A refreshingly honest comment about this war came from the Pontiff in Rome. Pope Francis remarked that Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine was ‘perhaps somehow provoked’ as he recalled a conversation with a head of state who had mentioned to him that NATO was “barking at the gates of Russia”. The Pope also warned against what he said was a fairy-tale perception of the conflict as a battle of good versus evil.

There have been no serious attempts to curtail this conflict by the West by acknowledging Russian security concerns in its immediate neighbourhood. However, within NATO itself there are discordant voices coloured by dependence of some member countries on Russian energy exports. While direct talks between the Russian and Ukrainian Presidents have been suggested by India, among others, a few nations, including Turkey, had made offers of mediation.

Apart from death and destruction, this war has led to an acute food shortage in many countries as Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of foodgrains and the conflict has disrupted supply chains. Russia is also an exporter of energy to Europe and has cut oil and gas supplies in response to sanctions, fuelling inflation and increased cost of living.

The US, UK, European Union, Japan and Australia, among others, have all backed Kyiv with military aid worth billions of dollars. Many NATO allies have been at the forefront of efforts to arm Kyiv with weaponry for repelling Russia’s forces.

Russia’s main supporter is its neighbour and close ally, Belarus, whose territory was also used as a launch pad for the invasion and it is now providing considerable ammunition stocks for Russian forces. Many other countries, including China, India and Turkey, have avoided openly supporting either side.

At the commencement of the invasion, Russia deployed about 2,00,000 soldiers into Ukraine from the north, east and south. After the Russian advance faltered, its troops regrouped in Ukraine’s east and Putin recast the Kremlin’s goal as ‘the liberation of Donbas’. By September, Moscow had annexed four partly occupied territories — Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces, aided by western arms supplies, were busy staging counterattacks. By mid-November, they had recaptured the southern city of Kherson. Since then, both sides have been locked in bloody battles for the control of territory in the Donbas.

This year, the key determinant will be the fate of Russia’s spring offensive. About 50,000 of its newly mobilised troops are already at the front and another 2,50,000 are under training. The occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions will continue, but a major Russian breakthrough is less likely. A continuation of current tactics, slow grinding of Ukrainian forces on limited fronts and a steady advance while targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure and heavy artillery and missile barrages in the rear, will mark this war of attrition.

Crossing over to the east side of the Dnipro river to pressure Russia’s vulnerable road and rail links into Crimea might be too demanding. But the possibility of Kyiv launching a surprise new offensive can never be ruled out.

For the Ukrainians, the strategically valuable direction is south, to Melitopol or Berdyansk, aiming to cut the Russian mainland corridor to Crimea. That would be a major Ukrainian victory, and that is exactly why the Russians are fortifying Melitopol.

A short and unstable ceasefire is the only other prospect. Putin has made it clear that he will not stop and Ukraine has asserted that it is fighting to recapture what has been lost, including the Crimea. This is an intense contest in political, economic, diplomatic and military domains. It is hard to escape the sense that as 2022 came to a close, an ‘iron curtain’ had once again been drawn across Europe, but this time from the West, aiming to contain Russia. Despite Russia’s sizeable budget deficit and other impacts of western sanctions, Moscow will probably have enough reserves and money to keep its war against Ukraine going. This does not mean the sanctions imposed by the West are not effective but only that it would be “naive to think that sanctions alone could end the war,” in the words of Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff.

The steady flow of arms and equipment through its western borders into Ukraine has greatly aided its war effort. However, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s desperate calls for fighter jets (about 200-odd F-16s) remain unheeded so far. The UK and Germany are providing a meagre squadron worth each of Challenger and Leopard 2 tanks and the US, while citing the extensive training and maintenance required, is expected to send about 30 M1 Abrams tanks. However, a missing element for offensive operations is air power which is unlikely to materialise anytime soon.

The visit of the US President to Kyiv was highly symbolic and came with the promise of providing ammunition and air defence radars as well as further sanctions on Russia, but it fell short of Zelenskyy’s wish list of weapon systems and aircraft. The Munich security conference was in much the same vein, with the UK baulking at directly supplying fighter jets.

As far as India is concerned, Prime Minister Modi’s advice to Putin, “Today’s era is not an era of war”, should be a pointer for Indian diplomacy to take the lead in resolving this conflict. New Delhi needs to reach out to the major players as a mediator. Its long-standing strategic ties with Russia, an ostensibly neutral stance with no ulterior motives unlike China, combined with its capabilities and capacities as the G20 president, make it ideally suited for this role. Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba had stated as much in what was nothing short of a direct invitation. The Ukraine war offers our diplomacy an ideal opportunity to play the roles of a peacemaker and a dealmaker. (Lt Gen Pradeep Bali).

The post Review of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine appeared first on IMR.

Russia’s invasion has killed thousands of people, displaced nearly 10 million, and raised fears of a wider confrontation between Russia and the United States – by far the world’s biggest nuclear powers.

Within days of Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, Putin put the country’s deterrence forces – which include nuclear arms – on high alert, citing what he called aggressive statements by NATO leaders and Western economic sanctions against Moscow.

Russia’s deputy foreign minister said, on 10 May, that a decision on the possible use of nuclear weapons was clearly set out in Russia’s military doctrine, when asked if Russia would rule out a preemptive tactical nuclear strike on Ukraine. “We have a military doctrine – everything is written there,” Alexander Grushko was quoted by state news agency RIA as saying.

Russia’s official military deployment principles allow for the use of nuclear weapons if they – or other types of weapons of mass destruction – are used against it, or if the Russian state faces an existential threat from conventional weapons.

The decision to use Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, the biggest in the world, rests with the Russian president, currently Vladimir Putin.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns said, on 7 May, that Putin believes he cannot afford to lose in Ukraine and cautioned that the West could not ignore the risk of the use of tactical nuclear weapons by Moscow.

“We don’t see, as an intelligence community, practical evidence at this point of Russian planning for a deployment or even use of tactical nuclear weapons,” Burns said. He cautioned, though, that “the stakes are very high for Putin’s Russia.”

Circumstances for Strike

Russia has accused However NATO countries of a “hybrid” confrontation that now “dangerously balances on the edge of open military clash.””Such a move would be able to trigger one of the two emergency scenarios described in our doctrine,” as per Russian strategists, adding “if Western countries try to test our resolve, Russia will not back down.”

Nuclear brinkmanship from Putin has been unprecedented. He ordered a snap nuclear wargame before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons if it determines the West’s intervention in the conflict goes too far.

As the conflict drags on, and Russia’s conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it is willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war.

A decree signed by Putin on June 2, 2020, said Russia views its nuclear weapons as “exclusively a means of deterrence”. It repeats the phraseology of the military doctrine but adds details about four circumstances under which a nuclear strike would be ordered. These include reliable information of a ballistic missile attack on Russia and an enemy’s attack “on critical state or military installations of the Russian Federation, the incapacitation of which would lead to the disruption of a response by nuclear forces.”

US Intelligence Assessment

Putin could view the prospect of defeat in Ukraine as an existential threat to his regime, potentially triggering his resort to using a nuclear weapon, a top US intelligence official has warned. The warning came in an assessment from intelligence chiefs briefing the Senate on worldwide threats.

The Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, told the Senate’s Armed Services Committee that Putin would continue to brandish Russia’s nuclear arsenal in an attempt to deter the US and its allies from extending further support for Ukraine.

The Russian leader would not use a nuclear weapon until he sees an existential threat to Russia or his regime, Haines argued.

But she added that he could view the prospect of defeat in Ukraine as constituting such a threat, the report said.

