The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike capabilities. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations. The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean- going LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure on Taiwan.

PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities.

Eastern Theatre Command

The Eastern Theater Command consists of a joint headquarters, a joint logistics support center (JSLC) from the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, a PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) service component, a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) service component, a PLA Navy (PLAN) service component, and a PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) service component. Within Eastern Theater Command these units these are the Nanjing headquarters, Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Facility, Eastern Theater Command Ground Forces, Eastern Theater Command Air Force, Eastern Fleet, and Base 61. It’s HQ is at Nanjing

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) component of Eastern Theater Command is composed of three major units: The 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Army.

71st Group Army headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, is composed of six combined-arms brigades and seven support brigades.

2nd Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

35th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

160th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

235th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

178th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

179th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

71st Army Aviation Brigade

71st Artillery Brigade

71st Air Defense Brigade

71st Special Operations Brigade

71st Service Support Brigade

72nd Group Army

The 72nd Group Army headquartered in Huzhou City, Zhejiang Province, consists of the below units.

10th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

5th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

124th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

85th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

90th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

72nd Army Aviation Brigade

72nd Artillery Brigade

72nd Air Defense Brigade

72nd Special Operations Brigade

72nd Service Support Brigade

The 73rd Group Army headquartered in Bantou, Jimei District, Xiamen City, of Fujian Province consists of the below units.

86th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

14th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

91st Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

145th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

3rd Light Combined-Arms Brigade

73rd Army Aviation Brigade

73rd Artillery Brigade

73nd Air Defense Brigade

73rd Special Operations Brigade

73rd Service Support Brigade

PLA Air Force

The Eastern Theater Command Air Force is

contd on page 19

The PLA’s Posture Against Taiwan

contd from page 16

composed of the following units.

8th Fighter Brigade

9th Fighter Brigade

25th Fighter Brigade

40th Fighter Brigade

41st Fighter Brigade

78th Fighter Brigade

83rd Fighter Brigade

85th Fighter Brigade

95th Fighter Brigade

10th Bomber Division

28th Bomber Regiment

29th Bomber Regiment

30th Bomber Regiment

76th Air Regiment

77th Air Regiment

93rd Regiment

Unidentified drone attack brigade

PLA Navy

Eastern Theater Command Navy (East Sea Fleet)

Ningbo Fleet Headquarters

Shanghai Naval Base

Xiangshan Naval Base

Zhoushan Naval Base

Fujian Naval Base

1st Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

2nd Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

Coastal Defense Brigade (Fujian)

13th Coastal Defense Division, (Jinjiang, Quanzhou)

31st Pontoon Bridge Brigade

PLA Naval Air Force

1st Air Division (Shanghai)

17th Air Regiment (Changzhou)

5th Independent Bomber Regiment (Changzhou)

4th Naval Aviation Brigade (Taizhou)

11th Air Regiment (Ningbo)

18th Air Regiment (JH-7)

PLA Rocket Force

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) component of Eastern Theater Command is Base 61 in Huangshan, Anhui, which has 611 to 618 Brigades armed as follows:

611 Brigade        DF-21A Chizhou

612 Brigade        DF-21/DF-21A Jingdezhen

613 Brigade        DF-15B Shangrao

614 Brigade        DF-11A/DF-17 Yong’an

615 Brigade        DF-11A Meizhou

616 Brigade        DF-15    Ganzhou

617 Brigade        DF-16    Jinhua

618 Brigade        Unknown            Unknown

The post The PLA’s Current Posture Against Taiwan appeared first on IMR.

8 Feb 2024: Taiwan Straits

On 8 Feb 2024, China commenced a series of low-level air and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These gradually increased in scope and scale. By early Mar 24, the PLAAF was sending almost 100 aircraft a day into the ADIZ (air defence identification zone) of Taiwan. The PLA Navy was regularly practising live fire drills in the waters around Taiwan. There were planted articles in the Chinese media saying these military exercises were to deter hotheads in Taiwan from making a Declaration of Independence. Solid intelligence had been received that this was likely. An announcement was made about a major amphibious exercise scheduled for mid or end-Apr that year. The aim of these exercises was to de-sensitise the Taiwanese defence forces as well as the Americans to high levels of military activity. In mid-Mar 24, a former presidential candidate made an impassioned speech condemning the president of Taiwan. He asked for the president’s impeachment and demanded that Taiwan declare Independence forthwith. He screamed, “China is trying to scare us with these endless war drills. This weak government is caving in. Enough is enough. ROC is a sovereign, democratic state. We declare our Independence from the hegemonistic Chinese regime now.”

Base 311 of the Strategic Support Forces Command dealing with Taiwan, went into overdrive. This statement was denounced in shrill terms on Chinese media and by the Chinese foreign minister himself. Chinese embassies in all major countries went into an overdrive with strident condemnation. The Chinese social media went berserk. The US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was concerned enough to call his Chinese counterpart. “What’s happening? “he asked.

“Oh, don’t be alarmed General, these are just the usual noises we have to make to keep hotheads in Taiwan in line,” he soothed. Meanwhile, editorials in Global Times warned, “Let Taiwan not trifle with the mainland. China is a very powerful country.”

8 Apr 2024. Off the Coast of Taiwan.

In early Apr 2024, the met and tide conditions were just right. President Xi gave his final nod. The aircraft carrier battle group led by Liaoning steamed off for exercises in the East China Sea. The newest Fujian CV-18 aircraft carrier with its battle group sailed off for north of Taiwan. It had 70 J-15 aircrafts with an AEW on board. The Shandong CV-17 aircraft carrier battle group sailed for the South China Sea, also for exercises. Large flotillas led by Rinhai-class cruisers started moving out for exercises to off the coast of Fujian for an amphibious landing drill. As a precaution, the US Navy started staging forward one of its aircraft carrier battle groups.

