During the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, the risks of nuclear weapon use or a nuclear accident at nuclear plants in Zaporizhzhia, occupied by Russia, and Kursk have been repeatedly highlighted. Russia has frequently threatened to use nuclear weapons, the latest instance being on February 24, 2026, when it accused the UK and France of helping Ukraine acquire nuclear capability and warned that such actions could trigger a confrontation between nuclear powers. Later, between 18 and 20 May 2026, Russia and Belarus conducted joint nuclear exercises involving missile units and strategic forces practicing nuclear weapon delivery and deployment. Such threats have emanated since the start of the conflict from various levels of the Russian government and military, including President Putin. Immediately after the invasion of Ukraine, Putin ordered Russia’s military on 27 February 2022 to put its deterrence forces, which include nuclear weapons, on “special alert.” On September 21 of the same year, he reiterated his threat to use all types of weapons, asserting that it was not a bluff. This clearly shows that his threats so far had not been taken seriously or lacked credibility, as they were driven by battlefield reversals and a shortage of military personnel in the invasion’s initial stages.

Russia’s nuclear threats reduced in 2023 when its military operations were achieving favourable results, another reason for their low credibility. However, nuclear rhetoric picked up again in 2024, including exercises simulating “theatre” or regional nuclear attacks, in contrast to “strategic” nuclear exercises simulating war with the US. Russian threats have been so frequent and unceasing that they no longer make headlines in Western media. Their recurrence has eroded credibility, rendering them ineffectual. These provocative articulations are assessed to be inconceivable, exaggerated, routine, discordant, and implausible.

The intent of these threats appears to be imposing restraint and influencing Western decisions. Russia has essentially reinforced two red lines for the West: first, the unacceptability of direct involvement and deployment of NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine; second, deterring and constraining the West from providing military aid to Ukraine, specifically offensive weapons platforms that could threaten Russian territory. In the first case, the US and NATO leaders have been extremely cautious and avoided direct resistance to Russia’s invasion. While military assistance was slow initially, it picked up gradually. The West has disregarded Russia’s warnings and provided Ukraine with weapon systems explicitly opposed by the Kremlin, including tanks, drones, and long-range missiles. On August 1, 2024, the first batch of long-awaited F-16 jets arrived in Ukraine, significantly bolstering its air force. Ukraine has since carried out aerial strikes deep into Russian territory, even hitting oil refineries in Siberia. Earlier, it forced Russia to scale down its Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2026 in Moscow due to security concerns. Despite its red lines being violated, Russia has avoided striking NATO territory. This reflects the continued effectiveness of strategic mutual nuclear deterrence among parties to the conflict.

Historically, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by either side has not been taken seriously. During the Cold War, NATO planning envisaged immediate use of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Soviet attack in Europe, to hedge against conventional asymmetry. Yet, nobody assigned a high probability to this option. Similarly, the Soviets remained largely hostile to the idea that nuclear war could be fought in a highly limited manner, such as small-scale battlefield exchanges for bargaining purposes.

India does not face a major nuclear threat from large nuclear powers—the US and Russia—or the medium-sized nuclear forces maintained by the UK and France. Its major adversaries are China and Pakistan. China is the first and only nuclear weapon state recognized under the NPT to have maintained an official NFU policy continuously since it first acquired nuclear weapons in 1964. Since then, it has shown no proclivity for nuclear blackmail or coercive diplomacy based on nuclear threats. While a full-blown war initiated by China to resolve the boundary issue is unlikely in the short term, limited conflict due to escalation of local issues on the LAC could occur, as seen in Eastern Ladakh in 2020. As long as nuclear capabilities remain, China’s intentions can change at any time.

Pakistan’s case is entirely different. It considers the threat from India existential and inimical to its very idea of nationhood. Its strategic thought process is based on proactive and pre-emptive actions. Nuclear weapons give Pakistan the confidence to face a larger neighbour with asymmetry in military, economic, and industrial capacity. It professes that nuclear weapons reduce the probability of conventional conflict. Accordingly, it has a declaratory doctrine of “first use,” and lately has been advocating “early use” as part of strategic signalling to India. It has also alluded to ambiguous territorial, infrastructure, and economic red lines. Ambiguity and irrationality reinforce the deterrence value of nuclear threats. Pakistan seeks to deter India at all levels of war—nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional—while denying India the same equation. It has regularly resorted to nuclear sabre-rattling in past conflicts to influence Indian decision-makers, as demonstrated during the Kargil War, Operation Parakram, surgical strikes across the LC, the Balakot air strikes, and recently Operation Sindoor.

In contrast, India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the twin pillars of NFU and minimum credible deterrence, resulting in massive retaliation in response to a nuclear attack. India believes that nuclear weapons deter only nuclear war and are of strategic relevance, not for warfighting. Suggestions have been made in recent years to revise the doctrine, abandon NFU, and incorporate “first use.” The main arguments advanced include the complex regional security environment and technological advances that may degrade the potency of a second strike.

Deterrence is widely accepted as a psychological construct rather than an end in itself. It should inspire fear, where the perceived cost of deterrence breakdown outweighs the benefits of war as a dispute resolution instrument. Even if a nation declares NFU, no one will trust that it will remain committed to NFU if its vital interests are at stake. A degree of calculated ambiguity in a nuclear doctrine is essential for credibility. Restraints on nuclear war are mainly intellectual, ethical, and doctrinal. During the Cold War, the USSR could not have invaded Western Europe even if the US had a declaratory NFU policy. Importantly, it is against the national interest of responsible and status quo powers like India to weaken the nuclear threshold. Conventional attacks are largely considered within the rules of international behaviour in a jus ad bellum situation, such as punitive conventional retaliation by India in response to high-profile terrorist incidents. The possibility of escalation or total eruption makes it unlikely that either side could achieve decisive victory in a limited war by using nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the existence of nuclear weapons cannot be downplayed, and they may be used in extreme cases by a nuclear-capable state. Threats to use nuclear weapons will continue to be made repeatedly to deter and influence adversary decision-making by playing mind games. Under the nuclear overhang, space for conventional operations exists, though its extent remains undefined and can be expanded by the side exercising escalation dominance. Moreover, deterrence is not static; it requires active escalation management throughout a crisis. Therefore, lessons from recent conflicts, particularly the Russia–Ukraine war, reinforce the enduring relevance, resilience, and credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine in maintaining strategic stability.

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Russia attacked Ukraine with a force of just 1,50,000. Ukraine had 2,50,000 men in arms to start with. Later it mobilised fully to field about 5,50,000 men. Given that most of the fighting was in heavily built-up areas, the force ratios were badly skewed to start with. Despite this, it was amazing that the Russian forces encircled Kiev, secured almost 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donetsk provinces and secured a land corridor to Crimea. They captured all Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov. Odessa was the only port left with Ukraine. Having met most of his minimal objectives, Putin started peace negotiations mediated by Turkiye. As a goodwill gesture he withdrew his forces from Kiev. The western media painted this as a rout of Russian forces. The Russian force was overstretched and exhausted after six months of fighting. By Jul-Aug 2022 the Ukrainians launched a much-heralded counter offensive in Kherson. The Russians had to pull out troops from Kharkiev to face this attack. The US satellites saw this gap. Americans encouraged Ukrainians to attack here even as Russian forces were withdrawing to the line of the Orkill river. On paper, this Ukrainian offensive looked like a brilliant Blitzkrieg and as it hit thin air and made rapid progress.

There was an outcry in Russia. Sergei Markov, and other pro-war Russians exhorted Putin to stop this strange phoney war (semi- war) in Ukraine and start a real war that Russia could win easily. Putin was forced to mobilise 3,00,000 reservists. The Syrian war combat vet, Gen Suvorvikin began construction of the three-tiered defence line using Russian construction companies. This 1200 km long Maginot line had deep minefields, anti-tank ditches and dragon teeth. Russia had realised that given the present state of technology, the advantage was clearly with the defender.

Operations in 2023

Meanwhile, the US and Nato helped create 9 new Ukrainian brigades equipped with a mish-mash of Leopard and Challenger tanks along with Bradley ICVs and Strykers. These were brand new formations and not combat-hardened troops. Ukrainians raised their 9th and 10th Strike Corps for the much-advertised counter-offensive in which they claimed they would throw Russians out of all captured territories. This Spring counter-offensive was finally launched on 4 June 2023. The attacks came in Zaporizhzhi and Bakhmut sectors.