“We do think that [Putin’s perception of an existential threat] could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine, and that Nato in effect is either intervening or about to intervene in that context, which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine,” Haines told the committee hearing.

She added that the world would probably have some warning that nuclear use is imminent.

The prediction for Ukraine is a long, gruelling war of attrition, which could lead to increasingly volatile acts of escalation from Putin, including full mobilisation, the imposition of martial law, and if the Russian leader feels the war is going against him, endangering his position in Moscow even the use of a nuclear warhead, the report said.

Putin, who has repeatedly expressed resentment over the way the West treated Russia after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, says Ukraine has been used by the United States to threaten Russia.

He justified his Feb. 24 order for a special military operation by saying Ukraine had persecuted Russian speakers and the United States was keen to enlarge the NATO military alliance in a way that would endanger Russia.

The Likelihood

IMR’s assessment of the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons, most likely scenario and US response is given below.

Putin is more likely than not to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine if he faces devastating defeat. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate tools of last resort; any rational leader would consider using them if his or her regime (or life) were on the line.

Putin presumably expects his threats will induce NATO to abandon Ukraine. However, if he believes he is facing defeat or a costly stalemate—or has a chance of success through sharp escalation—there is some risk he will carry out his threats.

If Russian forces suffered a humiliating defeat in the campaign to control Donbas, Putin could be pressed by hardliners to deliver on his nuclear threats; but he is unlikely to do so, since this would only galvanize a harsh US and allied response without providing any significant military advantage.

Most Likely Use Scenario

Washington and Moscow have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe.The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. The treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or “battlefield,” nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles, according to public estimates.

Putin would seek to create fear instead of rage. Thus, nuclear weapons would be used in Ukraine rather than on NATO territory, and they would be used against military, not civilian, targets. Any attack would likely involve detonating half a dozen low-yield air bursts (in order to minimize fallout) against well-entrenched Ukrainian military positions.

Putin might begin with the ostentatious movement of nuclear forces, such as sending weapons to Russia’s Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. He could order a “demonstration” or possibly a detonation at a Russian test range.

Putin may hope that just by crossing the nuclear threshold, he would so shock Ukraine and its Western backers—and so terrify allied publics—that they would back down rather than risk further escalation.

The risk of nuclear use through a mistake or blunder is higher than through intent. Many Russian battlefield systems are dual-capable and also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. It could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option. It is difficult to know if the S-300 battery packs a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.

Likely US and Allied Response

One possible response to Putin’s nuclear use would be to negotiate some kind of resolution in which all parties could declare Potemkin victories and find a solution before nuclear weapons are used.

If the Russian attack caused little damage, NATO might first try to issue an ultimatum with the aim of reaching a settlement on the Alliance’s and Ukraine’s terms.

A non-nuclear military response (eg, conventional strikes on military bases and infrastructure in Russian territory) would probably not be decisive and would appear inadequate to many.

Defending Ukraine may simply not worth risking a nuclear escalation. But there are also serious implications of not doing it. Absence of a US nuclear response would gravely weaken the credibility among both friends and adversaries of the entire strategy of deterring nuclear attack through the prospect of US nuclear retaliation.

If Putin resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies would need to respond quickly and decisively to ensure that Putin paid a heavy price for crossing the nuclear threshold.

The post Use of Nuclear Weapons Cannot be Ruled Out appeared first on IMR.

India’s neutral stand is mainly because all the key protagonists in the crisis are India’s close allies. Hence, India’s unaligned and diplomatic efforts. Possible support to Russia might hamper India’s relations with the NATO countries, including USA.

India’s stand on Ukraine has been appreciated within the country and by other countries, notably Pakistan, whose prime minister Imran Khan too appreciated India’s role and policies.

India-Russia relationship still continues to remain strong. Russia has been a significant supplier of military equipment. India is also procuring the S-400 Triumf Missile from Russia, despite strong US opposition.  A new ten-year defence pact between the two countries was being discussed. India-Russia annual trade is also worth about $10 billion. India’s support to Ukraine may mean Russia developing stronger ties with China and Pakistan. That can be a real-time threat to India’s national security.

Ukraine has consistently taken anti-Indian position in the United Nations, be it in terms of voting against India in UNSC after 1998 nuclear tests, voting for UN intervention in Kashmir after abrogation of Article 370 or in terms of selling military equipment to Pakistan to use against India.

India wants de-escalation of the crisis, but only through arbitration or conciliation. Thus, considering all the angles to this crisis, India is adopting the strategy to solve this dispute keeping in mind that any country’s national interest is above the overall global interest.

The US has managed to get most countries on its side, and the United Nations resolution condemning the Russian invasion has been supported by many countries. Countries like India chose to abstain from the vote due to a strong and continuing linkage with Russia, and due to considerations of what such a vote will imply to the geopolitics of the region.

The immediate impact is, of course, adverse due to high oil prices and investor nervousness. India has a very large oil deficit and also a current account deficit. The latter needs a continuous supply of foreign investor dollars to plug that deficit. On food security, India is on a strong footing. Its military capabilities are significantly inferior to China, mainly due to a resource constraint. But the level of preparedness and the advantage of terrain means that the asymmetry is considerably reduced.

The US will soon have to think about the more important geopolitical alignment and strategy around its bigger rival, China. So far, the Quad formation (with the US, India, Japan and Australia) has not delivered any tangible benefits to India. But the strategic importance of India could grow. It is conceivable that in a new configuration, the Americans will value an alignment with India more than the reverse. India, too, has a strong trade and investment relationship already. If its domestic economy shows steady and consistent high growth, it can become important to the US when dealing with a strong China.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng attacked the Quad thus, “No country should pursue its so-called absolute security at the expense of other countries’ security.” He drew a parallel between the situation in Ukraine — according to him, a result of “the NATO strategy of eastward expansion” — and the several provocations perceived by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. The analogy does not hold. Amid recent geopolitical developments, India’s foreign policy priorities and the ties fostered with members of the Quad are holding fast.

The Quad is a response to China’s rising ambitions, which have manifested in the form of occupying islands and trying to control sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its activities along the Line of Actual Control with India.

Both the Japanese and Australian prime ministers reportedly discussed the situation in Ukraine with prime minister Narendra Modi, and did not insist that India echo their position.

The post EDITORIAL – India’s Balancing Act appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 1 here

