30 Jun 2023. White House. Washington.

Director CIA, William Burns asked for a most urgent meeting with President Joe Biden on 30 Jun 23. Director CIA pointed out that the Ukrainian counter-offensive had stalled badly and they had taken heavy losses.

“But you already told me that”, the president interjected. The Director CIA took a deep breath. “But what I’m about to tell you is far worse, Mr President. In fact, it is explosive.” The president looked at him in surprise.

“Mr President, we have received very hard intelligence that China has preponed its time line for attack on Taiwan. We understand that this will go in now in Apr 2024.”

“What? The president was genuinely alarmed. “How do we know this?”

The Director CIA pursed his lips. How much could he reveal now, he wondered to himself. “Mr President, firstly, these are the clear battle indications:-

• The Chinese are rapidly reducing their holdings of US treasury bonds and securities. They are trying to cut down dollar holdings of their forex reserves. They have drawn lessons from how we simply seized 300 billion dollars worth of Russian forex reserves.

• They are building up their gold reserves.

• They are building up stocks of fuel and food. In fact, even during Covid, they refused to touch their food reserve stocks.

• They are building up their blood banks for military hospitals.

• The PLA has been carrying out increasingly more realistic exercises. They have already practised enforcing a blockade and gaining air and maritime control over and around Taiwan. Next year, they are planning a full-fledged joint island landing campaign exercise which could easily be turned to actuals.”

“All of that still doesn’t give us an exact timeline” said the president impatiently.

“Exactly, Mr President. I took this time to come to you because we wanted to be very certain. But we now have solid human intelligence that the CMC has decided to attack in Apr 2024.”

“How solid?” asked the president.

“I would say rock solid, Mr President.” The President got up in agitation.

“I say we call an immediate meeting with the Chairman JCS and Secretary of State.”

“Mr President, can’t we delay that a bit. It would endanger those very highly-placed sources who have risked their necks to share this.”

“You have given me this explosive bit of intelligence and expect me to sit on it? Talking about a two-front war is one thing, fighting a two-front war is quite another. No, we can’t afford this. We need to head this off preferably. We need to de-escalate right away. Go on a charm offensive,” the president said in considerable agitation.

Consequent to this exchange, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, made two efforts to resume talks with Beijing. This was followed up by Secretary of Treasury Janet Yallen, who went to Beijing and virtually pleaded with the Chinese not to get rid of their US treasury bonds. The way she kow-towed in Beijing had to be seen. Finally, the 100-year old former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the author of the US–China reproachment in the 1970s, himself made a visit to Beijing to placate the Chinese leadership.

18 Aug 2023. On board the presidential plane of XI Jinping. Over Nanjing.

President Xi Jinping made a sudden unannounced visit to HQ Eastern Command Nanjing. On the return flight, Director of China’s State Security Bureau (SSB) boarded the plane. He asked for an absolutely one-on-one meeting with the president on the plane. He had some top-class intelligence to share. The president was surprised. Director SSB apologised, “I’m sorry Comrade President. What I have to tell you is so sensitive that I had to arrange this special flight, just in case your office was bugged.”

“What is it,” asked President Xi, nervously.

“Comrade President, we have been betrayed. Our plans to invade Taiwan have been leaked to the Americans.”

“Leaked? By whom?” the president said as his face clouded with anger.

“Comrade president, I don’t know how to say this but your defence minister and foreign minister, no less, have done this treachery.”

“Li Shang Fu and Quiqiang?” The President was amazed. Both were his proteges and he had promoted them out of turn.

“Are you certain?” he asked in shock.

“Sir, before we came to you, we checked and double-checked. This is the sad truth,” the Director SSB said. “It was Li Shang Fu who told the foreign minister and also shared this decision with the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Rocket Forces.”

“This Li Shang Fu!” the President got up from his seat in rage. He immediately sent for Gen Zhang, Vice Chief of CMC. “Put plans for Taiwan on hold immediately, till we clean up this stinking system,” he was almost spluttering in rage. The system was duly cleaned up. The department for Discipline Inspection went into overdrive. First the foreign minister and then the defence minister simply disappeared from public view. The foreign minister, had a torrid affair with a tele- journalist when he was ambassador in USA. He had even fathered a child with her. The defence minister was involved in huge corruption in defence deals and had been compromised. Terse announcements followed weeks of speculation. Both had been sacked.

30 Oct 2023. Top Secret Meeting CMC. Shenyang.

On 7 Oct 2023, the Hamas struck Israel viciously and achieved complete surprise. Some 1,200 Israeli citizens were killed, 3,700 wounded and 250 taken hostage. Israel mobilised 3,00,000 reservists and reacted in rage. They bombed Gaza to rubble and then launched a brutal ground invasion spearheaded by Merkava tanks. In eight weeks, over 11,000 Palestinians were killed and some 23,000 wounded. US despatched two carrier battle groups to the Middle East and rushed in arms and munitions to Israel. On 30 Oct, Xi Jinping called for another top-secret CMC meeting. This time it was held in Shenyang in northern China. The Director of SSB was in attendance to ensure there was no leakage.

The President began with the Director SSB, “Comrade have we managed to clean up our system?

“Comrade Xi, we have purged the system thoroughly. With your support, the traitors at the highest levels have been dealt with,” he said grimly.

Xi just nodded curtly. He turned to Gen Zhang Youxian. “Comrade Zhang, in view of the Israel-Hamas conflict, what is your assessment of the global situation? Does it create a good window of opportunity for our Taiwan contingency?”

Gen Zhang said, “Comrade President, the situation is excellent. America is bogged down now in two wars, not just one. They have sent in two carrier battle groups to the Middle East and a large number of their army reserves are locked up in Europe. Both conflicts will drag on for a long time. 12% of Israel’s population were orthodox Jews who are extreme and don’t want a two state solution. This will likely go up to 32%. Both these conflicts will drag on. I say it is now or never. The correlation of forces will never be as favourable.”

Xi turned to Gen Hi Wei Dong, “Comrade?” he said briefly.

Gen Hi cleared his throat and said, “I agree entirely with Gen Zhang. The Americans know that we know, they know. In this situation they will least expect us to go ahead with the plan. We now need a good deception plan. Let us mount a good charm offensive to soothe American nerves and go right ahead in Apr 2024. We won’t get a more favourable global situation.”

“So what will it be? A full-scale Amphibious invasion, seizing some middle-sized island or a Blockade?”

Gen Hi said promptly, “The Americans are expecting a full scale invasion. So let us start with a joint fire strike on key targets in Taiwan, follow it up with the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy establishing air and maritime superiority. Concurrently, we announce a maritime blockade and if necessary, enforce it for months, till the renegades in Taiwan cave in. Let us learn from Ukraine. Defence today is far more powerful that attack. So, we put in blockade and, thereby, put the onus of attack on the Americans. Let them attack first. It will be best for our information and cognitive warfare theme – “We showed restraint, it is the Americans who were the aggressors.” This will be far less risky option than full scale invasion.”

Adimiral Miao Hua said excitedly, “I do not agree. The Americans will use submarines to break the blockade. If we do not pre-emptively strike their bases in Guam and Okinawa, they will use them to bomb our fleet and our cities on the east coast. Let us not make the same mistake the Russians did at start of Ukraine war. Either we go full on or not at all. Let’s not go to war with mental brakes full on.”

Gen Hi countered, “The amphibious landing phase will be very risky. They will focus on destroying maximum number of our ships as we come in. With US and Taiwanese air power, cruise and anti-ship missiles and drones they could do very great damage. Besides, do we have the full lift capability for carrying four if not all six of our amphibious brigades to make at least two major beach-heads on the western coast of Taiwan?

Adm Miao interjected, “We have been practising with civilian roll–on roll–off (Ro- Ro) with floating causeways. We have 64 of these that have trained for such assaults. Besides we have the largest merchant marine in the world. Even USA cannot lift as many troops as we can.”

“But these huge ships will be sitting ducks for US and Taiwanese anti–ship and cruise missiles. We could win or lose all. Are we prepared to lose all? And don’t forget, even if you do land successfully, you still have to fight through a very mountainous country with lots of built up areas,” Gen Hi countered.

The palpable tension was showing on President Xi’s face. He took a sip of water.

“So, if we blockade Taiwan, how will the Americans react,” he asked.

Gen Zhang Youxia replied, “The US will react first with his nuclear submarines to torpedo our blockading ships. Then, he will surge forward two or three carrier battle groups, maybe even five.”

“Then what do we do?” asked the President.

Gen Zhang replied, “Comrade President, our guided missile Renhai-class cruisers and Luyang-class destroyers have good anti-submarine warfare and anti-air capabilities. Besides, we have our nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines. In addition, our entire PLA Air Force and Marine Aviation will be up in the air. To take care of US carrier battle groups, we will fire salvos of Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles of 2000 km range. The Americans can’t accept casualties. Even if they lose one or two carriers, their ardour to intervene will evaporate quickly.”

There was a total silence in the room. You could cut the air with a knife. President Xi licked his lips to moisten them. His mouth had gone dry with the tension.

“OK, let’s go for the blockade,” he said finally. “But, what will be our pretext?”

“Oh, that is easy, Comrade President. Firstly, presidential elections in Taiwan are on 13 Jan next year. We can always take advantage of any pro-Independence sentiments expressed in the presidential campaign. If that does not work, we have an opposition candidate in our pay – a good agent provocateur. Next year, in March, he will make an impassioned speech denouncing President of Taiwan, ask for her impeachment and demand full Independence now,” said the Director SSB.

President Xi nodded grimly, saying, “Well, if a pro-Independence candidate wins in January elections, we will have very real reason to go in. Comrades, we plan for a blockade next year in Apr 2024. It will give us much better escalation control and lower any risk of catastrophic failure. If the first phase of the blockade goes well, maybe we could still go for full-scale amphibious assault. Let us see how that goes. We have a golden opportunity with the US already bogged down on two fronts. We can’t afford to let this pass. Meanwhile, let’s go on a charm offensive for full scale deception. I’ll go for the summit meeting with President Biden in California as planned on 15 Nov and try to be as nice as possible.” He then concluded the meet.

