The South China Morning Post published the report based on an assessment by PLA Daily – the propaganda mouthpiece of the Chinese army. The army doesn’t have enough skilled troops to operate high-tech hardware, the PLA Daily said.

Revelations made in the assessment:

1. The report highlights a core problem: as China speeds up the modernisation of the PLA, a lack of hi-tech expertise is limiting state-of-the-art equipment from being used to its full extent, especially in the navy.

2. Top commanders within the PLA are yet to complete a basic training test. This includes the vice-captain of a Chinese warship, Wang Yubing. Yubing is one of the several naval soldiers who has been made a vice-captain before the completion of his training.

3. According to the PLA Daily report on December 26, the vice-captain of the Type 056 corvette, Zhangye, was not been able to finish a crucial training assessment.

4. Shortage of adequately skilled personnel to operate the newly-enlisted ships and hi-tech hardware is a situation which has been termed by the report as “equipment awaiting talent”. It says “in recent years, a number of old ships have been retired, and a host of new warships have been commissioned, but there are very few people who know how to operate them and this has made the problem of ‘equipment awaiting talent’ become increasingly severe”.

5. There is training resource imbalance within the PLA and it is unable to organise the training of some commanders and key soldiers systematically, due to which the final training assessments are running behind schedule.

The admission by the official mouthpiece comes a month after the clash between Indian and Chinese troops along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector.

The revelation comes close on the heels of a growing competition between China and its rivals in the Indo-Pacific region. Recently, the Liaoning Battle Carrier group sailed close to the US Pacific island territory of Guam, which houses very strategically placed military facilities.

Why is the PLA in such an abysmal condition?

1. Conscription: Conscription, also called draft, is compulsory enrollment for service in a country’s armed forces. Military service is mandatory for all Chinese citizens and the practice of conscription is held high even in the Chinese constitution. However, the conscription cycle comes with its own set of challenges. The PLA relies on approximately 8,00,000 conscripts that have to serve for two years and each conscript is trained for 90 days, with 16 days of political indoctrination. Due to this policy, the forces lose 20 to 35 per cent of their combat power for a period of three to four months annually.

2. Recruiting and retaining qualified personnel: The PLA recruits heavily but fails to retain professionals. The Chinese army recruits a high number of poor youths from rural backgrounds who join for the perks. The educated city dwellers tend to leave the army and experts blame the one-child policy for this.

3. One Child Policy: China’s one-child policy produces pampered children who cannot withstand military discipline. When in the army, they are dissatisfied, the service is poor, perks are few and this weakens the force by depriving it of high-quality professionals.

4. Civilian oversight: The PLA is characterized by extremely weak civilian control. There is a total absence of civilian oversight and the only civilian in the military’s chain of command is said to be the chairman of China’s central military commission.

5. Insufficient training: Beijing’s propaganda videos of the PLA don’t quite tell the real story. They gloss over the fact that Chinese soldiers undergo insufficient training in conditions that are not challenging enough. Military exercises are not seen as a chance to identify problems. The aim is to always succeed and this reduces military training into opportunities to impress the supervisors.

In October 2019, the Chinese orienteering team was disqualified for cheating at the world military games in Wuhan city. In 2015, Chinese troops, as part of the UN peacekeeping force in Sudan, are said to have fled the battlefield instead of engaging in combat.

One of the world’s largest fighting forces, which claims itself to be superior and doesn’t hesitate to threaten its neighbours, doesn’t have troops with the required skill set or experience.

China has the largest navy in the world by size of fleet and has been bolstering its capability by modernizing and inducting cutting-edge vessels. It has the world’s largest fighting force with over two million active personnel. But as it turns out, its size is only a facade to hide its reality because the PLA is facing a shortage of efficient troops.

The recent revelations puncture China’s argument about the might of its army.

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Xi, 69, has been reappointed as the General Secretary of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) and head of the Central Military Commission (CMC) — the overall high command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for an unprecedented third five-year term by the party’s once-in-a-five-year Congress here last month.

Holding the three powerful posts of the head of the party, the military, and the Presidency, Xi is the only leader besides the party founder Mao Zedong to continue in power after completing 10-year tenure, while all his predecessors retired.

On 8 November, Xi inspected the joint operations command centre of the CMC here which provides vital support to the strategic command of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC.

Upon arriving at the command centre, the Chinese leader was given a briefing, the official media reported.

In his first address to the two million-strong military — the largest in the world — as he kicked off his third term as head of the CMC, Xi said the world is undergoing more profound changes unseen in a century and stressed that China’s national security is facing increased instability and uncertainty, and its military tasks remain arduous.

He said the entire military should devote all its energy to carry out all its work for combat readiness, enhance its capability to fight and win, and effectively fulfill its missions and tasks, state-run Xinhua news agency reported.

Xi instructed them to resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and successfully complete various tasks entrusted by the party and the people, the report said.

Though President Xi did not mention a particular country in his address, it came amidst growing international concern over China’s aggressive military manoeuvring in the resource-rich Indo-Pacific region. The armies of China and India are also engaged in a prolonged standoff in eastern Ladakh.

China claims nearly all of the disputed South China Sea, though Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam all claim parts of it.

Beijing has built artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea. China also has territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea.

Xi said the military leadership must focus on realising the PLA’s centennial goal – to make the PLA a world-class armed force by 2027, which is broadly interpreted as making it on par with the US armed forces.

“We must do all we can to make this happen,” he said.

During his speech at the party congress last month, Xi also set “victory in local wars” as a goal and told the PLA to “improve training and preparation for war in all aspects and improve the ability of the army to fight and win”.