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

After initial SEAD strikes on 24 February (the first day of the offensive) a large train of Mi-28 transport and Hokum attack helicopters was seen flying towards the Hostamel airport. It was attacked by air and missile strikes and possibly also by MBRLs. Elements of an air assault formation (possibly one of the Guards airborne divisions) landed and seized the Antonov airport at Hostamel. The giant Ukrainian AN-225 transport aircraft (the world’s largest) was destroyed in the fighting here. As per standard practice, military experts expected them to hold an airhead (to fly in reinforcements and supplies) and await a land link-up with the tank columns of the 41st Army that were crossing over from Belarus border. Given the distance of approximately some 150 kms, the link-up would at best have taken 2-3days. However, what followed was somewhat unorthodox and confusing. Instead of holding the airhead, the airborne troops left it and charged straight for Kiev some 23 kms away. Reportedly, the 141 Motorised National Guards Brigade under Chechen Maj Gen Magomed Tusaev charged into Kiev. They were surprised by the stiff resistence and the Javelins and artillery took a heavy toll. Reportedly, they lost some 58 armoured vehicles to the ATGMs and the Chechen Maj Gen was killed. Finding the Hostomel airfield unoccupied the Ukrainians recaptured it, thus, denying the airhead for flying in reinforcements and logistics supply. Apparently, this coup de main operation was planned at the highest level because President Putin himself called upon Ukrainian forces to surrender. Later, he personally praised the sacrifice of the paratroopers. There definitely was a major failure of intelligence here. On what intelligence basis was such a bold operation launched on the enemy capital? It could not be based merely on the expectation that the Ukraine forces would not fight and surrender tamely? That cannot be the basis of operational planning and there seemed to be no fall back option or Plan B in this coup de main operation. It seemed to be based on very subjective parameters and assumptions.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The Russian advance began on multiple thrust lines. As assessed by IMR, it was a full scale invasion option. Rapid progress was made in first 3-4 days with spear heads covering over 150 kms to reach the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to siege warfare – surrounding cities, isolating the entry and exit routes and pounding cities savagely with rockets, cruise missiles and conventional artillery. Humanitarian corridors were agreed on by both sides to let civilians flee the cities. Some 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced and over 3.5 to 5 million have been forced to flee to Poland and other neighboring countries. The pace of operations has been slowed down greatly partly due to need for logistical pauses and very heavy and dogged resistance by the Ukrainian army, which used their Javelins ATGMs and Strella SAMs  to cause fairly substantial attrition. However the simple ground reality is that neither US nor NATO are putting boots on ground nor will they enforce any No-Fly Zones. So, theoretically, Russia has all the time in the world to methodically and steadily but surely grind down the Ukraine military in a meat-grinder war of attrition, which could carry on for months. The longer it lasts the more Ukraine will suffer. Unfortunately, it will also have a fearful impact on the global economy that was staging a tenuous recovery from Covid. Let me now cover the operations in the Northern, Eastern and Southern sectors in detail.

Northern Sector

The Russian forces attacked in the Northern sector toward Kiev the capital and Kharkiev (former capital and financial hub which had the T- 80 tank factory here).

Kiev. The 41st Army charged across the Belarus border towards Kiev on two thrust lines west of the Dnieper river, while elements of 36the Army advanced along the east bank towards Chernobyl nuclear plant and further on to Hostomel airport. These thrust lines made very rapid initial progress and in just 2-3 days were on the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, operations slowed down to try and isolate and then besiege Kiev, while they carried out precise Iskander TBMs and Kalibr cruise missiles strikes and limited bombardment by MBRLs. They made a few probes towards Kiev city centre but were repulsed. The satellite imagery on 4th/5th day of war showed a huge 65 km long convoy stretched on the road to Kiev. This included assault tank echelons, which should have been moving cross country but were stuck to the road due to the slush and mud caused by the spring thaw. The convoy remained stuck like that for a couple of days. Had the Ukrainian Air Force been active, this would have led to a disaster but apparently the convoy was well protected by the slant range of the S-400 missiles from Belarus and remained largely unscathed. It did not seem as if the Russians were planning to fight in the streets of Kiev, which were heavily defended by Javelin ATGMs and Stinger SAMs and would have entailed heavy troop casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population. Some experts felt this was a deception operation designed to keep the world’s attention riveted towards Kiev, while they made major advances in the East (Donbas) and the south sea coast. Cruise missiles were used to destroy the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant and oil storage depots. Strangely, almost no attacks were made by aircraft or cruise missiles on key command and control targets like the Presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. This, to my mind, is a cardinal mistake of this war – the failure to target the top political and military leadership of Ukraine in a pinpoint and concerted manner.

Sumy. The 20th Army elements advanced on to Sumy and surrounded and bombed the city heavily.

Kharkiev. The 6th Army mounted heavy and sustained attacks on Kharkiev. It was surrounded and pounded to rubble. The tank manufacturing plant was destroyed by cruise missile strikes and bitter fighting took place on the streets. The Russians claim to be in control of the city but this is disputed by the Ukrainians.

Eastern Sector

This was the scene of major hostilities since 2014 and daily exchanges of artillery and mortar fire were taking place along the line of contact (LOC). Russians claim that Ukraine had massed some 60,000 of its best troops opposite Donbas and were planning to launch an offensive to take back the 30 per cent or so of the territories of the break-away districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was under Russian control. Attacks in this sector, therefore, were largely frontal and heavily contested. As per the Russians, it was to pin down Ukrainian forces in the North and not let them reinforce this sector that attacks were launched concurrently on Kiev and Kharkiev in the North.

•  The Russian 8th Army mounted fierce attacks on the Lukansk district and, by end of March, claimed to have liberated some 93 per cent of its territory.

•  The Russian 49th Army mounted fierce attacks on Donetsk district and, by end of March, claims to have liberated 56 per cent of its area. It also mounted operations towards Mariupol to link up with troops operating out of Crimea to establish a land corridor for Crimea.

•  In Phase II of the Russian operation they could complete the capture of the entire Donbas region and possibly try and encircle and annihilate the 60,000 or so Ukrainian troops operating against the Donbas region by encircling them from North and South in a major pincer movement.

Southern Sector

This encompasses the coast of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The three major ports here are Sevastopol (already with Russia on lease since decades) and now part of Russian occupied Crimea. The other major ports are Odessa and Mariupol. Russian Marines and Army made the most impressive gains here and have almost cut off Ukraine from the sea and made it a land locked state.

•  The Russian 58th Army and the Marines have advanced on Mariupol, laid siege to it and reduced the city to rubble by very heavy bombardment and missile strikes. The Russians claim to be in control of Mariupol, though Ukrainians claim that pockets of resistance remain. Mariupol and Kharkiev are the two major cities where the Russians have employed their standard tactics of capturing cities and the firepower used has been fearful. The land link up of Crimea with Donbas is now complete and is a major and significant gain.

•  The Russian 22nd Army and Marine elements advanced on and Quickly captured the coastal port city of Kherson (the first major city with a population of 300,000) that fell to the Russians. They then moved on and surrounded the port city of Mykolyiv and pounded it fiercely. Parts of the city have fallen to the Russians. Army elements and Marines have also advanced and captured the nuclear power plant complex of Zhaporizhzia. This is the largest nuclear plant in Europe with 6x 950 MW reactors (only one functional). They have also captured the Aneshader nuclear plant which has 25 per cent of the power generation capacity of the whole of Ukraine. Thus, almost all nuclear facilities in eastern Ukraine are now under Russian control.

•  While the world’s interest was riveted on Kiev, the Russians have made the most impressive advances in the South and have captured almost all the major seaports of Ukraine and cut off its access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. If Russians could induct fresh troops here they could drive up north along both banks of the Dnieper river and partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts along the Dnieper river. This could well be attempted by the Russians in Phase II of the operations.

Major Outcomes and Lessons Learnt So Far

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine is now in its second month. It began as a swift war of manoeuvre but now has turned into an inexorable attrition nightmare. Western propaganda is trying to claim it as a pyrrhic victory for Ukraine, which they armed very heavily with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs, which they claim had won the war in Afghanistan. These claims are over-hyped. Certainly, these defensive missiles have, to an extent, slowed down Russian operations and have been used to target their follow-on and logistics echelons. However, in no way can these tactical defensive weapons by themselves win the war for Ukraine. They can only serve to prolong it.

The American aim seems to be to prolong this war for a couple of months to humiliate Putin and impose maximum attrition on his war machine. This amounts to fighting the Russians till the last Ukrainian man or building standing. In the bargain, no one seems to care for the highly adverse impact on the global economy that has been struggling to recover from the impact of Covid pandemic. Nor does this approach show any sensitivity to the cost of human suffering of the people of Ukraine who have been callously dumped by the West.

The expenditure rate of these Javelins and Stingers missiles has been enormous. Zelinsky now wants 500 of these per day at an estimated missile replacement cost of $39 million per day. It is virtually impossible for even US and NATO to supply at such lavish scales.

