all the peace & tranquility accords from 1993 onwards and completely destroyed mutual trust between the two countries. The nation was outraged. Our boys had counted some 65 Chinese soldiers being carried away on stretchers. It was difficult to ascertain how many were fatal cases.

India enhanced its build-up and in end-Aug last year undertook a surprise, pre-emptive manoeuvre to occupy the Rezang La – Rechin La Ridge directly overlooking the Chinese Moldo garrison. This was a brilliant move that unhinged the Chinese. They were stupefied and rushed up tanks in a bid to sweep off the Indians. They were surprised to see Indian T-90 tanks there and a major face-off ensued – which has only been resolved now.

So what has made the Chinese blink? Their initial calculations of a low cost operation to coerce India seem to have gone awry. India refused to cow down and counter-mobilized. The situation escalated and soon became a stalemate with advantage – India.

Chinese strategic thinking lays emphasis on just one main strategic direction at a given point of time. Right now this is focused on Taiwan-South China Sea and the east coast of China. China clearly is not in a mood to open another major front on its western flank in Xinjiang. It defies common sense and all strategic logic. Hence, its quest for a face-saving pull-back from a futile coercive deployment that singularly failed to coerce India. Not surprisingly, Pakistan has also sought de-escalation on the Line of Control.

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A new joint venture protective carbine (JVPC) has successfully passed the final phase of user trials, meeting all criteria of the General Service Qualitative Requirement (GSQR), the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) has announced.

The compact gas-operated weapon has an effective range of more than 100 metres and weighs less than three kilos. During the tests, the ammunition penetrated 3.5 mm thick mild steel plate and 23 layers of soft armour at 100 metres, the OFB said in a statement.

The weapon can be fired with one hand. It has a rate of fire of 800 rounds per minute. The JVPC, which feeds through the pistol grip unlike any other indigenously developed weapon in 5.56 x30 mm calibre, is being issued to Central paramilitary forces and state police organisations, Gagan Chaturvedi, deputy director general, OFB, said in a statement.

The weapon features a 30-round steel magazine, semi bull-pup design, retractable butt, low recoil and multiple rails for mounting lights, laser pointers and optical sights.

The carbine has been jointly developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the OFB which has its headquarters in Kolkata. It is manufactured at the Small Arms Factory, Kanpur, while the ammunition is produced by Ammunition Factory Khadki in Pune.

The weapons earlier cleared the trials of the Directorate General of Quality Assurance, Chaturvedi said.

Indigenous Artillery Gun Trials to Resume

Winter and summer trials of the indigenous Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) jointly with private industry are scheduled to be resumed and completed by mid 2021.

Trials which began in September 2020 were paused after the gun suffered a barrel burst and an investigation was under way to determine the cause.

The ATAGS is a 155mm, 52 calibre artillery gun jointly developed by the DRDO in partnership with Bharat Forge of the Kalyani Group and the Tata Power SED.

In August, 2018 the Defence Acquisition Council had accorded approval for the purchase of 150 of these guns at an approximate ?3,365 crore which would be split between the two companies. The deal will be split in 60:40 ratio between thee lowest bidder (L1) and L2.

Once the user trials are over, the Army has to give the Request For Proposal (RFP) and the initial lot can be supplied immediately, the official said. The Army requires 1,580 guns in this category and Israeli firm Elbit Systems was shortlisted for a tender floated to procure them.

In September, the ATAGS had suffered a barrel burst during trials which have since been stopped. A committee was set up consisting of DRDO scientists, Army representatives and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) officials to determine the cause and submit an evaluation report.

The price has not yet been determined and for now it is only for the initial limited order. Price for the bigger order of 1,580 guns has to be negotiated.

First Batch of Negev LMGs Received

Indian Army has received the first batch of Negev Light Machine Guns (LMG) from Israel as it seeks to boost the firepower of frontline troops.

In 2020, the defence ministry signed a Rs8.8bn ($120.57m) capital acquisition contract with Israel Weapons Industries to procure 16,479 LMGs under the Fast Track Procedure.

In the first batch, 6,000 guns were delivered, while the remaining units are expected to be supplied by March.

The weapons are currently undergoing inspections, according to local media sources.

The Negev 7.62X51mm LMG is a combat-proven weapon system and is used by several countries. The LMG has a higher range, as well as greater lethality compared to the currently used weapons system by the Indian Armed Forces.