“We will strengthen the normal and diversified use of military forces, carry out military struggles with determination and flexibility, shape the security posture, contain crises and conflicts, and win local wars,” he said.

Commenting on Xi’s address to the military, retired Air Force General Xu Qiliang, who was the former vice-chairman of the CMC, said in a commentary that the PLA must prepare for a rapid transformation from peace to wartime.

“Always maintain a high readiness posture like arrows on a taut string ready to go, to ensure that the troops are prepared to fight at all times,” Xu, who retired from the top post in the CMC, was quoted as saying by Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

In his address to the CPC Congress last month, President Xi said China will establish a strong system of strategic deterrence, which was interpreted by observers as a call to increase China’s nuclear weapons.

Analysts said Xi’s remarks indicated China would improve its nuclear deterrence capability amid its increasing rivalry with the US.

Song Zhongping, a former People’s Liberation Army instructor, said the statement meant China would “strengthen its development of strategic nuclear forces” to safeguard its national security.

Song said the PLA must strengthen its “nuclear triad” forces – its combination of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched missiles, and air-launched weapons – as well as its second-nuclear strike capability to respond to a nuclear attack.

“All of these require the PLA to have a modern nuclear-armed force … and to moderately increase the nuclear arsenal,” he told the Post.

In his address to the military officials on Tuesday, Xi instructed the armed forces to thoroughly study, publicise and implement the guiding principles of last month’s 20th CPC

National Congress and take concrete actions to further modernize national defence and the military.

He said the entire armed forces implement the Party’s thinking on strengthening the military for the new era, following the military strategy, and adhering to combat effectiveness as the sole criterion.

The new era refers to his assumption of the leadership of the party in 2012.

The command centre, which provides vital support to the strategic command of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, is of great importance and shoulders heavy responsibilities, Xi said.

The command centre should make new and greater contributions to boosting military training and combat preparedness, effectively fulfilling all missions and tasks in the new era, Xi said.

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The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, released late 27 October by defence secretary Llyod Austin, directed the Department of Defense “to act urgently” to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the department’s “pacing challenge”.

However, it noted that “conflict with the PRC is neither inevitable nor desirable”.

It also identified Russia as an “acute threat” and said that the United States and its allies and partners will increasingly face the challenge of deterring two major powers with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities — the PRC and Russia — creating new stresses on strategic stability.

Making a clear shift from the terror angle to homeland threat, the defence strategy paper, which acts as the guiding principles for the US defence department, said the scope and scale of threats to the homeland (US) have fundamentally changed.

The PRC and Russia now pose more dangerous challenges to safety and security at home, even as terrorist threats persist, it said.

India and its tensions with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) figured thrice in the 80-page document which said that the department will advance “our Major Defense Partnership with India to enhance its ability to deter PRC aggression and ensure free and open access to the Indian Ocean region”.

It also noted that the department will also support ally and partner efforts, in accordance with U.S. policy and international law, to address acute forms of gray zone coercion from the PRC’s campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and disputed land borders, such as with India.

At the same time, the department will continue to prioritise maintaining open lines of communication with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and managing competition responsibly, it said.

Noting that the US 2022 National Security Strategy released earlier this month observes that the PRC is “the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order, and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so”, Austin said China remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades.

“I have reached this conclusion based on the PRC’s increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences, alongside a keen awareness of the PRC’s clearly stated intentions and the rapid modernisation and expansion of its military,” Austin said.

‘Part of broader destabilising, coercive PRC behavior’

The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the the PLA’s growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests, stated the defence strategy document.

The PRC’s increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilising, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, it added.

“This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control,” said the document.

Noting that the PRC has expanded and modernised nearly every aspect of the PLA, with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages, the document concluded that PRC is therefore the “pacing challenge” for the department.

It added that in addition to expanding its conventional forces, the PLA is rapidly advancing and integrating its space, counterspace, cyber, electronic, and informational warfare capabilities to support its holistic approach to joint warfare.

“The PLA seeks to target the ability of the (US) Joint Force to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and aid our Allies in a crisis or conflict,” said the document.

It added: “The PRC is also expanding the PLA’s global footprint and working to establish a more robust overseas and basing infrastructure to allow it to project military power at greater distances. In parallel, the PRC is accelerating the modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities.”

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Acutely conscious of the fate of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Chinese President Xi Jinping is particularly concerned that the army remains “an army of the party” and to ensure this, he mandated a series of consecutive year-long education campaigns to instil the CCP’s ideology and correct political orientation among the soldiers. A book released last week, titled “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Army Q&A”, has now indelibly affixed his imprimatur on the PLA. It has been distributed throughout the army as “important” reading for officers, soldiers, cadres and the masses.

Xi’s grip on the PLA is near absolute. At an “enlarged” meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC) within two days of taking over China’s top three posts, including Chairman of the CMC in November 2012, Xi announced that the political reliability and loyalty would trump all other considerations and be the sole determining criterion for promotions in the PLA. Other steps were taken to ensure the PLA’s “absolute obedience” to the CCP and CMC Chairman. The CCP’s anti-graft outfit, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), weeded out corrupt officers and those of doubtful loyalty and by September 2017 had dismissed over 4,885 officers, including 150 Generals. Each General in the PLA today has been appointed by Xi, who has also donned the operational role of the Commander-in-Chief.

With the PLA maintaining the number of delegates to the upcoming 20th Party Congress at 304, despite its downsizing by 3,00,000 personnel, it appears that the PLA’s representation in the new 20th CCP Central Committee (CC) will probably stay at 37 full members and 22 alternate members as in the outgoing 19th CCP CC. Its representation in the Politburo is similarly unlikely to be reduced. The PLA’s presence in the Party Congress would give Xi added leverage in the CCP CC.

