The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist threats in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base. PAP units responsible for internal security operations are also likely under the control of the Western Theater Command.

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” however, greater criticism from the international community, including the United Nations, refute such justifications. Moreover, ethnic oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions of border demarcations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) combined with recent infrastructure construction, led to multiple unarmed clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups on both sides of the India-China border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley – the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years-the Western Theater Command conducted a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Negotiations stalled throughout 2021, with the 13th round of military commander negotiations breaking down in October . Due to the sustained military development along the LAC, the Western Theater Command’s deployment will likely continue through 2022.

China-India Border

Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC. Negotiations made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages on the border.

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in the past 46 years. On June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley resulting in approximately twenty Indian soldiers and the death of four PLA soldiers, according to PRC officials.

Throughout the standoff, PRC officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, emphasizing Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India. The PRC seeks to prevent border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship with India.

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Western Theater Command Leadership (2021)

Commander of the Western Theater Command – General Zhang Xudong.

Current position: Commander of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Commander of the Central Theater Command Army DOB: 11/1962

Age: 59

Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command – General Wu Shezhou.

Current position: Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command Army and Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command DOB: 1958, Age: 63

Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command – Lieutenant General Rong Guiqing

Current position: Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command Previous position: Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region DOB: 5/1958. Age: 63

Birthplace: Weishi County, Henan Province

Education: Graduated with a master’s degree from the Department of Joint Campaign Command of the PLA National Defense University

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According to a new railway plan revealed by the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) government, the rail line will operate near the line of actual control (LAC) and through the disputed Aksai Chin region.

Chinese activity near the LAC is a matter of concern for both India and Tibet.

On January 12, Army Chief General Manoj Pande said that there has been a ‘slight increase’ in the number of Chinese troops at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Aksai Chin (around 38,000 sq km area) was illegally occupied during the 1950s and consolidated its military grip over the area during the 1962 India-China war. The area remained a point of contention between the two countries.

Tibet’s ‘medium to long-term railway plan’ will help expand the TAR rail network to 4,000km by 2025 from the current 1,400km, the railway technology reported.

Tibet, however, claims itself to be independent of China. Recently, on February 13, the 13th Dalai Lama proclaimed that his country had been independent for over 100 years. This incident marked an end to the period of domination by China’s Qing (Manchu) dynasty. However, the period of self-rule and independence ended very soon for Tibet as in 1949 China unlawfully occupied Tibet.

Commemorating the 110th anniversary of Tibet’s Declaration of Independence on February 13, Tibet called for an independent fact-finding mission from the United Nations (UN). The request was to hold China accountable for the mistreatment of Tibet’s people and culture, reported Tibet Rights Collective (TRC).

The fact-finding and investigative missions from the UN must consider the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) harmful “environmental policies” in Tibet, and question CCP about the whereabouts of Tibet’s Panchen Lama, who was abducted in 1995.

As per the report by Railway Technology, the project will cover new routes that will continue up to China’s borders with India and Nepal.

Designed to start in Shigatse, Tibet, the proposed rail line will run northwest along the Nepal border before piercing north via Aksai Chin and ending at Hotan, Xinjiang.

Recently UN experts had also expressed how around a million children of the Tibetan minority were being affected by Chinese government policies aimed at assimilating Tibetan people culturally, religiously and linguistically through a residential school system.

The planned route will travel through Rutog and around Pangong Lake on the Chinese side of the LAC.

The first section from Shigatse to Pakhuktso is anticipated to be completed by 2025, while the remaining line section concluding at Hotan is expected to be completed by 2035.

A state media report citing the plan revealed by the TAR Development and Reform Commission stated: “By 2025, the construction of several railway projects, including the Ya’an-Nyingchi section of the Sichuan-Tibet Railway, the Shigatse-Pakhuktso section of the Xinjiang-Tibet Railway, and the Bomi-Ra’uk section of the Yunnan-Tibet Railway will all see significant progress.

“Improvements to the regional railway network will be of great significance in promoting socioeconomic development and safeguarding national security.”

Notably, Along the LAC in the Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh there are areas of differing perception, wherein both sides patrol the area up to their claim lines. This has been the trend since 2006, the sources claimed. (ANI)

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In November 2020, Beijing announced plans to build an enormous “super hydropower dam” in Tibet on the section of the Brahmaputra River near India. In March 2021, the National People’s Congress (NPC) approved the country’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). A key objective listed in the document, which sets out the country’s national socio-economic and development goals, is the construction of what would be the world’s biggest dam on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo river in the foothills of the Himalayas.

Although the exact details are not publicly available, media reports note that Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina), a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) government will construct a 50-meter-high hydropower dam at Medog (Tibet) on the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, near the Indian border to generate 60-gigawatts of electricity annually. This amount is more than three times the electricity produced by the Three Gorges Dam. India has responded to the proposed dam with great alarm and remains seriously concerned. Delhi has also announced that it is considering constructing a 10-gigawatt dam to mitigate the impact on water flows of the China’s mega project.

