In the case of India, there are strong projections for the Prime Minister Modi to occupy the office again. In India, the general elections are scheduled to be conducted in several phases between 19 April-1 June, 2024. Due to the enormity of the voter population, India’s elections will be held in phases to ensure 970 million voters can cast their votes in a secure environment. In India, Prime Minister Modi is seeking a successive third term. The opposition coalition, INDI alliance, has faced significant turmoil even before it could take off. Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the Congress party attempted the Bharat jodo yatra, he is able to gather crowds but failed to project himself as a strong prime minister candidate. On the other hand, the incumbent prime minister with the country-wide infrastructure development, scientific advancements, economic restructuring with social development programs, is most likely assured victory in the elections.

The US is due for presidential elections in November 2024. In the US, it is a lengthy stretched process, over a period of two years, with several rounds of debates and elections, even within the parties themselves, for the selection of the presidential candidate. Towards the 2024 elections, after the Super Tuesday, President Trump has emerged as the Republican candidate, and President Biden is a leading Democrat candidate for the upcoming Presidential elections. Nonetheless, no matter who occupies the office in the US, its relationship with India stands on a solid foundation, and there has been bipartisan support for India.

There are several factors, over couple of decades, that catapulted the current momentum for a multidimensional strategic partnership.

Shifting of Nuclear Goal Posts

The upward swing in the US-India relations can be traced to the Clinton administration. Especially, to the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh talkathon, fourteen rounds of talks between 1998-2000, launched in the immediate aftermath of India’s nuclear tests and the resultant sanctions. This unprecedented dialogue led to mutual understanding of the geopolitical concerns of India along with the circumstances caused the “shifting of the nuclear goal posts”. Prior to the talks, Clinton was adamant on India to ‘Cap, rollback and eliminate.’ Later, in 1999, during the Kargil War, he came forth in outright support of India against Pakistan. This was in “stark contrast to the 1971 war, when Washington had situated its nuclear submarines in support of Pakistan.”

Subsequently, in March 2000, Clinton during his state visit and addressing India’s Parliament, affirmed that, “I say this with great respect. Only India can determine its interests.” His visit marked the first visit of a US President in 17 years and “institutionalized a high-level, multi-tiered and multi-faceted dialogue with India.”

Nuclear Agreement

His successor President Bush confronted with the post 9-11 challenges, recognized the dire urgency to engage India in the global counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts. Bush coined the term ‘Strategic Partnership,’ with India, based on reciprocal obligations to deal with the “multitudinous and complex threats of the post 9/11 world.” Viewed narrowly, in the Cold War perspective, the strategic partnership was mistaken as an alliance to maintain the Asian geopolitical balance of power, specifically directed against China. On the contrary, the Bush Administration wanted to enlist India’s support at a global level for the shaping of the future world order.

Alongside, the landmark US-India collaborative measures, the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) overcame the nuclear disjuncture, hitherto plaguing the US-India relationship. This enabled the Bush Administration to uproot the nuclear barriers, and the offer of the civilian nuclear technologies based on reciprocal obligations. This helped US-India overcome decades of nuclear estrangement and launch partnership based on strategic interests. In 2010, Obama supported India’s seat in the UNSC as a permanent member recognizing it as ‘indispensable’ partner for the coming century.” Over successive administrations, this created space for the US-India relationship to emerge as “one of equal partners and equal strategic interest.” Thus, in the last couple of decades, this change in approach towards India, can be greatly attributed to the change in Washington’s approach to restructure its own security framework- from region focused to global level.

Modi Factor

This restructuring aligns with Modi’s approach to (re)launch India at the global level to be recognized as a global stakeholder. Towards this, Modi based on his diplomatic craftsmanship with two Democrat and a Republican Presidents, yet three different personas (from Obama to Trump and now, Biden) ignited multi-sectoral comprehensive strategic partnership.

Initially, the Obama Administration seemed to be proceeding cautiously with the so-called Hindu nationalist Modi regime. However, subsequently, in an unprecedented move, recognized India as a “Major Defense Partner.” In 2016, Obama and Modi signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMA), that allowed the militaries of both countries to use each other’s facilities for refueling and strategic coordination. Especially for India, it was a significant development, as it enhanced India’s maritime prowess and navigation in Indian Ocean, for humanitarian and strategic purposes.

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In fact, the successive administration, headed by Trump, a Republican, exhibited ‘bromance’ with Modi. This was evident in the Howdy Modi event (Sept 2019), at the NRG stadium (Houston), a joint gathering of diverse groups of officials, businesses, along with gathering of 50,000 Indian diaspora. On the one hand, Trump focused on economic gains, removed India from special trade status from the preferential trade, called the Generalized System of Preferences. Yet, on the other hand, there was significant defense cooperation agreements along with the launching of the Tiger Triumph exercises with New Delhi. The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) agreement granted India access to the advanced communication technology and real time information sharing between the US and India defense agencies. Similarly, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) enabled geospatial information sharing, critical for India to navigate the maritime domain, marks significant strategic cooperation.

Thus, during 2016-2020, the LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA sealed the foundational core for the US-India strategic defense partnership enabling India to obtain critical advanced technologies to strengthen its defense communications, navigation and targeting capabilities.

Modi-Biden

In 2020, with the onset of the Biden Presidency, there were speculations that the ‘bromance’ between US-India would be elusive. Nevertheless, the Biden Administration, moving beyond the narrow geopolitical confines, launched multi-sectoral cooperation with India. Probably because Biden, as former US Secretary of State during the Obama Administration, was aware of the necessity to harness India’s engagement in Washington’s global security framework, beyond the confines of South Asia. This aligned with the India’s strategic vision under the Modi regime as well, as evident in intense collaboration in the varied sectors – ranging from defence (joint production of F414 jet engines), critical emerging technology (iCET,) space exploration (NISAR), cyberspace, semiconductor supply chain, AI and quantum technologies, and 5G/6G telecommunications. Modi and Biden, besides their intense bilateral dialogue, have proactively engaged in multiple triangular and multilateral fora, such as the QUAD, I2U2, G20, etc.

‘Strategic Convergence’ beyond China

Currently, there is a persistent hyper-linkage with the ‘counter-China’ factor. Regardless to say, India’s and the US apprehensions of China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean have contributed to the “strategic convergence” and the urgency “to counter China in the Indo-Pacific Region.” This is visible in the revival of the QUAD, and other Indo-Pacific arrangements. Yet, it is not restricted to this factor alone. Modi is focused on establishing India’s military prowess as well as strategic positioning. This may deter China from military overtures, yet, India will be ready to successfully thwart such attempts, in case the situation arises.