There was strong difference of opinion between the Americans and Ukrainians about this splitting of forces. The Russian plan was based upon the Kursk battle of 1943, when the Russians had let the German Panzers attack first, inflicted heavy casualties with artillery and combat aviation and then switched to a major counter-offensive. The Russians had manned their first line with Spetsnaz troops, ATGMs and drones, who could vector down airstrikes and artillery fires. The Ukrainian attacks were led by mine-clearing trawl tanks and ploughs. This caused the attacking columns to bunch up and take heavy casualties. The Russians used their Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopters armed with the 7-10 km range Vykhir anti-tank missiles to destroy the Leopard and Challenger tanks from stand-off ranges. Su-24 ground attack aircraft and Russian artillery took a very heavy toll of attacking formations. Remotely delivered mines rapidly closed minefield safe-lanes behind trawl tanks. Most attacks could not make it even to the first Russian defence line.

By end-Jun, the Ukrainian offensive by their 9 Strike Corps had ended in a fiasco. There was great deal of recrimination between the Americans and Ukrainian generals. The Americans called the Ukrainians “casualty averse”. They berated them for frittering effort away in Bakhmut. When the Ukrainians resisted, the Americans forced Zelenskyy to sack his defence minister Reznikov and most top officials in the ministry. Investigations were launched into corruption scandals. Finally, in Aug, the Ukrainians resumed the offensive in Zaporizhzhia with their fresh 10 Corps. Under US pressure, they moved out some troops from Bakhmut, to this sector. They claimed to have breached the first defence line in Robotinye. The Russians also pulled out formations from their own Kupiansk counter-attack to plug this breach. Heavy losses were inflicted by Russian combat aviation, artillery and drones. Soon, this second corps-sized offensive also petered out with heavy losses. The new innovation was heavy Ukrainian investment in counter-battery (CB) fires to supress Russian artillery.

To draw media attention away from the glaring failure of the Ukrainian ground offensive, the Americans put pressure on the Ukrainians to mount major air attacks on the ports in Crimea and HQ of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet using Storm Shadow and Spice (French) cruise stand-off attack missiles. One Kilo-class submarine and a landing ship were damaged. Ukraine also mounted drone attacks on Moscow and other Russian cities. Though tactical damage was minimal, the psy ops value of these attacks was considerable and served to distract attention from the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Meanwhile, Russia has conscripted some 2,70,000 additional troops and is readying for its major counter-offensive. Generals in Moscow have been urging Putin to expedite this offensive so as to seize and retain the initiative. So far, there are no clear indications of when this would materialise. This will, in all probability, be a winter offensive as the current campaign season is drawing to a close. Meanwhile, Russian retaliatory attacks on Kiev, Odessa and other cities have started to target the power grid, so Ukraine will have a miserable winter ahead. This battle will certainly stretch to 2024. However, the US NATO strategy of a long war to exhaust Russia may backfire. Already NATO members like Poland are feeling the fatigue and US funding has been halted temporarily.

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• M777 155mm towed howitzer provided by the United States and Canada. It has a range of up to 40 km (25 miles) and can fire GPS-guided shells.

• M119 105mm towed howitzer was also provided by the United States. It has a range of up to 18 km (11 miles) and can fire a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds.

• 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm self-propelled howitzer manufactured in Ukraine. It has a range of up to 20 km (12 miles) and can fire a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds.

• BM-21 Grad 122mm multiple rocket launcher manufactured in the Soviet Union. It can fire a salvo of 40 rockets in just 20 seconds, and has a range of up to 40 km (25 miles).

• HIMARS high-mobility artillery rocket system provided by the United States. It can fire a variety of rockets, including guided and unguided, with a range of up to 80 km (50 miles).

Performance of Ukrainian Artillery

The performance of Ukrainian artillery in the war so far has been mixed. On the one hand, Ukrainian artillery has been effective in disrupting Russian operations and inflicting heavy casualties. For example, in the Battle of Kyiv, Ukrainian artillery played a key role in repelling the Russian advance on the capital.

On the other hand, Ukrainian artillery has also suffered significant losses. As of July 2023, Ukraine has lost an estimated 4,717 field artillery cannons and mortars. This is due to a number of factors, including Russian artillery strikes, Ukrainian ammunition shortages, and the difficulty of transporting and operating artillery in the contested battlefield environment.

Overall, the performance of Ukrainian artillery in the war has been impressive. However, the Ukrainian military will need to continue to receive Western support in order to maintain its artillery capabilities.

Here are some of the factors that have contributed to the success of Ukrainian artillery:

• Effective use of Western-supplied artillery: The United States and other Western countries have donated a significant number of artillery pieces to Ukraine, including the M777 howitzer, the M119 howitzer, and the HIMARS. These weapons have given the Ukrainian military a significant edge in terms of range and accuracy.

• Decentralized command and control: Ukrainian artillery units are organized in a decentralized manner, which allows them to respond quickly to changing battlefield conditions. This has made it difficult for Russian forces to suppress Ukrainian artillery fire.

• Effective use of drones: Ukrainian drones have been used to great effect in spotting and targeting Russian artillery positions. This has allowed Ukrainian artillery units to fire with greater accuracy and lethality.

Challenges Faced

Despite these successes, Ukrainian artillery has also faced a number of challenges.

Russian forces have a significant advantage in terms of the number of artillery pieces and the amount of ammunition available. This has made it difficult for Ukrainian artillery units to maintain a sustained fire.

Ukrainian forces have been facing ammunition shortages for some time. This has limited their ability to use artillery to its full potential.

The Donbas region, where much of the fighting is now taking place, is characterized by difficult terrain. This has made it difficult for Ukrainian artillery units to manoeuvre and fire effectively.

Russian Artillery

The main artillery systems that have been used by the Russians against Ukraine are mentioned below.

• BM-21 Grad 122mm multiple rocket launcher that is capable of firing a salvo of 40 rockets in just 20 seconds. It has a range of up to 40 km (25 miles).

• 2S19 MSTA-S 152mm self-propelled howitzer, Both the MSTA-S and MSTA-B have been used by the Russians in Ukraine. These are both 152mm self-propelled howitzers that are capable of firing a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds. They have a range of up to 24.7 km (15.3 miles) and 22 km (14 miles) respectively. The MSTA-S is the more modern of the two howitzers and is equipped with a digital fire control system that allows it to fire more accurately and rapidly. The MSTA-B is an older model, but it is still a capable weapon system.

• 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled howitzer that is the heaviest artillery piece in service with the Russian military. It is capable of firing a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, cluster, and nuclear rounds. It has a range of up to 50 km (31 miles).

• D-30 122mm towed howitzer that is a standard weapon in the Russian artillery inventory. It is capable of firing a variety of ammunition, including high-explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds. It has a range of up to 17.5 km (10.9 miles).

• 2S3 Akatsiya: This is an older self-propelled howitzer that is still in use by the Russian military. It has a range of up to 20 km (12 miles).

155mm is a standard NATO caliber, and many countries use 155mm artillery guns.

The use of these howitzers by Russia in Ukraine is a sign that the Russians are taking the war seriously and are willing to use heavy firepower to achieve their objectives.

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Artillery Donated to Ukraine

United States: The United States has provided Ukraine with the most artillery, including 185 M777 howitzers, 72 M119 howitzers, and 20 HIMARS.

Canada: 45 M777 howitzers and 20,000 rounds of ammunition.

Australia: 14 M777 howitzers and 10,000 rounds of ammunition.

United Kingdom: 20 M777 howitzers and 4,000 rounds of ammunition.

Poland: 18 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers.

Slovakia: 8 Zuzana self-propelled howitzers.

Lithuania: 18 M101 howitzers.

Estonia: 72 D-30 towed howitzers.

Czech Republic: 20 DANA self-propelled howitzers.

The exact numbers of artillery pieces provided by each country vary, and it is likely that more countries will provide artillery to Ukraine in the future.

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Drones have been used to provide valuable intelligence to Ukrainian forces, helping them to track Russian troop movements, identify targets, and direct artillery fire. This has been especially important in the Donbas region, where the fighting has been intense and the terrain has been difficult to navigate.

Drones have also been used to carry out direct attacks on Russian forces. These attacks have been carried out with both small, commercial drones that have been modified to carry explosives, and larger, military-grade drones. The use of drones for attack purposes has been particularly effective in disrupting Russian supply lines and targeting command and control centres.

Ukrainian Drone Attacks inside Russia

The drone attacks inside Russia have been a significant escalation in the Ukraine War. It is not clear who was responsible for those attacks, but they have been blamed on Ukraine. Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the attacks, but it has not denied them either. The drone attacks in 2023 have been a continuation of the trend of drone attacks inside Russia that began in 2022. But they have shown that Ukraine is willing to target Russian territory, and they have raised the possibility of a wider conflict between Russia and NATO. The number of drone attacks inside Russia is relatively small. However, the attacks have caused significant damage and have raised the stakes in the Ukraine War.

