Pakistan military’s 2018 gamble to install the former Pakistan cricketer-turned politician, Imran Khan, flopped with the ousting of the former prime minister and his government in 2022. Along with the arrests of Imran Khan, his wife and several of his party workers, many serving military officers of various cadres were also interrogated and arrested on numerous charges.

Recently, on 12 August 2024, the former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed was arrested by the Pakistan military. The Supreme Court ordered the arrest of the former chief. He was charged with misconduct, corruption and for abetting in political interference. Since then, court martial proceedings have been launched against him.

“Complying with the orders of Supreme Court of Pakistan . . . the process of Field General Court Martial has been initiated and Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) has been taken into military custody,” the Pakistan army stated. Since the conception of Pakistan, its military has been infamous for having influence over the country’s politics.

According to various reports presented against Hameed, there were allegations against him for allegedly harassing the owner of Islamabad’s ‘Top City’ housing scheme and society. Besides him, three other retired officers have been detained by the military in relation to Hameed’s case. But an important element to factor in, amidst all the said charges, is the undeniable close affiliation the former spy master has shared with the ousted prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan.

Khan has dismissed the charges against him as “frivolous and politically motivated,” even though he was forced to serve time in a jail for a year.

However, the appellate courts have since reversed, invalidated or suspended the charged convictions due to the lack of substantial evidence. But, the authorities in Islamabad seemed determine to file new cases against Khan in order to keep him in jail. Hence, the determination of the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen Asim Munir to contain the political turbulence and to nail Imran Khan’s cronies should be no surprise with the arrest of his “top dog” spy master, Faiz Hameed.

The Former ISI Spy Chief, PMLN and the State

Lt Gen Faiz Hameed served as the 24th Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) from 2019 to 2021. He is known as the “India baiter” and Imran Khan’s affiliate.

It was reported that post-Taliban’s take over of Afghanistan in 2021, the chief had paid a visit to Kabul. The visits of the DG ISI had been clandestine in the past. However, it was not the case with his trip to Kabul. Several images of Lt Gen Faiz and Pakistan’s Ambassador Mansoor Ali Khan, having tea at Kabul’s Serena Hotel, surfaced on the social media. The purpose of Hameed’s visit was to seek “peace and stability” in Afghanistan and to get the first-hand account of the ground situation in Afghanistan. Despite the statements made by the former DG ISI, it was confirmed that the objective of his visit was to meet with the top Afghan leadership and certain foreign envoys in Kabul. Even though no official details were divulged at the time, it later came to light that the chief had brokered peace between the Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Baradar network.

The main promoter of Taliban had been Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, who was also in favour of the Haqqani Network when the fight to take over Kabul erupted between the warring factions. The ISI has been reported in the past to have utilized the Haqqani Network to orchestrate attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul as well as to sway the Sunni Pashtun force in a direction inclined to Pakistan. Additionally, under Hameed’s command’s, reports of the induction of Pakistan Army regulars in the anti-resistance operations against the Resistance Force, led by Commander Amrullah Saleh in Panjshir Valley, were conducted.

It was inferred, that Pakistan’s consistent aid to Taliban rose from their desire for a strategic depth in Afghanistan, while nurturing an outfit such as Taliban to act as ISI’s puppet to curb the possible terror threats, which it incurs from Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, the tables have turned since then. The disillusionment of the Pakistani government of controlling the Afghan Taliban shattered with Taliban’s lackadaisical and undetermined effort in fostering a peace deal with TTP and Pakistan. The TTP later called off the ceasefire with Pakistan in 2022. The negotiations were carried out between a delegation led by Faiz Hameed and TTP leaders in Khost, Afghanistan. Under the negotiations, corps commanders of TTP, Muhammed Khan and Muslim Khan were released. Since then, TTP has ravaged Pakistan with their persistent attacks.

Besides the TTP threat, Pakistan was also hopeful with regards to the Pakistan-Afghan border areas, which even though are demarcated by the Durand Line, still remain as areas of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans view the border as an artificial entity and do not recognize the Durand line agreement, which Pakistan inherited post-1947. Afghanistan has claimed certain areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a part of their territory and views Pakistan as the illegal occupiers of their land. Hence, there have been several border skirmishes between the security forces of both nations. Pakistan’s relations with China and the presence of Chinese immigrants in the area have also served as reason for mistrust amongst the local habitants in these regions, who view the Chinese presence as a form of planned displacement of their communities to accommodate the Chinese, with exploitation of their land. Several attacks were orchestrated on Chinese citizens, who were assigned to Sino-Pakistan projects by various insurgents and militant outfits. Later on, at the behest of China, Pakistan decided to carry out a large scale military operation – Azm-i-Istehkam – to neutralize the threats especially around the Durand Line. This has resulted in rallies and ‘jirgas’ (tribal councils) being held in many cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) due to the fear of mass displacement.

Additionally, the refoulement of Afghans back to their homeland from Pakistan has also sparked further tensions between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan government is of the view that many Afghan refugees may be sleeper cells or individuals involved in organized crimes. The inhibitions arising from the growing TTP threat and other offshoots remain to be a strong reason for Pakistan’s preventive course of action. Pakistan has blamed Kabul for being lenient in their approach towards the TTP and has blatantly made accusations of Taliban allowing the anti-Pakistan elements to carry out operations from Afghanistan, while also providing safe havens to them.

Furthermore, with Pakistan struggling economically, the decision for refoulement of undocumented Afghans has been considered prudent and imperative by Islamabad.

