While the Goa Maritime Conclave sought to project the Indian Navy’s cooperative engagement at the strategic-operational level, by providing a forum for the Chiefs-of-Navy and Heads of Maritime Agencies in the Indian Ocean Region, the IPRD, on the other hand, was the principal manifestation of the Navy’s international engagement at the strategic-level, addressing ‘holistic’ maritime security issues across the Indo-Pacific.

The first two editions of IPRD were held in 2018 and 2019 respectively at New Delhi.  IPRD 2020 was cancelled due to the Covid-19 outbreak. The third edition of IPRD was held in 2021 in online mode and the fourth edition was conducted, reverting to a physical format, at New Delhi in 2022.

Theme of IPRD-2023

The overarching theme of IPRD-2023 was “Geopolitical Impacts upon Indo-Pacific Maritime Trade and Connectivity”. This year’s edition of the IPRD built upon the previous one, which focussed upon ‘Operationalising the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)’, by specifically addressing the ‘Trade, Connectivity and Maritime Transport’ pillar of the IPOI.

IPRD-2023 explored geopolitical impacts upon Indo-Pacific maritime trade and connectivity through six professional sessions spread over a three-day period. 

The sessions were:

Nodes of maritime connectivity;

China’s impact vis-à-vis maritime connectivity across the Indo-Pacific;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade (Part 2);

Private industry in the safety and security of Indo-Pacific maritime trade and shipping; and

Maintaining a rules-based, safe, and secure Indo-Pacific.

Eminent speakers from 16 countries and representatives of the various embassies and high commissions attended and offered diverse regional perspectives on the subject.

Navy Chief’s Address

Speaking at the Indo-Pacific Regional dialogue organised by the Indian Navy, navy chief Admiral R Hari Kumar said that violations of established rules pose a danger to good order at sea. He described the security situation in the South China Sea as “fragile.” He warned that the region is the most militarised in the world and a “contestation” at sea can have adverse economic and social consequences.

“The fragile security situation in the South China Sea, in addition to the happenings of violations of established codes of conduct or confidence building measures, pose a clear and present danger to good order and discipline at sea,” Admiral Kumar said.

The comments were a rare direct reference to the situation in the South China sea and come at a time when China and Pakistan are undertaking large-scale naval drills in the Arabian Sea.

He said that more than 50 warships of extra regional forces are deployed in the Indian Ocean Region on various missions, including anti-piracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indo-Pacific has a significant naval presence, which can lead to confrontation and contestation.

“Owing to the increased presence of multinational forces, and differing interpretations of international laws, there is this fear that the region’s ‘global commons’ can change to ‘contested seas’,” he said. The navy chief added that this contestation at sea “can have adverse consequences for security-physical, social as well as economic”.

Admiral Kumar made a case for greater collaboration between nations in the maritime nation. “We are traversing through a contested present into an uncertain future. The future of global commons hinges on cooperative efforts of nations,” he said.

He said that cooperative or collaborative systems amongst like-minded maritime nations are essential for a stable future. He also made a strong case for developing interoperability and trust between nations, saying this requires a sustained and continued engagement.

Chinese Threat

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) presents the greatest challenge to the Indian Navy in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAN is supported by the China Coast Guard and the Chinese maritime militia in furthering Chinese national interest in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s friendship with Pakistan is of concern as they together present a new challenge to India in the maritime domain. India considers the Indian Ocean region as the key to India’s security and also aims to build credibility in the Indo-Pacific.

The dispute over Taiwan and China’s aggressive posture in the South and East China Seas, and China’s rivalry with America for dominance in those waters has brought the Indo-Pacific region centrestage. China’s ‘grey zone’ operations against US maritime forces and its allies have further sharpened rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s Linkages with the Indo-Pacific

The Indian government’s has often enunciated a vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific is the gateway to the Indian Ocean from the east with crucial trade and security implications. Hence its is of vital interest to India as also to ASEAN countries. India has linkages with many countries of southeast Asia and east Asia. The Indian Navy has been exercising with navies of the ASEAN region for many years. The Malabar series of exercises include participation by the United States navy and Japanese Self Defence Forces. Ther Indian Navy has exercised not only in the Bay of Bengal but in the western Pacific as well.

India’s ‘Look East’ policy was enunciated in the early 1990s, keeping in mind its maritime and security interests. The same has transformed into ‘Act East’ policy. In pursuit of this policy, the Indian Navy has engaged its counterparts in the Indo-Pacific by way of maritime military cooperation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Piracy, maritime terrorism, maritime crimes like drug and human trafficking, are some of the other threats which the Indian Navy has to be deal with. Other non-traditional threats include climate change-induced sea-level rise and maritime pollution. State actors in particular are challenging the rules-based, liberal international order and need to be dealt with.

Indian Navy’s Approach

The Indian Navy provides maritime security for safe trade and monitors vessels that enter or leave the Indian Ocean region through the Malacca Strait, with the Andaman and Nicobar Command’s undertaking regular surveillance. Coordinated naval patrols with Bangladesh, Thai and Indonesian navies have been institutionalised. Maritime partnership exercises are conducted with Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar, in bilateral or multilateral formats.