There have been several drone attacks on Moscow by Ukraine since the start of the war. In May 2023, two drones were shot down over the Kremlin, and in July 2023, a drone attack was carried out on Sheremetyevo International Airport. These attacks have caused some damage, but no injuries have been reported.

Drones Employed by Ukraine

Ukraine has used a variety of drones in the war, including commercial drones, such as the DJI Mavic 3 and the DJI Matrice 300, for reconnaissance and attack purposes. These drones are relatively inexpensive and easy to operate, making them a valuable asset for Ukrainian forces.

Ukraine has also received a number of military-grade drones from its allies, including the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and the American Switchblade kamikaze drone. These drones are more expensive and sophisticated than commercial drones, but they offer greater range, payload, and endurance.

Bayraktar TB2 drones have been used to great effect against Russian forces.

The United States has provided Ukraine with a number of Switchblade kamikaze drones, which are designed to loiter over a target before exploding.

The United Kingdom has provided Ukraine with a number of Watchkeeper WK450 drones, which are used for reconnaissance and surveillance.

Poland has provided Ukraine with a number of Warmate kamikaze drones, which are similar to the Switchblade.

Turkish Drones for Ukraine

Turkey has supplied Ukraine with two types of drones. The Bayraktar TB2, a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). And the Akinci, a high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UCAV. Turkey has also provided Ukraine with training on how to operate them.

The Bayraktar TB2 has been credited with destroying a number of Russian tanks, artillery pieces, and other military equipment. The Akinci is still under development, but is expected to be even more capable than the Bayraktar TB2.

According to Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine has received 50 Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey since the Russian invasion began in February 2022. It is not clear how many Akinci drones Ukraine has received. The Turkish drones have been a valuable asset to Ukraine, and have helped to level the playing field against Russia. However, they are not a silver bullet, and Ukraine will need more military aid if it is to defeat Russia.

The Bayraktar TB2 can fly for long periods of time at altitudes of up to 27,000 feet. It is equipped with a variety of sensors, including a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and a laser designator, which allow it to target enemy forces with precision.

The Akinci is a high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UCAV, which means that it can fly for even longer periods of time at altitudes of up to 40,000 feet. It is equipped with even more advanced sensors than the Bayraktar TB2, and is capable of carrying a heavier payload.

Employment of Drones by Russia

The Russian military has used combat drones in a variety of ways in the Ukraine War, including reconnaissance, attack and jamming.

Russian drones have been used to provide valuable intelligence to Russian forces, helping them to track Ukrainian troop movements, identify targets, and direct artillery fire.

Russian drones attacks on Ukrainian forces have been carried out with both small, commercial drones that have been modified to carry explosives, and larger, military-grade drones. The use of drones for attack purposes has been particularly effective in disrupting Ukrainian supply lines and targeting command and control centers.

Russian drones have also been used to jam Ukrainian communications and radar systems. This has made it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to coordinate their operations and defend themselves against Russian attacks.

The Russian military has also used drones to deliver supplies to its troops and to evacuate wounded soldiers.

However, the Russian military has also suffered some losses to its drone fleet. Ukrainian forces have shot down a number of Russian drones, and they have also used electronic warfare to disrupt Russian drone operations.

In recent months, the number of Russian drone attacks in Ukraine has decreased. This is likely due to a number of factors, including the increasing effectiveness of Ukrainian air defenses and the increasing difficulty of operating drones in the face of electronic warfare.

Russian Drones

Russia has used a variety of drones in the Ukraine war, including including Orlan-10, Forpost, Zala Aero, and Kamikaze drones. March 2022, Ukrainian forces claimed to have shot down over 100 Russian drones.

Orlan-10 is a small, fixed-wing drone that is used for reconnaissance and surveillance. It has a range of up to 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 5 kilograms.

Forpost is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone that is used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. It has a range of up to 250 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 200 kilograms.

ZALA Aero is a family of small, fixed-wing drones that are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. They have a range of up to 30 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 5 kilograms.

Kamikaze drones are small, disposable drones that are used for suicide attacks. They are equipped with explosives and are programmed to fly into their targets.

The Russians have also used Iranian-made drones in the Ukraine war, including the Shahed-136 and the Shahed-186. These drones are small, cheap, and easy to operate, making them ideal for use in a war zone.

Iranians Drones for Russia

Amongst the drones supplied by Iran, which have been used by the Russians in the Ukraine war are Shaed-129, -136, -191 and Mohaje-6.

Shahed-129 is a long-range, medium-altitude, reconnaissance and strike drone. It has a range of over 2,000 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 80 kilograms.

Shahed-191 is a medium-range, medium-altitude, attack drone. It has a range of over 1,500 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 60 kilograms.

Mohaje-6 is a short-range, low-altitude, reconnaissance and attack drone. It has a range of over 1,000 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 40 kilograms.

Shahed-136 is a kamikaze drone, also known as a “suicide drone.” It is a small, disposable drone that is used to carry out a single, destructive strike.

Performance of Russian Drones

The performance of Russian drones in the Ukraine war has been mixed. Some drones, such as the Orlan-10, have been used effectively for reconnaissance and surveillance. However, other drones, such as the Forpost, have been more vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses.

There are a number of reasons why Russian drones have not been as effective as they could have been. First, Russian drones are not as advanced as some of the drones used by Ukraine, such as the Bayraktar TB2. Second, Russian drones are not as well-protected from enemy air defenses. Third, Russian forces have not been as effective at using drones in coordination with other weapons systems.

Despite these challenges, Russian drones have still played a significant role in the war. They have been used to target Ukrainian forces, to gather intelligence, and to coordinate artillery strikes.

Some of the key factors that have contributed to the mixed performance of Russian drones in the Ukraine war are lack of advanced technology, vulnerability to air defences and ineffective use:

Russian drones are not as advanced as some of the drones used by Ukraine, such as the Bayraktar TB2. This means that they are less capable of carrying out complex missions and are more vulnerable to enemy air defenses.

Russian drones are not as well-protected from enemy air defenses as some of the drones used by Ukraine. This means that they are more likely to be shot down by Ukrainian fighters or missiles.

Russian forces have not been as effective at using drones in coordination with other weapons systems. This has limited the effectiveness of drones in the war.

Comments

Overall, drones have played a significant role in the Ukraine war. They have been used by both sides for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. However, Russian drones have been more vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses than Ukrainian drones.

The use of drones in the Ukraine War has had a number of implications for the future of warfare as force multipliers, for reconnaissance and attack purposes.

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Drones Used to Attack by Ukraine

Here are some specific examples of how drones have been used in the Ukraine War:

In February 2022, a Ukrainian drone was used to destroy a Russian convoy of 80 tanks and armoured vehicles.

In March 2022, a Ukrainian drone was used to strike a Russian command and control centre, killing several high-ranking Russian officers.

In April 2022, a Ukrainian drone was used to disrupt a Russian supply line, preventing the delivery of food and ammunition to Russian forces.

Drone Attached Carried Out Inside Russia

No fatal injuries were reported in the following attacks.

May 25, 2022: A drone attack targeted the Kremlin in Moscow. The attack caused some damage to the building.

June 5, 2022: A drone attack targeted an oil refinery in Bryansk, Russia. The attack caused a fire at the refinery.

June 17, 2022: A drone attack targeted a military base in Kursk, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the base.

July 1, 2022: A drone attack targeted a military airfield in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the airfield.

February 22, 2023: A drone attack targeted a military base in Shebekino, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the base.

March 4, 2023: A drone attack targeted a substation of the Transneft-Druzhba oil pipeline in Belgorod Oblast, Russia. The attack caused a power outage in the region.

May 25, 2022: Two drones were shot down over the Kremlin. The attacks caused some damage to the building.

May 30, 2023: A drone attack targeted the Kremlin in Moscow. The attack caused some damage to the building.

June 1, 2023: A drone attack targeted a military base in Kursk, Russia. The attack caused some damage to the base.

July 4, 2023: A drone attack targeted Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow. The attack caused some damage to the airport.

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Key Advantages of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci Drones

Relatively inexpensive, making them a cost-effective way to target enemy forces.

Easy to operate, making them suitable for use by even inexperienced pilots.

Long range and endurance, allowing them to operate deep behind enemy lines.

Equipped with advanced sensors, allowing them to target enemy forces with precision.

Limitations of Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci Drones

Vulnerable to air defense systems, and can be shot down by enemy fighters or missiles.

Not stealthy, making them easy to detect by enemy radar.

Can only carry a limited payload, meaning that they cannot carry large or heavy weapons.

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Russian Drone Attacks

Here are some examples of Russian drone attacks in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023:

February 24, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack Ukrainian military bases and airfields on the first day of the invasion.

March 8, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine. The attack killed three people and injured dozens more.