With the evolving political developments, dotted with several security and political threats erupting from Imran Khan’s PTI party opposing and clashing with the newly installed prime minister Shehbaaz Shariff’s PML-N, it was expected of the COAS Gen Aseem Munir to employ pre-emptive measures to wrest control over the state of affairs with the favoured political government installed by the military in power.

As a handpicked candidate of Imran Khan, Fiaz Hameed has been acknowledged for his involvement in Khan’s PTI party rioting across Pakistan on 9 May 9, 2023. This move was enough to upset Islamabad, given that PTI workers barged into and torched the official residence of the IV Corps commander in Lahore and also attempted to force themselves into the army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Further reports of Hameed providing counsel to Khan after taking premature retirement from the army, also suggested of his abetment in the May 9 riots in 2023, which has been regarded as an anarchy against the military institution.

Additionally, Nawaz Sharif also asserted that Gen Hameed had colluded with few generals and individuals from higher judiciary to impeach him from power in 2017.

In 2017, Hameed became infamous for orchestrating anti-blasphemy protests against the PML-N government by the far-Right group Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.

“The arrest of former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed sends a clear signal to those still on the fence – there will be no compromise, no exceptions. Fall in line or face the consequences. The writing is on the wall,” stated Baqir Sajjad Syed, the national security correspondent of the influential Dawn newspaper.

Apart from various charges against Hameed, his personal swipe at the COAS Gen Munir for being a Shia in hopes of dismantling the Saudi-Pakistan relations and expecting the response to remove Munir or halt his appointment also, may have fanned the growing conflagration.

The Military Institution Always Wins in Pakistan After years of impunity, the reign of the former chief ended with the military usurping back its socio-economic and political control. The COAS, Gen Munir seems to have solidified his position with the removal of the puppet government set by the former COAS Gen Javed Qamar Bajwa. He has also carried out a witch hunt against the associates and close affiliates of Imran Khan. The arrest of Gen Bajwa’s former ISI spymaster also has been made into an example for those who would conspire against the current military regime. It would be no surprise if the security of the former COAS may also be under threat.

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Crux of the Matter and the Af-Pak Challenges

Since the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, there has been a certain change in the attitude of Taliban. Unlike what Pakistan had expected, the Taliban has moved away from being viewed as a puppet of ISI and Pakistani forces. It has remained vocal on its stance in regards to the Durand Line, discrediting Pakistan’s recognition of what the British Raj left behind as a demarcated area bestowed upon Pakistan as its territory.

Additionally, Pakistan’s request for assistance with the looming TTP threat availed no fruitful result as it is apparent that Taliban has chosen to lean towards its affiliate. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Asif excoriated the Taliban government in Kabul for its inaction against militants along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

In an interview with BBC Urdu, Asif stated that Pakistan also offered to grant Rs10 billion to relocate the militants towards the western border. He further reiterated that “It’s correct that we have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan, and we will continue to do so. We won’t serve them with cake and pastries. If attacked, we’ll attack back”.

He placed the stress on the element of surprise which the Pakistani forces hope to achieve in terms of their attack strategy which meant to proceed with the attacks without any prior warning to the Taliban government stating, “This would eliminate the element of surprise. Why should we tell them, ‘get ready, we are coming’?”

In response, the Taliban called the statement “irresponsible”, and forewarned Pakistan of “consequences” in case of cross-border attacks.

Following the deterioration of the Pak-Afghan relations, reports of Pakistani ISI colluding with the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) or Daesh Khorasan emerged. In one such report, a former TTP commander outlined the nature of the relationship between ISK and ISI, which was established through “Dabori Agreement” in the form of a quid pro quo approach. ISK gets the opportunity to infiltrate areas now easily accessible with the aid of ISI, the agreement also provides the necessary funds, logistics and arms required to carry out their assignments while Pakistan is able to achieve the deniability for the actions of ISK. ISI has been notably recognized for its cooperation and aid to Taliban prior to the US exit from Afghanistan in 2021. Due to this precedence, most jihadist groups would seek the opportunity to align with the ISI for consistent donorship and aid.

ISK is Taliban’s rival group, which upon the exit of the Afghan Taliban from the war theatre, has tried to gain complete authority and monopoly on Jihad in the Khorasan area while using Afghanistan as a launching pad for its operations. The Afghan Taliban, upon its return to power has carried out several operations to wipe ISK and its safe havens in Afghanistan. However, the ISK cadre has continued to retain its strength, if not multiply in numbers, by also attracting the soldiers, intelligence officers and cadres from the previous Ghani government, who were prosecuted or who stand the chance of being killed off by the Afghan interim government. ISK, on the other hand, has criticised Taliban for going soft in terms of Jihad and has also managed to successfully gain support amongst various jihadist groups, who also view the new persona of a politically functioning Taliban government as a deviation from Jihad.

The recent reports of ISK in cohorts with the ISI presents an expected obstacle for any sincere reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. To stretch the matter further, the possibility of the Pakistan military pushing the ISK cadre across the Durand Line under the cover of a retaliatory fire as a result of border skirmishes has certainly aggravated the situation.
Apart from the border skirmishes, the largest refoulement of the Afghans in Pakistan on the Pakistani claim of Afghans leading to the growing terrorism activity in the country, has also added more fuel to the fire of an already simmering Taliban sentiment.

Hence, given that the breakdown in relations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has proved no fruition for either of them, the so called “good meeting” in Doha has become ends to the means.

