Russia’s Strategy

Russia’s approach to war planning, particularly concerning the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, has often been misinterpreted. The Russian strategy exhibits remarkable tactical prowess, maturity, and calculated decision-making. By drawing Ukraine into a prolonged state of attrition, Russia aims to exhaust Ukrainian resources while incrementally advancing its positions. This accumulative push allows Russia to secure territorial gains and serves a strategic purpose by creating a buffer zone and gaining leverage in negotiations. Additionally, Russia’s strategy of gradual advance serves to root out the potential for insurgency within the territories it seeks to control. By consolidating their positions methodically, Moscow aims to preemptively address any potential resistance or insurgency from local populations, which helps maintain control over the newly acquired territories with the priority of stabilizing the regions under Russian control.

The Russian strategy evolved over the early course of the operation, which was intended to reign in the Ukrainian regime out of its NATO ambitions and the ethnocultural cleansing of the Donbas region, but not to occupy or annex Ukrainian territory per se. But as the narrative from Western countries became more entrenched with hostility and delusional opportunism to use Ukraine to degrade Russia permanently, the Russian strategy shifted to the gradual bleeding and destruction of Ukrainian military capabilities, including its projection of power and threat.

Hence, fundamentally, Russia has never completely aimed at capturing Ukrainian territory in a grand scenario. Russia also knew that such a strategy would be militarily frivolous in terms of tactical, operational, and strategic goals. However, it was also not in its long-term political interests and was fraught with significant risks. Russia is not fighting the war the Soviet Union had during WWII. Neither is Russia the Soviet Union, nor are the historical contexts or exigencies under which it operates similar to or necessitates conducting itself based on what might have been relevant almost eighty years ago! Russia also never had the military manpower at the outset of the Special Military Operation or even today to roam across Ukraine. And it has to preserve a significant portion of its forces to protect itself from potential ongoing aggression from NATO and its multiple allies close to Russian territory.

Ukrainian Forces

Ukraine’s force structure is always difficult to understand because of its tendency to form ad hoc battlegroups and its practice of fragmenting forces into resident brigade commands. In fact, ORBAT and force distribution in Ukraine are in a league of their own. As a result, the AFU’s organization and force generation are often more opaque and difficult to understand than Russia’s, for example. Whereas Russia uses conventional army-level groups, Ukraine has no organic commands over the brigade level. The chains of higher command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are extraordinarily flexible and irregular entities. Ukraine’s entire fighting organization is an improvised mixture and modification around established formations. That aspect applies especially to its highest field commands down to the brigade level. The AFU field command system’s most conspicuous anomaly is its absence of any division-level (and higher) formations. Ukraine started abolishing the Division around a decade ago in a forced restructuring.

The German Kampfgruppe units during WWII were used as a contingency against front disarray, severe losses, and replacements. They were ad-hoc combat units formed during World War II by the German Army, often composed of infantry, armor, and supporting elements for specialized tasks or missions. The AFU idealization of all-level Kampfgruppen is bizarrely unique. That said, the primary picture is one of three Ukrainian “Operational Strategic Groupings,” vaguely akin to army groups. These are, from north to south, Operation Strategic Groupings (OSGs) in Khortytsia, Tavriya, and Odessa. Against these are arrayed four Russian Army Groups – from north to south: Army Groups West, Center, East, and Dnieper. Assessing the total line strength is always tricky, largely because we do not always have good insight into the actual combat rating of these units. However, we can make estimates of paper strength. Based on deployment information from the Project Owl Ukraine Control Map, we can estimate that the nominal strength in the theater right now is some 33 Division Equivalents for Ukraine against perhaps 50 DEs for Russia – a significant, but not utterly overwhelming Russian advantage. Ukrainian Army-level formations are absent because they simply do not exist, and such arrangements prove to be a pressing challenge for any formal military establishment.

War Doctrine

But, as the Operation evolved, Russia rather quickly devised a strategy of destroying Ukraine’s Military and, by extension, degrading its NATO sponsors through long-term attrition, where the territorial battles have been used as opportunities to demolish Ukrainian forces little by little, as death by a thousand cuts over an extended period and across a vastly stretched battlefield where killing the enemy and destroying its equipment is the primary goal no matter how limited the amount of territory actually gained.

As far as Russia’s War Doctrine in Ukraine is concerned, Russia is committed to positional attrition warfare as this maximizes the asymmetry of their advantage. This depletes the firepower of not only the Ukrainian Armed Forces but also of NATO members without engaging in direct conflict with them. Russian Armed Forces iron out Ukrainian defenses with artillery and then push forward into pulverized defenses. As Ukraine continues to funnel units to refill positions, they play into the hands of the Russian Military. Noting the importance of deploying fresh operational reserves as a crucial element of any counterattack, Russia keeps the burn rate at the front high. It degrades Ukraine’s ability to form reserves and continues to place immense pressure on Ukraine and NATO, not solely in terms of seizing territory but in terms of attrition, chipping away infrastructure, and creating a cumulative impact on Ukraine’s overall fighting capability. Kiev’s position is untenable as they may be able to fight effective static defense from prepared positions. Still, they cannot reverse Russian gains or respond to new breakthroughs without a combined arms reserve. Any serious effort by Ukraine to retrieve the fortified cities will divert the scarce trained manpower and equipment, thus squashing any attempts of offensive campaigns. They are also currently exhausted to the point where they lack combat-effective combined arms reserve units. Furthermore, such units have been unable to maneuver efficiently due to fuel shortages and incessant Russian artillery and air strikes.

Russia’s Advances

Russia is slowly advancing on almost every axis of the theater, which has both strategic and tactical implications, as the Ukrainians are being forced to burn reserves while being prevented from rotating and reconstituting their forces, as well as a precise operational formulation. Russia’s maneuver scheme must be kept in mind regarding its minimum end-state objectives: to capture the remaining Donbas city agglomerations (around Slovyansk) around Kramatorsk Although the war and Russia’s military ambitions may not end there.

At present, there are several main axes of advancement: On the central axis of the front, the Russian thrusts on the Avdiivka axis and the Chasiv Yar axis converge on the crucial Ukrainian hub of Konstytinivka, capturing which is a prerequisite for any serious effort to advance on Kramatorsk.

Simultaneously, Russian forces exert ongoing pressure on the northern front, employing a gradual squeeze tactic on the city of Kupyansk at the apex of the Oskil line and advancing towards Lyman along the Zherebets axis. These maneuvers aim to establish a foothold towards the strategic objective of Kramatorsk, contingent upon Russian control of the north bank of the Donets River up to the Izyum confluence with the Oskil.

In the southern sectors, Russia expands its zone of influence following the capture of Marinka, likely intending to build momentum towards Kurakhove, thereby placing the Ukrainian stronghold of Ugledar in a precarious position. Ugledar’s proximity to Russian rail lines vital for the land bridge amplifies its strategic significance, prompting Russian efforts to seize it. Additionally, Russian forces target the Ukrainian-held Robotyne salient, a remnant of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. While these assaults serve to tie down Ukrainian forces, they also aim to preempt any Ukrainian aspirations to utilize Robotyne as a launching point for future offensives towards Tokmak. Thus, these southern operations serve both attritional purposes and the strategic neutralization of Ukrainian staging areas. The overarching operational scenario indicates Moscow is gaining offensive momentum across the entire theater. This trend undermines Ukrainian combat effectiveness by impeding rotation, regeneration, and lateral troop movements while depleting Ukraine’s already limited reserves.

Sustaining the War Effort

The Russo-Ukrainian War is one of industrial attrition – a grueling campaign marked by relentless assaults against entrenched defenses, where concrete, steel, and explosives dictate the tempo. Ukraine confronts a stark reality: Russia’s military buildup nears critical mass, tipping the scales decidedly in Moscow’s favor. Initially strengthened by a substantial shell inventory, Ukraine’s arsenal benefitted from meticulous resource management and international aid, notably from the United States and South Korea. However, sustained high-intensity combat depleted much of these reserves, leaving Ukrainian forces grappling with a critical shortage of artillery ammunition.

Ukraine has sought to expand its production capabilities to sustain its war effort, primarily in Europe and the United States. Yet, this strategy encounters formidable obstacles: sluggish industrial ramp-up, production targets insufficient to match Russia’s onslaught, and logistical hurdles such as barrel scarcity. The United States has fared better in ramping production, slated to deliver approximately 500000 shells in 2024. Europe faces various problems, like labor shortages, exorbitant energy costs, and a consensus-driven decision-making culture that is slow to allocate significant resources. The European practice of small orders placed by individual member states also makes manufacturers hesitant to invest significantly in new production lines. Or, as one Belgian general put it: “We’re in deep shit.”