Russian interdiction has now destroyed many oil storage depots, ammunition dumps, tank and aircraft manufacturing plants in Ukraine. They have captured all the Ukrainian nuclear plants in east Ukraine and control the water supply and power to most cities. Sadly, it is doubtful how long the Ukrainians can last in the face of such heavy punishment.

In a pure war of attrition, Russia is bound to prevail. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the war more in Russia’s favour. No amount of Western propaganda of an impending collapse of material and moral support for the war in Russia can hide this basic military fact. They may win the war on television and captive social media, the ground reality, however, will inexorably shift in Russia’s favour. In a meat grinder war of pure attrition Russian missile power, air power and fire power will prevail. Abraham Lincoln’s words – “You can fool all of the people some of time; you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all the people all the time” – may come back to haunt these shrill spin masters.

Russian force usage has been very uncharacteristically restrained. Whether this stems from cultural factors or a Russian apprehension that this war is likely to spread and escalate remains to be seen. They are clearly retaining their most advanced weapon systems for a time when they apprehend that they may have to fight NATO and American forces. So, we have not heard the last of this conflict and that is worrying. The Russians are clearly apprehending a widening and escalation of this conflict and are clearly husbanding their cutting edge resources. We have seen no T- 14 Armata tanks or active protection systems in this conflict despite the very dense anti-tank environment.

Traditionally, Russians maintain momentum by employment of fresh second and third echelons, which are carefully kept out of the battle for when the first echelons will run out of steam. Will Phase II see an induction of fresh troops and more material? That will depend on Russia meeting its minimal objectives – they say these have largely been met.

The use of the Russian air force has been rather limited. This failure to press home air superiority has needlessly extended this conflict.

Meteorological factors like the spring thaw and slush were not given adequate Importance.

Use of tactical ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles (Kalibr) have been Impressive and very effective. Over 1000 of them have been used in this war for pin-point destruction of targets.

Biden’s talks of Ukrainian sovereignty and calls for regime change in Russia are rather hypocritical and contradictory.

Economic sanctions could backfire if the dollar stops being the world currency for oil trade. Sanctions will hit Europe very hard and cause stagflation in the US economy.

Information and media war will be covered in a separate article.

Read Part 1 here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 2 here

Gerasimov’s Hybrid War vs Traditional Russian War Doctrines

A few days before the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, IMR had done an in house war-game (Feb 2022 issue). Based upon known Russian doctrines and recent demonstrated combat performance in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – we had forecast that Russian likely war aims would be to seriously wreck Ukraine as a functional military state and attempt regime change. They would advance on multiple thrust lines but seek to retain ground only in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the East and Crimea and the coastal areas in the South. These would be terrain objectives that would be retained at any cost. Russia had a huge advantage in airpower, missile power and traditional artillery firepower. Its T-72 and T-90 tanks were clearly superior to the Ukrainian T-80 and T-64 tanks especially in optronics and night fighting capabilities.

The signature Russian way of war has been to use massive fire assaults to create shock and awe and, thereby, economise on force levels and military lives. This was most evident in World War II, when Stalin called artillery the God of war and quipped that quantity generates its own quality. Russian forces have traditionally relied on echelonment of forces. Second and third echelon forces were kept in reserve and used to maintain relentless momentum in any offensive once the first echelon was used up or petered out. Based on this anchor premise, most military observers felt that Russia could achieve these objectives in 10 days (two to three weeks at best) in Ukraine. This war, however, has now entered its second month.

The Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare. The Chief of Russian General Staff Gen Velary Gerasimov had enunciated a whole of government doctrine for warfare based on a combination of hard and soft power in 2013. This entailed use of regular and irregular forces (conventional and sub-conventional forces) and coherent use of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, disinformation, political, diplomatic and economic tools to gain victory. Based on this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Russians had made impressive use of hybrid warfare in 2014 to foment insurgencies in Russian speaking areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. They captured significant chunks of these provinces (around 30 per cent), which declared themselves as independent (a la Abhkazia and Osettia in Georgia). Just before this conflict Russia recognized these as independent states. Hybrid war had worked very well so far in both Georgia and Ukraine.

Transition from Hybrid War to Regular Warfare. The key question here is – when on 24 Feb President Putin announced his decision to launch a “Special Operation” in Ukraine with the stated aim of destroying Ukraine’s military potential and carrying out De-Nazification, was he not making a direct transition from hybrid war now to full scale conventional war? From 2017 onwards, the US had been heavily arming Ukraine with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In July 2021, US, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian troops had held a joint military exercise in Ukraine (Ex Three Swords). This entailed over 1200 troops and 200 tanks and armoured vehicles along with air power elements. Tactics to counter a Russian attack had been worked out in detail. Russian sources indicate that plans were being hatched to mount an invasion of the Russian held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and concurrently ask for membership of NATO. This would involve US and NATO troops in this conflict. It was this exercise that had convinced President Zelinsky that, if Russia attacked, US & NATO forces would come to his aid. In December 2021, in yet another provocation Ukraine and USA co-hosted a major naval exercise (code named Op Sea Breeze) on the Black Sea in which 34 nations’ navies took part. American B-52 bombers made practice nuclear bombing runs against Russia and a ramming incident almost happened between a Russian destroyer and a British naval vessel.

Finally, in December 2021 itself, US and Ukraine foreign ministers signed the US–Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership that was said to be guided by the 2008 Bucharest Summit (where the idea of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was first mooted). By end-Dec 2021, Ukraine was a de facto member of NATO for all practical purposes and Russia was apprehending an attack on the separatist held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some 60,000 Ukrainian troops were massed against this Donbas region. That is why Russia had begun mobilizing its forces on the Ukrainian border in a massive exercise of compellence deigned to seek written guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and no offensive weapons would be deployed in 14 East European countries that had joined NATO. (In December 2021 itself, Putin had written to President Joe Biden clearly seeking these written guarantees).

To be credible, any such compellence exercise has to be structured for a seamless transition to actual kinetic operations. When that finally happened on 24 February 2022, the level of combat had clearly to shift from hybrid warfare to full-fledged conventional military operations with a clear option to cross the tactical nuclear threshold if USA or other NATO countries intervened. The continuation of the hybrid war mindset after onset of full scale military operations was, in hindsight, a clear miscalculation. This highlights the tension between the Gerasimov Hybrid War Doctrine and the traditional Russian way of war. This mismatch between the two mindsets has characterized this conflict. In trying to win the information war you cannot afford to lose or impede the outcome of the ground war.

Force Restraint

From the very outset of this war, the Russian campaign has been characterised by a surprising degree of restraint that flies in the face of the traditional Russian way of war. This has always relied on mass and scale – especially in the use of suppressive fires. From the purely military point of view massive suppressive fires were badly needed to neutralise huge numbers of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and Stinger shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been liberally supplied to Ukraine. Most military analysts were, therefore, surprised to find a near total absence of the Russian Air Force (VKS) for extended and extensive bombing campaigns. Even more surprising was the near total absence of large scale artillery and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) fire assaults on cities and built up areas – especially in the initial stages of the war.

The Russian first phase SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) campaign was confined to just one single day. Contrast this with the US 40-day air campaign in Iraq and the 80-day air interdiction campaign by the US and NATO in Yugoslavia. Given troops to task calculations, the overall Russian force level deployed was far too less to cater for the reduction/ isolation of some 15 or more cities, unless use of heavy fire power was envisaged. Besides, there was a near total absence of Russian cutting edge equipment like T-14 Alamty tanks and even Active Protection Systems (APS) on the T-72 and T-90 tanks employed (despite the dense anti-tank environment they had to operate in). Like the Egyptians had done in 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Russians seemed to prefer to operate under the area denial umbrella of their Triumf S- 400 missiles deployed in Belarus and Russia proper. Though the S- 400s have worked quite well, this denied the Russian troops the heavy air support they could easily have counted on – given the air power asymmetry between the two sides.

