1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE is yet another masterpiece in the galaxy of books on military history being brought out every second or third year by the Dehra Dun-born acclaimed military historian Shiv Kunal Verma. It is by far the most eloquent account of the 1965 War and “it sets the bar in military writing,” say some of the critics. 

While India was still licking its wounds from the disastrous 1962 War against the Chinese, a belligerent and somewhat overconfident Pakistan decided to wrest Kashmir from India. To test the waters, it launched its initial military probes into the Rann of Kutch between February and May of 1965; India strongly responded. However, by the end of July, India gave in to the dictates of the UN, and stood down the troops it had mobilized in the Punjab and Kargil sectors in response to the Rann of Kutch ‘skirmishes’.

Pakistan then launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August 1965 imagining it to be its Brahmastra. It deployed nearly 12,000 trained Mujahids in multiple groups, each named after historical plunderers of the sub-continent. Confident that it had the superior armour like M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks and better fighter planes such as F-86 Sabres and F-104 Starfighters, and better submarines than India, the Pakistanis expected that in the event of an expanded war, the Indians would collapse just as they had against China in NEFA three years previously,” Verma writes in the Introduction.

Focus shifts to International Border

However, contrary to the Pakistan’s expectations, India firmly repulsed the attack and cut off its entry and exist points into the Kashmir Valley by capturing the Haji Pir Bulge. Operation Gibraltar thus fizzled out. Stung by its reverses, Pakistan then launched Operation Grand Slam in September 1965 in Chhamb and Jaurian. The resultant Indian counter-attack saw the focus shift to various other sectors – Lahore, Barki, Kasur [Khem Karan], Fazilka, Sialkot, and Barmer – on the international border. With the rival Air Force formations getting involved almost simultaneously, the Armed ‘Skirmishes’ turned into a full-scale war.

Continuing the narrative, Verma writes, “As they had in 1962, the junior officers and men of the Indian Armed Forces admirably acquitted themselves despite the on-the-fly reorganization of Forces, lack of intelligence, obsolete equipment, and lackluster military leadership. What could have ended in victory instead culminated in a stalemate. Official Indian figures put the total number of causalities at 12,714, out of which 2,763 were killed, 8,444 wounded, and 1,507 missing. An estimated 2,000 casualties occurred after the Ceasefire, raising questions about the effectiveness of the UN as a global Peacekeeping body. Neutral observers put the Pakistani deaths at over 5,000. The conflict ended when the Tashkent Agreement was signed by the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan on 10 January 1966, agreeing to observe the ceasefire lines and withdraw their respective armed personnel to positions that they had held before 5 August 1965.”

However, the Tashkent agreement was not without an accompanying tragedy; within hours of its signing, India’s diminutive Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack.

A scion of an Army family, Shiv Kunal together with his better half Dipti Bhalla,  enjoys the unique distinction of having worked in conjunction with all the three Wings of the Indian Armed Forces over the past two-and-a-half decades producing short films on military-related issues. Their documentary ‘The Standard Bearers’ on the National Defence Academy (NDA) turned out to be a classic in its own genre. 

I wonder why Shiv Kunal and others of his ilk attribute the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as the culmination of the ‘skirmishes’ that had continuously taken place in the Runn of Kutch between the two countries during April to September 1965. On the contrary, these so called ‘skirmishes’ in the Kutch region were meant to test India’s preparedness, and were a prelude to a well planned strategy aimed at completing the half-finished job in the erstwhile princely state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Fortuitously, Shiv Kunal’s 1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE by virtue of its rich content has emerged as an excellent text book for the students of military history. Propitiously, the incumbent Commandant at the Shimla-based Army Training Command Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla, a ‘man of letters’ himself, would gladly consider prescribing it as a text book for the entrance examinations of the various Courses as also at the military training institutions like Indian Military Academy, National Defence Academy, Rashtriya Indian Military College et al.  

The Book running into 557 pages including 48 pages of colour photographs and maps with hardcover weighs about a kilogram. Its entire content is in a small font that is not easy on the eye. It would, perhaps, be better in two volumes.

1965: A WESTERN SUNRISE undoubtedly provides a definitive account of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Raj Kanwar

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By the end of November, the Pakistani high command must have realised that the Indian Army had deployed in full strength on the west, its infantry divisions backed up by a number of armoured brigades—besides the formidable 1st Armoured Division. As for its own forces, the two divisions that Pakistan had begun to raise in May 1971 to replace the divisions sent to the eastern wing were still below strength and not fully operational. No one but an incurable optimist would, in those circumstances, hope for the cherished breakthrough to materialise. And yet that is exactly what they attempted—and with incredible ineptitude.