The post Chinese Leadership Discusses Strategy appeared first on IMR.

16 Feb 2022. Meeting of Central Military Commission (CMC) on Taiwan Question. Beijing

Russia was fully poised to launch its invasion of Ukraine in Feb 22. President Putin had visited China just before the invasion and signed the “friendship without limits” agreement. Xi Jinping had assured Putin of full, tacit support. The Russian invasion could occur anytime now. On 16 Feb 2022, President Xi Jinping had convened a top-secret meeting of the CMC. Once Russia invaded Ukraine, it would create a crisis that would completely tie down the USA and the West. Would that present an ideal opportunity for China to invade Taiwan? Historically, China had exploited the opportunity provided by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, to teach India a lesson while the world was pre-occupied. Was there a similar opportunity coming up? He asked for frank views.

Gen Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of CMC, spoke first. He was one of the last few veterans of the 1979 China-Vietnam war of 1979 still serving, and Xi gave great respect to his views on all matters military. Zhang said, “Comrade President, the West anticipates an invasion of Taiwan earliest in the 2025-27 timeframe. As such, we certainly would achieve strategic surprise if we attack before that. The crucial point is how ready are we today for such a massive operation? My second point is – should we not wait to see how the Russian invasion of Ukraine proceeds? What are the American reactions? Will Russia overcome Ukraine in a 7-10 days’ timeframe, as is being anticipated? The crisis will then dissipate in a very short timeframe. What if Russia fails or gets bogged down? The crisis could then get extended. I say let us wait and watch. It will give us valuable lessons and pointers for our own operation.”

 Xi turned to Gen He Weidong, Second Vice Chairman of CMC. He had been former commander of China’s Eastern Theatre Command and was considered an expert on Taiwan. He said, “I tend to agree with Gen Zhang. It would be most useful and instructive to wait and watch and see how the Russian offensive fares. That will give us clear pointers to how the West will react and we can prepare accordingly.”

President Xi now turned to the CMC members.

Gen Li Shangfu, Defence Minister spoke up next, “Comrades, I don’t think our operations in Taiwan will be contingent upon success or failure of the Russian offensive in Ukraine. A major amphibious invasion of Taiwan will be a very serious decision. Once war in Ukraine distracts global attention, we will have to take a clear cut call and then go firm. A lot of preparations will have to commence now for a major amphibious invasion. The met conditions are ideal in April, May or August each year. You will have to decide, go or no-go and then stick to it firmly. Now is the time to act. We cannot debate forever.”

Gen Liu Zhenli, the Chief of Staff, was a bit irritated by this oblique criticism of Gen Zhang, from someone who had not heard a shot fired in anger. ”Gen Li Shangfu, have we decided it will be a full-fledged amphibious invasion? We all know what the options are:-

• Air and maritime blockade of Taiwan.

• Limited kinetic strikes with missiles and airpower.

• Capture of small or medium sized offshore island or

• Full scale amphibious invasion.

Have we decided which option we will adopt? A lot will depend upon that.” That led to animated discussion on the options. Finally, Chairman Xi said, “Returning to the main theme, it appears to me that it would help to adopt a wait and watch option for now. Let the Russian invasion be for us a trailer, which will uncover Western reactions and counter moves for us.”

20 Jul 2022. Second Meeting of CMC – Taiwan Question. Beijing

The Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced on 22 Feb 2022. It made good progress initially. The Russians reached the outskirts of Kiev and captured 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donbas. They created a land link to Crimea and captured all the ports on the Sea of Azov and Black Sea (less Odessa). However, thereafter they got bogged down. The West imposed severe economic sanctions to cripple the Russian economy. On 20 July, President Xi convened the second meeting of CMC. “Comrades, the Russian offensive in Ukraine seems to have bogged down badly. What has gone wrong? Gen Zhang, you are most combat experienced general here. Can you analyse this for us?

Gen Zhang Youxia said, “Strangely, the Russians opted for invasion “lite” that is so far removed from the standard Russian way of war with emphasis on using overwhelming force and mass. Here, the Russians attacked with just 1,50,000 men, whereas, the Ukrainians were 2,50,000 men to start with and then fully mobilised to get some 5,50,000 men in arms. If most of your fighting was to be in built-up areas, this was a terribly skewed force ratio to start with. The Russians had hoped that technological superiority would help them win, but now they are bogged down badly. Using too little force will just prolong this war. Ukraine has seen the gaps and have now started counter-attacking. The Russians forces are now tired and spread out too thin. I’m really surprised why the Russians are not mobilising. This is war and you can’t afford to fight half–heartedly.”

Lt Gen He Weidong spoke next. “What this war has so clearly demonstrated is that with recent advances in technology – especially satellites, AWACS and drones –  surprise is impossible to achieve. What is worse is, defence today has a very clear advantage over offense. With drones, loitering munitions, precision strike weapons like HIMARS, attacks are becoming prohibitively costly. The attacker has to pay a heavy price, as we have seen.”

Lt Gen Liu Zhenli, the Chief of Staff pitched in. “The Russian attack was overland. They had no major obstacles to cross. If they took such losses, we will have to pause and think. Our offensive will have to cross 80 miles of sea. An amphibious landing is the most complex and difficult operation to execute. It calls for total command of the sea and maritime domain. With the current state of technology, we will have to bear heavy losses and even accept risk of catastrophic failure. I think we may have to postpone our offensive plans and focus on increasing our military power in the meantime.”

Gen Zhang Shengmin, the powerful head of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, spoke next. “However, Russia has been very successful at defeating Western economic sanctions. The major lesson learnt is that we must immediately start reducing our investments in US securities and treasury bonds. We have to reduce our holding of dollars in US banks. Otherwise, like they simply seized 300 billion dollars worth of Russian forex reserves, they could do the same to us. We must strive for de-dollarization of global trade and invest more in gold reserves.”

Admiral Miao Hua, member of the CMC said, “Comrades, Americans have already sensed our hesitation and doubt. They are acting in such a triumphalist manner and trying to rub our noses in the dirt. They are being most reckless. They seem to think that they can take on Russia and China together and defeat us both. I do not think this hubris is justified.”

Chairman Xi Jinping was cautious and risk averse as usual. “Comrades, we have to keep in mind ground realities. Seeing the way Russia has become bogged down in Ukraine, this time does not at all seem opportune to proceed with our Taiwan contingency plans. We will have to pend them for now.”

26 Jul 2022. Emergency Meeting of CMC. Beijing

The American truculence towards China seemed to be rising by the day. They openly threatened China not to supply any weapons to Russia or help it evade the economic sanctions. Now, to further rub Chinese noses in the sand, the Americans announced that Congress Speaker Nancy Pilosi would be visiting Taiwan on 2-3 Aug 22 as part of Congress Member Delegation (CODEL). On 26 July, Xi Jinping summoned an emergency meeting of the CMC. He was really upset.

“Comrades, this is too much. The Americans are sending their Speaker, this Pilosi woman, to Taiwan, deliberately to spite us. We will have to work out how we react to this grave provocation.”

Admiral Miao Hua, spoke up instantly, “Comrade president, you will recall this is precisely what I had warned against in the last CMC meeting. The Americans have sensed our hesitation and caution and are trying now to push us around. This will become intolerable, if we let this pass.”

“So, what do we do?” asked the President.

Gen Hi Weidong, former Eastern Theatre Commander and Taiwan expert of the CMC, said, “Comrade president, we have worked out an effective response short of war. We will hold an exercise of imposing a simulated blockade of Taiwan. Concurrently, we will hold major air and naval exercises to practise seizing maritime and air control in the Strait. We will fire missiles over Taiwan. That will send a clear message.”

Gen Zhang Youxia added, “Simultaneously, let us cut off all military-to-military contacts with America, so no hot line works, and they worry.”

President Xi grunted, “Sounds good. Let’s do it.”

China fired a number of missiles with impact points all around the seas of Taiwan. Dangerously, four of them flew over Taiwan. The PLA Air force launched 250 sorties that crossed into Taiwan’s AIDZ (air defence identification zone) and 13 Chinese naval units sailed around Taiwan to its north, south east and south west, simulating a blockade. For a time, the Americans were worried. They even escorted Nancy Pilosi’s plane with F-16 fighters as it flew into Taiwan. But when nothing more happened, the Americans saw through the Chinese bluff. The response was more hysteria, exercises and nothing more.

The Ukrainians had started launching counter-attacks to take advantage of serious gaps in Russian defence lines. American satellites were picking up these gaps and vectoring the Ukrainian counter-attacks on the harried and over-stretched Russian contingent of forces in Ukraine. The Americans sent yet another delegation to Taiwan.

President Xi Jinping scowled darkly, “Threats don’t work now. We will have to do something real.”

15 Apr 2023. Top Secret CMC Meeting. Beijing

In Sep 2023, in a belated concession to common sense, the Russians finally mobilised 3,00,000 reservists. Gen Suvorvikin, used civilian construction companies to build a formidable, three-tiered Maginot line for the defence of all territories captured in Ukraine. Defence had proved to be the stronger form of war with current technology. Now, the Russians wanted the over-confident Ukrainians to get a taste of their own medicine. Accordingly, in a repeat of their strategy during the Kursk battle in World War II, the Russians deliberately decided to let the Ukrainians attack first, absorb and defeat these attacks and then go on the counter-offensive. The military situation in Ukraine was clearly shifting In Russia’s favour. That was the time that president Tsai Wen of Taiwan decided to visit the US (7 Apr 2023). President Xi Jinping was infuriated. There was no end to American provocations. Meanwhile, Russia was hitting Ukrainian cities with massive barrages of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and Iranian Shahed drones. The damage was substantive and highly visible on global TV screens.

On 30 Apr 23, President Xi Jinping summoned the fourth meeting of CMC on the Taiwan issue. This was a top secret meeting held under very tight security blanket in Beijing.

