Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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The unthinkable is happening in the Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi: the Pakistan Army is divided in its political loyalties. For the better part of 76 years, it was Pakistani politicians who have been divided in their loyalties to the Army GHQ. And the GHQ unfailingly picked their favourite politician and installed him or her in office, usually to rescue a Martial-Law-Administrator-turned-President from the hot seat. These roles are likely to be reversed if the ongoing tussle on the streets of Pakistan for control of the country reaches its logical conclusion later this year. It may happen sooner if the streets of Pakistan become bloodied after Nawaz Sharif returns home from Umrah in Saudi Arabia instead of going back to his self-imposed exile in London. It may happen only next year if Sharif is able to – even while being out of any formal office – restore a semblance of normalcy in the life of the aam admi in his country or if simmering differences in the Army are papered over.

Divided Loyalties

The new Army Chief, General Asim Munir Ahmed Shah, will stop at nothing to prevent the hugely popular Imran Khan from returning to elected office in Islamabad. Khan sacked General Munir, as he is commonly known, as Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief before he completed even one year as spymaster and installed his most loyal General Faiz Hameed, now retired, in that crucial post. In Pakistan, the Chief of the (ISI) always has unfathomable tricks up his uniform, which less wily and conspiratorial Chiefs of Army Staff have to contend with. Despite his retirement, Faiz – as he is best known – commands huge loyalty at the Army GHQ.

After all, as ISI Chief, he won Afghanistan back for Pakistan without firing a shot on India’s Independence Day in 2021, went to Kabul soon after and practically handpicked and installed members of the new Taliban regime that September. Since retirement, Faiz has been helping Khan build his populist mass movement just as he is said to have covertly helped the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader build up his movement to dislodge Sharif as Prime Minister after the infamous 2016 Panama Papers leak on illegal foreign assets owned by politicians. Because Faiz has a following in the Army ranks, Munir has been viewing the former’s activities with great consternation. The Chief is unable to maintain the disciplined, monolithic atmosphere within the Pakistan Army any longer.

Then there is another General who has become a backroom player, the retired Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa. Always suspected, it has now been circumstantially acknowledged that Bajwa was instrumental in regime change in Islamabad last year because, for the most part, Khan had become an insurgent against Pakistan’s benefactors in Washington. After Shehbaz Sharif succeeded Khan, Bajwa is known to have been in constant contact with Nawaz Sharif in London.

Arrogated Guardian

The unprecedented intrigues within the Army – which were always firmly and quickly put down in the past before they drew big attention – do not bode well for India and for the rest of the world. The Army has been Pakistan’s only stable institution since General Ayub Khan – self-appointed Field Marshal in 1965 – seized power 11 years after that country’s formation in a constitutional coup d’état, justified by the Supreme Court under the “Doctrine of Necessity.” Every other institution in Pakistan has been systematically eviscerated and cannot be a reliable interlocutor for India. This applies to Washington as well, although successive administrations in the White House make a pretence of wanting democracy in Islamabad.

Most of Pakistan’s leaders like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had gradually, through trial by fire, been installed in office and also thrown out of office, matured under the Army’s overarching roof as the arrogated guardian of that country’s ultimate self-interest. Khan is yet to reach that level, having been in power just one time. Hillary Clinton, the United States of America’s Secretary of State, famously said: “It is like that old story – you cannot keep snakes in your backyard and expect them to only bite your neighbours. Eventually, those snakes are going to turn on whomever has them in the backyard.” Unlike other Prime Ministers mentored by the Army GHQ, Khan is yet to learn that lesson. Otherwise, he would not have committed the monumental mistake of making peace with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). That fragile peace ended when Khan ceased to be Prime Minister and Faiz retired as ISI Chief. The proverbial snakes have since been turning on those within Pakistan.

But the illusory idea of peace with the TTP has a big following within the Army’s ranks and this school is now ranged against Bajwa’s idea of accommodation with India and engagement of the US. Munir belongs to this camp, so does Nawaz Sharif. If these differences are not reconciled soon and the Army can no longer be the glue holding the country together, there is every possibility that Pakistan could splinter like Yugoslavia. With Pakistan’s secret warehouses full of nuclear weapons, this is not good news for anyone, least of all for neighbour India.