Indian naval ships, submarines and aircraft have undertaken long-range overseas deployments, across the Indo-Pacific as far as Japan, Hawaii and Australia.

Towards becoming a net security provider in the region, the Indian Navy has been helping smaller maritime neighbours and providing platforms and equipment for their navies. Neibhbours have appreciated India’s help in training, repairs, expertise in hydrography, maritime surveys and cartographic assistance.

The Indian Navy is the first responder in the region for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, earthquakes, cyclones, and pandemics the Indian Navy’s contribution with relief supplies with professionalism has created yremendous goodwill.

Comments

The Indo-Pacific region stretches from the coastlines of East Africa to the western Americas. It is today a vital oceanic space comprising critical chokepoints that carry a majority of the world’s trade. The chokepoints are situated at key geopolitical flashpoints. The Indo-Pacific is now perceived as vital for energy security, maritime security, and maritime commerce. The Indian Navy is is a formidable and potent force to provide such security in the region.

The Indian Navy is preparing a 175-ship plan (25 ships more than its current strength of 150) to particularly deal with the Chinese threat in the Indian Ocean.

India has strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Southeast Asian countries, and West Asian countries. India is also involved in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) featuring three partners in the US, Japan, and Australia.

The Indian Navy is playing an important role in realising the Indian government’s vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

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India will have to grapple with a more belligerent China along its northern borders as a fallout of the Ukraine crisis. The Indian and Chinese armies have been locked in a border standoff since May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. Since then, the two sides held several rounds of military and diplomatic which have only resulted in partial disengagement of troops from friction points.

So far, India has walked the diplomatic tightrope between the US and Russia, given its own strategic compulsions. Warding off pressure from the US and its European allies to strongly oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is a matter by itself. India hopes that purchase of the five S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile squadrons, under the $5.43 billion (Rs 40,000 crore) contract inked with Russia in October 2018, was an “urgent national security requirement” to counter aggressive neighbours like China and Pakistan. Hence, the US will not impose sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), which seeks to prevent countries from buying Russian weapons, by mounting a major diplomatic-military campaign with both the Trump and Biden administrations.

On the China front, India will need to keep an eagle-eye on the annual exercises of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in March-April along the 3,488-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) and be “prepared for any contingencies.

In addition to the stalemate along the LAC, the IA could face the emergence of another front on its western flank from China’s ‘willing’ affiliate Pakistan, with the aim of dividing India’s already overstretched forces and equally strained financial and equipment resources.

As it is, the PLA has shown no signs of de-escalating the 21-month-long troop confrontation in eastern Ladakh, even as it has systematically strengthened its military positions and infrastructure all along the LAC.

With the attention of the US-led West diverted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine instead of countering China in the Indo-Pacific, an emboldened Beijing is likely to indulge in muscle-flexing along the LAC, especially in the Arunachal sector.

Apart from conventional military capabilities, China’s focus on space, cyberspace and “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare has been a major concern for India.

“China’s latest demonstration of physically moving one of its disabled satellites into the graveyard orbit is bringing in newer threats in the race to weaponise the space domain, a domain hitherto considered relatively safe,” IAF chief Air Chief Marshal V R Chaudhari said at a seminar on 24 February.

Quad’s Focus

Furthermore, the inchoate and nebulous preemptive deterrent instrumentality like the naval-focused Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, initiated in 2007-08 as a China-containment strategy, and one which included Australia, Japan and the US, has, in its new avatar, proven ineffectual in discouraging Beijing’s adventurism in Ladakh. Besides, all four Quad members are now preoccupied with dealing with the fallout from Ukraine’s invasion and bracing themselves for a unified China-Russia front, in which the latter’s military technology, expertise and know-how would be more aggressively mated and advanced by a financially flush and industrially forward Beijing.

India should now forcefully use its considerable diplomatic clout and its deep friendships on all sides to end the conflict and stabilise the region. The additional advantage in such a solution would be to persuade India’s strategic partners including its Quad partners to turn back their focus on China and the Indo-Pacific.

Beijing-Moscow Axis

The ongoing confusion over the war in Ukraine could impact the LAC situation, as sanctions could drive Moscow into a ‘Chinese embrace’. In that case, India would have to deal with the PLA threat by itself. And to do so it needs to summarily and significantly augment its economic and military capabilities.

India could well end up facing the brunt of this deadly security partnership between Moscow, Beijing and Islamabad. Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on February 25, within hours of the latter having ordered his army’s mobilisation against Kyiv, was ‘significant.’ It had firmly secured Putin’s eastern flank, with the exception of India, which had opted to remain neutral. It is apposite to recall that Putin lifted sanctions on Pakistan in 2014, sold it Mi-35M Hind-E attack helicopters and conducted joint exercises with its army near Peshawar in October 2018.

India’s ‘nightmare scenario’ is  – Washington deciding to confront a greater threat from Russia in its European backyard than from China, and opting for a strategic accommodation with Beijing. Or the US conceding Chinese dominance in Asia to safeguard its European flank from an expansionist Russia.