The president said, “Comrades I am now getting sick and tired of American insults and provocations. Our shows of force are not working at all. We will have to now use actual force like our Russian friends. And, by the way, the Russian military position is far stronger than was painted by American propaganda. They were largely winning this war on TV screens. Now the truth is emerging. The war situation is now finally turning in favour of the Russians. Let us emulate the Russian example and finally take the plunge.”

Gen Zhang Youxia cleared his throat, “Comrade President, I could not agree more with you. We have taken enough bullying from the Americans. America’s military industrial capacity has grown weak in their unipolar era. They have transferred huge stocks of ammunition to Ukraine and locked up their land forces reserves in Europe. This could seriously weaken their capability to react to any crisis over Taiwan. I think it is time to take another look at our decision to defer the Taiwan contingency operations. There are very strong reasons to prepone the time-line for Taiwan. Maybe if we strike in 2024 itself we will achieve full strategic surprise and take advantage of America’s preoccupation with Ukraine.”

Gen He Weidong fully endorsed the views of Gen Zhang. He said, “Comrades our military thinking and planning has been very realistic. We have invested so much in our Strategic Rocket Force and our drones. Both have proved their value in combat in Ukraine. It is time to press home this resource. Today, the PLA Navy is the biggest navy in the world and the PLA Air Force has over 1300 fourth generation aircraft. I say let us strike out boldly and resolutely.”

The Defence Minister Gen Li Shangfu was most enthusiastic. He said, “Comrades let us act in a decisive manner and do it finally. We need to set a firm time line cast in stone and then not dither. That will enable the PLA to prepare in a decisive manner. We must take the firm decision today and stick to it with resolve.”

“So, when do you propose we go in? 2024 or the next year?” asked the president. He was not liking the undertone of criticism in the Defence Minster’s statement.

“Comrade president, I think we should go firm on Apr 2024,” Gen Li Shangfu said emphatically.

There was total silence in the room. One could feel the tension. Finally, Xi Jinping spoke up, “Comrades let us do it. We go firm on Apr 2024. Please plan accordingly.”

The post Events Leading up to the Invasion appeared first on IMR.

Russia attacked Ukraine with a force of just 1,50,000. Ukraine had 2,50,000 men in arms to start with. Later it mobilised fully to field about 5,50,000 men. Given that most of the fighting was in heavily built-up areas, the force ratios were badly skewed to start with. Despite this, it was amazing that the Russian forces encircled Kiev, secured almost 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donetsk provinces and secured a land corridor to Crimea. They captured all Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov. Odessa was the only port left with Ukraine. Having met most of his minimal objectives, Putin started peace negotiations mediated by Turkiye. As a goodwill gesture he withdrew his forces from Kiev. The western media painted this as a rout of Russian forces. The Russian force was overstretched and exhausted after six months of fighting. By Jul-Aug 2022 the Ukrainians launched a much-heralded counter offensive in Kherson. The Russians had to pull out troops from Kharkiev to face this attack. The US satellites saw this gap. Americans encouraged Ukrainians to attack here even as Russian forces were withdrawing to the line of the Orkill river. On paper, this Ukrainian offensive looked like a brilliant Blitzkrieg and as it hit thin air and made rapid progress.

There was an outcry in Russia. Sergei Markov, and other pro-war Russians exhorted Putin to stop this strange phoney war (semi- war) in Ukraine and start a real war that Russia could win easily. Putin was forced to mobilise 3,00,000 reservists. The Syrian war combat vet, Gen Suvorvikin began construction of the three-tiered defence line using Russian construction companies. This 1200 km long Maginot line had deep minefields, anti-tank ditches and dragon teeth. Russia had realised that given the present state of technology, the advantage was clearly with the defender.

Operations in 2023

Meanwhile, the US and Nato helped create 9 new Ukrainian brigades equipped with a mish-mash of Leopard and Challenger tanks along with Bradley ICVs and Strykers. These were brand new formations and not combat-hardened troops. Ukrainians raised their 9th and 10th Strike Corps for the much-advertised counter-offensive in which they claimed they would throw Russians out of all captured territories. This Spring counter-offensive was finally launched on 4 June 2023. The attacks came in Zaporizhzhi and Bakhmut sectors.

There was strong difference of opinion between the Americans and Ukrainians about this splitting of forces. The Russian plan was based upon the Kursk battle of 1943, when the Russians had let the German Panzers attack first, inflicted heavy casualties with artillery and combat aviation and then switched to a major counter-offensive. The Russians had manned their first line with Spetsnaz troops, ATGMs and drones, who could vector down airstrikes and artillery fires. The Ukrainian attacks were led by mine-clearing trawl tanks and ploughs. This caused the attacking columns to bunch up and take heavy casualties. The Russians used their Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopters armed with the 7-10 km range Vykhir anti-tank missiles to destroy the Leopard and Challenger tanks from stand-off ranges. Su-24 ground attack aircraft and Russian artillery took a very heavy toll of attacking formations. Remotely delivered mines rapidly closed minefield safe-lanes behind trawl tanks. Most attacks could not make it even to the first Russian defence line.

By end-Jun, the Ukrainian offensive by their 9 Strike Corps had ended in a fiasco. There was great deal of recrimination between the Americans and Ukrainian generals. The Americans called the Ukrainians “casualty averse”. They berated them for frittering effort away in Bakhmut. When the Ukrainians resisted, the Americans forced Zelenskyy to sack his defence minister Reznikov and most top officials in the ministry. Investigations were launched into corruption scandals. Finally, in Aug, the Ukrainians resumed the offensive in Zaporizhzhia with their fresh 10 Corps. Under US pressure, they moved out some troops from Bakhmut, to this sector. They claimed to have breached the first defence line in Robotinye. The Russians also pulled out formations from their own Kupiansk counter-attack to plug this breach. Heavy losses were inflicted by Russian combat aviation, artillery and drones. Soon, this second corps-sized offensive also petered out with heavy losses. The new innovation was heavy Ukrainian investment in counter-battery (CB) fires to supress Russian artillery.

To draw media attention away from the glaring failure of the Ukrainian ground offensive, the Americans put pressure on the Ukrainians to mount major air attacks on the ports in Crimea and HQ of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet using Storm Shadow and Spice (French) cruise stand-off attack missiles. One Kilo-class submarine and a landing ship were damaged. Ukraine also mounted drone attacks on Moscow and other Russian cities. Though tactical damage was minimal, the psy ops value of these attacks was considerable and served to distract attention from the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Meanwhile, Russia has conscripted some 2,70,000 additional troops and is readying for its major counter-offensive. Generals in Moscow have been urging Putin to expedite this offensive so as to seize and retain the initiative. So far, there are no clear indications of when this would materialise. This will, in all probability, be a winter offensive as the current campaign season is drawing to a close. Meanwhile, Russian retaliatory attacks on Kiev, Odessa and other cities have started to target the power grid, so Ukraine will have a miserable winter ahead. This battle will certainly stretch to 2024. However, the US NATO strategy of a long war to exhaust Russia may backfire. Already NATO members like Poland are feeling the fatigue and US funding has been halted temporarily.

The post EDITORIAL—The Ukraine War in 2023 appeared first on IMR.

Session 1 – Inaugural Session

The seminar was inaugurated by Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ. The welcome remarks were given by Air Marshal Anil Chopra, Director General, CAPS. This was followed by an industry perspective provided by Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst & Young. The guest speakers also released the EY-IMR knowledge paper on Air & Missile Defence.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra commenced his introductory statements by addressing the protracted conflict in Ukraine, which has persisted for sixteen months, despite the substantial casualties incurred by both opposing factions. The vulnerabilities manifest themselves through the widespread deployment of tanks, drones, large ships, cruise missiles, and aircraft, which are strategically withheld from entering technical zones due to the presence of formidable air defence systems. The concept of air Denial has been surpassed by both parties involved. Hence, the conflict has once again underscored the significance of the air and missile defence systems. Several key lessons can be derived for India from this conflict, including the imperative of maintaining unhindered supply chains and promoting domestic manufacturing. Additionally, he emphasised the significance of counter-drone technology, which encompasses various tools such as kinetic interception and electromagnetic interdiction. According to Air Marshal Chopra, India is currently developing medium and long-range surface-to-air missiles. However, there is a need to expedite the advancement of cost-effective iterations of missiles and unmanned aircraft. The speaker proposed that the private sector is making significant strides in the field, exemplified by the Kalyani missile creation. This missile was developed through a partnership between Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd and DRDO, and its production involved collaboration with various players in the Indian industry, including both public and private sector entities and MSMEs. The author emphasised the government’s initiatives to promote indigenisation, encompassing both the public and commercial domains.

Air Marshal Surat Singh, DG Air Ops, Air HQ gave the Inaugural Address. He addressed the crucial capabilities of the air defence and missile system in various contexts, including times of peace, periods of uneasy peace, and even in times of war. The activation of this capability is the initial step, while its deactivation is the final action. In certain instances, it persists consistently. It offers both deterrence and the assurance needed to execute air operations. The system encompasses numerous interconnected components and sub-systems that encompass monitoring, control, and the ability to make decisions for destruction swiftly. He highlighted critical advancements in air defence during the last decade while focusing on reducing the size of systems and sub-systems and the increasing lethality of weapons and Unmanned systems, encompassing both offensive and defensive capabilities. He emphasised the evolving nature of operations, which were formerly limited to land but have since expanded into the air and are now expanding into space. He stressed the necessity of successfully encountering the threats. India’s capacity to cope with threats needs jointmanship as well as an exhaustive capability. The endeavour is to be made not in isolation but as a team. Therefore, the diverse range of threats necessitates an air defence system that can enhance capabilities and multiply abilities multiple-fold. This will entail utilising expedited, reliable, and fortified decision-making mechanisms alongside a fusion of active and passive sensors to generate a comprehensive representation. He concluded by emphasising the interaction between a user and a manufacturer during the initial stages of development of any system is crucial to the smooth transmission of situational awareness and the successful incorporation of the decision-making tool.