US is clearly aware that India under Modi’s astute leadership, a strong India will handle the China challenge. So, definitely there is a ‘strategic convergence’ of interests, but, this is not a conditional relationship, nor exclusively setting up India to counter China. As Washington is aware that New Delhi will uphold its strategic autonomy and not take dictates regarding its foreign or domestic issues.

It is crucial to overcome the persistent China ‘hangover.’ China is a lingering challenge to both India and the US, but to view their relationship in the narrow confines of the China factor is erroneous. Rather the engagement of India should be viewed as an attempt by Washington to restructuring its foreign and security policy at the global level. Especially, in view of the growing focus on the strategic issues related to Indo-Pacific or the entire Indian Ocean region (covering the Middle East) as well as non-military challenges related to climate change, health, quantum computing, space, clean energy, AI and so on.

READ MORE: Support building in US think tanks against sanctioning India

Due to intense dialogue, since 1998, both official and informal (including policy community, Indian diaspora etc.) there is a greater multi-level, multi-dimensional sense of security partnership established between the two countries. This is the reason that regardless of the occupants of the political office, this symbiotic relationship will strengthen. There is possibility that at times, some issue(s) may emerge to create concerns regarding the internal or external issues related to India. For instance, US representatives expressed concerns on the alleged attacks on the Sikh activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannu, and the recent arrest of the Delhi Chief Minister, Arvind Kejriwal. There may be several reasons for the concerns being raised by Washington. India has handled these charges effectively.

However, besides political relations, multiple channels of communication and dialogue have been established that there may be some wavering but it will be difficult to derail the momentum. Moreover, the US recognizes India’s strategic autonomy and has on several occasions has recognized India’s exceptional stand on certain issues. For example, in 2014, the Obama Administration had categorically warned countries to prohibit trade with Iran. Yet, US realized India’s reliance on oil import from Iran was crucial for the latter’s energy security and simply advised to adhere to global obligations as well.

Thus, to conclude, India-US is a dynamic multidimensional strategic partnership, in several vital areas of defence, space, climate change, critical technologies. Regardless of the incumbents’ post 2024 elections, the US-India relations will forge ahead. As President Biden enthusiastically acknowledged that the US-India relationship, “is among the most consequential in the world, that is stronger, closer, and more dynamic than any time in history.”

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Unsavoury Advices

On 22 March, China sent unsavoury advice to the Philippines over its decision to further boost bilateral relations with the US. The reasons cited by Secretary Blinken while in Manila, was China’s “provocative actions” in the region, the US diplomat was confident that it would “promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.” These assertions were just too much for Xi’s strategists to swallow comfortably. Naturally, with growing tension in the regional waters particularly around the contested Spratly Island, China views this as an ‘unnecessary intervention’ from the US. China also felt unhappy with the news from Japan that it plans to convert its 16 seaports and airports into dual-use military infrastructure. Global Times in a commentary on 29^th March termed the Japanese action as “Japan’s resurgence of militarism”. It appeared particularly infuriated that the new plans are actively promoted by the US in line with its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Not long back China had sent detailed advice on how Taiwan should plan and conduct its national election. In fact, it termed them as a regional election in its territory of Taiwan. From time to time, China has felt like advising many countries about their domestic policies. The list included major countries like Australia and India as well. Its ‘pearls’ of advice to India have special considerations about the conduct of diplomacy, foreign trade, state-to-state relations, multilateral military exercises, and of course, a list of restricted locations that must remain out of bounds in any case. China does not restrict its ‘advisories’ to comments from the Foreign Office but mostly it is pursued in great earnest by its state agencies and deeply controlled media.

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The world has a great spectacle to witness the Chinese interference in the just concluded Taiwan national election where China pushed its state machinery to create a massive disinformation campaign discrediting the Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling alliance, and promoting its choice of candidates. It offered free trips to the mainland for a ‘better understanding’ of the perspective. When the election drew closer it even sent muffled threats to voters to ‘choose carefully’ as it imposed import restrictions under the garb of trade investigations.

In an aggressive show of strength, its fighters continue to breach the Median Line over the Taiwan Straits, once assumed as a sacrosanct air boundary between China and Taiwan. Its ships have dangerously attacked and blocked tiny Philippine boats with water cannons knocking them out of action on multiple occasions. It continues to send its ‘fishing boats’ further deeper into Senkaku Island raising alarms of territorial violation from the Japanese. Significantly, China conducts its affairs the way it desires, at the same time expecting everyone else to follow its directives. That’s being closest to how one can define the word hypocrites!

Raising Security Concerns

Countries in the neighbourhood of China not only feel threatened by its continued aggressive behaviour but are extremely worried about deteriorating future course. Japan’s National Security Council presented a very disturbing picture of the growing Chinese threat to Japan’s sovereignty. It was highlighted that with its current capacity, Japan would not be able to sustain a conflict with China. This strongly drove Japan to find a fix which was illustrated when they changed their national security outlook in December 2022 and dispensed with terms like Self Defence Force enshrined in Article 9 of their constitution. This was one of the reasons why Japan was so interested in getting NATO to set its foot there through a first-of-a-kind ‘Liaison Office’. Australia on the other hand was another major neutral power which decided it was time to ‘change course’. It boosted its defence investments, critically planned to adopt new platforms like nuclear submarines and almost rushed into the security grouping of AUKUS along with the UK and the US.

Deepening security concerns from China also took their toll on ASEAN. For the first time it decided to institute a dedicated commission for dialogue and discussion under the collective security approach for its members. Privately many ASEAN members have expressed alarming concerns over China’s hostile approach towards them. At one time ASEAN had entirely focussed on China to draw economic benefits, but the dramatic change in the situation demands credible management of security vulnerabilities with the same country. China has somehow been successful in creating a serious security quandary among almost all its neighbours. In global geopolitics unpredictability and unsavoury approaches are highly despised. It pushes countries further to find newer ways to preserve their sovereignty and dignity.

In such an unstable environment, countries joining hands in a promising formal security alliance is surely not out of context. If that happens, it will be a watershed moment for Asia and a point of no return. Xi’s chosen advisors may hurriedly dismiss such a scenario, and clearly, it is not an easy choice anyway. However, the perception is – they may be doomed if they choose and surely doomed if they don’t. It is a dark reality about China’s bloated ambitions and sadly for it, early signs of countries coming together have already begun to show!

