SR-UAV-W, also called the Basic Archer, has undergone flight demonstration and will undergo missile evaluation soon. An official from the DRDO said, “We have made two versions of Archer-one — a basic archer also called SR-UAV-W — and Archer-Next Generation (Archer-NG). The missile evaluation trials of basic Archer are left where we will arm the UAV with anti-tank missiles and hit a dummy target. We want to see how the weapon performs. If the trials are successful, the Army and the paramilitary forces could induct these. They have expressed a lot of interest in this.”

“While working on RUSTOM 1 (a short range remotely piloted aircraft system), we came up with the idea of Archer. Basic Archer can be used to cater to the requirement of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, tracking and reconnaissance (ISTAR). It gathers real time and high quality imagery. It can operate up to a height of 22,000 feet with an endurance of up to 12 hours. It also carries Electro Optical and Infrared (EO/IR) payload,” the official said.

ADE is also working on finalising the air frames for Archer-NG. The airframe is the mechanical structure of the aircraft that includes wings, fuselage and undercarriage.

“Archer-NG can operate up to an altitude of 30,000 feet and can be used for ISTAR. The basic airframe structure will be ready in a couple of months. Archer-NG can also be used for battlefield post-strike assessment. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) is our partner as far as avionics or electrical systems of Archer NG is concerned. The DRDO has introduced a policy on selection of the Development cum Production Partner (DcPP) for the DRDO developed systems, which ensures involvement of industries from the beginning of development cycle and lead to reduction in the time-frame of the development-to-induction cycle. So, Archer-NG’s realisation is also through DcPP,” he added.

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The scheme has been accused of diluting the professionalism of the armed forces. They also feel that the process will result in mixed units, who will lack cohesion and hence regimentation, which will reduce their effectiveness. There is also the criticism that with the induction of women in all trades, a unit’s fighting efficiency and rigour will reduce.

The concept is new for the Indian armed forces, but similar schemes have been implemented in several other countries, without any adverse impacts.

The scheme has been evolved keeping in mind the phenomenal changes in society and technology, and to equip the organisation to be future ready. In a modern battle field everyone requires a younger workforce, tech-savvy or tech friendly armed force and a modern fighting soldier.

The future of warfare entails a lighter human footprint, but soldiers equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry, supported by cutting-edge technology to fight a war in a highly informationised environment. This recruitment reform would help in right sizing the armed forces provided it gets dovetailed into the imperatives of fifth generation warfare.

There is a desire among the youth, especially those in the border areas, to serve the country for a short duration, rather than settle for a service spanning about two decades.

In a Nutshell

Agniveers will go through 26 weeks of basic military training (the existing module is of 44 weeks), bear a distinct rank; and have on-the-job training in the unit. After the four-year engagement, they will go back to society. During the service, their uniform will have a distinct insignia. The armed forces should achieve a younger warrior profile without compromising on quality or capability. And, Agniveers should be looked after in terms of employment benefits and post-exit opportunities.

For the ranks below officers, the Agnipath Scheme is the equivalent of the short service scheme for officers The armed forces have a Short Service Commission (SSC) for officers for 10 to 14 years, which was necessitated as a cadre-management exercise. The SSC scheme has worked well and SSC officers have been fairly well employed in the civil world.

Agniveers will be selected from across the country. The selection process should improve homogeneity, national cohesion and integration.

Agniveers will be entitled to all medical facilities, leave, CSD facilities, honours and awards. They will have a fixed salary package, with annual increments. In addition, they will get the risk and hardship, dress, and travel allowances. Agniveers will be provided life insurance cover for their engagement period. They will also be entitled to compensation for disability. One-time ex-gratia will be paid in case of death on duty in addition to the insurance.

The tax-exempt ‘Seva Nidhi’ package and detailed skill-set certificate will be provided to Agniveers, for possible employment outside.