April 16, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack a train station in Kramatorsk, Ukraine. The attack killed at least 50 people and injured dozens more.

May 9, 2022: Russian drones were used to attack a military parade in Lviv, Ukraine. The attack killed at least 20 people and injured dozens more.

June 1, 2023: Russian drones were used to attack a military base in Kharkiv, Ukraine. The attack killed at least 10 people and injured dozens more.

The post Role of Drones in the Russia-Ukraine War appeared first on IMR.

Maj Gen Deepak K Mehta

The possible reasons for Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group to revolt against Russian President Vladimir Putin are still unclear, but there are a few possible explanations.

Prigozhin was unhappy with the way the Russian military was treating his Wagner Group mercenaries. Wagner Group is a private military contractor that has been used by the Russian government in a number of conflicts, including in Ukraine and Syria. Prigozhin had claimed that the Russian military had deliberately shelled Wagner Group positions, and that this has led to the deaths of many of his men.

Prigozhin may have been trying to position himself as a potential successor to Putin. Putin is 70 years old, and there was speculation that he may not run for re-election in 2024. Prigozhin was a wealthy and powerful businessman, and he may have been hoping to use the Wagner Group revolt as a way to boost his own political profile.

The revolt may have been a deliberate provocation by Putin himself. Putin has a history of using staged events to test the loyalty of his subordinates. It is possible that the Wagner Group revolt was a way for Putin to see how Prigozhin would react, and to test the loyalty of the Russian military.

Whatever the reasons for the revolt, it is clear that it was a serious challenge to Putin’s authority. The fact that Prigozhin was able to raise an army of thousands of men and march on Moscow is a sign that Putin’s grip on power is not as strong as it once was.

It is also worth noting that the Wagner Group revolt came at a time when Putin was facing increasing international pressure over the war in Ukraine. The revolt may have been a way for Prigozhin to distract from the war and to show Putin’s opponents that he was still a force to be reckoned with.

Ultimately, the reasons for Prigozhin’s revolt against Putin may never be fully known. However, the event is a reminder that even the most powerful leaders are not immune to challenges from their subordinates.

Implications of Revolt

Here are some of the implications of the Wagner Group revolt:

The revolt damaged the reputation of the Wagner Group. The group is now seen as a more dangerous and unpredictable organization, and it is likely to have difficulty securing contracts in the future.

The revolt weakened the position of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin was the founder and leader of the Wagner Group, and the revolt showed that he was not in complete control of the organization.

The revolt increased tensions between Russia and Belarus. The Wagner Group is a Russian-backed mercenary group, and the revolt has strained relations between Russia and Belarus.

The revolt raised questions about the stability of the Russian government. The revolt showed that there is some dissent within the Russian government, and it is possible that this could lead to further instability in the future.

It is still too early to say what the long-term implications of the Wagner Group revolt will be. However, it is clear that this event has had a significant impact on Russian politics and on the Wagner Group itself.

Theories About Conspiracies

There are a few theories behind the notion that Prigozhin’s revolt may have been deliberately provoked by Putin.

Putin wanted to test the loyalty of the Russian military. The Russian military is a powerful institution, and Putin has been careful to cultivate its loyalty. The Wagner Group revolt was a way for Putin to see how the military would react to a challenge to his authority.

Putin wanted to eliminate a potential rival. Prigozhin was a wealthy and powerful businessman, and he has been seen as a potential successor to Putin. The Wagner Group revolt was a way for Putin to remove Prigozhin from the political scene.

Putin wanted to distract from the war in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has been a major source of international criticism for Putin. The Wagner Group revolt was a way for Putin to distract from the war and to show his opponents that he was still a force to be reckoned with.

It is important to note that these were just theories, and there was no concrete evidence to support any of them. However, the fact that Putin has a history of using staged events to test the loyalty of his subordinates, and the fact that the Wagner Group revolt came at a time when Putin was facing increasing international pressure, suggests that it is possible that the revolt was deliberately provoked by Putin.

Wagner Group Strength

The Wagner Group is a shadowy organization that is closely linked to the Russian government, but its exact size and structure are unknown. It is believed to be made up of former Russian military personnel, as well as mercenaries from other countries.

The Wagner Group is a Russian private military contractor (PMC) that has been active in a number of conflicts, including in Ukraine. The group was controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Group’s organization is hierarchical, with a clear chain of command. The group is divided into brigades, which are further divided into companies and platoons. Each brigade is led by a commander, who reports to a higher-level commander.

The Group’s strength is estimated to be between 20,000 and 50,000 fighters. The group’s fighters are mostly former Russian military personnel, but they also include mercenaries from other countries. The group’s fighters are well-trained and equipped, and they are often used in the most dangerous and difficult missions.

The Group’s weapons are a mix of Russian and Western-made weapons. The group is known to use assault rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-tank missiles. The group also has access to armored vehicles, including tanks and armored personnel carriers.

The Group has been active in Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2022. The group has been involved in a number of key battles, including the Battle of Kyiv and the Battle of Mariupol. The group has also been accused of committing war crimes in Ukraine.

The Group is a significant force in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The group’s fighters are well-trained and equipped, and they have been involved in some of the most important battles of the war. The group’s involvement in the war has also raised concerns about the use of PMCs in conflicts.

Employment of Wagner Group in Ukraine

The Wagner Group has been involved in a number of fronts in Ukraine, but they have been most active in the Donbas region. The Donbas is a strategic region in eastern Ukraine, and it has been the focus of heavy fighting since the beginning of the war. The Wagner Group has been used to support Russian forces in the Donbas, and they have been involved in some of the most intense battles in the region.

The Group has also been active in other parts of Ukraine, including the southern coast and the capital, Kyiv. However, their involvement in these areas has been less significant than their involvement in the Donbas.

Here are some of the specific battles that the Wagner Group has been involved in:

The Battle of Debaltseve (2015)

The Battle of Mariupol (2022)

The Battle of Severodonetsk (2022)

The Battle of Lysychansk (2022)

The Wagner Group has also been accused of committing war crimes in Ukraine. In 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on the Wagner Group and its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, for their involvement in war crimes in Ukraine.

Sanctuary by Belarus

There are a few reasons why Belarus gave sanctuary to Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Group.

Geopolitical considerations. Belarus is a close ally of Russia, and the Wagner Group is a Russian-backed mercenary group. By giving sanctuary to the Wagner Group, Belarus is currying favor with the Kremlin. This could be seen as a way for Belarus to secure its own interests in the face of Western sanctions and pressure.

Economic considerations. The Wagner Group is a lucrative business, and Belarus may be hoping to profit from its presence in the country. The Wagner Group has been involved in a number of high-profile contracts in Africa, and it is possible that Belarus could be hoping to attract similar contracts.

Security considerations. The Wagner Group is a well-trained and well-equipped mercenary group. By giving sanctuary to the Wagner Group, Belarus is gaining a valuable asset in terms of security. The Wagner Group could be used to protect Belarus’s borders or to suppress dissent within the country.

It is also possible that there are other, less obvious reasons why Belarus has given sanctuary to the Wagner Group.

Revolt Difused

The Wagner Group revolt was diffused by a combination of factors, including:

Belarusian Intervention. President Alexander Lukashenko, who is a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, brokered a deal between Prigozhin and the Kremlin that allowed the Wagner Group to withdraw from Moscow without further violence.

The threat of military force. The Russian military was mobilized to stop the Wagner Group’s advance on Moscow, and it is likely that this threat played a role in persuading Prigozhin to back down.

Lack of popular support . The Wagner Group is not a popular organization in Russia, and it is likely that the Kremlin was concerned about the potential for widespread unrest if the revolt had continued.

In the end, the Wagner Group revolt was a failure. The group was unable to achieve its goals, and it was forced to withdraw from Moscow without further violence.

Despite the Russian government’s denials, the use of the Wagner Group by the Russian government has been controversial. Critics have accused the group of committing war crimes and human rights abuses, and of destabilizing countries in which it operates.

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Wagner Group Worldwide

The Wagner Group has been used by Russia in a number of countries around the world, including:

Ukraine: The Wagner Group has been heavily involved in the conflict in Ukraine since 2014, and is believed to have played a significant role in the capture of Crimea and the Donbas region.

Syria: The Wagner Group was deployed to Syria in 2015 to support the Assad regime, and has been accused of committing war crimes, including the use of chemical weapons.

Libya: The Wagner Group was deployed to Libya in 2019 to support Khalifa Haftar, and has been accused of human rights abuses.

Mozambique: The Wagner Group was deployed to Mozambique in 2019 to fight against Islamic State militants, and has been accused of committing abuses against civilians.

Central African Republic: The Wagner Group has been active in the Central African Republic since 2018, and is believed to have been involved in the looting of natural resources.

