Unsavoury Advices

On 22 March, China sent unsavoury advice to the Philippines over its decision to further boost bilateral relations with the US. The reasons cited by Secretary Blinken while in Manila, was China’s “provocative actions” in the region, the US diplomat was confident that it would “promote peace and stability in the South China Sea.” These assertions were just too much for Xi’s strategists to swallow comfortably. Naturally, with growing tension in the regional waters particularly around the contested Spratly Island, China views this as an ‘unnecessary intervention’ from the US. China also felt unhappy with the news from Japan that it plans to convert its 16 seaports and airports into dual-use military infrastructure. Global Times in a commentary on 29^th March termed the Japanese action as “Japan’s resurgence of militarism”. It appeared particularly infuriated that the new plans are actively promoted by the US in line with its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Not long back China had sent detailed advice on how Taiwan should plan and conduct its national election. In fact, it termed them as a regional election in its territory of Taiwan. From time to time, China has felt like advising many countries about their domestic policies. The list included major countries like Australia and India as well. Its ‘pearls’ of advice to India have special considerations about the conduct of diplomacy, foreign trade, state-to-state relations, multilateral military exercises, and of course, a list of restricted locations that must remain out of bounds in any case. China does not restrict its ‘advisories’ to comments from the Foreign Office but mostly it is pursued in great earnest by its state agencies and deeply controlled media.

ALSO READ: Chinese Influence Operations

The world has a great spectacle to witness the Chinese interference in the just concluded Taiwan national election where China pushed its state machinery to create a massive disinformation campaign discrediting the Democratic Progressive Party, the ruling alliance, and promoting its choice of candidates. It offered free trips to the mainland for a ‘better understanding’ of the perspective. When the election drew closer it even sent muffled threats to voters to ‘choose carefully’ as it imposed import restrictions under the garb of trade investigations.

In an aggressive show of strength, its fighters continue to breach the Median Line over the Taiwan Straits, once assumed as a sacrosanct air boundary between China and Taiwan. Its ships have dangerously attacked and blocked tiny Philippine boats with water cannons knocking them out of action on multiple occasions. It continues to send its ‘fishing boats’ further deeper into Senkaku Island raising alarms of territorial violation from the Japanese. Significantly, China conducts its affairs the way it desires, at the same time expecting everyone else to follow its directives. That’s being closest to how one can define the word hypocrites!

Raising Security Concerns

Countries in the neighbourhood of China not only feel threatened by its continued aggressive behaviour but are extremely worried about deteriorating future course. Japan’s National Security Council presented a very disturbing picture of the growing Chinese threat to Japan’s sovereignty. It was highlighted that with its current capacity, Japan would not be able to sustain a conflict with China. This strongly drove Japan to find a fix which was illustrated when they changed their national security outlook in December 2022 and dispensed with terms like Self Defence Force enshrined in Article 9 of their constitution. This was one of the reasons why Japan was so interested in getting NATO to set its foot there through a first-of-a-kind ‘Liaison Office’. Australia on the other hand was another major neutral power which decided it was time to ‘change course’. It boosted its defence investments, critically planned to adopt new platforms like nuclear submarines and almost rushed into the security grouping of AUKUS along with the UK and the US.

Deepening security concerns from China also took their toll on ASEAN. For the first time it decided to institute a dedicated commission for dialogue and discussion under the collective security approach for its members. Privately many ASEAN members have expressed alarming concerns over China’s hostile approach towards them. At one time ASEAN had entirely focussed on China to draw economic benefits, but the dramatic change in the situation demands credible management of security vulnerabilities with the same country. China has somehow been successful in creating a serious security quandary among almost all its neighbours. In global geopolitics unpredictability and unsavoury approaches are highly despised. It pushes countries further to find newer ways to preserve their sovereignty and dignity.

In such an unstable environment, countries joining hands in a promising formal security alliance is surely not out of context. If that happens, it will be a watershed moment for Asia and a point of no return. Xi’s chosen advisors may hurriedly dismiss such a scenario, and clearly, it is not an easy choice anyway. However, the perception is – they may be doomed if they choose and surely doomed if they don’t. It is a dark reality about China’s bloated ambitions and sadly for it, early signs of countries coming together have already begun to show!

Unmistakable Similarities

Existing home truths point to unmistakable similarities between Asian security challenges and what Europe was going through at the fag end of the Second World War. Noticeably, China is striving to get the aura of the erstwhile Soviet Union. In the near term, it wanted to be counted as ‘equal’ to the US while carrying a secret ambition of soon replacing it as the most powerful country in the world. The hanging fear of war among European nations at that time seemed replaced by a growing security threat among many Asian countries today. A pre-security alliance before NATO already existed in the form of the ‘Brussels Pact’, whose charter was to ensure “Collective Self-Defence” for its five members. Asia has already witnessed the formation of QUAD and AUKUS with a deep security undertone;

The US formed an integral part of NATO since its inception while it held special relations with the UK. In the Asian context, the US already maintains a strong presence both politically and militarily, while it holds special relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Soviets have tried to strengthen their influence with Eastern Europe. China does not have that buffer but it has someone like North Korea which is much more powerful than maybe what Belarus is for Russia today. A formal alliance like NATO in Asia may not be imminent but it may also be just a ‘few events’ away.

Asian Security Alliance

If and when the deteriorating security environment dictates the formation of a formal alliance, say an ‘Asian Security Alliance’(ASA), the driving purpose would only be to ensure ‘collective security’ for its members. It would be undoubtedly looking for the NATO construct as an inspiration, especially the nuances of Article 5 and Article 10, which define the alliance’s commitment to security for its members and modalities for membership. However, it would also present an opportunity to incorporate measures ab initio which are seen as creating hurdles and conflict within NATO today. The existing ingredients definitely indicate that an ASA would probably be a reality sooner than later while being a much-improved version of NATO, offering better security resolutions.