Ukraine’s ammunition shortfall remains dire even if the USA and Europe meet their delivery targets. Optimistically, combined efforts might yield 1.3 million rounds annually, equating to a modest daily allocation-insufficient for sustained offensive operations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Reznikov’s assertion of needing nearly 12000 shells daily underscores the magnitude of the challenge. While this figure may be aspirational, conservative estimates suggest Ukraine requires at least 200000 shells monthly to maintain a functional military posture. However, with current projections, Ukraine faces an uphill battle in amassing the requisite stockpile for intensified offensives. Artillery barrels deteriorate with prolonged use, typically lasting around 2500 shots for a howitzer. Consequently, assuming sustained firing rates as desired by Reznikov, Ukraine would face the wearing out of approximately 125-150 guns per month. Complicating matters further, Ukraine operates at least 17 different artillery platforms. Meanwhile, Russia’s shell production capacity has been significantly underestimated. Domestic Russian production has surged, with Estonian estimates indicating around 3.5 million shells produced in 2023, which is expected to increase to 4.5 million in 2024. Russia has considerable capability to sustain a firing rate of up to 12000 shells per day, with reserve surge capacity. Even if European production surges as anticipated, there remains a substantial advantage for Russia, potentially reaching a ratio of 3-1 or even 5-1 in artillery firepower. This advantage is compounded by Western reports of increased Russian production of advanced strike systems such as cruise missiles, Geran drones, Lancets, and glide bombs, boasting greater power and range. Recent publications, such as those from the Royal United Services Institute, highlight Russia’s capacity to deliver significant numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, and missiles, further solidifying its military dominance.

The most important question is simple: whether an army’s relative combat power is growing or shrinking over time – that is, whether its ability to generate forces is greater than its rate of burn – can it reconstitute attrited units in a timely manner, generate replacements, recover, repair, and replace broken equipment, and so forth. The prototypical example of this is, of course, the German-Soviet War. Even though the Third Reich enjoyed favorable “loss ratios” throughout most of the war, the ratio of combat power consistently grew in the USSR’s favor due to their vastly superior force generation powers. During the Battle of Kursk, Hitler even quipped that the loss ratios should predict an imminent German victory. Loss ratios do not matter nearly as much as the relative rate of loss and force generation. Estonian intelligence estimates underscore Russia’s ability to continually train, equip, and deploy additional troops, outpacing current loss rates. RUSI further emphasizes the growth in Russian forces deployed in Ukraine, from 360000 to 470000 over the last year, highlighting the formidable challenge Ukraine faces. Russian force generation continues to grow steadily over time rather than merely replenishing losses.

In contrast, Ukrainian forces face increasing manpower shortages, with under-strength brigades tasked with increasingly demanding operations. It’s evident that Ukrainian reserves are dwindling, as highlighted in Avdiivka, where brigades from other fronts were hastily deployed, indicating a lack of strategic reserves. The elite 3rd Assault Brigade was even committed in the final stages of the battle to stem the tide. Meanwhile, units like the 110th Mechanized engaged for months, suffered significant attrition due to the inability to rotate out. In contrast, Russia conducts regular troop rotations while Ukrainian forces remain on the front lines due to a shortage of replacements.

The Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu recently made an uncharacteristically bold statement that the AFU was committing much of its remaining reserves: “After the collapse of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian Army command has been trying to stabilize the situation at the expense of the remaining reserves and prevent the collapse of the frontline.”

What to Expect?

In the near term, one could expect Russia to progress toward the following intermediate operational goals:

•   Developing a concentric offensive towards the Ukrainian agglomerations around Chasiv Yar, Novomikhailovka and Toretsk

•   An offensive along the Zherebets-Oskil line towards Lyman to capture or screen the Donetsk River line as a prerequisite for an operation against Kramatorsk

•   Continued assaults towards Kurakhove in preparation for the liquidation of the Ugledar salient

•   Preventative attacks towards the Orakhiv axis to prevent future Ukrainian attempts to exploit the Robotyne salient

While 2022 witnessed initial successes for Ukraine, 2023 saw missed opportunities despite ample Western assistance. Instead, Ukraine exhausted valuable resources in defending Bakhmut and futilely attacked a well-prepared Russian defense in the south. With Russian force generation rising inexorably, Ukraine faces the looming threat of strategic defeat. To avert this, Ukraine must pursue a radical mobilization plan bolstered by increased support from its allies. However, Ukraine lacks the capacity to train and equip its forces independently. Without substantial NATO assistance, a total mobilization risks escalating casualties without significant gains. Yet, even maintaining current levels of aid is challenging amidst waning international support and domestic crises in crucial NATO member states.

2022 was the year of wild swings as the front stabilized into a conveniently shaped and quickly supplied Russian position, and 2023 was the year of Ukraine’s strategic window of opportunity, frittered away at Bakhmut. 2024 is the year that Russia’s swelling force generation reaches a climax, and the war turns in an evident and irreversible way against Ukraine. As Steve Harris of Iron Maiden remarked in one of the most iconic songs of the band, “The sands of time for me are running low…”, Kiev has almost no time and resources to ‘orchestrate’ (special courtesy Wagner PMC) any meaningful offensive operations. Of course, once substantially degraded, the Ukrainian regime and its allies would be at Russia’s mercy in shaping the postwar era in Ukraine, both politically and territorially. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated that industry, manufacturing & the physical economy have always been relevant, and newly emerging powers such as India must grasp this insight to develop a broadly industrialized economy in the wake of a real two-front threat and a rewarding prospect of becoming a serious global power. That said, the window of strategic opportunity has closed for Ukraine and now opens wide for Russia. In this sense, one must appreciate how a few meters in this theatre equals hundreds of miles relative to the grand old wars of the previous century. The heinous attack at the Crocus City Hall marks the beginning of a new phase in the conflict. March 2024. Not very far from Fontainebleau, a windy dawn at Brussels unfolds skies seven and a half decades old. The sun struggles to pierce through the misty haze, and the approaching summer months carry the weight of a hot war.

The post MILITARY HISTORY: Kursk, Manchuria and Russo-Ukrainian War (Part 2) appeared first on IMR.

Montgomery himself said it best. When asked what it would take for the Red Army to break through to the Atlantic, he simply answered: “Shoes.”

As the dust now settled on the conclusion of World War II, Western European leadership was anxious about a potential tactical challenge – a communist-led land invasion. The USSR had emerged from the conflict as a formidable power, while its former European allies were weakened after the War. Yet, to understand the gravity of this situation, we must rewind our clocks by seven years to the onset of WWII itself. The Second World War had an odd symmetry in that it ended much the same way it started: with a well-drilled, technically advanced, and operationally ambitious army carving apart an outmatched foe. Of course, the major phase of the war began with Germany’s swift devastation of Poland, which rewrote the book on mechanized operations. The Soviet Union’s equally totalizing and fast victory of Manchuria in August 1945 marked the end of the war, or at least the final major land campaign.

To provide proper context, it is essential to tell the tale of the Battle of Kursk before proceeding with Manchuria. In the challenging spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht faced a daunting situation. Army Group South’s efforts to reach the Caucasus had been in vain, and the aftermath of the Stalingrad defeat required a monumental effort led by Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein to salvage the Army. With Soviet forces outnumbering the Germans twofold on the eastern front and having a significant advantage of reserve troops, the odds were stacked against the Germans. The Red Army’s superiority in tube and rocket artillery further compounded the challenges. Manstein’s successful counterattack in Central Ukraine had pushed the Soviets back, regaining key cities like Kharkov and Belgorod. However, a planned offensive towards Kursk had to be canceled due to weaknesses in the German formations further north, which resulted in the Soviets occupying a significant bulge centered around Kursk.

