After a long hiatus marked by minimal diplomatic interactions, Pakistan and the US have witnessed a significant renewal in their engagement over the past few months. This discernible reset in US-Pakistan relations is characterized by enhanced defence cooperation, economic agreements, and high-level symbolism. Pakistan’s Army Chief has made two official visits to the US in as many months, reflecting a change in the approach of the US. Unprecedented invitations to a private White House lunch with President Donald Trump and the change of command at CENTCOM highlight the reestablishment of close military-to-military and diplomatic ties. The Trump administration has also recalibrated its approach to Pakistan, unveiling a “massive” oil exploration and development deal, and discussing broader cooperation in critical minerals, trade, technology, and counterterrorism. Although several factors have contributed to this shift, media coverage has particularly emphasized Pakistan’s endorsement of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize as a personal glorification, along with the signing of a deal with World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency firm connected to the US President’s family. Underlying strategic reasons include possible future assistance in addressing Iran if required, changing regional dynamics marked by rising US-India trade tensions, new US tariffs on Indian goods, and Washington’s growing frustration with India over its increasing purchases of Russian oil and arms. Unlike in the past, Pakistan is positioning itself as a multidimensional partner of the US to enhance its leverage, not just as a security enabler.

The use of terrorism against India as an instrument of state policy by Pakistan began in 1989. Pakistan’s importance to Washington has fluctuated—peaking during periods such as the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, US military engagement in Afghanistan post-9/11, and more recently when Pakistan has been viewed as a facilitator in the Afghan peace process. Historically, terrorist activities in J&K have tended to increase whenever Pakistan’s strategic utility to the United States has risen. Relying on US support as a shield, Islamabad has perceived greater latitude to support proxy war operations with reduced fear of international repercussions and strong punitive measures. During these periods, Pakistan has benefited from increased political leverage and aid flows, while militant groups operating in J&K have often found greater freedom of action. The highest numbers of terrorist killings in J&K occurred during the 1990s and early 2000s, which were the peak years of militancy. During this period, a large portion of the overall casualties—estimated at around 41,000 deaths, including civilians, security personnel, and terrorists—took place. In the 2010s, escalations in terror attacks like the 2016 Uri attack and the 2019 Pulwama attack coincided with critical moments in US-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan. Therefore, empirically, the Kargil conflict of 1999 and other surges in violence occurred during or just after periods of intense US-Pakistan cooperation. However, despite periods of global anti-terror pressure, infrastructure and support for militants have persisted in Pakistan, with the involvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in training, arming, and financing these groups.

Operation Sindoor, initiated on May 7, 2025, in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack that claimed the lives of 26 innocent civilians, achieved its strategic and military objectives decisively. These objectives were to punish the perpetrators and planners of terror, destroy their infrastructure, demonstrate resolve, raise costs, impose caution on Pakistan, and thus restore deterrence that had waned since the Balakot air strikes five years ago. India has also adopted a declaratory policy on May 10, stating that any future act of terror will be considered an act of war against the country and will be responded to accordingly. This being an inflection point, the India-Pakistan equation has changed permanently by introducing the certainty of retaliation to every attack. However, it is important to distinguish between high-profile terrorist attacks like Mumbai, Uri, Pulwama, and Pahalgam, and localized, low-intensity terrorist incidents in J&K, which has been suffering from militancy abetted by Pakistan since the late 1980s. These low-intensity attacks, which have been occurring in J&K regularly, cannot be construed as a loss of deterrence.