In addition to these countries, the Wagner Group has also been reported to be active in Sudan, Madagascar, and Guinea.

The post Prigozhin’s Revolt Against Putin appeared first on IMR.

The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) has been the most effective against Russian targets. HIMARS is a mobile, self-propelled artillery system that can fire a salvo of six rockets up to 80 kilometers away. The rockets are guided, meaning they can hit their targets with a high degree of accuracy. This makes HIMARS ideal for targeting Russian command centers, supply depots, and other critical infrastructure behind the front lines.

Since the arrival of HIMARS in Ukraine, the Ukrainian military has been able to inflict significant damage on the Russian military. In June 2023, for example, Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy a Russian ammunition depot in the Donbas region.

HIMARS has also been credited with helping to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine. In the early stages of the war, the Russian military was able to make significant gains. However, the arrival of HIMARS has given the Ukrainian military the ability to strike back at the Russians from a distance forcing them to focus on defending their own positions.

Characteristics of HIMARS System

The HIMARS is a light multiple rocket launcher developed in the late 1990s for the United States Army. It is mounted on a standard United States Army Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) truck frame. The HIMARS carries one pod with either six Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets or one Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile. It is capable of launching all rockets specified in the Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions (MFOM).

Mobility: The HIMARS is mounted on a wheeled vehicle, which gives it a high degree of mobility. It can be transported by C-130 aircraft, which allows it to be rapidly deployed to any theater of operations.

Accuracy: The HIMARS can fire guided rockets with a high degree of accuracy against command centers, supply depots, and other critical infrastructure.

Range: The HIMARS can fire its rockets up to 80 kilometers away. This gives it the ability to strike enemy targets from a distance, which reduces the risk of its own forces being exposed to enemy fire.

Survivability: The HIMARS is a relatively small and lightly armored vehicle. However, it is equipped with a fire suppression system and other features that help to protect its crew from enemy fire.

The HIMARS system has been used in combat by the United States Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ukrainian Tanks

The most effective tank used by the Ukrainians against the Russians has been the T-72. The T-72 is a Soviet-era main battle tank that has been in service with the Ukrainian military since the 1970s. It is a relatively simple and reliable tank, and it is well-suited for the conditions in Ukraine.

The T-72 has been upgraded by the Ukrainians with a number of features, including improved armor, a new fire control system, and a more powerful gun. These upgrades have made the T-72 a more effective tank against the Russian T-72s and T-80s.

In addition to the T-72, the Ukrainians have also used other tanks, such as the T-64 and the T-80, against the Russians. However, the T-72 has been the most effective tank used by the Ukrainians.

Here are some of the reasons why the T-72 has been so effective against the Russians:

Numbers: The Ukrainians have a large number of T-72s in their inventory. This means that they have a lot of tanks to throw at the Russians.

Reliance on old technology: The Russians have relied on older technology in their tanks, such as the T-72. This has made them vulnerable to the newer Ukrainian tanks, such as the T-72M1R.

Tactics: The Ukrainians have been using the T-72s effectively in combined arms operations. This means that they have been using the tanks in conjunction with other weapons systems, such as artillery and infantry, to achieve success.

Characteristics of T-72 Tank

The T-72 has been upgraded by the Ukrainians with a number of features, including improved armor, a new fire control system, and a more powerful gun. These upgrades have made the T-72 a more effective tank against the Russian T-72s and T-80s.

Armor: The T-72 has a well-sloped armor that provides good protection against enemy fire. The armor is made up of steel and composite materials, and it is designed to defeat HEAT, APFSDS, and HE rounds.

Armament: The T-72 is armed with a 125mm smoothbore gun that can fire a variety of ammunition, including HEAT, APFSDS, and HE rounds. The gun is mounted in a turret that can rotate 360 degrees.

Fire control system: The T-72 is equipped with a fire control system that includes a laser range finder, a thermal sight, and a ballistic computer. This system allows the tank to engage targets accurately at long range.

Engine: The T-72 is powered by a V-12 diesel engine that produces 780 horsepower. This engine gives the tank a top speed of 50 kilometers per hour and an operational range of 450 kilometers.

Crew: The T-72 is crewed by three people: a commander, a gunner, and a driver. The commander is responsible for commanding the tank and directing the fire of the gun. The gunner is responsible for firing the gun and operating the fire control system. The driver is responsible for driving the tank and operating the engine.

Ukrainian Anti tank Weapons

The most effective Ukrainian anti-tank weapon against Russians has been the Javelin. The Javelin is a portable, fire-and-forget anti-tank missile system that can be used by a single soldier. It is guided by infrared, meaning that it can lock onto and pursue a moving target up to 4 kilometers away. The Javelin has a tandem warhead that can penetrate even the most heavily armored tanks.

The Javelin has been used to great effect by the Ukrainians against the Russians. In the early stages of the war, the Javelin was credited with helping to slow the Russian advance. More recently, the Javelin has been used to destroy Russian tanks and other armored vehicles in the Donbas region.

Other effective Ukrainian anti-tank weapons include the Stugna-P and the NLAW. These weapons have also been used to great effect against Russian tanks and other armored vehicles.

Characteristics of Javelin ATGM System

The Javelin is a portable, fire-and-forget system that is easy to use and can be operated by a single soldier. The Javelin has a tandem warhead that can penetrate even the most heavily armored tanks. It weighs 22 kgs and has a max range of 4 kms. It has high accuracy with IR guidance.

Fighter Jets

The Ukrainian Air Force has two main fighter jets: the MiG-29 Fulcrum and the Su-27 Flanker. Both of these jets have performed well against the Russians, but the MiG-29 has been particularly effective.

The MiG-29 is a lightweight fighter jet that is well-suited for close-quarters combat. It is also relatively maneuverable, which makes it difficult for Russian jets to shoot down.

The Su-27 is a larger and more powerful fighter jet than the MiG-29. It is also more heavily armed, with a larger cannon and more missile hardpoints. However, the Su-27 is not as maneuverable as the MiG-29, which makes it more vulnerable to Russian air attacks.

Ukrainian Arsenal at the Start of the War

Some of the key Ukrainian land weapon systems at the start of the war included:

Main Battle Tanks (MBTs): Ukraine operates several types of MBTs, including the T-84 and its variants.

Artillery: Self-propelled howitzers like the 2S3 Akatsiya and 2S1 Gvozdika, multiple rocket launchers like the BM-27 Uragan, and towed artillery pieces.

Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs): ATGMs like the Skif, Korsar, and Stugna-P to engage armored vehicles at longer ranges.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs): IFVs like the BMP-2 and BMP-1.

Fighters, Bombers, and Helicopters

The Ukrainian Armed Forces operate a variety of fighter aircraft, bombers, and helicopters. Here are some of the main platforms used by Ukraine at that time:

Fighter Aircraft:

Sukhoi Su-27: A twin-engine air superiority fighter.

Mikoyan MiG-29: A multirole fighter for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.

Sukhoi Su-24: A variable-sweep wing bomber with a secondary air-to-air capability.

Bombers:

Sukhoi Su-24: In addition to its role as a fighter, the Su-24 can also perform bombing missions.

Sukhoi Su-25: A close air support and ground attack aircraft primarily used for targeting enemy ground forces.

Helicopters:

Mil Mi-24 “Hind”: A heavily armed attack helicopter used for close air support, anti-armor operations, and troop transport.

Mil Mi-8 “Hip”: A versatile helicopter used for transport, reconnaissance, and search-and-rescue operations.

Mil Mi-2: A light utility helicopter primarily used for training, transport, and surveillance.

Ukrainian Artillery

Here are some of the types of artillery employed by the Ukrainian forces:

Towed Howitzers:

2A36 Giatsint-B: A 152 mm towed howitzer with a range of approximately 30 kilometers.

D-30: A 122 mm towed howitzer with a range of around 15 kilometers.

D-20: A 152 mm towed howitzer with a range of about 17 kilometers.

Self-Propelled Howitzers:

2S3 Akatsiya: A 152 mm self-propelled howitzer with a range of up to 18 kilometers.

2S1 Gvozdika: A 122 mm self-propelled howitzer capable of engaging targets at a range of approximately 15 kilometers.

2S19 Msta-S: A 152 mm self-propelled howitzer with an extended range of up to 29 kilometers.

Self-Propelled Artillery:

2S1 Gvozdika: A 122 mm self-propelled howitzer used for indirect fire support.

2S3 Akatsiya: A 152 mm self-propelled howitzer capable of providing heavy artillery fire.

Rocket Artillery:

BM-21 Grad: A multiple rocket launcher system utilized for long-range indirect fire support.

BM-27 Uragan: A multiple rocket launcher system with a larger caliber and extended range compared to Grad.

Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs):

BM-27 Uragan: A 220 mm multiple rocket launcher system with a range of around 35 kilometers.

BM-21 Grad: A 122 mm multiple rocket launcher system with a range of up to 40 kilometers.

BM-30 Smerch: A 300 mm multiple rocket launcher system with a range of up to 90 kilometers.

Air Defense Weapon Systems

Some of the types of air defense systems used by Ukraine were:

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems:

S-300: Long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system capable of engaging targets at a range of up to 150 kilometers.

Buk-M1/M2: Medium-range SAM system with a range of approximately 40-50 kilometers.

Tor-M1/M2: Short-range SAM system designed to engage aircraft, helicopters, and precision-guided munitions at a range of up to 15 kilometers.

Osa-AKM: Short-range SAM system used for defense against aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems):

Igla-S: Portable SAM system capable of engaging low-flying aircraft and helicopters at ranges of up to 6 kilometers.

Strela-10: MANPADS mounted on a tracked vehicle with a range of approximately 5 kilometers.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery:

ZU-23-2: A twin-barreled, 23 mm anti-aircraft autocannon used for low-level air defense.

ZSU-23-4 Shilka: Self-propelled anti-aircraft system armed with four 23 mm autocannons.

Armoured and Mechanized Forces

Some of the key armored and mechanized units within the Ukrainian Army were:

Main Battle Tanks (MBTs):

T-64: Ukrainian Army operated different variants of the T-64 MBT, including the T-64BV and T-64BM “Bulat.”

T-72: Some older T-72 MBTs were still in service with the Ukrainian forces.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs):

BMP-1 and BMP-2: These Soviet-designed IFVs were extensively used by the Ukrainian Army to transport infantry and provide fire support.

Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs):

BTR-80 and BTR-4: The Ukrainian Army utilized these wheeled APCs for troop transport and other support roles.

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During the Ukraine War, the Smerch rocket launchers were used by Russian-backed separatist forces and by Russian military units as well. The Smerch rockets were employed in various offensives and counteroffensives, particularly in the Donbass region, targeting Ukrainian military positions and infrastructure.

Smerch system allowed the Russians to strike targets deep inside Ukrainian territory, including military bases, supply depots, and infrastructure critical to the Ukrainian military.

Characteristics of Smerch Weapon System

The BM-30 Smerch (also known as the 9K58 Smerch) is a Russian multiple rocket launcher system designed to deliver devastating firepower over a large area. Here are some key characteristics of the Smerch weapon system:

Range: The Smerch has an impressive maximum range of up to 90 kilometers (56 miles)which allows it to strike targets deep inside enemy territory.

Payload: The Smerch launcher carries 12 300mm rockets, each equipped with a high-explosive warhead. The rockets are unguided and rely on their sheer firepower and large blast radius to inflict damage on the target area.

Accuracy: Despite being unguided rockets, the Smerch system is known for its relatively high accuracy incorporating advanced targeting and fire control systems such as a satellite-based navigation system and a self-contained fire control system.

Firing Rate: The Smerch launcher is capable of a rapid-fire salvo, with all 12 rockets being launched in just 38 seconds. This allows for concentrated and overwhelming firepower within a short period.

Versatility: The Smerch launcher is mounted on a heavy-duty 8×8 truck chassis, providing mobility and ease of transport. It can quickly be deployed and relocated, enhancing its operational flexibility on the battlefield.

Destructive Power: Each rocket carries a large high-explosive warhead, capable of creating significant damage to infrastructure and causing casualties over a wide area.

Saturation Effect: The Smerch system’s ability to fire multiple rockets simultaneously creates a saturation effect on the target area, overwhelming enemy defenses and causing panic and disruption.

Reload Capability: The Smerch launcher is equipped with an automated reloading system that allows it to be reloaded within a relatively short time, enhancing its sustained firepower.

Overall, the Smerch multiple rocket launcher system combines long-range capability, high accuracy, and a large payload to deliver a powerful and destructive impact on the battlefield. Its ability to strike targets at a distance and saturate an area with rockets has made it a significant weapon system in the Ukraine War.

Fighter Aircraft

One of the Russian weapon systems in the air that has made a significant impact In the Ukraine War is the Sukhoi Su-25 ground-attack aircraft, also known by its NATO reporting name “Frogfoot.” The Su-25 is a dedicated close air support aircraft designed to provide direct air support to ground forces.

Here are some characteristics of the Su-25 and its impact in the Ukraine War:

Close Air Support Capability: The Su-25 is twin-engine, twin-tail design, specifically designed for close air support missions, with 30mm twin-barrel cannon, making it highly effective in engaging targets on the ground. It can carry a payload of 8,000 kg of ordnance, it has 10 external hard points that can carry various weapons, including rockets, bombs, and air-to-ground missiles, enabling it to engage a wide range of targets, such as armored vehicles, fortified positions, and enemy formations.

Durability and Survivability: The Su-25 is known for its rugged construction and high survivability. It features an armoured cockpit for the pilot and key systems, along with redundant flight controls and hydraulic systems, allowing it to withstand ground fire and operate in hostile environments.

Operational Range: The Su-25 has a considerable operational range (1000 kms on internal fuel), allowing it to cover large areas and provide close air support wherever needed.

Maneuverability and Low-Flying Capabilities: The Su-25 possesses excellent maneuverability, enabling it to operate effectively in the challenging and dynamic battlefield environments. It can fly at low altitudes, up to altitude of 7,000 meters at max 950 km/h, which helps it evade enemy air defenses and deliver accurate strikes on ground targets.

Target Acquisition and Navigation Systems: The Su-25 is equipped with sophisticated target acquisition and navigation systems, including forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors and electronic countermeasures. These systems enhance its ability to locate and engage targets accurately, even in adverse weather conditions or at night.

Psychological Impact: The presence of Su-25 aircraft in the Ukraine War had a significant psychological impact on the opposing forces. The aircraft’s distinctive appearance and sound, coupled with its ability to deliver precise and powerful airstrikes, contributed to a sense of fear and vulnerability among enemy troops.

Air Defense System

One of the Russian air defense systems that has made a significant impact is the Buk-M2 (NATO reporting name: SA-17 Grizzly) medium-range surface-to-air missile system. The Buk-M2 is a highly capable air defense system designed to engage a wide range of aerial threats, including aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles.

Here are some key characteristics of the Buk-M2 and its impact in the Ukraine War:

Range and Altitude Coverage: The Buk-M2 system has a maximum engagement range of up to 45 kilometers (28 miles) and can engage targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers (15.5 miles).

Multiple Target Engagement: The Buk-M2 is capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously, thanks to its radar-guided missiles and advanced command and control system. It can track and engage several threats simultaneously, enhancing its effectiveness in defending against coordinated aerial attacks.

Anti-Aircraft Missiles: The Buk-M2 employs 9M317 missiles, which are surface-to-air missiles designed for medium-range engagements. These missiles have high maneuverability, radar guidance, and explosive warheads, making them highly effective against different types of aerial targets.

Mobility and Transportability: The Buk-M2 system is mounted on a tracked vehicle, providing excellent mobility and maneuverability.

Integration with Command and Control Systems: The Buk-M2 system is integrated into a larger air defense network, allowing it to receive target information from various radar sources and command and control centers.

Psychological Impact: The presence of the Buk-M2 system, along with other advanced air defense systems, created a significant deterrent and defensive advantage for the Russian-backed forces in the Ukraine War.

The Buk-M2 air defense system played a notable role in the Ukraine War, particularly during the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014, where it was alleged to have been used. Its capabilities as a medium-range air defense system contributed to the overall air defense strategy of the Russian-backed forces, influencing the operational dynamics and limiting the effectiveness of Ukrainian air operations in the conflict.

Main Battle Tank

Several Russian tanks have been used in the Ukraine War. However, one tank that has been prominently used and had a significant impact is the T-72B3.

The T-72B3 is a modernized version of the T-72 main battle tank, which incorporates various upgrades to enhance its combat capabilities, including improved armor protection, upgraded fire control systems, and modernized communication equipment. Some characteristics and impacts of the T-72B3 in the Ukraine War include:

Firepower: The T-72B3 is armed with a 125mm smoothbore gun, capable of firing various types of ammunition, including armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds and high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds.

Armor Protection: The T-72B3 features improved composite and reactive armor, enhancing its protection against enemy projectiles.

Mobility: The tank is equipped with a powerful engine that allows it to achieve high speeds and maneuverability on various terrains.

It is worth noting that other Russian tanks, such as the older T-64, T-80, and even the more modern T-90, have also been observed in the conflict. However, the T-72B3 is widely considered one of the primary tank models used by Russian-backed forces in the Ukraine War and has demonstrated significant impact in battles, contributing to the Russian-backed forces’ ground superiority and the challenges faced by the Ukrainian military.

