Key Takeaways

• Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.

• The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait ? referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan-and training for a Taiwan contingency-likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

• The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

• Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

• Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

• Internal unrest in Taiwan;

• Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

• Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

• Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

• Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign- capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture For A Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades-four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021-in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship-the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities – such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets- to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability To Deter Force

Key Takeaways

• The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.

• To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

 Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure with the 2021 defense budget at NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion)

Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022.

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Based on the outcome of the Gulf War, the PLA started researching joint operations in earnest with informatized warfare in mind. From the mid-2000s, the PLA advocated the IJO concept and “Information System-Based System of Systems Operational Capability,” and presented a joint operations concept that included traditional security domains (land, sea, and air) and new security domains (such as space, cyber electromagnetic, and cognitive domain). Meanwhile, during the Hu Jintao regime, the PLA’s informatization was still in the initial stage. Therefore, the PLA set forth that, for the time being, the feasible joint operations were “joint operations under the conditions of informationization,” which was based on the military doctrine of “local wars under the conditions of informationization.” The joint operations capabilities of the PLA had not necessarily reached a sufficient level in the Hu Jintao era.

The Xi Jinping leadership established “informationized local wars” as a military doctrine. Under this doctrine, the Xi leadership undertook large-scale military reforms in order to strengthen joint operations capabilities based on the IJO concept and “Information System-Based System of Systems Operational Capability.”

In October 2017, at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi advocated the new concepts of “Joint Operations Capability Based on Network Information Systems” and “All-Domain Operations Capability” in order to deepen the IJO concept. The implementation of precision, stealth, and unmanned operations, as well as the gaining of information dominance, are positioned at the core of these concepts, putting more pronounced emphasis on new security domains.

With “intelligentized warfare” proposed from 2019, the PLA is conducting ongoing research on new joint operations concepts, such as “Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations” and “Joint Operations under the Conditions of Intelligentization.” These discussions include the possibility of further PLA reforms, such as the establishment of new military services and the implementation of bolder military reforms.

The Reformed PLA’s Joint Operations Structure

The PLA carried out large-scale military reforms from the end of 2015 to 2016. The reforms were wide-ranging and included:

(1) the dissolution of four general departments and the launch of the multi-department system of the Central Military Commission (CMC); (2) the abolition of the seven military regions (MRs) and the establishment of five theater commands (TCs); (3) the creation of the PLA Army headquarters; (4) the upgrading of the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force and the launch of the PLA Strategic Support Force and the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force; and (5) the expansion of the PLA Navy Marine Corps.

The PLA reforms clarified the distinction between the operational chain of command (CMC-TC headquarters-operational units) and the administrative chain of command (CMC-service headquarters-operational units), based on the policy of “the CMC performs general management, the theaters are mainly in charge of operations, and the services are mainly in charge of force building”. Under this policy, TCs were described as “the only supreme joint operations command organization in their respective strategic directions.” The TCs have greater power and command and control (C2) authority than the MRs before the PLA reforms and have gained in importance.

As part of the PLA reforms, the C2 authority of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) was centralized in the CMC, and the China Coast Guard (CCG) was placed under the PAP, creating the new CMC-PAP-CCG maritime border security management system.

Enforcing the CMC chairman responsibility system strengthened Xi Jinping’s C2 authority over the PLA. In addition, under Xi’s leadership, loyalty to Xi and joint operations were emphasized for selection of the PLA  leadership. Nevertheless, PLA Army personnel still dominate the TC headquarters.

With the formation of the standing CMC Joint Operations Command Center and TC Joint Operations Command Organizations, the PLA established a joint operations command structure for “unification of peacetime structure and wartime structure”. In addition, the PLA has been developing C2 systems for joint operations, interconnecting them with the C2 systems of the military services and integrating them with the C2 systems of government organizations and the civilian sector.