Now, with Pakistan’s utility to the US having surged, it will be emboldened to continue the proxy war against India and keep tensions simmering. Therefore, terrorist actions below the tolerance threshold—restricted to J&K, targeted killings of migrants, tactical actions on the Line of Control (LC), and trans-LC firing—are likely to continue. The current estimated number of active terrorists in J&K, according to police and intelligence reports, is around 120, with 61 being foreign terrorists. Therefore, to make up numbers, a spike in infiltration of terrorists across the borders in J&K is very likely in the next few months before winter snows make passage across the LC in Kashmir difficult. Murmurs of statehood being restored in J&K are also likely to build pressure on Pakistan to direct terrorist handlers to initiate incidents to demonstrate that it is a disputed territory. These efforts will be complemented by increased narcotics smuggling—especially using drones—incitement of communal violence, and the smuggling of fake Indian currency notes, among other activities aimed at destabilizing India.

This can be related to recent media reports and intelligence inputs alluding to Pakistan having reactivated and rebuilt over 15 terrorist training camps and launch pads within the last 90 days in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), following India’s Operation Sindoor. Pakistan’s ISI and other government agencies are reportedly providing substantial funding—estimated at more than PKR100 crore—and logistical support to rebuild these camps. The reconstructed camps are smaller in size to avoid detection and are equipped with advanced technological counter-surveillance measures such as radar camouflage, satellite masking, and drone usage. These camps are located across various places in POK, including Kel, Shardi, Dudhniyal, Athmuqam, Jura, Leepa Valley, Tandpani, Nayyali, Jankot, Chakothi, and others. Additionally, four launch pads along the International Border in the Jammu region have also been reactivated. The terrorists are apparently using lessons from Operation Sindoor by employing smaller camps of about two dozen militants and dispersing locations to evade Indian intelligence and military forces. The rebuilt infrastructure efficiently supports recruitment, training, and operational planning for attacks in J&K.

Until US interests shift and Pakistan feels greater pressure to curb such activities again, the security forces need to retain and sustain a robust counter-infiltration posture on the LC, as well as an extensive counter-terrorism grid in the depth areas of J&K, irrespective of overall violence levels. At present, there is no room for complacency or lowering the guard, given the improved security situation in J&K. The gains made by the security forces should not be squandered at this stage.

The author is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff

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Biden said, “What I think is maybe one of the most dangerous nations in the world, Pakistan. Nuclear weapons without any cohesion.”

The US president made the comments at the reception while talking about the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and how it has impacted the globe. He also spoke about Washington’s ties with other countries.

It is pertinent to note here that Biden’s comment surfaced almost three weeks since the US and Pakistan materialised a defence deal on the F-16 fleet. On September 26, US State Secretary Antony Blinken said it was Washington’s responsibility and obligation to help provide military supplies ‘to whoever’ required them for military sustenance.

“To be very clear, this is a sustainment programme for F-16s that Pakistan has long had. These are old planes and systems that they already have. We have a responsibility and obligation to whoever we provide military supplies to maintain and sustain them. Pakistan’s programme bolsters its capability to fight terror and terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan or from the region,” Blinken had said.

It may be noted that Blinken was posed a question pertaining to the F-16 deal with Pakistan after Indian foreign affairs minister S Jaishankar questioned the ulterior motive of the pact.

Voicing his doubts about the merits of US-Pakistan bilateral ties, Jaishankar had said, “…Very honestly, it’s a relationship that has neither ended up serving Pakistan well nor serving American interests. So, it’s really for the US today to reflect on what the merits are of this relationship (US-Pakistan ties) and what they get by it.”

Shortly after Jaishankar approached the US-Pakistan F-16 deal with a view, Pakistan was quick to justify it. Issuing a statement, Islamabad said, “Responding to media questions about unwarranted remarks by the Indian Minister for External Affairs, the spokesperson said that Pakistan has a longstanding and broad-based relationship with the United States.”

“India is strongly urged to respect basic norms of inter-state relations and refrain from commenting on the bilateral ties between the US and Pakistan. India also needs serious introspection of its diplomatic conduct,” Pakistan’s foreign affairs ministry said.

The comment on Pakistan comes at a time when Islamabad may be ejected from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global financial watchdog. Pakistan has been listed under the category owing to deficiencies in counter-terror funding and anti-money laundering policies.

