The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike capabilities. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations. The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean- going LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure on Taiwan.

PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities.

Eastern Theatre Command

The Eastern Theater Command consists of a joint headquarters, a joint logistics support center (JSLC) from the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, a PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) service component, a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) service component, a PLA Navy (PLAN) service component, and a PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) service component. Within Eastern Theater Command these units these are the Nanjing headquarters, Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Facility, Eastern Theater Command Ground Forces, Eastern Theater Command Air Force, Eastern Fleet, and Base 61. It’s HQ is at Nanjing

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) component of Eastern Theater Command is composed of three major units: The 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Army.

71st Group Army headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, is composed of six combined-arms brigades and seven support brigades.

2nd Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

35th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

160th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

235th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

178th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

179th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

71st Army Aviation Brigade

71st Artillery Brigade

71st Air Defense Brigade

71st Special Operations Brigade

71st Service Support Brigade

72nd Group Army

The 72nd Group Army headquartered in Huzhou City, Zhejiang Province, consists of the below units.

10th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

5th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

124th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

85th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

90th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

72nd Army Aviation Brigade

72nd Artillery Brigade

72nd Air Defense Brigade

72nd Special Operations Brigade

72nd Service Support Brigade

The 73rd Group Army headquartered in Bantou, Jimei District, Xiamen City, of Fujian Province consists of the below units.

86th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

14th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

91st Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

145th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

3rd Light Combined-Arms Brigade

73rd Army Aviation Brigade

73rd Artillery Brigade

73nd Air Defense Brigade

73rd Special Operations Brigade

73rd Service Support Brigade

PLA Air Force

The Eastern Theater Command Air Force is

contd on page 19

The PLA’s Posture Against Taiwan

contd from page 16

composed of the following units.

8th Fighter Brigade

9th Fighter Brigade

25th Fighter Brigade

40th Fighter Brigade

41st Fighter Brigade

78th Fighter Brigade

83rd Fighter Brigade

85th Fighter Brigade

95th Fighter Brigade

10th Bomber Division

28th Bomber Regiment

29th Bomber Regiment

30th Bomber Regiment

76th Air Regiment

77th Air Regiment

93rd Regiment

Unidentified drone attack brigade

PLA Navy

Eastern Theater Command Navy (East Sea Fleet)

Ningbo Fleet Headquarters

Shanghai Naval Base

Xiangshan Naval Base

Zhoushan Naval Base

Fujian Naval Base

1st Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

2nd Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

Coastal Defense Brigade (Fujian)

13th Coastal Defense Division, (Jinjiang, Quanzhou)

31st Pontoon Bridge Brigade

PLA Naval Air Force

1st Air Division (Shanghai)

17th Air Regiment (Changzhou)

5th Independent Bomber Regiment (Changzhou)

4th Naval Aviation Brigade (Taizhou)

11th Air Regiment (Ningbo)

18th Air Regiment (JH-7)

PLA Rocket Force

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) component of Eastern Theater Command is Base 61 in Huangshan, Anhui, which has 611 to 618 Brigades armed as follows:

611 Brigade        DF-21A Chizhou

612 Brigade        DF-21/DF-21A Jingdezhen

613 Brigade        DF-15B Shangrao

614 Brigade        DF-11A/DF-17 Yong’an

615 Brigade        DF-11A Meizhou

616 Brigade        DF-15    Ganzhou

617 Brigade        DF-16    Jinhua

618 Brigade        Unknown            Unknown

The post The PLA’s Current Posture Against Taiwan appeared first on IMR.

Key Takeaways

• Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.

• The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait ? referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan-and training for a Taiwan contingency-likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

• The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

• Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

• Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

• Internal unrest in Taiwan;

• Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

• Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

• Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

• Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign- capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture For A Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades-four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021-in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship-the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities – such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets- to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability To Deter Force

Key Takeaways

• The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.

• To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

 Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure with the 2021 defense budget at NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion)

Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022.

The post Developments In The Taiwan Strait appeared first on IMR.

The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist threats in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base. PAP units responsible for internal security operations are also likely under the control of the Western Theater Command.

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” however, greater criticism from the international community, including the United Nations, refute such justifications. Moreover, ethnic oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions of border demarcations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) combined with recent infrastructure construction, led to multiple unarmed clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups on both sides of the India-China border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley – the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years-the Western Theater Command conducted a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Negotiations stalled throughout 2021, with the 13th round of military commander negotiations breaking down in October . Due to the sustained military development along the LAC, the Western Theater Command’s deployment will likely continue through 2022.

China-India Border

Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC. Negotiations made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages on the border.

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in the past 46 years. On June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley resulting in approximately twenty Indian soldiers and the death of four PLA soldiers, according to PRC officials.

Throughout the standoff, PRC officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, emphasizing Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India. The PRC seeks to prevent border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship with India.

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Western Theater Command Leadership (2021)

Commander of the Western Theater Command – General Zhang Xudong.

Current position: Commander of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Commander of the Central Theater Command Army DOB: 11/1962

Age: 59

Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command – General Wu Shezhou.

Current position: Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command Army and Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command DOB: 1958, Age: 63

Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command – Lieutenant General Rong Guiqing

Current position: Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region DOB: 5/1958. Age: 63

Birthplace: Weishi County, Henan Province

Education: Graduated with a master’s degree from the Department of Joint Campaign Command of the PLA National Defense University

The post Recent Developments in China’s Western Theatre appeared first on IMR.