0600 hours, 8 Apr 2024. An intense barrage of DF-11, DF-15 and DF-16 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs 500-700 kms range), Navy anti-ship cruise missiles and YJ-12A supersonic cruise missiles, hit the presidential palace and Ministry of Defence, in Taipei. They also targeted three airfields, six radar stations and some major communication nodes. The president and senior officials were whisked away to safety in the nick of time. One General however, was wounded. At 0630 hours, a second wave of ballistic and cruise missiles hit the remaining air bases and radar stations and three major ammunition dumps and fuel storage tanks. A third wave of missiles struck airfields and radar stations again after an interval of 10 minutes.

Special Forces Operations. Meanwhile, six small teams of PLA Special Forces had landed on the coast of Taiwan via submarines and rubber dinghies well before dawn. They now raided the land-based cruise missile sites of the Taiwanese Navy that could target any invasion force. They succeeded in destroying four sites. The other teams were spotted by civilians and rounded up by the Taiwanese Army.

Air and Maritime Air Operations

0645 hrs, 8 Apr 2024. Some 200 fighter jets of the PLA Air Force crossed the median line and headed straight for Taiwan airfields from the Western direction. They were led by J-20 Stealth aircraft armed with BVR missiles. Just 10 minutes later, 60 aircraft took off from the aircraft carrier Fujian along with an AEW aircraft to help in the expected air-to-air combat with the Taiwan Air Force. Fierce air battles erupted as the dazed Taiwanese fighters rose up to challenge the invaders. The J-20s shot down eight F-16 and two Mirages. The F-16s downed one J-20 and three J-11s with their ARAAM missiles. The Chinese fighters from the Fujian did better, as all attention had been diverted towards the PLA Air Force fighters coming from the west. The Navy fighters bombed the target air bases. When they were returning, some brave Taiwanese F-16s and Mirages scrambled up to engage them. In the ensuing air battle five Mirages and two F–16 fighters were shot down for the loss of three J-15s.

0700 hours, 8 Apr 2024. President Xi Jinping went on TV and radio to broadcast a message. He said, “We had patiently and peacefully tried for re-unification of the motherland but to no avail. We recently received very disturbing intelligence that renegades on the island were trying to declare Independence. Such statements have now indeed been made in Taipei. We have still showed great restraint. Today, the Strategic Rocket Forces have made purely demonstrative strikes on Taiwan along with our PLA Air Force and Naval aviation. To seek reunification of the renegade island with the motherland, we are now announcing an air and maritime blockade of the island with immediate effect. We do not want any further escalation. This is purely an internal matter of China and no other country has any right to intervene. China is a peace loving country and would like to resolve it peacefully. We call upon authorities in Taiwan to commence negotiations at once for peaceful re-unification. That will resolve the crisis

0715 hours, 8 Apr 2024. Crisis Room, White House. Washington.

Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the President and NSA. The president was shaken. “I thought we had defused it. We now have three wars on our hands. Do we want the third?” he asked.

“Mr President, we will have to react. Doing nothing will seriously erode our credibility,” said the grim-faced Chairman JCS.

“Frankly General, if this escalates, how ready are we now for a two-front war?” asked the NSA.

“Ready or not, we have no choice. We simply can’t do nothing. We will have to react,” replied the Chairman JCS obdurately.

“Yes, but can we do it in a way that this doesn’t escalate out of control?” asked the President. The Chairman JCS fell silent. He thought for a bit. Then he said, “Mr President, you could demand that the Chinese immediately call off the blockage and pay compensation for the damage caused in their so called ‘demonstrative’ strike. Meanwhile, we have already told our submarines to stage forward. By tomorrow they should be able to sink one or two major capital ships of the Chinese, as a ‘demonstration’ to start with. One of our aircraft carrier battle groups is already steaming toward the area. I have ordered two more carrier battle groups to set sail immediately,” said the Chairman JCS.

“Sink one or two Chinese warships? Won’t that be a declaration of war, General? asked the NSA.

“Yeah and China is a f—g nuclear armed country. This would be a direct clash, not a proxy war, as in Ukraine,” added the President.

“Sir, we can always say it was not us but one of their own mines they had sown for the blockade. That will put them in a decision dilemma as our carrier battle groups race for Taiwan.”

“What about our carrier battle group already half way? Won’t that get into a mess with their Fujian aircraft carrier or Chinese submarines before your neat subterfuge about mines hitting their ships can confuse them?” asked the President.

The Chairman JCS pursed his lips, “Mr President, that was a deterrence action. The situation has changed drastically now. I can order it to slow down and let other CBGs catch up if you wish to avoid immediate escalation and gain time. That will make the situation a bit more predictable and we won’t blunder into a shooting war right away.”

All three took a deep breath. The President knitted his brows, “OK, do that, I can’t think of anything smarter for the time being,” he said, but he was not liking this whole thing one bit.

1503 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Off North Eastern Coast of Taiwan.

The carrier battle group headed by CV-18 aircarft carrier Fujian had two Rinhai-class cruisers, four Luyang-class destroyers and 6 Jinhai-class frigates. It was the main battle group enforcing the blockade. At 1503 hours on 9 Apr 24, a torpedo struck a Rinhai-class cruiser. There was a massive explosion. The warship caught fire. The ship listed to one side and then sank slowly. Meanwhile, Taiwan scrambled its F-16s and Mirages also to attack this Chinese armada enforcing the blockade. The Taiwan jets were picked both by shore-based J-2000 AWACS and the AEW then in the air from the Fujian. J-15 fighters from the carrier and then a whole host of J-20, J-10 and J-11 aircrafts from the shore-based airfields, swarmed up. A major air battle erupted. The BVRs from the J-20s managed to shoot down 10 Mirages and four F-16s. Three J-15s and two J-10s were shot down in this melee. One Mirage fighter fired an Exocet anti-ship missile and badly damaged a Jiangkai-class frigate of the Chinese Navy. Three American carrier battle groups were now steaming full speed towards Taiwan.

1700 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Joint Operations Room. Beijing.