Battle of Kursk

The plan was to have armies from Army Group Center and Army Group South attack the base of the bulge, meet at the rear, and encircle the Soviet forces within. However, Manstein faced obstacles with the mud season halting operations during the spring thaw, causing both sides to pause and regroup. German intelligence believed the USSR could deploy 40 fresh divisions in Kursk. In reality, they deployed 800 divisions! The Red Army planned to fill the bulge with troops and artillery, denying the Wehrmacht any possibility of encirclement. This demonstrates the importance of operational reserves in warfare. However, it is also crucial to note that a clash of tanks occurred at Prokhorovka, where the powerful Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army aimed to counterattack against the approaching SS spearhead, leading to a close-range tank-on-tank combat. However, the clash resulted in a tactical debacle for the Soviet tank army, as they launched an ill-advised frontal assault against technologically superior German vehicles. The technological gap between the German Big Cats – the Panzer V Panther, and the Tiger proved to be serious opponents for the Soviet tanks. Although, the battle at Prokhorovka did not greatly alter the course of the larger Kursk operation, as the German attack failed to break through the heavily fortified Soviet defenses. But this was a clarion call for the Soviet military planners.

Manchuria

Now, Manchuria is one of the many forgotten fronts of the War despite being among the oldest. The Japanese had been meandering in Manchuria since 1931, consolidating a pseudo-colony and puppet state ostensibly called Manchukuo, which served as a launching pad for more than a decade of Japanese incursions and operations in China. For a brief period, the Asian land front had been a key pivot of world affairs, with the Japanese and the Soviet Red Army fighting a series of skirmishes along the Siberian-Manchurian border and Japan’s brutal 1937 invasion of China, which was an indicator of the impending global war. However, circumstances had pulled attention and resources in other directions, particularly the events of 1941, with the outbreak of the German-Soviet War and the Great Pacific War. After a few years, as a significant geopolitical pivot, Manchuria was relegated to the background and became a lonely, forgotten front of the Japanese Empire until 1945.

Among the many topics discussed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 was the Soviet Union’s long-delayed entry into the war against Japan, opening an overland front against Japan’s mainland colonies. Although it seems relatively obvious that Japanese defeat was inevitable, given the relentless American advance through the Pacific and the onset of regular strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands, there were concrete reasons why Soviet entry into the war was necessary to hasten Japanese surrender. More specifically, the Japanese continued to harbor hopes late into the war that the Soviet Union would choose to mediate between Japan and the United States, negotiating a conditional end to the war that fell short of total Japanese surrender. Soviet entry into the war against Japan would dash these hopes. The Soviet Union’s overrunning of Japanese colonies in Asia would emphasize to Tokyo that they had nothing to fight for. Against this backdrop, the Soviet Union spent the summer of 1945 preparing for one final operation to shatter Japan in Manchuria.

The Soviet maneuver scheme was tightly choreographed and well-conceived – representing in many ways a type of encore, perfected demonstration of the operational art that had been developed and practiced at such a high cost in Europe. The strategic plan involved utilizing the unique geography of Manchuria, which extended into the Soviet Union’s borders. The plan was designed to rapidly and efficiently attack several rail and transportation hubs situated in the Japanese rear. These hubs were identified as Qiqihar, Harbin, Changchun, and Mukden, and the aim was to secure them quickly and effectively. By rapidly bypassing the main Japanese field armies and converging on transit hubs in the rear, the Red Army effectively isolated all the Japanese armies from each other and from their lines of communication to the rear, effectively slicing Manchuria into a host of separated pockets.

It is important to acknowledge that the Japanese faced insurmountable odds in resisting the attack. The Soviet force was overwhelmingly equipped with manpower and resources-three fronts consisting of over 1.5 million men, 5000 armored vehicles, and tens of thousands of artillery pieces and rocket launchers. The Japanese were facing an uphill battle from the onset. Imperial Japan (including Manchurian proxy forces) had a paper strength of perhaps 900000 men, but the vast majority of this force was unfit for combat. Virtually all of the Japanese Army’s veteran units and equipment had been steadily transferred to the Pacific in a cannibalizing trickle-a vain attempt to slow the American onslaught. Accordingly, by 1945, the Japanese Kwantung Army had been reduced to a lightly armed and poorly trained conscript force suitable only for police actions and counterinsurgency against Chinese partisans.

There was nothing for the Japanese to do. The Kwantung Army had far less of a fighting chance in 1945 than the Wehrmacht had in the spring of that year. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets broke through everywhere at will when they began the assault on 9th August. Soviet armored forces comfortably overran Japanese positions, which were armed primarily with archaic, low-caliber antitank weaponry that could not penetrate Soviet armor even at point-blank range. By the end of the first day, the Soviet pincers were driving far into the rear. The offensive demonstrated the Red Army’s extreme proficiency in organizing enormous operations and moving at high speeds. By August 20 (after only 11 days), the Red Army had reached the Korean border and captured all their objectives in the Japanese rear, in effect completely overrunning a theater that was even larger than France. Many of the Soviet spearheads had driven more than three hundred miles in a little over a week.

The combat aspects of the operation were ludicrous, given the totalizing level of Soviet overmatch. Red Army losses hardly breached the 5-digit mark, which is inconsequential for an operation of this scale. What was genuinely impressive – and terrifying to alert observers – was the Red Army’s clear demonstration of its capacity to organize colossal operations in scale, both in the size of the forces and the distances covered. Soviet forces would begin a formal withdrawal from Manchuria and Korea in 1946. Still, as they receded, they left in their wake consolidated and well-supported communist political machines, including the Workers Party of Korea under Chairman Kim Il Sung and the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong. The Soviet Union presented something of a unique geopolitical triple threat. In its own right, it had astonishing state capacity to field massive armies and roll them over continent-sized spaces. It had a proven model of effective political institutions that could allow local communist parties to establish powerful political monopolies.

All of these powers had been on full display in Asia, with the lightning advance, the rapid consolidation and funneling of resources to local communist parties, and the durable North Korean and Chinese party states that were left behind once the Red Army withdrew. To make matters even worse, this powerful Soviet expansion apparatus was now precariously forward deployed deep in the heart of Europe, with the Soviet frontier pushing all the way into Central Germany. The fear that the Soviet Union would replicate its Manchurian exploits in Europe became the foundational anxiety of the Cold War – predating both Soviet atomic weapons and, by extension, the fear of nuclear war. As early as 1947, France and the United Kingdom began signing joint defense pacts, which expanded to include Belgium and the Netherlands with the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, bringing about the short-lived “Western Union Defense Organization” (WUDO). It was clear, however, that such a limited alliance structure would be utterly inadequate in the event of war with the Soviet Union. France and Britain were degraded, threadbare powers in no place to fight yet another major war.

The Cold War

The beginning of the Cold War can be best identified as a sequence of events in 1948 and 1949, which together represented the breakdown of the post-war Soviet-American cooperation in Europe and the consolidation of the power blocs that would characterize the Cold War. In those intervening years after the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook a series of actions designed to consolidate their positions in Europe according to the postwar settlement. The US rehabilitated Western Europe under the Marshall Plan, while the USSR forbade Eastern bloc countries from participating. There was thus a certain degree of symmetry as both the USSR and the United States consolidated the two spheres of Europe, creating a sharp split down the spine of the continent. The US intervened in Greece to prevent a communist takeover, followed by a Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet abandonment of the Allied Control Council ended any joint administration in occupied Germany. The situation worsened with the attempted communist putsch in Berlin and the Soviet blockade of the German capital, leading to the Berlin airlift. The formation of NATO in April 1949 was a response to the deteriorating security situation. The Soviet Union predictably followed with the Warsaw Pact a few years later. The Cold War was on.

The doctrines established during the Cold War have persisted to a significant extent in the present tactical situation in Europe. NATO’s expansion has not helped ease these considerations. The balance between evolving military technologies and the constraints of available resources continues to shape contemporary military strategies in the European theater.

Modern-day Russia has overcome its Kurskian deficiencies by arming itself with some of the world’s most advanced weaponry and establishing an elaborate, yet normative means of use.

However, a notable departure from historical precedents such as Kursk and Manchuria is Russia’s manpower limitation. This has impacted its ability to swiftly conduct large-scale Manchurian offensives in Ukraine. This scarcity of manpower has influenced Russia’s tactical decision-making, leading to a more calculated approach to strategic dynamics.

The post MILITARY HISTORY: Kursk, Manchuria and the Russo-Ukrainian War (Part 1) appeared first on IMR.

Zelenskyy first announced his peace formula at a November summit of the Group of 20 major economies.

The plan calls for:

1. Radiation and nuclear safety, focusing on restoring safety around Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine, which is now-Russian occupied.

2. Food security, including protecting and ensuring Ukraine’s grain exports to the world’s poorest nations.

3. Energy security, with focus on price restrictions on Russian energy resources, as well as aiding Ukraine with restoring its power infrastructure, half of which has been damaged by Russian attacks.