India’s Options

India needs to forge long-term alliances with advanced materiel producing countries to eventually replace Russian equipment, in addition to ‘realistically’ beefing up its domestic defence manufacturing.

The government’s disjointed and ad hoc approach to fostering military capability development has to stop. The MoD needs to optimise scarce financial resources and focus on immediate security threats and not on optics, like the recent strident official announcement that Indian industry had indigenised the manufacture of assorted military-grade nuts and bolts.

Instead of half-baked measures, India must make self-reliance in military requirements a concrete national mission, along with a special thrust on space, cyberspace and special operations. Moreover, a robust nuclear deterrence is required to deter all adversaries.

The ongoing situation on northern Borders warrants the Indian Army to re-align the operational tasking of its reserve formations to focus on the northern borders and refine warfighting capabilities in high altitude mountainous terrain.

India uneasily awaits the next Chinese misadventure on its borders. Unlike Ukraine, India is alone.

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Sea Dragon is a US-led multi-national exercise designed to practice and discuss Anti-submarine warfare tactics to operate together in response to traditional and non-traditional maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

The exercise, primarily focused on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training, will involve more than 270 hours of in-flight training and activities ranging from tracking simulated targets to tracking a US Navy submarine. Each event will be graded and the country scoring the highest points will receive the Dragon Belt award.

The wargame, being held at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, includes contingents from the Indian Navy, the US Navy, Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force and the South Korean Navy.

Two P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft of the US Navy are participating in the drill. During classroom training sessions, pilots and flight officers from all the countries will build plans and discuss tactics incorporating the capabilities and equipment of their nations, the US Pacific Fleet said in a statement.

“As [officer-in-charge], I am eager for the opportunity to further develop our partnerships with Australia, Canada, India, Japan, and Korea while at Sea Dragon 2022,” said Lt Cmdr Braz Kennedy, officer-in-charge of the US detachment from Patrol Squadron 47.

The Royal Canadian Air Force won the Dragon Belt at last year’s exercise and is defending the title at Sea Dragon 2022.

“This exercise is an annual, multi-national high-end ASW training exercise,” said Cmdr Tomoyuki Michiyama, commanding officer of Flight Division 31 of Air Patrol Squadron 3 of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force.

“I believe that by conducting a wide range of training, from classroom training on the ground to actual training targeting a submarine, we will be able to improve our tactical skills. In addition, through training, exchange of opinions, and various types of exchanges, we expect to strengthen cooperation and deepen mutual understanding among the participating navies and air forces.”

The P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will conduct maritime patrols and reconnaissance and theatre outreach operations within the US Pacific Fleet area of operations.

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So far, one or the other of the Quad countries has been reluctant to ruffle Beijing’s feathers at different times. After participating in joint exercises with India in 2007, Australia pulled away, wary of evoking Chinese displeasure. India, too, had been reticent about participating in a grouping directed against China. China’s belligerence in recent months has forced the Quad countries to shed such inhibitions.

The coronavirus, concerns over Chinese government actions in Hong Kong, the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, military incursions into the South China Sea and political interference have all given an impetus to strengthen the Quad.

The Quad

In response to China’s aggressive policies, the Quad – a strategic coalition of the Indo-Pacific region’s leading democracies (US, India, Japan and Australia) – is solidifying its alliance. Following a meeting of the foreign ministers of the four countries in Tokyo, on 6 October, the four countries are now actively working toward establishing a new multilateral security structure for the region.

There are efforts to develop a close security partnership founded on shared values and interests, including the rule of law, freedom of navigation, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution, free markets, and free trade.

China represents a growing challenge to all these principles.

European Support

The Quad’s focus also extends to ensuring a stable balance of power within a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” While all of the Quad partners agree in this principle, Chinese expansionism that has accelerated their recent actions. Even United Kingdom, France and Germany view it (rules-based Indo-Pacific) as essential for international peace and security.

France has appointed an ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, after unveiling a new strategy affirming the region’s importance in any stable, law-based, multipolar global order.

In September 2020, Germany, Europe’s largest economy, which has long enjoyed close ties with Beijing, released its first Indo-Pacific strategy focused on increasing diplomatic pressure on China.

Germany has sought to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy for the European Union. It has released policy guidelines, which call for measures to ensure that rules prevail over a “might-makes-right” approach in the Indo-Pacific. Germany currently holds the European Council presidency.

France

Apart from the Quad, which also includes Australia and Japan in addition to the US, India has been exercising regularly with France. The last one was conducted at French Reunion Island in the expanded Indian Ocean waters. India has discussed conducting similar exercises with the UK and Russia.

Giving up its reluctance to offend China which whom it has business interests, French president Emmanuel Macron has appointed Christophe Penot, his ambassador to Australia, to the new post of ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, realising the danger of Chinese hegemony.