Unmistakable Similarities

Existing home truths point to unmistakable similarities between Asian security challenges and what Europe was going through at the fag end of the Second World War. Noticeably, China is striving to get the aura of the erstwhile Soviet Union. In the near term, it wanted to be counted as ‘equal’ to the US while carrying a secret ambition of soon replacing it as the most powerful country in the world. The hanging fear of war among European nations at that time seemed replaced by a growing security threat among many Asian countries today. A pre-security alliance before NATO already existed in the form of the ‘Brussels Pact’, whose charter was to ensure “Collective Self-Defence” for its five members. Asia has already witnessed the formation of QUAD and AUKUS with a deep security undertone;

The US formed an integral part of NATO since its inception while it held special relations with the UK. In the Asian context, the US already maintains a strong presence both politically and militarily, while it holds special relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Soviets have tried to strengthen their influence with Eastern Europe. China does not have that buffer but it has someone like North Korea which is much more powerful than maybe what Belarus is for Russia today. A formal alliance like NATO in Asia may not be imminent but it may also be just a ‘few events’ away.

Asian Security Alliance

If and when the deteriorating security environment dictates the formation of a formal alliance, say an ‘Asian Security Alliance’(ASA), the driving purpose would only be to ensure ‘collective security’ for its members. It would be undoubtedly looking for the NATO construct as an inspiration, especially the nuances of Article 5 and Article 10, which define the alliance’s commitment to security for its members and modalities for membership. However, it would also present an opportunity to incorporate measures ab initio which are seen as creating hurdles and conflict within NATO today. The existing ingredients definitely indicate that an ASA would probably be a reality sooner than later while being a much-improved version of NATO, offering better security resolutions.

NATO has served one great purpose – its members haven’t seen a major war for more than half a century. This will be one of the most important stimulations towards the formation of the ASA. However, ASA must look to ensure its actions are – ‘time relevant’, unlike NATO it must dispense with the condition of ‘unanimity’. It should be able to undertake timely preventive military action with say even a 2/3rd majority, while punitive military actions could be undertaken with a 3/4th majority. Such an arrangement would obviate a ‘decision dilemma’ within the organisation which at critical times could be purposefully induced by the prime adversary through the weakest link and prevent unanimity from ever coming across, eventually defeating the entire raison d’être of the alliance.

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The membership should remain ‘by invite’ and only for those who meet the strict requirements to which its members are supposed to commit especially funding and national military spending. To give strength to this multi-nation grouping, it may propose that each member must get into a bilateral security commitment as a prerequisite to join the grouping. First, it would remove the scope of conflict among members, and second, it would fully commit them in the time of need removing all scope of geopolitical influences. It would enhance every member’s confidence that their national security challenges will be addressed promptly and cannot keep waiting for phoney approvals from the UNSC or unanimity of views. Such security arrangements are probably becoming more relevant as the UN has become hostage to a select few who continue to stall popular action time and again by their veto. This would create a new powerful grouping taking its place as a major pole, simultaneously addressing the yearning for multipolarity in global affairs. It will considerably diminish the idea of the sole superpower and prevent the urge for global policing.

Global Realities

In the existing dynamics, the ASA appears much more capable of stabilising the security situation in the Asian theatre. It will allow every member irrespective of their size and potential to better commit its national resources for its people without ever having to worry about bullying by anyone. It will definitely not be against anyone and remain very attractive for everyone! The charter would make it possible for even Taiwan and China to be members simultaneously, as long as both commit to abide by the bilateral security commitment of ‘no war’ and coming to fully help the other in case of any threat. Those who would find it ‘uncomfortable to join’ will have no locus standi to criticise it, as the entry though conditional, is ‘not denied’ for anyone. The global realities have given one prominent message to all that practice of shadow boxing and cold war tactics only create greater complications, sucking in more and more resources. A plain-vanilla grouping is what addresses the problem, especially against wayward adversaries and unpredictable proxies. When the scale of reprisal and fear of suffering become obvious it would create invisible guard rails keeping lunatics on globally accepted behavioural norms. Pundits in China must be strategising their next move to have a greater destabilising impact upon their chosen adversary, but they must also remain watchful, their every act is only pushing the tiniest of countries to gain stronger resolve to stand up and guard their national pride. China may end up being the greatest contributor towards the creation of an eventual security alliance like ASA, without ever qualifying as a member of the same!

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While the Goa Maritime Conclave sought to project the Indian Navy’s cooperative engagement at the strategic-operational level, by providing a forum for the Chiefs-of-Navy and Heads of Maritime Agencies in the Indian Ocean Region, the IPRD, on the other hand, was the principal manifestation of the Navy’s international engagement at the strategic-level, addressing ‘holistic’ maritime security issues across the Indo-Pacific.

The first two editions of IPRD were held in 2018 and 2019 respectively at New Delhi.  IPRD 2020 was cancelled due to the Covid-19 outbreak. The third edition of IPRD was held in 2021 in online mode and the fourth edition was conducted, reverting to a physical format, at New Delhi in 2022.

Theme of IPRD-2023

The overarching theme of IPRD-2023 was “Geopolitical Impacts upon Indo-Pacific Maritime Trade and Connectivity”. This year’s edition of the IPRD built upon the previous one, which focussed upon ‘Operationalising the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)’, by specifically addressing the ‘Trade, Connectivity and Maritime Transport’ pillar of the IPOI.

IPRD-2023 explored geopolitical impacts upon Indo-Pacific maritime trade and connectivity through six professional sessions spread over a three-day period. 

The sessions were:

Nodes of maritime connectivity;

China’s impact vis-à-vis maritime connectivity across the Indo-Pacific;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade (Part 2);

Private industry in the safety and security of Indo-Pacific maritime trade and shipping; and

Maintaining a rules-based, safe, and secure Indo-Pacific.

Eminent speakers from 16 countries and representatives of the various embassies and high commissions attended and offered diverse regional perspectives on the subject.

Navy Chief’s Address

Speaking at the Indo-Pacific Regional dialogue organised by the Indian Navy, navy chief Admiral R Hari Kumar said that violations of established rules pose a danger to good order at sea. He described the security situation in the South China Sea as “fragile.” He warned that the region is the most militarised in the world and a “contestation” at sea can have adverse economic and social consequences.