India does not yet possess a strategic bomber aircraft, despite having the fourth largest Air Force in the world. It appears now that the Indian Air Force will soon acquire the advanced and upgraded version of the Tu-160 Blackjack called the ‘White Swan’.

This was disclosed in a throwaway line about a “bomber” being acquired by IAF, by the former CAS, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, while delivering the keynote speech, on 8 August, at the ‘Chanakya Dialogues.’ By way of another casual remark, he also mentioned the possibility of a nuclear-warhead variant of a hypersonic glide missile being developed shortly.

The negotiations with Russia are apparently in the final stages for securing on lease six – a third of a squadron —of the supersonic, fly-by-wire, 4-man crewed Tu-160. 

Strategic Bombers

A strategic bomber is a medium-to-long-range aircraft designed primarily to drop loads of air-to-ground weapons on distant targets to impede the enemy’s capacity to wage war.

Strategic bombers, as opposed to tactical bombers, fighter-bombers, and attack aircraft, are built to fly deep into enemy territory and destroy strategic targets like major infrastructure, logistical facilities, military installations, and factories. They are used in air interdiction operations to attack enemy combatants and military equipment.

Strategic bombers can carry nuclear weapons and breach opposing air defenses. The states who own them have the option to strike “anytime, anywhere” thanks to their long-range capabilities and great striking strength despite the large armaments load they carry.

Due to their size, bombers have a broad radar cross-section (RCS), making them susceptible to airborne and ground-based air defense (AD) weaponry. Additionally, they are expensive to buy and keep up. Although they have longer-range capabilities, they must be flown from deep airfields. They may undoubtedly transport electronic warfare gear to aid in deep penetration efforts.

In addition, the price of developing a strategic bomber is astronomical even by American standards. One of the reasons only a small number of nations operate and produce them is the estimated $100 billion overall production cost associated with the creation of the US’ newest bomber.

Despite these costs, strategic bombers make sense to create deterrence with China and a formidable nuclear triad to boost overall defense.

About the Tu-160

The Tupolev Tu-160 is operated by a crew of 4 personnel comprising a pilot, co-pilot, bombardier and a defensive systems officer. The aircraft has a length of 54.1 metres and a wingspan of 55.7 metres. It has a maximum speed of 2,220 kilometres per hour and an operational range of 12,300 kilometres. It has two internal weapon bays which can house 45,000 kilograms of ordnance.

The strategic bombers being large size aircrafts have a large Radar Cross Section (RCS), and hence are extremely vulnerable to both airborne and air defence systems. The strategic bombers are generally operated from the airbases located in depth.

To showcase its endurance, the Russians had staged a Murmansk to Venezuela sortie in 2008 and in 2010 a 23 hour patrol covering 18,000 kms over the Russian landmass.

One version of the bomber runs on hydrogen fuel, though for reasons of fuel/fueling aspects, the aircraft India leases will likely stick with the variant run on enhanced aviation fuel.

Like the Tu-22M Backfire, which Russia uses as a maritime strike bomber, the Tu-160 could be equipped to receive data directly from spy satellites. India has a constellation of ocean survey and spy satellites which constantly keep track of Chinese warships entering the Indian Ocean. Using this real time data, the Tu-160s can be vectored towards Chinese carrier battle groups which can then be targeted with anti-ship missiles. The bombers can also be guided by scout aircraft.

With this bomber it should be possible to planning nuclear targeting of the most distant Chinese targets — Beijing. with other critical and closer targets being taken on by Su-30MKIs.

Russia has extensively used these strategic bombers in the war against Ukraine.

Only three countries in the world – USA, Russia and China possess strategic bombers in its air force. The Indian Air Force (IAF) would be the fourth air force in the world to possess the deadly and destructive strategic bombers after the Tupolev Tu-60 strategic bombers, nicknamed White Swan, starts joining its fleet. NATO has named the Tupolev-Tu160s as Blackjack.

The PLAAF has 231 H-6 strategic bombers and 36 H-6K strategic bombers, making it the biggest air force in the world in terms of strategic bombers.

US Air Force comes a distant second with 156 B-1, B-2 and B-52 strategic bombers whilst the Russian Air Force has 135 Tu-22s, Tu-95s and Tu-160s.

An important reason of the thinking of the IAF to acquire the White Swan is that China has deployed its H-6K strategic bombers near the Indian borders. H-6Ks were first sighted near the Indian borders on November 11, 2021 which was the 72nd Raising Day of the Chinese air force (PLAAF).

Comments

The Russian Tu-160 is certainly a game changer, but it doesn’t mean India should rush headlong into a deal. In terms of size, firepower and reach, it dwarfs everything in the IAF, but it should not be forgotten that the Blackjack is a 35 year old design. Plus, with the Russian defence companies, the delivery of spares is always an issue.

The IAF could modify the aircraft for the AWAC-killing role by arming the Blackjack with the indigenous Astra Mark 3 – a 300 km range air-to-air missile which is likely to be tested by 2024. The Astra’s speed of 5,556 kph – two times faster than a bullet – means it would be able to hit targets with a huge amount of kinetic energy. The Tu-160’s blistering speed will add extra launch momentum to such a missile.