During Macron’s visit to India in March 2018, addressing a French gathering in New Delhi, he reminded his countrymen: “France is a power of the Indian and Pacific Oceans; we are present at Reunion, we are also there in French Polynesia and New Caledonia. And we are a maritime power, it is often forgotten but France is the second maritime power in the world. We have a strong navy, we have nuclear submarines equipped like few other powers in the world; a maritime surveillance capability through our own satellites and technologies; it is obvious we are a military and intelligence power ranking us among the first nations in the world.”

C. Raja Mohan and Darshana Baruah wrote for Carnagie India, in 20028,on Deepening the India-France Maritime Partnership, thus: “As maritime security acquires greater salience in India’s foreign policy, New Delhi is increasingly looking to leverage its strategic partnerships, particularly with Paris. Although India and France have joined forces on a number of issues since 1998, regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has never risen to the top of the agenda. However, this may be about to change.”

New Multilateral Security Arrangement

The Quad was resurrected in late 2017, but in late-2019, it gained momentum, when its consultations were elevated to the foreign-minister level. It had been lying dormant for nine years.

Since the US, Japan and Australia are already tied by bilateral and trilateral security alliances among themselves, the future of the Quad hinges on India. India is also directly facing Chinese territorial aggression besides having a large border with it. This aggression has changed the strategic equation. With India having taken a confrontational position, the Quad is now more likely to shift from consultation and coordination to a strategic alliance for a new multilateral security arrangement for the region.

ALSO READ: JOINT EXERCISES – Quad Navies Hold 24th Malabar Exercise

The US has been working on getting India into a “soft alliance” devoid of any treaty obligations. On October 26-27, Pompeo and US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper visited New Delhi for the 2+2 Dialogue with their Indian counterparts. The meeting concluded with India signing the last of the four foundational agreements, under which both countries are committed to providing reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities, securing military communications, and sharing geospatial data from airborne and satellite sensors.

When India invited Australia to the “Malabar” naval war games in November 2020, with the US and Japan, the Chinese communist mouthpiece Global Times, said “it would signal that the Quad military alliance is officially formed.”

During a visit to Malaysia, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that Washington aimed to build an “Indo-Pacific NATO” through the Quad.

The Quad’s consolidation is evidence that the Xi regime’s aggressive policies have started to backfire. International views of China have reached new lows this year.

The Quad symbolises an emerging international effort to establish a check on Chinese power.

India’s Initiative

India took the lead in banning Chinese apps. It was India’s decision that had elevated the Quad dialogue to ministerial-level in 2019. India shed its reticence and decided to welcome Australia to the Malabar 2020 exercise.

India pulled out from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in 2019. China’s actions have since led to the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) involving India, Japan and Australia, focussed on key sectors such as semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and telecommunications.

US Role

The US has played a key role in the region’s stability and prosperity since Second World II. US military presence prevented Japan from re-arming itself. It has stopped China from risking military adventurism across the Taiwan Strait and kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula. But, China, which is the biggest beneficiary of the trans-Pacific trade and investment flows, does not see it that way.

The US position on the South China Sea, which is in alignment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal award of 2016, boosts the morale of disputants such as the Philippines, who are routinely bullied by China.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

China is maintaining a quasi-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean region, under the cloak of anti-piracy deployments, with bases in Gwadar and Djibouti for penetrating South Asia, the Gulf region and littoral Africa.

Beijing views the “Indo-Pacific” as a direct threat to the BRI and as an “encirclement” strategy.

Comments

Would the US stand by India if its own ties with China improve? In the event of a war with China, others may not be willing to risk their own relations with Beijing to support India, other than with intelligence support. India’s security challenges are primarily continental. Quad countries may not be may not be able to deal with the kind of challenges that a border war with China entails.

The Quad holds potential for India in the economic and technological domains rather than its value in the military domain by way of building up an alternative global supply chain and reducing trade dependency on China. Tokyo is already seriously exploring such collaboration with India. Similarly, India could take this further with the US and Australia, rather than focus on the military dimension alone.

In the future, the Quad could gradually be elevated to the level of vice minister and minister.

There are no limits to the number of active and possibly participating friends that can be added to the Quad, in the Indian Ocean.

South Asia as a whole has ceased to be the ‘traditional sphere of Indian influence’, a title we may have to share with others.

From left to right, external affairs minister S Jaishankar, Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga, Australian foreign minister Marise Payne and US secretary of state Mike Pompeo pose for a picture before a four Indo-Pacific nations’ foreign ministers meeting at the minister’s office in Tokyo 2020.

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The Malabar exercise aims at interoperability with emphasis on humanitarian assistance, surface war manoeuvres, anti-submarines warfare, counter-terror operations and aerial surveillance. Classically, it is enhancing capabilities of operating jointly in an adverse scenario if the situation so demands.

The invitation by India went out to the Australian Navy two weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad countries held extensive talks in Tokyo, on 6 October, with a focus on enhancing their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, a region that has witnessed increasing Chinese military assertiveness.

ALSO READ: JOINT EXERCISES – Quad Navies Hold 24th Malabar Exercise

In the Quad meeting, foreign affairs minister S Jaishankar stated, “We remain committed to upholding the rules-based international order, underpinned by the rule of law, transparency, freedom of navigation in the international seas, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes.” Jaishankar also emphasized that Quad was aiming for ‘maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.’

