An indicator of Chinese activity comes from the fact that this year, the Chinese have sent up 55 rockets. The US leads with 80 launches and the Russians came a poor third with 22. Beijing’s maturity as a space-faring power was confirmed earlier this year when it added the third and last module to its Tiangong space station, which has been occupied by three-man crew since June 2021.

According to the Pentagon report, the Chinese are investing heavily in space and putting money into everything from intelligence assets to weapons such as kinetic-kill missiles and ground lasers. Since 2018, China has almost doubled its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites that are now more than 260, which is about half of the entire world’s ISR systems.

China has one of the most-advanced space programmes in the world and its origins lie in its military doctrine. The Chinese programme was launched by the Fifth Academy of the National Defence Ministry in 1956 and launched its first satellite in 1970.

But today, China has a broad-based programme that includes human space flight, exploration missions to Mars and the moon, alongside the military applications such as enabling long-range precision strikes and using satellite-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and at the same time denying them to adversaries.

The military applications come under the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), which was set up in 2015 and has since centralised all of the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic and psychological operations. It has two broad divisions — the Space Systems Department (SSD) responsible for military space operations and the Network Systems Department (NSD), which handles information warfare.

The SSF space activities are about war fighting and war winning and are deeply integrated with information warfare, which includes cyberwar, technical intelligence, electronic warfare and psychological operations. The current commander of the SSF is General Ju Qiansheng, who earlier headed the NSD.

The SSF’s Space Systems Department is responsible for most of PLA’s space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking and control and space warfare. The SSD runs the Yuan Wang space support ships, one of which created a furore when it visited Sri Lanka earlier this year.

Perhaps, most significant developments are in the PLA’s counter-space capabilities which seek to degrade and deny space capabilities to adversaries. China, according to the Pentagon report, believes that space-based operations are a crucial element in the US military system and has, thus, pursued a strategy to negate this American advantage. Thus, US reconnaissance, communication, navigation and early-warning satellites will be targeted early in any conflict.

In January 2007, China had tested a direct-ascent ASAT missile that destroyed an old-weather satellite. The resultant debris created a controversy and China has not undertaken such a test since then. The Chinese have also conducted anti-satellite tests using the DN-1 and 2 missiles in 2010, 2013 and 2014, and by a DN-3 missile in 2015. They claimed that these were ballistic missile defence tests, but the Americans insist that these were direct-ascent missiles aimed at ramming into satellites to destroy them. Their assessment is that these missiles are capable of taking out satellites in near geosynchronous orbits where most intelligence and navigation satellites are located.

Reports on China testing a manoeuvring satellite to capture another satellite in space began to appear in 2013 and in July, China tested a deployment involving three satellites in which one of them was fitted with a mechanical arm. The Chinese claimed that this was a test of a system to collect space debris. There is little doubt that China today has the ability to neutralise adversary satellite by capturing them or knocking them off their orbit.

According to a 2020 report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the PLA also has an operational ground-based satellite electronic counter-measures capability designed to disrupt satellite communications, navigation, missile early warning and other satellites through jamming.

The technology was incidentally sourced from Ukraine in the late 1990s and developed indigenously. It is well known that the Chinese also have a well-developed cyberwar capability, which can work in tandem with these jamming systems.

It’s clear that the PLA’s advances in both kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space activities will be a serious problem for the US, which has otherwise enjoyed enormous advantage in space. But by the same measure, India needs to think of ways to meet this burgeoning Chinese threat.

Kartik Bommakanti of the Observer Research Foundation has pointed out that India’s record of heavy-launch vehicles — the type that is needed to hoist certain militarily useful satellites into the orbit — is patchy. By contrast, the Chinese Long March series “are a visible demonstration and example of the Chinese progressing more rapidly than India in the development of geosynchronous launch vehicle.” But this is not the only area where China is ahead of India.

With just five launches in the past year, India can hardly compete with China. It took a tentative step forward when it created the Defence Space Agency under the Integrated Defence Staff in 2019 along with a Defence Space Research Agency. But, it needs to urgently work on a strategy to deal with the China challenge. 

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The radar was displayed for the first time at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai (Guangdong), which concluded on November 13. The ten-meter-tall SLC-18 radar is said to be particularly successful in detecting and tracking multiple Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites in all conditions. 

LEO satellites are located anywhere from 200 kilometers to 2,000 kilometers above the Earth’s surface. These satellites are used primarily for data collection and military surveillance and have steadily evolved into critical equipment for powerful countries seeking remote intelligence. 

LEO satellites can carry out intense, 360-degree, and all-factor hotspot surveillance thanks to their powerful capability, small size, and flexible orbits. China’s new radar is capable of monitoring such satellites.

The SLC-18 was developed by the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), which also manufactures electronic systems and components, missiles, radars, and other weapons for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Sun Lei, CETC deputy general manager, said, “This radar will allow friendly countries to locate targets in space.” The statement hints at China’s desire to provide Pakistan with a radar system. 

The system provides capabilities for situational awareness against low-orbiting satellites to balance the tactical stance. This radar is substantially less expensive than others in its class, adding an affordability factor for Pakistan. 

It is important to note that India is a significant space power with a diverse array of satellites in orbit. This enables New Delhi to monitor Islamabad’s every action. However, with the SLC-18 radar, Pakistan could detect where the Indian satellites are. 

China and Pakistan have close ties, referring to one another as “iron brothers” and “all-weather allies” in their bilateral declarations. China is Pakistan’s top supplier of military equipment, including aircraft, missiles, and warships.

Islamabad is also crucial to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Highlighting that point, Sun emphasized that the SLC-18 radar’s situational awareness against LEO satellites and competitively priced ground-based space target monitoring can help the Belt and Road Initiative.

In the five years between 2017 and 2021, according to data from the Swedish research tank SIPRI, which contains information on weapon transfers, Pakistan imported 72% of its total weapons from China, and it was also the end recipient of 47% of all of China’s major arms exports.

In addition, China has armed Pakistan with its HQ 9/P HIMADS (High to Medium Air Defense System), which was inducted into the Pakistan Army Air Defense in October 2021.

With a single-shot kill probability, the HQ 9 can intercept various air targets, such as aircraft, cruise missiles, and weapons, beyond the optical range of more than 100 kilometers.

SLC-18 Radar Capabilities 

The SLC-18 radar, a P-band solid-state active phased array radar, is primarily used to detect space targets. It can track and measure several objects while searching for and capturing LEO satellites and other space targets.

Sun told the Global Times that the SLC-18 radar could identify and catalog satellites to create a radar database, which may be used to direct other equipment to respond accordingly. 

This development also alters the traditional practices of developing nations purchasing satellite data from developed countries, which may be compromised and very expensive because they lack the necessary space-based resources and platforms.

The SLC-18 can detect satellites from a distance and relay satellite data to the command center to help make decisions. It has wide-area detection capability, allowing it to instantly record a satellite’s orbit and enter it into a database. Based on the orbit parameters, it can immediately assess whether it is a new satellite type and its primary usage.

Sun pointed out that the radar has essential advantages such as all-weather, all-time, multi-target, immense power, and extensive search areas, which can identify LEO targets in various airspace and cover many LEO satellite targets.

He added that the radar is entirely built in China, from chip production to manufacturing. It also uses a modular design to extend its capabilities as needed. This suggests that China’s radar development has advanced to a new level.

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