4. Release of all prisoners and deportees, including war prisoners and children deported to Russia.

5. Restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Russia reaffirming it according the UN Charter, which Zelenskyy said is “not up to negotiations”.

6. Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, restoration of Ukraine’s state borders with Russia.

7. Justice, including the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes.

8. Ecocide, protection of environment, with focus on demining and restoring water treatment facilities.

9. Prevention of escalation of conflict, and building security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including guarantees for Ukraine.

10. Confirmation of the war’s end, including a document signed by the involved parties.

In December, Zelenskyy urged the leaders of the Group of Seven nations to support his Global Peace Summit idea in winter that would focus on the peace plan “as a whole or some specific points in particular”.

Russia rejected Zelenskyy’s peace proposal this month and Moscow reiterated on Tuesday that it would not give up any territory it has taken by force, around a fifth of Ukraine, which it says it has annexed.

Zelenskyy has been on a diplomatic flurry presenting his plan to leaders including Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose country has assumed the G20 presidency.

The Western world’s support for Ukraine’s military has run into billions of dollars, led by Washington, and nations have rushed to help Kyiv with demining and fixing power infrastructure.

But response to Zelenskyy’s peace plan and his proposed peace summit has been more cautious.

During Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington on December 22, Biden said in public remarks only that he and Zelenskyy “share the exact same vision” for peace and that the United States is committed to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself.

The G7 leaders said they were committed to bringing peace to Ukraine “in line with its rights enshrined in the UN Charter.”

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said that chances for any peace talks are small any time soon.

“I do believe that the military confrontation will go on, and I think we’ll have still to wait for a moment in which serious negotiations for peace will be possible,” he said in late December.

The post Volodymyr Zelenskyy Offers 10-point peace plan appeared first on IMR.

India’s neutral stand is mainly because all the key protagonists in the crisis are India’s close allies. Hence, India’s unaligned and diplomatic efforts. Possible support to Russia might hamper India’s relations with the NATO countries, including USA.

India’s stand on Ukraine has been appreciated within the country and by other countries, notably Pakistan, whose prime minister Imran Khan too appreciated India’s role and policies.

India-Russia relationship still continues to remain strong. Russia has been a significant supplier of military equipment. India is also procuring the S-400 Triumf Missile from Russia, despite strong US opposition.  A new ten-year defence pact between the two countries was being discussed. India-Russia annual trade is also worth about $10 billion. India’s support to Ukraine may mean Russia developing stronger ties with China and Pakistan. That can be a real-time threat to India’s national security.

Ukraine has consistently taken anti-Indian position in the United Nations, be it in terms of voting against India in UNSC after 1998 nuclear tests, voting for UN intervention in Kashmir after abrogation of Article 370 or in terms of selling military equipment to Pakistan to use against India.

India wants de-escalation of the crisis, but only through arbitration or conciliation. Thus, considering all the angles to this crisis, India is adopting the strategy to solve this dispute keeping in mind that any country’s national interest is above the overall global interest.

The US has managed to get most countries on its side, and the United Nations resolution condemning the Russian invasion has been supported by many countries. Countries like India chose to abstain from the vote due to a strong and continuing linkage with Russia, and due to considerations of what such a vote will imply to the geopolitics of the region.

The immediate impact is, of course, adverse due to high oil prices and investor nervousness. India has a very large oil deficit and also a current account deficit. The latter needs a continuous supply of foreign investor dollars to plug that deficit. On food security, India is on a strong footing. Its military capabilities are significantly inferior to China, mainly due to a resource constraint. But the level of preparedness and the advantage of terrain means that the asymmetry is considerably reduced.

The US will soon have to think about the more important geopolitical alignment and strategy around its bigger rival, China. So far, the Quad formation (with the US, India, Japan and Australia) has not delivered any tangible benefits to India. But the strategic importance of India could grow. It is conceivable that in a new configuration, the Americans will value an alignment with India more than the reverse. India, too, has a strong trade and investment relationship already. If its domestic economy shows steady and consistent high growth, it can become important to the US when dealing with a strong China.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng attacked the Quad thus, “No country should pursue its so-called absolute security at the expense of other countries’ security.” He drew a parallel between the situation in Ukraine — according to him, a result of “the NATO strategy of eastward expansion” — and the several provocations perceived by Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. The analogy does not hold. Amid recent geopolitical developments, India’s foreign policy priorities and the ties fostered with members of the Quad are holding fast.

The Quad is a response to China’s rising ambitions, which have manifested in the form of occupying islands and trying to control sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its activities along the Line of Actual Control with India.

Both the Japanese and Australian prime ministers reportedly discussed the situation in Ukraine with prime minister Narendra Modi, and did not insist that India echo their position.

The post EDITORIAL – India’s Balancing Act appeared first on IMR.

Chernobyl has no military significance but it is one of the fastest land routes for invading forces. It is close to the border and also has a 2,600 square kilometre ‘exclusion zone’. The route via Chernobyl is one of four ‘axes’ Russian forces have used to invade Ukraine. The others were a second vector from Belarus, an advance south into the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv and a push north out of Russian-controlled Crimea to the city of Kherson.

Nevertheless, the advance through Chernobyl brought back the memories of the disaster that occurred on 26 April 1986 at Reactor No 4 in the ChNPP, near the city of Pripyat in present-day Ukraine. It is considered the worst nuclear disaster in history. The explosion led to the release of radioactive isotopes in the environment and most of the radioactive dust settled in the forest in the vicinity of the reactor. With the sacrifices and valiant efforts of the liquidators, the radioactivity settled down. The reactor core was covered, the top soil in the nearby region removed and replaced, and exclusion zone established and disposal of the radioactive waste was carried out.

The most astonishing part for the dosimetrist who ventured into Reactor Complex 4 was to find that the core of the reactor was empty, except for the inverted upper biological shield (Elena), ruptured fuel channels and the graphite blocks strewn due to the force of the explosion. Upon venturing further into the complex, it was discovered that the lava of nuclear fuel had melted down to the basement levels and formed a solid mass known as the Elephant’s Foot. Even after 35 years, the inside of Reactor No 4 main hall, turbine hall and the basement are highly radioactive.

The New Safe Confinement put in place in 2016 has drastically reduced the background radiation levels in the area. However, disposed off equipment, vehicles, clothing (firemen clothes in the basement of the Pripyat Hospital), the forest and the soil in the area are still radioactive and not safe to handle without adequate protection. Danger of wildfire, which has the potential to release some of the radioactive dust in the atmosphere, is always present. Radioactive dust contains alpha emitters, which if ingested/inhaled can cause serious health problems.

In the field of nuclear energy, safety is of paramount importance. Operational guidelines for a nuclear reactor are fairly comprehensive covering all possible contingencies. Several mechanisms are put in place to ensure safety. Redundancy is the key for ensuring safety. There are no safety mechanisms for the leftovers of the Reactor No 4; the only way to lower the radiation levels is by shielding. The first and the second structure are important for containing the exposed core. The structures may be compromised in the event of a war or an armed conflict.

The strategic location of ChNPP makes it a dangerously attractive choice for a well defended offensive position during an armed conflict. Military units and assets stationed would be considerably safer as targeting the area would risk causing another fallout. Bombardment of the area would expose the buried radioactive waste/debris which would be an undesirable outcome. Although the Reactor Nos 1, 2 and 3 have been decommissioned, many hotspots of radioactivity remain throughout the area. Risk of Cesium-137 dispersion might rise if any military action were to occur. Apart from this, the location of the NPP facilitates troop movement and the ability to oversee operations in that region.

All parties involved must ensure the radiation levels are kept in check. Movement of heavy vehicles should be carefully planned so as not to cause any sort of contamination. Periodic checks should be implemented and the standard operating procedures for monitoring of dosage should be carried out.

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If Putin decides to go to war what options does he have? To empirically analyse these options let us take a look at past precedents – namely the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the capture of Crimea in 2014.

