The Type 003 carrier is China’s most-advanced warship ever built and its launch has cemented Beijing’s position as a top contender among global shipbuilding industries.​

China’s PLA Navy launched its latest Type 003 aircraft carrier on June 17, 2022, an indicator of Chinese naval shipbuilding prowess, making it the largest warship ever built in the nation.

China now has three aircraft carriers, in addition to over one hundred warships built over the last ten years, exceeding the growth of any navy worldwide.

Displacing 85,000 to 100,000 tons, and over 300 metres in length, the Type 003 is noteworthy for the speed of its development, particularly in skipping two generations of hydraulic and steam technology in its carrier launch technology. Instead, the Type 003 includes an electromagnetic launch system, competing with a more advanced US equivalent. The electromagnetic catapult technology will allow the Type 003 to field different military aircraft, increasing the range and effectiveness of the carrier, according to a US Department of Defence report to Congress.

China is in the process of developing a fourth aircraft carrier capable of nuclear propulsion, with leaked documents indicating that it will be capable of fielding advanced fighters and stealth jets, surveillance and control craft, anti-submarine helicopters and drones.

As China focuses on building its next-generation carrier, it’s also coming up short on aircraft to field them. With at least 22 J-15 carrier-compatible fighter jets, China will need more fighter aircraft if it is to equip two modern carriers, giving rise to expectations of a next-generation aircraft-based fighter to accommodate its new capacities.

A nuclear-capable aircraft carrier would only be limited by the amount of supplies it can carry at sea, and the resilience of its sailors, granting the ability to project force or deny across the world’s seas and coasts.

China’s latest aircraft carrier is not welcome news to US defence officials who also have to contend with the widespread use of satellite imagery and artificial intelligence, making it more difficult for large warships to maintain the advantage of surprise.

AI could allow satellites to quickly identify warship electronic signatures from space, despite scrambling and background noise.

Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System

Fujian’s electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) will accelerate jets taking off at speed, assisting their take-off with such force the aircraft will be able to carry more fuel and weapons, therefore extending the reach and size of the punch the aircraft carrier packs. Early warning aircraft will be able to take off and land more easily, enhancing the carrier’s ability to spot its enemies from further away.

EMALS is also able to launch more aircraft at a greater rate, getting more jets into the air faster than its opponents using older technologies – and is vital for defending itself against incoming attacks.

This latest feature gives the Fujian a significant edge, as only the United States’ latest Ford-class of aircraft carrier is equipped with it. France is slowly developing a similar system and India is examining its feasibility, but outside the US, only China employs this system. Its navy has yet to operate a nuclear-powered carrier, as the US has done for decades. The Fujian is conventionally powered but predictions are that the next one to be built by China will be nuclear-powered.

The first two carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, were ex-Soviet designs; the Liaoning initially bought for scrap from Ukraine and refitted. While antiquated, they have been used to train new generations of naval officers and pilots in the complex science and art of aircraft carrier operations.

This carrier will certainly impact the PLANs maritime capabilities… but it will not significantly impact U.S. warfighting capabilities in the Western Pacific.

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The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike capabilities. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations. The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean- going LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure on Taiwan.

PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities.

Eastern Theatre Command

The Eastern Theater Command consists of a joint headquarters, a joint logistics support center (JSLC) from the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, a PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) service component, a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) service component, a PLA Navy (PLAN) service component, and a PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) service component. Within Eastern Theater Command these units these are the Nanjing headquarters, Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Facility, Eastern Theater Command Ground Forces, Eastern Theater Command Air Force, Eastern Fleet, and Base 61. It’s HQ is at Nanjing

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) component of Eastern Theater Command is composed of three major units: The 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Army.

71st Group Army headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, is composed of six combined-arms brigades and seven support brigades.

2nd Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

35th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

160th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

235th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

178th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

179th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

71st Army Aviation Brigade

71st Artillery Brigade

71st Air Defense Brigade

71st Special Operations Brigade

71st Service Support Brigade

72nd Group Army

The 72nd Group Army headquartered in Huzhou City, Zhejiang Province, consists of the below units.