All members of the CMC and the entire top hierarchy of the PLA were in attendance. The Commander PLA Airforce briefed first. “In yesterday’s air battles we had shot down a total of 18 F-16s and 7 Mirages for a loss one J-20, three J- 10s and three J-11s (ratio 25:7). Today, the Taiwanese Air Force tried to attack our blockading force. In the combined air battle, we have shot down 10 Mirages and 8 F-16s. The enemy managed to shoot down three J-15s and two J-10 fighters (ratio 18 : 5). Overall, Taiwan has lost 43 jet fighters to our 12,” he said.

Commander PLA Navy briefed next. “Comrades, the most important development today is that an American nuclear submarine, fired a torpedo and sank our Rinhai-class cruiser. This is a major loss and is an act of war on part of the Americans. The Taiwanese Air Force mounted a major attack on our Fujian carrier battle group enforcing the blockade but was driven off with huge losses. One of our guided missile Jiangkai-class frigates was, however, damaged. We are now at war with USA and I recommend that we immediately fire DF-21D salvos on his three advancing carrier battle groups and stop them before they join battle.”

“Just one second,” Gen Zhang Youxia interjected. “I just got a call from the US Chairman JCS to say that they have no submarines in that area and this seems an accident caused by our own mines laid for the blockade.”

The Commander of PLA Navy went red in the face. “That’s a blatant lie. We must hit back immediately.”

“How do you want to do that?” asked President Xi Jinping.

Admiral Miao, member CMC spoke up. “As the Commander PLAN has rightly said, we must immediately engage the American aircraft carrier battle groups with non-stop salvos of DF-21D anti-ship missiles, till we draw blood. Meantime, we must not lose time and immediately attack the American bases in Okinawa and Guam. Otherwise, US and Japanese fighters and bombers from there, could hit our blockading forces and our cities on the east coast. Shanghai would be a prime target. Comrade President, this is not the time to hesitate. Hit back before we are hit hard. We must pre-empt the Americans.”

President Xi Jinping’s face was taut with tension. He swallowed hard and then took a few sips of water from his glass. He turned to Gen Zhang Youxia. “Comrade Zhang?” he queried.

“The Admiral is right. But that means full scale war that could go right up even to the nuclear level. So let’s pause and think now. The fact that the Americans have disowned their submarine attack on our Rinhai cruiser, tells me they are not keen to escalate. Maybe, they are also looking for a way out. We have amply shaken them up for now. Should we de-escalate and begin negotiations for a peaceful merger of Taiwan now? Or will that be too soon? Problem is, a day later may simply be too late.”

The question hung unanswered in the tense air of the Joint Operations Room in Beijing. All anxious faces turned towards the President of China.

The post The Invasion Unfolds appeared first on IMR.

In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine- dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island.

Security Situation in the South China Sea

In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest ruled that the PRC’s claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, within the area depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, four SCS claimants (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. The PRC does so in ways calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict.

The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty. Throughout 2021, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, and in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG blocked two Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the South China Sea and employed water cannons against them, prompting the United States to warn that an armed attack on Philippine public vessels would invoke U.S. defense commitments.

In April 2020, Beijing announced the creation of two new administrative districts in the SCS covering the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. This action were likely intended to further solidify PRC claims in these areas-especially in terms of domestic law- and justify its actions in the region.

In July 2019, China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members completed the first reading of the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC), with a second and third reading remaining before China and ASEAN members finalize the agreement. China and ASEAN member states had sought to complete CoC negotiations by 2021; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed its progress.

When negotiations resumed in November of 2021, China was met with hostility from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte following the aforementioned CCG actions against Philippine vessels. Negotiations did not produce substantive outcomes, likely because China and some SCS claimants were sensitive to language in the CoC that limits their activities. Given the complexity of the disagreement and ASEAN’s consensus-based process, it is extremely unlikely that there will be a CoC signed in 2022.

South China Sea Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations

Since early 2018, PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, marking the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed South China Sea to date. From early 2018 through 2021, the PRC regularly utilized its Spratly Islands outposts to support naval and coast guard operations in the South China Sea. In mid-2021, the PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the Spratly Islands during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region.

The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. The PRC has stated the main objectives of these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the PRC’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the range of response options available to Beijing

East China Sea

The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols.

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels-including four equipped with deck guns-sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express “extremely serious concerns” in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of escalation.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

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With government funding, massive computational capacity, and ties to the military, Peng Cheng Lab is likely to be actively used by state hacking teams. Notably, this cyber range, which facilitates military-civil fusion, has supercomputers, research facilities for AI, ICS, smart cars, etc. It is known to have hosted cyber competitions.

The lab is led by the Guangdonag Provincial Laboratory of Cyberspace Science and Technology and built with funding from the Guangdong provincial and Shenzhen municipal governments. It aims to provide computational power to groups conducting research on a large number of topics.

Based on the lab’s known partnerships (see below), these groups include academics, industry, and military researchers. Peng Cheng Lab enumerated areas of research extends to robotics, virtual reality, smart lasers, and “electromagnetic cognition.”

Peng Cheng Lab has built a powerful supercomputer, Cloudbrain-II Based on available data, Cloudbrain-II is estimated to be half as fast as the world’s fastest supercomputer, Fugaku in Japan. Its most famous contribution to China’s public research so far has been the computational power it provided to train China’s PanGu large language model. Peng Cheng Lab aims to provide similar computation resources to work on cyber ranges and AI and cyber research.

Peng Cheng Lab also hosts cyber ranges for industrial control systems, smart cars, cybersecurity development, and AI. The facility’s work on industrial control systems appears aimed at securing IoT devices used to implement “smart manufacturing”—a policy goal formalized in a recent five-year plan. Smart cars, part of the electric vehicle revolution and a topic of concern in China’s Three-Year Action Plan for the High-Quality Development of the Cybersecurity Industry (2021-2023), receive their own cyber range. The Internet of Vehicles Lab is being built in concert with central government regulators under the China Automotive Technology and Research Center in Tianjin.

Peng Cheng Lab issued contracts to build its AI cyber range within months of opening in 2019. The contracts were quickly followed with public events promoting research on AI in China. The Shenzhen-based lab hosted China’s National AI Competition in late 2020, which counted leaders from the Chinese Academy of Engineering, leading Chinese universities, and private firms among its participants.