Another major spinoff is the Tu-160 will amplify Beijing’s “Malacca Dilemma”. Since a large part of China’s trade and nearly 80 per cent of its oil supplies pass through the narrow (65 km wide) waterway, long-range strikes by the IAF can bottle up Chinese merchant and naval fleets within this body of water. This will not only choke the flow of oil flowing from the Gulf and Africa to China but also grind down the country’s export-oriented economy.

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Air & Missile Defence India Seminar & Exhibition 2022 was organised by Indian Military Review and CENJOWS on 15 July 2022. The objective was to provide a forum for interaction between the armed forced and industry to deliberate, appraise and redress contemporary issues pertaining to air and missile defence. Various domain experts expressed their views on threats and countermeasures and need for certain technologies. Senior representatives from industry elaborated upon the growth of self-reliance and ongoing and future development of required technologies.

Seminar Sessions

Five seminar sessions included topics like Emerging Threats and Countermeasures; Emerging Technologies; Upgrades, Optimisation and Self-Reliance; and Joint Planning and Conduct of Air Defence Operations.

Session I: Inaugural Session

The Welcome Address was given by Lt Gen Sunil Srivastava, Director, CENJOWS. He highlighted the significance of the event being held physically after two years of online conduct of events due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He extensively covered various conflicts and lessons to be drawn from them while underlining the significance of the air domain. He mentioned the need to leverage manned and unmanned platforms indigenously and analyse the threat landscape carefully. Comparative capabilities, he discussed components of People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and cautioned against growing Sino-Pak collusion. To cater to growing needs, he proposed the use of novel sensing solutions, counter stealth capabilities, high power data domain, sense of fusion, algorithms and AI; machine learning, counter-UAS, counter swarm capabilities, threat evaluation and assignment algorithms.

The Inaugural Address was given by Air Chief Marshal Vivek Ram Chaudhari, Chief of Air Staff. He covered an array of topics. He emphasised that,” Air defence is an essential and continuous mission in peace time.”  He underlined the changes in the concept of air defence through lessons learnt from 9/11, Sri Lanka and Ukraine. He noted that proliferation and easy availability of platforms have made us highly vulnerable, due to utilisation by anti-national elements. Thus, he called for a threat scenario analysis. He stressed the challenges faced by us in speed spectrum besides the challenge for interception posed due to enormous speed difference in hypersonic weapons. He noted the increasing demand of joint operations, budgetary constraints and the need to make crucial technical choices. He emphasised the need to strengthen air defence through integration into a bigger network and that intermarrying of air defence system, passive and an offensive counter head was critical. He defined amalgamation of territorial and space domains as fundamental to future war fighting.

The Theme Address was delivered by Lt Gen SP Goswami, Director General Army Air Defence. In his address, he dwelled on the increasing criticality of the subject and accentuated the importance of army air defence as pioneers since 1940 with an emphasis on its operations in joint study groups. He emphasised on the need to evolve air defence strategy and sought answers on questions pertaining to stealth technology, carbon composite materials, variations of physical sizes. While addressing our needs, he focussed on the requirement of ECCM technology, modules to operate in a wider bandwidth with 2-3 bandwidths simultaneously. He said that incorporation of electronic IIF and improvement of scan technology will have to be incorporated.  He mentioned 3D and 4D radars as the mainstay of technology to counter threats. He highlighted quantum radar as a new area of research to ultimately replace current radar technology. He recommended the use of lighter missiles with better propellants backed by unjammed fuses and laser beam missiles as the answer to engagement of low RCS drones. He said that radar control guns will provide terminal defence against release from stand-off platforms. Lastly, he stressed on the imperative need for integration of various surveillance outcomes.

Navdeep Singh of Dassault Systemes gave an Introductory Talk on “Boosting Innovation and Operations Through Collaboration on a Digital Platform”. He noted the emerging threats in the landscape with emphasis on two challenges – how to integrate new technology and optimise legacy systems? He then presented the solutions available at Dassault Systemes highlighting their inter applicability across platforms through a data driven approach. He mentioned the use of such platforms by the Indian Navy.

Eli Hefetz of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems gave an Introductory Talk on their efforts towards manufacturing globally and drew a parallel towards their efforts in India to cater to Atmanirbharta including engagement with partners in industry, highlighting Rafael as a team player.

The Industry Perspective was provided by Col KV Kuber, Director Defence and Aerospace, Ernst and Young. He expressed his views on the Atmanirbharta initiative and the need for indigenised weapons. He listed future prospects and reported the key industrial developments in the domain. He further provided a roadmap for the development and upgradation of indigenised weapons, underlining their role in providing enhanced security and protection.

The session concluded with release of the IMR– EY Knowledge Paper on Air Defence 2022. 

Session II: Emerging Threats and Countermeasures

The theme of Session II was “Emerging Threats and Countermeasures.”It was chaired by Air Vice Marshal Makarand Ranade, ACAS Ops (Space), Air HQ. In his introductory remarks he stated obsolescence of our system and cyber threat as key challenges and suggested various countermeasures.