The LMG was needed to meet urgent operational requirements. Notably, India has been engaged in a border standoff with Chinese forces in the Ladakh region since May. Recently, the two sides held the ninth round of talks to resolve the impasse.

The military face-off has accelerated defence acquisitions and development in India.

High Mobility Vehicles Ordered

Public sector defence equipment manufacturer BEML Limited has received orders from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for supply of High Mobility vehicles, which play a key role in the logistics management of the Indian Army leveraging on its exceptional cross country capabilities.

The high mobility vehicles (HMV) will help in the transportation of armoured fighting vehicles, troops, ammunition and stores to far-flung, difficult terrains in operational areas.

At an approximate value of Rs 758 crore, the equipment will be supplied to Indian Army in a span of one year after manufacturing them at BEML’s Palakkad Plant in Kerala.

Patrol Boats for Pangong Lake

The Indian Army has finalised procurement of 12 high-performance patrol boats to enhance its surveillance of large water bodies, including the Pangong Lake in eastern Ladakh where India and China are locked in a bitter border standoff as well as for other water bodies.

The Army said it inked a contract with Goa Shipyard Ltd, a state-run public sector undertaking, for 12 fast patrol boats for surveillance and patrolling of large water bodies, including those in high altitude areas. Delivery would commence from May 2021.

In a statement, Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) said it signed a contract with the Indian Army for supply of the ‘high performance specialised patrol crafts’ on Thursday and that they will be fitted with specialised equipment to meet the requirement of the force.

Nearly 50,000 Indian Army troops are deployed in a high state of combat readiness in various mountainous locations in eastern Ladakh in sub-zero temperatures as multiple rounds of talks between the two sides have not yielded concrete outcome to resolve the standoff.

Indian troops occupied a number of strategic heights in the Mukhpari, Rechin La and Magar hill areas around the southern bank of the Pangong lake after the Chinese military attempted to intimidate them in the area on the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020.

The Pangong lake and areas around it are considered very important. India has stepped up surveillance of the lake after the standoff began in early May 2020.

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“Delivery would commence from May 2021,” the Army tweeted.

Official sources said the boats are being procured for surveillance of Pangong lake as well as other water bodies in mountainous areas.

In a statement, Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) said it signed a contract with the Indian Army for supply of the ‘high performance specialised patrol crafts’ on Thursday and that they will be fitted with specialised equipment to meet the requirement of the force.
“These craft will be constructed at GSL, Goa and will be only few crafts in the world for such specialized operations,” it said in a brief statement.

Nearly 50,000 Indian Army troops are deployed in a high state of combat readiness in various mountainous locations in eastern Ladakh in sub-zero temperatures as multiple rounds of talks between the two sides have not yielded concrete outcome to resolve the standoff.

China has also deployed an equal number of troops, according to officials.

The eighth and last round of military talks had taken place on November 6 during which both sides broadly discussed disengagement of troops from specific friction points.

Around three-and-half months back, Indian troops occupied a number of strategic heights in the Mukhpari, Rechin La and Magar hill areas around the southern bank of the Pangong lake after the Chinese military attempted to intimidate them in the area on the intervening night of August 29 and 30.

The Pangong lake and areas around it are considered very important. India has stepped up surveillance of the lake after the standoff began in early May.

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On 31 August, a statement from the Army said that on the night of August 29-30, “PLA troops violated the previous consensus arrived at during military and diplomatic engagements…and carried out provocative military movements to change the status quo.” However, the Indian troops “pre-empted this PLA activity on the Southern Bank of Pangong Tso Lake, undertook measures to strengthen our positions and thwart Chinese intentions to unilaterally change facts on ground.”

A few hours later, the social media was abuzz with news that a Tibetan officer had died. Company Leader Nyima Tenzin lost his life on a landmine in the theatre of operations.

This news turned the spotlight on the Special Frontier Force (SFF) and its predominantly Tibetan soldiers. The deployment of the SFF emerged as a source of pride for India’s Tibetan community. A video from 4 September showed Tibetans in Shimla gathering, singing and tying their traditional khatas (white scarves) to a departing convoy as they waved goodbye to SFF personnel headed for the Ladakh front.