In case of Pakistan, China has expressed its discontentment with Pakistan’s efforts at countering terrorism and protecting its citizens against the threats from insurgent groups and militant outfits such as the TTP, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Since majority of Chinese investments are in western Pakistan, especially along the border of Afghanistan, these projects are constantly susceptible to terror threats from many insurgent and militant groups who view the Chinese presence as a contiguous subjugation and marginalization of the local citizens. Pakistan’s approach to retain its ongoing ties with China at the cost of the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun and minority interests, with constant crackdowns to hush the grievances, has not attained any brownie points for Pakistan. It was apparent that there was a foreseeable uptick in the militant cadre and the number of terrorist orchestrated activities which Pakistan undermined as minor threats.

Since the BLA claimed Dasu Dam attack in March 2024 on the Chinese citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), several Chinese firms have suspended their operations until further notice. After the attacks, China demanded of Pakistan to initiate a large-scale counter terrorism operation against the militants, just as it had done in the past in form of operations Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fassad.

On the Chinese demand, Pakistan’s government announced operation Azm-e-Istehkaam or “Resolve of durable stability” to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.”

The operation is essential to Pakistan’s interest which entailed to not only placate the Chinese worries to perpetuate the economic and defence aid to Pakistan, but also as an effort to curtail spread of the armed groups and anti-Pakistani insurgents. With Pakistan’s economy in a chaotic milieu, it is blisteringly taking measures to secure both foreign and domestic investments. However, due to the the lack of political stability and the disintegrating security issues, the probability of attracting domestic or foreign investors seems like a difficult task.

UAE-Taliban
It is apparent, the extended invitation to the representatives of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a well contemplated and premeditative move by Pakistan. Prior to Taliban’s visit to Doha, the Afghan delegation paid a visit to the UAE.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan met with Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is a designated terrorist with a FBI placed bounty on his head. Even though several nations have not entirely acknowledged the Taliban government, the UAE government has indirectly provided the Taliban with an informal legitimate credibility by extending the invitation to discuss bilateral ties and regional stability. China, too, has tried to maintain relations with the Taliban fearing the spill over of the terrorism activities along its shared borders with Afghanistan and in an effort have kept their embassies open and accredited Taliban diplomats. Given Pakistan’s recent agenda to mollify China and furnish the funds for its large-scale operation Azm-e- Istehkam, the intent for the meeting in Doha was as expected for the success of the operation.

The question remains, to what extent Afghan Taliban would honour the Pakistani wishes to dispose its protected TTP assets in name of counter-terrorism, regardless of the probable compromise that may have been made to further individual interests between the two.

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According to Pakistan’s bomb disposal teams, 100kg of explosives were utilized to carry the attack in Khar. Due to the large number of casualties, the Pakistani authorities declared a health emergency at the local district hospital. Pakistan’s prime minister Shehbaz Sharif condemning the attack, stated “The terrorists are enemies of Pakistan, we will eliminate them from the face of this earth.” Grandiloquent statement sans any teeth.

The target, JUI-F is a Deobandi Sunni political party. It is a part of the ruling coalition in Pakistan, which is believed to have strong ties with the Afghan Taliban, as well. Like other religious parties, JUI-F, too, has undeniably tried to take advantage of the economic crisis in Pakistan and the arrest of the former Pakistani prime minister, Imran Khan. As a result, the JUI-F political rally held on 30 July in Khar was aimed to garner the electoral support ahead of the upcoming elections in Pakistan.

The area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has seen several attacks in the recent months, and most were claimed by TTP. Bajaur, specifically, has been a hotbed of such attacks and was also controlled by Taliban in the past. During the leadership of Imran Khan, large number of TTP fighters were brought back from Afghanistan into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This was as part of a failed programme for rehabilitation of TTP fighters. Imran Khan claimed that upon assuming power in Kabul, the Afghan Taliban, had ordered their Pakistani fighters to return to Pakistan. He stated that the Pakistani government was left with limited choices; the government could “either line up those 40,000 people, including fighters and their families, and shoot them, or we could rehabilitate them.”

In an effort to alleviate the TTP issue in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), such a plan was actually proposed. Despite the political consensus to “rehabilitate” the terrorists, the program was never implemented. The incoming Taliban fighters were not rehabilitated or employed. Having no options to return to Afghanistan, most fighters were seen rallying for ISIS recruitment or Al Qaeda, with the hope of getting paid. The former Pakistani prime minister, foreseeing the need to nip the TTP issue in the bud, had suggested such a program. He had claimed his government had wanted to resettle TTP fighters in Pakistan’s FATA region, but the efforts were unsuccessful as the provinces had failed to make provision for the necessary resources to counter the elements rejecting the merger of the tribal areas with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

There has been a sharp increment in number of TTP fighters in the region, followed by a series of persistent attacks on military and police posts. There is a strong consensus that FATA had provided sanctuary to several regional and foreign jihadist fighters belonging to Taliban, al-Qaida’s central Leadership, and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Safe havens provide the insurgents and terrorists the time to plan attacks, generate critical support for Infrastructure by raising funds, imbibing ideologies and providing technical assistance to associated groups and cells. Known in Pakistan as ilaqa-e-ghair (lawless lands), the Pashtun tribal areas that are around the Peshawar Valley have, without a doubt, been a sanctuary for various groups.

Waziristan is a stronghold of the TTP. The movement commanded by Baitullah Mehsud had been a safe haven for core elements of al-Qaida and the IJU. Despite the advantages that FATA provides for the militants, the area suffers a severe disadvantage due to the financial vulnerability of their protectors – the TTP and the Afghan Taliban to maintain their scale of militancy. The other important factor, which caters to Pakistan’s worries in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, is the ongoing insurgency in the area. This is also known as the War in North-West Pakistan. It is an ongoing armed conflict involving Pakistan and various Islamist jihadist outfit such as the TTP, Jundallah, Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), al-Qaeda, and their Central Asian allies, amongst which are the ISIL, ISIL–Khorasan (ISK), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkistan Movement, Emirate of Caucasus, and elements of organized crime.