In her reaction, Australian defence minister Linda Reynolds termed the participation of her country in the exercise a “milestone opportunity” and said it would showcase the “deep trust” between four major Indo-Pacific democracies and their shared will to work together on common security interests.

“High-end military exercises like Malabar are key to enhancing Australia’s maritime capabilities, building interoperability with our close partners, and demonstrating our collective resolve to support an open and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” Reynolds said.

Growing Ties

Defence and security ties between India and Australia have been on an upswing in the last few years. In June, India and Australia elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a landmark deal for reciprocal access to military bases for logistics support during an online summit between prime minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison. India has already inked mutual logistics support deal with the other two Quad members.

The Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) allows militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall defence cooperation.

In September, the navies of India and Australia carried out a two-day mega exercise in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that featured a range of complex naval manoeuvres, anti-aircraft drills and helicopter operations.

The last time Australian naval ships joined Malabar was back in 2007, when it was a five-nation exercise involving India, US, Japan, Singapore and Australia. Until 2007, Malabar was an annual bilateral exercise with the US Navy that was launched in 1992.

Military Strategy

The military strengthening of the Quad raises the possibility of India countering a China offensive in the Himalayas by exercising its option of opening the maritime front. Opening the third front is not impossible since India’s geographic advantages in the Indian Ocean provides the potential to project a potent maritime threat. It involves a measure of risk and the call would have to be taken by the political leadership. Indian military strategy based on defending the land borders and launching an offensive in the maritime domain is only possible with the support of Quad nations acting in concert.

Australia-China Equation

China continues to be Australia’s largest trading partner and accounts for 32.6 per cent of its exports. Besides, China sources iron ore, coal and gas from Australia because of its geographical proximity. India was sceptical about Australia doing anything to jeopardise this mutually beneficial relationship and risk China hitting back.

India’s announcement of Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise was, thus, significant geo-politically because four of the biggest democracies with stakes in the region are collectively committed to preserving open waters and hold off China’s misadventures to monopolise them ruthlessly.

ALSO READ: Editorial: Towards a Comprehensive Indo-US Strategic Partnership

When virus-hit Australia spearheaded a petition for a neutral, global investigation into Covid-19’s origins and China’s role in it, it was immediately hit by China, which imposed an 80 per cent tariff on Australian barley and ban on beef imports. Ever since, Australia had been looking to find allies where it could diversify markets and find support. One of the results was the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, agreed upon by prime minister Scott Morrison and prime minister Narendra Modi on 4 June 2020.

Quad Plus

The current Quad plus which includes South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam, though aimed at China, is more than just a consultative or possibly future military grouping or alliance. It also has an economic component which could benefit India, as all countries within the group seek decoupling from China.

The broad objectives of its participants are political equilibrium and a sustainable security architecture.

Comments

The move to invite Australia to participate in the Malabar 2020 naval exercises marked an important inflexion point not only in India’s bilateral relations with Australia but also in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.  The naval exercise imparted a military dimension to the Quad.

The main reason behind Delhi’s hesitation so far was the concern that including Australia into the Quad might offend China’s political sensitivity. Clearly, India’s calculus on China has changed as China’s undermined India’s territorial integrity and regional and multilateral interests. The aggression in Ladakh was possibly the last straw.

Administratively, rather than geopolitically, having separate exercises with each of the partners was not logical. It was more sensible to combine them into one. But the multilateral exercise in the Bay of Bengal produced vehement protests from China, which dubbed it as an “Asian NATO”.

Rather than bringing the Quad partners into India’s territorial battles against Beijing, the strengthening of the Quad is more about expanding India’s bilateral security ties with Australia, whose potential is immense.

India would not desire to be sucked into operations in the South China Sea unless they are of specific concern to India. India would also be careful not to allow its diplomatic ties with Russia, Iran and other nations, where the US has differing perceptions, to deteriorate by joining a US-led alliance.

The full-fledged military alliance gives an emboldened Quad the robustness to act together against Chinese assertiveness and debt-trap diplomacy. So far, only the US had directly dared to call out China. Over time, if mutual interests and concerns converge, the Quad could become what the US calls a NATO-like presence in Asia that could contain China’s expansionist designs. It could lead to the establishment of an economic coalition of sorts, with a Quad Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to reduce the dependence on China.

The Quad consolidation can make it difficult for Beijing to monitor the entire South China Sea, which it claims as its own.

The international order is evolving quickly, mainly due to a consensus amongst every major liberal democracy in the world, that China is a threat – to political systems and open societies, economic self-reliance, and a rules-based regime, particularly in the international seas. Chinese aggression against India makes it incumbent on New Delhi to explore and deepen every international alliance which can serve as a source of symbolic and substantive support, including in the maritime domain where China has obvious vulnerabilities.

One view is that cementing the Quad will alienate China further and make reconciliation difficult. India has realised that China tends to respect power and strength. Economic strength and partnerships such as the Quad can broaden India’s options with China.