So what explains this baffling and most uncharacteristic force usage restraint by the Russians?

Cultural Factors and Intelligence Failure

There is a widespread belief that Putin was misled by his intelligence (FSB) to seriously under estimate the degree of resistance that the Ukrainian armed forces would put up. It was mentioned that, perhaps, accurate intelligence was available but senior FSB officers lacked the moral courage to put it up to Putin. They only tried to reinforce his dominant perception that, like in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine itself in 2014, the opposition would fold up and surrender without a fight. There is indeed some truth in this premise. The Russians went in for just a one-day air campaign and even as the 41 Combined Arms Army was heading for Kiev from the Belarus border, an air assault formation (perhaps elements of a Guards airborne division) captured the Antonov Hostamel airport (just 23 kms from Kiev) in a brilliant coup de main operation. Military experts now expected them to hold this airhead till link up by the land-based tank columns moving in from Belarus. Given the 150 kms they had to cover, this could have been done in two or three days. To everyone’s surprise the airborne forces left the air base and charged up to Kiev, the capital, even as Putin demanded that Ukraine surrender. The Ukrainian’s put up stiff resistance and recaptured the vacated Hostomel air base. The airborne forces almost walked into a trap as it were. No operation can be premised on the expectation that the enemy will just surrender. There does seem to have been a major intelligence failure of humanint or even a deliberate trap.

Most Russian military officers I have spoken to have stressed that this nostalgic perception of people to people relations was not just confined to President Putin but was a widespread cultural blind spot in the entire Russian military. Many Russians and even people of Belarus have relations in Ukraine and Kiev indeed was once a important centre of Russian culture. As such, there was a clear cut and widespread desire to restrict force usage against kindred people. This cultural constraint cum Intelligence error tended to make military planning clearly subjective in the initial phase of the conflict. The Indians and Pakistanis too were once one people culturally and linguistically. Yet they have, since1947, fought four major wars and one long hybrid war in J&K. This has been characterised by particular viciousness on Pakistan’s part.

DETAILED ANALYSIS – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Phase One – Coercive Deployment

The Russian command level HQ at Varyinch (80kms from Donbas) seemed to be the controlling HQ for this operation. Tanks, missile launchers and artillery were moved from the far-eastern military districts of Siberia to raise two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs are equivalent of Indian corps). These were the 4th and 20th CAAs. Of Russia’s 12 CAAs, some 11 were deployed around Ukraine. Another estimate felt that out of some 170 Battalion Tactical Groups some 87 were used against Ukraine. In numerical terms this amounted to some 1,50,000 troops that were subsequently raised up to 1, 90,000.in terms of troops to task analysis, if encirclement/capture of 10-15 Ukrainian cities was involved, this force level was clearly inadequate. It could only make sense if it intended to use heavy air power and suppressive artillery fire power to carry out this task and compensate for low force levels.

The 41st CAA was sent for a 10-day exercise to Belarus. This positioned it to strike directly at Kiev. After termination of the exercise it was retained there itself. The Ukrainian forces were organized into 14 armoured, airborne and mechanized brigades and had mobilised a large territorial militia and also called up reservists. The defender, thus, clearly outnumbered the attackers but the Russians had an overwhelming technological edge.

In December 2021, President Putin had written a letter to President Joe Biden demanding written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe. However, the dominant perception in USA and Europe seemed to be that Russia was bluffing and this force posturing was just a coercive military deployment to compel NATO to negotiate a new security architecture in Europe. The Ukrainians themselves were most nonchalant about the Russian deployment and dismissed it as bluff and bluster to Indian students who took their advice and did not evacuate in time. With modern satellite surveillance each and every tank, gun and truck could be picked up with ease. No force concentration can be hidden in this day and age. What can be kept secret is the intention. Was the force just posturing or would it really strike? It must be said that the Russians were able to keep this secret well and Russian maskirovka (deception) operations were highly successful in keeping the world guessing.

Putin gave ample chance for a diplomatic solution till the very end. This delayed the offensive and caused it to run into the spring thaw, which generates slush and mud and impedes cross country manoeuvre. As part of information operations the Americans tried to leak Russian military plans in the media and announced 16 February as the D Day. This, perhaps, forced Russia to delay the operation. It was finally launched a week later on 24 February with a near formal declaration of war (a special operation) to destroy Ukraine’s military potential and de-Nazify the country. Russia officially recognized the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and cited their full liberation as the primary territorial objective. It must be noted that from 2014 onwards the Ukrainians had deployed some 60,000 of their best troops in this region and attacking them directly would have amounted to a rather costly frontal attack on a very live line of contact. Hence, any Russian operation would have to advance along multiple thrust lines that would tie down and divide Ukrainian forces and mask the main objective. So, was Kiev then a deception operation as subsequently claimed? This merits further analysis. However, after the initial surprise, the Russian forces quickly readjusted to the changed scenario and now carried out their operations with far greater deliberation and with due caution. They changed their overall operational design from rapid manoeuvre to set piece siege operations and increasingly greater use of suppressive fires.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

As stated, the Americans had carried out a 40-day air campaign in Iraq for SEAD and interdiction of enemy communications and infrastructure including destruction of Republican Guards armoured reserves. In Yugoslavia, the air campaign had extended for over 80 days. Hence, most military observers were baffled when the Russian Air Force finished its SEAD campaign in a single day. The Russian Air Force (VKS) used MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters as also SU-27 and SU-30s along with SU-25SM fighter bombers. Given that Ukrainians had extensively deployed Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, bulk of attacks would have had to be from mid- to high-altitudes (to stay out of the shoulder-fired SAM envelope). This would necessitate use of PGMs for ground attack.

It is not known what percentage of munitions employed were PGMs or just plain gravity bombs, which can be quite inaccurate. The bulk of damage, however, was done by the 9K720 Iskander short range ballistic missiles (200 miles range). These were equipped with decoys to degrade enemy air defences and the Ukrainian S-300, Tor and Buk SAMs failed to intercept any of these. The Kalibr and Klub cruise missiles were also used extensively. Russians claimed to have struck 11 enemy airfields, destroyed 18 radars and a number of S-300 missile batteries on this first day itself. In hindsight, these claims appear exaggerated and the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) seems to have been flawed.

Many Ukrainian fighters escaped by moving out to western Ukraine and some are said to have flown out to Romania before the Russian attack. Many S-300 batteries also were dispersed initially. They survived and were active much later in the course of the fighting. The Russians seemed to have relied heavily on the area denial capability of their S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems. From Belarus these downed a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter at a range of 150 kms over Kiev, setting a world record for the distance of engagement. The impression one gets is that like the Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Russians were more inclined to rely upon the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) capability of their Triumph missile systems. These were apparently quite effective as is proved by their ability to protect a 65 km long convoy of assault tanks and other vehicles for days on the outskirts of Kiev. But this also ruled out much air support by the Russian air force due to closure of air space. This was badly needed to suppress the swarms of Javelin ATGMs and the Stingers. These kept taking pot shots throughout the campaign. The Ukrainians were advised by the Americans to ambush rear/ logistics echelons and they appear to have taken their toll. The road axes were not protected adequately due to a paucity of infantry. Amazingly, the Russian air force was largely absent from the skies over Ukraine, after the initial day’s SEAD attacks.