Also, ever since Taliban’s exit from the war theatre, ISK has consistently tried to exert it’s monopoly on Jihad in the South Asian region. Treating each other as rivals, ISK and Taliban have consistently launched attacks on their individual leaders, commanders or assets. Recently, Taliban claimed the assassination of an ISK recruiter/ commander, Aijaz Ahmad Ahangar alias Abu Usman Al-Kashmiri, a Srinagar-born ISHP leader recently based in Afghanistan, in a Taliban raid in Kabul. Evidently due to the growing rivalry amongst the two, the attack in Khar on the pro-Taliban JUI-F came as no surprise.

ISIS has in the past, also claimed the responsibility for the assassination of a Pakistani political party official in Inayat Killi. It has recently issued claims in the name of “Khorasan Province” branch (ISKP), which remains predominant in Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan. The group also claims attacks in Pakistan in the name of its “Pakistan Province” or “Wilayat-e-Pakistan” branch. In 2019, ISK declared the province of “Wilayat-e-Hind” (Province of Hind) on 12 May, followed by Wilayat-e-Pakistan on 14 May. It is vital to mention that ISIS does not recognize the sovereign borders as decided by the nations but functions as pan-Islamic entity.

In the early years from the conception of the two wilayats, ISK continued to target Taliban and its allies or exploit the local tribal or regional conflicts by planting itself amidst the issues. In India, IS managed a response in Islamist-insurgency-ridden Kashmir, and there was some level of organized support in the form of ISJK.

In Pakistan, ISK conducted large-scale terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties. The jihadist landscape of Pakistan offers greater opportunities to IS and limits the risks of factional issues which may hinder in making it a part of a larger wilayat consisting of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asian States. While the growing TTP threat has over-shadowed the activities of ISK in Pakistan due to their frequent attacks, it must be noted that the Islamic State has also been responsible for one of the deadliest bombings in Pakistani history, which killed 149 people in Balochistan in 2018.

Post the Khar attack on 30 July, the response of the Pakistani government was rather underwhelming in regards to their failing security capabilities and counter-terrorism response. Pakistan failed to negotiate peace with the TTP last year. Its military forces have been incapable of sustaining or even launching operations near the Afghan border and have been unable to mount a formal offensive due to its economic crisis and political polarization. The recent attacks have also fuelled tensions between Pakistani officials and the Taliban administration in Afghanistan. The Pakistani government has accused the Taliban of providing safe haven to some terror outfits. Taliban officials, of course, have denied that claim.

With the break-down in the Pakistan-Afghan Taliban bilateral relations, there is little chance of any cooperation in counter-terrorism operations between these two states. It is highly unlikely that the current prime minister of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, will be able to show any game-changing progress on this front any time soon. The same is the case with the newly appointed chief of army staff (COAS), General Asim Munir, too.

At any rate, the Pakistani military will need to be seen as doing something. This may require the Pakistani government to pursue its threat and carry out counter-terrorism measures beyond its borders. The Pakistan army will, however, be very reluctant to do this. Due to Pakistan ISI’s deep involvement with state sponsored terrorism and defence against India and the current deterioration of bilateral relations with Kabul, Pakistan will be forced to re-calibrate its move in regard to its army’s counter-terrorism operations.

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The unthinkable is happening in the Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi: the Pakistan Army is divided in its political loyalties. For the better part of 76 years, it was Pakistani politicians who have been divided in their loyalties to the Army GHQ. And the GHQ unfailingly picked their favourite politician and installed him or her in office, usually to rescue a Martial-Law-Administrator-turned-President from the hot seat. These roles are likely to be reversed if the ongoing tussle on the streets of Pakistan for control of the country reaches its logical conclusion later this year. It may happen sooner if the streets of Pakistan become bloodied after Nawaz Sharif returns home from Umrah in Saudi Arabia instead of going back to his self-imposed exile in London. It may happen only next year if Sharif is able to – even while being out of any formal office – restore a semblance of normalcy in the life of the aam admi in his country or if simmering differences in the Army are papered over.

Divided Loyalties

The new Army Chief, General Asim Munir Ahmed Shah, will stop at nothing to prevent the hugely popular Imran Khan from returning to elected office in Islamabad. Khan sacked General Munir, as he is commonly known, as Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief before he completed even one year as spymaster and installed his most loyal General Faiz Hameed, now retired, in that crucial post. In Pakistan, the Chief of the (ISI) always has unfathomable tricks up his uniform, which less wily and conspiratorial Chiefs of Army Staff have to contend with. Despite his retirement, Faiz – as he is best known – commands huge loyalty at the Army GHQ.

After all, as ISI Chief, he won Afghanistan back for Pakistan without firing a shot on India’s Independence Day in 2021, went to Kabul soon after and practically handpicked and installed members of the new Taliban regime that September. Since retirement, Faiz has been helping Khan build his populist mass movement just as he is said to have covertly helped the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader build up his movement to dislodge Sharif as Prime Minister after the infamous 2016 Panama Papers leak on illegal foreign assets owned by politicians. Because Faiz has a following in the Army ranks, Munir has been viewing the former’s activities with great consternation. The Chief is unable to maintain the disciplined, monolithic atmosphere within the Pakistan Army any longer.

Then there is another General who has become a backroom player, the retired Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa. Always suspected, it has now been circumstantially acknowledged that Bajwa was instrumental in regime change in Islamabad last year because, for the most part, Khan had become an insurgent against Pakistan’s benefactors in Washington. After Shehbaz Sharif succeeded Khan, Bajwa is known to have been in constant contact with Nawaz Sharif in London.