Relevant to India is the attention being paid by Xi to the PLA Western Theatre Command (WTC). The largest of China’s five theatre commands, it exercises operational jurisdiction over China’s borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal and Myanmar. Its tasks include protection of Chinese personnel and assets deployed on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Western Theatre Command was operationally responsible for the intrusions in the Ladakh region in April 2020 that activated the entire 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC).

In this backdrop of continuing tension and deployment of 60,000-70,000 troops each by India and China in the high-altitude eastern Ladakh, what is interesting is that the number of delegates representing the PLA WTC at the 20th Party Congress is nearly double than that of the other four theatre commands. The WTC has selected 30 delegates for the 20th Party Congress. There are other signs of the leadership’s attention to the WTC.

The Chinese President visited Lhasa on July 23, 2021, Chengdu on July 9, 2022, and Urumqi on July 15, 2022, where he met WTC officers. The WTC receives advanced military hardware and latest jet aircraft ahead of all other theatre commands, except the Eastern Theatre Command.

Massive infrastructure projects sanctioned by the 14th Five-Year Plan are scheduled for completion by 2030-35. These will upgrade the WTC’s military capabilities and include new railways, a new highway and 30 additional airfields in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and its surrounding areas.

Coincidentally, the timeline matches that in the article published in June 2013 by Hong Kong-based Wen Wei Po, projecting China’s war with India for the “reconquest of the southern Tibet” between 2035 and 2040.

Furthermore, there is little sign of abatement of the considerable widespread discontent inside China, further inflamed by the “zero Covid” policy and unending lockdowns.

A PLA Daily editorial had earlier warned that the United States could “use the tense domestic situation in China to fan the social upheaval and provoke social conflict.”

“Colour revolutions” is a serious worry for the Chinese leadership. Significant for China’s neighbours and India is the fresh warning issued just weeks before the 20th Party Congress via a commentator’s article, which conveys the views of the CCP CC.

This commentator’s article in the People’s Daily last week stated that the world has become increasingly turbulent and more prone to change. In an unusually candid admission, it said the “country’s security situation has become increasingly unstable and uncertain.” It disclosed the CCP leadership’s concern at the increasingly “prominent issues” related to maritime disputes and the “increased likelihood of chaos on our doorstep”, thus making the task of “defending the country’s political security and social stability more formidable.”

The latest warning clearly implies that Xi is facing a difficult period and will be on the edge. The CCP cadres, public security apparatus and the PLA, including the WTC, are certainly on high alert. In case the situation doesn’t improve, or deteriorates, and the CCP’s authority and legitimacy are perceived as beginning to erode, Xi will be tempted to divert attention and resort to military actions abroad. The developments in Ukraine will be a factor in his calculations. In this backdrop, any expectation, prompted by disingenuous Chinese media comments or the disengagement at Gogra-Hot Springs, that Xi will change his attitude or policy towards India is unfounded and premature.

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The provocation efforts by the Chinese side are being continued despite the matter being raised at the Corps Commander level talks.

Chinese aircraft have been regularly flying close to the LAC over the past three to four weeks, which is being seen as an effort to check Indian defence mechanisms in the region.

Indian Air Force (IAF) is responding to the situation responsibly and is not taking any chances to tackle the threat as well as not letting the matter escalate in any way.

As per the sources, the IAF has taken strong measures to respond to these provocations as it has moved its most powerful fighter jets, including the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000, to advanced bases from where they can respond to Chinese movements within minutes.

It seems that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is tense over the upgradation of IAF infrastructure in the Ladakh region, they added.

Sources further said that the IAF is responding to these actions in a “calibrated manner” and is also monitoring Chinese flight patterns in the area where they are flying at both low and high altitudes.

India is working at a brisk pace to upgrade its military infrastructure in Ladakh after China tried to unilaterally change the status quo on the LAC in the April-May 2020 time frame.

The provocation by Chinese fighter jets began around June 24-25 when a Chinese fighter jet flew very close to a point of friction in eastern Ladakh.

After that, there were several CBM violations between the two sides on the LAC near Chumar sector and this has been going on since then, they asserted, adding that the IAF, including its Rafale fighter jets, is also doing extensive flying in the eastern Ladakh region.

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On May 20, the ministry of external affairs confirmed reports about China building a second bridge across the lake. The MEA statement said the bridge was being built in territory illegally occupied by China. It is coming up near the ruins of the Khurnak fort, built in 1867 by the Changpa tribes of Tibet, on the north bank of the lake. Till 1958, the fort and the premises marked the Sino-Indian border where the Indian Army had an observation post. The Chinese overran the area in 1958 and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) now runs nearly 20km west of Khurnak.

India has been closely monitoring Chinese activity in Khurnak since January, but could not do much as the construction was happening within the territory under Chinese control. The first bridge, which was completed in April, is being used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to transport construction equipment to build the second bridge.

Latest satellite images show that the new bridge is bigger and wider—it is 450m long and 10m wide—and is meant for faster movement of not just troops and vehicles, but even tanks. It is expected to be ready by July. The bridge will cut the distance from Rudok—the PLA’s main base servicing its deployments in the Pangong area—to the LAC to about 50km, from the existing distance of over 200km.

Background

India and China have been locked in the border row since April-May 2020, and despite disengagement of soldiers at Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake and Gogra, the two sides still have around 60,000 troops each and advanced weaponry deployed in the Ladakh theatre.

In May 2020, Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a brawl near Pangong Tso, causing serious injuries to both sides. A month later, a deadly clash in the Galwan valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel Santosh Babu. It was the first time in nearly five decades that fatalities were reported on the LAC, and it triggered massive deployment of troops and heavy weapons by both armies.

