8 Feb 2024: Taiwan Straits

On 8 Feb 2024, China commenced a series of low-level air and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These gradually increased in scope and scale. By early Mar 24, the PLAAF was sending almost 100 aircraft a day into the ADIZ (air defence identification zone) of Taiwan. The PLA Navy was regularly practising live fire drills in the waters around Taiwan. There were planted articles in the Chinese media saying these military exercises were to deter hotheads in Taiwan from making a Declaration of Independence. Solid intelligence had been received that this was likely. An announcement was made about a major amphibious exercise scheduled for mid or end-Apr that year. The aim of these exercises was to de-sensitise the Taiwanese defence forces as well as the Americans to high levels of military activity. In mid-Mar 24, a former presidential candidate made an impassioned speech condemning the president of Taiwan. He asked for the president’s impeachment and demanded that Taiwan declare Independence forthwith. He screamed, “China is trying to scare us with these endless war drills. This weak government is caving in. Enough is enough. ROC is a sovereign, democratic state. We declare our Independence from the hegemonistic Chinese regime now.”

Base 311 of the Strategic Support Forces Command dealing with Taiwan, went into overdrive. This statement was denounced in shrill terms on Chinese media and by the Chinese foreign minister himself. Chinese embassies in all major countries went into an overdrive with strident condemnation. The Chinese social media went berserk. The US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was concerned enough to call his Chinese counterpart. “What’s happening? “he asked.

“Oh, don’t be alarmed General, these are just the usual noises we have to make to keep hotheads in Taiwan in line,” he soothed. Meanwhile, editorials in Global Times warned, “Let Taiwan not trifle with the mainland. China is a very powerful country.”

8 Apr 2024. Off the Coast of Taiwan.

In early Apr 2024, the met and tide conditions were just right. President Xi gave his final nod. The aircraft carrier battle group led by Liaoning steamed off for exercises in the East China Sea. The newest Fujian CV-18 aircraft carrier with its battle group sailed off for north of Taiwan. It had 70 J-15 aircrafts with an AEW on board. The Shandong CV-17 aircraft carrier battle group sailed for the South China Sea, also for exercises. Large flotillas led by Rinhai-class cruisers started moving out for exercises to off the coast of Fujian for an amphibious landing drill. As a precaution, the US Navy started staging forward one of its aircraft carrier battle groups.

0600 hours, 8 Apr 2024. An intense barrage of DF-11, DF-15 and DF-16 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs 500-700 kms range), Navy anti-ship cruise missiles and YJ-12A supersonic cruise missiles, hit the presidential palace and Ministry of Defence, in Taipei. They also targeted three airfields, six radar stations and some major communication nodes. The president and senior officials were whisked away to safety in the nick of time. One General however, was wounded. At 0630 hours, a second wave of ballistic and cruise missiles hit the remaining air bases and radar stations and three major ammunition dumps and fuel storage tanks. A third wave of missiles struck airfields and radar stations again after an interval of 10 minutes.

Special Forces Operations. Meanwhile, six small teams of PLA Special Forces had landed on the coast of Taiwan via submarines and rubber dinghies well before dawn. They now raided the land-based cruise missile sites of the Taiwanese Navy that could target any invasion force. They succeeded in destroying four sites. The other teams were spotted by civilians and rounded up by the Taiwanese Army.

Air and Maritime Air Operations

0645 hrs, 8 Apr 2024. Some 200 fighter jets of the PLA Air Force crossed the median line and headed straight for Taiwan airfields from the Western direction. They were led by J-20 Stealth aircraft armed with BVR missiles. Just 10 minutes later, 60 aircraft took off from the aircraft carrier Fujian along with an AEW aircraft to help in the expected air-to-air combat with the Taiwan Air Force. Fierce air battles erupted as the dazed Taiwanese fighters rose up to challenge the invaders. The J-20s shot down eight F-16 and two Mirages. The F-16s downed one J-20 and three J-11s with their ARAAM missiles. The Chinese fighters from the Fujian did better, as all attention had been diverted towards the PLA Air Force fighters coming from the west. The Navy fighters bombed the target air bases. When they were returning, some brave Taiwanese F-16s and Mirages scrambled up to engage them. In the ensuing air battle five Mirages and two F–16 fighters were shot down for the loss of three J-15s.

