In a televised address to the Russian people on 21 September, Putin explicitly raised the specter of a nuclear conflict. Despite being regarded as a very low likelihood scenario, the potential implications of such a scenario are huge.

This article tries to give the reader-at-large an idea about what is involved in launching a tactical nuclear strike.

The push for partial mobilization is bound to escalate the situation in Ukraine. Losses are mounting exponentially and with the influx of inexperienced conscripts who lack any meaningful knowledge of the weapon systems would further make the situation even more dire.

There is no justification to use nuclear weapons in a conflict with a non-nuclear state. But according to Russia, the only feasible way to put an end to the conflict is to use nuclear weapons. The chances of a nuclear device detonation have become uncomfortably high.

Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces possess a wide variety of nuclear weapons platforms and devices. Russia currently has approximately 6000 warheads. They vary in their yield and the safety mechanisms. Most of the devices are equipped with a standard dialable yield system, which according to the target can be adjusted. They also possess a wide variety of platforms to deliver the said devices ranging from ICBMs to artillery shells.

As per the Russian state, current conflict would call for the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Ukrainian advances all the up to the border of Russia. The most important factor is the launch time preparedness. The long range ballistic missiles are at the highest level of readiness. The inherent problem of long range liquid fueled missiles meant that they had to be fueled immediately before launch, this was solved by the R-36 series which were fueled only once, when they are placed in the silos. After that the missiles are ampulised/sealed and kept in this state ready for launch. As a result, the time needed to wind up the guidance system’s gyroscopes became the main constraint on launch readiness rather than the several hours that the missile previously needed to launch.

R-36M missiles were the first liquid-fuel missiles that used a so-called cold launch method, in which the missile main engine did not start until the missile had been ejected from the silo by a special charge: a pressure accumulator. This launch method reduced the heat and acoustic load on the missile and allowed the fuller use of silo volume.

The development of the automated system of combat management and the introduction of third-generation missile systems with on-board computers provided the RVSN the technological capacity to remotely alter missile flight assignments and alter nuclear force use scenarios in response to changing circumstances. Since the flight trajectory of missiles moving along the combat route must constantly be recalculated as the location of the launchers changes, the adoption of fourth-generation systems (the R-36M2, RT-23UTTH, and Topol) provided the capability for quick retargeting, which was crucial in the case of mobile systems. Therefore, there were no new technological challenges while changing the targeted coordinates.

During the pre-war time silo-based missiles would have been reprogrammed with “neutral” flight assignments (aimed at targets in the ocean). Fourth-generation systems are now on combat duty with zero flight assignments. These changes were largely symbolic, however, because it takes no more than a few minutes to retarget systems in accordance with operational plans for their use.

It is the tactical systems that require more time for getting ready to be deployed on the battlefield. Russia has many of them. The warhead must be prepared, mated to the desired platform (usually cruise missiles but in some cases smaller warheads can be mated to the S-300/400 series to deny the airspace to the enemy).

From transporting the warhead to the location, calibrating the gyroscopes (if the device has them), programming the detonation yield, testing the on board power system and finally mating the device to the platform on the appropriate bus. This will take several hours and will be detected by satellites, drones and people.

For instance, if Russia wishes to deploy the Nuclear weapon from a ground based launcher to detonate above the Black Sea/forward areas of Donetsk. It is highly likely the platform of choice is going to be a Mig-31. It is important to know that the control of the missile launch will be remote and may not be in the hands of the pilot.

If they choose to use a ground based launcher(static or mobile), it is highly likely the following steps will be followed :

1. The General Staff gives the proper directives to the armed forces’ services regarding the use of nuclear weapons when the decision to use nuclear weapons has been taken and the precise scenario for their use has been determined.

2. The Central Command Center of the General Staff (which serves as the Supreme High Command Central Command Center) transmits the necessary authorization codes and unlocks certain launchers to issue the command to employ nuclear weapons.

3. The combat management signal for the Rocket Forces initially travels to the Strategic Rocket Forces Central Command Center before being forwarded to the regiments whose launchers are to be employed.

4. The on-duty staff must input the authorizing codes and launch the missiles when the order to employ weapons and the authorizing codes have been sent. The command and control system also allows for the capability of firing missiles without the involvement of personnel on lower levels directly from the Supreme High Command Central Command Center.

5. Automated launch preparations begin as soon as the launcher receives the launch command. The response time—the period of time between the transmission of the launch command and the actual launch—depends on the missile and launcher, as well as their condition at the moment the command is received.

6. Prior to launch, the missile’s guidance system must be activated (the switch to onboard power supply, the activation of the gyros, etc.), and the first-stage propulsion system (or the pressure accumulator in a cold-launch system) must be ignited.

7. When the launch command is received, the transporter-launcher (ground or rail) stops, the launcher is secured in the soil with hydraulic supports, and the canister containing the missile is raised to a vertical position. After this, the pressure accumulator is ignited and the missile is fired from the canister.

Part 2 will cover the launch to detonation and aftermath

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Russia’s invasion has killed thousands of people, displaced nearly 10 million, and raised fears of a wider confrontation between Russia and the United States – by far the world’s biggest nuclear powers.

Within days of Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion, Putin put the country’s deterrence forces – which include nuclear arms – on high alert, citing what he called aggressive statements by NATO leaders and Western economic sanctions against Moscow.

Russia’s deputy foreign minister said, on 10 May, that a decision on the possible use of nuclear weapons was clearly set out in Russia’s military doctrine, when asked if Russia would rule out a preemptive tactical nuclear strike on Ukraine. “We have a military doctrine – everything is written there,” Alexander Grushko was quoted by state news agency RIA as saying.