10th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

5th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

124th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

85th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

90th Light Combined-Arms Brigade

72nd Army Aviation Brigade

72nd Artillery Brigade

72nd Air Defense Brigade

72nd Special Operations Brigade

72nd Service Support Brigade

The 73rd Group Army headquartered in Bantou, Jimei District, Xiamen City, of Fujian Province consists of the below units.

86th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade

14th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

91st Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

145th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade

3rd Light Combined-Arms Brigade

73rd Army Aviation Brigade

73rd Artillery Brigade

73nd Air Defense Brigade

73rd Special Operations Brigade

73rd Service Support Brigade

PLA Air Force

The Eastern Theater Command Air Force is

contd on page 19

The PLA’s Posture Against Taiwan

contd from page 16

composed of the following units.

8th Fighter Brigade

9th Fighter Brigade

25th Fighter Brigade

40th Fighter Brigade

41st Fighter Brigade

78th Fighter Brigade

83rd Fighter Brigade

85th Fighter Brigade

95th Fighter Brigade

10th Bomber Division

28th Bomber Regiment

29th Bomber Regiment

30th Bomber Regiment

76th Air Regiment

77th Air Regiment

93rd Regiment

Unidentified drone attack brigade

PLA Navy

Eastern Theater Command Navy (East Sea Fleet)

Ningbo Fleet Headquarters

Shanghai Naval Base

Xiangshan Naval Base

Zhoushan Naval Base

Fujian Naval Base

1st Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

2nd Coastal Defense Brigade (Shanghai)

Coastal Defense Brigade (Fujian)

13th Coastal Defense Division, (Jinjiang, Quanzhou)

31st Pontoon Bridge Brigade

PLA Naval Air Force

1st Air Division (Shanghai)

17th Air Regiment (Changzhou)

5th Independent Bomber Regiment (Changzhou)

4th Naval Aviation Brigade (Taizhou)

11th Air Regiment (Ningbo)

18th Air Regiment (JH-7)

PLA Rocket Force

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) component of Eastern Theater Command is Base 61 in Huangshan, Anhui, which has 611 to 618 Brigades armed as follows:

611 Brigade        DF-21A Chizhou

612 Brigade        DF-21/DF-21A Jingdezhen

613 Brigade        DF-15B Shangrao

614 Brigade        DF-11A/DF-17 Yong’an

615 Brigade        DF-11A Meizhou

616 Brigade        DF-15    Ganzhou

617 Brigade        DF-16    Jinhua

618 Brigade        Unknown            Unknown

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These shipyards were previously responsible for the construction of the immediate predecessor, the Type 054A frigate, of which at least 40 units have been produced to date for PLAN. Four more modified Type 054A were built at Hudong for Pakistan. Both Hudong and Huangpu have also produced a modified Type 054A adapted for use by the Chinese Coast Guard, referred to as Type 818, and continue to build a newer re-designed variant with as yet to be confirmed designation.

The new frigate, typically referred to as Type 054B, is despite its designation a wholly redesigned warship that is both longer and wider than the existing Type 054. Estimated to have a length of around 147 meters and a beam of 18 meters, its displacement will likely be around 6,000 tons, and as such about 2,000 tons heavier than 054A. Armament and other subsystems are yet to be confirmed, but will include a VLS and very likely a new double-sided rotating active electronically scanned array-radar (AESA) on the main mast. Apart from the basic dimensions the new images also confirm structural differences in configuration over 054A.

ALSO READ: Recent Developments in PLA Navy Surface Combatants

The Type 054B feature a bulkier superstructure and a bridge set higher. A close in weapon system (CIWS), likely a H/PJ-11 11-barrel 30 mm autocannon is placed ahead of the bridge in an overall similar configuration to Type 052D- and Type 055-destroyers. The main gun will likely be a 76 mm H/PJ-26, also in use on Type 054A and the smaller Type 056/A-corvettes. The configuration and type of the vertical launch missile system (VLS) remains to be confirmed, although 32 cells seem plausible. Reasonably the new ship should see adaption of the new Z-20 ASW- and naval utility helicopter, replacing the lighter and less capable Z-9 in use on Type 054A.

The Type 054B frigate under construction at Huangpu has already been painted and launch appears likely in the next few months. The second hull at Hudong was floated out of the drydock in the beginning of June to make way for a civilian cargo vessel getting launched, but then returned into dock for further work. Nevertheless both Type 054B should see launch well before the end of the year. Sighting of further modules at Hudong also suggests that construction of additional frigates is already underway.