The Yarlung Tsangpo is one of the world’s largest transnational river systems. Originating in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in southwest China, it flows 2,900 kilometers across southern Tibet via the Himalayas, entering India through Assam and Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet), where it is called the Brahmaputra. Many of the river’s tributaries begin in China, while others start in Bhutan, each of which holds significance in terms of socio-economic and political value. As South Asia remains one of the world’s most impoverished regions, each country seeks to maximize its utilization of the Brahmaputra to achieve national and international development goals such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Sino-India relations over shared water resources remain undoubtedly complicated. The Brahmaputra is the most important of the rivers that transverse the Sino-Indian border. For India and China, two of the world’s most populous countries, the Brahmaputra is essential to their socio-economic development. The river accounts for nearly 30 percent of India’s freshwater resources and 40 percent of its total hydropower potential. For China, the Brahmaputra’s role in the country’s total freshwater supply is limited but plays a significant role in Tibet’s agricultural and energy industries as well as civilization. Yet, their growing populations mean water resources are under increasing stress and demand in both countries. Despite China’s basin coverage, it only contributes between 22 percent and 30 percent of the total basin discharge.

Neighbors without trust

Competing water and development plans have long caused significant tensions and a lack of trust between China and India. One of the biggest points of contention is China’s construction of hydropower dam and water-diversion projects on the Brahmaputra’s upper reaches, affecting the river’s flow and course. As the upper riparian, China can make decisions that have a direct impact on the quantity of water available downstream, giving it unequal power over and triggering alarm in India due to changes in flows. Despite Beijing’s insistence that the dam construction is for hydropower generation and will not cause a reduction in river flow, Delhi remains skeptical. It has responded by unsuccessfully claiming prior user rights and attempting to establish additional monitoring mechanisms to monitor China’s riparian activities. No dedicated multilateral cooperation mechanism exists, however – only limited institutionalized cooperation between the two neighbors.

The Sino-Indian territorial dispute is a factor

The historical territorial dispute between the two countries further complicates matters. As China and India disagree on border demarcation, there is no official mutually agreed border between the two countries, which assert competing claims to territory in the Eastern Himalayas. The disputed area, known as Arunachal Pradesh State in India and South Tibet in China, is home to more than one million people and occupies an area of approximately 90,000 square kilometers. The competing claims to the territory are connected to their respective assertions of sovereignty. If China should somehow abandon its claim to South Tibet/Arunachal Pradesh State, its claim of sovereignty over Tibet will weaken. India, for its part, is unwilling to cede the land to its rival as the territory is the site of China’s victory against India during the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Nationalist sentiment sustains Delhi’s persistence.

Hydro-hegemonic behavior

Both countries have accused the other of hydro-hegemonic behavior. Transboundary water interactions are political and influenced by the greater socio-political context of the river-basin countries. Due to their geographical position, upstream countries can often manipulate water flows for strategic ends. China, the “upstream superpower” of Asia, does not have an independent transboundary river policy but manages it as part of its foreign policy with downstream countries. Drivers of its water diplomacy include domestic challenges such as water insecurity and the need for energy security, as well as international programs such as Beijing’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Given its distrust of multilateral frameworks to resolve international disputes, Beijing has not signed a water-sharing or international transboundary water treaty. Although China is criticized for refusing to do so, most of China’s 17 downstream neighbors, including India, are not themselves signed such an agreement. China abides by the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC), even if it has not signed it. There are questions about India’s adherence to the convention. Others have also argued that Delhi encourages the narrative of “Chinese hegemony” to defend its hydropower development projects. Nonetheless, despite an information-sharing agreement between them, China refused to share hydrological data with India during the 2017 Doklam standoff between their two militaries in the Himalayas.

The prospect of Sino-Indian water wars

India has long speculated about China’s intentions and hydropower dams to control the Brahmaputra. Many Indian analysts argue that China’s water ambitions and the growing competition over water between China and India will inevitably lead to “water waters” between the two nations. Indian politicians, media, and officials frequently warn of the consequences of dependence on China for water supplies. In 2013, Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed that China is stemming the flow of the Brahmaputra. In 2017, the Siang – a tributary of the Brahmaputra – turned black, making the water unsuitable for drinking, damaging the ecology and disrupting local agricultural production. Indian officials publicly blamed China. Nonetheless, China dismissed the complaints as highly exaggerated, given its much smaller contribution to the river flows.

In this context, the proposed Chinese super dam is contributing to the water wars narrative by raising fears in India that China will eventually gain complete control over the disputed territory. By contrast, Chinese media has downplayed the dispute, calling the accusations an “absurd theory”. PowerChina declared that the proposed project represents a “historic opportunity for the Chinese hydropower industry”.

How to reduce the heat

As China only contributes a small volume to the total flow of the river, any attempt to alter the flow of the Brahmaputra would be unlikely to affect India’s water supply. This would undermine the water wars narrative. Yet, rather than addressing India’s concerns, Beijing merely denies any ill intent, a reaction which only provokes Delhi’s fears and inadvertently raises concerns about possible conflict. Without publicly releasing hydrological data or the plans for the dam, it is difficult to predict accurately the proposed mega-project’s impact on India. The withholding of information simply increases India’s mistrust of China.