0700 hours, 8 Apr 2024. President Xi Jinping went on TV and radio to broadcast a message. He said, “We had patiently and peacefully tried for re-unification of the motherland but to no avail. We recently received very disturbing intelligence that renegades on the island were trying to declare Independence. Such statements have now indeed been made in Taipei. We have still showed great restraint. Today, the Strategic Rocket Forces have made purely demonstrative strikes on Taiwan along with our PLA Air Force and Naval aviation. To seek reunification of the renegade island with the motherland, we are now announcing an air and maritime blockade of the island with immediate effect. We do not want any further escalation. This is purely an internal matter of China and no other country has any right to intervene. China is a peace loving country and would like to resolve it peacefully. We call upon authorities in Taiwan to commence negotiations at once for peaceful re-unification. That will resolve the crisis

0715 hours, 8 Apr 2024. Crisis Room, White House. Washington.

Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the President and NSA. The president was shaken. “I thought we had defused it. We now have three wars on our hands. Do we want the third?” he asked.

“Mr President, we will have to react. Doing nothing will seriously erode our credibility,” said the grim-faced Chairman JCS.

“Frankly General, if this escalates, how ready are we now for a two-front war?” asked the NSA.

“Ready or not, we have no choice. We simply can’t do nothing. We will have to react,” replied the Chairman JCS obdurately.

“Yes, but can we do it in a way that this doesn’t escalate out of control?” asked the President. The Chairman JCS fell silent. He thought for a bit. Then he said, “Mr President, you could demand that the Chinese immediately call off the blockage and pay compensation for the damage caused in their so called ‘demonstrative’ strike. Meanwhile, we have already told our submarines to stage forward. By tomorrow they should be able to sink one or two major capital ships of the Chinese, as a ‘demonstration’ to start with. One of our aircraft carrier battle groups is already steaming toward the area. I have ordered two more carrier battle groups to set sail immediately,” said the Chairman JCS.

“Sink one or two Chinese warships? Won’t that be a declaration of war, General? asked the NSA.

“Yeah and China is a f—g nuclear armed country. This would be a direct clash, not a proxy war, as in Ukraine,” added the President.

“Sir, we can always say it was not us but one of their own mines they had sown for the blockade. That will put them in a decision dilemma as our carrier battle groups race for Taiwan.”

“What about our carrier battle group already half way? Won’t that get into a mess with their Fujian aircraft carrier or Chinese submarines before your neat subterfuge about mines hitting their ships can confuse them?” asked the President.

The Chairman JCS pursed his lips, “Mr President, that was a deterrence action. The situation has changed drastically now. I can order it to slow down and let other CBGs catch up if you wish to avoid immediate escalation and gain time. That will make the situation a bit more predictable and we won’t blunder into a shooting war right away.”

All three took a deep breath. The President knitted his brows, “OK, do that, I can’t think of anything smarter for the time being,” he said, but he was not liking this whole thing one bit.

1503 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Off North Eastern Coast of Taiwan.

The carrier battle group headed by CV-18 aircarft carrier Fujian had two Rinhai-class cruisers, four Luyang-class destroyers and 6 Jinhai-class frigates. It was the main battle group enforcing the blockade. At 1503 hours on 9 Apr 24, a torpedo struck a Rinhai-class cruiser. There was a massive explosion. The warship caught fire. The ship listed to one side and then sank slowly. Meanwhile, Taiwan scrambled its F-16s and Mirages also to attack this Chinese armada enforcing the blockade. The Taiwan jets were picked both by shore-based J-2000 AWACS and the AEW then in the air from the Fujian. J-15 fighters from the carrier and then a whole host of J-20, J-10 and J-11 aircrafts from the shore-based airfields, swarmed up. A major air battle erupted. The BVRs from the J-20s managed to shoot down 10 Mirages and four F-16s. Three J-15s and two J-10s were shot down in this melee. One Mirage fighter fired an Exocet anti-ship missile and badly damaged a Jiangkai-class frigate of the Chinese Navy. Three American carrier battle groups were now steaming full speed towards Taiwan.

1700 hours, 9 Apr 2024. Joint Operations Room. Beijing.