As of now, military disengagement has only taken place in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso (both banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs area. The Indian army wants PLA to first restore April 2020 status quo ante in PPT 15 and then resolve the patrolling issues in Depsang Bulge  (south of DBO sector) and the Charding Nulllah Junction in Demchok. Till the time these military objectives are achieved, New Delhi is in no mood to normalize ties with Beijing.

Importance of Pangong Tso

Pangong Tso is a 130-km-long lake, approximately one-third of which is in India and the remainder in China with width varying from one to five km is a major obstacle. The water body is of immense strategic importance as it offers suitable avenue for undertaking major operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Khurnak Fort in 1958 and later in 1959 also established a camp at Maldo- Spanggur Lake area, South of Pangong Tso.

During the 1962 war, Chinese offensive to clear Indian defensive localities on the Northern Bank was launched from Khurnak Fort garrison on October 22. The Chinese were able to capture Indian positions from Sirijap right up to Finger 2 in just two days. However, for progressing operations south of Pangong Tso, PLA had to take a tactical pause of more than three weeks as it had to circumvent the lake to concentrate forces at Rudok.

Second Bridge

The Chinese are constructing another bridge over Pangong Tso; adjacent to the one built few months earlier in the Khurnak Fort area, barely 25 km east of the LAC. It is a double-span bridge, capable of ferrying heavier equipment like tanks and artillery guns. China’s overdrive to upgrade infrastructure, both military and civil, part of ‘dual use’ policy, all along the LAC indicates its larger design with serious ramifications.

In May 2020, PLA’s aggression in Pangong Tso area was confined to the northern side only. When the Indian Army occupied the Kailash Range South of Pangong Tso on the night of August 29-30, 2020 as counter to the Chinese actions, PLA was again handicapped due to the constraints of shifting troops from north to the south of Pangong Tso. To obviate this, China has now gone on to build twin bridges at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso, which cuts down the distance to Rudok by almost 150 km and movement time from 10 to barely 3 hours.

Satellite imagery shows the new bridge is being constructed parallel to the first bridge, which is narrower and was completed in April. The first bridge is being used to move equipment such as cranes needed to build the second one, which will be capable of accommodating larger and heavier vehicles such as tanks.

Both structures are located across the narrowest section of the 134-km-long lake. They will cut the distance between Chinese troop positions on the north bank to a key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Rutog, on the eastern end of the lake, by around 150 km.

Kailash Range

On the intervening night of August 29 and 30, 2020, India took control of several key heights lying vacant since 1962, including Rezang La, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Gorkha Hill and Maggar Hill of the Kailash range, overlooking China’s Moldo garrison.

The military assessment is that not only does the twin bridge cut the road loop to Rudog base but also allows for faster deployment were India to enact the August 29-21, 2020, action by suddenly occupying heights on the south banks of the lake. The Indian military action during that period not only took the PLA by surprise but also forced China to settle for military disengagement on both banks of the lake with the creation of buffer zones.

Fingers on the Pangong Tso

On the strategic front, the confrontation between Indian and Chinese forces at Pangong Tso is largely on the eight spurs—called ‘Fingers’ in military parlance—jutting out of the Chang Chenmo range, an eastern extension of the Karakoram Range which ends at the north bank of Pangong Tso. Traditionally, India exerted control up to Finger 4 and has claimed up to Finger 8 from where the Indian perception of the LAC starts. India has a permanent position near Finger 3 (named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded Param Vir Chakra after the 1962 war), while China maintains a base east of Finger 8. But over the years, China steadily encroached upon Indian territory. Both sides have now reached an agreement giving India control up to Finger 4 and the rest to China.

Heavy Deployment

Both the armies are matched in deployment across the LAC with Chinese armour and rocket regiments stationed at Rudog base, south of Pangong Tso, and at Xiadullah in the restive Xinjiang military region. The PLA Air Force has stationed its fighters and bombers at Gar Gunsa across Demchok and at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang.

The Indian Army is also fully deployed along the LAC with roads and bridges that can accommodate tanks or armoured personnel carriers all the way up to Daulet Beg Oldi and as many as seven bridges coming up on Galwan river to handle any military emergency.

Until May 2020, Pangong Tso had only minimal military presence. Only one company each of the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police were deployed in the area. Now, the entire lake is militarised. The PLA is converting its temporary ammunition dumps, helipads and surface-to-air missile positions into permanent ones. Its soldiers are equipped with howitzers, T-15 light tanks, and Type-81 assault rifles and PHL-03 multiple rocket launchers. The PLA has augmented its manpower by deploying two new divisions from the Xinjiang Military District, with elements of motorised infantry, armoured, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments.

On the Indian side, nearly 20,000 troops guard the region, armed with Bofors howitzers and BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles. Armoured columns of T-90 and T-72 tanks are stationed behind. Several news posts with additional deployment and bunkers have come up. A large number of additional battalions have been moved to Ladakh from the western sector. To patrol the lake, Indian Army’s new boats, capable of cruising at a speed of nearly 40kmph with around 20 soldiers, are deployed. Built by Goa Shipyard exclusively for the Army, these advanced boats can be modified to fit light weapons if needed.

The ITBP, the force responsible for guarding the India-China border, too, has made significant enhancements. It has deployed close to 40 per cent additional troops in the area. New border outposts are being created along with infrastructure development of barracks and accommodations for better living conditions, while existing outposts are being further strengthened with additional men and machines. 