Projects focused on cybersecurity advanced just as quickly. Peng Cheng Lab hosted an inaugural conference on cyber range research in mid-2019 and has done so at least once since then. After China’s National Cybersecurity Center for Education and Innovation opened in 2020, Peng Cheng Lab began partnering with the facility. In 2021, Peng Cheng Lab joined the National Cybersecurity Center, Sichuan University, and a cybersecurity park in Qingdao in jointly hosting a cybersecurity competition. Qi An Xin Technology Group, a Chinese cybersecurity company active at the National Cybersecurity Center and one of China’s 20 “invisible champions” of national security technology, may have facilitated Peng Cheng Lab’s engagement—the company won a contract to construct Peng Cheng Lab’s AI cyber range. The lab’s rapid integration into existing cybersecurity and AI research initiatives across the country by Qi An Xin indicate it is taken seriously by other leading researchers in China. As of 2022. such cooperation appears to be organic and not centrally dictated.

The lab’s list of partners is growing rapidly. Since opening its doors in 2019, Peng Cheng Lab has formed research partnerships with other Chinese institutions. The lab partners with 21 universities, 13 research organizations, and 25 businesses or SOEs. Among the organizations participating in the initiative, prominent institutions include several of China’s premier universities, such as Peking University, Tsinghua University, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. One school tied to state-sponsored hacking campaigns and co-located on a PLA base, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, also partners with Peng Cheng Lab. Shanghai Jiao Tong University is also subject to a 2017 agreement with the PLA Strategic Support Force to develop “new combat forces.”

Likewise, China’s National University of Defense Technology and the Key Laboratory of Science and Technology for National Defense are listed among its partnerships with research organizations. The collection of collaborators reads as a who’s who of Chinese high-tech research talent. Peng Cheng Lab names entities like BGI, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, China Electronics Corporation, China Electronics Technology Group, iFlyTek, and HiSense among its corporate and defense-SOE partners. The US Department of Commerce has listed many of these businesses on its Entity List.

Of the cyber ranges discussed in this report, Peng Cheng Lab stands out for its association with Li Jianhua, a professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Li currently runs a PLA-affiliated lab which researches the applications of AI to cybersecurity research for both offensive and defensive purposes. His work is also featured in Robot Hacking Games, China’s version of DARPA’s Cyber Grand Challenge.

Li is one of China’s leading experts on cyber policy. In 2018, he published an article extolling the importance of cyber ranges and offered a detailed path for successful development. Li argued that the ability to rapidly recreate networks is critically important, a capability which can facilitate attack planning. He specifically suggested the use of AI to aid both defenders in detecting intrusions and in “decision making” during range operations.

Given Li’s prominence, his involvement in Peng Cheng Lab suggests it is among the more sophisticated cyber ranges developed by China. His involvement, his school’s history of working with China’s security services, the technical capabilities of the lab, and the lab’s partnership with military institutions indicate it may be used by the PLA to practice offensive operations. Li’s institution, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, is listed among the lab’s strategic partners, alongside defense-SOEs and the PLA’s National University of Defense Technology. Further, given Li’s focus on AI and ties to the security services, Peng Cheng Lab is well-situated to enable AI-aided attack planning. One possible scenario would allow offensive operators to further hone their attacks by applying machine learning to attack simulations made possible by the range.

Based on “Downrange: A Survey of China’s Cyber Ranges”, A report by Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2022

The post Peng Cheng Laboratory appeared first on IMR.

China is rapidly building cyber ranges that allow cybersecurity teams to test new tools, practice attack and defence, and evaluate the cybersecurity of a particular product or service. Nineteen of China’s 34 provinces are building, or have built, such facilities.

Their purposes span from academic to national defence. In short, the presence of these facilities suggests a concerted effort on the part of the government, in partnership with industry and academia, to advance technological research and upskill its cybersecurity workforce—more evidence that China has entered near-peer status in the cyber domain.

A report titled “Downrange: A Survey of China’s Cyber Ranges”, by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, published in September 2022, examines some of China’s 19 facilities that have demonstrable ties to the military or security services.

China’s investment in cyber ranges is in line with what is known about other efforts to bolster the country’s hacking and cybersecurity capabilities. As these facilities mature, network defenders who find themselves in the crosshairs of China’s hacking teams may be subject to attacks that have been rehearsed, tested, and sometimes practiced on replicas of their own networks.

Important Findings

This report finds:

1. China’s cyber ranges facilitate joint exercises between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and civilians. One competition hosted each year in Chengdu aims to replicate the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Locked Shields exercise. Teams include representatives from the military, private cybersecurity firms, and critical infrastructure operators. Separately, a defence state-owned enterprise (SOE) makes a “comprehensive space scenario range” available to civilians at an annual cybersecurity competition. Each of these examples demonstrates China’s implementation of military-civil fusion in the cyber domain.

2. Some cyber ranges allow hackers to practice attacking and defending critical infrastructure systems. Some ranges provide users with training on industrial control systems within the cyber range; one of which purportedly engages in “national offensive and defensive exercises.” The Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s 2022 unclassified annual threat assessment found that China was “almost certainly […] capable of launching cyberattacks that would disrupt critical infrastructure services.” These ranges could allow rehearsals and testing of these types of attacks in the future.

3. Peng Cheng Laboratory in southern China is using a supercomputer to research artificial intelligence’s (AI) application to cybersecurity. The lab’s partners include the National University of Defense Technology, China’s Key Laboratory of Science and Technology for National Defense, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, a university with ties to military hacking teams. The lab has quickly earned the respect of longtime experts in China’s cybersecurity community.