Significant Advantages

One significant advantage of this scheme would be the much lower age profile of the service. It will increase promotional avenues of the permanent cadre. The significant advantage for the young entrant will be early employment with significantly good emoluments and a 25 per cent chance of joining the permanent cadre. The Agniveers will acquire new skill sets, leadership and team-building capabilities.

It may not be possible to train or assign hi-tech jobs in this short period of engagement of Agniveers, but they will be used for many less technical jobs, including working on the aircraft and on ships. Those who become permanent employees will go through higher technical training. The armed forces have confirmed that their combat capability will not be affected by such enrolment.

Primarily, the scheme has been woven around the need for the national exchequer to save money, which can then be used for modernisation of the forces. India’s defence budget for 2022-23 is Rs 5.25 lakh crore, of which Rs 1.2 lakh crore is for pension component. As per reports, the “prospective life-term saving” in the cost of engagement of a jawan who leaves after 17 years of service with pension and other benefits, as compared to an Agniveer, will be Rs 11.5 crore. National defence budget management is essential. There has to be a much more significant percentage for Capital acquisitions. No major country has such adverse capital to revenue expenditure and pension bill ratios. It is hoped that the money saved would be used to focus more on the advancement of technology and military modernisation.

Countering Criticism

It is unfair to say that Agniveers will not have the desired status in the forces. They will be a key member of the team. Similarly, it will also give an opportunity for the youth to choose if they want to continue the armed forces career or switch to other options.

While there may not be assured side-stepping in paramilitary forces or in any other government organisation, help and guidance will be provided to soldiers for their employment, including in the private sector.

As regards professionalism, a cursory look at the list of gallantry award winners will indicate that most of them had service less than five years and there is no doubt that with better educational qualifications, it is feasible to abridge the existing training period.

As regards regimentation, there are mixed units in the army, which have in no way performed lesser than the ‘pure’ regiments. In any case, dedication is a factor of motivation and not of the number of years that one puts in.

The example of western countries indicates that the induction of women in no way reduces the efficiency, but in most cases enhances it. More significantly, the scheme would reduce the average age of the force thereby enhancing its youthful profile and fitness levels.

There is also an apprehension that this youthful population with military training could “create political militias”, if they cannot find suitable employment avenues. However, a young person aged 21-25 with a nationwide exposure and having led a disciplined life will have much better employability than any other youth from a similar background.

The Seva Nidhi funds will prepare them for self-employment. Of course, both the central government and the state governments as well as the society at large will need to provide an enabling environment for their absorption into other walks of life.

No Change in Regimental System

No change is being done to the Army’s regimental system under the ‘Agnipath’ scheme and the numbers of personnel to be recruited in the first year of its roll out would only make up three per cent of the armed forces. There were apprehensions that the ‘Agnipath’ scheme would change the composition of several regiments that recruit youths from specific regions as well as castes such as Rajputs, Jats and Sikhs.

On the criticism that the short-duration tenure of ‘Agniveers’ will harm the effectiveness of the armed forces, such a system exists in several countries, and hence, it is already “tested out and considered best practice for an agile army. Most armies across the world depend upon their youths and the new scheme will only bring about a right mix of “50 per cent-50 per cent” slowly in a very long run of youngsters and experienced personnel in the supervisory ranks.

China Case Study

Military reforms in China were the result of the Gulf War of 1990 and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995. The Chinese Communist Party leadership adopted a three-pronged approach by exponentially ramping up defence spending. It involved investing in new weaponry, enhancing anti-access area denial tactics, and establishing programmes to boost the Chinese defence industry. They brought in a fundamental change – integrated fighting force with first-rate naval and air capabilities. As the other services expanded, the army was shrunk to around 9,75,000 from an approximate three million in the mid-70s and the higher defence management paradigm was reorganised into theatre commands by February 2016.