The post Most Effective Russian Weapon Systems appeared first on IMR.

The New Relevance of High-Tech and Mass

In the dynamic between offense and defence, between tank and anti-tank weapons, between aircraft and air defence (AD) systems, we have seen a new equilibrium that clearly favours defence over the offense. Tanks, the primary instruments of offense, have taken particularly heavy casualties and the sheer lethality of surface-to-air missiles (S-300, S-400/500) have forced Air Forces to stay away from battle areas and restrict sortie generation rates (to just 250-300 a day). These were over 1600 a day in Gulf War I, some 600/day in Yugoslavia and 460/day in the 1971 Bangladesh War). This is a new era of not just high-tech but high-tech and mass. Any armed forces that fail to cater for this new order of lethality and the consequent need for mass, will be making a fatal mistake. Given the scale of casualties, we will have to focus hard on force–preservation, re-constitution of badly battered units and quick replacement of casualties in all future wars. Towards that end, the Indian Army’s move to cut manpower by two lakhs is very inopportune and ill-timed.

Col Jhonson writes, “What we are witnessing is a pivotal moment in military history, the re-ascendence of defence as the decisive form of war. We had seen it in World War and then we saw the same dynamic re-assert itself again by the end of World War Two. The power of the offensive had been restored at the start of that war by the brilliant German doctrine of Blitzkrieg, (which had created a lethal combination of tanks and Stuka dive bombers), to restore mobility on the battlefield. By the end of World War Two, defensive fire power had caught up once again, defeated the German Blitzkrieg and made attrition supreme on the battlefield once more. Stalin had said correctly “Artillery is the God of War.” In Ukraine, we have simply re-learnt the lessons of World War I and II. That is why the Russians chose to go on the defensive in 2023 and have so far inflicted some 70,000 personnel casualties and destroyed almost 7000 armoured vehicles.

Unprecedented Battle Field Transparency

What has favoured the defender and made the task of the attacker even more difficult is the near total level of battle field transparency in Ukraine. The US satellites, UAVs, AWACs, JSTARS, etc, can pick up virtually every single tank, truck and even soldiers that move on the battlefield. Surprise in the attack has, thus, become virtually impossible to achieve. Concentrations can be picked up immediately and even intentions can be discerned through electronic surveillance of enemy communications. What has made Russia’s task even more difficult is the proxy nature of the war. Had it been a direct clash between US and Russia, the latter could have shot down US spy satellites, AWACS and even drones loitering in Poland or Romania. These are now totally safe from any Russian counter-action. In a direct clash the attacker can take prophylactic action to shoot holes in the sky over the projected area of the offensive by downing enemy satellites with ASAT missiles. The proxy nature of this war has kept the surveillance assets of US and NATO totally unmolested and free to snoop on Russia. The levels of battlefield transparency, thus, available to Ukraine have simply been unprecedented in the annals of warfare.

Return of the Stalemate

The new equivalence or equilibrium between defensive and offensive systems has led to brutal stalemates on the battlefields of Ukraine and unprecedented levels of attrition that are reminiscent of the First World War and its sheer carnage. Once again, as in the two World Wars, medium and heavy artillery has proved to be a decisive, war-winning factor. An Austrian Army Operational Research Statistical Analysis (ORSA) study of the last seven years of combat in the Donbas region, has clearly highlighted that 45% of the tank kills, 65 % of artillery guns and 57 % of the vehicles destroyed were by medium artillery – especially of the 152/155 mm calibre.

Despite all the media hype, the total number of tanks destroyed by Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) – Javelins, TOWs, etc, – were just 13%. A major media hype was created that Javelins, Stingers (and later the HIMARS) were singular war winning factors – the US silver bullets that by themselves would win the war single-handedly. There are no silver bullets in war. People said the tank was now a dinosaur – no longer relevant on the modern battlefield. As Capt Sir Basil Liddel Hart had noted earlier, the tank has been pronounced dead so many times in recent military history. Each time it reasserts its relevance. It is still the only viable instrument of shock and offensive action. So even though defence has regained primacy over offense in overall terms, the tank remains the sole instrument of offense on the land battlefields. Like at the end of World War II, tanks may have to be used in mass to overcome lethal defenses. Massive artillery barrages have to pave the way for tanks as we saw in the Donbas. We may need more tanks, not less. Top attack is a new vulnerability for tanks but it is certainly something that can and will be countered by simple expedients like canopies and more sophisticated Active Protection System (APS). Besides, despite all this media hype – actual casualties inflicted by the ATGMs on tanks have just been 13%. The real tank-killer was medium artillery (45% tank kills). As such, earlier lessons of the Second World War have simply been revalidated today.

Drones

Drones – unmanned aerial, ground and sea vehicles – have created a new revolution in military affairs (RMA). We have loitering Kamikaze drones that are able to inflict heavy casualties and yet cost so little. Drones are very useful for gaining tactical and contact intelligence and vector in artillery fire and air strikes and launch missiles and bombs. They have brought about a paradigm shift in the nature of war. The Russians have recently retrofitted Iranian Shahed drones with the Glonass navigation system and used them in mass to mask lethal attacks by their cruise and tactical ballistic missiles and saturate Ukrainians air defences.

Wrong Lessons from Low Intensity Conflicts

In fact, the world has learnt some patently incorrect lessons from the era of Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). The levels of asymmetry between the opponents was inordinately high in Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon and also in Iraq and even Yugoslavia and Syria. Due to the sheer asymmetry, patently wrong lessons were learnt which cannot withstand the shock of high intensity conflict between evenly matched opponents. No lessons from Afghanistan or Libya can be applied to any Western conflict with peer group competitors like China or Russia. Given the accuracy of precision guided munitions (PGMs), the levels of lethality have gone up by several orders of magnitude. What the Russia-Ukraine war clearly highlights is the need to graduate quickly beyond the era of LIC entailing inordinately high levels of asymmetry between the two sides. The world is rapidly entering into the era of long duration High Intensity Conflicts between evenly matched opponents, where the levels of attrition will be inordinately high.

Nuclear Backdrop

All such future conventional wars will be fought against a nuclear backdrop. So far, the nuclear threat had served to constrain the levels of combat below the nuclear threshold. However, we are increasingly seeing nuclear red lines being completely ignored on the modern conventional battlefield. So far, the USA and NATO have refrained from direct combat with Russia and China. Ukraine is an unfortunate proxy war that has been bled white. The Americans have certainly fought Russia to the last Ukrainian in the current conflict. Either by deliberate design or by sheer accident, the world is careening towards a dangerous Armageddon, a Third World War that may see limited or full-scale use of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. Restraints are fast eroding at a rate that spells serious danger for mankind.

An Economic War Coup de Grace?

In hind sight, it is quite apparent that the US and NATO (by the uncalled for eastward expansion of NATO) had deliberately pushed and provoked Russia into the Ukraine War. With some reflection (and purely in hindsight) it appears that a grand design of waging unrestricted economic war against Russia had already been prepared in the US. The aim was, perhaps, to repeat 1991 – when unrelenting economic war had caused the Soviet Union to collapse. That, however, had been the result of a carefully-calibrated, long term, economic war strategy to bring a nuclear power to its knees. It had been triggered by the American induced oil glut of 1986 in which the US had persuaded its surrogate – Saudi Arabia – to flood the world with cheap oil. In that year (1986) itself, petrol prices had plummeted from $30 a barrel to just around $10 a barrel. This unprecedented fall in oil prices had torpedoed and seriously wounded the Soviet economy. It went into a negative tailspin from which it never really recovered. In 1991, the USSR simply vanished without a shot being fired. The USSR splintered into 15 states and simply ceased to exist.

Was that the design that Joe Biden was trying to replicate? If so, the Second Economic War against Russia seems to have floundered rather badly till now. The outcome of this economic war will be far more consequential than the shooting war in Ukraine. At first the Russian Rouble had fallen rather steeply from 80 roubles to a dollar to over 160 roubles to a dollar. Russia, however, took strong and energetic counter measures. They asked for all payments of oil and gas to be made in roubles. Europe was hopelessly dependent upon Russian gas and oil. Creating alternative infrastructure would take minimum four to five years. Despite all brave talk of sanctions, Europe had no option but to keep buying Russian oil and gas on the sly. The cost of the war in Ukraine has been estimated at a billion dollars a day. It is noteworthy that Europe by itself has paid a billion dollars a day to Russia for its oil and gas and this has financed the Ukraine war for Russia.

Economic War and Europe. The Boomerang?