Gp Capt Prashant Arora, Air HQ spoke on “Russia-Ukraine War – Lessons from the AD Battles.” He extensively covered and compared the evolution of Russian air defence philosophy and the Ukrainian air defence philosophy, their Air Defence architecture and air operations. Broadly he covered – symbiotic relationship of air defence and offensive operations, co-ordination in employment of air defence systems, active and passive air defence against SSM threat, lethality of MANPADS, low observable technology, networked operations, geography and air defence. Key points include:

• Offensive air operations must complement AD operations: degrade the adversary airpower at source.
• Common AD communication network was essential
• Russians made extensive use of Active and Passive AD against SSM threat in the conflict
• Active and Passive AD measures against SSM threat have become mandatory in modern conflicts
• Missile defence systems, Terminal Weapon Systems, CIWS, Non-kinetic options, HAS, U/G complexes, dispersion of assets and agility are some of the solutions
• Mitigation of MANPAD threat is essential through countermeasures and sound tactics
• The procurement and employment of cost-effective and viable AD systems must to be continued owing to relevance in modern conflicts
• Importance of Low Observable technology for operations in dense AD environment
• Networked operations should be complemented by training and inter-operability

Brig Manish Kumar, Brig AD (Ops & C2) Army Air Defence Directorate, Army HQ, spoke on “Emerging Threats in the Indian Sub-continent”. He dwelled on classification of air threat, various platforms, air threat manifestation, nuances, emerging technologies, mitigation strategies, mitigation challenges, preferred mitigation philosophy and electronic warfare. Key points were:

• Emerging technologies in next gen aircraft include stealth design, carbon composites and low RCS
• Mitigation strategies in RPA are classified into:
  • Ultra-Low/Low Bracket – high rate of fire guns, fragmentation ammunition, AD sights, decentralised control
  • Med Bracket – Surveillance by active sensors, tracking and mitigation: Radar controlled gun systems and VSHORADS, centralised control
  • Deep Bracket – Surveillance by active sensors, tracking and mitigation: Radar controlled missile systems
• Army’s concern in Tactical Battle Area (TBA) – Air threat manifestation
• Low level threat critical for the Army in TBA
• Noted a progressive shift from manned to unmanned and platforms to weapons.
• Preferred mitigation philosophy for hypersonic weapons/cruise missile to be “Target the weapons systems ‘Left of Launch’.” 

Col Manish Sareen, Senior Director Land Systems, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems spoke on “Flexible AD resource deployment.”  He advanced the operational requirements – manoeuvrability, fast and flexible deployment, force protection, use of passive detection capabilities and reliability. He then introduced SPYDER All-in-One: A Complete AD Solution developed by Rafael. He enumerated its characteristics – response to saturated attacks, mature operational system, effective solution, high mobility, TMS, open architecture and all-weather operation. He explained its configuration and components – exMHR Radar and Toplite EO Sensors. He further presented details about three missiles and the range and systems. Lastly, he summarised all benefits of SPYDER.

Ran Marom, Vice President, Rada Electronic Industries spoke on “Tactical Air Surveillance and Emerging Threats.” He explained the tactical threats to airspace permeability in tactical forces, critical infrastructure and maritime. He further explained the common gaps through the purview of local air picture and local defence and analysed the use of MANPADS as potential effective countermeasures. He then proposed the use of RADA radars as current operational solutions. He presented the characteristics of USMC LMADIS, USMC MADIS, and US Army MSHORAD. He further explained NEM-TASK-Network-Enabled, Mobile, Modular Tactical Air Situation Kit and various software and hardware modules available under it. Under requirements for critical asset protection and gap filling, he listed:

• Low SWaP
• Very high reliability
• Effective range
• Unattended 24/7 operation
• Control Local AD assets
• Multi-mission – very high Pd and reliable tracking against widely varying threats
• Mobile
• SW-defined – easy integration and adaptation, future-proof SW upgrade
• Low cost of ownership

Session III: Emerging Technologies

Session III was chaired by Air Vice Marshal PV Shivanand, ACAS (Air Defence), Air HQ.

Air Marshal Daljit Singh from Rafael Advanced Defence Systems spoke on “Challenges of Optimizing the AD Array.” He covered the operational challenges of AD deployment – vulnerability of RF sensors, challenging terrain, multiple origin AD assets, redeployment in a dynamic environment, multiple threats and experience and expertise. He provided the following solutions:

• User friendly, upgradable and adaptive software tool to plan deployment/ redeployment of AD assets for adequate and optimum AD protection of VA/VPs against multiple types of threats
• Quick results
• Provide effective debrief and training tools for evaluation
• Tool to be available at all relevant C2 centers and standalone tool for forward formations.
• The tool is to be operationally mature and available Now.

He also spoke about the purpose, workflow and other capabilities of the Rafael AD Optimizer. These were:

• Training tool
• Exercise Debriefs
• Tool for offensive strikes
• Tool for Future Inductions
• He labelled the following as future blocks roadmap:
• Time line – waves of attack, fire capacity
• Advanced ECCM
• Manoeuvring Forces
• Connectivity to live systems

R. Suman, Senior Manager, Hind High Vacuum Company presented an overview of the company profile and history. He gave details about:

• Optics fabrication, materials
• Coating technology, capabilities, manufacturing
• ZnS, Domes, Periscope prisms, Night vision optics,
• Thin Film Characterization
• Lithography

Session IV: Upgrades, Optimisation and Self-Reliance

The theme of Session IV was Upgrades, Optimisation and Self-Reliance. It was chaired by Cmde Alok Ananda, Cmde Naval Ops, Naval HQ.