Pakistan launched a pre-emptive strike on a number of Indian airfields—Srinagar, Avantipur, Pathankot, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra – at 5.45 pm on 3 December 1971. The strikes were clumsy. Not a single Indian aircraft was lost on the ground. Within 24 hours the Indian Air Force (IAF) had broken the back of the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) through counter-strikes.

The Indian Air Force went into action later that night and continued mounting operations till they reached the peak of 500 sorties per day — a world record. The IAF attacked Chanderi, Shorkot, Sargodha, Muri, Mianwali, Marur (Karachi), Risalwalla (Rawalpindi) and Changa Manga (Lahore). Over 25 aircraft were hit.

After the first abortive series of strikes the PAF ceased to be a serious air threat. By the evening of 4 December, the IAF had established air superiority.

Land Forces

The Pakistan Army in the West consisted of about ten infantry divisions (two of them newly raised) a few independent brigades, two armoured divisions and an independent armoured brigade. The grouping was as follows:

Kashmir Sector

•             12th Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (POK) Division in the northern sector

•             23 POK Division on the Kotli-Poonch front.

•             II Pak Corps, HQ  In the Sialkot sector: Sialkot

                8,15 and 17 Infantry Divisions

                6 Armoured Division.

•             IV Pak Corps, HQ Lahore, in the Central sector

                10 and 11 Infantry Divisions

                8 Independent Armoured Brigade.

•   I Pak Corps, HQ Mooltan, in the Mooltan sector

                7 and 33 Infantry Divisions,

                25 Infantry Brigade

                1 Armoured Division.

• 18 Infantry Division, in the Southern sector

• Two armoured regiments

From these dispositions, it was appreciated by our high command that the most likely sectors where the Pak army-would attempt offensives would be, firstly, on the Sialkot front, with the aim of cutting either the Jammu-Poonch or the Pathankot-Jammu road links to isolate our forces: and secondly, a thrust by I Pak Corps in the southern Punjab. The latter could be the much vaunted “deep Israeli-type thrust”.

  Indian Forces, only marginally superior, were grouped as follows:

• Western Command (Lt Gen K.P. Candeth).

• Three army corps (Lt Gen Sartaj Singh, Lt Gen N.C. Rawlley and Lt Gen K.K. Singh).

•   Army HQ reserve.

• Southern Command (Lt Gen G.G. Bewoor), responsible for the Rajasthan front.

Jammu & Kashmir Theatre

The first Pakistani offensive was launched at 8.30 pm on 3 December, against the Indian Army’s Poonch and Chhamb sectors. The aim was to capture a piece of Kashmir territory by a pincer movement. It failed miserably.

An “Azad” Kashmir infantry brigade launched an attack against Poonch from the direction of Kahuta in the north-west, while commandos infiltrated behind the Poonch area to cut the road link.

The attack was launched with determination but the IAF pounded them in the forests north-west of Poonch. The enemy decided to call off the attack.

The second attempt on the night of 9/10 December, was pre-empted by the IAF – it strafed them in their assembly areas.

The Indian forces now launched the counter-offensive. A brigade column was moved towards Hajiian to dominate the Poonch-Kotli road. By 16 December, most parts of the road had been secured.

In the Chhamb sector, the Indian forces were at a slight disadvantage. The Indian defences, based on the line of the Munnawar Tawi river, had covering positions to the west — only 50 miles from the Pak Army’s base at Kharian. In 1965, the Pakistani forces had scored a major success here.

The story of the Battle of Chammb Jaurian will be covered in a later issue of IMR.

In the rest of the J&K theatre, Gen Sartaj Singh, the Corps Commander, aimed at removing the tactical disadvantages of the alignment of the Ceasefire Line (CFL), by capturing dominating heights and denying the enemy easy routes for infiltration.

In the Kargil sector, this entailed the capture of about 15 enemy posts located at heights of 10,000 feet and more in severe weather and terrain conditions.

In the Tithwal sector, the threat to the Indian lines of communications from a large salient of Pak-held territory on the east bank of the Kishenganga river, west of Tut Mari Gali pass, was cleared.

Similarly, in the Uri sector, where the Haji Pir salient provides easy infiltration access to Gulmarg, Indian forces captured posts in the Tosh Maidan and neutralised the threat.

Punjab Sector

The Pakistanis made limited gains in small enclaves of Indian territory located on the far side of rivers or obstacles. So did the Indian forces.

Of the three bridges over the rivers Ravi and Sutlej where they form the Indo-Pak boundary, the only one that lay in Indian territory was the Hussainiwalla bridge near Ferozepur.

A small Indian enclave on the far bank of the river was attacked by the Pakistani forces on the night of 3/4 December. Fighting a delaying action, in which the Pakistanis lost 18 tanks, the Indian garrison made a pre-planned withdrawal to the east bank of the river — during which the bridge itself was heavily shelled and damaged by the enemy.