The anti-terror funding laws failed to comply with FATF standards, thus, Pakistan has been named on the ‘grey list’ since June 2018.

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The Biden presidency will have to deal with the most important strategic challenge of the times – the belligerence of China. The appointment of an Indo-Pacific coordinator signals the continued commitment of the new administration to managing China’s ambitions and investing in regional partnerships in Asia – including with India. But this will be accompanied by Washington’s need to keep up a working relationship with Beijing. Given the relatively bipartisan support for the relationship with India, New Delhi should not be overly concerned about the tactical ebbs and flows in Washington’s policy – for the strategic convergence between the two is unmistakable.

Despite concerns that may be expressed about what has come to be seen as India’s democratic backsliding, Biden is likely to invest in the India partnership across the realm of defence, economy, technology, and climate – and perhaps even make a trip to India in the first half of his term.

Biden’s Core Team

While Biden’s nominees to head the state and defence departments and the CIA are all well-known individuals, their depositions before Senate committees a day before the inauguration give an insight into the new administration’s thinking.

Secretary of State nominee Anthony Blinken listed the most pressing challenges as rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry from “China, and Russia and other authoritarian states, mounting a threat to a stable and open international system”. He also noted “a technological revolution” was reshaping our lives. If the US doesn’t lead, he said, “there can be only two outcomes: another nation will step in or none will, and chaos shall ensue”.

On specifics, Blinken argued the US must defeat Covid-19, out-compete China and take the lead in tackling climate change.

Blinken also singled out democracy and human rights as central to the Biden administration’s global outreach. Thus overall, while India would be happy with the tone and tenor on China, though what the new China containment strategy will be is still unclear.

The defence secretary-designate, Gen. Lloyd Austin (Retd), talked about India’s near western neighbourhood. While he reiterated the US resolve to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, he qualified it, as Trump avoided doing, by saying safeguarding the gains in women’s rights, etc, must be a precondition to a final settlement. On Pakistan, he seemed to regress to old formulations like underscoring its importance to Afghan peace and regional stability.

The new approach to foreign policy was articulated most consistently over the last year and more by Jake Sullivan, one of Biden’s closest associates, who has been designated as the new national security adviser. A report issued by Washington’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last fall, which was co-authored by Sullivan, gives some insights into the new thinking.

The report points to the overreach of American foreign policy in recent decades and proposes a “less ambitious” foreign policy. The Carnegie report notes that “There is no evidence America’s middle class will rally behind efforts aimed at restoring US primacy in a unipolar world, escalating a new Cold War with China, or waging a cosmic struggle between the world’s democracies and authoritarian governments.”

Biden’s team took charge with the recognition that the expansive globalist ambitions of the American foreign policy establishment have lost much domestic political support.

Biden’s Immediate Actions

For a start, Biden’s priorities were focused on managing the raging COVID-19 pandemic which has claimed 400,000 lives in the US, an economic crisis and a deeply polarised society and politics as was witnessed during the siege of the US Capitol in January.

President Biden’s 17 acts of rolling back prominent Trump policies on the very first day could send some awkward signals about the way the new administration may view the outcome of the last four years of US policies.

Biden’s first actions as president were sharply aimed at sweeping aside former President Donald Trump’s pandemic response, reversing his environmental agenda, tearing down his anti-immigration policies, bolstering the teetering economic recovery and restoring federal efforts to promote diversity.

Immediately after taking over, Biden executive order that will eventually provide relief and citizenship to migrants who have no legal documents would benefit five lakh Indian beneficiaries.

Most expect a return to the pre-Trump era with the US playing a more active role in world dynamics. Secretary of State nominee Anthony Blinken said that India had been a “bipartisan success story” of successive administrations, and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin has also been batting for stronger Indo-US ties. Biden himself is a vocal proponent of friendly ties with India and has been a familiar face in New Delhi since his days as the Vice-President under Barack Obama.