NATO has served one great purpose – its members haven’t seen a major war for more than half a century. This will be one of the most important stimulations towards the formation of the ASA. However, ASA must look to ensure its actions are – ‘time relevant’, unlike NATO it must dispense with the condition of ‘unanimity’. It should be able to undertake timely preventive military action with say even a 2/3rd majority, while punitive military actions could be undertaken with a 3/4th majority. Such an arrangement would obviate a ‘decision dilemma’ within the organisation which at critical times could be purposefully induced by the prime adversary through the weakest link and prevent unanimity from ever coming across, eventually defeating the entire raison d’être of the alliance.

ALSO READ: China’s Cyber Ranges for Attack and Defence

The membership should remain ‘by invite’ and only for those who meet the strict requirements to which its members are supposed to commit especially funding and national military spending. To give strength to this multi-nation grouping, it may propose that each member must get into a bilateral security commitment as a prerequisite to join the grouping. First, it would remove the scope of conflict among members, and second, it would fully commit them in the time of need removing all scope of geopolitical influences. It would enhance every member’s confidence that their national security challenges will be addressed promptly and cannot keep waiting for phoney approvals from the UNSC or unanimity of views. Such security arrangements are probably becoming more relevant as the UN has become hostage to a select few who continue to stall popular action time and again by their veto. This would create a new powerful grouping taking its place as a major pole, simultaneously addressing the yearning for multipolarity in global affairs. It will considerably diminish the idea of the sole superpower and prevent the urge for global policing.

Global Realities

In the existing dynamics, the ASA appears much more capable of stabilising the security situation in the Asian theatre. It will allow every member irrespective of their size and potential to better commit its national resources for its people without ever having to worry about bullying by anyone. It will definitely not be against anyone and remain very attractive for everyone! The charter would make it possible for even Taiwan and China to be members simultaneously, as long as both commit to abide by the bilateral security commitment of ‘no war’ and coming to fully help the other in case of any threat. Those who would find it ‘uncomfortable to join’ will have no locus standi to criticise it, as the entry though conditional, is ‘not denied’ for anyone. The global realities have given one prominent message to all that practice of shadow boxing and cold war tactics only create greater complications, sucking in more and more resources. A plain-vanilla grouping is what addresses the problem, especially against wayward adversaries and unpredictable proxies. When the scale of reprisal and fear of suffering become obvious it would create invisible guard rails keeping lunatics on globally accepted behavioural norms. Pundits in China must be strategising their next move to have a greater destabilising impact upon their chosen adversary, but they must also remain watchful, their every act is only pushing the tiniest of countries to gain stronger resolve to stand up and guard their national pride. China may end up being the greatest contributor towards the creation of an eventual security alliance like ASA, without ever qualifying as a member of the same!

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While the Goa Maritime Conclave sought to project the Indian Navy’s cooperative engagement at the strategic-operational level, by providing a forum for the Chiefs-of-Navy and Heads of Maritime Agencies in the Indian Ocean Region, the IPRD, on the other hand, was the principal manifestation of the Navy’s international engagement at the strategic-level, addressing ‘holistic’ maritime security issues across the Indo-Pacific.

The first two editions of IPRD were held in 2018 and 2019 respectively at New Delhi.  IPRD 2020 was cancelled due to the Covid-19 outbreak. The third edition of IPRD was held in 2021 in online mode and the fourth edition was conducted, reverting to a physical format, at New Delhi in 2022.

Theme of IPRD-2023

The overarching theme of IPRD-2023 was “Geopolitical Impacts upon Indo-Pacific Maritime Trade and Connectivity”. This year’s edition of the IPRD built upon the previous one, which focussed upon ‘Operationalising the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)’, by specifically addressing the ‘Trade, Connectivity and Maritime Transport’ pillar of the IPOI.

IPRD-2023 explored geopolitical impacts upon Indo-Pacific maritime trade and connectivity through six professional sessions spread over a three-day period. 

The sessions were:

Nodes of maritime connectivity;

China’s impact vis-à-vis maritime connectivity across the Indo-Pacific;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade;

Maritime connectivity through shipping and trade (Part 2);

Private industry in the safety and security of Indo-Pacific maritime trade and shipping; and

Maintaining a rules-based, safe, and secure Indo-Pacific.

Eminent speakers from 16 countries and representatives of the various embassies and high commissions attended and offered diverse regional perspectives on the subject.

Navy Chief’s Address

Speaking at the Indo-Pacific Regional dialogue organised by the Indian Navy, navy chief Admiral R Hari Kumar said that violations of established rules pose a danger to good order at sea. He described the security situation in the South China Sea as “fragile.” He warned that the region is the most militarised in the world and a “contestation” at sea can have adverse economic and social consequences.

“The fragile security situation in the South China Sea, in addition to the happenings of violations of established codes of conduct or confidence building measures, pose a clear and present danger to good order and discipline at sea,” Admiral Kumar said.

The comments were a rare direct reference to the situation in the South China sea and come at a time when China and Pakistan are undertaking large-scale naval drills in the Arabian Sea.

He said that more than 50 warships of extra regional forces are deployed in the Indian Ocean Region on various missions, including anti-piracy patrols off the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indo-Pacific has a significant naval presence, which can lead to confrontation and contestation.

“Owing to the increased presence of multinational forces, and differing interpretations of international laws, there is this fear that the region’s ‘global commons’ can change to ‘contested seas’,” he said. The navy chief added that this contestation at sea “can have adverse consequences for security-physical, social as well as economic”.

Admiral Kumar made a case for greater collaboration between nations in the maritime nation. “We are traversing through a contested present into an uncertain future. The future of global commons hinges on cooperative efforts of nations,” he said.

He said that cooperative or collaborative systems amongst like-minded maritime nations are essential for a stable future. He also made a strong case for developing interoperability and trust between nations, saying this requires a sustained and continued engagement.

Chinese Threat

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) presents the greatest challenge to the Indian Navy in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAN is supported by the China Coast Guard and the Chinese maritime militia in furthering Chinese national interest in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s friendship with Pakistan is of concern as they together present a new challenge to India in the maritime domain. India considers the Indian Ocean region as the key to India’s security and also aims to build credibility in the Indo-Pacific.