Europe, however, has been hit the hardest. Structurally its energy linkages with Russia were far too deep and comprehensive to be severed in such a hurry. The sudden removal of 3 million barrels a day of Russian oil has caused energy prices to skyrocket. From $70 a barrel they shot up to $125 a barrel. Russia and Ukraine are also the biggest exporters of food grains and sun flower oil. Energy inflation has now combined with food inflation to give a body blow to the global economy that was still reeling from the disastrous impact of the Covid pandemic. Today, the world is staring at a dangerous recession and stagflation. In hindsight, the economic war offensive against Russia has clearly boomeranged. What has clearly been destroyed beyond repair is the trust that was the basis of globalisation. America’s weaponsation of its banking system and economic institutions has destroyed this trust. Russia had a forex reserved $630 bn. Of this $300 billion was invested in US and European banks. America simply seized this money. Will Russia, China or India or other major economies ever put their money and trust in US banks again?

Impact on India

This military conflict is of overwhelming relevance to India. That is simply because over 70% of our cutting-edge military equipment is still of Russian origin. The Americans have tried to ridicule the performance of the Russian Army in Ukraine. It was not incompetence but a shift in the power of the defence over offense that has resulted in the stalemate. Had the US or NATO armies been attacking, they would have found the going as tough, if not tougher. This campaign is, therefore, being closely studied in all armed forces. Let me summarise some primary lesson in the Indian context:

Military Demographic. Demographics is the key to the outcome of any prolonged conflict. Russia has no shortage of equipment. It has a dire shortage of manpower and it is showing badly. Russia had fielded an Army of 1,50,000 against Ukraine, which has fielded some 2,50,000 (now almost 7,50,000 by some estimates) due to complete mobilization. The Russian constraints are painful and showing. It has had to recycle and use the same forces again and again. Due to embarrassing reverses in Kharkiev, Putin was finally forced, in Sep 2022, to order partial mobilization of 3,00,000 reservists. Had he done this at the outset the war would have been long over. He has now conscripted 2,70,000 fresh troops for his impending counter-offensive in winter. This has painful and obvious lessons for India. India has no dearth of manpower but it is cutting down its manpower and switching from a regular full ‘colour service’ Army to short terms inductees (Agniveers). Russian short term inductees (conscripts) have performed poorly in the Ukraine War. We need to draw immediate lessons from this war and take a fresh look at the Agniveer scheme. We may have to increase service tenures from 4 to 7 years and retention levels from 25% to 50%. Future wars will not just be high-tech but high-tech and mass. Seeing the grim realities of the modern battlefield we simply cannot afford to downsize.

The Tank is Dead. All notions that the tank has been turned into a dinosaur by drones, Javelins and TOWs is highly misplaced and premature. Tanks will continue to be the prime platform for offensive action for decades to come.

Medium Artillery. Artillery of the heavy and medium calibres has proved to be a decisive and war winning factor in the new wars of intense attrition. Artillery has inflicted 45% of the tank kills in Ukraine. Before the Kargil War, India had planned to standardize its Artillery around the 155mm caliber. The Bofors scandal badly derailed this plan. We now need to accelerate the mediumistaion of the Artillery with rapid induction of at least 1800 Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) of indigenous manufacture at the earliest.

Air Power. Despite near total air superiority, the Russian use of air power was curiously restrained. Perhaps, this has been due to the vastly enhanced lethality of the AD systems (the S-300 and Buk SAMS and the shoulder-fired Stingers). Russian sortie generation rate at its peak was confined to 250-300 per day. In Gulf War I, the USAF was mounting 1600 sorties per day but against a much weaker and outdated air defence system of Iraq. India needs a 45-squadron Air Force to deal with the dual threat from China and Pakistan. Today, we are down to just 30. This is an alarming situation. We must accelerate our induction of fighters like Tejas and at least a 115 more in the Rafale class. Pending this, 155mm gun induction must be rapidly accelerated to make up for short falls in fire power. We may have to increase reliance on tactical ballistic and cruise missiles to much higher levels.

Drones. Drones have become the new war winning factor. Given their low cost the damage they can inflict on enemy tanks and equipment is formidable. They will have to be fielded in massive numbers.

Retrofitting Russian Tanks. Russian T-72 tanks make up 60% of India’s tank fleet. The war has shown ergonomic design flaws, wherein ammunition is stored in the turret which tends to blow up. We will have to retrofit these tanks with overhang compartments for ammunition stowage behind the turret.

Objectivity and ORSA. It is vital that this seminal conflict in Ukraine be studied dispassionately and objectively. There has been an unprecedented barrage of disinformation and propaganda. A military analyst must sift fact from fiction and discern the truth from post-truth. Only an objective (preferably ORSA-based) analysis will help in separating fact from fiction and draw up accurate lessons learnt. Over 3500 Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) to include Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Iskandars and Cruise missiles (like Yakhont, Klub and Kalibir) were fired. We need to analyse their accuracy and impact on various types of targets.

Nuclear Backdrop. Another impact of overwhelming import is the nuclear backdrop. We find this aspect being recklessly ignored in the hope of snatching some limited advantage on the conventional battlefield. The nuclear threshold has proved to be rather elastic and flexible in the Ukraine War. Despite repeated Russian threats and nuclear sabre rattling, not a single nuke has been used so far. In fact no nuke has even been moved into firing position. What does that tell us about an India-Pakistan or an India-China war? Are nuclear weapons becoming an unusable resource? Or are we heading for an accidental or deliberate nuclear escalation that could prove to be catastrophic?

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“China looks forward to France and other European countries to also play their due role,” Wang told Emmanuel Bonne, a diplomatic advisor to the French president, in a phone call Thursday.

“A cease-fire, stopping the war, resuming peace talks and a political settlement of the crisis should become the strategic consensus between China and Europe,” Wang said, according to a statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

The call came just after President Xi Jinping capped off a state visit to Russia, where President Vladimir Putin pledged even closer ties and hailed Beijing’s proposals for ending the fighting. Xi has sought to reboot his image as a global statesman, with China helping to secure a deal to improve ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia and announcing its own plan for a cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine.

That proposal would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and is seen by Kyiv as a non-starter. President Volodymyr Zelensky has vowed to continue fighting until they depart. Moscow has shown no sign of stopping its attacks, and continues to claim portions of eastern Ukraine and Crimea as its territory after referendums widely denounced as illegal on annexation.

The US and its allies have rejected the Chinese initiative as biased toward Russia, and Ukraine has reacted cautiously. However, US administration officials worry that dismissing China’s proposal outright could send a message that Washington isn’t interested in peace.

Also, Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, announced he would travel next week to China to speak to Xi about the proposal to negotiate a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will begin a five-day visit to China on Sunday, and French President Emmanuel Macron said he would visit in early April to push Beijing to help end Russia’s war in Ukraine.

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Zelenskyy first announced his peace formula at a November summit of the Group of 20 major economies.

The plan calls for:

1. Radiation and nuclear safety, focusing on restoring safety around Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine, which is now-Russian occupied.

2. Food security, including protecting and ensuring Ukraine’s grain exports to the world’s poorest nations.

3. Energy security, with focus on price restrictions on Russian energy resources, as well as aiding Ukraine with restoring its power infrastructure, half of which has been damaged by Russian attacks.

4. Release of all prisoners and deportees, including war prisoners and children deported to Russia.

5. Restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Russia reaffirming it according the UN Charter, which Zelenskyy said is “not up to negotiations”.

6. Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, restoration of Ukraine’s state borders with Russia.

7. Justice, including the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes.

8. Ecocide, protection of environment, with focus on demining and restoring water treatment facilities.

9. Prevention of escalation of conflict, and building security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including guarantees for Ukraine.

10. Confirmation of the war’s end, including a document signed by the involved parties.

In December, Zelenskyy urged the leaders of the Group of Seven nations to support his Global Peace Summit idea in winter that would focus on the peace plan “as a whole or some specific points in particular”.

Russia rejected Zelenskyy’s peace proposal this month and Moscow reiterated on Tuesday that it would not give up any territory it has taken by force, around a fifth of Ukraine, which it says it has annexed.

Zelenskyy has been on a diplomatic flurry presenting his plan to leaders including Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose country has assumed the G20 presidency.

The Western world’s support for Ukraine’s military has run into billions of dollars, led by Washington, and nations have rushed to help Kyiv with demining and fixing power infrastructure.

But response to Zelenskyy’s peace plan and his proposed peace summit has been more cautious.

During Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington on December 22, Biden said in public remarks only that he and Zelenskyy “share the exact same vision” for peace and that the United States is committed to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself.

The G7 leaders said they were committed to bringing peace to Ukraine “in line with its rights enshrined in the UN Charter.”

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said that chances for any peace talks are small any time soon.

“I do believe that the military confrontation will go on, and I think we’ll have still to wait for a moment in which serious negotiations for peace will be possible,” he said in late December.

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