Georgia 2008. The CIA had started its series of colour revolutions In Eastern Europe to spread democracy. Under that pretext anti-Russian regimes were being installed on the Russian borders. Putin was elected in Russia in year 1999. In 2003, a pro-West President Shaakashvilli took power in Georgia. Georgian territory posed serious threat to Russian Muslim underbelly of Chechenya. In April 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, it was announced that NATO would welcome inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine. This was a clear Russian red line. Russia began massing troops on the borders of Georgia. It encouraged Russian separatists in Abkhazia and Ossetia to intensify their actions. Russian separatists in Osettia began to shell Georgian villages. Georgia now made the mistake of launching ground assaults in Osettia and captured the separatist stronghold of Takshanvali. This was the precise pretext the Russians were looking for. Their troops were in position and, on 8 August, they launched a massive counterattack. It began with a major cyber attack and electronic warfare operations to jam communications. The Russian 58th Army attacked across the mountains via the Roki tunnel and cleared all of Osettia and took some more territory ahead. Concurrently, the Russian Black Sea fleet blockaded the coast of Georgia and Russian troops made amphibious landings in Abkhazia. They quickly moved inland and cleared the whole of Abhkazia. They moved beyond that province and seized the cities of Zugdidi, Senaki, Poti and Gori. By 12th August, it was all over and the French negotiated a ceasefire. Russia recognized Osettia and Abhkazia as independent states. They vacated all other Georgian territory. This was the first war in Europe in the 21st century.

Ukraine 2014 – The Capture of Crimea. US persisted with its colour revolutions. In February 2014, as part of the Orange Revolution the pro-Russian President Yankovich of Ukraine was deposed and fled to Russia. His successor once again began to talk of joining NATO. Russia saw a clear violation of its red line in Ukraine. Russian forces were already in the leased naval base of Sevastapole. On 28 February, Russian troops moved in swiftly and occupied the whole of Crimea without a shot being fired. They held a referendum and, by 18 March, had simply incorporated Crimea into Russia. Concurrently, they backed Russian separatists in Donbas region and instigated revolts in the Oblasts of Dontsk and Luhansk. A number of Russian troops in civil clothes but with heavy weapons also moved into these rebel provinces, almost like a repeat of Georgia. What was noteworthy was the speed and decisive nature of this operation. Russia had clearly asserted its red lines in Ukraine and enforced them in a swift coup de main operation. The US and NATO could do nothing.

The Current Crisis

The current crisis stems from Putin’s determination to make the altered military realities count on ground in Europe. As Prof Meershimer says, Putin is seeking to change the entire post Cold War security architecture in Europe and enforce a Monroe doctrine variant. He is seeking written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO and assurances about non-stationing of offensive weapons in the countries drafted into NATOin the last two decades. Towards this end, he has forward deployed some 1,90,000 troops around Ukraine. Next, he went ahead and recognized the breakaway provinces of Dontesk and Luhansk in a clear escalatory move that underlines his determination. But, were Dontesk and Luhansk his red lines? What are his military options in case diplomacy fails to deliver on what he had demanded? US and NATO have already refused to give written assurances and asserted that Ukraine as a sovereign state has the right to choose its form of government and what treaties it will join.

This amounts to a deadlock and, if talks break down, what will a military invasion of Ukraine look like? There are primarily three options:-

Georgia Redux. The Ukraine scenario today is remarkably similar to the situation in Georgia in 2008. Like Abkhazia and Osetta, the two Russian speaking states of Dontesk and Luhansk have separatists in full scale revolt. Russia has also sent in its troops in muftis inside. Firing incidents have started on the borders of these two provinces. Russia has already recognized their independence and troops have started moving in. In this option Russian troops would move beyond the Line of Contact to the border of these provinces. So a Georgian redux style operation could see occupation of and  escalation in these two  districts . While troops from Donbas are engaging Ukranian troops on the border frontally, Russian forces from Crimea would hit them in the rear. This would consolidate occupation of these two provinces and certain other territories to give tactical depth to these states.

Limited War Option. What next will depend on what Ukraine does militarily. Any military response would provide the pretext/justification of what would follow next. There are two option limited war or full scale offensive. Limited war would see Russian forces from the East making a dash for Kharkiev (former capital of Ukraine). Forces from Crimea would advance upon the port city of Mariopole. Naval landings could be mounted to seize the port city of Odessa. Thus, Ukraine would be cut off from the sea and become a landlocked country dependant on Russia. This option entails fighting in built-up areas to secure cities and capturing and holding ground. This can cause heavy casualties and take a lot of time as cities can be defended street by street.

Fullscale War Option. Prof Meershimer, noted political scientist of the University of Chicago, feels that Russia will not aim to seize and defend territory in Ukraine (as it could get bogged down in an Afghanistan like quagmire). The Russian aim would be simply to wreck Ukraine as a functional state. Towards this end, this could unfold with massive cyber attacks and electronic warfare strikes to paralyse communications. The Russians would rapidly gain air and naval supremacy and commence operations with massive air strikes, cruise missile and tactical ballistic missile strikes. Massive artillery suppressive fires will be used to destroy anti-tank missile and shoulder-fired SAMs. The main attack will come from Belarus and aim straight for Kiev – the capital city. Key command and control centres (presidential palace, Ministry of Defence and Interior, Parliament, etc) would be knocked out. Concurrently, forces from the East would go for Kharkiev and the breakaway provinces of Dontesk and Luhansk. Naval landings would seek to seize the port cities of Odessa and Mariopol. It would be a swift blitzkrieg style operation that will encircle and bypass major centres of resistance and inflict heavy damage by air and missile strikes and heavy fire assaults. The aim would be not to capture and hold Ukranian territory but wreck Ukraine as a functional state. The operation should not last more than one week. At the end of it Russians could declare a unilateral cease fire and withdraw from most of Ukranian territory less the districts of Dontesk and Luhansk, which will now be independent states.

So which option will Russia take? One view is that since whichever option is adopted US and West will impose economic sanctions- Russia might prefer a massive Full scale option to impose regime change in Kiev. That would highlight Russian military power and capacity and would deter any further adventurism against Russia . West has Imposed only the first tranche of graded sanctions yet  and is waiting to see the option Russia will take finally. Will Russia be satisfied with just the breakway provinces of Dontesk and Luhansk (which were never its stated) red lines? Or will it go for limited or full scale invasion? it all depends on  the risk taking  appetite of Putin.

Western Options – Need for a Strategic Response

So far, Western nations have stated that crippling economic sanctions would be imposed and have rushed token forces to other East European states that have earlier joined NATO. Economic sanctions could include:-

•  Close Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. This incidentally would cause enormous economic losses to Germany also.

•  Impose blocking sanctions on large Russian banks, energy and defence companies and energy projects.

•  Sanctions on Russian Oligarchs and their families.

•  Impose restrictions on secondary markets in Russian bonds.

•  Exclude Russia from Swift global electronic payment system based in Belgium. This would be a last resort option.

Strategic Response

Writing in the 11 February issue of the Foreign Affairs magazine, Michael McFaul has made the eminently reasonable suggestion that USA should not respond knee jerk and tactically by offering defensively minimal concessions to stave off the crisis. Instead, President Biden should seize the diplomatic initiative with a grand strategic and comprehensive bargain for enhancing European security. This would be analogous to the Helsinki Accord of 1975. This would resuscitate and amend defunct arms control agreements and provide the bigger framework of European security of which Ukraine per se, would only be a sub set. USA has low strategic stakes in Ukraine and is playing a losing hand.

A number of respected American pundits of geopolitics (to include Henry Kissinger, Prof Meershimer and Stephen P Cohen) have been advising America to not drive Russia into Chinese arms and not take on these two major powers together. In fact, Kissinger had said, “It should be settled maxim of US foreign policy never to take on more than one major Asian power at a time.” China is the real peer competitor of the USA in the long term. It has almost matching economic power and is fast catching up in military power. It will prove to be far more dangerous than Russia could ever be with its economic constraints. It would be prudent for America to designate its main threat clearly. If it is China, it makes eminent strategic sense to seek détente with one while going full steam to contain the other. Nixon had done that by a détente with Mao’s China when USSR was the main threat. Today, the situation is reversed and a détente with Russia makes eminent sense. It will allow the USA and the West to focus its energies on China. The desire to take on China and Russia together sounds macho, but is highly unrealistic. Given Biden’s disastrous performance against Afghanistan the world would be forgiven for being somewhat skeptical. That, however, is the problem. Only a self-assured and confident leader would refrain from knee jerk, tactical responses and think strategic and long term. Where monthly popularity ratings decide responses it would be overly optimistic to expect such a clear headed response from President Biden. Post Afghanistan he has little room for manoeuvre.

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The roots of the current military crisis in Ukraine can be traced back to the events surrounding the breakup of the former USSR. The USSR was one of the two superpowers in the bi-polar era. However, it was a wounded giant that had, in fact, not really recovered from the staggering manpower and material losses of World War II. Its economy was highly dependent on export of oil and gas. America engaged it in a geo-economic competition. It started the Star Wars arms race. In the 1980s, the USA made a deliberate effort to bring down the prices of oil globally by engineering an oil glut. Oil prices went into free-fall ($10- 30 a barrel) and severely derailed the Soviet economy. Afghanistan added to the hemorrhaging.