The dispute over Taiwan and China’s aggressive posture in the South and East China Seas, and China’s rivalry with America for dominance in those waters has brought the Indo-Pacific region centrestage. China’s ‘grey zone’ operations against US maritime forces and its allies have further sharpened rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s Linkages with the Indo-Pacific

The Indian government’s has often enunciated a vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific is the gateway to the Indian Ocean from the east with crucial trade and security implications. Hence its is of vital interest to India as also to ASEAN countries. India has linkages with many countries of southeast Asia and east Asia. The Indian Navy has been exercising with navies of the ASEAN region for many years. The Malabar series of exercises include participation by the United States navy and Japanese Self Defence Forces. Ther Indian Navy has exercised not only in the Bay of Bengal but in the western Pacific as well.

India’s ‘Look East’ policy was enunciated in the early 1990s, keeping in mind its maritime and security interests. The same has transformed into ‘Act East’ policy. In pursuit of this policy, the Indian Navy has engaged its counterparts in the Indo-Pacific by way of maritime military cooperation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Piracy, maritime terrorism, maritime crimes like drug and human trafficking, are some of the other threats which the Indian Navy has to be deal with. Other non-traditional threats include climate change-induced sea-level rise and maritime pollution. State actors in particular are challenging the rules-based, liberal international order and need to be dealt with.

Indian Navy’s Approach

The Indian Navy provides maritime security for safe trade and monitors vessels that enter or leave the Indian Ocean region through the Malacca Strait, with the Andaman and Nicobar Command’s undertaking regular surveillance. Coordinated naval patrols with Bangladesh, Thai and Indonesian navies have been institutionalised. Maritime partnership exercises are conducted with Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar, in bilateral or multilateral formats.

Indian naval ships, submarines and aircraft have undertaken long-range overseas deployments, across the Indo-Pacific as far as Japan, Hawaii and Australia.

Towards becoming a net security provider in the region, the Indian Navy has been helping smaller maritime neighbours and providing platforms and equipment for their navies. Neibhbours have appreciated India’s help in training, repairs, expertise in hydrography, maritime surveys and cartographic assistance.

The Indian Navy is the first responder in the region for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, earthquakes, cyclones, and pandemics the Indian Navy’s contribution with relief supplies with professionalism has created yremendous goodwill.

Comments

The Indo-Pacific region stretches from the coastlines of East Africa to the western Americas. It is today a vital oceanic space comprising critical chokepoints that carry a majority of the world’s trade. The chokepoints are situated at key geopolitical flashpoints. The Indo-Pacific is now perceived as vital for energy security, maritime security, and maritime commerce. The Indian Navy is is a formidable and potent force to provide such security in the region.

The Indian Navy is preparing a 175-ship plan (25 ships more than its current strength of 150) to particularly deal with the Chinese threat in the Indian Ocean.

India has strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Southeast Asian countries, and West Asian countries. India is also involved in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) featuring three partners in the US, Japan, and Australia.

The Indian Navy is playing an important role in realising the Indian government’s vision of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

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In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine- dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island.

Security Situation in the South China Sea

In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest ruled that the PRC’s claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, within the area depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, four SCS claimants (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. The PRC does so in ways calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict.

The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty. Throughout 2021, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, and in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG blocked two Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the South China Sea and employed water cannons against them, prompting the United States to warn that an armed attack on Philippine public vessels would invoke U.S. defense commitments.

In April 2020, Beijing announced the creation of two new administrative districts in the SCS covering the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. This action were likely intended to further solidify PRC claims in these areas-especially in terms of domestic law- and justify its actions in the region.

In July 2019, China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members completed the first reading of the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC), with a second and third reading remaining before China and ASEAN members finalize the agreement. China and ASEAN member states had sought to complete CoC negotiations by 2021; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed its progress.

When negotiations resumed in November of 2021, China was met with hostility from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte following the aforementioned CCG actions against Philippine vessels. Negotiations did not produce substantive outcomes, likely because China and some SCS claimants were sensitive to language in the CoC that limits their activities. Given the complexity of the disagreement and ASEAN’s consensus-based process, it is extremely unlikely that there will be a CoC signed in 2022.

South China Sea Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations

Since early 2018, PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, marking the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed South China Sea to date. From early 2018 through 2021, the PRC regularly utilized its Spratly Islands outposts to support naval and coast guard operations in the South China Sea. In mid-2021, the PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the Spratly Islands during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region.

The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. The PRC has stated the main objectives of these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the PRC’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the range of response options available to Beijing

East China Sea

The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols.

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels-including four equipped with deck guns-sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express “extremely serious concerns” in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of escalation.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

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Objectives of Japan’s National Strategy

Over the 77-year period since the end of World War II, Japan has, in the face of the Cold War as well as the dramatic changes in the security environment that ensued its ending, preserved peace and security by:

• Enhancing its diplomatic strength and defence capability

• Expanding and deepening cooperation with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the key pillar.

In so doing, Japan, under the Constitution, has adhered to the basic percept of maintaining the exclusively defence-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine attests, Japan is facing serious challenges and has plunged into a new crisis, especially China’s continued attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and South China Sea. North Korea has escalated its ballistic missile activities at an unprecedented high frequency and pursues further miniaturization of its nuclear weapons. As Japan is situated on the very frontlines of these trends, the future shape of Japan’s security and defence policy has a direct link to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

Japan considers it critical for it to deepen cooperation and collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests.

Japan considers it necessary to engage in fundamental reinforcement of defence capabilities which focuses on opponent’s capability and new ways of warfare to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals. Strengthening of Japan’s architecture for national defence by integrating national power as well as fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s defence capabilities in a unified manner with strategic intent is the way Japan wishes to enhance deterrence capabilities and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which will also be a cornerstone for the security cooperation with like-minded countries and others.

Based on these recognitions, as a substitute for the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) , Japan’s basic guideline for buildup, sustainment and operation of defence capability with the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) as its core and formulated six times since 1976, Japan has formulated the National Defence Strategy (NDS) to comprehensively demonstrate Japan’s defence objectives, approaches to accomplish them and their means.

The policies of the fundamental reinforcement of defence capabilities and the level of defence buildup supporting them, which were decided by the Government through the NDS and “Defence Buildup Program” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022), represent a major turning point for the post-war defence policy.