Col KV Kuber, Director of Defence and Aerospace, Ernst and Young, provided the defence industry perspective. He stated that the Indian Air Force was responsible for safeguarding the entirety of the nation’s airspace, which encompasses the island territories and offshore facilities and falls within the jurisdiction of the air defence identification zone. In order to effectively safeguard the expansive airspace, it is imperative to implement a strategy that involves the proactive positioning of surface-to-air missiles, the utilisation of countermeasures against advanced technologies, the establishment of surveillance systems and radar networks, as well as the deployment of short-range surface-to-air missiles to deter and neutralise aerial incursions. Col Kuber emphasised the significance of the heightened dissemination of quantum technologies, the integration of quantum into military operations, and the transformative impact it will have on the character of warfare. The speaker provided an explanation regarding the distinction between quantum and linear phenomena, highlighting the pervasive nature of the former in contrast to the latter. During his discourse, he also referred to the hypersonic glide vehicles. In order to effectively address the issue, it is advisable to develop an anti-missile capability that facilitates the straightforward identification of these entities. The speaker concluded his discourse by comparing the escalating military expenditures of the United States and China and subsequently deliberated on the appropriate course of action for India considering this development. In order to augment its capabilities, the government has pursued collaboration with the private sector to develop advanced weaponry. It will be stipulated to be productive.

SESSION 2 – EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES

Session 2 was chaired by Air Vice Marshal Tarun Chaudhry, Asst Chief of Air Staff Ops (Projects), Air HQ. He emphasised technology’s importance in shaping a conflict’s contours. Therefore, it is essential for all parties involved to acknowledge and adapt to new challenges brought about by technological advancements in the context of warfare. He underlined the need to develop an appropriate industrial environment for research and development to quickly provide the essential equipment or solutions. Here, timeframe and R&D efforts are of utmost importance.

Gp Capt Prashant Arora, Air HQ, discussed the ‘Lessons in AD from the Russia-Ukraine War.’ As part of the philosophies/concept of operations, he highlighted the DEAD/SEAD missions conducted by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which allowed the Ukrainians to mount an effective air defence response. Russian forces employed Kh-31 and Kh-58 ARMs extensively against Ukrainian ground-based air defence weapons. The Ukrainians also utilised customised MiG-29s equipped with AGM-88 HARM with success.

The Ukrainian PSU’s innovative and flexible air defence systems have prevented the Russian VKS from dominating the sky. Russia’s VKS employed the S-400 in Belarus and Crimea to illustrate its practical air defence doctrine. The surface-to-air missile system of the S-400 was effective at bringing down aircraft. Russian aircraft were forced to fly at low altitudes due to the Ukrainians’ effective use of the S-300 SAM and SA-11. The Pechora system was an effective anti-aircraft armament for the Ukrainians. As part of the anti-missile/SOWs operation, it is impossible to intercept Russian Tochka-U and Iskander missiles due to a lack of adequate interceptor missiles. Between 80% and 90% of Ukrainian missiles were intercepted by the Russian S-400. Intercepting Russian “Zircon,” “Vanguard,” and “DF-ZF” hypersonic cruise missiles during anti-hypersonic operations is complex. He stated that the Russian VKS Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) had little effect on the efficacy of the air defence network. Active AD capability and passive AD measures against missiles/ SOWs/ HCMs/HGVs are essential for assuring survivability. AWACS and AEW&C are crucial enablers for AD Operations. The development of future AD capabilities must be prioritised, and plans must account for detecting and eliminating low RCS threats.

Brig Manish Kumar, Brig AAD Ops, Army HQ, discussed the ‘Emerging Air Threat: Challenges to Ground Based Air Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) from Recent Conflicts.’ He addressed the concept of air threat in its state of being and air threat in its manifestation. Air threats encompass various factors, including numerical strength, quantity, aircraft types, capabilities, operational ranges, refuelling capabilities, and tactical approaches. “Air Threat Manifestation” refers to the strategic process of developing and implementing measures to mitigate air defence risks. The manifestation of air threats necessitates the management of stand-off threats, limited stand-off threats, and dynamic threats. He emphasised the increase in the variety of air attack instruments and the expansion of the range of potential threats, including remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAs) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Additionally, they mentioned the emergence of futuristic air threats such as hypersonic and hyper glide technologies, as well as surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they noted the resurgence of conventional dumb bombs, explicitly referring to rocket-boosted kinetic energy (REK) weapons and gliding munitions. According to Brig Manish Kumar the VKS air operation in Russia is limited to the Central Military District (CSFO) and activities related to air defence. The initial chapter operations yielded successful outcomes. The initial attacks were limited to Stand Off Launches utilising Kh series Cruise Missiles and ARMs. However, they were effectively countered by the Ukrainian S-300 air defence systems. Moreover, the SHAHED-136 introduction was employed in Ukraine. The term “three-layer air defence” is a misnomer. Each layer must be designed to address a specific type of threat. To address various levels of threat, encompassing stand-off threat, limited stand-off threat, and dynamic threat, it becomes imperative to implement a comprehensive array of mitigation measures. He identified the prerequisites for comprehensive air defence solutions, which include low radar cross-section (RCS) surveillance, low-level surveillance, and stealth surveillance. The layout challenges faced by the defence industry encompass several key aspects, including the miniaturisation of components, the management of electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic compatibility in limited spaces, the ability to handle multiple targets simultaneously, and the development of cost-effective electronic identification friend or foe (IFF) solutions.

Sh Vasudev Ramakrishna, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, discussed the ‘New Developments in Radars for Detection, Tracking Threats and Targeting.’ He deliberated on radars concerning air and ballistic missile defence. Modern radar systems possess various applications, encompassing areas such as ballistic missile defence, air defence, weapon designation, reconnaissance, commercial utilisation, weather monitoring, and interplanetary investigations. The radar may be categorised as surveillance radars, which possess a mechanical rotation fixed RPM, offer volumetric search capabilities, have fixed target update intervals, and exhibit limited range and angular resolution as well as accuracies; track radars, designed for tracking a single target, have limited search capabilities; and multiple radars for diverse threats, which are specialised in their respective functions and have limited programmability. To construct a unified multifunction radar system in the future, it will be necessary to address various components of radar sub-systems, including waveform agility (such as low pulse repetition frequency and medium pulse repetition frequency, as well as target radar cross-section estimation), as well as the programmability of radar modes (such as air defence and ballistic missile defence).

SESSION 3 – EMERGING THREATS, SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION

Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani, Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, chaired session 3. He emphasised the importance of hypersonic weapons and the difficulties faced by current countermeasures in addressing them. In contrast to ballistic missiles that can be easily intercepted and monitored, identifying hypersonic missiles poses a significant challenge. To effectively tackle these challenges, it is imperative to embrace technological advancements.

Air Commodore SM Paranjpe, Team Ldr, Project AD Services Interface Gp, Air HQ addressed the challenges associated with ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as stand-off weapons. He gave an account of the historical background of hypersonics, with particular emphasis on ‘The Great Extinction Event’ that occurred approximately 66 million years ago, resulting in the extinction of all dinosaur species. It also emphasised the historical, contemporary, and prospective dimensions of hypersonic weaponry; and furnished an extensive account of the fundamental principles underlying hypersonic velocities, elucidating various attributes of hypersonics, ultrasonics, supersonics, and related phenomena. He elucidated the distinct challenges associated with stand-off weapons by examining the ballistic trajectory and orbital trajectory within the classification of ballistic armaments. He discussed the tactical obstacles associated with air defence, specifically focusing on four key aspects: being situated beyond the radar horizon and at a low altitude, operating at high altitudes and speeds, flying at low altitudes and high speeds, and possessing small or stealthy characteristics. He gave insight into the origins of the challenges, specifically highlighting the Anti-Hypersonic Weapons Technology Challenge and the requisite scientific expertise. He concluded by directing attention towards the main points to be learned and the actions being implemented to address them, categorising them into three distinct areas: Technology, Organisation, and Operations.

Sh Nandakumar S, Scientist F, LRDE, DRDO, gave an insight into ‘the OTH Radar for Peninsular & Chinese Front: a Perspective.’ Considering that OTH Radars operate at high frequencies, he emphasised their value. He compared the two Over Horizon (OTH) Radars, such as the Surface Wave OTH (SW OTH) and the Sky Wave OTH (SKW OTH). He emphasised the examination of OTH Radar, specifically highlighting various countries such as Iran, the United Kingdom, the United States, Romania, and Israel and the respective radar systems they possess. He presented an analysis of a separate survey pertaining to the Skywave Over-The-Horizon (OTH) Radar, specifically focusing on the United States. He emphasised the various sub-systems of the SkW OTH Radar, including transmitters, receivers, and Tx Antennas, as well as the techniques and technologies employed within these sub-systems. According to the research conducted by Sh Nandakumar S, developing a Skywave Over-the-Horizon Radar (SkW OTHR) for specifically identified locations is feasible. He emphasised the development of Ionosphere modelling is imperative for SkW OTHR. He proposed that the implementation of the Frequency Management System should be completed within a time-frame of approximately five years. He discussed the advancement of the Surface Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) for the Indian Navy, specifically in the Gujarat Peninsula, which is nearing completion. It is anticipated that the radar system will become operational within a year. Additionally, Nandakumar highlighted the forthcoming development of the Two-L shape (180* Coverage) SkW OTHR for Sea/Air Surveillance, which is expected to be completed within a time-frame of 5-7 years. This technological advancement is anticipated to provide the Indian Armed Forces with enhanced capabilities to assess the Chinese front. 

SESSION 4 – AIR DEFENCE COUNTERMEASURES

Air Vice Marshal PV Shivanand, Asst Chief of Air Staff (Air Defence), Air HQ chaired the session. He highlighted that conventional air defence was designed to detect certain airborne flight objects. In recent times, there have been changes in the basic detection capability; and multiple new threats challenge the domain of air defence. We need to address it on priority.