The USSR was an over militarized state. By 1990, it simply collapsed from what Paul Kennedy calls economic overreach and imperial over-stretch. A superpower went down without a shot being fired and the world was shocked. A uni-polar global order, now led by America and the West, came into being. The Soviet Union splintered with many of its republics in Eastern Europe and Central Asia seceding. There was chaos in Russia and it struggled to restore order.

NATO Expansion

The West had initially promised that there would not be even an inch of NATO expansion in Eastern Europe (US Foreign Secretary James Baker’s assurance to Gorbachov). All these verbal assurances, however, were violated with impunity. As a result of Russian military and economic weakness, NATO expanded eastward in four distinct phases:-

Phase One 1990. Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic – three former Warsaw pact countries joined NATO.

Phase Two 2004. Seven countries to include Estonia, Latavia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovenia followed suit.

Phase Three 2009. Albania and Croatia joined NATO.

Phase Four 2017-2019. Montenegro and Macedonia followed suit. Thus, by 2019, some 14 countries in Eastern Europe had Joined NATO.

President Vladimir Putin of Russia rapidly started closing the conventional military gap. By 2008, Russia hit back hard in Georgia and then in 2014 it captured Crimea in Ukraine. The present crisis has really been precipitated by the clear change in military-technical capabilities, which have altered the local conventional military power balance in Eastern Europe. Putin is now determined to change the security architecture in Europe to reflect these military realities and has virtually issued demarches to the US and NATO to renegotiate the security equations in Europe. He has mobilized the largest number of troops on the border of Ukraine in a clear coercive deployment, a use of force without war to re-negotiate security terms in Europe. If he can do it without war it would suit him eminently. The danger is that if he does not get the outcomes he seeks, he is fully prepared and ready to go to war.

In a clear escalation, the Russian Duma recommended recognition of Dontesk and Luhansk provinces in Ukraine, where Russian separatists are fighting and, on 21 February, Putin duly announced recognition of these two states. Economic sanctions did not deter him as he feels Russia’s core strategic interests are involved and he has articulated his red lines so publically that there is no chance of him recalling his troops without enforcing his red lines. He would lose great face domestically and internationally and he simply cannot afford that. Putin has acted decisively as he is fully prepared for the next steps in the military escalation ladder.

Military – Technical Factors

It is my contention that these sea-saw in the fortunes of Russia and the West can be traced back to the swings in the conventional military power balance between the two blocks from 1990 to date. These were largely focused on gaining superiority in air power and anti-air defenses. From World War II onwards, air superiority had become a decisive war winning factor. The Korean War saw a stalemate in air power and that shaped the stalemate on the ground. The Vietnam War saw US war planes and helicopters taking huge losses (over 3400 lost) from rudimentary Soviet Air defences and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The Americans deeply studied these and learnt major lessons. They began to make a serious bid to regain air superiority. They learnt from Israeli experiences in the 1967 and 1973 Conflicts.

By 1973, low level Russian SAM-6 and SAM-7 missiles had inflicted fearful losses to aircraft flying at the low level to evade radar. Meanwhile, USA had fielded a number of new fourth-generation fighters like F-15, F-16 and F-18 as also the AWACs and AEWs. Then came the precision guided munitions (PGMs) by 1990, which created a significant military technical revolution (Revolution in Military Affairs) with far reaching impact. These enabled aircraft to bomb from mid and high altitude without losing accuracy. Thus, they could stay out of the low firing SAM envelopes. The US demonstrated this in the first war against Iraq, when Soviet-era weapons were decimated and air power paved the way for a decisive victory.

The USSR had imploded as a result of economic decline and these military technical factors added to Russian weakness. Thereafter, it was a uni-polar world with USA as the sole superpower based on its conventional military superiority in air power. Things began to stabilize in Russia only when Putin took charge around the turn of the century. Slowly, the Russians began to close the air power gap with their Su-27, Su-30 and Su-35 jet fighters along with MiG-29s and their own AWACs and PGMs. Thus, by 2008, we once again saw the Russians asserting themselves in Georgia. The Americans had sought to regain superiority by investing heavily in stealth technology and fielded stealth aircraft like F-22, F-35 fighters and B-2 bombers and beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles for air-to-air combat. The problem was this technology was frightfully expensive and stealth aircraft could not be fielded in large numbers because of cost factor.

Thus, in 2014, we saw Russia again capturing Crimea and seizing parts of Donbas. Today, we are seeing the Impact of the Russian S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems upon the Eastern European battlefield. These air defence (AD) missile systems have radars that can look out to 600 kms and pick up stealth aircraft. They have multiple missiles that can engage enemy aircraft from 40 out to 400 kms. They can achieve Anti Access & Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities and totally deny the airspace over the combat area. This, and a whole host of other weapons, which Russia had tested in Syria have today given it the confidence to decisively challenge the USA and NATO enforced status quo in Eastern Europe and seek a radical re-structuring of the security architecture in Europe. This is a decisive inflexion point and the crisis in Ukraine is a direct outgrowth of the shift in military-technical factors in favour of Russia.

The simple fact is that the USA and NATO have ruled out military retaliationand are relying primarily on economic sanctions to deter Russia. The implications are clear – USA is in no position now to take on Russia militarily in its own backyard. This is what has clearly emboldened Russia to exploit the military–technical advantage it has gained in recent years. It has now gone ahead despite threat of economic sanctions and recognized the Russian majority states of Dontesk and Luhansk giving a fait accompli to US and NATO. However, the crisis is far from over.

Russian redlines were not Dontesk and Luhansk but non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO and no stationing of offensive weapons in the 14 East European nations recently incorporated into NATO. These have not been met and Russia, to my mind, will pursue them doggedly. Are we seeing the multi-polar moment?

Use of Force Without War: Op Parakram Anology

To back his demands Putin had deployed some 1,50,000 Russian troops around Ukraine. To cite an anology – it was like Operation Parakram, India’s massive deployment on Pakistan’s border after the terror attack on its parliament. This is using military deployment for coercion. The aim is to clearly threaten the use of force to achieve tangible results. This is the use of force without war. That is what Russia is doing currently. Will it work? Only if the use of force threat is credible. India lacked a clear military edge over Pakistan then and our political will to wage war was very tenuous. In Russia’s case, they have the military edge locally and their intent to Invade if their demands are not met is deadly serious. The USA and NATO have already thrown in the towel by clearly stating they will put no boots on the ground and restrict themselves to economic sanctions. Russia has now moved troops into Dontesk and Luhansk provinces of Ukraine. Should Ukraine retaliate, Russia will escalate dramatically as its military is fully poised to do so.

Stake Analysis

It is simply a case of stake analysis. Russia has crucial strategic stakes in Ukraine. It is the direct historical invasion route and abuts Russian borders. It has vital mineral reserves like Uranium, Titanium and natural gas, etc. Russia simply cannot afford to let it become part of NATO. It now has the military capability to stop NATO and can wreck Ukraine whenever it wants to. US and NATO can do little more than enforcing economic sanctions. Conversely, America has few strategic stakes in Ukraine except to needle Russia and stop the Nord 2 gas pipeline as part of the famed economic sanctions. Real economics now comes in significantly. The Nord 2 Russian gas will cost Germany $270 per 1000 cubic feet, whereas the American gas will cost them a $1000 per 1000 cubic feet. The US, perhaps, would be happy to see a war in Ukraine, which stops the Nord 2 gas and forces Germany to buy from USA. France and Germany have major economic linkages with Russia and are already very uneasy with the US resolve to push Russia to invade Ukraine for American profit in gas. That is why President Macron of France is making the most energetic efforts to stop the war.