Strategic Environment and Defence Challenges

Changes in the Strategic Environment. The global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competitions across the political, economy and military spheres are emerging. Such trends are especially notable in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has been continuing and strengthening its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. Not only China but also North Korea and Russia have been intensifying their activities more than ever.

In particular, it is expected that the interstate competition between China and the United States will continue to intensify in various fields, and the United States shows a recognition that the next ten years will be the decisive decade for the competition with China.

Rapid advances in science and technology have fundamentally changed the paradigm of security, and countries are developing cutting-edge technologies, what can be called as game changers, to completely transform future warfare. Notably, China has been rapidly promoting the acceleration of technological innovation and its application for military purposes under the name of the “Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy” and in particular, accelerating the strengthening of military power on the premise of unmanned assets employing artificial intelligence (AI). These trends have led to fundamental changes to traditional military forces in terms of their force structure and way of warfare.

There are also challenges in global security including the increasing risks in domains such as cyber, the expansion of information warfare including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

Military Trends of Japan’s Neighboring Countries and Regions. In the report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party of China (NCCPC) in 2017, the goals of “basically achieving modernization of national defence and the military” by 2035 and building “a world-class military” by the middle of the century have been set, and in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee in 2020, the achievement of “the centennial military building goal” by 2027 was added as a target. In a report to the NCCPC in 2022, it was newly stated that more rapidly elevating the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to “world-class military” at an early stage is a strategic task for building “a modern socialist country” in all respects, and under such goals, China holds up a “new system concentrating nationwide effort and resources,” will continue integrated development of “mechanization, informatization and intelligentization” and is broadly and swiftly strengthening its military capability in both quality and quantity. Moreover, it has stipulated that next five years will be the critical period to start the full-scale construction of a “modern socialist country.”

China’s announced national defence budget first exceeded Japan’s defence-related expenditures in FY1998 and has since increased at a rapid pace, reaching approximately 4.8 times of Japan’s defence-related expenditure in FY2022. China’s announced national defence budget is just a portion of actual expenditures spent for military purposes, and backed by the rapid increase in national defence expenditures, China now possesses more numerous modern naval and air assets than those of Japan.

China has been strengthening its capabilities in new domains including the space and cyber domains. Regarding nuclear forces, it appears highly likely that China intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable nuclear warheads by the end of the 2020s. Moreover, China is promoting development and deployment of unmanned assets, and their increased activities have been confirmed in the areas surrounding Japan.

Backed by these military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea, particularly the exterritorial water around Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including the areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called First Island Chain to the Second Island Chain, as well as increasing military pressure on Taiwan and promoting its militarization in the South China Sea.

Regarding Taiwan, the report to NCCPC in 2022 reiterated that China “will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.”

Moreover, China has launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents. China, thus, has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region but also in the entire international community.

North Korea has concentrated on building up its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles in order to maintain its regime. Technologically, North Korea is considered to already have the capability to launch an attack on Japan with a ballistic missile which includes Japan in its range, fitted with a nuclear warhead. North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very foundation of the international order and is perceived as the most significant and direct threat to defence in Europe. As for the areas surrounding Japan, the Russian forces intensified their military activities including through the deployment of newer-model equipment and implementation of large-scale military exercises in the Far East region including the Northern Territories.

In addition, in recent years, Russia has strengthened collaboration with China in terms of military aspect by conducting activities such as joint navigations with naval vessels and joint flights with bombers. Such military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong concern from a defence perspective.

Defence Challenges. Russia has openly launched an aggression against Ukraine and repeatedly took actions and sent messages that could be interpreted as threat of use of nuclear weapons, creating an unprecedented situation. This kind of unilateral changes to the status quo by force, this time happening in Europe, could also occur in the Indo-Pacific region.

Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have the intention and capability to respond to invasion jointly in order to deter invasion from outside.

Moreover, it should be noted that a country with high military capability can have the intention to launch an aggression at some point. A threat emerges when capability is combined with intention, but it is difficult to accurately grasp the intention from outside. When the decision-making process of the state is unclear, there is always a foundation for a threat to be actualized.

To protect one’s own country from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability thereby making them realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult. It is also important to build own capability, or defence capability focused on their capability in order to prevent them from harboring the intention to launch an aggression.

The way of warfare has also been drastically changing. In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive missile strike by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare such as false-flag operations, asymmetric attacks leveraging the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains and with unmanned assets, and actions and remarks that could be interpreted as threat of use of nuclear weapons made publicly by nuclear powers. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare has become a major challenge to building defence capabilities in the future.

Surrounded by the sea and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is blessed with vast EEZ, and continental shelves: spread widely therein are life, person, and property of the Japanese nationals, as well as its territory, territorial waters, airspace, and various natural resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation that depends on overseas trade for the majority of its resources and food, it is essential to reinforce the free and open maritime order as well as to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight.

On the other hand, Japan has frequently suffered from natural disasters with significant damage. Because while its industrial, population, and information centers are concentrated in urban areas with a large number of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants located on the coast, making it a challenge to protect the Japanese nationals and critical facilities from various threats.

In addition, considering Japan’s aging population with a declining birth rate and continued severe fiscal conditions, it is essential to make more efficient use of budget and personnel than ever before.

Based on National Defense Strategy published in December 2022.  Translated from Japanese.

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China’s aircraft carrier fleet is becoming more advanced, with larger and more capable ships, making them more powerful projection of military power.

China’s carrier-borne aircraft fleet is becoming more advanced and capable with the inclusion of stealth capabilities, making them more difficult to detect and defend against.

China’s frigates and destroyers are becoming more advanced and capable with the inclusion of stealth technology and advanced weaponry, making them more powerful in their roles as defensive and offensive platforms.

Developments in anti-ship missiles have led to concerns about the potential threat they pose to naval vessels in the region, particularly in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea.

China’s amphibious ships are becoming larger and more capable, making them more powerful platforms for amphibious operations and power projection.

Nuclear and Conventional Submarines

In terms of nuclear-powered submarines, China has developed the Type 095 and Type 096 classes of submarines, are believed to be equipped with advanced stealth technology and more advanced weaponry, including new types of cruise missiles and torpedoes.