In response, Gen NC Rawlley, the Corps Commander, ordered an offensive to capture the Sehjra salient, northwest of Ferozepur. This salient posed a threat not only to Khem Karan but also to the Harike bridge further up the Sutlej.

The attack was to go in on the night of 5/6 December. The attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Indian troops took an approach along the open and sandy river-bed leading to a twenty-foot escarpment behind which the Pak defences were located, which was unexpected, with the result that Sehjra was soon captured and the threat to Khem Karan and Harike removed.

Indian forces also attacked and captured the Pak enclave on the eastern side of the Ravi guarding the Dera Baba Nanak bridge on December 6/7. This enclave was strongly fortified with concrete pillboxes and bunkers along the bund, mortar positions and high observation towers. The Indian assault from an unexpected flank, after several feints from a different direction, unbalanced the enemy. By the morning of 7 December, the enclave was in Indian hands with control over the bridge.

Jammu & Kashmir Theatre

Pakistan’s II Corps (Sialkot), the heaviest of the Pak Army Corps, posed a threat to the Pathankot-Jammu road and to Pathankot itself. It was important to capture the Shakargarh salient and reduce the crucial tactical disadvantage.    

The offensive was launched along three axes

•             Two striking southwards from the general direction of the Kathua-Samba stretch of the main Pathankot-Jammu road; and

•             A third, subsequent thrust from the Gurdaspur area striking west-ward.

The operation started on the night of 5/6 December and lasted till the Ceasefire, culminating in the biggest tank battle of the war.

The two northern thrusts reached the outskirts of Shakargarh and Nurkot by 8 December —a very slow rate of advance due to extensive caution about enemy minefields laid in great depth.

The Pakistani forces had been expecting an attack in the Chawinda-Phillaura area. The enemy strength in the area was about one infantry brigade supported by a squadron of armour. As soon as the Pakistanis realised what the Indian were up to in the Shakargarh salient, they quickly and sent two armoured regiments (Pattons) from 6 Armoured Division to re-inforce the brigade in Shakargarh.

The Indian attack from the eastern side went in on the night of 8/9 December, across the River Ravi—supported, as were the other two, by armour and artillery. The western-most column reached the outskirts of Zafarwal. The Pakistanis reacted strongly and sent in an armoured counter-attack by two regiments of Pattons. However, the Indian Centurions quickly proved the superiority of Indian tank-gunners over those of the Pakistanis.

The 1965 story of Khem Karan was repeated in this battle — 45 Patton tanks being knocked out during the day and night long battle on 15 and 16 December. Indian Army’s losses were only 15 tanks.

Poona Horse, the Indian armoured regiment involved in this battle, had also fought here in 1965 (under the command of Colonel Tarapore, who was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra) did well in the I Corps battle on the Phillaura front. The nick-name the enemy had given this regiment was “Fakhr-i-Hind,” the Pride of India.

After the tank battle, the three columns moved forward till they were in contact with the defences of both Zafarwal and Shakargarh. Here again, the Ceasefire came just in time to save the enemy from losing those two towns.

Rajasthan Sector

A Pakistani infantry brigade supported by a regiment of armour (mixed T-59s and Shermans) launched an attack on Indian positions at Longewala (Jaisalmer sector) — probably to disrupt an anticipated of a thrust by Indian forces – towards the road and rail link at Rahim Yar Khan. The soft vehicles of the supporting troops bogged down soon after crossing our border. The ranks too got stuck in the soft sand, providing easy targets for the IAF aircraft. One of the IAF Hunter pilots described it as a duck shoot. More than 20 enemy tanks were destroyed on the first day.

The next day the targets were the long columns of soft vehicles.

Southern Command Theatre

The intention in the Southern Command’s area of responsibility in Rajasthan was to force the enemy to commit his strategic reserve, ie, Pak I Corps, which included Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division and an infantry division. It entirely succeeded in this aim.

Following the enemy’s failed attack at Longewala, Gen GG Bewoor, GOC-in-C Southern Command, struck out from the Jaisalmer sector to capture Islamgarh and, further south, along the old Bombay-Sind-railway axis, a more determined thrust towards Gadra.    

Gadra was taken easily, while along the railway axis a brigade struck out for Khokrapar and beyond. At the same time, a whole series of long-range raiding columns were sent out into the salient between Nagar Parka and the railway axis. Special Forces dominated the area, liquidating Pak outposts and within a few days the whole salient was under Indian control. Meanwhile, the column along the railway axis forged ahead and laid sieging to Naya Chor, which was saved only by the Ceasefire.

The enemy reacted by sending 33 Infantry Division down from Pak I Corps to reinforce the Rahim Yar Khan-Hyderabad sector. The offensive-defensive strategy paid off.

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