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The meeting will discuss collaboration among Quad countries in counter-terrorism, cyber and maritime security, development finance, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, according to South Block officials. The ministers are also expected to discuss practical collaborations in developing advanced technologies including 5G and 5G-plus telecom standards as well as securing the sea lanes of communications in the Indo-Pacific.

While Beijing is expected to take aim at the four partners for seeking to target China at the meeting, there has been a sea change since the ministers met informally on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 2019. Quad is expected to take steps towards an institutionalized dialogue at the meeting, where Chinese actions since the rise of global pandemic from Wuhan will come under a magnifying glass.

Relationships Changed

The Quad ministerial comes at a time when the Donald Trump administration has made a U-turn on US policy towards China, which was guided by the rapprochement policy tailored by Henry Kissinger 50 years ago under the Republican administration of Richard Nixon. The tough, new US policy towards Communist China was defined by US secretary of state Mike Pompeo in his Nixon Library address on July 24.

The Indian relationship with China has taken a 180-degree turn since the Chennai summit on October 11-12, 2019, after the People’s Liberation Army’s aggression in eastern Ladakh in May. The armies of the two countries are still locked in a staring match in Ladakh with both sides losing soldiers in the June 15 Galwan Valley flare-up and firing in the air in the first week of September after the Indian Army pre-empted the PLA south of Pangong Tso. This is not all.

Australia’s relationship with China, its largest trading partner, has nosedived with Beijing imposing an 80% tariff on barley, launching an anti-dumping investigation of Australian wine, blocking Australian beef, arresting an Australian journalist and banning two academics from visiting China.

The situation with Japan is no different, with Chinese warmongering over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea forcing Tokyo to increase its defence budget to a record. Tokyo is also upset over new security laws in Hong Kong and pressure put on democratic Taiwan by Beijing.

In short, all the four Quad partners have their own reasons for being upset with China’s aggressive posture under paramount leader Xi Jinping under the mask of the deadly coronavirus disease (Covid-19) pandemic. The Chinese posture in the Indo-Pacific and the threat it poses to the democratic world will be discussed at the Tokyo ministerial, with all Quadl partners sharing their experiences.

Given that all the Quad partners have a military supply and logistics sharing agreement with each other, the foreign ministers will also take a decision on a four-nation naval exercise under the rubric of Malabar in the Arabian Sea to signal their commitment for free and open navigation in the Indo-Pacific.

Source

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The US, Japan, Australia and India are the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Starting with the then Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, the group was revived in late 2017 and has since been meeting on a semi-annual basis. As the initial proposal for Quad 1.0 in 2007 could not survive, the question for Quad 2.0, since 2017, has been whether the latter can effectively navigate the region’s uncertain dynamics. During the Quad’s decade-long recess, China aggressively solidified its naval presence in the region and efforts to persuade China to halt its aggression bore no fruit. While there is plenty of room for cooperation within the Quad, the discussion of China’s increasing influence over the South China Sea should take centre stage.

The Quad is not a formal military alliance. The US would like to see it become something like an Asian NATO. As deputy secretary of state Stephen Biegun has said, “Remember even NATO started with relatively modest expectations and a number of countries [initially] chose neutrality over NATO membership.” India has long been hesitant about joining any such military alliance and has even put up some resistance to the idea. When it comes to the South China Sea crisis, it remains unclear just how much heed China will pay to a merely political association of these four powers, given how deeply invested the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become in building out the China’s physical footprint in the region. However, because mutual interests among the four powers have increased, while grievances toward China have continued to run ever deeper over the past decade, there are at least two reasons why Quad 2.0 will likely be more effective than Quad 1.0.

First, an even greater convergence of interests between the four members has emerged since the association’s inception. As one of the core examples of the increasing concept of the Indo-Pacific (IP) configuration, which aims to make a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” the Quad seeks to secure the critical sea lanes of communication connecting the two oceans, as a shared objective. Capt (Dr) Gurpreet S. Khurana, who coined the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2007, opined that “free” means no barriers to use of the seas for the prosperity of all states and “open” means “an environment that facilitates sea-going enterprise enabled by inclusiveness of the comity of nations that seek to meet their national ends through the fairness of such enterprise.” Such an integrated strategic vision, which was lacking from Quad 1.0, clearly seems to be driving Quad 2.0.

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Second, there is currently no comparable alternative means by which these states can deter China’s continued unwelcome advances in the region. In addition, Quad 2.0 reflects the building frustration shared by these states, which emphasize the need for the rule of law in international relations over and against China’s nationalistic and more unilateral approach, which balks at any constraints that might be placed on it under an international rules-based order. As U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Philip Davidson said “an emboldened Communist Party of China seeks to change the world in which Chinese national power is more important than international law.”

The following are examples of grievances by individual states, and their efforts to get redress for their South China Sea disputes with China through reliance on and recourse to international law.

Efforts to restore the rule of law attempted by the Philippines ended in a victory on paper but a failure in practice in 2016. When the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled unanimously, by a vote of 16–0, that there were no legal ground for China to assert that the disputed area is its own based on historical rights, China refused to abide by the ruling.