ALSO READ: INDIA-CHINA: Indian Troops Occupy Key Heights North of Pangong Tso

The SFF serves in the Directorate General of Security (DGS) – a wing of India’s external intelligence agency R&AW. With help from the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) – the air wing of the DGS and superior reconnaissance capabilities, the Tibetan refugees-dominated SFF can conduct covert operations behind Chinese enemy lines at will.

The SFF has mostly operated in the shadows since its creation in 1962. When Tibetan resistance fighters began crossing over into India with the 1956 uprising. More followed in the wake of the failed uprising three years later and the Dalai Lama’s exile to India. Most of the resistance fighters were from the Kham region of eastern Tibet, which was one of the major sites of rebellion against the Chinese.

Earlier they were used in a covert manner, but now, it’s against China. It’s a clear message, even to the people in Tibet.

Raising of the SFF

The fighters did not lack passion but needed weapons and training. The CIA was roped in for training the SFF recruits, though no written agreements existed. This suited the Americans well, as their own agenda in Tibet got bolstered through this involvement. They were smuggled into East Pakistan and flown to the island of Saipan in the Pacific, where for four months they were trained in communication and guerilla warfare. In July 1957, they were air-dropped into Tibet and started supplying intelligence to Washington.

By 1958, 23 units had completely driven the Chinese from Tibet’s south, but were in dire need of arms and ammunition. There were 25,000 fighters, but most poorly equipped. The CIA support failed to deliver.

The 6,000 or so fighters who remained in India would be given a new opportunity in 1962. Encouraged by Biju Patnaik, a World War 2 veteran and Bhola Nath Mullik, the then chief of Intelligence Bureau, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave the green light to recruitment of Tibetan refugees. Mullik had the support of leaders of the Tibetan resistance movement.

India, perhaps, wanted China to know that Tibetan nationalism could and would be weaponised against the PLA, should push come to shove again?

Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban, who had earlier commanded the 22 Mountain Regiment and was a Second World War veteran was chosen to raise the force. An old Gurkha training centre at Chakrata (Uttarakhand) was lying vacant. The unit was raised on 14 November 1962. A week later, China announced its “unilateral ceasefire”, so the unit did not see any action in the war.

The outfit was called Establishment 22, named after Gen Uban’s old mountain regiment. They would be all paratroopers — an elite unit capable of high-altitude warfare, special operations, and fighting behind enemy lines. They would report to the Cabinet Secretariat, and were not part of the Army. A women’s wing was also created. In 1967, Establishment 22 was expanded and renamed the Special Frontier Force.

They would finally see action in the 1971 war. They were deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and fought with extraordinary valour. More than 50 would lay down their lives, a sacrifice that was, given the secrecy of the outfit, never given its due recognition.

In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the CIA-trained, Indian-funded Tibetans used hastily-imported Bulgarian assault rifles and U.S.-manufactured carbines to obscure their links to India. Fighting under the direct command of RAW’s legendary spymaster Rameshwar Kao, Brig. Uban’s forces engaged in a series of low-grade border skirmishes.

ALSO READ: PLA troops vacate Finger 4 area in Pangong Tso

The SFF succeeded in destroying several key bridges at the cost of 56 dead and 190 wounded. They ensured that Pakistan’s 97 Independent Brigade and 2 Commando Battalion remained bogged down in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Indira Gandhi deployed the SFF, once again, during the Operation Blue Star in Harmandir Sahib in Amritsar.

The SFF also played a key role during the Kargil conflict. It is rumoured that the capture of Tiger Hill was made possible because of the SFF deployment.

New Attention

The new attention on the SFF holds implications both inside Tibet and for the Tibetan community in India. Tibetan people in the diaspora and refugee community are now showing their patriotism. The limelight might provide the opportunity for the SFF’s warriors to get long overdue recognition from the government.

The use of the SFF against China has renewed attention towards the Free Tibet movement.

China Nervous

Two days before the Tibetan lost his life in Ladakh, on 28-29 August, the Seventh Tibet Work Forum (TWF) was held in Beijing. For the first time, the TWF was given large publicity. The TV report lasted more than 14 minutes, mostly quoting XiJinping. In his speech, he emphasised that Beijing’s objective was to build a new socialist modern Tibet that is “united, prosperous, civilised, harmonious and beautiful.”