In conclusion PLAN appears to be well set up to transition from the large scale production of Type 054A, which by now has established itself as a workhorse for the Chinese Navy. The new Type 054B will likely serve to provide significant further capability, especially for anti-submarine (ASW) warfare, building on the already very substantial capacity available through the numerous Type 054A – and Type 056A – fleets.

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Key Takeaways

• Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.

• The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait ? referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan-and training for a Taiwan contingency-likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

• The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

• Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

• Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

• Internal unrest in Taiwan;

• Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

• Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

• Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

• Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign- capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture For A Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades-four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021-in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship-the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities – such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets- to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability To Deter Force

Key Takeaways

• The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.

• To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

 Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure with the 2021 defense budget at NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion)

Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022.

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These comments could cause deep tremors in New Delhi, which is already alarmed by Chinese antics at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, stated that despite the Himalayan conflict that “cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future,” New Delhi shouldn’t view Beijing as a threat to its interests in the Indian Ocean.

Speaking at a King’s College seminar, Zhou further argued that India must understand that Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean will increase in frequency.

“To safeguard China’s growing interests in the Indian Ocean and maintain the security of strategic sea lanes, the Chinese Navy must maintain or even strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean,” he said.

“It is only a matter of time before a Chinese carrier strike group appears in the Indian Ocean.” If New Delhi views the Indian Ocean as the “Great Ocean for Hindus” or India as the “Net Security Provider” for the Indian Ocean, friction and even violence between the two sides are likely, Zhou said.

These statements are in stark contrast with the Chinese position that its Navy is only used to protect its national sovereignty, unlike the US Navy, which uses its carrier battle groups for achieving “world hegemony.”

Earlier, Chinese state-run Global Times had stated that its newest carrier Fujian would only be deployed in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and the South China Sea.

Besides hinting at PLAN’s enhanced presence in the Indian Ocean Region, especially by its carrier battle group deployment, Zhou pitted the United States against India. According to the Chinese military strategist, the United States, not China, is the true threat to India’s rights and interests in the Indian Ocean.

He cited the USS John Paul Jones guided missile destroyer passage into the waters that India claimed as its exclusive economic zone last year. These comments come when India is going through heartburn at the US decision to provide F-16 maintenance support to its arch-enemy Pakistan.

 Jabin T Jacob, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, told EurAsian Times, “The Chinese arguments follow a common pattern – play up differences between India and the US, including recent ones on issues related to Russia, stressing that China and India share common interests and at the same time try to socialize India into accepting China’s presence and dominance in the Indian Ocean.

However, India will perceive China as a threat to Indian interests given the record and refuse to accept any Chinese dominance of the IOR. At the same time, it is also essential for New Delhi and other members of the Quad to now reconsider their approach of not having an explicitly military focus against China. Lack of clarity hurts the Quad’s ability to deal effectively with the Chinese threat.”

The Chinese military strategist further urged his country’s Asian neighbor to manage their disagreements better and stabilize relations and that the relationship could suffer dire consequences if mismanaged. “If left to fate, such an attitude is irresponsible and can also push China-India relations in a deleterious direction,” said Jacob.

These comments are significant for the policymakers in India and the Indian Navy, which has embarked on a new journey that could entail future engagements and even a stand-off with China as the dispute between the two sides shifts from the mountain to the sea.

China’s CBG Entry Into The IOR

Earlier, EurAsian Times had analyzed the works of Chinese strategists and specialists on China’s plans for developing a modern fleet and their potential application in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In essence, they support a protectionist and non-interventionist approach focused primarily on defending its sea lines of communication (SLOCS).

According to a previous analysis, there have been hints of a tough stance toward dealing with the US and India. However, nothing to suggest an aggressive stance that may endanger the core of Indian security from the sea.

However, a carrier battle group in the IOR may depart from this position.

Further, Zhuo’s assertion that India must not try to assume the role of a “net security provider” in the region indicates that there could be a challenge to the status quo in the IOR, as well as to India’s policy objectives in the region that it regards as its backyard.

A glimpse of that has been visible with a Chinese spy ship Yuan Wang 5 docking at Sri Lanka in August.