All members of the CMC and the entire top hierarchy of the PLA were in attendance. The Commander PLA Airforce briefed first. “In yesterday’s air battles we had shot down a total of 18 F-16s and 7 Mirages for a loss one J-20, three J- 10s and three J-11s (ratio 25:7). Today, the Taiwanese Air Force tried to attack our blockading force. In the combined air battle, we have shot down 10 Mirages and 8 F-16s. The enemy managed to shoot down three J-15s and two J-10 fighters (ratio 18 : 5). Overall, Taiwan has lost 43 jet fighters to our 12,” he said.

Commander PLA Navy briefed next. “Comrades, the most important development today is that an American nuclear submarine, fired a torpedo and sank our Rinhai-class cruiser. This is a major loss and is an act of war on part of the Americans. The Taiwanese Air Force mounted a major attack on our Fujian carrier battle group enforcing the blockade but was driven off with huge losses. One of our guided missile Jiangkai-class frigates was, however, damaged. We are now at war with USA and I recommend that we immediately fire DF-21D salvos on his three advancing carrier battle groups and stop them before they join battle.”

“Just one second,” Gen Zhang Youxia interjected. “I just got a call from the US Chairman JCS to say that they have no submarines in that area and this seems an accident caused by our own mines laid for the blockade.”

The Commander of PLA Navy went red in the face. “That’s a blatant lie. We must hit back immediately.”

“How do you want to do that?” asked President Xi Jinping.

Admiral Miao, member CMC spoke up. “As the Commander PLAN has rightly said, we must immediately engage the American aircraft carrier battle groups with non-stop salvos of DF-21D anti-ship missiles, till we draw blood. Meantime, we must not lose time and immediately attack the American bases in Okinawa and Guam. Otherwise, US and Japanese fighters and bombers from there, could hit our blockading forces and our cities on the east coast. Shanghai would be a prime target. Comrade President, this is not the time to hesitate. Hit back before we are hit hard. We must pre-empt the Americans.”

President Xi Jinping’s face was taut with tension. He swallowed hard and then took a few sips of water from his glass. He turned to Gen Zhang Youxia. “Comrade Zhang?” he queried.

“The Admiral is right. But that means full scale war that could go right up even to the nuclear level. So let’s pause and think now. The fact that the Americans have disowned their submarine attack on our Rinhai cruiser, tells me they are not keen to escalate. Maybe, they are also looking for a way out. We have amply shaken them up for now. Should we de-escalate and begin negotiations for a peaceful merger of Taiwan now? Or will that be too soon? Problem is, a day later may simply be too late.”

The question hung unanswered in the tense air of the Joint Operations Room in Beijing. All anxious faces turned towards the President of China.

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Key Takeaways

• Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.

• The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait ? referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan-and training for a Taiwan contingency-likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

• The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:

• Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

• Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

• Internal unrest in Taiwan;

• Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

• Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

• Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

• Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign- capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture For A Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades-four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021-in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship-the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities – such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets- to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability To Deter Force

Key Takeaways

• The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.

• To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

 Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure with the 2021 defense budget at NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion)

Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022.

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“The South China Sea is now becoming one of those regions where NATO is not averse, as they once did in Ukraine, to escalating tensions,” Lavrov told a news conference.

“We know how seriously China takes such provocations, not to mention Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and we understand that NATO’s playing with fire in these regions carries threats and risks for the Russian Federation. It is as close to our shores and to our seas as Chinese territory,” he said.

Lavrov said that was why Russia was developing military cooperation with China and conducting joint exercises.

“The fact that NATO members under the leadership of the United States are trying to create an explosive situation there, in the wake of Europe, is well understood by everyone,” he said.

Lavrov did not provide evidence to back his assertions, but alluded to the formation of the AUKUS alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia.

He also accused NATO of trying to drag India into what he called an anti-Russian and anti-Chinese alliance at a time when he said the West was attempting to squeeze out Russian influence.

When asked about Lavrov’s remarks, India’s UN Ambassador Ruchira Kamboj said: “We are a country that stands tall and proud and stands tall and proud on its own.”

“In the course of the conflict in Ukraine, we have been very clear and consistent right from the outset – we have spoken in one voice that we are for peace. Peace is also a side,” she also told reporters in New York. 

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