Another major problem confounding the security planners is that unlike most other hotspots along the LAC, Pangong Tso is also a popular tourist destination. Pangong Tso and its surroundings were opened up for visitors in the early 1990s, and it became famous after the climax of the 2008 Bollywood movie 3 Idiots, starring Aamir Khan, was filmed near the lake. Ironically, the movie was equally popular in China.

Comments

While the twin bridges in Khurnak Fort area are  beyond the LAC perception of India and hence technically on territory that the PLA occupied in 1959,  Chinese soldiers continue to be forwardly deployed on patrolling point 15, which is in Kugrang Heights and en-route the shortest path from Panging Tso to Galwan Valley.

China’s strategic intent is clear: it plans to keep the positions it recently captured in the Pangong area.

The only feasible response is to have reciprocal infrastructure development in areas controlled by India. For instance, despite strident Chinese opposition, India went ahead with building several bridges on the Shyok River and in Daulat Beg Oldi in the past couple of years.

The Indian side has conveyed its expectations regarding the military standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Chinese side, including foreign minister Wang Yi, and will continue to take the matter forward in order to find a solution though talks.

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The hike is over three times that of India’s defence budget of 5.25 lakh crore (about $70 billion) for 2022.

Last year, China’s defence spending for the first time crossed $200 billion. In 2021, the defence budget grew by 6.8 per cent to $209 billion.

In his work report presented to China’s Parliament, Chinese Premier Li called for deepening comprehensive combat readiness from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). He said the PLA needs to carry out military struggles in a resolute and flexible manner to defend the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests.

China’s increase in this year’s defence budget came amid the standoff at eastern Ladakh and its increasing political and military tensions with the US.

How to read China’s defence expenditure?

China’s 2019 defence whitepaper outlines three major categories of China’s defence spending: personnel expenses, capital expenses and training and sustainment expenses. The white paper highlights that since 2010, China’s capital expenditure has increased every year. In 2010, China’s capital expenditure was 33.2 per cent of the total budget, and it grew to 41.1 per cent of the total expenditure in 2017. Earlier, in the last two decades, China’s defence spending was roughly equal in all three categories. However, the rising trend, especially in this decade, aligns with Xi Jinping’s rise as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary.

Interestingly, China’s 2015 defence white paper emphasised that the PLA should focus more on far seas operations to protect it overseas interests along with near sea defence. This would require a major investment in the Navy and Air Force, which are more capital intensive forces than the ground force. Furthermore, Xi’s armed forces reforms have also emphasised on newer weaponry to achieve ‘multi-domain integrated joint operations’. Thus, in this decade, the PLA’s defence expenditure is majorly utilised on commissioning more advanced and high-tech weapons to achieve regional supremacy and extra-regional operational capabilities.

What the defence expenditure hides?

But these are just conservative estimates that are published by China’s State Council and Ministry of Finance. Military observers across the world have questioned these numbers and claim that China hides more than it reveals. For instance, scholars from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and RAND Cooperation have all claimed that China’s defence expenditure is much higher than it showcases. Similarly, the US Department of Defense’s (DOD) annual China military power report doesn’t provide a specific assessment but has repeatedly claimed that China’s military spending could be much higher than projected.

This is because China’s military expenditure hides major categories of defence spending. For instance, China’s published numbers don’t account for People’s Armed Police and Coast Guard expenses (paramilitary forces), which could be significantly high in all probability. Similarly, it doesn’t account for newer but capital-intensive areas like China’s space and cyber programmes, nuclear programmes and defence mobilisation funds. It also doesn’t reveal the provincial military bases’ operating costs. Furthermore, China’s defence expenditure also excludes expenditure on disaster relief operations — which is later to be reimbursed through non-defence related agencies. Finally, China also doesn’t reveal the accurate cost of all its military goods and services, thus, increasing the inconsistencies and ambiguities about its defence spending.

However, China is not the only country to hide its defence expenditure, as India too doesn’t reveal several components like its defence spending on space, cyber and nuclear programmes.

Comparing China’s defence expenditure

The US DOD report projects a slowdown in China’s economic growth in the next 10 years, thus reducing its capabilities to spend on defence and national security needs. However, on comparing defence expenditures, it is clear that China is many folds ahead of its regional competitors, and it would take a significant jump for the regional actors, including India, to catch up with China.

For instance, China’s total defence expenditure for 2022 is more than the combined defence expenditures of India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan for 2021. However, China’s defence expenditure is around 3.5 times less than the US annual military budget, thus making the US an important extra-regional actor in the Indo-Pacific region for balancing China’s rise.

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India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis. The Indian and Chinese armies have been locked in a border standoff since May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. Since then, the two sides held several rounds of military and diplomatic which have only resulted in partial disengagement of troops from friction points.

So far, India has walked the diplomatic tightrope between the US and Russia, given its own strategic compulsions. Warding off pressure from the US and its European allies to strongly oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is a matter by itself. India hopes that purchase of the five S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile squadrons, under the $5.43 billion (Rs 40,000 crore) contract inked with Russia in October 2018, was an “urgent national security requirement” to counter aggressive neighbours like China and Pakistan. Hence, the US will not impose sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), which seeks to prevent countries from buying Russian weapons, by mounting a major diplomatic-military campaign with both the Trump and Biden administrations.

On the China front, India will need to keep an eagle-eye on the annual exercises of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in March-April along the 3,488-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) and be “prepared for any contingencies.

In addition to the stalemate along the LAC, the IA could face the emergence of another front on its western flank from China’s ‘willing’ affiliate Pakistan, with the aim of dividing India’s already overstretched forces and equally strained financial and equipment resources.

As it is, the PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.

With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.

Apart from conventional military capabilities, China’s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.