Wg Cdr KJ Antony, Joint Director AD, Air HQ, presented his views on ‘Countering Stealthy Aerial Threats.’ His presentation centred around four fundamental domains pertaining to the attainment of stealth capabilities. These domains encompassed the concept of stealthy aerial threats, their potential ramifications on air operations, as well as the strategies employed to counteract such threats, encompassing both existing and future technologies. He perceived stealth as a fusion of technological elements aimed at evading or prolonging the process of detection. For example, stealth aircraft must possess minimal signatures across various electromagnetic (EM) spectrum domains, including radar, infrared, acoustics, and visual signature. In order to attain stealth capabilities in a fighter aircraft, it is imperative to strike a delicate equilibrium between the attributes of stealth, manoeuvrability, and cost-effectiveness. The individual emphasised that achieving stealth or low observability can be accomplished by reducing radar cross-section, minimising infrared signature, and diminishing visual signature. He classified stealthy aerial threats into three categories: airborne platforms that employ stealth technology, threats with low radar cross-section (RCS) or low observability, and threats that do not require line-of-sight (LOS) engagement, such as terrain-hugging missiles and ballistic missiles. In order to address the challenge posed by covert airborne threats, the individual in question proposed the implementation of an anti-stealth system capable of functioning autonomously or in conjunction with other systems. This system would utilise multiple sensors to generate a comprehensive air situation depiction, thereby enhancing the likelihood of successful detection. Ultimately, he emphasised the importance of space-based systems to mitigate the risks posed by stealth aerial threats in forthcoming times.

Cdr Viraat Shiggaon, Cdr Staff Requirements, Naval HQ, explained the ‘AD Countermeasures: Naval Perspective.’ He focused on the growing dangers in the maritime sphere and the accompanying advances in AD technology of the future. While marine air defence (AD) is generally comparable to other services, the sea presents unique obstacles. Cooperative engagement is made possible by both long- and medium-range SAMs. The evolution of modern air defence weaponry is motivated by the changing geopolitical landscape. It serves as an anti-access/area-denial mechanism. Since its final velocity is so incredible, it cannot be stopped by traditional AD systems. The use of decoys and MIRVs increases the difficulty of engagement. The topic of the operations of unmanned vehicles and swarm drones was discussed. It is a low-priced A2/AD weapon that regular armies and insurgents can deploy. He discussed potential future technologies for naval air defence, focusing on “the electromagnetic railgun,” which is affordable and can engage supersonic targets at extended ranges; “laser/microwave weapons,” which can engage hypersonic weapons/anti-drone systems; and “anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) interceptors,” which can engage ASBMs during both the boost and re-entry phases. He ended by stressing the importance of indigenisation, the introduction of cutting-edge technology and innovations, and the creation of counter-technologies.

Brig. OP Vaishnav, AAD Dte, Army HQ explained ‘Countering Unmanned Aerial Threats – Future Roadmap.’ He focused on how the aerial danger posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has changed over time. UAS include anything from tiny quad/hexa copters to huge fixed-wing military UAVs. There are three levels of threat – superficial, intermediate, and severe. He pointed out that India’s rivals on both sides can now produce and build unmanned aerial systems on their own. The Burraq, Barq LGB, Wingloong-10, CH-4, Shahpar-2, and Sharp Sword are among the dangerous autonomous weapon systems they want to modernise with. Surveillance, identification, and tracking; microprocessors or calculating a firing solution; and interdiction were the three pillars he emphasised under the Counter UAS system pillars.

Sh Amit Kumar, Scientist F, PGAD, DRDO, presented his views on ‘Countering the Threat from Ballistic and Hypersonic Missiles and Stand-off Weapons.’ The increased range and precision of ballistic missiles, their potential use by non-state actors, and the diffusion of ballistic missile technology were all issues he brought up, as was the danger posed by ballistic missiles in the Indian subcontinent, he said. India needs a ballistic missile defence system because of its no-first-use (NFU) nuclear strategy. Ballistic, subsonic, and supersonic cruise missiles are the current go-to options for delivering warheads across vast distances. Using hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and MARVs by adversaries is a common strategy for countering and penetrating missile defences. An emerging danger is the hypersonic glide vehicle. Low altitude gliding, high manoeuvrability, re-targeting area, and high cross-range capability to plan the glide path allow it to penetrate enemy ballistic missile defence while engaging time-critical targets like ballistic missile launch pas/silo, deeply buried command centres, air bases, warships, and tactical targets.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), Director General, CAPS, delivered his closing remarks at the conclusion of the ideation sessions. Air Marshal Chopra commended the astute presentations and notable presence of all panellists, as well as the intellectually stimulating questions posed by the audience.

The seminar ended with a Vote of Thanks by Maj Gen Ravi Arora, Chief Editor Indian Military Review.

The post EVENT REVIEW—Air & Missile Defence India 2023 appeared first on IMR.

Drones have been used to provide valuable intelligence to Ukrainian forces, helping them to track Russian troop movements, identify targets, and direct artillery fire. This has been especially important in the Donbas region, where the fighting has been intense and the terrain has been difficult to navigate.

Drones have also been used to carry out direct attacks on Russian forces. These attacks have been carried out with both small, commercial drones that have been modified to carry explosives, and larger, military-grade drones. The use of drones for attack purposes has been particularly effective in disrupting Russian supply lines and targeting command and control centres.

Ukrainian Drone Attacks inside Russia

The drone attacks inside Russia have been a significant escalation in the Ukraine War. It is not clear who was responsible for those attacks, but they have been blamed on Ukraine. Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, but it has not denied them either. The drone attacks in 2023 have been a continuation of the trend of drone attacks inside Russia that began in 2022. But they have shown that Ukraine is willing to target Russian territory, and they have raised the possibility of a wider conflict between Russia and NATO. The number of drone attacks inside Russia is relatively small. However, the attacks have caused significant damage and have raised the stakes in the Ukraine War.

There have been several drone attacks on Moscow by Ukraine since the start of the war. In May 2023, two drones were shot down over the Kremlin, and in July 2023, a drone attack was carried out on Sheremetyevo International Airport. These attacks have caused some damage, but no injuries have been reported.

Drones Employed by Ukraine

Ukraine has used a variety of drones in the war, including commercial drones, such as the DJI Mavic 3 and the DJI Matrice 300, for reconnaissance and attack purposes. These drones are relatively inexpensive and easy to operate, making them a valuable asset for Ukrainian forces.

Ukraine has also received a number of military-grade drones from its allies, including the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and the American Switchblade kamikaze drone. These drones are more expensive and sophisticated than commercial drones, but they offer greater range, payload, and endurance.

Bayraktar TB2 drones have been used to great effect against Russian forces.

The United States has provided Ukraine with a number of Switchblade kamikaze drones, which are designed to loiter over a target before exploding.

The United Kingdom has provided Ukraine with a number of Watchkeeper WK450 drones, which are used for reconnaissance and surveillance.

Poland has provided Ukraine with a number of Warmate kamikaze drones, which are similar to the Switchblade.

Turkish Drones for Ukraine

Turkey has supplied Ukraine with two types of drones. The Bayraktar TB2, a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). And the Akinci, a high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UCAV. Turkey has also provided Ukraine with training on how to operate them.

The Bayraktar TB2 has been credited with destroying a number of Russian tanks, artillery pieces, and other military equipment. The Akinci is still under development, but is expected to be even more capable than the Bayraktar TB2.

According to Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine has received 50 Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey since the Russian invasion began in February 2022. It is not clear how many Akinci drones Ukraine has received. The Turkish drones have been a valuable asset to Ukraine, and have helped to level the playing field against Russia. However, they are not a silver bullet, and Ukraine will need more military aid if it is to defeat Russia.

The Bayraktar TB2 can fly for long periods of time at altitudes of up to 27,000 feet. It is equipped with a variety of sensors, including a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and a laser designator, which allow it to target enemy forces with precision.

The Akinci is a high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UCAV, which means that it can fly for even longer periods of time at altitudes of up to 40,000 feet. It is equipped with even more advanced sensors than the Bayraktar TB2, and is capable of carrying a heavier payload.

Employment of Drones by Russia

The Russian military has used combat drones in a variety of ways in the Ukraine War, including reconnaissance, attack and jamming.

Russian drones have been used to provide valuable intelligence to Russian forces, helping them to track Ukrainian troop movements, identify targets, and direct artillery fire.

Russian drones attacks on Ukrainian forces have been carried out with both small, commercial drones that have been modified to carry explosives, and larger, military-grade drones. The use of drones for attack purposes has been particularly effective in disrupting Ukrainian supply lines and targeting command and control centers.

Russian drones have also been used to jam Ukrainian communications and radar systems. This has made it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to coordinate their operations and defend themselves against Russian attacks.

The Russian military has also used drones to deliver supplies to its troops and to evacuate wounded soldiers.

However, the Russian military has also suffered some losses to its drone fleet. Ukrainian forces have shot down a number of Russian drones, and they have also used electronic warfare to disrupt Russian drone operations.

In recent months, the number of Russian drone attacks in Ukraine has decreased. This is likely due to a number of factors, including the increasing effectiveness of Ukrainian air defenses and the increasing difficulty of operating drones in the face of electronic warfare.

Russian Drones

Russia has used a variety of drones in the Ukraine war, including including Orlan-10, Forpost, Zala Aero, and Kamikaze drones. March 2022, Ukrainian forces claimed to have shot down over 100 Russian drones.

Orlan-10 is a small, fixed-wing drone that is used for reconnaissance and surveillance. It has a range of up to 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 5 kilograms.

Forpost is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone that is used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. It has a range of up to 250 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 200 kilograms.

ZALA Aero is a family of small, fixed-wing drones that are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. They have a range of up to 30 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 5 kilograms.

Kamikaze drones are small, disposable drones that are used for suicide attacks. They are equipped with explosives and are programmed to fly into their targets.

The Russians have also used Iranian-made drones in the Ukraine war, including the Shahed-136 and the Shahed-186. These drones are small, cheap, and easy to operate, making them ideal for use in a war zone.

Iranians Drones for Russia

Amongst the drones supplied by Iran, which have been used by the Russians in the Ukraine war are Shaed-129, -136, -191 and Mohaje-6.