China has also developed new conventional diesel-electric stealth submarines such as the Type 039A and Type 039B, equipped with land-attack cruise missiles.

Aircraft Carriers

The Chinese Navy currently operates two aircraft carriers, the Liaoning, a refurbished Soviet-era carrier and the Type 001A, which is a domestically built carrier.

China is currently building its third aircraft carrier, the Type 002. It will be the first aircraft carrier to be equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), instead of traditional steam catapults.

China is also developing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Type 003, which is currently under construction. It will be the first aircraft carrier of its kind in the Chinese Navy and will be equipped with advanced technologies such as an EMALS, a more advanced radar system, and a larger flight deck.

Carrier-borne Aircraft

The Chinese Navy currently operates the J-15, a carrier-borne fighter aircraft, which is based on the Russian Su-33 aircraft and is primarily used for air defense and strike missions. The J-15 is equipped with advanced avionics, weapons systems, and radar, allowing it to engage both air and ground targets.

China is also developing a new carrier-borne fighter aircraft, the J-31, which is designed to have a stealth capability, to operate from both the Liaoning and the Type 001A aircraft carriers.

China is also working on a new advanced carrier-borne early warning aircraft, the KJ-600.

In addition, China has been developing new carrier-borne unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Lijian (Sharp Sword) stealth UAV which is designed for reconnaissance and strike missions.

Chinese Naval Surface Combatants

In terms of frigates, China has developed the Type 054A and Type 054B classes of stealth frigates, which are equipped with advanced weapons systems, including anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles, as well as radar and sonar systems.

In terms of destroyers, China has developed the Type 055 class of stealth destroyers, which are equipped with advanced weapons systems, including long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as radar and sonar systems.

China is also developing the Type 056 class of stealth corvettes, which are smaller than frigates but larger than patrol boats.

Anti-ship Missiles

China has developed long-range, supersonic anti-ship missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26, which are capable of striking targets at distances of up to 1,500 and 2,500 km respectively. China has also developed the YJ-12, an anti-ship missile that can be launched from land, ships, and aircraft and is capable of flying at low altitude to evade radar detection.

Another recent development is the Type 022 fast attack missile boat which is equipped with YJ-83 anti-ship missiles. Also, the development of the H-6N bomber that can carry CJ-20 air-launched cruise missiles with a range of about 2,500 km, capable of striking ships and land-based targets.

Amphibious Ships

China’s current amphibious ships include the Type 071 and Type 072III classes of landing platform docks (LPDs) and the Type 073 and Type 074 classes of landing ship tanks (LSTs) with a variety of capabilities.

China is also developing the Type 075 class of amphibious assault ships, which are larger than current ships and are expected to have a greater amphibious assault capabilities, including the ability to carry more landing craft and aircraft, as well as being equipped with a well-deck and a flight deck.

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“The South China Sea is now becoming one of those regions where NATO is not averse, as they once did in Ukraine, to escalating tensions,” Lavrov told a news conference.

“We know how seriously China takes such provocations, not to mention Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and we understand that NATO’s playing with fire in these regions carries threats and risks for the Russian Federation. It is as close to our shores and to our seas as Chinese territory,” he said.

Lavrov said that was why Russia was developing military cooperation with China and conducting joint exercises.

“The fact that NATO members under the leadership of the United States are trying to create an explosive situation there, in the wake of Europe, is well understood by everyone,” he said.

Lavrov did not provide evidence to back his assertions, but alluded to the formation of the AUKUS alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia.

He also accused NATO of trying to drag India into what he called an anti-Russian and anti-Chinese alliance at a time when he said the West was attempting to squeeze out Russian influence.

When asked about Lavrov’s remarks, India’s UN Ambassador Ruchira Kamboj said: “We are a country that stands tall and proud and stands tall and proud on its own.”

“In the course of the conflict in Ukraine, we have been very clear and consistent right from the outset – we have spoken in one voice that we are for peace. Peace is also a side,” she also told reporters in New York. 

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READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

Events of the last three years in and around China, in the Indo-Pacific, in Europe and Russia have been fast paced.

The Chinese have become increasingly assertive in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping consolidated his position. Even before the pandemic set in, wolf warrior diplomacy emerged in 2017 characterised by the use of confrontational rhetoric by Chinese diplomats and coercive behavior. It was tied to Xi Jinping’s political ambitions and foreign policy inclinations. There was a backlash and a realignments have begun to take place to keep China in check.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic China has sparred with Malaysia and Vietnam, with Philippines and the US in the South China Sea, threatened Taiwan, revoked Hong Kong’s autonomy, chased Japanese fishing boats, traded barbs with the US and is now challenging India at the Line of Actual Control.

Territorial Fronts

China has opened four territorial fronts in the last decade, deploying coercive tactics 1) in the East China Sea, 2) South China Sea, 3) China-India border, and 4) toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation.

The China-India border was once thought to be among the more stable of these fronts. What is surprising is that China has taken up all these fronts at the same time.

China has increased domination in affairs outside its borders along with modernisation of its armed forces to conduct operations in the western Asian region and to protect its eastern seaboard from US carriers and bombers

China has increased its role in the Indian Ocean by building naval bases and also making incursions using its navy and the naval militia flotilla

China has fortified and militarised islands in the South China Sea as well as the Sea of Japan.

Aggressive Behaviour

China has thrown its weight around across the globe in the last three years, unmindful of whom it offended.

Early in 2020, Chinese officials escalated their “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aggressively and undiplomatically attacked countries and individuals they believed had slighted China.

In April 2020, China retaliated against Australia’s call for an inquiry into the origins and spread of the coronavirus by launching a trade war.

In July 2020, Beijing imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong designed to crush the pro-democracy movement.

China was aggressive as well in its dealings with Taiwan as the Trump administration strengthened its ties with Republic of China.

China also continued its systematic repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang.

The Chinese communist state with capitalist characteristics has become a country developed enough to export small and big products and weapons to the developing world. China has become the factory of the world, with its cheap labour.

But by end 2020, China was convinced that it was winning its economic contest with the West and it embraced steps designed to decouple its economy from the West on its own terms.