The US has conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the area, yet Chinese behavior in the region in these disputed waters remains unchanged. Rather, China’s land-reclamation and installation-building projects, along with other “legitimacy-building” efforts around small maritime features, such as sending patrol boats to the area regularly, along with other low-level provocations at sea, continue apace. US frustration has been palpable. Furthermore, China has pursued its own strategy of FONOPs, not only in the South China Sea, but more broadly in the region.

With respect to Australia, China sent a reconnaissance ship near the coast of Queensland to monitor U.S.-Australia naval exercises in July 2017. One of the Chinese major news outlets, the Global Times, reported that while the Australian Ministry of Defence stated that Australia “respects the right of all countries to navigate freely in international waters,” Australian media nevertheless displayed a fierce attitude, declaring that the behavior of the Chinese ship was “provocative” and “worrying.” But the Chinese newspaper went on to say that what was important was for China “to give both parties [the U.S. and Australia] more insights into understanding FONOPs. Australians learn more about the seriousness of the South China Sea issue and understand the Chinese concern [surrounding FONOPs].” This incident shows how China’s view of the scope for their FONOPs goes beyond Southeast Asia, and that sending a strong message to Australia on this matter was strategically important.

Similarly, a PLA Navy reconnaissance vessel entered Japanese territorial waters on 15 June 2016 for about one hour and thirty minutes. This marked the first such incursion since 2004, when a Chinese nuclear submarine did likewise. China’s Ministry of Defense Information Bureau said that the action was “in compliance with freedom of navigation from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” However, Japan’s national broadcasting organization, Nippon HōsōKyōkai (NHK), interpreted this action as being designed to prevent Japan from getting involved with the ongoing South China Sea territorial and navigational freedom disputes. Another Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, described the affair as a “Chinese version of freedom of navigation,” and argued that the reason for China taking such action was that Japan, the U.S. and other states were targeting China for constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea and that China saw this as its rivals attempting to erect a string of maritime siege towers around China, thereby making China insecure.

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While Britain is not a member of the Quad, China’s warning to other states that might engage in hampering the building up of China’s “own legitimacy in the South China Sea” has continued. On 3 June 2018, France and Britain’s defence ministries reported that they would send warships to sail through the South China Sea to challenge China’s excessive claims on the region. On 5 June, the Chinese military’s TV network, First Military Intelligence, issued a warning, stating: “China will use British warships as a model to let them taste frustration.” The network further stated that the British case was like “kill[ing] a chicken to give a lesson to monkeys.” (Shā​jī​jǐnghóu). In other words, Britain should be made an example of, in order to scare other countries, so that it dare not follow in the footsteps of the “chicken.”

Such Chinese behavior, which has frustrated states that understand the importance of the rule of the law and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, generates hopeful that the role of the Quad this time around should have a greater chance of success than did the Quad 1.0.

The question remains, then: What about enlarging the Quad’s membership? Bringing in more states from around the region would means both more soft and more hard power. But would smaller nations be willing to join? On the possibility of having a Quad-plus dialogue, Biegun said on 31 August 2020, it might include South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand. In addition, U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo mentioned on 1 September 2020 that, “in addition to India, Australia and Japan, Korea will become a partner of the United States.” South Korean foreign minister Kang Kyunghwa played down the idea and denied that there had been any formal request from the U.S. to join it or talk about it.”

As the South Korean case reveals, states would prefer to be able to avoid being forced into making a hard binary choice between aligning themselves solely with the U.S. or China. However, in general, these potential “plus” states share the common objective of support for the rule of law and a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, since South Korea and New Zealand are already formal military allies of the United States, and since both already have a shared interest in what the Quad is aiming for, if Quad 2.0 can establish unity among its core four members, it can have a brighter future than its previous iteration.

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They upgraded their strategic ties to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, and signed other science and technology agreements among the nine bilateral cooperation documents following a discussion at the virtual summit.

The ‘Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support‘ (MLSA) will allow militaries of the two countries to use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall defence cooperation.

The ‘Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defence Science and Technology to the MoU on Defence Cooperation’ was also signed.    

Shared Vision

India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue along with Australia, Japan, and the US. With these agreements in place it is expected that Australia would be invited for the annual multilateral exercise Malabar comprising of India, US and Japan. The third edition of AUSINDEX-2019 was held in the Bay of Bengal in April 2019.

The other pacts will provide for bilateral cooperation in areas of cyber and cyber-enabled critical technology, mining and minerals, military technology, vocational education and water resources management.

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Modi and Morrison also decided to announce a ‘Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region‘ to “harness opportunities and meet challenges together” as ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partners‘.

India has previously signed logistics support agreement, called Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, with the United States in 2016 under which the two nations’ military assets such as warships will receive reciprocal cashless supplies while docked at each other’s port. The two nations have also pursued the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) since 2012 for cooperation on military technology joint development and production.

Bilateral Cooperation

The bilateral economic engagement too has been on an upswing in the last few years. According to official data, the trade between the two countries was around USD 21 billion in 2018-19.