“China’s latest demonstration of physically moving one of its disabled satellites into the graveyard orbit is bringing in newer threats in the race to weaponise the space domain, a domain hitherto considered relatively safe,” IAF chief Air Chief Marshal V R Chaudhari said at a seminar on 24 February.

Quad’s Focus

Furthermore, the inchoate and nebulous preemptive deterrent instrumentality like the naval-focused Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, initiated in 2007-08 as a China-containment strategy, and one which included Australia, Japan and the US, has, in its new avatar, proven ineffectual in discouraging Beijing’s adventurism in Ladakh. Besides, all four Quad members are now preoccupied with dealing with the fallout from Ukraine’s invasion and bracing themselves for a unified China-Russia front, in which the latter’s military technology, expertise and know-how would be more aggressively mated and advanced by a financially flush and industrially forward Beijing.

India should now forcefully use its considerable diplomatic clout and its deep friendships on all sides to end the conflict and stabilise the region. The additional advantage in such a solution would be to persuade India’s strategic partners including its Quad partners to turn back their focus on China and the Indo-Pacific.

Beijing-Moscow Axis

The ongoing confusion over the war in Ukraine could impact the LAC situation, as sanctions could drive Moscow into a ‘Chinese embrace’. In that case, India would have to deal with the PLA threat by itself. And to do so it needs to summarily and significantly augment its economic and military capabilities.

India could well end up facing the brunt of this deadly security partnership between Moscow, Beijing and Islamabad. Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on February 25, within hours of the latter having ordered his army’s mobilisation against Kyiv, was ‘significant.’ It had firmly secured Putin’s eastern flank, with the exception of India, which had opted to remain neutral. It is apposite to recall that Putin lifted sanctions on Pakistan in 2014, sold it Mi-35M Hind-E attack helicopters and conducted joint exercises with its army near Peshawar in October 2018.

India’s ‘nightmare scenario’ is  – Washington deciding to confront a greater threat from Russia in its European backyard than from China, and opting for a strategic accommodation with Beijing. Or the US conceding Chinese dominance in Asia to safeguard its European flank from an expansionist Russia.

India’s Options

India needs to forge long-term alliances with advanced materiel producing countries to eventually replace Russian equipment, in addition to ‘realistically’ beefing up its domestic defence manufacturing.

The government’s disjointed and ad hoc approach to fostering military capability development has to stop. The MoD needs to optimise scarce financial resources and focus on immediate security threats and not on optics, like the recent strident official announcement that Indian industry had indigenised the manufacture of assorted military-grade nuts and bolts.

Instead of half-baked measures, India must make self-reliance in military requirements a concrete national mission, along with a special thrust on space, cyberspace and special operations. Moreover, a robust nuclear deterrence is required to deter all adversaries.

The ongoing situation on northern Borders warrants the Indian Army to re-align the operational tasking of its reserve formations to focus on the northern borders and refine warfighting capabilities in high altitude mountainous terrain.

India uneasily awaits the next Chinese misadventure on its borders. Unlike Ukraine, India is alone.

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“The Ukraine situation has to be seen in the context of similar attempts that could be made by the Chinese PLA along our contested Northern borders. At no stage should people lose focus on the Northern borders,” ANI quoted a senior officer at Army Headquarters as saying.

The officer further stated that the Indian Army continues to maintain its operational priorities with an intent to develop capabilities with a long-term perspective in view of the threat from the country’s northern adversary.

“The ongoing situation on northern Borders warrants the Indian Army to re-align the operational tasking of its reserve formations to focus on the northern borders and refine warfighting capabilities in high altitude mountainous terrain,” the officer added.

“Various situations and responses of the formation were wargamed at Mathura and suitable lessons were also being drawn from various modern-day conflicts across the globe,” the officer posted at Army headquarters added.

The Armies of India and China have been locked in a border standoff since May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakhsev. Since then, the two sides held several rounds of military and diplomatic which have only resulted in partial disengagement of troops from friction points.

Russia-Ukraine war
On February 24, the Russian military began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including carrying out attacks on cities with ballistic missiles, artillery, and tanks.

The war between the two neighbouring countries escalated on 3 March with the Russian invasion forces taking control of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia after a battle with Ukrainian troops that caused a fire and fears of an accident.

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“The Science of Military Strategy” released in 2013 by the Academy of Military Sciences was the third edition of the text, following previous versions in 1987 and 2001. A full-English translation of the 276-page Chinese document, which was first released a year into Xi Jinping’s tenure in October 2013, was published, on 8 February 2021, by the United States-based China Aerospace Studies Institute at Air University, based at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Here are the extracts related to India’s Military Strategy.

“India is a regional power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and is also an emerging major country that is in the midst of arising, and so its international status is improving every day. Understanding and analyzing trends in its military strategy have an important significance for understanding and grasping the world and regional strategic setup, and even its security situation.

“From India’s independence in 1947 to the end of the Cold War, India’s military strategy largely underwent three stages of development.

“The first stage was a period of limited offensive strategy (from India’s independence to the beginning of the 1960s). At the start of Indian independence, its domestic economy was backward and its military power was weak; externally, it formed a confrontation with Pakistan, and it also faced an intense competition between the United States and the Soviet Union as they struggled to dominate the South Asian region. Under these circumstances, the [Jawaharlal] Nehru government adopted a policy of “non-alliance” with the outside, it dealt with both the U.S. and the Soviet blocs, while internally, it adopted a policy of “first the economy and then national defense;” it struggled for time, it developed the economy, it deepened and accumulated national power, and it strove to achieve the strategic goals of preserving India, developing India, and strengthening India. Militarily, it promoted a strategy of “limited offense,” viewed Pakistan as its most direct threat, put its strategic focus on the west, and continually improved its deployment for operations against Pakistan. At the same time, India intensified its military penetration into areas that it had yet to occupy south of the McMahon Line, in order to achieve the goals of territorial expansion and long-term control over contested areas along the Sino- Indian border; by 1958 it had seized a large area of Chinese territory north of the traditional and customary lines south of the McMahon Line, and had established the socalled “Himalayan security system” in India’s north, aimed at China.