Ranges Enhance Chinese Defence

China’s cybersecurity posture will be enhanced by the use of cyber ranges in several ways. First, China’s critical infrastructure, massive data troves, and government agencies will be better defended. Cybersecurity teams with years of experience and hours of practice on a range will be better able to defend against a variety of threats. Second, China’s attacks are likely to increase in efficacy and capability. While there are no indications to date that China has launched a physically destructive or disruptive cyberattack against another country’s critical infrastructure, the ranges covered in this report suggest such a lack of action may be based in policy rather than from a lack of capabilities. Besides making attacks on industrial control systems more feasible, other types of attacks will improve as well. For example, hacking teams have more opportunities to try new tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Components of Cyber Ranges

Cyber ranges can help these agencies provide the experiential learning that hackers need. A set of virtual machines—software that creates a computer within a computer— comprise most cyber ranges. Because virtual machines are cheap software to license, a cyber range can quickly grow in size but with little additional cost. The operator can design the range to his or her needs, specifying how the machines are connected, what operating system they use, and even the range’s defences. The best cyber ranges aim to simulate real computer networks. Few achieve this high standard, and for most users “close” is good enough. The best government-funded cyber ranges can simulate millions of connections.

But cyber ranges do not only let users learn new tools, they also let them practice. Offensive teams that hope to damage or impair physical systems with precision often need to rehearse. Attacking an electrical substation or gas pipeline requires deep knowledge about the target. A cyber range built to emulate that target can help attackers make sure that they are on the right path. Industrial networks can be recreated from stolen data; AI may even help attackers understand how to attack these systems.

Background and Recent Policies

The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) established China’s first national cyber range in 2010. That was China’s first publicly-acknowledged, government-led effort to establish such a facility. Some of China’s best universities, military hacking teams, and private cybersecurity firms likely already had access to cyber ranges.

Cyber ranges within China featured prominently in 2021 in two important ways. First, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology began soliciting public opinions on the drafted Three-Year Action Plan for the High-Quality Development of the Cybersecurity Industry (2021-2023) in July 2021. MIIT policymakers called on the government and industry to build “AI security cyber ranges,” promote research on cyber ranges, use cyber ranges for training, and invest in cyber ranges that can be used to train defenders of China’s futuristic smart cities. MIIT frequently allocates money for research on cyber ranges, including allotments to research partnerships between universities and the PLA Strategic Support Force—the service branch responsible for computer network operations and space systems.

China issued its second policy addressing cyber ranges a few months later in October 2021. The National Industrial Information Security Development Research Center, a research institute of the MIIT, published a document whose contents were only summarized publicly. In the policy document, titled “Industrial Cyber Range Platform Technology Capability Evaluation Criteria”, policymakers lay out the standards that China’s Industrial Control System cyber ranges should aspire to meet. Available summaries reference standards from companies such as Dragos, KPMG, EY, and Deloitte. What little information is publicly available stresses the close connection between industrial security and China’s future as an automated manufacturing powerhouse.

Private Sector Participation

China, like many countries, has a robust market for cyber range providers. Private sector companies sell services to universities so cybersecurity students can practice their skills. Some companies specialize in supporting critical infrastructure operators, helping electrical grid operators learn how to defend their networks. And still some companies focus on training other private sector employees. Similarly, it is well known that China’s premier military university for hackers—the PLA Information Engineering University—has a cyber range.

Potential Cyber Range Uses in China

There are a number of potential uses of cyber ranges. The following have been observed in China:

● Training on new tools and techniques in a controlled environment.

● Practicing attacking and defending industrial control systems.

● Evaluating product cybersecurity—smart cars, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, etc.

● Evaluating the efficacy of cybersecurity/antivirus products. Such evaluations can determine whether the products will detect new attack methodologies or malware. These evaluations can also help attackers evade a target’s defences. China’s military has been observed purchasing such systems.

● Recreating networks to allow defenders to practice defending those systems and attackers to practice attacking targeted systems.

● Planning attacks using attack graphs, which recreate a network and determine which pathways to a target are least likely to pique the interest of defenders. Some researchers are using an AI technique, reinforcement learning, to determine and optimize these attack paths.

● Replicating smart-city networks for defenders to practice protecting internet- connected infrastructure and surveillance systems.

Conclusion

The development of China’s cyber ranges highlights how its military-civil fusion strategy is applied to the cyber domain, leveraging academic institutions, companies and government labs/entities to work toward a central goal. These ranges not only provide the opportunity for civilian organizations and the military to practice their skills together, but they also consistently engage in national security related research in areas such as applying machine learning frameworks to software vulnerability discovery, applying AI to cyberattack and defence, and developing attack and defence methodologies for industrial control systems.

The growth of China’s cyber ranges is not accidental. Central policymakers signalled their interest in cyber ranges for education, training, AI development, and testing in China’s most recent development plan for the cybersecurity sector. Consequently, municipal and provincial governments funded the development of cyber ranges with sometimes significant subsidies in alignment with Beijing’s political mandate. Other cyber ranges included in the appendix receive similar funding across China. The decentralized approach to investment supports innovation by provincial governments and increases opportunities for cooperation and collaboration between the military and civilians.

Cyber ranges are key to training the next generation of talent to defend, and potentially attack, critical infrastructure. China—through the development of its ranges—is providing a venue for testing and exercising the tools and techniques to attack and defend critical infrastructure while developing the technical talent to execute these operations. Although no cybersecurity firms or governments have yet attributed a disruptive or destructive attack on industrial control systems to China, this report on its cyber ranges demonstrates that the PLA has the capabilities to do active research in this area and could be postured to conduct such attacks in the future. New research on Chinese procurement records and research publications shows Chinese interest in procuring the capabilities for such destructive attacks, following the 2015 attack on Ukraine’s electrical grid. China’s interest in having that capability is likely driving those requests.

As new cyber range capabilities develop and mature, the lessons learned from their use will provide more policy options to Beijing. Competition among states for influence and power in China’s near-abroad will continue to shape Beijing’s policy in the region. Besides positive incentives that induce cooperation, such as trade deals, disincentives—like potentially learning that Beijing has implanted destructive malware on your country’s electrical grids—bolster China’s ability to compel other countries.

Although the time and place of future cyber operations is hard to predict, the scope and scale of China’s operational capabilities is growing. Investment precedes capabilities, and China has invested.