China is also trying to control a number of small nations through debt trap strategy.

What is China Doing Against India?

On the Indian borders, a deadly bloody clash took place, on 15 June 2020, for the first time in 45 years, during the period of lockdown, in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh, in which 20 Indian soldiers died and an unknown number of PLA soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat. No shots were fired. I will return to this later.

Till 2020, China’s aggressive attitude was mainly focused on the South China Sea but now it’s turned in India’s direction.

Besides creeping up into India territories, China is trying to surround India by getting involved in its neighbouring countries.

PLA Navy ships have increased their forays into the Indian Ocean region. Chinese submarines and destroyers have been docking in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

China is also strengthening airbases in Xinjiang and Tibet, some of which are for both civilian and military use.

India, by contrast, has always played it very cautiously with its powerful neighbour. It’s never made a statement on minorities in Xinjiang, an extremely delicate subject for the Chinese. Similarly, when it comes to Hong Kong, India has not uttered even a murmur.

India obviously has to play it super-carefully with its powerful and super-aggressive neighbour which has an economy that is about five times India’s.

India-China Relations in Brief

India gained independence in 1947 and established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC on 1 October 1949. India was the first non-communist nation in Asia to establish diplomatic relations and recognize PRC as the legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan on 1 April 1950.

In 1950 China marched into Tibet and, in 1954, India signed an agreement recognising Tibet as part of China. In 1959 the Dalai Lama escaped and sought political asylum in India. Today, a Tibetan govt-in-exile functions from India. China is extremely sensitive about the Dalai Lama’s political activities.

Border disputes resulted in a short but traumatic war for India on 20 Oct 1962. In the north, China occupied Aksai Chin in 1957 and has not vacated it since then. Instead it made an all-weather highway through it to Xinjiag. In the East, it reached the plains of Assam before declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov 1962 and withdrawing.

India has strengthened its defences and infrastructure on the Chinese border and also modernised its armed forces. So have the Chinese. There have been agreements to open the Nathula Pass in the East for symbolic local trade and a route for annual pilgrimage by Indians to Mount Kailash in Tibet.

During bilateral visits, agreements for maintaining peace on the Line of Actual Control and Confidence Building measures have been signed.

There have been some significant border stand-offs

* The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks

* In September 2014 People’s Liberation Army entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in Chumar sector.

* In June 2017 Chinese troops began extending an existing road southward in Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as India’s ally Bhutan. This posed a security threat to India’s narrow Siliguri corridor. The stand-off ended in August 2017, when both sides agreed to disengage in Doklam.

* On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La in  Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.

India’s China Policy

As I said earlier, When India recognised the PRC on 1 April 1950, it broke off relations with Taiwan and also recognised Tibet as a part of China. Adhering to its One China policy was understandable provided India-China relations were stable. Delhi is aware that, any deviation or even a hint of deviation from this policy has an immense psychological impact on China, especially since India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile.

The Dalai Lama has a huge following amongst Tibetans the world over. He is a demi-God. One word from the Dalai Lama can cause riots and self immolations in Tibet.

Since the Ladakh standoff, India has stopped using the term One China policy. India has also become more open in supporting the Dalai Lama thus challenging China’s core beliefs.

Disputes  with India

For ease of understanding, the India-China border can be divided into three areas – western sector, middle sector, and eastern sector as shown on this map.

Western Sector

This sector comprises the area between Ladakh to Tibet and the Kunlun mountain range and also extends from Wakhan (Afghanistan edge) to the Karakoram Pass, thereafter following the alignment of the Kunlun mountain range.

The border length of the western sector is 1,597 kms. India’s claim is based on the Treaty of 1842 which was signed between the representative of Maharaja Gulab Singh, former ruler of J&K, with Lama Gurusahib of Lhasa and the representative of the Chinese emperor.

It needs to be understood that China was ruled by the Qing dynasty till 1911 before it was replaced by Chinese nationalists led government, called the Republic of China or ROC in 1912. In 1949, power shifted to the People’s Republic of China or PRC.

At various times in history the British drew lines on the map to depict the border in Aksai Chin as they saw fit. The Johnson Line is shown in grey dashes on the outer edge of Aksai Chin. The McCartney Line is shown in Green. The final line was the Johnson Line of 1912, which India followed after it got Independence and it when it published the map of the area in 1954.

By all standards, this area is the most challenging task for the border negotiations. The China-Pakistan collusivity, Karakoram highway, CPEC corridor and the renewed infrastructure development with increased settlement of the civil population has further reduced the flexibility of negotiations. China Land Border Law, which came into effect on January 1, 2022, has already changed the tenets of territorial disputes to sovereignty disputes.

Middle Sector

This comprises the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. This is the least disputed sector and covers 545 km of Indian borders. Except for one large claim in the Barahoti sector in Uttarakhand, other claims and counterclaims are minuscule.

Eastern Sector

The eastern sector conventionally refers to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, but both these states have Bhutan separating them. Though Sikkim has a land border of only 220 km and has been witness to both the 1962 as well as 1967 Nathula-Chola conflicts, the situation has normalised a lot after it joined the Indian state on May 16, 1975.

China finally recognised Sikkim as part of India in 2003 in a reciprocal statement by India to re-emphasise Tibet being part of China. An understanding with Bhutan will also be essential for the resolution.

Direct discourse between the British and Tibetans continued till 1908. In 1911, in the last year of the Qing dynasty, Tibetans revolted and asked for British intervention.

A tripartite conference was held at Shimla between the representatives of British India (McMohan), Tibet and China. Deliberation commenced in November 1913 and the McMohan Line was drawn and initialed by all the three representatives in the draft document on April 27, 1914. This document was not formally signed by Chinese representatives in the main document.

The land border, as per this line, covers a length of 1,126 km. This document was finally signed by Britain and Tibet on July 3, 1914.

The border in Arunachal Pradesh, as per the McMohan Line, has been a part of China’s formal offer for border settlement but not by itself. It has been proposed only in lieu of seeking a concession in the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. The LAC also has a large number of areas of differing perceptions which remain a cause of regular skirmishes or local conflicts.