According to Ye Hailin, Vice-President of the Institute of Asia Pacific and Global Strategy in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), China has never considered India as the key concern; whether it is a partner or an opponent, it is always on a secondary level.

The PLAN is already far bigger than the Indian Navy and is expanding rapidly because it is reorienting and growing to challenge the US Navy.

Beijing might use excessive maritime power against the IOR in the short term. The logistical difficulties of conducting operations in the IOR will be significantly reduced by the presence of an overtly military facility in Djibouti and proximity to numerous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ports.

It is important to note that China already has about 15 frontline replenishment ships. The PLAN’s ability to undertake out-of-area operations is no longer as constrained with the Y-20 strategic airlifter in service, quickly rising numbers.

Further, it has three aircraft carriers in its inventories with state-of-the-art vessels like the Type 054 and the Type 055 in its inventory.

Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor in Chinese Studies, Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, decoded the comments for EurAsian Times.

According to Kondapalli, “The Chinese argument for India is that the latter should not go with the United States, but if you put things in perspective, India does not have a dispute with the US except for marginal yet manageable issues.

On the contrary, Chinese troops killed 20 Indian soldiers in Galwan not too long ago. China is essentially taking the same line as the US when it says it wants to expand its presence to protect the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS).

With PLAN in the IOR, it is an entirely different ballgame because there’s an active dispute and rivalry between India and China. It is, in fact, provocative for China to sail its carrier in the Indian Ocean waters.

“Chinese surveillance ships have been mapping the Bay of Bengal (BoB) and trying to mine the area for minerals. With India’s expanding economic growth needs, the prospect of having China mine these minerals from its maritime backyard would be seen as a threat.

The US does sail these waters, but like China, it is not putting pressure on Sri Lanka or the Maldives to grab islands or on Pakistan and Bangladesh to take their ports to balance India. The real challenge to India can never be the United States despite their differences, and there’s absolutely no comparison between Chinese and US presence in the IOR.”

The Western Pacific and the Northern Indian Ocean (from the Middle East and East Africa to the Strait of Malacca) are identified as the core zones for the PLAN.

The PLAN will not challenge the Quad nations in this area as it can only spare three to four ships in the northern IOR and is engaged in an “away game” with inadequate logistical support.

However, with the expansion that the PLAN is undertaking now and going by the statements made by an influential military strategist, this could be in for a significant change.

– Sakshi Tiwari

The post PLA Navy Carrier Battle Group ‘Would Be Sailing In IOR Very Soon’ appeared first on IMR.

The first domestically designed and built aircraft carrier named Fujian was launched at a brief ceremony held at Shanghai’s Jiangnan Shipyard. Fujian is the name of China’s eastern coastal province of Fujian.

The launch was delayed by two months due to the COVID lockdown of Shanghai. It was due to be launched on April 23 around the 73rd anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

The J-15 aircraft which China currently operates for its aircraft carriers were regarded a major problem for the PLAN as each plane weighed about 18 tonnes, too heavy for carriers in the long run. The planes were considered to be a big drag.

Catapult Details

The third aircraft carrier built by China State Shipbuilding Corporation Limited has a displacement of more than 80,000 tonnes and is equipped with electromagnetic catapults and arresting devices.

EMALS was regarded by Indian naval experts as a major leap forward by the Chinese navy as currently, only the US has such an advanced one.

It is more energy-efficient and reduces maintenance. It is also used on the US Navy’s Gerald R. Ford-class carriers.

China’s other two aircraft carriers, which are equipped with ski-jump take-off ramps, the Fujian features a flat-top flight deck.

The Type 003 warship with a hull number of 18 is the first carrier in China’s fleet to use an electromagnetic catapult to launch planes from the deck, which is faster than the older steam catapult system.

Future Plans

China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was a refit of the Soviet-era ship commissioned in 2012, followed by the indigenously built 2nd aircraft carrier Shandong in 2019.

China plans to have around five aircraft carriers, according to the official media.

The next aircraft carrier China plans to build is expected to be nuclear-powered.

However, recent reports said the speedy launch of the aircraft carriers is resulting in technical issues and repairs delaying their operational readiness.

China’s indigenously built 2nd aircraft carrier Shandong, which was launched in 2019, had to undergo in April its first maintenance and comprehensive examination.