The Russia-Ukraine War (Part 2) click here

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine that had started out as a war of manoeuvre quickly morphed into an attrition nightmare where several cities are surrounded and being savagely pounded. Generals do end up fighting the last war. In 2008 and 2014, there had been virtually zero resistance and initial Russian plans this time were based on a quick collapse of the Ukrainian forces. The Russians had not counted on the Western genius for creating and exacerbating fault lines within peoples. Once Slav brothers, the people of Russia and Ukraine are sworn enemies today.

As we go to press, the Russians have apparently called off their offensive on Kiev, which they have claimed was a diversionary move to ensure critical sectors in the east were not reinforced. They have achieved a clean break and are regrouping forces for a concerted offensive in the East (Donbas) and the South coast of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Their attempt seems to be to partition Ukraine along the Dnieper river.

 In this issue we have carried out a very detailed and objective analysis of the war in Ukraine. Since 70 per cent of our cutting edge equipment is of Russian origin we have a vital stake in an objective and truthful analysis. Truth unfortunately is the first casualty in any war. The CIA has deployed an army of some 3,00,000 cyber warriors to hack Russian computer networks and fill the social media with morphed images from war game videos and old conflicts to paint daily narratives of Ukraine’s great victory and an imminent fall of Moscow and Putin. (Quite incidentally, Putin’s popularity ratings have gone above 80 per cent in Russia. Biden’s have dropped steeply). Former US and UK media consultants are mounting strident campaigns on the electronic and print media to paint a military victory for Ukraine. America has clearly won the war of narratives on social media and TV screens. There is a danger, however, of believing your own propaganda as truth.

Russia may have erred initially. However, it has quickly readjusted to the new reality of a very dense anti-tank and shoulder-fired SAM envelope and has calibrated operations accordingly. It is clear that there will be no US/NATO boots on the ground or any No Fly Zones. So Russia is in no particular hurry. It is slowly but methodically wearing down the Ukrainian forces in an unrelenting, meat grinder war of attrition. Ukrainian tank and aircraft manufacturing plants have been destroyed, refineries and oil storage depots gutted and almost all nuclear plants captured (along with some 32 US-funded bio labs). Gas, water and power supply in Eastern and Southern Ukraine are now all in Russian hands. Some 40 towns have been razed to the ground. The asymmetry in military power is far too skewed. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the scales further in Russia’s favour. Yet, western strategy is to extend this war for a few months to bleed the Russians and spite Putin. In the bargain, they are prepared to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian man and building standing.

Russia has fired over a 1000 Iskandar tactical ballistic missiles, Kalibr cruise missiles and other PGMs. The destruction of infrastructure has been grim. An Israeli expert has said that since Russian military might is far superior, relentless destruction of infrastructure and sustained military pressure could lead to collapse of will of Ukrainian government. It could culminate in partition of Ukraine along Dniper river.

In sum, the Russian initial campaign was premised upon faulty intelligence. In addition cultural factors – a feeling of kinship with Ukrainians as fellow Slavs, led Russians to show uncharacteristic restraint in force usage in the initial phase of war. We could also see the tension between Gen Grasimov’s New Hybrid War Doctrine and standard Russian way of war fighting with very heavy reliance on fire power. After initial setbacks, however, they have readjusted tactics rapidly and are now fighting a methodical battle of attrition. In the long run.

Ukraine is taking fearful punishment and this is bound to tell on ground over time. The economic sanctions that seek to imperil Russia’s economic existence over time may well have lowered the nuclear threshold. Any spill over of conflict beyond Ukraine’s border could lead to serious escalation. Russia has been deliberately withholding its cutting edge equipment from Ukraine in anticipation of a larger war with NATO. (Eg, so far we have not seen any T-14 Armata tanks or Su-57 stealth fighters in Ukraine).

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Maj Gen Deepak K Mehta

India’s neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine War could be viewed as a tilt towards Russia. To be coveted for support by both sides provided both opportunities and challenges, and could help shape India’s foreign policy postures to deal with the geopolitical turbulence that lies ahead.

The Russia-Ukraine clash made India walk a fine balance between a values-based foreign policy and stark geopolitical compulsions.

India cannot evade the economic impact of rise in prices of oil and several other commodities including agricultural products like refined oil.

US, Russia and China have wooed India to toe their line due to its global geopolitical standing, derived from its geography, size, population, economic and nuclear weapons.

India’s Initial Posture

Amid the Russian attack on Ukraine, Prime Minister Narendra Modi appealed for an “immediate cessation of violence” in his phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin on 24 Feb 2022 and called for concerted efforts from all sides to return to the path of diplomatic negotiations and dialogue. He expressed his “long-standing conviction that the differences between Russia and the NATO group can only be resolved through honest and sincere dialogue”, the PMO said.

This was a fine balancing act as it called for “immediate cessation of violence” – something the Western bloc would appreciate.

Earlier, India expressed “regret” – an upgrade from expressing “concern”, but stopped short of condemnation of Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

One of India’s initial concerns was the Indian community in Ukraine, mostly medical students. Most were helped to leave through land borders in neighbouring countries — Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovak Republic – and many were air-lifted back to India. India also sent humanitarian aid and medical supplies to war-hit Ukraine in the evacuation flights.

External Affairs minister S Jaishankar got calls from the EU’s High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss. The ambassadors of the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and US) and Ukraine met in Delhi to express solidarity on what they called “Russia’s unjustifiable military aggression”.

UNSC Discussion

India sat on the fence and abstained on two UN Security Council resolutions. India’s abstention gave it the option of reaching out to both sides to find a middle ground as well as ensure the safety of its citizens in Ukraine.

India’s actions and statement during the discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution, which sought to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, indicate that New Delhi saw it as an issue between NATO and Russia that should be resolved through dialogue. It abstained from the vote saying, “It is a matter of regret that diplomacy was given up. For these reasons, India has chosen to abstain from the resolution.”

There was Western criticism over India’s underwhelming and insufficient response at the UN Security Council to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. response was described as ‘careful, avoid angering Putin at all costs’ which expose its unpreparedness to step up to major power responsibilities or be a dependable partner.

But the fine print of India’s explanation for not voting and PM Modi’s conversation with Vladimir Putin show that India did convey the need for Moscow to step back.

Both at the UNSC and during the Modi-Putin phone call, New Delhi underlined the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations and immediate cessation of violence and hostilities. At the same time, India’s abstention showed its unwillingness to jump on the US bandwagon for a ‘strong collective response’ to the Russian invasion after witnessing the aftermath of previous such responses in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.

India’s statement at the UN Security Council, made in an emergency meeting, said, “The Security Council had met two days ago and discussed the situation. We had called for urgent de-escalation of tensions and emphasized on sustained and focused diplomacy to address all issues concerning the situation.”

At the meeting, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN T S Tirumurti said, “However, we note with regret, that the calls of the international community to give time to the recent initiatives undertaken by parties to diffuse tensions were not heeded to.

“The situation is in danger of spiralling into a major crisis. We express our deep concern over the developments, which if not handled carefully, may well undermine the peace and security of the region.” He called for “immediate de-escalation and refraining from any further key to India’s engagements in Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has held informal summits with only leaders of two countries — Putin and China’s Xi.

Growing Russia-China Proximity

India is worried about the Russia-China axis too. India is conscious that the hostility between the West and Russia is likely to push Moscow further in the direction of Beijing.

One of the key players which has been cautious in its response to the Ukraine crisis is China which is the real cause of worry for India. China seems to be gaining the most out of the situation.

Russia has carefully scripted an alternative path out, by increasingly courting China bilaterally and also at global forums. China and Russia are both permanent members of the United Nations security council and between them have a bilateral trade relationship of nearly $150 billion. Russia has carefully cultivated China (or vice versa) to develop an alternative “Russian” standard of international payment and settlement system.