There have been Efforts to Resolve Disputes

A Special Representatives mechanism was institutionalised between India and China for talks on the boundary question. The 22nd edition of talks was held in New Delhi in December 2019. The SR talks have developed a three-part role — the original mandate of searching for a political settlement to the boundary question, management of borders, and a forum for strategic dialogue.

One important achievement to their credit is the the agreement of 2005 on political parameters and guiding principles for the boundary settlement.

On the substanbtial issue of the boundary disputes there has been no traction. There is not even an agreement of which maps to use while discussing the each other’s positions.

Water Sharing Disputes

Besides territorial disputes, India and China have water sharing disputes.

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India.

India’s formal recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and river-water interests.

India has concern with China’s water–diversion, dam–building and inter–river plans. Moreso, in a conflict, India fears that China can use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries and there has been talk of China building a mega–dam at the “great bend before the Brahmaputra river enters India.

China does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact water sharing; nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites.

READ ALSO: Can There Be Rapprochment Between India and China—Part 2)

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The facility, occupying a portion of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, is set to become only China’s second foreign outpost after the opening of a base in the East African nation of Djibouti in 2017, a Western official claimed, speaking on condition of anonymity, RT reported.

The base is reportedly located to the west of the South China Sea, where Beijing has overlapping territorial claims with several countries. It will be capable of hosting large naval vessels, according to sources.

The leadership in Beijing sees “the Indo-Pacific as China’s rightful and historic sphere of influence”, one official was quoted as saying.
“They view China’s rise there as part of a global trend toward a multipolar world where major powers more forcefully assert their interests in their perceived sphere of influence.

“Essentially, China wants to become so powerful that the region will give in to China’s leadership rather than face the consequences,” the source added, RT reported.

The Post wrote that the groundbreaking ceremony at the Ream Naval Base will take place on Thursday, with sources claiming that Beijing is going to confirm its involvement in the expansion of the Cambodian facility during the event, but will remain silent about plans for it to be used by the Chinese military.

The deal to build new structures at the base was finalised in 2020, envisaging the Chinese military having “exclusive use of the northern portion of the base, while their presence would remain concealed”, a second official told The Post.

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Moving on to delivering on the promises made in the first year of its establishment, the Quad in its second year, the Summit of the four leaders – US President Joe Biden and Prime Ministers Narendra Modi, Anthony Albanese and Fumio Kishida – announced a large number of initiatives in the joint statement released after the deliberations.

On the political front, the Quad was critical about the situation in North Korea, Myanmar and Afghanistan but in view of India’s reluctance, the joint statement did not criticise Russia. “Quad is a force for good, committed to bringing tangible benefits to the region,” said the statement.

The Quad mentioned its focus on South China Sea but refrained from mentioning China though the tone and tenor of several formulations in the joint statement left no doubt about their determination to counter Beijing’s forward forays. The Pacific Island countries this time came for prominent mention in the backdrop of China signing a military pact with one of them which is geographically close to Australia.

The Quad also dwelt at length on terrorism. It denounced the use of terrorist proxies, emphasised the importance of denying any logistical or military support to terrorist groups and condemned the 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks.

But a considerable focus was on emerging and critical technologies where the West is intent on maintaining an advantage over China. Work will begin by the four countries aligning their baseline software security standards and promoting interoperability and security in 5G supplier diversification.

Taking note of Quad’s capacity and vulnerabilities in global semiconductor supply chains, they decided to strengthen cooperation through a new International Standards Cooperation Network (ISCN).

A “Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP)” will be launched with “mitigation” and “adaptation” as its two themes.

A Quad Debt Management Resource Portal will help countries with debt issues.

Quad partners have also collectively committed $524 million for the development of new vaccines to prevent and contain infectious diseases.

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Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has already shown how unexpected shocks can drive the international situation in unexpected directions. Moreover, China has serious liabilities that could impair its ability to compete with the United States. Some of these have been posited by Chinese analysts and commentators, but others can be deduced by analysis. The most-important vulnerabilities highlighted by Chinese leaders center on the country’s domestic situation.

China continues to face severe economic imbalances, problems of corruption, regional unrest, and daunting demographic challenges. In terms of international attributes, China suffers from a position of disadvantage as the rising power. It has a weaker leadership role in multilateral venues and an inferior influence on global discourse than the incumbent power, the United States. China’s defense strategy has drawbacks as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains an unattractive partner for many countries, especially in Asia. And the military’s lack of power-projection capabilities limits its ability to provide the public security goods that helped make U.S. global leadership so successful. These vulnerabilities suggest advantages for the United States, but they also underscore areas that China could address in coming years if it hopes to improve its competitive position. One final point deserves emphasis. The most-critical factors that will determine the outcome of U.S.-China competition are fundamentally domestic.

Which side can build the more technologically innovative and prosperous economy, flourishing and well-governed society, and durable and responsive politics will likely be the side to gain a decisive advantage in competition. A thorough analysis of the potential trajectory of U.S.- China competition would examine such variables closely, but such a task lies beyond the scope of this analysis. The importance of domestic policy should nonetheless be borne in mind when analyzing the international and defense dimensions of competitive strategies.

The research carries several implications for U.S. decision-makers and the Department of Defense (DoD). The first is the enduring importance of strengthening America’s network of alliances and partnerships. China recognizes this network to be a tremendous strategic advantage for the United States, one that Beijing has struggled to match. This analysis has underscored the importance of initiatives undertaken by the past two presidential administrations to shore up U.S. influence and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific remains a critical domain of U.S.-China competition, and its importance for the broader global competition merits emphasis. U.S. policies that facilitate China’s consolidation of influence and leadership in the Indo-Pacific could simply accelerate Beijing’s efforts to challenge U.S. leadership at the global-systemic level.