Shahed-129 is a long-range, medium-altitude, reconnaissance and strike drone. It has a range of over 2,000 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 80 kilograms.

Shahed-191 is a medium-range, medium-altitude, attack drone. It has a range of over 1,500 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 60 kilograms.

Mohaje-6 is a short-range, low-altitude, reconnaissance and attack drone. It has a range of over 1,000 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 40 kilograms.

Shahed-136 is a kamikaze drone, also known as a “suicide drone.” It is a small, disposable drone that is used to carry out a single, destructive strike.

Performance of Russian Drones

The performance of Russian drones in the Ukraine war has been mixed. Some drones, such as the Orlan-10, have been used effectively for reconnaissance and surveillance. However, other drones, such as the Forpost, have been more vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses.

There are a number of reasons why Russian drones have not been as effective as they could have been. First, Russian drones are not as advanced as some of the drones used by Ukraine, such as the Bayraktar TB2. Second, Russian drones are not as well-protected from enemy air defenses. Third, Russian forces have not been as effective at using drones in coordination with other weapons systems.

Despite these challenges, Russian drones have still played a significant role in the war. They have been used to target Ukrainian forces, to gather intelligence, and to coordinate artillery strikes.

Some of the key factors that have contributed to the mixed performance of Russian drones in the Ukraine war are lack of advanced technology, vulnerability to air defences and ineffective use:

Russian drones are not as advanced as some of the drones used by Ukraine, such as the Bayraktar TB2. This means that they are less capable of carrying out complex missions and are more vulnerable to enemy air defenses.

Russian drones are not as well-protected from enemy air defenses as some of the drones used by Ukraine. This means that they are more likely to be shot down by Ukrainian fighters or missiles.

Russian forces have not been as effective at using drones in coordination with other weapons systems. This has limited the effectiveness of drones in the war.

Comments

Overall, drones have played a significant role in the Ukraine war. They have been used by both sides for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. However, Russian drones have been more vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses than Ukrainian drones.

The use of drones in the Ukraine War has had a number of implications for the future of warfare as force multipliers, for reconnaissance and attack purposes.

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Drones Used to Attack by Ukraine

Here are some specific examples of how drones have been used in the Ukraine War:

In February 2022, a Ukrainian drone was used to destroy a Russian convoy of 80 tanks and armoured vehicles.

In March 2022, a Ukrainian drone was used to strike a Russian command and control centre, killing several high-ranking Russian officers.

In April 2022, a Ukrainian drone was used to disrupt a Russian supply line, preventing the delivery of food and ammunition to Russian forces.

Drone Attached Carried Out Inside Russia

No fatal injuries were reported in the following attacks.

May 25, 2022: A drone attack targeted the Kremlin in Moscow. The attack caused some damage to the building.

June 5, 2022: A drone attack targeted an oil refinery in Bryansk, Russia. The attack caused a fire at the refinery.

June 17, 2022: A drone attack targeted a military base in Kursk, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the base.

July 1, 2022: A drone attack targeted a military airfield in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the airfield.

February 22, 2023: A drone attack targeted a military base in Shebekino, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the base.

March 4, 2023: A drone attack targeted a substation of the Transneft-Druzhba oil pipeline in Belgorod Oblast, Russia. The attack caused a power outage in the region.

May 25, 2022: Two drones were shot down over the Kremlin. The attacks caused some damage to the building.

May 30, 2023: A drone attack targeted the Kremlin in Moscow. The attack caused some damage to the building.

June 1, 2023: A drone attack targeted a military base in Kursk, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the base.

July 4, 2023: A drone attack targeted Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow. The attack caused some damage to the airport.

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Key Advantages of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci Drones

Relatively inexpensive, making them a cost-effective way to target enemy forces.

Easy to operate, making them suitable for use by even inexperienced pilots.

Long range and endurance, allowing them to operate deep behind enemy lines.

Equipped with advanced sensors, allowing them to target enemy forces with precision.

Limitations of Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci Drones

Vulnerable to air defense systems, and can be shot down by enemy fighters or missiles.

Not stealthy, making them easy to detect by enemy radar.

Can only carry a limited payload, meaning that they cannot carry large or heavy weapons.

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Russian Drone Attacks

Here are some examples of Russian drone attacks in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023:

February 24, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack Ukrainian military bases and airfields on the first day of the invasion.

March 8, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine. The attack killed three people and injured dozens more.

April 16, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack a train station in Kramatorsk, Ukraine. The attack killed at least 50 people and injured dozens more.

May 9, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack a military parade in Lviv, Ukraine. The attack killed at least 20 people and injured dozens more.

June 1, 2023: Russian drones were used to attack a military base in Kharkiv, Ukraine. The attack killed at least 10 people and injured dozens more.

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The New Relevance of High-Tech and Mass

In the dynamic between offense and defence, between tank and anti-tank weapons, between aircraft and air defence (AD) systems, we have seen a new equilibrium that clearly favours defence over the offense. Tanks, the primary instruments of offense, have taken particularly heavy casualties and the sheer lethality of surface-to-air missiles (S-300, S-400/500) have forced Air Forces to stay away from battle areas and restrict sortie generation rates (to just 250-300 a day). These were over 1600 a day in Gulf War I, some 600/day in Yugoslavia and 460/day in the 1971 Bangladesh War). This is a new era of not just high-tech but high-tech and mass. Any armed forces that fail to cater for this new order of lethality and the consequent need for mass, will be making a fatal mistake. Given the scale of casualties, we will have to focus hard on force–preservation, re-constitution of badly battered units and quick replacement of casualties in all future wars. Towards that end, the Indian Army’s move to cut manpower by two lakhs is very inopportune and ill-timed.

Col Jhonson writes, “What we are witnessing is a pivotal moment in military history, the re-ascendence of defence as the decisive form of war. We had seen it in World War and then we saw the same dynamic re-assert itself again by the end of World War Two. The power of the offensive had been restored at the start of that war by the brilliant German doctrine of Blitzkrieg, (which had created a lethal combination of tanks and Stuka dive bombers), to restore mobility on the battlefield. By the end of World War Two, defensive fire power had caught up once again, defeated the German Blitzkrieg and made attrition supreme on the battlefield once more. Stalin had said correctly “Artillery is the God of War.” In Ukraine, we have simply re-learnt the lessons of World War I and II. That is why the Russians chose to go on the defensive in 2023 and have so far inflicted some 70,000 personnel casualties and destroyed almost 7000 armoured vehicles.

Unprecedented Battle Field Transparency

What has favoured the defender and made the task of the attacker even more difficult is the near total level of battle field transparency in Ukraine. The US satellites, UAVs, AWACs, JSTARS, etc, can pick up virtually every single tank, truck and even soldiers that move on the battlefield. Surprise in the attack has, thus, become virtually impossible to achieve. Concentrations can be picked up immediately and even intentions can be discerned through electronic surveillance of enemy communications. What has made Russia’s task even more difficult is the proxy nature of the war. Had it been a direct clash between US and Russia, the latter could have shot down US spy satellites, AWACS and even drones loitering in Poland or Romania. These are now totally safe from any Russian counter-action. In a direct clash the attacker can take prophylactic action to shoot holes in the sky over the projected area of the offensive by downing enemy satellites with ASAT missiles. The proxy nature of this war has kept the surveillance assets of US and NATO totally unmolested and free to snoop on Russia. The levels of battlefield transparency, thus, available to Ukraine have simply been unprecedented in the annals of warfare.

Return of the Stalemate

The new equivalence or equilibrium between defensive and offensive systems has led to brutal stalemates on the battlefields of Ukraine and unprecedented levels of attrition that are reminiscent of the First World War and its sheer carnage. Once again, as in the two World Wars, medium and heavy artillery has proved to be a decisive, war-winning factor. An Austrian Army Operational Research Statistical Analysis (ORSA) study of the last seven years of combat in the Donbas region, has clearly highlighted that 45% of the tank kills, 65 % of artillery guns and 57 % of the vehicles destroyed were by medium artillery – especially of the 152/155 mm calibre.

Despite all the media hype, the total number of tanks destroyed by Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) – Javelins, TOWs, etc, – were just 13%. A major media hype was created that Javelins, Stingers (and later the HIMARS) were singular war winning factors – the US silver bullets that by themselves would win the war single-handedly. There are no silver bullets in war. People said the tank was now a dinosaur – no longer relevant on the modern battlefield. As Capt Sir Basil Liddel Hart had noted earlier, the tank has been pronounced dead so many times in recent military history. Each time it reasserts its relevance. It is still the only viable instrument of shock and offensive action. So even though defence has regained primacy over offense in overall terms, the tank remains the sole instrument of offense on the land battlefields. Like at the end of World War II, tanks may have to be used in mass to overcome lethal defenses. Massive artillery barrages have to pave the way for tanks as we saw in the Donbas. We may need more tanks, not less. Top attack is a new vulnerability for tanks but it is certainly something that can and will be countered by simple expedients like canopies and more sophisticated Active Protection System (APS). Besides, despite all this media hype – actual casualties inflicted by the ATGMs on tanks have just been 13%. The real tank-killer was medium artillery (45% tank kills). As such, earlier lessons of the Second World War have simply been revalidated today.

Drones

Drones – unmanned aerial, ground and sea vehicles – have created a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). We have loitering Kamikaze drones that are able to inflict heavy casualties and yet cost so little. Drones are very useful for gaining tactical and contact intelligence and vector in artillery fire and air strikes and launch missiles and bombs. They have brought about a paradigm shift in the nature of war. The Russians have recently retrofitted Iranian Shahed drones with the Glonass navigation system and used them in mass to mask lethal attacks by their cruise and tactical ballistic missiles and saturate Ukrainians air defences.