The Transformation of Joint Operations Training and Talent Cultivation Programs through the PLA Reforms, and the Quest for Strengthening Party-Army Relations

In accordance with Xi Jinping’s instruction to become an army that is “ready to fight and win wars,” the PLA further strengthened its joint operations training after the PLA reforms, stepped up trainings in Taiwan’s vicinity and in the South China Sea, and is enhancing its capabilities for commanding joint operations in China-Russia joint exercises. Through a series of joint operations trainings, the PLA has especially strengthened information sharing among the services and connecting their C2 systems. In addition, the PLA improved the quality of trainings by strengthening the training supervision structure.

In order to overcome the shortage of personnel for commanding joint operations, the PLA developed the “triad” System for training new types of military personnel, consisting of military institutional education, unit training practice, and military professional education (online education). The PLA National Defense University is the central academy for cultivating personnel for joint operations, and the joint operations personnel who have been trained at the university are assigned to operational units.

The PLA sought to strengthen the education and training structure by establishing and improving related documents, laws, and regulations. In terms of training, the PLA updated the “Military Training Regulations” and the “Military Training Outline” and enacted the “Trial Guidelines on PLA Joint Operations.” In terms of education, it enacted the “Military Education Policy in the New Era,” the “Trial Regulations on the Education in Military Academies,” and the “Trial Regulations on Military Professional Education for Armed Forces.”

As the PLA strengthens its joint operations structure, some scholars note that the traditional system for maintaining Party-Army relations will become a setback. To address this, the PLA seeks the coexistence of the IJO concept and the maintenance and strengthening of Party-Army relations by: (1) enforcing the “system of division of the leader’s responsibilities under the unified collective leadership of the Party committee”; (2) focusing on military expertise and scientific and technological knowledge in the selection and cultivation of political officers; and (3) emphasizing the “Three Warfares” and promoting informatization in wartime political work.

Internal Structure of Main Command Post of TC Joint Operations Command

The Commanding officers in the TC JOCO (commander and political commissars) are:

• Intelligence Center

• Communication Center

•  C2 Center (Info Warfare, AD and Special Ops Centres)

• Military Affairs & Mobilization Center

• Political Work Center

• Logistic and Equipment Center

• Command Support Center

Conclusion

Since the 1990s, the PLA has advocated IJO, a concept with broad applicability, in order to adapt flexibly to the developments in U.S. military theories and science and technology. The PLA sought to deepen the IJO concept by pursuing uniqueness, combining tradition (such as “Three Warfares,” military-civil fusion, and maintenance and strengthening of Party-Army relations) and innovations (such as emphasis on long-range precision attack capability, shift to new security domains, and intelligentized warfare).

Under the strong initiative of Xi Jinping, the PLA reforms developed a joint operations structure that can realize the IJO concept. In line with this, the PLA evolved its joint operations training and personnel cultivation programs and aimed to reconcile the effective execution of the IJO concept and the maintenance and strengthening of Party-Army relations.

In the PLA reforms, the PLA accomplished many achievements in deepening its joint operations. Meanwhile, there still remain numerous challenges even after the reforms, such as: (1) coordination of authority and roles among the CMC, TCs, and services; (2) insufficient awareness of joint operations and service parochialism; (3) the formalism of joint operations training and coordination between the joint operations training led by the TCs and the training of the services and branches; (4) difficulties with recruiting, cultivating, and retaining personnel skilled in science and technology; and (5) the nature of command authority and capability of political commissars. Overcoming these challenges is expected to take time.

The timetable for the PLA’s modernization sets 2027, 2035, and 2050 as milestone years. In these years, it will be important to estimate the joint operations capabilities of the PLA from multiple aspects, paying attention not only to the increase in defense spending, introduction of new equipment, and statements and actions directed at other countries, but also to the PLA’s joint operations concept, military reforms and the formation of an organizational culture, qualitative improvements in education and training and personnel, and Party-Army relations.

Based on the NIDS, Japan, China Security Report 2022

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