Arrogated Guardian

The unprecedented intrigues within the Army – which were always firmly and quickly put down in the past before they drew big attention – do not bode well for India and for the rest of the world. The Army has been Pakistan’s only stable institution since General Ayub Khan – self-appointed Field Marshal in 1965 – seized power 11 years after that country’s formation in a constitutional coup d’état, justified by the Supreme Court under the “Doctrine of Necessity.” Every other institution in Pakistan has been systematically eviscerated and cannot be a reliable interlocutor for India. This applies to Washington as well, although successive administrations in the White House make a pretence of wanting democracy in Islamabad.

Most of Pakistan’s leaders like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had gradually, through trial by fire, been installed in office and also thrown out of office, matured under the Army’s overarching roof as the arrogated guardian of that country’s ultimate self-interest. Khan is yet to reach that level, having been in power just one time. Hillary Clinton, the United States of America’s Secretary of State, famously said: “It is like that old story – you cannot keep snakes in your backyard and expect them to only bite your neighbours. Eventually, those snakes are going to turn on whomever has them in the backyard.” Unlike other Prime Ministers mentored by the Army GHQ, Khan is yet to learn that lesson. Otherwise, he would not have committed the monumental mistake of making peace with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). That fragile peace ended when Khan ceased to be Prime Minister and Faiz retired as ISI Chief. The proverbial snakes have since been turning on those within Pakistan.

But the illusory idea of peace with the TTP has a big following within the Army’s ranks and this school is now ranged against Bajwa’s idea of accommodation with India and engagement of the US. Munir belongs to this camp, so does Nawaz Sharif. If these differences are not reconciled soon and the Army can no longer be the glue holding the country together, there is every possibility that Pakistan could splinter like Yugoslavia. With Pakistan’s secret warehouses full of nuclear weapons, this is not good news for anyone, least of all for neighbour India.

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Major terrorist groups that focused on conducting attacks in Pakistan included Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and ISIS-K, the US Bureau of Counterterrorism’s report said. “Pakistan reviewed and revised its 2015 National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism, reducing the NAP from a 20-point plan to 14 key points, but made meager progress on the most difficult aspects — specifically its pledge to dismantle all terrorist organizations without delay or discrimination,” the report read.

Terrorist attacks were conducted against varied targets in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Sindh provinces by separatist militant groups. The terrorists used a range of tactics to attack varied targets, including IEDs, VBIEDs, suicide bombings, and targeted assassinations.

Pakistan was in 2018, designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. It was redesignated as a CPC in 2019, 2020, and 2021.

In 2018, FATF identified Pakistan as a jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT system. Pakistan remained on the FATF grey list in 2021.

In 2021, members of religious minorities in Pakistan faced significant threats from terrorist groups. On January 3, ISIS-K militants claimed responsibility for the murders of 11 Shia Hazara coalminers in the Kachi district of Balochistan. On April 21, five persons were killed in a VBIED suicide attack in the parking lot of the Serena hotel in Quetta, Balochistan. According to details of the investigation, the attack targeted local and foreign officials. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack, also claiming the targets were police and law enforcement, according to the Bureau of Counterterrorism’s report on terrorism in Pakistan.

A prominent journalist in Pakistan was on October 10, 2021, killed in an explosion in Hub, Balochistan. According to law enforcement, the bomb was attached to his vehicle. The BLA claimed responsibility for the attack.

On December 30, attackers ambushed security officials in North Waziristan. Four security personnel were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.

As per the ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Pakistan’, the Pakistani government continued to implement the Antiterrorism Act of 1997, the National Counterterrorism Authority Act, the 2014 Investigation for Fair Trial Act, and major 2014 and 2020 amendments to the Antiterrorism Act, all of which give law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts enhanced powers in terrorism cases.

Military, paramilitary, and civilian security forces conducted CT operations throughout Pakistan against anti-state militants. Pakistani law allows for preventive detention, permits the death penalty for terrorism offences, and creates specialized courts to try terrorism cases, as per the official report.

The extremist doctrine was being taught by some madrassas in Pakistan.

While the government continued efforts to increase madrassa regulation, some analysts and madrassa reform proponents observed that many madrassas failed to register with the government, provide documentation of their sources of funding, or comply with laws governing acceptance of foreign students, according to the official report.

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Consequently, the terror group is targeting Pakistan’s security forces with impunity and is in no mood to restart the peace negotiations anytime soon.

The recent spike in terror attacks is a major failure of Pakistan’s powerful military establishment. While the political leadership in Pakistan is facing criticism from different quarters, the security establishment should be blamed for the recent security turmoil in the country. The civilian government was not even included in peace negotiations with TTP and therefore had limited information on the outcome(s) of the dialogue, according to a report in Pakistan Tribune.

It is reported that former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Lieutenant General (Retd) Faiz Hameed single-handedly led negotiations with TTP and had possibly compromised on certain controversial demands of the terror group, according to Pak media reports

Therefore, it is not surprising that TTP felt emboldened and acted aggressively after its core demands were not ‘officially’ accepted by the Pakistan government. The security situation has worsened since General Asim Munir took over the charge as Pakistan’s new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on November 29. Interestingly, TTP official announced the ending of a months-long ceasefire with the Pakistan government on November 28, expecting a hawkish policy from the new Army chief.

The terror group is mostly targeting security forces in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. According to the annual report of Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Pakistan witnessed as many as 376 terror attacks in 2022 and KP province experienced an exponential rise in violence whereby “the fatalities there went up by 108 per cent.”