Based on “Downrange: A Survey of China’s Cyber Ranges”, A report by Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2022

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The South China Morning Post published the report based on an assessment by PLA Daily – the propaganda mouthpiece of the Chinese army. The army doesn’t have enough skilled troops to operate high-tech hardware, the PLA Daily said.

Revelations made in the assessment:

1. The report highlights a core problem: as China speeds up the modernisation of the PLA, a lack of hi-tech expertise is limiting state-of-the-art equipment from being used to its full extent, especially in the navy.

2. Top commanders within the PLA are yet to complete a basic training test. This includes the vice-captain of a Chinese warship, Wang Yubing. Yubing is one of the several naval soldiers who has been made a vice-captain before the completion of his training.

3. According to the PLA Daily report on December 26, the vice-captain of the Type 056 corvette, Zhangye, was not been able to finish a crucial training assessment.

4. Shortage of adequately skilled personnel to operate the newly-enlisted ships and hi-tech hardware is a situation which has been termed by the report as “equipment awaiting talent”. It says “in recent years, a number of old ships have been retired, and a host of new warships have been commissioned, but there are very few people who know how to operate them and this has made the problem of ‘equipment awaiting talent’ become increasingly severe”.

5. There is training resource imbalance within the PLA and it is unable to organise the training of some commanders and key soldiers systematically, due to which the final training assessments are running behind schedule.

The admission by the official mouthpiece comes a month after the clash between Indian and Chinese troops along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector.

The revelation comes close on the heels of a growing competition between China and its rivals in the Indo-Pacific region. Recently, the Liaoning Battle Carrier group sailed close to the US Pacific island territory of Guam, which houses very strategically placed military facilities.

Why is the PLA in such an abysmal condition?

1. Conscription: Conscription, also called draft, is compulsory enrollment for service in a country’s armed forces. Military service is mandatory for all Chinese citizens and the practice of conscription is held high even in the Chinese constitution. However, the conscription cycle comes with its own set of challenges. The PLA relies on approximately 8,00,000 conscripts that have to serve for two years and each conscript is trained for 90 days, with 16 days of political indoctrination. Due to this policy, the forces lose 20 to 35 per cent of their combat power for a period of three to four months annually.

2. Recruiting and retaining qualified personnel: The PLA recruits heavily but fails to retain professionals. The Chinese army recruits a high number of poor youths from rural backgrounds who join for the perks. The educated city dwellers tend to leave the army and experts blame the one-child policy for this.

3. One Child Policy: China’s one-child policy produces pampered children who cannot withstand military discipline. When in the army, they are dissatisfied, the service is poor, perks are few and this weakens the force by depriving it of high-quality professionals.

4. Civilian oversight: The PLA is characterized by extremely weak civilian control. There is a total absence of civilian oversight and the only civilian in the military’s chain of command is said to be the chairman of China’s central military commission.

5. Insufficient training: Beijing’s propaganda videos of the PLA don’t quite tell the real story. They gloss over the fact that Chinese soldiers undergo insufficient training in conditions that are not challenging enough. Military exercises are not seen as a chance to identify problems. The aim is to always succeed and this reduces military training into opportunities to impress the supervisors.

In October 2019, the Chinese orienteering team was disqualified for cheating at the world military games in Wuhan city. In 2015, Chinese troops, as part of the UN peacekeeping force in Sudan, are said to have fled the battlefield instead of engaging in combat.

One of the world’s largest fighting forces, which claims itself to be superior and doesn’t hesitate to threaten its neighbours, doesn’t have troops with the required skill set or experience.

China has the largest navy in the world by size of fleet and has been bolstering its capability by modernizing and inducting cutting-edge vessels. It has the world’s largest fighting force with over two million active personnel. But as it turns out, its size is only a facade to hide its reality because the PLA is facing a shortage of efficient troops.

The recent revelations puncture China’s argument about the might of its army.

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Throughout its standoff with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Chinese officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, emphasising Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India, the Pentagon said in a report on 29 November.

“The PRC (People’s Republic of China) seeks to prevent border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship with India,” the Pentagon said in its latest report to the Congress on Chinese military buildup.

In a section on the China-India border, the Pentagon said throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC. Negotiation made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages on the border, it said.

Beginning in May 2020, Chinese and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the border. “Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions,” it said.

 “The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory,” it added.

Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in the past 46 years, the report said. On the June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley resulting in the death approximately twenty Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers, according to PRC officials, it said.

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Xi, 69, has been reappointed as the General Secretary of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) and head of the Central Military Commission (CMC) — the overall high command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for an unprecedented third five-year term by the party’s once-in-a-five-year Congress here last month.

Holding the three powerful posts of the head of the party, the military, and the Presidency, Xi is the only leader besides the party founder Mao Zedong to continue in power after completing 10-year tenure, while all his predecessors retired.

On 8 November, Xi inspected the joint operations command centre of the CMC here which provides vital support to the strategic command of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC.

Upon arriving at the command centre, the Chinese leader was given a briefing, the official media reported.

In his first address to the two million-strong military — the largest in the world — as he kicked off his third term as head of the CMC, Xi said the world is undergoing more profound changes unseen in a century and stressed that China’s national security is facing increased instability and uncertainty, and its military tasks remain arduous.

He said the entire military should devote all its energy to carry out all its work for combat readiness, enhance its capability to fight and win, and effectively fulfill its missions and tasks, state-run Xinhua news agency reported.

Xi instructed them to resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and successfully complete various tasks entrusted by the party and the people, the report said.

Though President Xi did not mention a particular country in his address, it came amidst growing international concern over China’s aggressive military manoeuvring in the resource-rich Indo-Pacific region. The armies of China and India are also engaged in a prolonged standoff in eastern Ladakh.

China claims nearly all of the disputed South China Sea, though Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam all claim parts of it.

Beijing has built artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea. China also has territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea.

Xi said the military leadership must focus on realising the PLA’s centennial goal – to make the PLA a world-class armed force by 2027, which is broadly interpreted as making it on par with the US armed forces.

“We must do all we can to make this happen,” he said.