Air Cmde Vikram Gaur, Air Cmde Air Staff Requirements, Air HQ spoke on “Air Force upgrades and optimisation.” He highlighted how the Low Speed and Very Low RCS instruments have evolved as the emerging threats in the AD domain. He suggested procuring high-powered indigenous radars along with AWE&C capabilities and N-LOS systems as a counter to these emerging threats. Further, he reflected on how we can upgrade our present fleet of Mirage 2000, SU30 MKI, Jaguars, helicopters, etc, with BrahMos, Astra MK-I, Derby, Dhanush ATGMs, Spike N-LOS systems, EW suites (developed indigenously by DRDO and BEL) against the enemy.

Lt Col GNVS Vijay, GSO-1 AD (Procurement), Army Air Defence Directorate, Army HQ spoke on “Ground-based Air Defence Weapons’ Upgrades and Optimisation”. He brought out how ‘AD Battle is not sequential.’ He emphasised the following in the present scenario:

• Procurement cycles are considerably slower.
• Change is a constant phenomenon.
• Battles are getting more dynamic.
• Upgrades are getting delayed.

He highlighted how we face a dual challenge from the dated technology and the legacy platforms and our only way forward was to make the upgrades in the field of:

• Detection
• Interception
• C3 (Command, Control, Communications)

Capt SS Sinsunwal, Capt SR (ND & CMS), Naval HQ spoke on “Recent developments in Indian Navy’s AD capabilities.” He reflected on the fact how maritime air defence was quite similar yet distant from the conventional air defence. Further, he highlighted how leveraging ICT tools and awareness in this domain was the key enabler of the Net Centric Operations in the maritime domain.

Raghunandan Jagdish, Managing Director, Nandan GSE spoke on the “Customised Solutions for Missile Handling.” He presented an overview of the company profile and history. Further, he reflected on how ‘people’ serve as the weakest link in missile and bombs handling procedures and highlighted the need to revolutionise the missile defence and safe handing in India with the help of specialised lifting and handling solutions with applications in the aerospace, aviation, defence, material handling, car parking, and similar sectors.

Sunil Dhingra, Technical Executive, Industry Consultants Group, Dassault Systemes spoke on “Data Driven Program Governance & MRO on Digital Platform.” He stressed on the need of Optimised Design as the platform allows us to digitally innovate the product and allow us to digitally recreate the old technology and find prospects of optimising it.

Session V: Joint Planning and Conduct of Air Defence Operations

The theme of this session was “Joint Planning and Conduct of Air Defence Operations.” The session was chaired by Brig Manish Kumar, Brig AD (Ops & C2), Army Air Defence Directorate.

Air Cmde Manu Midlha, Air Cmde Ops (Offensive), Air HQ covered “Integration & Interoperability – Air Force Perspective.” He broadly covered the Principles of War, Characteristics of the Operating Medium and Tasks. He defined air defence as ‘a misnomer’ and labelled its military strategy based solely on defensive operations as reactive besides conceding time, scope and tempo to enemy. He talked about the under exploitation of air power capabilities. He highlighted the significance of offensive air power capabilities and characteristics of air power. He was of the view that Indian Air Force’s Air HQ has the highest authority with ultimate responsibility for the air defence of the country. He quoted Mitchell to substantiate his belief that the first battles of any future war would be air battles.

Under key approaches to ensure air defence, he covered:

• Surveillance and Early Warning – integration of sensors, integration of communications,
• integration of weapon systems
• Fire power upon enemy – airborne, ship/ land-based radars, MOP, civilian radars, naval air defence radars, army radars in TBA
• Centralised Command and Control – defence through offence, minimise risks, airspace control, efficient and flexible use of airspace by all elements
• Under the Indian Air Force Perspective, he presented the following points:
• Cohesive and synergized approach to AD is elementary to optimum response
• Offensive and defensive elements under one commander
• Resources irrespective of colour of uniform under functional control of one air commander

His recommendations included:

• Interoperability at architectural level key to ensure seamless integration
• Emphasis on integrated and secure communication network imperative for network centric warfare
• Naval and land forces can significantly enhance the defensive depth only if they are fully integrated within the AD system
• Failure to integrate can be disastrous in terms of fratricide
• Authority to approve, disapprove or dent combat operations vested in only one operational Air commander

Col Sameer Babu, Col AD, AAD Directorate covered “Integration & Interoperability – Army Perspective”. The main topics included were – current air threats, jointness in planning of air defence operations, jointness in conduct of air defence operations and areas of integration. He introduced the concept of embedded air defence and mentioned the role of Army Air Defence in conjunction with Air Force in all conflicts post-Independence. He presented a brief overview of the functions of Army Air Defence in joint operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels. He enumerated the following functions pertaining to jointness in conduct of air defence operations:

• Integration of Surveillance.
• Integration of surveillance inputs is supreme and time critical
• Geographical Basis of Control.
• All ground-based AD weapon systems in the geographical area of responsibility operate under the operational control of one joint entity at the tactical level
• Exclusive Engagement Zones.
• The induction of Long Range Surface to Air Missiles (LRSAMs)
• Mutually exclusive areas may have to be earmarked
• Maximum freedom of action to GBADWS
• Afford maximum safety to the interceptor aircraft
• Coordinated interplay between Surface to Air Missiles and interceptor aircraft
• Air Defence Battle Management.
• AD Control and Reporting System is the Army Air Defence Battle Management System.
• Highly reliable, responsive and flexible
• Backbone of robust communication network
• Distributed Architecture
• Upwards integrated architecture – integrated surveillance, control and reporting, weapon engagement
• Dynamic nature of weapons
• Temperamental communications
• Empowered and Decentralized Control and Reporting
• Real time situational awareness
• Afford battlefield transparency
• Infusion of technology
• Decentralized architecture
• Low flying low Radar Cross Section (RCS) targets in terms of RPAs, SWARMS and munitions will afford minimum reaction time.