What about Russia? Its stakes in Ukraine are simply crucial. Putin has clearly announced Russian red lines. He cannot backtrack. With Chinese help he can deal with western sanctions which will hurt Germany and France equally. The simple fact is that Putin cannot afford a military pull back with no concrete security outcomes. Initially, he seemed inclined to give negotiations a chance. He had written a letter to Joe Biden, in December 2021, spelling out his demands for security restructuring in Europe. In January, he got a reply that seemed rational to the Russian foreign minister Lavrov. Putin decided to give the negotiators a chance. Immediately, the US hardened its stance and began to boast that they had coerced Russia into backing down and that Ukraine had the right to choose its form of government and alliances. Russia simply stopped the withdrawal and increased the number of troops around Ukraine to some 1,90,000. In fact, out of Russia’s 12 Combined Arms Armies (corps) 11 are now deployed around Ukraine. They have staged forward their tanks, self propelled artillery and S-400 and S-500 missile systems. The Su-35 fighter bombers, attack helicopters and Iskander missiles have been deployed. The Russians were carrying out a major military exercise in Belarus with their 41st Army. This was to end on 20 February but Belarus has announced that Russian troops will stay on till NATO forces are in Poland, etc. The forces in Belarus are directly poised to strike at the Ukranian capital of Kiev and destroy the main command and control node. Stepping on the escalatory ladder the Russian Duma recommended that Russia recognise Dontesk and Luhansk. Putin announced that on 21 February, throwing down the gauntlet. Should Ukraine respond militarily it will be the pretext that Russia needs for a limited or partial invasion of Ukraine.

Simply stated, Putin will try his best to get without war the realignment of the security architecture in Europe by his coercive military deployment. If it works, well and good. The point to note is that if it does not, he is determined to go ahead and use major military force to underline his intent. That military reality force is now fully poised on ground.

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The Atlantic Council published a paper titled “Thwarting Kremlin Aggression Today For Constructive Relations Tomorrow” authored by Anders Åslund, John E. Herbst, David J. Kramer, Alexander Vershbow and Brian Whitmore in February 2022, as part of its series of papers on Global Strategy 2022, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The paper offers a comprehensive strategy to manage and develop US relations with Russia over the next twenty years. This strategy seeks to thwart current Kremlin efforts to undermine the international system that the United States helped create after World War II and revise after the Cold War; to cooperate in the short and medium term on issues of mutual interest, in particular arms control; and to establish in the long term a broad cooperative relationship once Moscow recognizes that its own security and prosperity are best realized in partnership with the United States and the West.

Here is the Executive Summary

After the end of World War II, the United States, its allies, and partners built a rules-based international system that ushered in peace, prosperity, and freedom in many parts of the world. The system has come under fire from revisionist powers, mainly China and Russia, seeking to fundamentally change the established international order. This paper seeks to address how to manage the multifaceted challenges Russia poses.

There are broadly two views of the threat posed by Russia. One maintains that Russia is a revisionist power that uses all means of state power, including military aggression, to impose its will on its neighborhood and to undermine US, NATO, and the European Union’s (EU’s) interests in an effort to revise the international order. The second view does not deny Kremlin misbehavior but contends that NATO and the EU have not been sensitive to traditional Russian interests, especially in the post-Soviet space, and have responded too strongly to Kremlin provocations with sanctions, military support to Ukraine, and enhancing NATO’s military presence on its eastern flank.

This paper leans toward the first view but seeks to transcend the debate by laying out a vision for a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. In brief, Russia is a historic great power with talented people and great natural resources. Unfortunately, within a decade of the fall of the Soviet Union, an authoritarian system formed in Russia with strong state control of the economy that directed resources to the leadership and privileged insiders, and its leader launched an aggressive foreign policy. In sum, for more than a decade, Kremlin policies have not been good for Russia, its neighbors, or the West. 

Washington should seek to build a relationship with Russia in the long run—likely, but not necessarily, post-Putin—based on mutual respect, respect for international law, and respect for the international order that emerged after World War II and the Cold War. This is a Russia with which the United States would cooperate on many political issues, and with which there would be substantial economic cooperation. It would also be a Russia whose people would prosper.

A peaceful, prosperous Russia is a distinct possibility if we approach US policy realistically, and that starts with a clear-eyed look at the global system and Russia today.

The Russia challenge is evident in the economic, diplomatic, governance, and security domains.

The list of Kremlin provocations is long and includes military action notably in Georgia and Ukraine and changing borders by force, relentless and ongoing cyberattacks, electoral interference in the United States and numerous other democratic countries, assassinations abroad, disinformation campaigns, coup attempts, and efforts to buck up dictators. There is also evidence that Moscow is likely behind some of the directed energy attacks on US officials that produce the Havana Syndrome. Russian President Vladimir Putin presides over these active measures and malign activities in his quest to destabilize the international order that the Kremlin calculates works against its interests.

All of this is a sign of fear of and opposition to democracy, especially in Russia’s neighborhood. While the Biden administration evaluates the Chinese threat to US interests as its top priority, the Russian threat to the rules-based order, in the short term at least, has been more aggressive and persistent.1 The United States does not have the luxury of focusing only on China.

The strategy outlines the following overarching short, medium, and long-term goals.

Short term: Thwart and deter the Kremlin’s revisionist foreign policy, which seeks to weaken NATO, the EU, and their respective principal states, especially the United States, and to restore Russian hegemony in Eurasia. Push back against Kremlin repression at home.

Short and medium term: Seek areas of cooperation where US and Russian interests may overlap: arms control, counterterrorism in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, reduced military confrontations, and an effective response to climate change. It also includes dialogue with Russian elites on possible future cooperation and outreach to the Russian people.

Longer term: Describe in clear terms the cooperative relationship that would emerge with a prosperous, powerful Russia that plays a constructive role in the rules-based international order. While this is a long-term objective, it should immediately be enshrined in US policy.

The strategy consists of four major elements.

1) WORK WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO COUNTER IMMEDIATE DANGER FROM MOSCOW: The first element of the strategy is to ensure that US allies and partners understand the danger coming from Moscow and work together to counter it. The United States should:

Maintain and strengthen NATO’s defense and deterrence posture, both conventional and nuclear.

• Enhance the already significant forward presence on NATO’s northeastern flank.

• Establish a comprehensive Black Sea strategy. To do this the United States should:

• Work with NATO to establish a stronger and more regular NATO naval presence in the Black Sea.

• Enhance cooperation with and defense support for NATO partners Georgia and Ukraine in the Black Sea.

• Establish mutual understanding with the EU on the danger from Moscow and how to meet it.

• Build on the first Summit for Democracy to highlight Moscow’s aggressive policies in Ukraine and Georgia and show staunch support for the democratic movements in Belarus and Venezuela.

2) ESTABLISH CLEAR REDLINES ON MOSCOW’S BEHAVIOR: The second element of the strategy is to thwart Kremlin aggression and provocations against US interests and the international liberal order. The United States must establish clear redlines as a deterrent and be prepared to act swiftly when Moscow threatens or crosses them. Ukraine is the current center of Moscow’s revisionist foreign policy and needs the self-defense capabilities to deter further aggression. Frustrating Kremlin aggression in Ukraine reduces the risk of Kremlin provocations against the United States’ Eastern European NATO allies and may well prove the key to persuading it to change policy course. The US policy response should involve military, economic, and diplomatic tools, specifically to:

• Encourage Ukraine’s military to become completely interoperable with NATO.

• Increase US military aid to Ukraine to $1 billion per year and encourage additional assistance from other NATO members. Make Ukraine’s defense to a NATO objective.

• Provide Ukraine with anti-ship missiles, naval drones, and air defense systems.

• Maintain and strengthen the current sanctions regime. Impose new sanctions promptly the next time that Moscow either escalates its military operation in Ukraine or commits a major new provocation there. In concert with the EU, impose progressively tighter sanctions as Moscow continues its current operation in the Donbas. The sanctions for new escalation should be stronger than those for ongoing aggression.

• Impose proportionate sanctions for Moscow’s ongoing, under-the-radar aggression in Georgia, and consider sanctions on Moscow for its efforts to extort geopolitical concessions from Moldova for gas supplies.

• Focus on the most effective sanctions, financial sanctions and personal sanctions, on Kremlin oligarchs.

• Maintain public attention on Moscow’s occupation of Crimea, the Donbas, and Georgia.

• Take a more active role in the Minsk peace process and consult with the parties to ensure that Ukraine is not pressured to make undue concessions to Moscow. Prepare to enter negotiations fully when Moscow is ready to negotiate its withdrawal from the Donbas.

Equally important, the United States should respond forcefully to Kremlin provocations against itself, as well as its allies and partners globally:  

• Respond to Kremlin election interference, cyber operations, and assassinations abroad promptly with public diplomacy, sanctions, and, in the case of cyberattacks, counter operations.

• Support the democratic movements in Belarus and Venezuela.

• Provide strong support to the current reformist Moldovan government so that its reforms can succeed in spite of a Russian gas embargo.