Islamabad promised stability in the tribal areas after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pashtun areas are among the worst hit by the ‘new’ wave of militancy in Pakistan.

While TTP is largely operating in KPK province and Balochistan, it has conducted few attacks in Islamabad and Punjab as well in the last one year. On December 23, TTP militants detonated a car bomb in Pakistan’s capital, killing a police officer and injuring several others. Worryingly for the security establishment, there is a spike in TTP-led suicide attacks in Pakistan.

The recent Peshawar Mosque bombing was also a suicide attack. Reports suggest that the bomber was standing in the front row at the time of the explosion. The mosque is located inside a ‘highly fortified’ compound in Peshawar that included the headquarters of KPK police force and the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) offices. Last month, TTP militants seized a CTD police station in KPK’s Bannu district and took hostages to negotiate with the government authorities.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and General Syed Asim Munir visited Peshawar following the suicide bombing and reportedly held a meeting to discuss the law-and-order situation in KPK. Sharif stated that the capacity of the country’s anti-terrorism institutions and police would be enhanced and National Action Plan (NAP) would be “implemented comprehensively and with full force”.

Imran Khan also condemned the attack in a tweet: “It is imperative we improve our intelligence gathering & properly equip our police forces to combat the growing threat of terrorism.” Khan’s known ‘soft approach’ on the TTP issue and the PTI government’s lackadaisical attitude have been criticised for the deteriorating situation in KPK province.

Peshawar attack was the deadliest terrorist act since a suicide bombing at a Shia Mosque in Koocha Risaldar area during Friday prayers in March 2022, resulting in 58 deaths and 200 injuries. The investigation had revealed that the attacker was an ‘Afghan exile’ who trained with the Islamic State (IS) before carrying out the attack.

Frequent attacks target law enforcement agencies, but the recent Police Lines bombing is seen as a major escalation. Some analysts are predicting a new military operation against TTP after this attack as the political leadership, security establishment, and even the opposition leaders have failed to control the scourge of militancy in Pakistan.

Politically, Pakistan is completely paralyzed as the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) alliance government and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) are indulged in a ruthless battle to rule Islamabad. It is believed that the weakened economy and the persistent political instability present an opportunity for TTP and similar groups to increase pressure on the Pakistani state to fulfill their key demands. More importantly, Islamabad cannot continue to pressure the Afghan Taliban on TTP until its own house is not in order.

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Pakistan is paying the price of soft-peddling on terror. Arming and funding terror outfits against India in the past may have played dividends at one time, but today it is bleeding Pakistan.

The expansion of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) clout is entirely Pakistan’s fault because it hosted, armed, and supported Taliban leaders and cadres on its land, while turning a blind eye to its misdeeds. In Kabul, a few of these leaders now have ministerial roles.

With the Taliban’s presence in Kabul, Pakistan had previously justified its backing for the Taliban by asserting that it provided greater “strategic depth” against India. The Taliban and ISI had worked together to hijack IC 814 flight to Kabul in 1999. Although New Delhi has not legally recognised the Taliban, it has developed a working relationship with the Taliban leadership in order to provide medical care and other forms of support to the Afghan people as well as to keep a presence in Kabul.

Islamic terror groups across the region were reinvigorated after the Afghan Taliban’s victory over the US. The fact that the Taliban could win against the world’s most powerful army was a morale booster. The TTP now felt that it was only a matter of time before the Pakistan forces could also be overrun.

Background

The Pakistani Taliban share a common ideology with the Afghan Taliban and have assisted them in the ––2001-2021 war, but the two groups have separate operation and command structures.

The TTP’s aim is to overthrow the government of Pakistan by waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistan armed forces and the state. The TTP depends on the tribal belt along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, from which it draws its recruits. The TTP receives ideological guidance from and maintains ties with al-Qaeda.

After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan was unable to persuade the Afghan Taliban to crack down on the TTP.

Ever since a ceasefire with TTP expired on 10 December 2021, it has increased attacks on Pakistani security forces from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan.

Apparently with US encouragement and cooperation, Pakistan is now threatening to attack TTP militants residing in its Pashtun-dominated tribal regions as well as across the border in Afghanistan. As a result, Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line might band together to fight the Pakistani army. While Pakistani attacks against TTP and Taliban bases may be welcomed by the US, the Taliban will not remain silent if its people are attacked.

The rise of the TTP could potentially trigger a conflict within the organisation itself with the international terrorist organisation ISIS, which is also vying for control of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Rising Casualties

Pakistan’s security forces, including troops, ISI personnel, police, and regular civilians, have become targets of the TTP militants’ increasingly violent attacks.

282 personnel of the security forces were killed in terrorist and insurgent attacks in Pakistan in 2022, according to statistics released by the non-governmental Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), which has its headquarters in Islamabad. According to the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), situated in Delhi, this nuamber is six times more than the number of Indian security officers (47).

In 2022, the TTP perpetrated 376 terrorist incidents, resulting in 533 fatalities and 832 injuries. Among them, 374 Pakistani security officers and 365 TTP fighters are thought to have perished in fighting in the previous year.

The deadliest month in more than ten years – December 2022 – saw 56 fatalities as a result of the deteriorating ISI-TTP relationship.

Since the middle of November, there have been over 100 attacks. The TTP’s 18 December attack on the Counter Terrorism Department in Bannu was the most notable of these events

TTP’s Demands

Delegitimization of Pakistan’s claim to a region bordering Afghanistan is one of the TTP’s demands. This entails restoring FATA’s status as a semi-governed region.

The Afghan Taliban also wholeheartedly supports the removal of border fencing and barriers. The only long-term, but currently improbable, option is to foster goodwill, give up using force, and manage boundaries.