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Major terrorist groups that focused on conducting attacks in Pakistan included Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and ISIS-K, the US Bureau of Counterterrorism’s report said. “Pakistan reviewed and revised its 2015 National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism, reducing the NAP from a 20-point plan to 14 key points, but made meager progress on the most difficult aspects — specifically its pledge to dismantle all terrorist organizations without delay or discrimination,” the report read.

Terrorist attacks were conducted against varied targets in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Sindh provinces by separatist militant groups. The terrorists used a range of tactics to attack varied targets, including IEDs, VBIEDs, suicide bombings, and targeted assassinations.

Pakistan was in 2018, designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. It was redesignated as a CPC in 2019, 2020, and 2021.

In 2018, FATF identified Pakistan as a jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT system. Pakistan remained on the FATF grey list in 2021.

In 2021, members of religious minorities in Pakistan faced significant threats from terrorist groups. On January 3, ISIS-K militants claimed responsibility for the murders of 11 Shia Hazara coalminers in the Kachi district of Balochistan. On April 21, five persons were killed in a VBIED suicide attack in the parking lot of the Serena hotel in Quetta, Balochistan. According to details of the investigation, the attack targeted local and foreign officials. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack, also claiming the targets were police and law enforcement, according to the Bureau of Counterterrorism’s report on terrorism in Pakistan.

A prominent journalist in Pakistan was on October 10, 2021, killed in an explosion in Hub, Balochistan. According to law enforcement, the bomb was attached to his vehicle. The BLA claimed responsibility for the attack.

On December 30, attackers ambushed security officials in North Waziristan. Four security personnel were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.

As per the ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Pakistan’, the Pakistani government continued to implement the Antiterrorism Act of 1997, the National Counterterrorism Authority Act, the 2014 Investigation for Fair Trial Act, and major 2014 and 2020 amendments to the Antiterrorism Act, all of which give law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts enhanced powers in terrorism cases.

Military, paramilitary, and civilian security forces conducted CT operations throughout Pakistan against anti-state militants. Pakistani law allows for preventive detention, permits the death penalty for terrorism offences, and creates specialized courts to try terrorism cases, as per the official report.

The extremist doctrine was being taught by some madrassas in Pakistan.

While the government continued efforts to increase madrassa regulation, some analysts and madrassa reform proponents observed that many madrassas failed to register with the government, provide documentation of their sources of funding, or comply with laws governing acceptance of foreign students, according to the official report.

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Pakistan is paying the price of soft-peddling on terror. Arming and funding terror outfits against India in the past may have played dividends at one time, but today it is bleeding Pakistan.

The expansion of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) clout is entirely Pakistan’s fault because it hosted, armed, and supported Taliban leaders and cadres on its land, while turning a blind eye to its misdeeds. In Kabul, a few of these leaders now have ministerial roles.

With the Taliban’s presence in Kabul, Pakistan had previously justified its backing for the Taliban by asserting that it provided greater “strategic depth” against India. The Taliban and ISI had worked together to hijack IC 814 flight to Kabul in 1999. Although New Delhi has not legally recognised the Taliban, it has developed a working relationship with the Taliban leadership in order to provide medical care and other forms of support to the Afghan people as well as to keep a presence in Kabul.

Islamic terror groups across the region were reinvigorated after the Afghan Taliban’s victory over the US. The fact that the Taliban could win against the world’s most powerful army was a morale booster. The TTP now felt that it was only a matter of time before the Pakistan forces could also be overrun.

Background

The Pakistani Taliban share a common ideology with the Afghan Taliban and have assisted them in the ––2001-2021 war, but the two groups have separate operation and command structures.

The TTP’s aim is to overthrow the government of Pakistan by waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistan armed forces and the state. The TTP depends on the tribal belt along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, from which it draws its recruits. The TTP receives ideological guidance from and maintains ties with al-Qaeda.

After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan was unable to persuade the Afghan Taliban to crack down on the TTP.

Ever since a ceasefire with TTP expired on 10 December 2021, it has increased attacks on Pakistani security forces from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan.