The importance of areas outside the Indo-Pacific and of developing countries as constituencies for international leadership deserves emphasis as well. China’s cultivation of client states and influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America could directly affect the ability of the United States to compete in the Indo-Pacific. As one example, Chinese success in consolidating influence with vital energy suppliers in the Middle East could affect the ability and willingness of countries like Japan and India to support measures that constrain Chinese power. The need to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo- Pacific may need to be balanced by the need to uphold U.S. credibility as a global leader. At the very least, closer coordination between competitive strategies both within and outside the Indo-Pacific will be imperative. In terms of developing countries, China’s lack of allies leaves it in a weak position to challenge the United States. Washington could strengthen its hand further by bolstering its relationships with those states that have only recently experienced substantial growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Given the long-term trends favoring the rise of the “non-West,” cultivation of support in the developing world appears prudent in any case.

While multilateral organizations and institutions for global governance have endured considerable criticism for their many failings and inefficiencies, this research has concluded that engagement with those entities will remain an important component of U.S.-China competition. Greater U.S. investments in shaping and reinvigorating international institutions and multilateral venues can help consolidate U.S. influence and restrain Chinese challenges. In some cases, this may involve initiatives to grant China more influence and extend cooperation. The goal here, as in other areas, is to weaken the force of Chinese criticisms by demonstrating responsive, effective U.S. leadership, thereby reducing the incentive for other countries to back Beijing’s efforts to renovate those organizations in ways that harm U.S. interests. In terms of defense strategy, the posited strategy has emphasized the importance of deterrence, crisis management, and military diplomacy in the competition. As presented in this report,  China’s defense strategy could expand the geographic range of potential crisis situations and contingencies. Along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) routes and as part of the effort to expand a network of client states worldwide, China has a strong incentive to offer arms sales, military training, and other forms of assistance. Such transactions have been increasing in recent years. In coming years, China may take on even more security responsibilities to protect its BRI investments. An imperative to demonstrate its credibility as a patron to client nations could incentivize PLA forces to carry out more-frequent acts of military diplomacy that coerce U.S. allies or partners, or even to contemplate the development of alliance-like obligations.

These possibilities suggest that the U.S. military faces a compelling need to bolster conventional deterrence and invest in capabilities to ensure the superiority of the armed forces in the future. A focus on traditional deterrence through conventional military superiority remains the bedrock of any security strategy to counter China. A robust U.S. military capability to defend its interests and those of its allies and partners provides a critical source of U.S. credibility as a leader in the Indo-Pacific. A strong conventional military capability is also essential for incentivizing regional powers, such as Japan, Vietnam, and others, to resist Chinese coercion and demands. By contrast, clear evidence that the United States had lost the military advantage could persuade other countries to either adopt a position of tacit submission and accommodation to Chinese demands or step up a potentially destabilizing arms race to shore up their defense.

Ensuring the capability to deter China in the short term will remain critical, but investment to ensure long-term advantage will be critical as well. Sustaining investment in the future capabilities of the U.S. military will be essential not just for ensuring the long-term credibility of U.S. deterrence, but also for bolstering America’s position in the broader competition. Finding ways to better protect U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific but also in the cyber, space, and other domains can backstop broader competitive efforts. DoD may need to maintain a significant presence in the Middle East and other theaters to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Strengthening U.S. conventional capabilities and investing in a technologically advanced future force remain critical tasks. But military diplomacy could assume greater importance, too. The diplomatic struggle for influence and leadership suggests that the U.S. military could play an important role in incentivizing cooperation with the United States and helping countries resist unreasonable Chinese demands. U.S. experience in military advisory missions and assistance can help strengthen diplomatic partnerships and counter Chinese influence efforts. The provision of public goods, such as security for key shipping lanes and humanitarian aid in the face of disaster, can help maintain the appeal of the United States as the global leader.

As the competition intensifies, U.S. military planners may need to expand the portfolio of possible contingencies involving China. The flashpoints between the United States and China today may not be flashpoints in the future, or they may coexist alongside new ones. Scenarios involving Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and cyberspace tend to occupy the concerns of military planners today, but these issues may be augmented by new ones that arise from China’s efforts to exert greater leadership, especially along its BRI routes and with client states on other continents. As just one illustration, China’s willingness to court Iran despite U.S. sanctions raises the possibility over time of proxy conflicts between forces backed by China and those by the United States in the Middle East. The more that China assumes the role of patron for client states, the higher the likelihood that, at some point, PLA forces or Chinese-backed host nation forces could engage in hostile acts against parties aligned with the United States.

The appeal and feasibility of Chinese military efforts to resolve longstanding issues, such as Taiwan, may need to be reexamined through the lens of the broader competition as well. From Beijing’s perspective, the potential cost and risk of escalation in war increase the more the competition with the United States intensifies. Thus, it is in China’s interest to delay the resolution of Taiwan’s status and that of other disputed regions until it has prevailed in its competition with the United States. This might mean that Beijing tolerates a stable cross-strait relationship premised on Taiwan’s rejection of formal independence so long as the United States retains the international upper hand and a credible military intervention option. Other PLA missions may be more pressing for the near term. However, the calculus could change, should China succeed in gaining a decisive competitive advantage in international and regional leadership and in its military posture near Taiwan. Similarly, China may regard as satisfactory a continued reliance on gray-zone tactics that incrementally change the status quo within the first island chain in a low-risk manner while it prioritizes efforts to weaken the U.S. position in Asia and elsewhere. To maximize deterrence and the protection of U.S. interests, the defense and foreign policy dimensions of any U.S. competitive strategy may need to be even more closely coordinated.

Any Chinese deliberation on how to tailor the controlled use of force in any confrontation involving U.S.-backed forces would carry serious risks, of course. The dangers of escalation and miscalculation paradoxically underscore the importance of finding ways for both countries to cooperate and ease tensions as a component of successful competition. The development of a strategy that includes some degree of reassurance and cooperation could help stabilize the competition and reduce risks of miscalculation and dangerous incidents. Moreover, as the international security environment experiences more fragmentation and breakdown, collaboration between the world’s two largest powers could prove nearly unavoidable in any case.

The return of great-power competition after decades of unchallenged U.S. global primacy has introduced new challenges and risks. Washington enters the contest burdened by fiscal strains, domestic political polarization, and competing international and domestic priorities. These constraints raise the imperative of developing effective strategies that allocate resources efficiently and effectively. The derivation of a Chinese strategy can, hopefully, provide a useful tool for that important task.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

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