What is worrying from India perspective is, the growing dependency of Russia on China for its survival which could turn the tables for India. India has had several decades of warm relationship with Russia, unhampered by regime changes. India’s dependence on Russian military equipment is a well-known fact. Growing proximity between Russia and China is a potential threat for future.

Russia has been calibrated in its statements on issues China is sensitive to, such as Huawei’s 5G rollout, Hong Kong and Covid-19. Beijing and Moscow, however, do not always see eye to eye with each other. China does not recognise Crimea as part of Russia, and Moscow, formally speaking, takes a neutral stance on Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea.

Is it not possible that China can use Russia-like pluck and revised history to lay claim to large parts of Nepal and march up to the Terai region? What if Russia backs China’s aggression in the future?

Comments

There are no permanent friends nor enemies; only permanent interests. Building cooperative relationships based on common interests will continue to provide the sinews of crafting India’s strategy.

With pressure piling from the western bloc, led by the US, this is a test for New Delhi to make a strategic choice — principles and values on one side, and pragmatism and interests on the other side.

India’s dependence on Russia and the US for strengthening its military preparations can be expected to be leveraged by both Moscow and Washington  to pressurise New Delhi in terms of alignments on issues contested between them.

Strengthening India’s military power is an imperative and not a choice that can depend on foreign policy initiatives or depend on the goodwill of others.

The global chessboard of geopolitics is a mix of issue-based cross-purposes and theatre-specific agendas that often generate asymmetric perceptions. After dragging its feet, fence-sitting on Ukraine, India needs a gameplan.

Modi will have to use all his political and diplomatic skills and continuously navigate between competing US and Russian demands to ensure that India’s interests are protected.

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Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe, with a population of 43.8 million. With rolling plains and river valleys, the land is unequally divided by the 980-km course of the Dnieper river. It has a long coastline on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

Ukraine is rich in strategic minerals. It is in top position with Europe’s proven recoverable reserves of uranium ores; it has the second largest titanium ore reserves in Europe; it is second in the world in terms of explored reserves of manganese ores and the second largest iron ore reserves in the world; and it has Europe’s second largest mercury ore reserves.

Agriculturally, Ukraine has Europe’s largest arable land area; it the world’s top exporter of sunflower and sunflower oil, second in the world in barley production; and the third largest producer of corn in the world.

Ukraine is an important industrialized country being the top European ammonia producer; having Europe’s second largest natural gas pipeline system and the third largest installed capacity of nuclear power plants in Europe.

Ukraine is a largely democratic nation of more than 40 million people, with a pro-Western president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who in 2019 won 73% of the vote in the election’s final round. Ukrainians want to live in a country that resembles the European nations to its west — and the U.S. — more than it resembles Russia.

In a bid to unshackle itself from Russia, Ukrainian has desired to be a member of the European Economic Union and NATO. Demography and geography, however, weigh against this. To the east of the Dnieper, large sections of the Russian minority are linked to Russia. Thus, Russia has the capability of bleeding Ukraine in an insurgency centred in the eastern Donbass region.

Political Milestones

Both Ukraine and Belarus were independent members of the UN. With 77.8% Ukrainians and 17.3% people of Russian origin, Ukraine was quick to declare autonomy on 16 July 1990, as well as independence on August 24, 1991, as the Soviet Union unravelled.

The present crisis must be viewed in the light of definitive protests of the Orange Revolution (2004-05) and the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv of 2014. The US backed a coup in Ukraine in 2014 to oust the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych. It was an invitation to a Russian military buildup along its frontier?

Why Ukraine’s Invasion is different?

There have been dozens of wars in the almost 80 years since World War II ended but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is different from almost all of them. The invasion involves one of the world’s largest militaries launching an unprovoked ground invasion of a neighboring country. The apparent goal is an expansion of regional dominance, either through annexation or the establishment of a puppet government.

Since World War II, such unprovoked aggression has been undertaken by the Soviets in Afghanistan (in the 1970s), Czechoslovakia (in the 1960s) and Hungary (in the 1950s) and Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2014). The U.S., for its part, sent troops into Vietnam (1961-73), the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Kuwait & Iraq (1991), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1994), Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003-2010), Libya (2011) and Syria (2011-).

Why Russia invaded Ukraine?

So, what is it about Ukraine that Russia was compelled to invade? The invasion is a spectacular gamble and a sign that the world might be changing.

Russia believes that liberal democracies are in decline, the U.S. and Europe are struggling to lift living standards for much of their populations, they are polarized by cultural conflicts between metropolitan areas and more rural ones and major political parties are weak. These problems have given Putin and his top aides confidence that “the American-led order is in deep crisis,” as Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center wrote in The Economist.

Gabuev explained: “A new multipolar order is taking shape that reflects an unstoppable shift in power to authoritarian regimes that support traditional values. A feisty, resurgent Russia is a pioneering force behind the arrival of this new order, along with a rising China.”
Russia wants to “demilitarise and de-Nazify” Ukraine which Putin refuses to recognise as a “country” and firmly believes, as he asserted in his speech justifying the invasion, that Ukraine is “an inalienable part of our history, culture and spiritual space” for historical reasons. Putin’s claim in fact extends to all the “historic Russian lands” extending to Odessa on the Black Sea coast, the logic on which he had annexed Crimea in 2014.

Russia’s key demand is a halt to NATO expansion. Russian President Vladimir Putin has asked for guarantees that Ukraine will never be allowed to join the alliance, and demanded a withdrawal from eastern Europe. That, naturally, is a no-go for the allies. On the contrary, NATO wants to welcome Sweden and Finland, Ukraine and Georgia.

Why Ukraine Matters to NATO?

The US considers stability and security of Europe as vital to its interests.

Moscow wants to establish new rules of the international order or to weaken the current order. Its objectives include weakening NATO and the EU, which means that the United States has a vital interest in thwarting the Kremlin in Europe. Ukraine is at the very front of this war. If Ukraine cannot repel the Russians, they will go farther and try to gobble up additional European territory. Helping Ukraine defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty is the most economical way of defending our NATO.

During the Cold War, Western Germany served as another buffer to the rest of Europe, and it also allowed NATO states to help influence the country’s military development. Ukraine could very well serve a similar purpose that West Germany did.

Promise Belied

In the early 1990s, US President George HW Bush verbally promised not to expand NATO into former Soviet bloc countries. The promise was ditched and the Russians lost trust in the West. US leaders assert that Russia is a expansionist state, but they are blind to NATO expansion against Russian terrain since 1991.

The issue of Ukraine’s exclusion from NATO has been a long-standing obsession for Putin, who bitterly remembers the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union under his predecessor Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s as “a decade of humiliation” in which Bill Clinton’s US “imposed its vision of order on Europe (including in Kosovo in 1999) while the Russians could do nothing but stand by and watch”, according to diplomatic relations expert James Goldgeier.

To address Russian anxieties, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in 1997, a political agreement explicitly stating that: “NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries.” The formation of the NATO-Russia Council followed in 2002.

Putin is nevertheless said to begrudge what he regards as the alliance’s gradual extension eastwards, which saw ex-Soviet satellites Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland join in 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004.

He chooses to interpret the recruitment of these nations as the US breaking a promise allegedly made by its then-secretary of state James Baker to Mikhail Gorbachev during a visit to Moscow in February 1990 to discuss German reunification following the fall of the Berlin Wall. “There would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east,” Baker is supposed to have pledged to Gorbachev, according to Russian officials, although the quote is heavily disputed and the latter denied the topic was ever discussed in an October 2014 interview with the Kommersant newspaper.