Apparently with US encouragement and cooperation, Pakistan is now threatening to attack TTP militants residing in its Pashtun-dominated tribal regions as well as across the border in Afghanistan. As a result, Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line might band together to fight the Pakistani army. While Pakistani attacks against TTP and Taliban bases may be welcomed by the US, the Taliban will not remain silent if its people are attacked.

The rise of the TTP could potentially trigger a conflict within the organisation itself with the international terrorist organisation ISIS, which is also vying for control of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Rising Casualties

Pakistan’s security forces, including troops, ISI personnel, police, and regular civilians, have become targets of the TTP militants’ increasingly violent attacks.

282 personnel of the security forces were killed in terrorist and insurgent attacks in Pakistan in 2022, according to statistics released by the non-governmental Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), which has its headquarters in Islamabad. According to the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), situated in Delhi, this nuamber is six times more than the number of Indian security officers (47).

In 2022, the TTP perpetrated 376 terrorist incidents, resulting in 533 fatalities and 832 injuries. Among them, 374 Pakistani security officers and 365 TTP fighters are thought to have perished in fighting in the previous year.

The deadliest month in more than ten years – December 2022 – saw 56 fatalities as a result of the deteriorating ISI-TTP relationship.

Since the middle of November, there have been over 100 attacks. The TTP’s 18 December attack on the Counter Terrorism Department in Bannu was the most notable of these events

TTP’s Demands

Delegitimization of Pakistan’s claim to a region bordering Afghanistan is one of the TTP’s demands. This entails restoring FATA’s status as a semi-governed region.

The Afghan Taliban also wholeheartedly supports the removal of border fencing and barriers. The only long-term, but currently improbable, option is to foster goodwill, give up using force, and manage boundaries.

The TTP wants to impose Afghan-style Sharia in FATA before extending the system across Pakistan. This include ending female education, instituting limb-chopping justice, replacing democracy with a shura system run by an amirul momineen, and sealing Pakistan off from the outside world. This is grotesque to non-Muslims, Shi’ites, (Sunni) Barelvis, and modern-minded Muslims. On the other hand, backward regions and radicalised segments of urban Pakistani society favour this interpretation of Sharia.

TTP vehemently rejects both disarming and adhering to Pakistan’s Constitution. Instead, it is adding new demands that no sovereign state could ever agree to.

Pakistan’s readiness to negotiate with TTP militants and caving in to their demands has considerably boosted their confidence. Top TTP members, like Muslim Khan and Ehsanullah Ehsan before him, were surreptitiously released, as an example.

Pakistan in a Cleft Stick

The government is under pressure to take strong action against the TTP. Similar to a patron-client relationship gone sour, the confrontation between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is getting worse. Pakistan is currently going through a complex crisis that may be its worst since 1971, when it split up as a result of the Bangladesh conflict. The crisis in Pakistan is overwhelming, and there is a pervasive sense of being lost among the political and military elite.

The TTP and the Afghan Taliban have crossed across to Pakistan on the northern front. The Taliban’s win in Afghanistan was seen by the ISI as a chance to rule Kabul, giving Pakistan a substantial amount of “strategic depth.” Once the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Islamabad might have thought that by setting up an allied force in Kabul, it had achieved its planned strategic objectives. Pakistan anticipated that it would be better able to manage the TTP situation. Yet, it appears that the Taliban started to object to Pakistan interfering with its internal affairs. Now that the client is openly biting its patron, Islamabad has no choice except to combat the TTP.

Dangers for India

The establishment of fidayeen (suicide) camps in Gilgit-Baltistan regions of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and TTP’s declaration of a shadow government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region could have an impact on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

The TTP has between 12,000 and 14,000 fighters and suicide bombers stationed in POK. To solidify their authority in the area, the Pakistani security forces are planning a significant operation that will include airstrikes. This might potentially trigger a humanitarian crisis that would affect India, notably in J&K.

Pakistani Army Proxies

With the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and other anti-State jihadists on the rise, Pakistan is once more grooming the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM0 as devoted proxies. Evidence of the Lashkar’s infrastructure continuing to function and the group’s ability to mobilise resources and cadre has been seen for months.

Ever since General Pervez Musharraf’s split from the jihadist movement in 2001, which led thousands of people to join anti-regime groups like the TTP and al-Qaeda, the need for obedient, submissive proxies like the Jaish and Lashkar has gotten even stronger.