Under recommendations in areas of integration, following were mentioned:

• Development of air and electronic intelligence
• AD policy formulation
• AD resource planning
• AD Control and Reporting and Airspace Control including integrated/ joint manning of control nodes
• Establishment and management of interoperable networks
• Integrated training
• Integrated logistics sustenance
• Integrated AD procurement and budget management
• Common manning/ staffing norms
• Situational awareness through Integrated
• Communication Networks
• Battle Field Transparency will provide
• Sensor-shooter linkage
• Robust and secure digital integrated communication network amongst the three services

Capt Vishnu V Reddy, Capt (Naval Plans) – Financial Planning, Naval HQ covered “Integration & Interoperability – Navy Perspective.” The major topics were India’s maritime security environment, air defence threats, air defence in maritime domain, avenues of overlap, offshore installations, ground-based air defence, command and control, communication systems and data links and integrated capability development. He emphasised that Indian Navy has to be self-sufficient towards AD and AMD at high seas. And stressed on the criticality of information sharing between IN and IAF for quick and precise AD action.

Under maritime security environment – he noted maritime terrorism, unresolved land/maritime disputes, Sino-Pak collusion, Chinese military/economic growth and nuclear armed neighbours to be some of many key factors influencing maritime security.

He further characterised the air defence threats into the following:

• Platform – conventional surface forces, sub-surface platforms, air platforms, land-based strike platforms.
• Kinetic Weapons – cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, precision guided munitions.
• Non-Kinetic/ SEAD – EMP weapons, swarm drones, offensive EW, laser weapons.

Under the avenues of overlap, following points were mentioned:

• Offshore installations/ VAs and Vps
• Coastal areas
• Anti-ship strike and MR busting within ROA of IAD AD aircraft
• AD Cover for land forces, when required

The ways, means and ends to be met in AD in maritime domain were mentioned. Those are:

Ends.

• AD of Naval Assets at Sea – IN responsibility
• Battle groups/ single units to defend themselves
• Provide AD cover to escorted Convoys/HVUs

Ways.

• Naval operations/ tactics formulated to protect forces against incoming air strikes/ missiles
• Continuous Surveillance and Engagement Zones (Fleet/ Ship Air Defence Zones)
• Expanse of zones defined by Sensor and Weapon capabilities
• Catered for layered protection

Means,

• Integrated sensors
• Area Defence Missile Systems (LRSAM/ MRSAM)
• Point Defence Systems (SRSAM/ PDMS/ Guns)
• Decoys/ Chaff
• Organic Air Early Warning Assets
• Carrier borne fighter aircraft – CAP Role
• Organic air launched weapons

Following points were enumerated under integrated capability development:

• Joint capability development’s significance as the foundation for integration and interoperability
• LTIPP – Merger of capability requirements post finalisation of Service Capability Development Plans
• ICADS – Joint activity from initial stages
• ICDP – Inter service prioritisation and impetus on commonality

The speaker concluded with the following recommendations:

• Forces to be responsive, flexible and integrated
• Identification of specific and common tasks/missions enabled through network centric operations
• Key to affective and efficient AD
• Clear command relationships
• Shared responsibilities
• Common operating picture
• Communication networks
• Component of joint forces

The Vote of Thanks and Concluding Remarks was presented by Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor, Indian Military Review.

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China’s National Strategy 

The PRC’s strategy aims to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049 to match or surpass U.S. global influence and power, displace U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and revise the international order to be more advantageous to Beijing’s authoritarian system and national interests. This strategy can be characterized as a determined pursuit of far-ranging efforts to expand the PRC’s national power. 

Despite challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing continued its efforts to advance its overall development including steadying its economic growth, strengthening its armed forces, and taking a more assertive role in global affairs. In response to both long and short-term economic trends, the CCP unveiled a new economic strategic task, or a new “development pattern,” called “dual circulation.”

The PRC has characterized China’s view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. Beijing views the United States as increasingly determined to contain the PRC, creating potential obstacles to its strategy. Additionally, the PRC’s leaders are increasingly willing to confront the United States and other countries in areas where interest diverge. 

Foreign Policy 

The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Beijing’s revisionist ambition for the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems.

In 2019, the PRC recognized that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing its foreign policy, highlighting the increasingly global character that Beijing ascribes to its military power.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic was a driving force behind the PRC’s foreign policy efforts, as Beijing sought to deflect any culpability for the virus and its initial spread, and to capitalize on its narrative of domestic success and foreign assistance. 

Economic Policy 

The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with, and part of, Beijing’s broader national development aspirations. The PRC’s economic, technological, political, social, and security development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support Beijing’s strategy to shape international and regional environments that accept and facilitate Beijing’s interests.  

The PRC’s economic development supports its military modernization not only by providing the means for larger defense budgets, but through deliberate Party-led initiatives such as Made in China 2025 and China Standards 2035, as well as the systemic benefits of the PRC’s growing national industrial and technological base. 

In the rollout of the PRC’s 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025), the Party announced a shift to a new “development pattern” of “dual circulation.” Dual circulation is focused on accelerating domestic consumption as a driver of economic growth, shifting to higher-end manufacturing, and creating “breakthroughs” in key technologies along critical high-end global supply chains, all while emphasizing “mutually reinforcing” foreign investment in these key technologies to provide the capital and technology necessary to advance domestic technological innovation in support of the PRC’s security and development objectives.  

Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy 

The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF); Development Strategy to fuse its economic, social, and security development strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities in support of the PRC’s national rejuvenation goals.

Beijing’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and technology industries, and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power. 

The PRC’s MCF development strategy encompasses six interrelated efforts:

(1) fusing China’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base;

(2) integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations across military and civilian sectors;

(3) cultivating talent and blending military and civilian expertise and knowledge;

(4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure and leveraging civilian construction for military purposes;

(5) leveraging civilian service and logistics capabilities for military purposes; and,

(6) expanding and deepening China’s national defense mobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its society and economy for use in competition and war.

Defense Policy and Military Strategy 

The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and development interests. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense.”

The PRC’s leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great modern socialist country.” In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces, which if realized would provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency.

In November 2020, the CMC issued the “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Joint Operations Outline (trial)” described as the “top-level law” of the PLA’s combat doctrine system in the “new era” that would strengthen the requirements and procedures for joint operations, combat support, national defense mobilization, and political work, among others.  

In 2020, the PLA remained primarily oriented toward “safeguarding” its perceived “sovereignty and security” interests in the region, while emphasizing a greater global role for itself, such as through delivering COVID-19 aid abroad and the pursuit of overseas military facilities, in accordance with the PRC’s defense policy and military strategy.

MISSIONS AND TASKS OF CHINA’S ARMED FORCES IN THE “NEW ERA”

With a force that totals approximately two million personnel in the regular forces, the PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains so that as a joint force it can conduct the range of land, air, and maritime operations as well as space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyber operations. 

The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy” [a likely euphemism for the United States], coerce Taiwan and rival claimants in territorial disputes, counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRCs periphery, and project power globally. 

In 2020, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct joint operations.  

Developments in the PLAs Modernization and Reform 

In November 2020, a PRC Defense Ministry spokesperson stated that the PLA accomplished its modernization milestone to “generally achieve mechanization” in 2020 that was previously set by CCP leadership. The goal of mechanization can be broadly understood as the PLA seeking to modernize its weapons and equipment so they can be networked into “systems of systems” and utilize more advanced technologies suitable for “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare. 

The Peoples Liberation Army Army (PLAA) has approximately 975,000 active-duty personnel in combat units. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, border clashes with India, and other significant events in 2020, the PLAA accelerated its training and fielding of equipment from the already fast pace of recent years. The PLAA also strove to increase the realism of its training and the effectiveness of Opposition Force (OPFOR) units.

The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of approximately 355 ships and submarines, including approximately more than 145 major surface combatants. As of 2020, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms. In the near-term, the PLAN will have the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s global power projection capabilities. The PRC is enhancing its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and competencies to protect the PLAN’s aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines. 

The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,800 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or UAVs) of which approximately 2,250 are combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft). In October 2019, the PRC signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces as well as associated support forces and missile bases. In 2020, the PLARF advanced its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities.  

The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the incorporation of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. The PRC has commenced building at least three solid-fueled ICBM silo fields, which will cumulatively contain hundreds of new ICBM silos. 

The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of road-mobile DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), which are capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets.

In 2020, the PLARF began to field its first operational hypersonic weapons system, the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). 

The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the Space Systems Department responsible for military space operations, and the Network Systems Department responsible for information operations (IO), which includes technical reconnaissance, EW, cyber warfare, and psychological operations.

PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct ascent, co-orbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.

The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration. The PRC is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions. 

Military Readiness: The CMC’s focus is on improving the PLA’s combat readiness and the guidance issued by senior leaders is increasingly evident in the PLA’s training and exercises. The PLA is training to “fight and win” through increasingly realistic combat training that uses dedicated “blue force” opponents and other elements to improve realism.  Despite initial delays and cancellations in military training, exercises, research, and recruitment in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, impact to the overall readiness of the PLA remains minimal.  

Capabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection 

The PLA has fielded, and is further developing, capabilities to provide options for the PRC to attempt to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. U.S. defense planners often refer to these collective capabilities as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. 

The PLA’s A2/AD capabilities are to date the most robust within the First Island Chain, although the PRC is beginning to field significant capabilities capable of conducting operations out to the Second Island Chain and seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean and throughout the globe.

In addition to strike, air and missile defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities improvements, the PRC is focusing on information, cyber, and space and counterspace operations. The PLA’s focus on an integrated approach to the cyber domain using advanced technologies likely will lead to the PLA improving its ability to conduct cyber operations over the next several years.

Nuclear Capabilities 

Over the next decade, the PRC aims to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces.  

The PRC is investing in, and expanding, the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear forces. 

The PRC is also supporting this expansion by increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities. 

The accelerating pace of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the pace and size the DoD projected in 2020. 

The PRC has possibly already established a nascent “nuclear triad” with the development of a nuclear capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and improvement of its ground and sea-based nuclear capabilities. 

New developments in 2020 further suggest that the PRC intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture with an expanded silo-based force.

Chemical and Biological Research 

The PRC has engaged in biological activities with potential dual-use applications, which raise concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 

Studies conducted at PRC military medical institutions discussed identifying, testing, and characterizing diverse families of potent toxins with dual-use applications. 