During his speech at the party congress last month, Xi also set “victory in local wars” as a goal and told the PLA to “improve training and preparation for war in all aspects and improve the ability of the army to fight and win”.

“We will strengthen the normal and diversified use of military forces, carry out military struggles with determination and flexibility, shape the security posture, contain crises and conflicts, and win local wars,” he said.

Commenting on Xi’s address to the military, retired Air Force General Xu Qiliang, who was the former vice-chairman of the CMC, said in a commentary that the PLA must prepare for a rapid transformation from peace to wartime.

“Always maintain a high readiness posture like arrows on a taut string ready to go, to ensure that the troops are prepared to fight at all times,” Xu, who retired from the top post in the CMC, was quoted as saying by Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

In his address to the CPC Congress last month, President Xi said China will establish a strong system of strategic deterrence, which was interpreted by observers as a call to increase China’s nuclear weapons.

Analysts said Xi’s remarks indicated China would improve its nuclear deterrence capability amid its increasing rivalry with the US.

Song Zhongping, a former People’s Liberation Army instructor, said the statement meant China would “strengthen its development of strategic nuclear forces” to safeguard its national security.

Song said the PLA must strengthen its “nuclear triad” forces – its combination of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched missiles, and air-launched weapons – as well as its second-nuclear strike capability to respond to a nuclear attack.

“All of these require the PLA to have a modern nuclear-armed force … and to moderately increase the nuclear arsenal,” he told the Post.

In his address to the military officials on Tuesday, Xi instructed the armed forces to thoroughly study, publicise and implement the guiding principles of last month’s 20th CPC

National Congress and take concrete actions to further modernize national defence and the military.

He said the entire armed forces implement the Party’s thinking on strengthening the military for the new era, following the military strategy, and adhering to combat effectiveness as the sole criterion.

The new era refers to his assumption of the leadership of the party in 2012.

The command centre, which provides vital support to the strategic command of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, is of great importance and shoulders heavy responsibilities, Xi said.

The command centre should make new and greater contributions to boosting military training and combat preparedness, effectively fulfilling all missions and tasks in the new era, Xi said.

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The provocation efforts by the Chinese side are being continued despite the matter being raised at the Corps Commander level talks.

Chinese aircraft have been regularly flying close to the LAC over the past three to four weeks, which is being seen as an effort to check Indian defence mechanisms in the region.

Indian Air Force (IAF) is responding to the situation responsibly and is not taking any chances to tackle the threat as well as not letting the matter escalate in any way.

As per the sources, the IAF has taken strong measures to respond to these provocations as it has moved its most powerful fighter jets, including the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000, to advanced bases from where they can respond to Chinese movements within minutes.

It seems that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is tense over the upgradation of IAF infrastructure in the Ladakh region, they added.

Sources further said that the IAF is responding to these actions in a “calibrated manner” and is also monitoring Chinese flight patterns in the area where they are flying at both low and high altitudes.

India is working at a brisk pace to upgrade its military infrastructure in Ladakh after China tried to unilaterally change the status quo on the LAC in the April-May 2020 time frame.

The provocation by Chinese fighter jets began around June 24-25 when a Chinese fighter jet flew very close to a point of friction in eastern Ladakh.

After that, there were several CBM violations between the two sides on the LAC near Chumar sector and this has been going on since then, they asserted, adding that the IAF, including its Rafale fighter jets, is also doing extensive flying in the eastern Ladakh region.

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READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced.

The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. Even before the pandemic set in, wolf warrior diplomacy emerged in 2017 characterised by the use of confrontational rhetoric by Chinese diplomats and coercive behavior. It was tied to Xi Jinping’s political ambitions and foreign policy inclinations. There was a backlash and a realignments have begun to take place to keep China in check.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic China has sparred with Malaysia and Vietnam, with Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, threatened Taiwan, revoked Hong Kong’s autonomy, chased Japanese fishing boats, traded barbs with the US and is now challenging India at the Line of Actual Control.

Territorial Fronts

China has opened four territorial fronts in the last decade, deploying coercive tactics 1) in the East China Sea, 2) South China Sea, 3) China-India border, and 4) toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation.

The China-India border was once thought to be among the more stable of these fronts. What is surprising is that China has taken up all these fronts at the same time.

China has increased domination in affairs outside its borders along with modernisation of its armed forces to conduct operations in the western Asian region and to protect its eastern seaboard from US carriers and bombers

China has increased its role in the Indian Ocean by building naval bases and also making incursions using its navy and the naval militia flotilla

China has fortified and militarised islands in the South China Sea as well as the Sea of Japan.

Aggressive Behaviour

China has thrown its weight around across the globe in the last three years, unmindful of whom it offended.

Early in 2020, Chinese officials escalated their “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aggressively and undiplomatically attacked countries and individuals they believed had slighted China.

In April 2020, China retaliated against Australia’s call for an inquiry into the origins and spread of the coronavirus by launching a trade war.

In July 2020, Beijing imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong designed to crush the pro-democracy movement.

China was aggressive as well in its dealings with Taiwan as the Trump administration strengthened its ties with Republic of China.

China also continued its systematic repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang.

The Chinese communist state with capitalist characteristics has become a country developed enough to export small and big products and weapons to the developing world. China has become the factory of the world, with its cheap labour.

But by end 2020, China was convinced that it was winning its economic contest with the West and it embraced steps designed to decouple its economy from the West on its own terms.

China is also trying to control a number of small nations through debt trap strategy.

What is China Doing Against India?

On the Indian borders, a deadly bloody clash took place, on 15 June 2020, for the first time in 45 years, during the period of lockdown, in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and an unknown number of PLA soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat. No shots were fired. I will return to this later.

Till 2020, China’s aggressive attitude was mainly focused on the South China Sea but now it’s turned in India’s direction.

Besides creeping up into India territories, China is trying to surround India by getting involved in its neighbouring countries.

PLA Navy ships have increased their forays into the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines and destroyers have been docking in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

China is also strengthening airbases in Xinjiang and Tibet, some of which are for both civilian and military use.