India will continue to keep a close watch on Biden and his State Department nominees who might raise human rights concerns, after the comparatively less intrusive Trump administration.

China Policy

Social dynamics of the American society and the weakening US economy could prevent Biden from playing any hard options against China on issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Biden administration has displayed a bold intent by refusing to be intimidated by China over Taiwan – the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt was sent to the South China Sea to promote ‘freedom of the seas’.

It is unlikely that Biden will dilute the high status that Trump accorded to India in his strategic calculus for the Indo Pacific in the containment of China. Convergence of Indo-US interests has not been disturbed by Trump’s exit.

Indo-Pacific Policy

On its way out of power, the Trump administration, on 13 January, declassified a Indo-Pacific policy it evolved and shaped during its time in office to reveal broad and tough measures to contain China, including “accelerating India’s rise,” through diplomatic, military, and intelligence support.

Broad outlines of the policy were always known, but the decision to reveal it in detail in the turbulent waning days of the Trump dispensation even though the declassification was scheduled for 2042, came as a surprise even amid the toxic pathology between Washington and Beijing over the origins of the coronavirus pandemic.

Public disclosure of the policy will put pressure on the incoming Biden dispensation to stay on course with an evolving US-China-India policy that has progressively gotten tougher on Beijing.

The ten-page document, revealed during heightened tensions between India and China amid a continuing border stand-off, states that enhanced US assistance and intelligence sharing should aid New Delhi in key areas of conflict with Beijing, including over border disputes and water rights.

It outlines the US decision to “offer support to #India – through diplomatic, military and intelligence channels to help address continental challenges such as border dispute with China and access to water, including the Brahmaputra and other rivers facing diversion by China.”

“A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counter-balance to China,” the document states.

Outlining Washington’s desired outcomes, that policy seeks that “India’s preferred partner in security issues is the United States” and “India maintains the capacity to counter border provocations by China,” and “India remains pre-eminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean Security.”

During its four years in office, the Trump administration’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific theater was vigorous, and the pandemic, which the Trump administration blames on China, appears to have accelerated it beyond its initial moves in 2018, when it renamed US Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command in a signal it was bringing New Delhi into the security loop.

The US is fully aware of this and of India’s significance in the Indo Pacific strategy. Biden is unlikely to slow down the momentum that the Quadrilateral of nations involving Japan, Australia, India and the US, has gathered towards realisation of shared concerns and formulation of strategic intent against an aggressive China.

Pakistan

During the Trump era, de-hyphenation of Pakistan from India became a reality. Ties between the US and Pakistan may take off once again. The new US defence secretary, in his confirmation hearing with the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed the need for engaging with the Pakistan military. Pakistan’s geostrategic location gives it out-of-proportion strategic stakes. Pakistan has moved closer to China but US-Pak mutual interests have not changed. The US needs Pakistan for its Afghanistan policy, which will contribute towards an eventual final withdrawal. On the other hand, Pakistan needs US support for its economy.

Middle East

The Middle East and Asia are the two foreign policy theatres which will test Biden. Biden has shown signs of reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and reconsidering sanctions. Bringing back Iran to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will involve a number of steps, including rebuilding the trust with the Iranian leadership that got severely hit after the decision taken by the Trump administration to withdraw from the nuclear deal which was followed by the 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani.

Though there is little scope for a complete revision in the overall Middle East strategy, a withdrawal of support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen is expected as the situation has caused a humanitarian crisis and embarrassment to the US. Facilitated by the Trump administration, the accords between Israel and Bahrain, and Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) carry some weight, but there is little expectation of a major breakthrough on thorny issues like Israel-Palestine.

India’s interests are primarily the opening of Iran’s energy supplies, the rights on development and usage of Chabahar, stability of the Gulf nations where the large Indian diaspora resides and a general absence of violence.

Russia

India’s immediate concern is to see that the S-400 air defence system deal with Russia goes through. It remains contentious in US eyes with no certainty about application of sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The US imposed sanctions on Turkey recently under the CAATSA for the purchase of S-400 missile defences from Russia.