Suggestions

In addition to the reservation provided for former Agniveers in CAPFs and other PSUs, both central government and state governments, there needs to be provisions to provide them with cheaper credit to start their own businesses. Despite 5th and 6th Central Pay Commissions clearly recommending ex-servicemen’s induction into the CPOs, it has not been implemented by bureaucrats, who occupy the top echelons of CPOs and consider them their handmaidens. It is essential that at least 25 per cent of jobs in all CPOs be reserved for former Agniveers. This will provide CPOs with trained workforce, thereby reducing their training costs, and will ensure that no Agniveer remains unemployed and disgruntled after his ‘Tour of Duty’.

The Agnipath Scheme should be seen as a national project, rather than just a defence ministry initiative to cut costs. It must, therefore, not be allowed to fail due to bureaucratic machinations.

Among a slew of reforms that the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommended, one pertained to the recruitment practices of the armed forces. It stated, “the Army must be young and fit at all times. Therefore, instead of the present practice of having 17 years of colour service (as has been the policy since 1976), it would be advisable to reduce the colour service to a period of seven to ten years and, thereafter, release these officers and men for service here”.

In 2000, a Group of Ministers (GOM) endorsed the KRC’s recommendation stating that, “in order to ensure that the armed forces are at their fighting best at all times, there is a need to ensure a younger profile of the services. However, this is a highly complex matter. While the army desires a younger age profile, so do the central paramilitary forces (CPMFs)”. The Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security set up by the UPA government in 2011 also addressed this issue. Its report, however, is not public so far.

Keeping all aspects in mind, the colour service of jawans should be set at seven years, instead of four as incorporated in the Scheme.

The defence forces should absorb 50 per cent and release the balance to the civilian pool. Over the next 60 years, 13.8 lakh youth would be Agniveers, provided the 50 per cent absorption formulae is accepted.

The Agnipath scheme should be made an Act through legislation in Parliament with the proviso of being a pre-qualification for:

(i) Entry into all government and corporate jobs;

(ii) candidates for Assembly and Lok Sabha elections should be Agniveers as a prerequisite;

(iii) Ministry of Defence staff cadre.

Once the MoD stands dispensed with, 45% of the pension bill for civilians in the ministry, currently as part of the defence budget, will vanish, thereby resulting in national savings.

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OPVs are long range surface ships, capable of operating in maritime zones of the country including island territories with helicopter operation capabilities. The OPV is 98m long, 15m wide, has 3.6m draught, 2140 tonnes displacement and a range of 5,000 nm. It can attain a sustained speed of up to 26 knots.

ALSO READ: China creating a flashpoint in South China Sea

Some of the roles undertaken by the OPVs include coastal and offshore patrol, policing maritime zones of the country, surveillance, anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations.

The vessel will be inducted into the Coast Guard after completion of extensive trials and testing for the equipment and machinery.

Larsen and Toubro has already designed and built ICGS Vikram, ICGS Vijaya, ICGS Veera, ICGS Varaha, ICGS Varad and ICGS Vajra.

ICGS Kanaklata Barua Commissioned

Earlier, on 30 September, Fast Patrol Vessel (FPV) ICGS Kanaklata Barua of the Indian Coast Guard was commissioned at the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Kolkata. The FPV was delivered to the Indian Coast Guard on June 9.

FPVs are medium-range surface vessels with a length of 50m, width of 7.5m and displacement of around 308 tonnes. Its powerful, fuel-efficient platforms are designed to perform multipurpose operations like patrolling, anti-smuggling, anti-poaching and rescue operations.

The vessels are designed for a maximum speed of 34 knots with an endurance of more than 1,500 nm. It is equipped with three main engines. The entire design of the FPVs has been developed in-house by GRSE as per requirements specified by the Indian Coast Guard.

Coastal Security Exercise

A two-day coastal security exercise, named ‘Sagar Kavach,’ was conducted by the Indian Navy, along with Indian Coast Guard and concluded on 8 October.

Coastal police, coastal district administration, Cochin Port, fisheries department, Customs, Marine Enforcement Wing, Central Industrial Security force (CISF), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Light House department and members of fishermen community participated in the exercise. More than 20 ships of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard as well as 50 patrol craft manned by various security agencies participated in the exercise.