The lack of transparency suggests that India’s fears may not be entirely unfounded. But the blame for mounting tensions cannot rest entirely on Beijing. Although the prospect of water wars between the two countries is overhyped by India and downplayed by China, without a water-sharing agreement or basin-wide governing mechanism in place, the proposed dam and questions about the governance of the Brahmaputra are becoming yet another major irritant in Sino-Indian relations.

To reduce tensions, China could work with India to establish an inclusive mechanism – a river basin organization (RBO) – for all relevant riparian parties to institutionalize cooperation for effective governance and socio-environmental sustainability of the Brahmaputra basin. The RBO could be led by China. Establishing such an institution to strengthen collaboration and communication and build trust would reduce tensions among all parties involved, while reducing, if not impeding, India’s attempts to restrict China’s dam construction through claims of prior use rights.

The benefits of such a mechanism are numerous: Regular communication through established channels and procedures can prevent conflict from occurring over transboundary water resources. RBOs can significantly reduce tensions over disputes by strengthening mutual trust and facilitating information sharing for proper transboundary water governance as well as the protection of ecological systems. Basin-wide cooperation would be seen as part of a framework for greater regional and economic cooperation.

The super dam issue, while complex, with multisectoral and multidimensional implications, contributes to worries of future water wars between India and China. Although it has not yet been built, its size, the potential impact on river flows, and the lack of transparency on China’s part have heightened India’s fears of water shortage and an over-dependence on its neighbor for supplies, unnecessarily complicating an already tense geopolitical relationship.

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This is part of China’s strategy of aggressively constructing new villages in disputed border areas to extend or consolidate its control over these areas that India, Bhutan and Nepal maintain to be within their national territories, Tibet media reported.

As per a recent report in Hong Kong-based publication quoting a Chinese government document, China intends to build 624 border villages in disputed Himalayan areas.

This new measure is part of China’s larger strategy, launched in 2018 by the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Communist Party Committee, designed to relocate the Tibetans living in very high altitude regions throughout Tibet, defined as 4,800 meters high or above under its so-called ‘very high-altitude ecological relocation plan.

Although China claimed that its move was to conserve the environment but there is no scientific evidence as to how relocation would have a positive impact on the environment.

According to the publication, the actual reason was to end the Tibetan traditional way of life. Notably, Tibetans in these regions have been nomads for generations who have been living ‘cordially with nature’ high on the Tibetan Plateau for centuries.

It is estimated that the forced relocation and settlement would lead to the displacement of about 2 million Tibetan nomads, who would lose their livelihood and be pushed into, poverty and get marginalized.

And therefore, under China’s so-called ‘Poverty Alleviation’, ‘Ecological Migration’ and now the ‘Very High Altitude Ecological Migration’ plans, the Tibetans were uprooted and instantly altered to achieve Beijing’s plan to dilute Tibet’s identity, control and enforce their assimilation into the Chinese cultural and economic world.

The relocation plan imagined that as many as 130,000 people would be displaced from the Autonomous Prefectures of Shigatse (Rikaze), Nagchu and Ngari (Ali) in the TAR, to be carried out between 2018 and 2025.

According to the publication, over 100,000 of the 130,000 Tibetans will be re-settled along the Yarlung Tsangpo River with plans to develop a core economic zone with industrial corridors along the river.

Under the 2018 plan, the first relocation site was established in Gachong village, Gurum (Gurong) township, Toelung Dechen (Duilong Deqing) District, Lhasa prefectural city. According to a Xinhua report, published on October 21, 2020, 1102 residents were relocated from Gurum Township Jialing Jiadong Village, Rungma (Rongma Township), Nima County in Nagchu prefecture in the Jangthang (Qiangtang) Nature Reserve area.

Recently, the Chinese government has been implementing relocating 26,304 people mostly from Tsonyi County, Amod County and Nyima County to Lhoka prefecture within the TAR.

According to the Tibet Press citing Xinhua’s August 2022 report, about 17,555 Tibetans from Nagqu city (North East of Tibet) – which has more than 1000 towns and villages are relocating to Sinburi (Senburi) village, Gongkar (Gongga) County, Lhoka in southern Tibet. Lhoka (Shannan), with the relocation destination of the population about 400 km away from their home.

Behind the relocation plan, China also planned to spur innovation in key sectors and leverage dual-use technologies for military end-uses. China sees Military-Civil Fusion as a strategy to use civilians and dual-use technologies and facilitates its national defence, reported Tibet Press.

Under this strategy, the Chinese government has been giving training to civilian and military personnel to achieve an organic, powerful, and comprehensive national system of strategies.

It is therefore important to understand the Chinese hidden objective of these policies due to its strategic importance for Tibet and in the context of the Chinese strategy of forced mass relocation of Tibetans, from different parts of Tibet to Lhoka, which aimed at strengthening the ‘Border Defense Villages’ or ‘Xiokang Villages’ which is Beijing’s way of ‘Military-Civil Fusion (MCF)’.

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