“The fragile security situation in the South China Sea, in addition to the happenings of violations of established codes of conduct or confidence building measures, pose a clear and present danger to good order and discipline at sea,” Admiral Kumar said.

The comments were a rare direct reference to the situation in the South China sea and come at a time when China and Pakistan are undertaking large-scale naval drills in the Arabian Sea.

He said that more than 50 warships of extra regional forces are deployed in the Indian Ocean Region on various missions, including anti-piracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indo-Pacific has a significant naval presence, which can lead to confrontation and contestation.

“Owing to the increased presence of multinational forces, and differing interpretations of international laws, there is this fear that the region’s ‘global commons’ can change to ‘contested seas’,” he said. The navy chief added that this contestation at sea “can have adverse consequences for security-physical, social as well as economic”.

Admiral Kumar made a case for greater collaboration between nations in the maritime nation. “We are traversing through a contested present into an uncertain future. The future of global commons hinges on cooperative efforts of nations,” he said.

He said that cooperative or collaborative systems amongst like-minded maritime nations are essential for a stable future. He also made a strong case for developing interoperability and trust between nations, saying this requires a sustained and continued engagement.

Chinese Threat

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) presents the greatest challenge to the Indian Navy in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAN is supported by the China Coast Guard and the Chinese maritime militia in furthering Chinese national interest in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s friendship with Pakistan is of concern as they together present a new challenge to India in the maritime domain. India considers the Indian Ocean region as the key to India’s security and also aims to build credibility in the Indo-Pacific.

The dispute over Taiwan and China’s aggressive posture in the South and East China Seas, and China’s rivalry with America for dominance in those waters has brought the Indo-Pacific region centrestage. China’s ‘grey zone’ operations against US maritime forces and its allies have further sharpened rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s Linkages with the Indo-Pacific

The Indian government’s has often enunciated a vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific is the gateway to the Indian Ocean from the east with crucial trade and security implications. Hence its is of vital interest to India as also to ASEAN countries. India has linkages with many countries of southeast Asia and east Asia. The Indian Navy has been exercising with navies of the ASEAN region for many years. The Malabar series of exercises include participation by the United States navy and Japanese Self Defence Forces. Ther Indian Navy has exercised not only in the Bay of Bengal but in the western Pacific as well.

India’s ‘Look East’ policy was enunciated in the early 1990s, keeping in mind its maritime and security interests. The same has transformed into ‘Act East’ policy. In pursuit of this policy, the Indian Navy has engaged its counterparts in the Indo-Pacific by way of maritime military cooperation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Piracy, maritime terrorism, maritime crimes like drug and human trafficking, are some of the other threats which the Indian Navy has to be deal with. Other non-traditional threats include climate change-induced sea-level rise and maritime pollution. State actors in particular are challenging the rules-based, liberal international order and need to be dealt with.

Indian Navy’s Approach

The Indian Navy provides maritime security for safe trade and monitors vessels that enter or leave the Indian Ocean region through the Malacca Strait, with the Andaman and Nicobar Command’s undertaking regular surveillance. Coordinated naval patrols with Bangladesh, Thai and Indonesian navies have been institutionalised. Maritime partnership exercises are conducted with Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar, in bilateral or multilateral formats.

Indian naval ships, submarines and aircraft have undertaken long-range overseas deployments, across the Indo-Pacific as far as Japan, Hawaii and Australia.

Towards becoming a net security provider in the region, the Indian Navy has been helping smaller maritime neighbours and providing platforms and equipment for their navies. Neibhbours have appreciated India’s help in training, repairs, expertise in hydrography, maritime surveys and cartographic assistance.

The Indian Navy is the first responder in the region for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, earthquakes, cyclones, and pandemics the Indian Navy’s contribution with relief supplies with professionalism has created yremendous goodwill.

Comments

The Indo-Pacific region stretches from the coastlines of East Africa to the western Americas. It is today a vital oceanic space comprising critical chokepoints that carry a majority of the world’s trade. The chokepoints are situated at key geopolitical flashpoints. The Indo-Pacific is now perceived as vital for energy security, maritime security, and maritime commerce. The Indian Navy is is a formidable and potent force to provide such security in the region.

The Indian Navy is preparing a 175-ship plan (25 ships more than its current strength of 150) to particularly deal with the Chinese threat in the Indian Ocean.

India has strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Southeast Asian countries, and West Asian countries. India is also involved in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) featuring three partners in the US, Japan, and Australia.

The Indian Navy is playing an important role in realising the Indian government’s vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

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Immediately after the great International Fleet review that Japan hosted on November 6 at Sagami Bay, four Quad partners – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – will commence the Malabar naval exercise off Yokosuka on Tuesday (November 8). This exercise will conclude on November 18.

The Navy chiefs of the four Quad countries met in Tokyo on November 5. They exchanged views on “further enhancing inter-operability” in future editions of the Malabar multilateral naval exercise.

The timing of both the IFR and Malabar exercise is significant, coming as they do in the wake of China’s increasing aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific and North Korea firing record numbers of missiles.

Incidentally, the IFR marked the 70th anniversary of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) founding. Around 40 warships from 13 countries came together in Sagami Bay, off Tokyo.

The naval parade involved 38 vessels, 18 from friendly countries such as the United States, South Korea, Britain, Australia, Singapore, India, and Thailand. Thirty-three aircraft flew overhead, including submarine-hunting patrol planes and helicopters. India’s two frontline warships, INS Shivalik and INS Kamorta were in this parade.

Overseeing the parade, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said that Japan and like-minded nations must be prepared for situations in which “some countries trample on the peace and security of others through the use or threat of force.”

In a speech aboard the MSDF helicopter carrier Izumo, Kishida reiterated Tokyo’s plans to “fundamentally strengthen” Japan’s defense capabilities within five years.

His assertion that “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, such as the recent invasion of Ukraine, must never be tolerated in any region of the world” is also aimed at China, which is threatening to take over Taiwan Kishida forcibly and is staking territorial claims on the Japanese islands in the East China Sea.

However, it should be noted that the IFR, by its nature, is a symbolic and friendly gesture in which the host countries invite even the navies of the countries with which it has adversarial relations.

In this context, it was significant that China declined the Japanese invitation to send its vessels to the IFR. And equally substantial was Japan’s withdrawal of its invitation to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.