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On 31 August, a statement from the Army said that on the night of August 29-30, “PLA troops violated the previous consensus arrived at during military and diplomatic engagements…and carried out provocative military movements to change the status quo.” However, the Indian troops “pre-empted this PLA activity on the Southern Bank of Pangong Tso Lake, undertook measures to strengthen our positions and thwart Chinese intentions to unilaterally change facts on ground.”

A few hours later, the social media was abuzz with news that a Tibetan officer had died. Company Leader Nyima Tenzin lost his life on a landmine in the theatre of operations.

This news turned the spotlight on the Special Frontier Force (SFF) and its predominantly Tibetan soldiers. The deployment of the SFF emerged as a source of pride for India’s Tibetan community. A video from 4 September showed Tibetans in Shimla gathering, singing and tying their traditional khatas (white scarves) to a departing convoy as they waved goodbye to SFF personnel headed for the Ladakh front.

ALSO READ: INDIA-CHINA: Indian Troops Occupy Key Heights North of Pangong Tso

The SFF serves in the Directorate General of Security (DGS) – a wing of India’s external intelligence agency R&AW. With help from the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) – the air wing of the DGS and superior reconnaissance capabilities, the Tibetan refugees-dominated SFF can conduct covert operations behind Chinese enemy lines at will.

The SFF has mostly operated in the shadows since its creation in 1962. When Tibetan resistance fighters began crossing over into India with the 1956 uprising. More followed in the wake of the failed uprising three years later and the Dalai Lama’s exile to India. Most of the resistance fighters were from the Kham region of eastern Tibet, which was one of the major sites of rebellion against the Chinese.

Earlier they were used in a covert manner, but now, it’s against China. It’s a clear message, even to the people in Tibet.

Raising of the SFF

The fighters did not lack passion but needed weapons and training. The CIA was roped in for training the SFF recruits, though no written agreements existed. This suited the Americans well, as their own agenda in Tibet got bolstered through this involvement. They were smuggled into East Pakistan and flown to the island of Saipan in the Pacific, where for four months they were trained in communication and guerilla warfare. In July 1957, they were air-dropped into Tibet and started supplying intelligence to Washington.

By 1958, 23 units had completely driven the Chinese from Tibet’s south, but were in dire need of arms and ammunition. There were 25,000 fighters, but most poorly equipped. The CIA support failed to deliver.

The 6,000 or so fighters who remained in India would be given a new opportunity in 1962. Encouraged by Biju Patnaik, a World War 2 veteran and Bhola Nath Mullik, the then chief of Intelligence Bureau, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave the green light to recruitment of Tibetan refugees. Mullik had the support of leaders of the Tibetan resistance movement.

India, perhaps, wanted China to know that Tibetan nationalism could and would be weaponised against the PLA, should push come to shove again?

Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban, who had earlier commanded the 22 Mountain Regiment and was a Second World War veteran was chosen to raise the force. An old Gurkha training centre at Chakrata (Uttarakhand) was lying vacant. The unit was raised on 14 November 1962. A week later, China announced its “unilateral ceasefire”, so the unit did not see any action in the war.

The outfit was called Establishment 22, named after Gen Uban’s old mountain regiment. They would be all paratroopers — an elite unit capable of high-altitude warfare, special operations, and fighting behind enemy lines. They would report to the Cabinet Secretariat, and were not part of the Army. A women’s wing was also created. In 1967, Establishment 22 was expanded and renamed the Special Frontier Force.

They would finally see action in the 1971 war. They were deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and fought with extraordinary valour. More than 50 would lay down their lives, a sacrifice that was, given the secrecy of the outfit, never given its due recognition.

In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the CIA-trained, Indian-funded Tibetans used hastily-imported Bulgarian assault rifles and U.S.-manufactured carbines to obscure their links to India. Fighting under the direct command of RAW’s legendary spymaster Rameshwar Kao, Brig. Uban’s forces engaged in a series of low-grade border skirmishes.