Take advantage of Kremlin weaknesses in countering and deterring provocations:

• Uncover and publicize in English and Russian information about the corruption of the Russian regime and order US intelligence to establish the financial holdings of Putin, top Kremlin officials, and Putin cronies in the West. The appropriate classified information on this should be declassified, published, and publicized in English and Russian.

• Enact and enforce strong and transparent laws against money laundering and other hidden channels, including requirements for shell companies to disclose beneficial owners, that corrupt Putin cronies and Kremlin-associated actors use to further Russian state interests or their own.

• Implement the Corporate Transparency Act of 2020 rigorously.

• Significantly increase funding to Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and use other means, including the use of the Russian diaspora, to provide information to the Russian people.

• Pay consistent but low-key attention to points of friction in the Russia-China relationship and particularly Chinese territorial claims in Russia.

• Support Russian political figures, civil society activists, and influencers facing repression and highlight election practices in Russia that prevent the Russian people from fairly choosing their political leaders.

• Counter the Kremlin narrative that the United States and the West seek to encircle and weaken Russia; make clear that the United States looks forward to a closer, mutually beneficial partnership with a democratic Russia that respects the sovereignty of its neighbors.

3) WORK TOGETHER WHERE POSSIBLE. The third element of the strategy is to work with Moscow to reduce the dangers of competition and to explore cooperation in areas where interests may overlap. This starts with mitigating nuclear confrontation and reducing the risk of escalation of military incidents, but not at the expense of strong pushback against Kremlin provocations.

• Encourage NATO to maintain a mix of strategic and tactical nuclear options to dissuade the Russians from believing they can succeed with their “escalate to deescalate” strategy.

• Be open to maintaining and negotiating verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with Russia that also address nonstrategic systems and other destabilizing technologies.

• Regulate interactions between Russian and US warships and warplanes that risk escalating into confrontation. Reestablish the Open Skies Treaty.

• Cooperate with the Russian government on shared threats, including counterterrorism, counter-narcotics efforts, COVID-19, and climate change.

• Work to prevent the spread of Islamic extremism into Central Asia.

4) LAY OUT A VISION FOR CLOSE FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A PROSPEROUS RUSSIA. The fourth element of the strategy is to pursue a multiple-track policy designed to promote a significant improvement in relations with Russia once Moscow turns away from a revisionist foreign policy. While this policy is part of the long game, it should begin now because it will take time to have an impact. The purpose is to start to condition the Russian government, elites, and people that US intentions toward Russia are not hostile and that good relations with the United States and the West and an opening of the political and economic system would lead to both prosperity and security. As part of this, Washington should:

• Establish a framework for more interaction now with the Russian people and better relations with a future Russian government.

• Engage with all major segments of Russian society simultaneously, including various levels of Russian government, the general Russian public, elites, and involved members of the global Russian diaspora.

• Maintain and increase support for the “non-systemic” Russian opposition.2

• Sanction officials (and their spouses and children) who order and implement repressive measures.

• Increase the transparency of offshore funds and freeze and hold the assets of senior Kremlin officials and their associates in a trust fund for return to the Russian people when a Russian government that respects the rule of law is established. This would require new legislation to allow the transfer of funds.

• Impose strict reciprocity in the treatment of state media in Russia and the United States, respectively. If Russia expels RFE/RL, the United States should expel Sputnik and RT.

• Increase support for US-Russia educational and cultural exchange programs, especially for high school and college students.

• Propose track 1.5 or track 2 dialogues on alternative futures for the US-Russia relationship.

• Establish a similar dialogue with representatives of the non-systemic opposition and with the Russian diaspora.

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At UN Security Council, India has abstained on two resolutions on Ukraine in the 15-nation UN Security Council and one in the 193-member UN General Assembly.

In its first statement on the crisis between Russia and the West led by the US over Ukraine, India called for a “peaceful resolution” of the situation through “sustained diplomatic efforts” for “long-term peace and stability” in the region and beyond.

India maintained neutrality during the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014. Alongside 57 nations, India had abstained from the UN Resolution in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea.

The Indian decision to stay neutral has no doubt irked the US, which is seeking to muster global support for its actions. The US has still to announce its decision on sanctions against India for procuring the S-400 missile system from Russia. It continues to keep the sword dangling.

With key strategic partners on both sides, India could not afford any hasty moves hurting its vital stakes.

Almost 60 per cent of India’s military supplies are Russian manufactured, which means it cannot afford to alienate Moscow, particularly at a time when Indian and Chinese troops continue to be in a stand-off on the eastern border.

India has close defence ties with Ukraine. Ukraine is currently involved in upgrading India’s AN-32 fleet as also providing gas turbine engines for naval vessels.

At the same time, the US and Europe, which are pushing back against Russia over Ukraine, are both important partners from India’s strategic calculus. Many American platforms have been used for reconnaissance and surveillance along the India-China border. Winter clothing for 50,000 troops has been sourced from these western strategic partners.

Another concern for Delhi is the small Indian community in Ukraine, of which 18,000 are students in medical colleges.

Imposition of sanctions on Russia will be a headache as Indian procurement of defence equipment and spares continue, apart from other economic activities. Russia is the world’s third largest producer of oil and second largest of natural gas. Most of its supplies are sent to Europe through oil pipelines, some transiting through Ukraine. Currently it supplies one third of Europe’s natural gas and one fourth of its oil. In case of escalation, these would be impacted, enhancing oil prices.

While India has been increasing its parleys with the US and entering into various pacts and alliances with it, Russia has been cementing its ties with China in a bid to be able to better counter US aggressiveness, should the need for doing so arise. For India, the China threat is perceived to be managed well through a strengthening alliance with the US.

Ties between India and Russia would have to navigate through the tortuous ways of the present scenario, seemingly tempestuous dynamics of international politics.

The primary objective of the China-Russia alignment is and will be undermining American power. The US is essential to anchor any effort to balance China. Without this anchor, there is little hope that China’s domination over Asia can be countered. Anything that diminishes the US strengthens China and vice-versa. Russian interests are thus directly contradictory to India’s because the weakening of the American power that Russia desires will strengthen China, much to India’s detriment.

Formal diplomatic positions with China have not shown much difference. Even on the Quad, India still appears the laggard — it refused to even name Quad in public until after the 2020 Galwan clash.

A China-dominated Asian order, which will be the consequence of Moscow’s efforts to undermine the US, can hardly be conducive to India’s strategic autonomy.

All in all, Indian involvement in any form would not yield any positive result. Neutrality is the best option for the current.

The post Editorial: Russia & Ukraine: India’s Interests at Stake appeared first on IMR.

His comments went against the present narrative coming from Europe amid the deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe and buildup by Russian troops at the border with Ukraine.

Speaking at think tank IDSA on Friday, he said, “Does Russia really wants small and tiny strip of Ukraine soil, integrate the country. No, this is nonsense. Putin is probably putting pressure because he knows he can do it, and he splits EU opinion. What he really wants is respect. “

Ahead of stepping down, he called his comments in Delhi a “mistake”. Meanwhile, the Twitter bio of the German Navy chief official handle has been updated to “currently vacant” & the picture of VAdm Kay-Achim Schönbach has been removed.

The German Defence Ministry was quick to disown the comments. German newspaper BILD, quoting the German Defence Ministry said, “In terms of content and choice of words, the statements in no way correspond to the position of the Defense ministry. Admiral Schönbach is given the opportunity to make a statement to the Inspector General”

And not just in Berlin, the fallout off comments were seen on Ukraine’s capital Kyiv. Ukraine’s foreign ministry summoned the German envoy to the country over Navy Chief’s remarks.

In his Delhi comments, the German Navy chief explained that good ties are needed with Russia to rein in China and Crimea being lost now. He explained, “Even we India, Germany we need Russia, We need Russia against China…Having this big country, even if it’s not a democracy, as a bilateral partner, giving them a chance. It’s easy and keeps Russia away from China because China needs resources of Russia”.

Russia doesn’t want NATO to reach its borders, with countries like Ukraine joining it. It wants “security guarantees” from the west and NATO that Ukraine doesn’t join the security block.

The number of talks this month between Russia and the US hasn’t yielded any results. The comments in Delhi come even as the German navy chief visit was aimed to show Berlin’s increased engagement in the Indo Pacific but ended up with his resignation.

The visit of the German Navy chief also coincides with the visit of German frigate “Bayern” making a port call in Mumbai, as part of its seven-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific region.

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