The second stage was the period of a strategy of “expansion on two fronts” (the 1960s to the early 1970s). [India’s] defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict had a major impact on India’s military strategy. India reevaluated its security environment, rethought its military policies, and summarized its experiences and lessons.

“First, it gave priority to military buildup; starting in 1964, it implemented its first five-year plan for national defense, spending 50 billion rupees, and expanding its armaments on a large scale.

“Second, given the situation that it was difficult for [India’s] national power to contend with China, it adopted an in-depth defense program against the PRC for a given period of time.

“Third, it actively prepared for operations against Pakistan in the west and against the PRC in the north. In the late 1960s, India received a great deal of aid from the United States, and it formed a de facto alliance with the Soviet Union; in addition to this, its domestic economic situation improved somewhat, there was some strengthening of its overall national power, its military expansionist thinking accordingly looked up, and it adopted a strategy of “expansion on two fronts” where it had China and Pakistan as simultaneous targets of major operations and prepared for simultaneous operations along both the western and northern battle lines. It adopted a program of “attack to the west and defend to the north,” where the western front would be primarily for offense and the northern front would be primarily for defense, and it directly aimed the spearhead of its expansion toward the western border, in an effort to weaken Pakistan strategically. In November 1971, India launched a large-scale assault against Pakistan, in order to dismember Pakistan at one blow.

“The third stage was the period of a strategy of “maintain the land and control the sea” (1970s to the late 1980s). After the third India-Pakistan War, the setup where India dominated South Asia basically took shape. US-Indian relations and Sino-Indian relations, which had been tense for a time, tended to ameliorate; the United Kingdom withdrew its troops from the Indian Ocean because of a lack of financial and military strength; the Soviet Union gradually reduced its interference in the South Asian region after the mid-1980s; and this resulted in a major change in the South Asian strategic situation that benefited India and provided strategic opportunity and conditions for it to expand into the Indian Ocean region. Under these conditions, based on [the fact that] India’s strategic intentions on land had fundamentally been achieved, it gradually shifted the focus of its strategy from the South Asian subcontinent to the Indian Ocean, it proposed the military strategic idea of “maintain the land and control the sea,” and it comprehensively sought superiority at sea over the northern Indian Ocean.

“After the end of the Cold War, there was a major adjustment to India’s military strategy, where it shifted from a strategy of “regional offense” to a strategy of “regional deterrence.” India believed that the traditional concept of war in the Cold War period, where you annihilated the enemy country’s military strengths, plundered its territory, and conquered its will through warfare, was no longer suitable to the international strategic setup and the South Asian subcontinent situation, which had developed and changed, and that it should “put its stress on emphasizing the role of deterrence and not emphasize conquest and occupation of territory.” Based on this idea, India began in the early 1990s to execute the military strategy of “regional deterrence.” What was called the “region” included a broad scope that started with the Himalayan range in the north and went south to the Indian Ocean, and started in the west with Iran and went east to Burma. What was called “deterrence” was based on making worst-case preparations for major fighting, using powerful military strengths as a backup, and carrying out shock and awe that had effective military force against various targets of operations, including deterrence at sea and nuclear deterrence. Throughout the entire 1990s, the core of India’s strategy of “regional deterrence” was “denial” {juzhi}, and it emphasized maintaining absolute military superiority over the countries within the South Asian subcontinent, deterring these from engaging in military adventures that would threaten India, and achieving such goals as ensuring the security of the nation’s seacoasts and territorial waters and preventing major countries from infiltrating [the subcontinent].

“Upon entering the 21st century, as India’s economy quickly developed and its overall national power continually strengthened, its economic and military power exceeded the sum total of the various other countries in South Asia, and the other South Asian countries in actuality had no power to pose a major threat against India. India believed that the possibility of a large-scale total war breaking out between Pakistan and India in the future because of border disputes was small; it was more likely that there would be small- and medium-scale limited and conventional wars on the border. At the same time, the threats of terrorism, splittism, and transnational organized crime were increasing daily, and non-traditional security threats and traditional security threats were similarly serious and interwoven. Therefore, the Indian military gave the strategy of “regional deterrence” new details, and transformed the passive defense-type thinking of “denial deterrence” into a preemptive strike-type idea of “disciplinary deterrence;” it emphasized taking the initiative to attack, acting before the enemy does, and doing its best to win a high-tech “limited conventional war” under conditions of nuclear deterrence. The main details included [the following]. As regards strategic targets, it stressed having military matters subordinate to political ones; not seeking to threaten the existence of an enemy country; and influencing or impelling an enemy country to modify its anti-Indian policies through the flexible use of military means in a restrained way, while at the same time, it itself was prepared to make necessary compromises in exchange for the enemy’s concessions. As regards preparations for war, it shifted from being prepared to fight a total war, as in the past, to being based on fighting a high-tech limited conventional war under conditions of nuclear deterrence. As regards strategic guidance, it discarded the passive defensive concept of “waiting for the enemy to arrive within [India’s] borders and then getting rid of him” and adopted a guiding program of actively taking the initiative and of preemptive strikes, blocking the enemy in advance from large-scale attacks, so that the war would be waged on the enemy’s territory, forcing the opponent to be trapped on the defensive and in an opportune situation. As regards guidance of operations, there was a stress on joint operations by the three services, and an emphasis on “seamlessly mobilizing all resources in attacking, routing, and defeating the enemy,” and “concentrating all operational strengths for use at a single decisive point, and thus producing maximum effect.” As regards guidance of deterrence, it emphasized the use of both nuclear and conventional deterrence, using nuclear deterrence to ensure that India basically avoided invasions in war, that it was effective in keeping opponents from using nuclear weapons against India, that it limited warfare to the scope of a limited conventional war, that it developed reliable and powerful conventional means of deterrence, that it formed deterrent strengths at multiple levels, and that it used conventional military forces as the “spearhead” of the attack, that it used nuclear strengths as the “shield” of defense, and that it strengthened the flexibility and selectivity of military deterrence.