It was clear that by hosting the IFR, Japan signaled that it is firmly committed to the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Tokyo would like the international community to cement trust in its Self-Defense Forces as a proactive, reliable security partner, particularly in the maritime domain, where the power balance appears to be shifting toward China’s advantage of late.

That explains why Japan now consistently sends MSDF ships to similar events overseas, dispatches forces for engagements under its Indo-Pacific Deployment operations, and is one of the biggest supporters of exercises hosted by organizations such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus.

QUAD At The Malabar Military Drills

In contrast, however, the Malabar exercise is a proper military exercise. Over the next ten days, it will see the four Quad navies in action. Reportedly, the exercise will witness “high-tempo” drills in multiple domains and complex surface, sub-surface, and air operations, including live firing drills.

Apart from the ships (Shivalik and Kamotra), the Indian Navy is deploying other naval assets, including P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, in this exercise.

It may be noted that INS Shivalik is a multi-role guided missile stealth frigate, and INS Kamorta is an anti-submarine corvette. Both of them are indigenously produced, reflecting thus the growing capability of India to build its warships. And both of them are part of the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet based at Visakhapatnam.

Incidentally, this will be the 26th edition of the Malabar naval exercise. It started in 1992 as a bilateral drill between the Indian Navy and the US Navy in the Indian Ocean. Japan became a permanent member of the exercise in 2015. And Australia joined in 2020. It is an annual war game taking place in various parts of the Indo-Pacific.

Unmistakably, the continuous rise of the Chinese Navy (PLA Navy) in the Indo-Pacific binds all four countries in joining hands and bringing their armed forces together to develop joint strategies through military exercises. In the maritime domain, it is realized that they must act in unison individually; it is becoming tough to catch up with China’s growing naval prowess.

According to the World Directory of Modern Military Warships (2022), China now ranks second after the United States on the Global Naval Powers Ranking 2022 (India ranks seventh). China also has the largest number of major surface combatants of any navy globally, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 surface ships and submarines. The rate of its annual addition of naval vessels and frigates is the highest in the world.

This policy of acting together by the Quad partners, all concerned over the growing hegemony of China in the Indo-Pacific, was also manifested last week, with India and Australia conducting a bilateral maritime exercise off the Indian coast of Visakhapatnam in the Bay of Bengal.

Australia’s flagship regional engagement activity, Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE), arrived in Visakhapatnam on October 30. It comprised two ships (HMAS Adelaide and Anzac), helicopters, and 1,500 personnel. The Indian contingent in the exercise included INS Ships Jalashwa and Kavaratti. The exercise concluded on November 5.

Terming India and Australia as the guardians of the flanks of the Indian Ocean, visiting Australian Navy Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Jonathan Earley said that since the Indo-Pacific is marked by the ongoing “big power muscle movement,” it is vital that India and Australia must train together to build trust and confidence while stressing on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for the region.

He said good progress had been made on MDA and the exchange of information on the movement of military vessels in the region, a growing area of cooperation among the Quad countries. “There is an opportunity for that to grow in more classified domains.

That is ongoing… The enthusiasm and the motivation to share more are certainly there,” Earley added, adding that expanding surveillance in the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and India’s recent acquisition of MH-60R helicopters build commonality.

He highlighted how the Quad countries have several common military platforms, with India acquiring more and more military hardware from the US. “The recent reciprocal exchange of P-8 aircraft exercises between the two countries had gone “exceptionally well,” said the Australian Admiral.

India’s Shifting Focus From Land To Maritime Power

Incidentally, the Indo-Australian exercise was taking place during India’s second Naval Commanders’ Conference in New Delhi (October 31  to November 3), which, among other challenges in the Indian Ocean region, is of vital concern to India, did focus on Chinese maritime activities.

The conference, addressed by India’s defense minister Rajnath Singh, new Chief of defense staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan, and the Navy Chief Admiral Hari Kumar, focused on how the Indian Navy would remain “a combat-ready, credible, cohesive, and future-proof force.”

Admiral Hari Kumar is on record to have stated that China remains a formidable challenge and has increased its presence not only along India’s land borders but also in the maritime domain by leveraging anti-piracy operations to normalize its naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

“At any point, we have anything between five to eight Chinese Navy units, be it warships or research vessels, and a host of Chinese fishing vessels operating in the IOR. We keep an eye on them and see how they are undertaking their activities in the IOR”, according to the Indian Navy Chief.

The IOR, which includes the Middle East, the eastern coast of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, is a significant region of interest for the Indian Navy. More than 70% of the country’s imports and exports pass through sea lanes in this region. Therefore, the growing Chinese naval presence in the IOR seriously threatens India’s vital security interests.

In recent years, Indian strategic planners have rediscovered the importance of maritime power for the country’s security. Empires have risen and fallen as they lost command of the seas, whether the Persian, Napoleon, or Great Britain.

India was a global player as long as it had maritime interactions from Zanzibar off the coast of Africa to the shores of the Arabian Peninsula, all the way through the Andaman Sea to the mainland and islands of SouthEast Asia through people, faiths, ideas, mythologies, art, architecture and goods. India’s decline started when it became land-centric under the Mughal rule.

Even after independence in 1947, because of the wars with China and Pakistan, this land-centric or the “continentality-mindset” prevailed, with the Indian Navy getting scant attention in the security outlook.

Interestingly, China, like India, also had this continentality – mindset not long ago. But China now has become a foremost maritime power. Therefore, India’s stand is also shifting, as Admiral Arun Prakash, a former Indian Navy Chief, says, from pure ‘Continentality’ to the requisite mix of ‘Continentality-Maritimity.’

Accordingly, the Indian Navy is also growing. As Admiral Hari Kumar highlighted during the Naval Commanders’ conference, the Indian Navy has been strengthened by the recent commissioning of the second carrier INS Vikrant, acquiring of more missile power, two ALH squadrons, and the launch of platforms like Surat, Udaygiri, Dunagiri, Nistar, Nipun, and Nirdeshak.

He further pointed out that the maiden concurrent deployment of Indian Navy ships across six continents on August 15 this year served as valuable signaling to underscore India’s credibility – at home, in the region, and worldwide.

In the last six months, operational deployments have also emphasized India’s credibility, with a footprint covering all major oceans of the world, he added.