Seventy years after the so-called ‘liberation’ of Tibet, has no ethnic Tibetan been made Party Secretary in Tibet? No Tibetan has ever made it to the Politburo? The reason is that the Han still do not trust the Tibetans, though Xi is fond of mentioning his theory: “Governing border areas is the key to governing the country and stabilising Tibet is a priority for governing border areas.”

China has been quietly militarising the Tibetan plateau for over 60 years under the pretext of development and modernisation. For Tibet, this has only led to an influx of soldiers, Han (Chinese) settlers, and weapons. The militarisation of the Tibetan plateau has led to the recent Galwan incident.

China’s renewed attempt in crushing any form of Tibetan dissent is complementary to its advances along the Indo-Tibetan border. China’s control over Tibet is not only highly questionable, the vast number of cultural, socio-political, and humanitarian atrocities it has carried out has made it constitutionally immoral.

The PLA has been trying hard to recruit Tibetans in the Army and in militia outfits.

The two ‘coincidental’ events – India taking control over the ridge south of Pangong Tso and the Tibet Working Forum in Beijing – are linked to the ‘stability’ of the borders. Tibetans are ready to give up their lives to protect India’s from China. Clearly, Beijing is troubled by the happenings in Ladakh.

Commemts

The very fact that India has allowed the deployment of the SFF to go public suggests that New Delhi has just one message to give – India hardly cares about what China thinks. Gone are the days when pro-China policymakers in India would desist from taking steps that would ‘annoy China’. India is least bothered if border infrastructure in Ladakh antagonises China or if the ‘22 Establishment’ instils a sense of fear in the Chinese psyche.

India does not care if New Delhi’s support to the Dalai Lama irks China or if Xi Jinping is worried about Tibet and wants to curb ‘splitism’ in the occupied territory. If China does not turn to status quo ante in Eastern Ladakh, India will force the real facts on the ground dating back to the pre-1950 era when Tibet was an independent Buddhist nation, because if the SFF can help raise the Mukti Bahini for the liberation of Bangladesh, it can also free Tibet from Chinese occupation.

The Vikasi of the SFF have not forgotten how Tibet was coerced to become a part of China in 1951 when a Tibetan delegation was made to accede the Buddhist nation to China even without an approval from the Dalai Lama. Nor have the Tibetan fighters forgotten how the Dalai Lama was insulted in 1959 when Mao Zedong’s PLA forces shelled the Potala Palace.

Tibetans have not forgotten the thousands of monks who were either murdered by China or driven to immolate themselves. By sending Tibetans on the front-line, India is reminding China that the land it is fighting from is not even Chinese land.

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Indian soldiers thwarted an attempt by Chinese troops to occupy some heights near the southern bank of Pangong Tso on the night of 29-30 August. The “provocative military movements” by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aimed at seizing the heights in the Chushul sector, broadly between Pangong Tso and Spanggur Gap, were physically blocked by the swift deployment of Indian troops in the region at an altitude of around 15,000-feet.

The Army said there were no violent clashes in the intervening night of 29-30 August, as were witnessed during the extended bloody skirmish in the Galwan Valley on 15 June. Other reports said there were physical scuffles between the rival soldiers during the incident. The Indian troops involved in the action included commandos from the covert Special Frontier Force (SFF), which recruits from among the Tibetans exiled in India.

If the Indian Army had not undertaken the pro-active military manoeuvre, it would have been presented with a fait accompli like on the northern bank of Pangong Tso, Gogra and Depsang areas, from where the PLA has refused to withdraw from what India considers its territory.

ALSO READ: China threatens India with ‘severe’ military losses

There is also little doubt that the PLA attempts to open a new front on 29 August, in keeping with its strategy to push the LAC westwards, was sanctioned by the top Chinese politico-military hierarchy, much like the multiple intrusions deep into Indian territory in early-May.

Around 100 PLA soldiers, with equipment to set up camps, were also spotted below the ‘Black Top Hill’, which in turn led the Indian Army’s to respond in a “quid pro quo” manner. The PLA was obviously upset. It accused the Indian troops of “undermining” the consensus reached at the multi-level talks by “illegally” crossing the LAC to “seriously violate” China’s territorial sovereignty.

Renchin La

A critical mountain pass, Renchin La (called Reqin by China) is located close to Spanggur Gap, east of Chushul, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This was occupied on the night of 30-31 August. Earlier, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China had attempted to change the status quo at the LAC two days earlier but was reportedly thwarted by the Indian Army.