The TTP wants to impose Afghan-style Sharia in FATA before extending the system across Pakistan. This include ending female education, instituting limb-chopping justice, replacing democracy with a shura system run by an amirul momineen, and sealing Pakistan off from the outside world. This is grotesque to non-Muslims, Shi’ites, (Sunni) Barelvis, and modern-minded Muslims. On the other hand, backward regions and radicalised segments of urban Pakistani society favour this interpretation of Sharia.

TTP vehemently rejects both disarming and adhering to Pakistan’s Constitution. Instead, it is adding new demands that no sovereign state could ever agree to.

Pakistan’s readiness to negotiate with TTP militants and caving in to their demands has considerably boosted their confidence. Top TTP members, like Muslim Khan and Ehsanullah Ehsan before him, were surreptitiously released, as an example.

Pakistan in a Cleft Stick

The government is under pressure to take strong action against the TTP. Similar to a patron-client relationship gone sour, the confrontation between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is getting worse. Pakistan is currently going through a complex crisis that may be its worst since 1971, when it split up as a result of the Bangladesh conflict. The crisis in Pakistan is overwhelming, and there is a pervasive sense of being lost among the political and military elite.

The TTP and the Afghan Taliban have crossed across to Pakistan on the northern front. The Taliban’s win in Afghanistan was seen by the ISI as a chance to rule Kabul, giving Pakistan a substantial amount of “strategic depth.” Once the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Islamabad might have thought that by setting up an allied force in Kabul, it had achieved its planned strategic objectives. Pakistan anticipated that it would be better able to manage the TTP situation. Yet, it appears that the Taliban started to object to Pakistan interfering with its internal affairs. Now that the client is openly biting its patron, Islamabad has no choice except to combat the TTP.

Dangers for India

The establishment of fidayeen (suicide) camps in Gilgit-Baltistan regions of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and TTP’s declaration of a shadow government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region could have an impact on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

The TTP has between 12,000 and 14,000 fighters and suicide bombers stationed in POK. To solidify their authority in the area, the Pakistani security forces are planning a significant operation that will include airstrikes. This might potentially trigger a humanitarian crisis that would affect India, notably in J&K.

Pakistani Army Proxies

With the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and other anti-State jihadists on the rise, Pakistan is once more grooming the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM0 as devoted proxies. Evidence of the Lashkar’s infrastructure continuing to function and the group’s ability to mobilise resources and cadre has been seen for months.

Ever since General Pervez Musharraf’s split from the jihadist movement in 2001, which led thousands of people to join anti-regime groups like the TTP and al-Qaeda, the need for obedient, submissive proxies like the Jaish and Lashkar has gotten even stronger.

The TTP has decided to strike the Pakistani Army as well as State-Patronized Terrorist (SPT) organisations including the JeM) and LeT. Both The leader of the JeM, Maulana Masood Azhar, has been ill for a while and is unable to take on the TTP’s challenge.

The LeT and the JeM have taken a direct part in terrorist activities in J&K and the hinterland of India.

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According to reports from Kabul, the Chaman border crossing was evacuated, and medical emergency declared as more than 15 civilians were injured in heavy machine gun and mortar firing by both TTP fighters and Afghanistan Taliban. The clashes erupted after Pakistan Army ostensibly tried to repair the border fence forcing both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban to retaliate. As many as seven Pak nationals were killed in cross-border shelling by the Taliban earlier in December.

With series of clashes erupting all along the Af-Pak border, the Taliban experiment is proving to be costly for the Pakistan government in Islamabad and its deep state in adjoining Rawalpindi. While the Taliban government occupied Kabul on August 15, 2021, with the help of then Pakistan ISI chief Gen Faiz Hameed, a protégé of then PM Imran Khan Niazi, the ultra-conservative Sunni Pashtun government has turned against its once upon a time handlers and started targeting the Republic.

The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan has taken Islamic radicalization in Pakistan to a different level with a large section of public wanting that Islamic Republic should be turned into Emirate with Sharia law akin to Afghanistan. Although Pakistani deep state thought that Taliban would push the TTP to compromise with Rawalpindi and lead to indefinite ceasefire, the radical extremist group broke the ceasefire on November 28 and asked its cadre to carry out attack in the entire Republic.

Even though then Pakistan PM Imran Khan Niazi praised the Taliban occupation of Kabul by calling it “throwing off their shackles of slavery” under two decades of US occupation, the Sunni Pashtun force is today totally at odds with Islamabad as it refuses to recognize the Durand Line as the border. The Taliban have made it amply clear that it does not recognize the British drawn Durand Line as it divides the Pashtun community and hence they want Pashtun dominated areas on Af-Pak border to be under control of Kabul.

With the Taliban government refusing to act as proxy of Rawalpindi, Pakistan is still to recognize the Emirate of Afghanistan despite Islamabad being the chief promoter of the Sunni group for the past three decades. Instead, it is using terror groups like so-called Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) and other terror groups to destabilize the Taliban government in Kabul. It is the same extremist forces which are also trying to spread instability and radicalization in the Central Asian Republics much to the chagrin of Russia.

While India has reached out to Taliban as part of its historic commitment to help the Afghan people notwithstanding the political regime in power, the strategic depth game of Pakistan against India has gone awry with the Sunni Pashtun not interested in fighting proxy wars for Rawalpindi headquarters. With Pakistan’s western borders heating up due to regular clashes with TTP and Afghan Taliban, Islamabad’s plan has gone all topsy-turvy.

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The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a separate entity from the Taliban in Afghanistan but sharing a similar Islamist ideology, have been responsible for hundreds of attacks and thousands of deaths since emerging in 2007.