ALSO READ: PLA troops vacate Finger 4 area in Pangong Tso

The SFF succeeded in destroying several key bridges at the cost of 56 dead and 190 wounded. They ensured that Pakistan’s 97 Independent Brigade and 2 Commando Battalion remained bogged down in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Indira Gandhi deployed the SFF, once again, during the Operation Blue Star in Harmandir Sahib in Amritsar.

The SFF also played a key role during the Kargil conflict. It is rumoured that the capture of Tiger Hill was made possible because of the SFF deployment.

New Attention

The new attention on the SFF holds implications both inside Tibet and for the Tibetan community in India. Tibetan people in the diaspora and refugee community are now showing their patriotism. The limelight might provide the opportunity for the SFF’s warriors to get long overdue recognition from the government.

The use of the SFF against China has renewed attention towards the Free Tibet movement.

China Nervous

Two days before the Tibetan lost his life in Ladakh, on 28-29 August, the Seventh Tibet Work Forum (TWF) was held in Beijing. For the first time, the TWF was given large publicity. The TV report lasted more than 14 minutes, mostly quoting XiJinping. In his speech, he emphasised that Beijing’s objective was to build a new socialist modern Tibet that is “united, prosperous, civilised, harmonious and beautiful.”

Seventy years after the so-called ‘liberation’ of Tibet, has no ethnic Tibetan been made Party Secretary in Tibet? No Tibetan has ever made it to the Politburo? The reason is that the Han still do not trust the Tibetans, though Xi is fond of mentioning his theory: “Governing border areas is the key to governing the country and stabilising Tibet is a priority for governing border areas.”

China has been quietly militarising the Tibetan plateau for over 60 years under the pretext of development and modernisation. For Tibet, this has only led to an influx of soldiers, Han (Chinese) settlers, and weapons. The militarisation of the Tibetan plateau has led to the recent Galwan incident.

China’s renewed attempt in crushing any form of Tibetan dissent is complementary to its advances along the Indo-Tibetan border. China’s control over Tibet is not only highly questionable, the vast number of cultural, socio-political, and humanitarian atrocities it has carried out has made it constitutionally immoral.

The PLA has been trying hard to recruit Tibetans in the Army and in militia outfits.

The two ‘coincidental’ events – India taking control over the ridge south of Pangong Tso and the Tibet Working Forum in Beijing – are linked to the ‘stability’ of the borders. Tibetans are ready to give up their lives to protect India’s from China. Clearly, Beijing is troubled by the happenings in Ladakh.

Commemts

The very fact that India has allowed the deployment of the SFF to go public suggests that New Delhi has just one message to give – India hardly cares about what China thinks. Gone are the days when pro-China policymakers in India would desist from taking steps that would ‘annoy China’. India is least bothered if border infrastructure in Ladakh antagonises China or if the ‘22 Establishment’ instils a sense of fear in the Chinese psyche.

India does not care if New Delhi’s support to the Dalai Lama irks China or if Xi Jinping is worried about Tibet and wants to curb ‘splitism’ in the occupied territory. If China does not turn to status quo ante in Eastern Ladakh, India will force the real facts on the ground dating back to the pre-1950 era when Tibet was an independent Buddhist nation, because if the SFF can help raise the Mukti Bahini for the liberation of Bangladesh, it can also free Tibet from Chinese occupation.

The Vikasi of the SFF have not forgotten how Tibet was coerced to become a part of China in 1951 when a Tibetan delegation was made to accede the Buddhist nation to China even without an approval from the Dalai Lama. Nor have the Tibetan fighters forgotten how the Dalai Lama was insulted in 1959 when Mao Zedong’s PLA forces shelled the Potala Palace.

Tibetans have not forgotten the thousands of monks who were either murdered by China or driven to immolate themselves. By sending Tibetans on the front-line, India is reminding China that the land it is fighting from is not even Chinese land.

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