The TTP has decided to strike the Pakistani Army as well as State-Patronized Terrorist (SPT) organisations including the JeM) and LeT. Both The leader of the JeM, Maulana Masood Azhar, has been ill for a while and is unable to take on the TTP’s challenge.

The LeT and the JeM have taken a direct part in terrorist activities in J&K and the hinterland of India.

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The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a separate entity from the Taliban in Afghanistan but sharing a similar Islamist ideology, have been responsible for hundreds of attacks and thousands of deaths since emerging in 2007.

They agreed to a truce earlier this year after Afghanistan’s new Taliban rulers took a prominent role in brokering peace talks, but negotiations made little progress and there were frequent breaches.

“We… have shown our continued patience so that the negotiation process is not sabotaged,” the TTP said in a statement.

“But the army and intelligence agencies do not stop and continue the attacks, so now our retaliatory attacks will also start across the country.”

Less than two weeks ago the TTP claimed an ambush that killed six policemen in northwest Pakistan, claiming they were plotting a “raid” on their base in the area.

Since 18 November, the military has been patrolling the area in an attempt to root out militants, with helicopter gunships shelling their hideouts.

The TTP was founded in 2007 by Pakistani jihadists who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s before opposing Islamabad’s support for American intervention there after 9/11.

For a time they held vast tracts of Pakistan’s rugged tribal belt, imposing radical Islamic law and patrolling territory just 140 kilometres (85 miles) from the Pakistan capital.

The Pakistani military came down hard after 2014 when militants raided a school for children of army personnel and killed nearly 150 people, most of them pupils.

Its fighters were largely routed into neighbouring Afghanistan, but Islamabad claims the Taliban in Kabul are now giving the TTP a foothold to stage assaults across the border.

In the year since the Taliban took over Afghanistan, Pakistan has seen a 50 per cent surge in militant attacks, according to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

Lawmakers and business owners in northwest Pakistan have also told AFP that instances of TTP blackmail in the area have increased.

The presence of militants in the area is a deeply sensitive topic for Islamabad, which has long struggled to establish a writ there.

Analyst Saad Khan, a Peshawar-based retired brigadier, played down the significance of the TTP statement saying the ceasefire was barely observed anyway.

“The Afghan Taliban have assured the whole world that they will not allow their territory to be used against any other country,” he told AFP.

“It is important to initiate serious negotiations with the Afghan Taliban on this issue and make them aware of the seriousness of the matter.”

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The firing started after a sniper, reportedly belonging to the Taliban, shot dead two Pak soldiers where a border fence was being installed. The Pakistani side fired at border hamlets in response, prompting retaliation from the Afghan side.

Heavy clashes took place in the area, with a number of shells and artillery hitting the villagers, the local reports further said.

Meanwhile, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on Saturday claimed responsibility for the December 19 attack on federal minister Shibli Faraz in Darra Adam Khel in which his driver and bodyguard were injured.

The latest border clashes come amid claims from both Taliban and Pakistan that they have resolved the recent row over border fencing by agreeing that further work on the project that led to a tense situation would be done through consensus.

A senior official, who spoke to a group of journalists on Friday, said it had been decided at a senior level that fencing-related issues would in the future be dealt with through mutual agreement.

The official, however, did not exactly specify at which level the talks between Pakistan and the de facto Afghan government were held after Wednesday’s incident in which Taliban fighters disrupted border fencing and took away spools of barbed wire, the Dawn newspaper reported.

Pakistan has been fencing the 2600-kilometer-long border with Afghanistan since 2017 to end terrorist infiltration and smuggling despite very intense opposition from the neighbouring country, the report said.

Besides the erection of a fence, the project also includes the construction of border posts and forts, and the raising of new wings of Frontier Corps, the paramilitary force that guards the border.

The official said 90 per cent of the fencing had been completed. Fencing has been a contentious issue in Pakistan-Afghanistan ties because the Afghans dispute the border demarcation done during the colonial period.

While Afghan Pashtuns define their country borders on basis of Durand Line, Pakistan is opposed to this demarcation.

The differences over the status of the border have been so intense that they have in the past resulted in several fatal clashes between the troops of the two countries.

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