Australia’s cumulative investment in India is about USD 10.74 billion whereas India’s total investment in Australia is USD 10.45 billion. Australian Super Pension Fund has invested USD 1 billion in India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund. In the last few years, both the countries have been focusing on expanding maritime cooperation.

Historical Background

Indian and Australian troops first fought together in 1915 in the trenches of Gallipoli against the Turks and thereafter against the onslaught of the Afrika Korps led by Rommel during the siege of Tobruk in 1941. They have also fought shoulder to shoulder in the jungles of Malaya and in the Far East.

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The two countries also share a common love for cricket and sporting ties are second only to those of war.

Pre partition, both India and Australia were part of the British Empire, while India was ruled by the British, Australia was a self-governing dominion.

Australia prides itself on being a multi-cultural society and in a population of 25 million over 1.2 million are ethnic Chinese whereas Indians are nearly 7 lacs representing over 2.8 % of the population. Indians are, however, the highest growing migrant community.

The Andaman & Nicobar Islands became part of India in 1950. Thereafter, the paths of India and Australia diverged with the cold war. Australia is firmly aligned with the US and India on the path of non-alignment.

In 1990, Australia sold 50 Mirage III aircraft which had been decommissioned by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in 1988 to Pakistan.

Australia not only condemned India’s nuclear tests conducted in 1998, but also suspended all bilateral defence ties including recalling Australian officers attending courses in India, doubling military aid to Pakistan, which it cancelled after Pakistan conducted its nuclear test and banning the sale of uranium to India because India was not a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This ban was finally lifted after the signing of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in September 2014 during the visit of Prime Minister Tony Abbott to India.

India has no option but to weaponize its nuclear deterrent, whereas Australia, having 31 % of the world’s uranium reserves is protected by being under the US nuclear umbrella.

India and Australia, though located geographically at two extremities of the Indo–Pacific are the largest maritime powers in the region and shoulder the responsibility of its security. Australia would like to India becoming a more assertive maritime power.

Australia depends on the US for its security needs and at the same time China is its biggest trading partner. Chinese–Australian trade in 2018-19 stood at A$ 235 billion, accounting for nearly 26 % of its total trade, with the balance of trade firmly in Australia’s favour whereas with India it is A$ 30.3 billion.

With China’s belligerence increasing and the responsibilities of security of the Eastern Indian Ocean, Australia will need to make a tough choice between trade and security.

Australian officers have been attending courses in India regularly.

A Framework for Security Cooperation was also agreed during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Australia in November 2014.

AUSINDEX, the first bilateral exercise commenced in 2015.

Both countries have also been holding a Two plus Two Defence and Foreign Secretary-level dialogue since 2018.

In March 2019, Australia along with Bangladesh also co-sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council for blacklisting Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM ) Chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist.

The agreements, signed on 4 June, commit both countries to deepening military integration, including joint exercises and grant access to each other’s bases for logistical support. The joint statement issued at the end of the summit stated “as two Indo – Pacific countries, India & Australia have an enduring interest in a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo – Pacific region.”

Today, both nations acknowledge the US as the dominant power to balance China in the Indian Ocean Region.

Comments

It is not unexpected that India moves to invite Australia to the Malabar drills. It will take place sooner or later. India’s strategy is to expand its sphere of influence into the entire Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. Wanting to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific region, New Delhi seeks to become a greater power.

With restrained naval might and a tight defence budget, Australia would like to enhance its relations with India, Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as some South Pacific island countries.

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Malabar Exercises

The Indian Navy (IN) has been undertaking Malabar Exercises with the US Navy (USN) since 1992. Navies of the US, France, UK, etc have been interested in co-operation with IN, primarily due to their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The first ‘Malabar ‘ took place in 1992 but was suspended after three years due to US sanctions imposed after India’s nuclear tests. The exercises were resumed in 2002, when India agreed to join the US campaign on ‘War on Terror’. Malabar exercises, today, are complex naval exercises, encompassing Anti Air Warfare (AAW), Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Weapon firings, Dissimilar Air Combat,  Maritime Interdiction, Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS), Diving and salvage operation, Mine Countermeasure (MCM), Special Forces Operations, etc. 

In 2007 of Malabar became a multilateral exercise in the Bay of Bengal with USN, IN, Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) and Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). The Chinese were not pleased with such a large coalition exercising together. Since then only bilateral exercises have been held. Japan is also a permanent member of the Malabar exercise coalition since 2015.

Malabar Exercises are increasingly being seen as diplomatic exercises to send a strategic message to China particularly as a tit for tat when Chinese intrusions take place along the Indian border with China.

China is aware that IN continuously monitors the Malacca strait choke point through which nearly 80% of China’s trade flows. Hence, China sees Malabar as a ganging up of likeminded navies, which can hurt China in the SCS.

China has remained bitterly opposed to Malabar because it saw the growing relationship as India’s first step on the American bandwagon. Consequently, when Malabar-2007 was enlarged to accommodate Australia, Singapore and Japan, China sent a diplomatic protest conveying its fear and displeasure. It took another eight years before Japan was formally admitted to make Malabar a tri-lateral event in 2015.

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