Russia’s official military deployment principles allow for the use of nuclear weapons if they – or other types of weapons of mass destruction – are used against it, or if the Russian state faces an existential threat from conventional weapons.

The decision to use Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, the biggest in the world, rests with the Russian president, currently Vladimir Putin.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns said, on 7 May, that Putin believes he cannot afford to lose in Ukraine and cautioned that the West could not ignore the risk of the use of tactical nuclear weapons by Moscow.

“We don’t see, as an intelligence community, practical evidence at this point of Russian planning for a deployment or even use of tactical nuclear weapons,” Burns said. He cautioned, though, that “the stakes are very high for Putin’s Russia.”

Circumstances for Strike

Russia has accused However NATO countries of a “hybrid” confrontation that now “dangerously balances on the edge of open military clash.””Such a move would be able to trigger one of the two emergency scenarios described in our doctrine,” as per Russian strategists, adding “if Western countries try to test our resolve, Russia will not back down.”

Nuclear brinkmanship from Putin has been unprecedented. He ordered a snap nuclear wargame before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons if it determines the West’s intervention in the conflict goes too far.

As the conflict drags on, and Russia’s conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it is willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war.

A decree signed by Putin on June 2, 2020, said Russia views its nuclear weapons as “exclusively a means of deterrence”. It repeats the phraseology of the military doctrine but adds details about four circumstances under which a nuclear strike would be ordered. These include reliable information of a ballistic missile attack on Russia and an enemy’s attack “on critical state or military installations of the Russian Federation, the incapacitation of which would lead to the disruption of a response by nuclear forces.”

US Intelligence Assessment

Putin could view the prospect of defeat in Ukraine as an existential threat to his regime, potentially triggering his resort to using a nuclear weapon, a top US intelligence official has warned. The warning came in an assessment from intelligence chiefs briefing the Senate on worldwide threats.

The Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, told the Senate’s Armed Services Committee that Putin would continue to brandish Russia’s nuclear arsenal in an attempt to deter the US and its allies from extending further support for Ukraine.

The Russian leader would not use a nuclear weapon until he sees an existential threat to Russia or his regime, Haines argued.

But she added that he could view the prospect of defeat in Ukraine as constituting such a threat, the report said.

“We do think that [Putin’s perception of an existential threat] could be the case in the event that he perceives that he is losing the war in Ukraine, and that Nato in effect is either intervening or about to intervene in that context, which would obviously contribute to a perception that he is about to lose the war in Ukraine,” Haines told the committee hearing.

She added that the world would probably have some warning that nuclear use is imminent.

The prediction for Ukraine is a long, gruelling war of attrition, which could lead to increasingly volatile acts of escalation from Putin, including full mobilisation, the imposition of martial law, and if the Russian leader feels the war is going against him, endangering his position in Moscow even the use of a nuclear warhead, the report said.

Putin, who has repeatedly expressed resentment over the way the West treated Russia after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, says Ukraine has been used by the United States to threaten Russia.

He justified his Feb. 24 order for a special military operation by saying Ukraine had persecuted Russian speakers and the United States was keen to enlarge the NATO military alliance in a way that would endanger Russia.

The Likelihood

IMR’s assessment of the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons, most likely scenario and US response is given below.

Putin is more likely than not to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine if he faces devastating defeat. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate tools of last resort; any rational leader would consider using them if his or her regime (or life) were on the line.

Putin presumably expects his threats will induce NATO to abandon Ukraine. However, if he believes he is facing defeat or a costly stalemate—or has a chance of success through sharp escalation—there is some risk he will carry out his threats.

If Russian forces suffered a humiliating defeat in the campaign to control Donbas, Putin could be pressed by hardliners to deliver on his nuclear threats; but he is unlikely to do so, since this would only galvanize a harsh US and allied response without providing any significant military advantage.

Most Likely Use Scenario

Washington and Moscow have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe.The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. The treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or “battlefield,” nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles, according to public estimates.

Putin would seek to create fear instead of rage. Thus, nuclear weapons would be used in Ukraine rather than on NATO territory, and they would be used against military, not civilian, targets. Any attack would likely involve detonating half a dozen low-yield air bursts (in order to minimize fallout) against well-entrenched Ukrainian military positions.

Putin might begin with the ostentatious movement of nuclear forces, such as sending weapons to Russia’s Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. He could order a “demonstration” or possibly a detonation at a Russian test range.

Putin may hope that just by crossing the nuclear threshold, he would so shock Ukraine and its Western backers—and so terrify allied publics—that they would back down rather than risk further escalation.

The risk of nuclear use through a mistake or blunder is higher than through intent. Many Russian battlefield systems are dual-capable and also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. It could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option. It is difficult to know if the S-300 battery packs a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.

Likely US and Allied Response

One possible response to Putin’s nuclear use would be to negotiate some kind of resolution in which all parties could declare Potemkin victories and find a solution before nuclear weapons are used.

If the Russian attack caused little damage, NATO might first try to issue an ultimatum with the aim of reaching a settlement on the Alliance’s and Ukraine’s terms.

A non-nuclear military response (eg, conventional strikes on military bases and infrastructure in Russian territory) would probably not be decisive and would appear inadequate to many.

Defending Ukraine may simply not worth risking a nuclear escalation. But there are also serious implications of not doing it. Absence of a US nuclear response would gravely weaken the credibility among both friends and adversaries of the entire strategy of deterring nuclear attack through the prospect of US nuclear retaliation.

If Putin resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies would need to respond quickly and decisively to ensure that Putin paid a heavy price for crossing the nuclear threshold.

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