Europe’s Dependence on Russia

Europe imports approximately 40% of its gas from Russia. Russia also has the ability to disrupt global oil markets. It has already directly hit Americans.

A year after the “Orange Revolution” in end-2004 which led to the ouster of a pro-Kremlin leader, replacing him with one who sought closer ties with the West, Gazprom demanded Ukraine pay full market rates for its gas. Ukraine refused and Russia restricted the flow of gas through the pipelines. It was also later used as the basis for claims that Ukraine was an unreliable gas transit country, which helped build support for a new pipeline named Nord Stream that directly channeled gas from Russia to Germany. That pipeline opened up in 2011 and resulted in the annual loss to Ukraine of US$720 million in transit fees.

The U.S. had led efforts to thwart the $11 billion Nord Stream 2 pipeline running from Russia to Germany. While the US has succeded it is a disaster for Germany. Nord Stream had significantly increased German energy dependence on Russia, which by 2020 was supplying an estimated 50 to 75 per cent of its natural gas, up from 35 per cent in 2015. Natural gas is used not only to power industry but also for heating and to generate electricity in Germany. That pipeline grew to supply a third of all Russian gas exports to Europe. As a result, Russian gas exports to Europe reached a record level in 2021 – despite U.S. efforts to ramp up exports of liquefied natural gas to Europe.

Why Ukraine Matters

Ukraine is the second largest country by area in Europe by area and has a population of over 40 million – more than Poland.
Ukraine ranks:
• 1st in Europe in proven recoverable reserves of uranium ores;
• 2nd in Europe and 10th in the world in titanium ore reserves;
• 2nd in the world in explored reserves of manganese ores;
• 2nd largest iron ore reserves in the world (30 billion tons);
• 2nd in Europe in terms of mercury ore reserves;
• 3rd in Europe (13th in the world) in shale gas reserves;
• 4th in the world by the total value of natural resources;
• 7th in the world in coal reserves (33.9 billion tons)
Ukraine is an important agricultural country:
• 1st in Europe in terms of arable land area;
• 3rd in the world by the area of black soil;
• 1st in the world in exports of sunflower and sunflower oil;
• 2nd in the world in barley production;
• 3rd largest world producer and 4th largest exporter of corn;
• 4th largest producer of potatoes in the world;
• 5th largest rye producer in the world;
• 5th in the world in bee production (75,000 tons);
• 8th in the world in wheat exports;
Ukraine is an important industrialized country:
• 1st in Europe in ammonia production;
• Europe’s 2nd’s and world’s 4th largest natural gas pipeline system;
• 3rd largest in Europe and 8th largest in the world in terms of installed capacity of nuclear power plants;
• 3rd largest iron exporter in the world
• 4th largest exporter of turbines for nuclear power plants in the world;
• 4th world’s largest manufacturer of rocket launchers;

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In a historic move for the bloc, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced, on 28 February, that the EU would finance the purchase and delivery of arms to Ukraine totalling €450 million.

Some countries in the bloc would also be sending fighter jets, the EU’s foreign chief Josep Borrell announced.

In another major shift, Germany has broken its long-standing foreign policy of banning all exports of lethal weapons to conflict zones.

Listed alphabetically, here is what donor countries have announced.

* Belgium – 2,000 machine guns, 3,800 tons of fuel, 3,000 additional automatic rifles and 200 anti-tank weapons.

* Canada – helmets, bulletproof vests, anti-tank weapons, ammunition.

* Croatia – €16 million worth of protective gear and light arms

* Czech Republic – 30,000 pistols, 7,000 assault rifles, 3,000 machine guns, sniper rifles, ammunition.

* Czech Republic – military equipment.

* Denmark – 2,700 anti-tank weapons, volunteer brigade.

* EU – will finance the purchase of arms for €450 mn

* Finland – 2,500 assault rifles, 150,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,500 rocket launchers, 70,000 field rations.

* France – defence equipment and fuel support.

* Germany – 1,000 anti-tank rocket launchers, 500 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, nine Howitzers, 14 armoured vehicles and 10,000 tonnes of fuel to Ukraine.

* Italy – military equipment.

* Netherlands – weapons and protective equipment, 200 Stingers

* Norway – helmets, bulletproof vests, 2,000 M72 anti-tank weapons.

* Portugal – bulletproof vests, helmets, night vision goggles, grenades and ammunition.

* Portugal – military equipment.

* Romania – fuel, body armour, helmets, ammunition, military equipment, medical treatment.

* Slovenia  – rifles, ammunition and helmets.

* Sweden – anti-tank weapons

* USA – €350 million military aid package (adds up to €1 billion over last one year).

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Chernobyl has no military significance but it is one of the fastest land routes for invading forces. It is close to the border and also has a 2,600 square kilometre ‘exclusion zone’. The route via Chernobyl is one of four ‘axes’ Russian forces have used to invade Ukraine. The others were a second vector from Belarus, an advance south into the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv and a push north out of Russian-controlled Crimea to the city of Kherson.

Nevertheless, the advance through Chernobyl brought back the memories of the disaster that occurred on 26 April 1986 at Reactor No 4 in the ChNPP, near the city of Pripyat in present-day Ukraine. It is considered the worst nuclear disaster in history. The explosion led to the release of radioactive isotopes in the environment and most of the radioactive dust settled in the forest in the vicinity of the reactor. With the sacrifices and valiant efforts of the liquidators, the radioactivity settled down. The reactor core was covered, the top soil in the nearby region removed and replaced, and exclusion zone established and disposal of the radioactive waste was carried out.

The most astonishing part for the dosimetrist who ventured into Reactor Complex 4 was to find that the core of the reactor was empty, except for the inverted upper biological shield (Elena), ruptured fuel channels and the graphite blocks strewn due to the force of the explosion. Upon venturing further into the complex, it was discovered that the lava of nuclear fuel had melted down to the basement levels and formed a solid mass known as the Elephant’s Foot. Even after 35 years, the inside of Reactor No 4 main hall, turbine hall and the basement are highly radioactive.

The New Safe Confinement put in place in 2016 has drastically reduced the background radiation levels in the area. However, disposed off equipment, vehicles, clothing (firemen clothes in the basement of the Pripyat Hospital), the forest and the soil in the area are still radioactive and not safe to handle without adequate protection. Danger of wildfire, which has the potential to release some of the radioactive dust in the atmosphere, is always present. Radioactive dust contains alpha emitters, which if ingested/inhaled can cause serious health problems.

In the field of nuclear energy, safety is of paramount importance. Operational guidelines for a nuclear reactor are fairly comprehensive covering all possible contingencies. Several mechanisms are put in place to ensure safety. Redundancy is the key for ensuring safety. There are no safety mechanisms for the leftovers of the Reactor No 4; the only way to lower the radiation levels is by shielding. The first and the second structure are important for containing the exposed core. The structures may be compromised in the event of a war or an armed conflict.

The strategic location of ChNPP makes it a dangerously attractive choice for a well defended offensive position during an armed conflict. Military units and assets stationed would be considerably safer as targeting the area would risk causing another fallout. Bombardment of the area would expose the buried radioactive waste/debris which would be an undesirable outcome. Although the Reactor Nos 1, 2 and 3 have been decommissioned, many hotspots of radioactivity remain throughout the area. Risk of Cesium-137 dispersion might rise if any military action were to occur. Apart from this, the location of the NPP facilitates troop movement and the ability to oversee operations in that region.

All parties involved must ensure the radiation levels are kept in check. Movement of heavy vehicles should be carefully planned so as not to cause any sort of contamination. Periodic checks should be implemented and the standard operating procedures for monitoring of dosage should be carried out.

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