Wrong Lessons from Low Intensity Conflicts

In fact, the world has learnt some patently incorrect lessons from the era of Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). The levels of asymmetry between the opponents was inordinately high in Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon and also in Iraq and even Yugoslavia and Syria. Due to the sheer asymmetry, patently wrong lessons were learnt which cannot withstand the shock of high intensity conflict between evenly matched opponents. No lessons from Afghanistan or Libya can be applied to any Western conflict with peer group competitors like China or Russia. Given the accuracy of precision guided munitions (PGMs), the levels of lethality have gone up by several orders of magnitude. What the Russia-Ukraine war clearly highlights is the need to graduate quickly beyond the era of LIC entailing inordinately high levels of asymmetry between the two sides. The world is rapidly entering into the era of long duration High Intensity Conflicts between evenly matched opponents, where the levels of attrition will be inordinately high.

Nuclear Backdrop

All such future conventional wars will be fought against a nuclear backdrop. So far, the nuclear threat had served to constrain the levels of combat below the nuclear threshold. However, we are increasingly seeing nuclear red lines being completely ignored on the modern conventional battlefield. So far, the USA and NATO have refrained from direct combat with Russia and China. Ukraine is an unfortunate proxy war that has been bled white. The Americans have certainly fought Russia to the last Ukrainian in the current conflict. Either by deliberate design or by sheer accident, the world is careening towards a dangerous Armageddon, a Third World War that may see limited or full-scale use of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. Restraints are fast eroding at a rate that spells serious danger for mankind.

An Economic War Coup de Grace?

In hind sight, it is quite apparent that the US and NATO (by the uncalled for eastward expansion of NATO) had deliberately pushed and provoked Russia into the Ukraine War. With some reflection (and purely in hindsight) it appears that a grand design of waging unrestricted economic war against Russia had already been prepared in the US. The aim was, perhaps, to repeat 1991 – when unrelenting economic war had caused the Soviet Union to collapse. That, however, had been the result of a carefully-calibrated, long term, economic war strategy to bring a nuclear power to its knees. It had been triggered by the American induced oil glut of 1986 in which the US had persuaded its surrogate – Saudi Arabia – to flood the world with cheap oil. In that year (1986) itself, petrol prices had plummeted from $30 a barrel to just around $10 a barrel. This unprecedented fall in oil prices had torpedoed and seriously wounded the Soviet economy. It went into a negative tailspin from which it never really recovered. In 1991, the USSR simply vanished without a shot being fired. The USSR splintered into 15 states and simply ceased to exist.

Was that the design that Joe Biden was trying to replicate? If so, the Second Economic War against Russia seems to have floundered rather badly till now. The outcome of this economic war will be far more consequential than the shooting war in Ukraine. At first the Russian Rouble had fallen rather steeply from 80 roubles to a dollar to over 160 roubles to a dollar. Russia, however, took strong and energetic counter measures. They asked for all payments of oil and gas to be made in roubles. Europe was hopelessly dependent upon Russian gas and oil. Creating alternative infrastructure would take minimum four to five years. Despite all brave talk of sanctions, Europe had no option but to keep buying Russian oil and gas on the sly. The cost of the war in Ukraine has been estimated at a billion dollars a day. It is noteworthy that Europe by itself has paid a billion dollars a day to Russia for its oil and gas and this has financed the Ukraine war for Russia.

Economic War and Europe. The Boomerang?

Europe, however, has been hit the hardest. Structurally its energy linkages with Russia were far too deep and comprehensive to be severed in such a hurry. The sudden removal of 3 million barrels a day of Russian oil has caused energy prices to skyrocket. From $70 a barrel they shot up to $125 a barrel. Russia and Ukraine are also the biggest exporters of food grains and sun flower oil. Energy inflation has now combined with food inflation to give a body blow to the global economy that was still reeling from the disastrous impact of the Covid pandemic. Today, the world is staring at a dangerous recession and stagflation. In hindsight, the economic war offensive against Russia has clearly boomeranged. What has clearly been destroyed beyond repair is the trust that was the basis of globalisation. America’s weaponsation of its banking system and economic institutions has destroyed this trust. Russia had a forex reserved $630 bn. Of this $300 billion was invested in US and European banks. America simply seized this money. Will Russia, China or India or other major economies ever put their money and trust in US banks again?

Impact on India

This military conflict is of overwhelming relevance to India. That is simply because over 70% of our cutting-edge military equipment is still of Russian origin. The Americans have tried to ridicule the performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine. It was not incompetence but a shift in the power of the defence over offense that has resulted in the stalemate. Had the US or NATO armies been attacking, they would have found the going as tough, if not tougher. This campaign is, therefore, being closely studied in all armed forces. Let me summarise some primary lesson in the Indian context:

Military Demographic. Demographics is the key to the outcome of any prolonged conflict. Russia has no shortage of equipment. It has a dire shortage of manpower and it is showing badly. Russia had fielded an Army of 1,50,000 against Ukraine, which has fielded some 2,50,000 (now almost 7,50,000 by some estimates) due to complete mobilization. The Russian constraints are painful and showing. It has had to recycle and use the same forces again and again. Due to embarrassing reverses in Kharkiev, Putin was finally forced, in Sep 2022, to order partial mobilization of 3,00,000 reservists. Had he done this at the outset the war would have been long over. He has now conscripted 2,70,000 fresh troops for his impending counter-offensive in winter. This has painful and obvious lessons for India. India has no dearth of manpower but it is cutting down its manpower and switching from a regular full ‘colour service’ Army to short terms inductees (Agniveers). Russian short term inductees (conscripts) have performed poorly in the Ukraine War. We need to draw immediate lessons from this war and take a fresh look at the Agniveer scheme. We may have to increase service tenures from 4 to 7 years and retention levels from 25% to 50%. Future wars will not just be high-tech but high-tech and mass. Seeing the grim realities of the modern battlefield we simply cannot afford to downsize.

The Tank is Dead. All notions that the tank has been turned into a dinosaur by drones, Javelins and TOWs is highly misplaced and premature. Tanks will continue to be the prime platform for offensive action for decades to come.

Medium Artillery. Artillery of the heavy and medium calibres has proved to be a decisive and war winning factor in the new wars of intense attrition. Artillery has inflicted 45% of the tank kills in Ukraine. Before the Kargil War, India had planned to standardize its Artillery around the 155mm caliber. The Bofors scandal badly derailed this plan. We now need to accelerate the mediumistaion of the Artillery with rapid induction of at least 1800 Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) of indigenous manufacture at the earliest.

Air Power. Despite near total air superiority, the Russian use of air power was curiously restrained. Perhaps, this has been due to the vastly enhanced lethality of the AD systems (the S-300 and Buk SAMS and the shoulder-fired Stingers). Russian sortie generation rate at its peak was confined to 250-300 per day. In Gulf War I, the USAF was mounting 1600 sorties per day but against a much weaker and outdated air defence system of Iraq. India needs a 45-squadron Air Force to deal with the dual threat from China and Pakistan. Today, we are down to just 30. This is an alarming situation. We must accelerate our induction of fighters like Tejas and at least a 115 more in the Rafale class. Pending this, 155mm gun induction must be rapidly accelerated to make up for short falls in fire power. We may have to increase reliance on tactical ballistic and cruise missiles to much higher levels.

Drones. Drones have become the new war winning factor. Given their low cost the damage they can inflict on enemy tanks and equipment is formidable. They will have to be fielded in massive numbers.

Retrofitting Russian Tanks. Russian T-72 tanks make up 60% of India’s tank fleet. The war has shown ergonomic design flaws, wherein ammunition is stored in the turret which tends to blow up. We will have to retrofit these tanks with overhang compartments for ammunition stowage behind the turret.

Objectivity and ORSA. It is vital that this seminal conflict in Ukraine be studied dispassionately and objectively. There has been an unprecedented barrage of disinformation and propaganda. A military analyst must sift fact from fiction and discern the truth from post-truth. Only an objective (preferably ORSA-based) analysis will help in separating fact from fiction and draw up accurate lessons learnt. Over 3500 Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) to include Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Iskandars and Cruise missiles (like Yakhont, Klub and Kalibir) were fired. We need to analyse their accuracy and impact on various types of targets.

Nuclear Backdrop. Another impact of overwhelming import is the nuclear backdrop. We find this aspect being recklessly ignored in the hope of snatching some limited advantage on the conventional battlefield. The nuclear threshold has proved to be rather elastic and flexible in the Ukraine War. Despite repeated Russian threats and nuclear sabre rattling, not a single nuke has been used so far. In fact no nuke has even been moved into firing position. What does that tell us about an India-Pakistan or an India-China war? Are nuclear weapons becoming an unusable resource? Or are we heading for an accidental or deliberate nuclear escalation that could prove to be catastrophic?

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 For the world, the prime lesson of this war is the paradigm shift between the power of Defence over Offense. With satellite surveillance and drones, surprise is virtually impossible to achieve. Modern technology has made attacks prohibitively costly. It was this that had deterred China so far.

Russia was attacking across land. China would have to mount a prohibitively costly amphibious assault over 80 miles of sea. Politically and militarily, it would be a very high-risk venture with inordinately high chances of failure and fiasco. China’s habitually cautious political and military leadership baulked at taking such risks. There was an air of triumphalism in America then. They completely believed their own propaganda that they had beaten Russia hollow. The Americans went out of their way to rub China’s nose in the dirt. China was taunted with a series of high-profile political visits to Taiwan. There was a reckless air of hubris in Washington that it could take on Russia and China simultaneously and beat the hell out of both of them. The reality check came in June-July 2023, when the long advertised Ukrainian counter-offensive stalled badly on solid Russian defence lines. This seems to have engendered a sobering rethink in Washington and a number of senior officials (including the legendary Henry Kissinger) were sent to placate a humiliated and infuriated China. With its shrill and strident rhetoric of the last few decades, no Chinese leadership can afford to be seen as backing down on Taiwan. The more they wait, the stronger will Taiwan’s defences become. It’s a Hobson’s choice.

Meanwhile, the Chinese military also seems to have seen through the shrill Western propaganda on Ukraine. Xi Jiniping has been exhorting his commanders to speed up their preparations and avoid any more humiliations. Intelligence of this hardened Chinese stance and, perhaps, a speeded up timeline for Taiwan, has possibly induced Washington to hold out an olive branch. It is one thing to talk glibly of a two-front war. It is quite another to fight one. It is also a monumental strategic folly to do so. Kissinger had specifically advised against such a high-risk venture and went himself to patch up with Beijing.