Based on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.  

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE 

CCP leaders believe that the PRC’s global activities, including the PLA’s growing global presence, are necessary to create an international environment conducive to China’s national rejuvenation.  

The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy goals. 

China’s Global Military Activities 

The PRC has increasingly determined that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing its foreign policy goals. In 2020, a revision to the National Defense Law tasked the PLA with defending “overseas development interests,” further cementing the PLA’s involvement in the PRC’s global economic and diplomatic activities. 

As the PRC’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, the Party’s leaders have increasingly pushed the PLA to think about how it will develop the capabilities to operate beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery to advance and defend these interests. This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion—and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests.

In 2020, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas and build closer ties to foreign militaries, primarily through COVID-19 related aid.  

PLA’s Overseas Basing and Access 

The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances.

Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is pursuing additional military facilities to support naval, air, ground, cyber, and space power projection.  The PRC has likely considered a number of countries, including Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan, as locations for PLA facilities.   

A global PLA military logistics network and PLA military facilities could both interfere with U.S. military operations and support offensive operations against the United States as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve.

The PRC’s Influence Operations 

The PRC conducts influence operations, which target cultural institutions, media organizations, business, academic, and policy communities in the United States, other countries, and international institutions, to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic objectives. 

The CCP seeks to condition domestic, foreign, and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept Beijing’s narratives and remove obstacles preventing attainment of goals.

CCP leaders probably consider open democracies, including the United States, as more susceptible to influence operations than other types of governments. 

The PLA has emphasized the development of its “Three Warfares” concept—comprised of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare—in its operational planning since at least 2003. The PLA will likely continue to develop its digital influence capabilities by incorporating advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) to improve the quality and deniability of its messaging.

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities. 

The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including the implementation of its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment.  The PRC has substantially reorganized its defense-industrial sector to improve weapon system research, development, acquisition, testing, evaluation, and production. 

In 2021, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.8 percent, continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position as the second-largest military spender in the world. The PRC’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-related spending is higher than what it states in its official budget.

Science and Technology Goals Supporting Military Modernization 

The PRC has continued its aggressive, top-level push to master advanced technologies and become a global innovation superpower. The PRC seeks to dominate technologies associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution; this push directly supports the PLA’s ambitious modernization efforts and its goal of becoming a “world-class” military capable of “intelligentized” warfare.  

The PRC continues its pursuit of leadership in key technologies with significant military potential, such as AI, autonomous systems, advanced computing, quantum information sciences, biotechnology, and advanced materials and manufacturing. As evidenced by the country’s recent accomplishments in space exploration and other fields, China stands at, or near, the frontier of numerous advanced technologies.

The 14th Five-Year Plan maintains the PRC’s focus on technological independence and indigenous innovation in fields associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution. 

As of 2020, the PLA has funded multiple AI projects that focus on applications including machine learning for strategic and tactical recommendations, AI-enabled wargaming for training, and social media analysis.

Foreign Technology Acquisition

The PRC uses imports, foreign investments, commercial joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and industrial and technical espionage to help achieve its military modernization goals. 

The PRC is investing in and seeking to acquire technologies that will be foundational for future commercial and military innovations including AI, robotics, autonomous vehicles, quantum information sciences, augmented and virtual reality, financial technology, and biotechnology. These technologies blur the line demarcating commercial versus military use.

U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2020

DoD’s defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC in 2020 prioritized crisis prevention and management, risk reduction, and limited cooperation in areas where national interests aligned. 

In 2020, U.S.-PRC defense relations focused on building a framework with the PLA to advance DoD’s objective to build a constructive, stable, and results-oriented defense relationship with the PLA. The Policy Dialogue System framework sought greater stability by prioritizing policy dialogue channels and strengthening mechanisms to prevent and manage crisis and reduce operational risk.

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The Tupolev TU-160 White Swan is a supersonic, variable-sweep wing heavy strategic bomber designed by the Tupolev Design Bureau in the Soviet Union in the 1970s. It is the largest and heaviest Mach 2+ supersonic military aircraft ever built and second only to the XB-70 Valkyrie in overall length. It is the largest and heaviest combat aircraft, the fastest bomber now in use and the largest and heaviest variable-sweep wing airplane ever flown.

Entering service in 1987, the TU-160 was the last strategic bomber designed for the Soviet Union. As of 2016, at least 16 aircraft are in service in the long-range aviation arm of the Russian Air Force. [4] Since the early 2000s, the Tu-180 is being upgraded to active fleet electronics systems. The Tu-160M ​​modernization program has begun with the first updated aircraft delivered in December 2014.

The Tu-160 is a variable-geometry wing aircraft. The aircraft employs a fly-by-wire control system with a mixed wing profile, and full-span slats are used on the major sides, with double-slated flaps on the rear edges and cruciform tails. The T-160 has a crew of four (Pilot, Co-Pilot, Bombardier, and Defensive System Operator) in K-36LM ejection seats.

The TU-60 is powered by four Kuznetsov NK-32 powered turbofan engines, the most powerful for a fighter aircraft. Unlike the American B-1B Lancer, which reduced the original Mach 2+ requirement for the B-1A to achieve shorter radar cross-sections, the TU-160 retains variable intake ramps and is capable of reaching Mach 2.05 speed at altitude. The TU-160 is equipped with a probe-and-drogue in-flight refueling system for extended-range missions.

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