They agreed to a truce earlier this year after Afghanistan’s new Taliban rulers took a prominent role in brokering peace talks, but negotiations made little progress and there were frequent breaches.

“We… have shown our continued patience so that the negotiation process is not sabotaged,” the TTP said in a statement.

“But the army and intelligence agencies do not stop and continue the attacks, so now our retaliatory attacks will also start across the country.”

Less than two weeks ago the TTP claimed an ambush that killed six policemen in northwest Pakistan, claiming they were plotting a “raid” on their base in the area.

Since 18 November, the military has been patrolling the area in an attempt to root out militants, with helicopter gunships shelling their hideouts.

The TTP was founded in 2007 by Pakistani jihadists who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s before opposing Islamabad’s support for American intervention there after 9/11.

For a time they held vast tracts of Pakistan’s rugged tribal belt, imposing radical Islamic law and patrolling territory just 140 kilometres (85 miles) from the Pakistan capital.

The Pakistani military came down hard after 2014 when militants raided a school for children of army personnel and killed nearly 150 people, most of them pupils.

Its fighters were largely routed into neighbouring Afghanistan, but Islamabad claims the Taliban in Kabul are now giving the TTP a foothold to stage assaults across the border.

In the year since the Taliban took over Afghanistan, Pakistan has seen a 50 per cent surge in militant attacks, according to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

Lawmakers and business owners in northwest Pakistan have also told AFP that instances of TTP blackmail in the area have increased.

The presence of militants in the area is a deeply sensitive topic for Islamabad, which has long struggled to establish a writ there.

Analyst Saad Khan, a Peshawar-based retired brigadier, played down the significance of the TTP statement saying the ceasefire was barely observed anyway.

“The Afghan Taliban have assured the whole world that they will not allow their territory to be used against any other country,” he told AFP.

“It is important to initiate serious negotiations with the Afghan Taliban on this issue and make them aware of the seriousness of the matter.”

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The Islamist militant group once controlled large swathes of the mountainous region that borders Afghanistan and is populated by Pashtuns. Tens of thousands of people were killed and millions more displaced in years of TTP attacks and the army’s large-scale military operations against it. The group finally fled to Afghanistan in 2014.

But residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been shocked recently by the return of hundreds of TTP fighters. They are alarmed that the militants have come back even before Islamabad signed the peace agreement it has been negotiating with the group since late last year.

“We are against imposing a war on our homeland again,” Manzoor Pashteen, the leader of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), a civil rights organisation, told a gathering of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s political leaders on August 16.

He claimed the Taliban have already made a significant comeback in Waziristan, formally divided between the South Waziristan and North Waziristan districts.

Pashteen said several government agreements with the TTP and other Taliban factions before its eventual departure to Afghanistan in 2014 didn’t lead to peace.

“We are not against the negotiations, but we oppose theatrics in the name of talks. We have no choice but to resist,” he said.

Since its emergence in 2018, the PTM has earned the wrath of Pakistani authorities by accusing the powerful military of supporting various Taliban factions.

The PTM blames the Taliban and the military for tormenting Pashtun civilians, who make up most of the estimated 80,000 civilians killed and more than six million people displaced since the Pakistani Taliban emerged in 2003.

Afrasiab Khattak, a former lawmaker, said the entire negotiation process is aimed at “tackling” the Pashtun political resistance against Talibanisation, a term denoting growing Islamic fundamentalism.

“The TTP has been violently stopping the election campaign of Pashtun nationalists in Pakhtunkhwa,” he said, adding that Pakistan’s military wants to orchestrate “political engineering” to empower Islamists at the cost of secular Pashtuns.

Secular Pashtuns became the main target for the TTP after the Awami National Party (ANP), a moderate ethnonationalist group, formed the provincial government after winning the 2008 parliamentary elections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

More than 1,000 ANP members were killed in attacks by the Islamist militants. ANP lost the 2013 election partially because of the TTP’s attacks. Khattak survived a suicide attack in 2008.

Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistan expert at the University of London, agrees.

She said the military appears to not be worried about the domestic blowback from the TTP’s return.

“The institutional thinking [inside the military] is that the tribal areas are religiously conservative and the TTP should be allowed to implement their Shari’a-based system to keep the rest of Pakistan secure,” she told RFE/RL.

Siddiqa said the military sees the eastern province of Punjab as Pakistan’s core and whose protection supersedes peace and security in the peripheral regions.

But residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are not convinced by this reasoning.

“Our only demand is that the current insecurity must end,” said Adnan Khan, a resident of Maidan and one of the protesters against the return of the TTP.

For many, their reappearance heralds a return of the TTP’s oppressive control when targeted assassinations, bomb attacks, extortion, and harassment dominated daily life in some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The residents of Swat and the nearby Lower Dir districts staged protests this month after TTP militants established checkpoints, injured and kidnapped security forces, and were blamed for targeted killings and high-profile attacks.

The residents of North Waziristan, a restive district in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have been protesting the rising insecurity and assassinations for more than a month, RFE/RL reported.

“The TTP’s show of strength is gauging the public reaction to their demand of returning to these regions with their arms,” said Abdul Sayed, a Sweden-based researcher who tracks the group.

In talks with Islamabad, the group has insisted that its fighters must return to their home districts with their weapons.

On August 12, residents of Swat protested across the scenic region, which due to better security in recent years has again become a leading tourist destination for Pakistanis seeking to escape the scorching summer heat in the cities and plains across the country.

The Pakistani military, too, appeared to have felt the growing public resentment. An August 13 statement by the military’s media wing termed reports about the TTP presence as “grossly exaggerated and misleading”.

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