The pass is located in the “grey zone” along the LAC, where perceptions of the LAC vary with both sides making counter-claims. It led to a sharp reaction from China. Renchin La is one of the 13 identified possible routes of military ingress into Ladakh from the Chinese side. These routes are natural gaps in mountains along the 826-km LAC in Ladakh.

The pass accords India a clear view of Spanggur Gap, Moldo Garrison of China, besides the southern bank of the Spanggur Tso.

These positions dominate the Chushul-Tsaka la-Dungti road on the Indian side and overlook the Rezang La, where the two countries fought a pitched battle in 1962.

The move, a clear counter to the PLA, expands the ongoing stalemate south of Pangong Tso. So far, everything was happening north of the lake.

Two Brigadier-level meetings (on August 31 and September 1) at Chushul ended in a stalemate. At the military meetings, it was conveyed that India had no intention of changing the LAC status, as was being attempted by the PLA.

Chinese Counter Action

The PLA reportedly moved its tanks from its base at Moldo and could have occupied any area of “grey zone” like they did at Finger-4 on the north bank of Pangong Tso.

Indian surveillance systems picked up the PLA movement and the concentration of troops and tanks at Moldo necessitated a move to occupy heights.

Provocation by PLA

Troops of both sides exchanged fisticuffs as some 400 PLA soldiers tried to alter status quo near ‘Black Top’ along LAC.

On 31 August, the PLA Western Theater Command accused India of “illegally crossing the line” on August 31 at two points — south bank of Pangong Lake and near Rezang La.

Since May, clashes have taken place at the Galwan valley and north bank of Pangong Tso, making this the first such incident south of Pangong Tso. The area between Thakung and moving southwards towards Chushul is sensitive as a road runs almost parallel to the LAC for several kilometres. Thakung is an Indian military base located on the LAC. Chushul is an important base located 50 km south of Thakung.

ALSO READ: Amid Stand-off with China Two Phalcon AWACS Likely to Get Nod

A Ministry of Defence (MoD) statement said: “The PLA carried out provocative military movements to change the status quo (at the LAC). Indian troops pre-empted this activity on the southern bank of Pangong Tso and undertook measures to strengthen our positions and thwart Chinese intentions to unilaterally change the facts on the ground”.

Disengagement Incomplete

The first phase of disengagement undertaken in early July remains incomplete with disengagement completed at Galwan valley and Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in Gogra-Hot springs area. However, only limited disengagement has been undertaken at PP 17A in Gogra-Hot springs and it has barely begun at Pangong Tso. Chinese troops have only moved back from the base of Finger 4, the mountain spur, to Finger 5 but remain to occupy the ridgelines of Finger 4 where India’s claim extends till Finger 8, while it has always held till Finger 4.

Comments

Even if China vacates from Fingers 5-8 on the Northern Banks of Pangong Tso, we should not vacate the Chushul Heights, which give us tremendous tactical and strategic advantages to look into Chinese base at Moldo, dominate Spangur Gap and provide us a firm base for launching an offensive. More so, the heights in our occupation are on our own side of LAC.

In case we vacate the Chushul Heights the Chinese will come and occupy them. Throwing them out will require launching very costly assaults to retake then. 

In fact, Chinese incursions on the northern banks of Pangong Tso and PP 17A should be addressed in a similar way by occupying parallel heights in the vicinity to gain leverage over them.

On the northern bank of Pangong Tso, China has transgressed over 8 kms from behind Finger 8 to Finger 4. After some meetings it went back perfunctorily to Finger 5. It then claimed that the status quo ante had been restored. That is in keeping with its tactics of moving two steps forward and one step back. On insisting that they move back to the original location behind Finger 8, China asks us to vacate Finger 3 and threatens us with troops concentration in front of it.

The ridge on the south side of Pangong Tso dominates the Spangur Gap and also dominates the Chinese Moldo base. It also gives depth to the Chushul Bowl. The international boundary is about 15 kms to the east of our positions on Kailash Range. It is an excellent firm base in case we have to launch an offensive to reach the international border. It will also give us a road link to connect with his strategic National HW G-219 that links Tibet with Xinjiang. Hence under no circumstances, we should let go of our positions on the Kailash Range.

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