All this is said to be India’s signal that it will challenge China’s hegemonistic activities in the Indo-Pacific and the IOR in particular. And in this, India is not alone. India has solid support from Australia, Japan, and the United States in maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

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Moving on to delivering on the promises made in the first year of its establishment, the Quad in its second year, the Summit of the four leaders – US President Joe Biden and Prime Ministers Narendra Modi, Anthony Albanese and Fumio Kishida – announced a large number of initiatives in the joint statement released after the deliberations.

On the political front, the Quad was critical about the situation in North Korea, Myanmar and Afghanistan but in view of India’s reluctance, the joint statement did not criticise Russia. “Quad is a force for good, committed to bringing tangible benefits to the region,” said the statement.

The Quad mentioned its focus on South China Sea but refrained from mentioning China though the tone and tenor of several formulations in the joint statement left no doubt about their determination to counter Beijing’s forward forays. The Pacific Island countries this time came for prominent mention in the backdrop of China signing a military pact with one of them which is geographically close to Australia.

The Quad also dwelt at length on terrorism. It denounced the use of terrorist proxies, emphasised the importance of denying any logistical or military support to terrorist groups and condemned the 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks.

But a considerable focus was on emerging and critical technologies where the West is intent on maintaining an advantage over China. Work will begin by the four countries aligning their baseline software security standards and promoting interoperability and security in 5G supplier diversification.

Taking note of Quad’s capacity and vulnerabilities in global semiconductor supply chains, they decided to strengthen cooperation through a new International Standards Cooperation Network (ISCN).

A “Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP)” will be launched with “mitigation” and “adaptation” as its two themes.

A Quad Debt Management Resource Portal will help countries with debt issues.

Quad partners have also collectively committed $524 million for the development of new vaccines to prevent and contain infectious diseases.

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India’s neutral stand is mainly because all the key protagonists in the crisis are India’s close allies. Hence, India’s unaligned and diplomatic efforts. Possible support to Russia might hamper India’s relations with the NATO countries, including USA.

India’s stand on Ukraine has been appreciated within the country and by other countries, notably Pakistan, whose prime minister Imran Khan too appreciated India’s role and policies.

India-Russia relationship still continues to remain strong. Russia has been a significant supplier of military equipment. India is also procuring the S-400 Triumf Missile from Russia, despite strong US opposition.  A new ten-year defence pact between the two countries was being discussed. India-Russia annual trade is also worth about $10 billion. India’s support to Ukraine may mean Russia developing stronger ties with China and Pakistan. That can be a real-time threat to India’s national security.

Ukraine has consistently taken anti-Indian position in the United Nations, be it in terms of voting against India in UNSC after 1998 nuclear tests, voting for UN intervention in Kashmir after abrogation of Article 370 or in terms of selling military equipment to Pakistan to use against India.

India wants de-escalation of the crisis, but only through arbitration or conciliation. Thus, considering all the angles to this crisis, India is adopting the strategy to solve this dispute keeping in mind that any country’s national interest is above the overall global interest.

The US has managed to get most countries on its side, and the United Nations resolution condemning the Russian invasion has been supported by many countries. Countries like India chose to abstain from the vote due to a strong and continuing linkage with Russia, and due to considerations of what such a vote will imply to the geopolitics of the region.

The immediate impact is, of course, adverse due to high oil prices and investor nervousness. India has a very large oil deficit and also a current account deficit. The latter needs a continuous supply of foreign investor dollars to plug that deficit. On food security, India is on a strong footing. Its military capabilities are significantly inferior to China, mainly due to a resource constraint. But the level of preparedness and the advantage of terrain means that the asymmetry is considerably reduced.

The US will soon have to think about the more important geopolitical alignment and strategy around its bigger rival, China. So far, the Quad formation (with the US, India, Japan and Australia) has not delivered any tangible benefits to India. But the strategic importance of India could grow. It is conceivable that in a new configuration, the Americans will value an alignment with India more than the reverse. India, too, has a strong trade and investment relationship already. If its domestic economy shows steady and consistent high growth, it can become important to the US when dealing with a strong China.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng attacked the Quad thus, “No country should pursue its so-called absolute security at the expense of other countries’ security.” He drew a parallel between the situation in Ukraine — according to him, a result of “the NATO strategy of eastward expansion” — and the several provocations perceived by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. The analogy does not hold. Amid recent geopolitical developments, India’s foreign policy priorities and the ties fostered with members of the Quad are holding fast.

The Quad is a response to China’s rising ambitions, which have manifested in the form of occupying islands and trying to control sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its activities along the Line of Actual Control with India.

Both the Japanese and Australian prime ministers reportedly discussed the situation in Ukraine with prime minister Narendra Modi, and did not insist that India echo their position.

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World politics and eco-nomics at present seems to be dictated by the Russian-Ukraine conflict. A war that no one thought would last this long is continuing despite sanctions, and the US, European Union (EU), China, Russia and India seem to be combatting the common conundrum of planning their next move. While it would be unfair to the devastating wars and humanitarian conflicts plaguing the global south, it would still not be wrong to say that the Russia–Ukraine War has put the perceived prowess and influence of international institutions to the test. The complete refusal by Russia to buckle under international pressure and, later, the sanctions imposed on the country is emblematic not just of the need to re-assess the working of international institutions but also a greater geopolitical shift in the accepted standard procedures of global politics.

The economic sanctions that have been imposed on Russia had a two-fold objective. While the foremost aim was to disrupt Russian economy and destabilise its logistical support to the troops, the additional aim was to deter nations from toeing the Russian line and send a message to countries, who continue to maintain a working relationship with Russia. Russian aggression against the erstwhile Soviet nation of Ukraine and the western reaction to it is being translated by some scholars as return to Cold War politics; however, the romanticisation of that bygone era fails to take into account some pertinent realities of the present geopolitical scenario.

The world that has so long been governed by the political and economic systems of the West is now witnessing and acknowledging a world that has multiple poles of power. This shift has led to a feeling of a relative levelling of the proverbial playing field. As the dynamics of geopolitics register a change, the reaction to the Russia–Ukraine conflict by the rest of the world is not all that the US had hoped it would be.

India’s abstentions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and later in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on the Russia-Ukraine conflict have not gone unnoticed by the US and the EU. Earlier, in April 2022, India played host to the foreign ministers of the UK and Russia along with a surprise visit by their counterpart from China, as well as dignitaries from the US. Such a reaction was elicited by India’s choice to continue their relationship with the Russians. While the US and EU want a democracy like India to openly condemn the aggression and invasion by Russia, it is in India’s strategic favour to continue a cordial working relationship with Moscow.