China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, a refit of the Soviet-era ship which was commissioned in 2012, is so far the only Chinese aircraft carrier with initial operational capability or the basic level of combat readiness.

Strategic Significance

However, the launch of Fujian was expected to provide more room for China to operate in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits which have strategic significance for China where it is pitted against periodic US naval incursions, including the aircraft carriers.

Experts say the fast-paced construction of aircraft carriers by China has strategic significance for India too.

The launch of Fujian could provide leeway for PLAN to step out of the region and head to India’s backyard, the Indian Ocean, where the Indian Navy has a sizable presence. China has already expanded its naval base at Djibouti in the horn of Africa to berth aircraft carriers.

China has also acquired the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka as a debt swap for 99 years. It is also modernising Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea.

Naval experts say Fujian may take some time for operationalisation. Perhaps PLAN may begin sending aircraft carriers to the Indian Ocean by 2025.

China’s naval buildup comes amid growing geopolitical tensions with the US, which under President Joe Biden is seeking to strengthen ties with allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region to counter Beijing’s growing economic influence and military might.

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The waters off India haven’t seen this many naval vessels together since World War II as both China and Western allies deploy more warships in the area, according to senior Indian naval officials familiar with the matter. They estimated about 125 foreign naval vessels were in the Indian Ocean at any given time, roughly three times the number deployed in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks when the U.S. invaded Afghanistan.

While Indian officials are confident they can manage the threat for now, a lack of funding threatens the country’s ability to keep pace with China and other nations. Most Indian submarines critical to controlling the oceans are about two decades old, and plans to increase the warship fleet to 200 — including a third aircraft carrier — keep getting delayed.

India now has about 130 warships, roughly a third of China’s naval fleet comprising 350 ships and submarines — the largest in the world. Despite that, last year the navy saw the biggest gap among India’s three military services between requested and actual funds, prompting a parliamentary panel to ask the government to stop making further reductions.

The navy’s budget will be in focus on Feb. 1, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government presents its annual spending plan in parliament. In the last five years, the shortfall between what the Indian Navy requested and what it got ranged from 5% to 41%, the panel of lawmakers said in a 2020 report to the government. In the latest report submitted last month, they said the navy’s allocation was “less than half the amount” it wanted.

“Over time as the region gets more militarized, tension in the area is bound to increase,” said Anit Mukherjee, associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies who wrote a book on India’s military. “The solution for India is to develop the navy if it wants to address its growing diplomatic and strategic needs.”

Chinese warships have been present in the Indian Ocean since 2008, and India is constantly watching three to eight of them that are continuously on patrol, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral R. Hari Kumar told reporters in December. “I want to assure you the Indian Navy is confident of defending India’s maritime interests,” he said.

India has permanently deployed warships at five choke points in the Indian Ocean, stretching from the Gulf of Aden in the west to the Malacca Strait in the east. The waters carry some of 40% of the world’s oil from fossil-fuel producers in the Middle East to some of Asia’s biggest economies.

Last year the Indian Navy carried out an all-time high of 50 joint exercises with friendly navies, including one with Japanese warships around the Malacca Strait, said a senior naval official.

Still, India has been cautious to avoid antagonizing Beijing as the two countries battle along their contested Himalayan borders. Modi’s government has turned down requests from friendly navies to jointly patrol the South China Sea, another naval official said.

India’s navy has sought to demonstrate its reach with humanitarian missions. In 2015, more than 26 countries, including the U.S., turned to India to help evacuate their citizens when civil war in Yemen intensified. Half a dozen Indian warships were able to rescue 4,000 Indian citizens as well as 1,200 foreigners before Port Aden was bombarded.

In the last two years, the naval ships have sailed 40,000 nautical miles — or twice around the earth — carrying food, medicines and weapons to Indian Ocean countries. On Dec. 26, an Indian warship sailed into Mozambique for the first time carrying weapons and humanitarian aid.

Overall leaders in India’s capital have become “more aligned with the Indian Navy’s view of the country’s interest in the maritime domain,” said Nilanthi Samaranayake, a director of the Strategic and Policy Analysis Program at CNA, a U.S.-based research organization. “Especially if it relates to the safety of Indian citizens working overseas and remittances to the national economy.”

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