Top American officials have been taking a “pragmatic view” on the issue. India cannot wish away overnight the fact that it has huge dependency on Russia. So whether the Biden administration imposes sanctions or not India has to build its capability. Ultimately India will take decisions based on its own strategic interests.

Delhi’s Expectations

New Delhi is looking at “five baskets” of engagement: Strategic, environment, energy and climate change, digital and IT, education and health care.

According to Evan Osnos’s biography of Biden, he was one of the key advocates of strengthening the Indo-US partnership, especially in strategic areas.

With about 2 lakh Indian students in the US and the Trump administration’s progressively hardening line on visas, Delhi will look towards easing of norms for those aspiring to study and work there.

The US and India see each other as key strategic partners and analysts expect the Indo-US relations to grow closer and become less strained. With the coalition against China likely to persist, America’s ties with India and other Pacific nations, including Japan and Australia, may experience a further boost.

The major policy changes India is hoping for are in terms of software exports, H1 visa policy, minimum compensation for engineers (via which Trump tried discouraging hiring Indian IT professionals). Bilateral trade between the two countries was at $88.75 billion in 2019-20. In 2019, the US was the largest goods export market (17% share) for India and, in terms of goods import supplier, it was the third largest. In April-September 2020, the US was the second biggest source of FDI for India. It’s likely that higher portfolio investments influenced by federal rates will flow into India.

With India focusing on becoming a manufacturing hub, there might be a rise in US funding influx and India would hopefully become the alternative choice.

Defence Cooperation

A day after US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke for the first time with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, on 29 January, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby told reporters at a news conference, “The Secretary made it very clear that we’re going to remain committed to a strong US-India bilateral relationship.”  During his conversation with Singh on Wednesday, Austin pledged to work collaboratively with India to sustain the progress in the bilateral defence relationship, the Pentagon said earlier.

“During the call, Secretary Austin emphasised the Department’s commitment to the US-India Major Defence Partnership, observing that it is built upon shared values and a common interest in ensuring the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open,” Kirby said.

The Indo-US defence ties have been on an upswing in the last few years and in June 2016, the US had designated India a “Major Defence Partner”.

The two countries have also inked key defence and security pacts over the past few years, including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 that allows their militaries use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies as well as provides for deeper cooperation.

The two sides have also signed COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) in 2018 that provides for interoperability between the two militaries and provides for sale of high end technology from the US to India.

Comments

The Trump years have seen two important developments in India-US relations. One is the sharpening tensions on trade and the other is the deepening defence and security cooperation. The Biden moment offers the opportunity for Delhi to overcome the bilateral differences on trade and elevate defence cooperation to a higher level.

The need to take the Indo-US security-defence relationship to the next level is apparent to sober thinkers in both nations but the obstacles to it are not insignificant. There is no guarantee that the US-India positive trajectory will continue.

An essay published earlier this month by Joshua T. White, a leading scholar with the Brookings Institution, details the concerns on the American side. President Joe Biden will have to deal with apprehensions about India’s fiscal limitations, its ties with Russia, its “ponderous response” to Chinese provocations on its border, and its “drift toward illiberal majoritarian politics”. In addition, writes White, the Biden administration will likely seek, for good reason, to rebalance the bilateral relationship away from a disproportionate focus on security issues in order to address a wider array of topics including global health, energy and climate change, and technology cooperation.

On the Indian domestic front, prime minister Narendra Modi will have to contend with the long-held view that Democratic administrations are prone to hyphenating India and Pakistan, do not walk the tough talk on China, indulge in rank identity politics which they expect other nations including their allies to emulate, and lecture New Delhi on human rights, liberalism and the environment without accounting for an Indian exceptionalism, which has been in the forefront of pushing back against communitarian discourses. These are the challenges that both countries have to overcome, respectively, if they are serious about containing the rise and rise of China.

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