If one was to take lessons from history, India has been a non-aligned country and a move against the Russians could be viewed as a step towards the US and its allies. More importantly, the Indian armed forces depend primarily on Russia and Russian technology for their arms, vehicles, helicopters and frigates to mention a few. Conventional knowledge, which would be derived from instances in the past would also lead one to believe that Russia has proven to be a better strategic partner of India than the US. There is also the issue of geographical propinquity – Russia and India are geographically proximate countries that can potentially play a role in border disputes in the region. At the same time, it cannot be disregarded that Russia and India are also a part of multilateral platforms like Russia-India-China (RIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), which play a pivotal role in evening the keel of global politics.

The Indian decision to abstain from voting against Russian aggression is a decision quite congruent with RealPolitik. The proverb about all politics being domestic holds true for the current scenario as India is holding its national interest supreme. As Russia and India come to an understanding that India would be able to import crude oil and gas from Russia at pre-war prices. it is in Indian strategic interest to continue energy trade with the country.

To circumvent the sanctions, India and Russia and the rest of the world are also exploring options of trade based on alternative currencies in place of the US dollar (USD). A similar agreement is being attempted between India and Iran to reduce the dependency upon the USD; it is also indicative of the greater shift towards a post-dollar world.

However, as the Indian stance has been condemned by the US and the EU; it has also been postulated that there could be rifts within the Quadrilateral Security Organisation (QUAD) as a repercussion of the Indian refusal to toe the American line. The QUAD is a derivative of the multinational group that was formed to lead the Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster R operations in the Indian ocean after the 2004 tsunami. The QUAD however, has evolved from a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) group to a strategic grouping in the Indian ocean primarily focused on containing the growing presence of China in the region.

Out of the four countries that make up the QUAD, the US, Japan, and Australia are allies and tend to follow a similar pattern when it comes to geopolitical decisions; however, for India there are no security guarantees from the US and, therefore, very little incentive for India to prioritise its national interests below the US diktat.

It is also imperative to understand that the purpose of the QUAD has no direct relation with Russia and the fact that its primary objective of containment of the Chinese expansion is a very real concern for QUAD member countries. The compulsion of reducing Chinese sphere of influence is the diving force behind the joint QUAD exercises and summits. Hence, the scenario of the threat of sanctions against India or a definitive rift in the QUAD seems like a distant possibility. It has been argued that the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) could replace the QUAD; however, that also has limited feasibility. India is an extremely important nation in Asia and its economic and military prowess outweighs that of Japan and/or Australia. India also has a network of well-established and long-term relationships in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and is a major player in the Indo–Pacific. The recent sale of the BrahMos missiles by India to Philippines and the interest that it has garnered from other countries of the region are emblematic of India’s significance in the Indian Ocean.

While the US would have liked an unequivocal denunciation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and a complete debilitation of the Russian economy due to their sanctions, the reality is that nations have found ways to circumvent sanctions and continue international trade by moving on from the American dollar. As the world becomes more multi-polar, nations have begun to prioritise their national interests, and the US is now stuck in the reactionary cycles of an extremely globalised world where straightforward and uncomplicated actions have ceased to exist. The exigency of limiting China’s growth is as important as stopping Russia at the moment for the US. To balance the two, it must move in ways that forces Washington to make more concessions to nations as the “with us or against us” approach has become redundant.

The dynamics at play between the US, Russia, India and China are a precursor to what can be expected from global politics in the near future.

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The Ministers reviewed mutual efforts to respond to the worsening humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and assessed its broader implications. They urged an immediate cessation of hostilities. The Ministers unequivocally condemned civilian deaths. They underscored that the contemporary global order has been built on the UN Charter, respect for international law, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states.

On Quad

Recalling the inaugural virtual Quad Leaders’ Summit in March 2021, the in-person Quad Leaders’ Summit in September 2021 in Washington, the February 2022 Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Melbourne, and looking forward to the next Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo in 2022, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states are respected, and countries are free from military, economic, and political coercion.

They further reaffirmed their dedication to promoting regional stability and prosperity, with an inclusive regional architecture, abiding by the rule of law, the freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, and ASEAN centrality. They also reiterated the importance of adherence to international law to meet challenges to the rules-based order, including in the South China Sea.

Science, Technology, Cybersecurity, and Space

Reflecting on the positive science and technology cooperation between the two countries, the Ministers welcomed the announcement of a Joint Commission Meeting on Science and Technology in 2022, to discuss future science and technology collaboration.

The Ministers applauded the recent and upcoming meetings of the India-U.S. Cyber Dialogue and the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Working Group to deepen cybersecurity cooperation. They strongly condemned ransomware and other cyber-related crimes and recognized the need to bolster protection of critical networks and infrastructure.

Recalling their countries’ strong tradition of space exploration and endeavors, the Ministers announced the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding on Space Situational Awareness and pledged to expand bilateral space cooperation, acknowledging the pivotal role international cooperation plays in the long-term sustainability and safety of the outer-space environment. They applauded the ongoing development of the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) satellite, planned for launch from India in 2023. The NISAR mission will collect data vital to tackling the climate crisis. The Ministers also looked forward to the convening of the next India-U.S. Civil Space Joint Working Group in 2022.

On UNSC Permanent Membership

The United States congratulated India for its significant contributions as a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the term 2021-2022. In this context, the United States expressed its appreciation for India’s leadership as the Chair of the three Committees of the Security Council: the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the 1373 Counter Terrorism Committee.

The Ministers reiterated their commitment to work together in close coordination at the UNSC and in international organizations. The United States reaffirmed its continued support for India’s permanent membership in a reformed UNSC and for India’s entry to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

On Afghanistan

The Ministers called on the Taliban to abide by UNSC Resolution 2593 (2021), which demands that Afghan territory must never again be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or finance terrorist attacks. The Ministers urged the Taliban to adhere to these and all other commitments; respect the human rights of all Afghans, including women, children, and members of minority groups; and uphold freedom of travel. They also emphasized the importance of an inclusive Afghan government and unhindered access for the United Nations and its implementing partners to deliver humanitarian assistance. The Ministers recommitted to close consultations on Afghanistan to help facilitate an inclusive and peaceful future for all Afghans.