“Taking an overall look at developments in India’s military strategy since independence, it is possible to see four interrelated basic characteristics.

“First is a strong geopolitical nature. Since the day of its independence, India has determined its national interests through geopolitical thought, to plan its national security and draft military strategy. It has stressed that India is the heart of Asia and that the Indian Ocean is India’s ocean, it has treated the South Asian subcontinent as its sphere of influence, and it has regarded some neighboring countries as the main obstacles blocking it from achieving its geopolitical interests. India’s military strategy has treated protecting its geopolitical interests and eliminating geopolitical obstacles as its starting point and end point. After the end of the Cold War, the international security environment underwent major changes, but India still treated geopolitics as a basic factor that was the source for considering and designing military strategy, and it still determined the direction of its strategy, the means of its strategy, and the targets of its operations from the angle of a geostrategic competition, as it attempted to build the South Asian subcontinent into a strategic foundation with itself as the center, and to thus manage and control the Indian Ocean.

“Second is that it has comprehensively carried on with what it has inherited. After India’s independence, at the same time that [India] received intact the United Kingdom’s colonial political borders, it fully carried on with the United Kingdom’s imperial expansionist military strategic thought; the most important part of this was the idea of socalled “Indocentrism.” The core of this was to treat Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Assam as “the internal lines of India’s defense;” to incorporate Tibet into its sphere of influence as a “buffer state;” and to treat the illegally concocted McMahon Line and the Johnson-Ardagh Line as its “security inner ring.” Nehru viewed the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean as a “security ring,” and pursued a regional security policy that had India as its main body. In addition, India also absorbed local traditional ideas of strategy. For example, it treated peripheral countries as its main opponents to be guarded against and as the targets of its operations; it was deeply affected by the traditional ideas of its historically famous strategist Chanakya, “that treated neighbors as enemies and that dealt with those who were far away and attacked those who were near,” and the “law of fish.”

“Third is limited offensives. India has proposed the national strategic objectives of “dominating South Asia, controlling the Indian Ocean, and striving to be a first-rate power in the world;” this inevitably has determined that its military strategy will have a fairly strong offensive tint. Although India insists that it pursues a “defensive” strategy, a series of military actions that it took after its independence , including three India- Pakistan wars and its armed annexation of the kingdom of Sikkim, its instigation of the Sino-Indian border conflict, and its sending troops to Sri Lanka have all fully proven that its strategy has a distinctly offensive nature. In recent years, with the rapid rise of India’s national power and military power, this offensive nature has been increasing. At the same time, because its national power and military power are limited by not being strong enough yet, the offensive nature of this strategy is restricted to the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean situation, and it temporarily has no way to fully prevent major countries outside this region from infiltrating and controlling the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. As regards its strategy against the PRC, India has adopted a defensive posture overall, but at the same time has also used offense as a defense to actively seek local superiority, and has also used its unremitting nibbling away in peacetime to create conditions for switching from defense to offense in wartime.

“Fourth is deterrence in all directions. In order to resolve the contradiction between its ambition for dominance and its limited national power and military strength, India has proposed carrying out deterrence in all directions in various spheres. After the end of the Cold War, India strengthened its relations with such great powers as the United States and Japan, adjusted its previous emphasis on actual war to an emphasis on deterrence, and has emphasized carrying out deterrence that differed in nature against differing targets and along differing strategic directions. In regard to China, it has carried out “dissuasive” deterrence, to deter China from using troops against India, and has restrained China from entering its sphere of influence. In regard to the small countries along the South Asian periphery, it has carried out “punitive” deterrence, to ensure that they do not dare go against India’s interests and to force them to humbly heed India’s control. In regards to the United States, China, and India, it carries out “nuclear symmetry” deterrence; its nuclear strategic concept is to “discourage” the United States, “deter” China, and “deal with” Pakistan. Of these, “deterring” China is its focus, because it thinks that only by “deterring” China will it be able to “deal with” Pakistan and have the possibility of “discouraging” the United States.

“As India’s consciousness [of itself] as a great power grows stronger and as its overall national power and military strength continually grow, clues to the future developmental trends of its military strategy will gradually be revealed. The orientation of India’s strategic objectives may advance from regional dominance toward global participation, its strategic guidance will put more emphasis on active offense, its strategic deployments will be reflected more in its intentions to control the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, and it will give more stress to paying attention to both the land and the sea, and to stabilizing the western front, strengthening the northern front, advancing to the east and expanding to the south, and to developing toward the sea; its forms of operations will pay more attention to joint air-land operations, mobile operations, and information warfare by the various services and service arms; the building of its military strengths will change from being inward toward being outward “trans-border operational strengths;” and it will vigorously develop a new type of system of operations that will have as their backbone aircraft carriers, fourth-generation fighters, nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles as well as anti-missile systems and outer space military systems.”

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