China has learnt its lessons from Ukraine. It should now be investing heavily on enhancing its arsenal of Tactical Ballistic Missiles, Cruise and Hypersonic missile capabilities. It has already started to push up its nuclear arsenal from 350 to over a 1000 war heads. It is rapidly augmenting its naval capabilities for amphibious assault. With such a determined national effort, this build up process should not take very long. The Chinese Strategic Support Forces will play a major role in waging cyber and electronic warfare and will launch a major cognitive war offensive to shape the global narrative and maintain information dominance.

A China-Taiwan war, however, will not be a limited and localised conflict. China will have to exert really hard to deter, delay and defeat third party intervention. At stake will also be the vital semi-conductors or micro-chip industry of the world. Taiwan is one of the largest chip-making countries on the planet. The world cannot afford to let that capacity fall into Chinese hands. If she is seen as winning, the US itself may have to undertake a scorched earth policy by bombing Taiwan’s chip-making plants (even as Great Britain had bombed the French fleet after France surrendered in World War II). That worry is also behind the attempt at friend-shoring chip making, by encouraging India and Vietnam, etc, to start the manufacture of micro-chips in a big way and create new supply chains.

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Ukraine is keen to enhance engagement with India, especially at the level of the Prime Minister and national security adviser, to find a resolution to the war triggered by Russia’s invasion, Ukrainian first deputy foreign minister Emine Dzhaparova said on 10 April.

Dzhaparova, who held talks on 10 April, with secretary (West) Sanjay Verma of the external affairs ministry, delivered to the Indian side a letter from President Volodymyr Zelensky seeking a phone conversation with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and inviting him to visit Ukraine.

“I brought a letter signed by my president, we requested a phone conversation between our leaders. We invite Prime Minister [Modi] to pay a visit to Kyiv. We invite National Security Advisor, Mr [Ajit] Doval, to pay a visit to Kyiv and to talk to his counterpart Mr Andriy Yermak,” she said in an interview.

The Ukrainian leadership wants Yermak and Doval to “coordinate our bilateral track, especially on security issues”.

Pointing to the Indian G20 presidency’s motto of “One Earth, One Family, One Future”, Dzhaparova said this is “absolutely the correct thing because everything is inter-connected and this is why we believe India should play a greater role”.

Dzhaparova, who considers Sathya Sai Baba her spiritual guru and is the first Ukrainian leader to visit Delhi since the start of the war, said: “We call India vishwaguru. That’s something that also puts us on a common path because we promote values…My visit here is with one clear goal – to make our dialogue more intensified.”

In a reference to India’s long-standing security and strategic relations with Russia, Dzhaparova said Ukraine is “not in the position of lecturing how India should do this or that. It’s your domestic issue and we respect your domestic decisions, be it economy or military contracts or any other thing.”

However, Dzhaparova referred to the “turbulent” geopolitical situation in India’s neighbourhood and said it will be pragmatic for India to “diversify options with [regard to] military supplies and energy supplies, to be more pragmatic on the bilateral track, for example, with Ukraine”.

She added, “For example, National Security Adviser Doval has [visited] Moscow three times. So we think that in order to balance that, he might also come to Kyiv. This is what we call a pragmatic approach, because while there is a conversation with one side, there should be a conversation with another side.”

Ukraine envisages a “bigger engagement and greater involvement” for India in efforts to end the war, though all negotiations should be based on Zelensky’s 10-point peace plan, she said. During her meetings, Dzhaparova also sought equipment, technology and expertise from India for demining operations in Ukraine and raised the participation of Indian companies in the rebuilding of her country.

In the context of India’s G20 presidency, Dzhaparova said Ukraine believes it “would be important to engage Ukrainian officials in the meetings of G20 [and] the September summit…President Zelensky might be invited and we actually consider and expect the invitation, probably online”. She also raised the possibility of Ukraine’s speaker, Ruslan Stefanchuk, joining a parliament-level event to be hosted by India.

Responding to a question on Indian officials saying that the guest countries for this year’s G20 have been finalised and there are no plans to involve other nations, Dzhaparova said the situation is dynamic and there could be changes.

“Nobody thought Ukraine would resist that long a year ago. A year ago, we didn’t think we would have Patriot systems, Abrams tanks or HIMARS systems in Ukraine…This is why I’m here, to…deliver the message that comes from Ukraine, to explain to the Indian people what is the reality on the ground, to explain that it’s about everyone,” she said.

India has refrained from publicly criticising Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and it has not voted in favour of any resolution at UN bodies denouncing the aggression. The Indian side has consistently called for an end to hostilities and a return to dialogue, with Modi telling Putin last year that “today’s era is not of war”. At the multilateral level, differences between G7 states and Russia on text to describe the Ukraine war have held up consensus at key G20 meetings hosted by India.

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Relations between Russia and the United States, long strained, have worsened even further since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. In February, Moscow pulled out of the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with Washington.

Speaking at an event entitled “A World Without START: What’s Next”, Ryabkov said there was “no question” of Russia restoring the treaty for now, criticising what he called Washington’s “hostile course” towards Moscow.

“I wouldn’t want to dive into a discussion about whether the likelihood of a nuclear conflict is high today, but it is higher than anything we have had for the past few decades, let’s put it that way,” the Interfax news agency quoted him as saying.

Ryabkov said Russia was committed to keeping the world “safe and free” from the threat of nuclear war, but added later that business could not continue as usual, given that Moscow was now “in a de facto state of open conflict with the United States”.

A year on since the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has repeatedly accused Washington of directly participating in the conflict by supplying weapons to Kyiv, while casting the war as a battle for Russia’s very survival.

Both the United States and Russia – by far the world’s largest nuclear powers – have said that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought, but the conflict in Ukraine has raised fears of a direct confrontation with the West.

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Victory for the Russians could now well be a consolidation of the areas they have annexed through the September 2022 referendum in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. As for Ukraine, it says that the liberation of all those areas as well as Crimea is the victory they are seeking.

In the meantime, the conflict is increasingly looking like a proxy war between the US and Russia. This has been underscored by US President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Kyiv. And now, amidst US warnings against aiding the Russian war effort, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to visit Moscow in April.

The fighting grinds on. Neither side appears to have the wherewithal to compel the other side to concede. Despite their vast size and resources, the Russians have made trivial gains in their most recent offensives in the Donbas region. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are absorbing the attacks and waiting to launch their own offensive towards Mariupol.

The huge gap in the goals of the two antagonists makes any kind of a compromise difficult.

One solution is an outright and immediate ceasefire that freezes the conflict where it is. Probably, that is the point that both are aiming for this summer through their fresh offensives.

Each side may have to accept a tattered victory — Ukraine demonstrating its ability to take on the Russians, the latter indicating their determination to hold on to territories seized from Ukraine.

The larger picture also remains fuzzy. If Europe has managed to deal with its energy challenge through the winter of 2022, Russia, too has successfully used its oil and gas profits to ride out the difficulties its economy faced after the invasion and the western sanctions.

But income from energy, which provides 40 per cent of the Russian government’s income, is falling and could drop 25 per cent in the coming year as western sanctions sharpen their bite.

Meanwhile, the global community is at last getting worried that a prolongation of the conflict has dangerous, unpredictable consequences. Already, the world has had to pay an unanticipated price for what was thought to be a purely European affair.

The past year has seen significant geopolitical developments with implications not just for Russia but also its key friend China. The consolidation of the western alliance has derailed Chinese calculations in Europe. For Beijing, as for Moscow, relations with countries like Germany and those in central and eastern Europe are important from the economic and political perspectives.

Now, they support the US hard line on Russia, and China’s ‘no-limits’ partnership is not playing well in Europe. Even Japan has been forced to take major steps to re-arm and alter its pacifist policy and has made it clear that it will not accept the Chinese use of force in Taiwan.

There are three potential peace-making plans in the works:

China’s self-serving 12-point peace plan revealed at the Munich Security Conference was aimed at the European opinion, yet it undermined itself by Chinese diplomats blaming the war on western support to Ukraine. Beijing’s next moves could be revealed when Xi visits Russia later this year. So far, the response to the 12-point plan has been underwhelming.

The second potential peacemaker is India. New Delhi has been hoping to use the G20 presidency to find a leadership role in global affairs. India has been carefully feeling its way ahead and has maintained a neutral stance till now, one that is reluctantly accepted by the US and the EU.

However, India’s most recent vote of abstention at the UN General Assembly meeting on February 24 was a bit of a non sequitur. In its long-winded explanation of vote, it expressed concern over the loss of lives and destruction that the war had brought and spoke of the importance of international law and territorial integrity of states. It also invoked the Prime Minister’s statement that “today’s era is not an era of war.”

Yet, it abstained on a resolution calling for a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine” that passed 141 to seven against with 32 abstentions.

The G20 is unlikely to provide a platform for any putative Indian move on Ukraine. The Chinese insistence on keeping the word ‘war’ out of the joint communiqué of the G20 finance ministers last week suggests that Beijing will work to ensure that India does not cut into the diplomatic space it is possibly seeking to create for itself on Ukraine.

A third and potentially important route to dialogue has been opened up by the reported move of France, the UK and Germany to offer Ukraine a pact that would supply advanced weapons and assistance to Ukraine, but not the full benefits of a NATO membership. The idea is to enable a Ukrainian offensive as a prelude to negotiations which may involve a loss of some Ukrainian territory. The European move would also be a guarantee of sorts for the future security of Ukraine.

There is no report of the US signing on to the European plan. In Kyiv, Biden offered unconditional support without any talk of negotiations. But it is unlikely that the Europeans will move without American concurrence.

Of all the moves, this may be the most fruitful since the Europeans are crucial to Ukraine’s fight against Russia and minus their support, the Ukrainians will find the going difficult. As they say, he who pays the piper calls the tune. (Manoj Joshi, ORF)

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