Counterterrorism

The Ministers welcomed the convening of the 18th Meeting of the India-U.S. Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and the 4th Session of the India-U.S. Designations Dialogue in October 2021. The Ministers strongly condemned any use of terrorist proxies and cross-border terrorism in all its forms and called for the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack, and Pathankot attack, to be brought to justice. They called for concerted action against all terrorist groups, including groups proscribed by the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee, such as al-Qa’ida, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), and Hizb ul Mujahideen. The Ministers called on Pakistan to take immediate, sustained, and irreversible action to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks. The Ministers committed to continued exchange of information about sanctions and designations against terror groups and individuals, countering violent radicalism, use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, and cross-border movement of terrorists. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of upholding international standards on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism by all countries, consistent with FATF recommendations.

The Ministers also reaffirmed their support for the early adoption of a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) that advances and strengthens the framework for global cooperation and reinforces that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism.

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India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis. The Indian and Chinese armies have been locked in a border standoff since May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. Since then, the two sides held several rounds of military and diplomatic which have only resulted in partial disengagement of troops from friction points.

So far, India has walked the diplomatic tightrope between the US and Russia, given its own strategic compulsions. Warding off pressure from the US and its European allies to strongly oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is a matter by itself. India hopes that purchase of the five S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile squadrons, under the $5.43 billion (Rs 40,000 crore) contract inked with Russia in October 2018, was an “urgent national security requirement” to counter aggressive neighbours like China and Pakistan. Hence, the US will not impose sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), which seeks to prevent countries from buying Russian weapons, by mounting a major diplomatic-military campaign with both the Trump and Biden administrations.

On the China front, India will need to keep an eagle-eye on the annual exercises of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in March-April along the 3,488-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) and be “prepared for any contingencies.

In addition to the stalemate along the LAC, the IA could face the emergence of another front on its western flank from China’s ‘willing’ affiliate Pakistan, with the aim of dividing India’s already overstretched forces and equally strained financial and equipment resources.

As it is, the PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.

With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.

Apart from conventional military capabilities, China’s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.

“China’s latest demonstration of physically moving one of its disabled satellites into the graveyard orbit is bringing in newer threats in the race to weaponise the space domain, a domain hitherto considered relatively safe,” IAF chief Air Chief Marshal V R Chaudhari said at a seminar on 24 February.

Quad’s Focus

Furthermore, the inchoate and nebulous preemptive deterrent instrumentality like the naval-focused Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, initiated in 2007-08 as a China-containment strategy, and one which included Australia, Japan and the US, has, in its new avatar, proven ineffectual in discouraging Beijing’s adventurism in Ladakh. Besides, all four Quad members are now preoccupied with dealing with the fallout from Ukraine’s invasion and bracing themselves for a unified China-Russia front, in which the latter’s military technology, expertise and know-how would be more aggressively mated and advanced by a financially flush and industrially forward Beijing.

India should now forcefully use its considerable diplomatic clout and its deep friendships on all sides to end the conflict and stabilise the region. The additional advantage in such a solution would be to persuade India’s strategic partners including its Quad partners to turn back their focus on China and the Indo-Pacific.

Beijing-Moscow Axis

The ongoing confusion over the war in Ukraine could impact the LAC situation, as sanctions could drive Moscow into a ‘Chinese embrace’. In that case, India would have to deal with the PLA threat by itself. And to do so it needs to summarily and significantly augment its economic and military capabilities.

India could well end up facing the brunt of this deadly security partnership between Moscow, Beijing and Islamabad. Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on February 25, within hours of the latter having ordered his army’s mobilisation against Kyiv, was ‘significant.’ It had firmly secured Putin’s eastern flank, with the exception of India, which had opted to remain neutral. It is apposite to recall that Putin lifted sanctions on Pakistan in 2014, sold it Mi-35M Hind-E attack helicopters and conducted joint exercises with its army near Peshawar in October 2018.

India’s ‘nightmare scenario’ is  – Washington deciding to confront a greater threat from Russia in its European backyard than from China, and opting for a strategic accommodation with Beijing. Or the US conceding Chinese dominance in Asia to safeguard its European flank from an expansionist Russia.

India’s Options

India needs to forge long-term alliances with advanced materiel producing countries to eventually replace Russian equipment, in addition to ‘realistically’ beefing up its domestic defence manufacturing.

The government’s disjointed and ad hoc approach to fostering military capability development has to stop. The MoD needs to optimise scarce financial resources and focus on immediate security threats and not on optics, like the recent strident official announcement that Indian industry had indigenised the manufacture of assorted military-grade nuts and bolts.

Instead of half-baked measures, India must make self-reliance in military requirements a concrete national mission, along with a special thrust on space, cyberspace and special operations. Moreover, a robust nuclear deterrence is required to deter all adversaries.

The ongoing situation on northern Borders warrants the Indian Army to re-align the operational tasking of its reserve formations to focus on the northern borders and refine warfighting capabilities in high altitude mountainous terrain.

India uneasily awaits the next Chinese misadventure on its borders. Unlike Ukraine, India is alone.

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The leaders also criticized North Korea, which has been testing ballistic missiles and destabilizing the region. The launch of missiles are against United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the leaders reiterated.

The joint statement issued by the Indian, Australian, Japanese Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State, on 12 February, named North Korea explicitly; the statement had veiled references to Pakistan and China.

The statement issued post meeting did not name Pakistan, however called upon all countries to ensure that their soil is not used to launch terror attacks. The statement also denounced terror attacks in India, including the 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks.

The statement also, “urged countries to work together to eliminate terrorist safe havens; disrupt terrorist networks and the infrastructure and financial channels which sustain them, and halt the cross-border movement of terrorists.”

The ministers also shared that Afghanistan must be stopped from becoming a terrorist safe haven.

On the Indo-Pacific region, Quad members reaffirmed their commitment to keep it free and open and added that Indo-Pacific—”a region which is inclusive and resilient, and in which states strive to protect the interests of their people, free from coercion.”

The Japanese Foreign Minister said that the QUAD summit will take place in Japan in the first half of 2022.

The meeting of the four countries has generated a lot of interest as it happens when tension is escalating in Europe over Ukraine and China aggressively posturing in the Indo-Pacific region.

Apart from reaffirmed commitment to a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, the four countries also focussed on expeditious delivery of vaccines, rule-based maritime order, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism efforts and to counter disinformation.

There were differences over the Ukraine issue, as India chose not to take a hard stance against Russia. The joint statement made no mention of the crisis.

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