India, by contrast, has always played it very cautiously with its powerful neighbour. It’s never made a statement on minorities in Xinjiang, an extremely delicate subject for the Chinese. Similarly, when it comes to Hong Kong, India has not uttered even a murmur.

India obviously has to play it super-carefully with its powerful and super-aggressive neighbour which has an economy that is about five times India’s.

India-China Relations in Brief

India gained independence in 1947 and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC on 1 October 1949. India was the first non-communist nation in Asia to establish diplomatic relations and recognize PRC as the legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan on 1 April 1950.

In 1950 China marched into Tibet and, in 1954, India signed an agreement recognising Tibet as part of China. In 1959 the Dalai Lama escaped and sought political asylum in India. Today, a Tibetan govt-in-exile functions from India. China is extremely sensitive about the Dalai Lama’s political activities.

Border disputes resulted in a short but traumatic war for India on 20 Oct 1962. In the north, China occupied Aksai Chin in 1957 and has not vacated it since then. Instead it made an all-weather highway through it to Xinjiag. In the East, it reached the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov 1962 and withdrawing.

India has strengthened its defences and infrastructure on the Chinese border and also modernised its armed forces. So have the Chinese. There have been agreements to open the Nathula Pass in the East for symbolic local trade and a route for annual pilgrimage by Indians to Mount Kailash in Tibet.

During bilateral visits, agreements for maintaining peace on the Line of Actual Control and Confidence Building measures have been signed.

There have been some significant border stand-offs

* The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks

* In September 2014 People’s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in Chumar sector.

* In June 2017 Chinese troops began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India’s ally Bhutan. This posed a security threat to India’s narrow Siliguri corridor. The stand-off ended in August 2017, when both sides agreed to disengage in Doklam.

* On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La in  Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.

India’s China Policy

As I said earlier, When India recognised the PRC on 1 April 1950, it broke off relations with Taiwan and also recognised Tibet as a part of China. Adhering to its One China policy was understandable provided India-China relations were stable. Delhi is aware that, any deviation or even a hint of deviation from this policy has an immense psychological impact on China, especially since India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile.

The Dalai Lama has a huge following amongst Tibetans the world over. He is a demi-God. One word from the Dalai Lama can cause riots and self immolations in Tibet.

Since the Ladakh standoff, India has stopped using the term One China policy. India has also become more open in supporting the Dalai Lama thus challenging China’s core beliefs.

Disputes  with India

For ease of understanding, the India-China border can be divided into three areas – western sector, middle sector, and eastern sector as shown on this map.

Western Sector

This sector comprises the area between Ladakh to Tibet and the Kunlun mountain range and also extends from Wakhan (Afghanistan edge) to the Karakoram Pass, thereafter following the alignment of the Kunlun mountain range.

The border length of the western sector is 1,597 kms. India’s claim is based on the Treaty of 1842 which was signed between the representative of Maharaja Gulab Singh, former ruler of J&K, with Lama Gurusahib of Lhasa and the representative of the Chinese emperor.

It needs to be understood that China was ruled by the Qing dynasty till 1911 before it was replaced by Chinese nationalists led government, called the Republic of China or ROC in 1912. In 1949, power shifted to the People’s Republic of China or PRC.

At various times in history the British drew lines on the map to depict the border in Aksai Chin as they saw fit. The Johnson Line is shown in grey dashes on the outer edge of Aksai Chin. The McCartney Line is shown in Green. The final line was the Johnson Line of 1912, which India followed after it got Independence and it when it published the map of the area in 1954.

By all standards, this area is the most challenging task for the border negotiations. The China-Pakistan collusivity, Karakoram highway, CPEC corridor and the renewed infrastructure development with increased settlement of the civil population has further reduced the flexibility of negotiations. China Land Border Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, has already changed the tenets of territorial disputes to sovereignty disputes.

Middle Sector

This comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. This is the least disputed sector and covers 545 km of Indian borders. Except for one large claim in the Barahoti sector in Uttarakhand, other claims and counterclaims are minuscule.

Eastern Sector

The eastern sector conventionally refers to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, but both these states have Bhutan separating them. Though Sikkim has a land border of only 220 km and has been witness to both the 1962 as well as 1967 Nathula-Chola conflicts, the situation has normalised a lot after it joined the Indian state on May 16, 1975.

China finally recognised Sikkim as part of India in 2003 in a reciprocal statement by India to re-emphasise Tibet being part of China. An understanding with Bhutan will also be essential for the resolution.

Direct discourse between the British and Tibetans continued till 1908. In 1911, in the last year of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans revolted and asked for British intervention.

A tripartite conference was held at Shimla between the representatives of British India (McMohan), Tibet and China. Deliberation commenced in November 1913 and the McMohan Line was drawn and initialed by all the three representatives in the draft document on April 27, 1914. This document was not formally signed by Chinese representatives in the main document.

The land border, as per this line, covers a length of 1,126 km. This document was finally signed by Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.

The border in Arunachal Pradesh, as per the McMohan Line, has been a part of China’s formal offer for border settlement but not by itself. It has been proposed only in lieu of seeking a concession in the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. The LAC also has a large number of areas of differing perceptions which remain a cause of regular skirmishes or local conflicts.

There have been Efforts to Resolve Disputes

A Special Representatives mechanism was institutionalised between India and China for talks on the boundary question. The 22nd edition of talks was held in New Delhi in December 2019. The SR talks have developed a three-part role — the original mandate of searching for a political settlement to the boundary question, management of borders, and a forum for strategic dialogue.

One important achievement to their credit is the the agreement of 2005 on political parameters and guiding principles for the boundary settlement.

On the substanbtial issue of the boundary disputes there has been no traction. There is not even an agreement of which maps to use while discussing the each other’s positions.

Water Sharing Disputes

Besides territorial disputes, India and China have water sharing disputes.

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India.

India’s formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and river-water interests.

India has concern with China’s water–diversion, dam–building and inter–river plans. Moreso, in a conflict, India fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the “great bend before the Brahmaputra river enters India.

China does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing; nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

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