The G695 national expressway will be only the second national highway through the disputed Aksai Chin region, where China controls 38,000 sq km of land claimed by India, since the controversial construction of the G219 highway in the 1950s, and is expected to be completed by 2035.

The new highway, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on Wednesday, will run even closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) than G219 and is likely to broadly run along the course of G219 from Mazha in Xinjiang in the north, through Aksai Chin, which is currently administered under the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, heading south along the borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan, and down to Lhunze in southeastern Tibet right across the border from Arunachal Pradesh.

While a map of the proposed highway has not been released, the route described by the report will mean the highway will likely cut across Aksai Chin. Its course will bring it close to several disputed areas that have seen recent tensions, the Post reported, from Eastern Ladakh down to near Doklam close to the India-China-Bhutan trijunction. “Details of the new construction remain unclear, but the highway, when completed, may also go near hotly contested areas such as the Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley and Hot Springs on the LAC,” the report said.

The plan for G695 follows long-held discussions to build another border highway to supplement G219 and act as another key artery that could help China mobilise resources rapidly towards border areas. China has also stepped up the construction of secondary highways at the provincial level that will connect the national highways to remote border areas.

This week, Beijing unveiled a new national road network plan that aims to build 4,61,000 km of roads — including 1,62,000 km of national expressways and 2,99,000 km of provincial highways — by 2035. Under the plan, the official China News Service reported, all cities with a 1 lakh population will be connected to a national highway in 30 minutes.

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Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has already shown how unexpected shocks can drive the international situation in unexpected directions. Moreover, China has serious liabilities that could impair its ability to compete with the United States. Some of these have been posited by Chinese analysts and commentators, but others can be deduced by analysis. The most-important vulnerabilities highlighted by Chinese leaders center on the country’s domestic situation.

China continues to face severe economic imbalances, problems of corruption, regional unrest, and daunting demographic challenges. In terms of international attributes, China suffers from a position of disadvantage as the rising power. It has a weaker leadership role in multilateral venues and an inferior influence on global discourse than the incumbent power, the United States. China’s defense strategy has drawbacks as well. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains an unattractive partner for many countries, especially in Asia. And the military’s lack of power-projection capabilities limits its ability to provide the public security goods that helped make U.S. global leadership so successful. These vulnerabilities suggest advantages for the United States, but they also underscore areas that China could address in coming years if it hopes to improve its competitive position. One final point deserves emphasis. The most-critical factors that will determine the outcome of U.S.-China competition are fundamentally domestic.

Which side can build the more technologically innovative and prosperous economy, flourishing and well-governed society, and durable and responsive politics will likely be the side to gain a decisive advantage in competition. A thorough analysis of the potential trajectory of U.S.- China competition would examine such variables closely, but such a task lies beyond the scope of this analysis. The importance of domestic policy should nonetheless be borne in mind when analyzing the international and defense dimensions of competitive strategies.

The research carries several implications for U.S. decision-makers and the Department of Defense (DoD). The first is the enduring importance of strengthening America’s network of alliances and partnerships. China recognizes this network to be a tremendous strategic advantage for the United States, one that Beijing has struggled to match. This analysis has underscored the importance of initiatives undertaken by the past two presidential administrations to shore up U.S. influence and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific remains a critical domain of U.S.-China competition, and its importance for the broader global competition merits emphasis. U.S. policies that facilitate China’s consolidation of influence and leadership in the Indo-Pacific could simply accelerate Beijing’s efforts to challenge U.S. leadership at the global-systemic level.

The importance of areas outside the Indo-Pacific and of developing countries as constituencies for international leadership deserves emphasis as well. China’s cultivation of client states and influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America could directly affect the ability of the United States to compete in the Indo-Pacific. As one example, Chinese success in consolidating influence with vital energy suppliers in the Middle East could affect the ability and willingness of countries like Japan and India to support measures that constrain Chinese power. The need to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo- Pacific may need to be balanced by the need to uphold U.S. credibility as a global leader. At the very least, closer coordination between competitive strategies both within and outside the Indo-Pacific will be imperative. In terms of developing countries, China’s lack of allies leaves it in a weak position to challenge the United States. Washington could strengthen its hand further by bolstering its relationships with those states that have only recently experienced substantial growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Given the long-term trends favoring the rise of the “non-West,” cultivation of support in the developing world appears prudent in any case.

While multilateral organizations and institutions for global governance have endured considerable criticism for their many failings and inefficiencies, this research has concluded that engagement with those entities will remain an important component of U.S.-China competition. Greater U.S. investments in shaping and reinvigorating international institutions and multilateral venues can help consolidate U.S. influence and restrain Chinese challenges. In some cases, this may involve initiatives to grant China more influence and extend cooperation. The goal here, as in other areas, is to weaken the force of Chinese criticisms by demonstrating responsive, effective U.S. leadership, thereby reducing the incentive for other countries to back Beijing’s efforts to renovate those organizations in ways that harm U.S. interests. In terms of defense strategy, the posited strategy has emphasized the importance of deterrence, crisis management, and military diplomacy in the competition. As presented in this report,  China’s defense strategy could expand the geographic range of potential crisis situations and contingencies. Along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) routes and as part of the effort to expand a network of client states worldwide, China has a strong incentive to offer arms sales, military training, and other forms of assistance. Such transactions have been increasing in recent years. In coming years, China may take on even more security responsibilities to protect its BRI investments. An imperative to demonstrate its credibility as a patron to client nations could incentivize PLA forces to carry out more-frequent acts of military diplomacy that coerce U.S. allies or partners, or even to contemplate the development of alliance-like obligations.

These possibilities suggest that the U.S. military faces a compelling need to bolster conventional deterrence and invest in capabilities to ensure the superiority of the armed forces in the future. A focus on traditional deterrence through conventional military superiority remains the bedrock of any security strategy to counter China. A robust U.S. military capability to defend its interests and those of its allies and partners provides a critical source of U.S. credibility as a leader in the Indo-Pacific. A strong conventional military capability is also essential for incentivizing regional powers, such as Japan, Vietnam, and others, to resist Chinese coercion and demands. By contrast, clear evidence that the United States had lost the military advantage could persuade other countries to either adopt a position of tacit submission and accommodation to Chinese demands or step up a potentially destabilizing arms race to shore up their defense.

Ensuring the capability to deter China in the short term will remain critical, but investment to ensure long-term advantage will be critical as well. Sustaining investment in the future capabilities of the U.S. military will be essential not just for ensuring the long-term credibility of U.S. deterrence, but also for bolstering America’s position in the broader competition. Finding ways to better protect U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific but also in the cyber, space, and other domains can backstop broader competitive efforts. DoD may need to maintain a significant presence in the Middle East and other theaters to bolster the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific as well.

Strengthening U.S. conventional capabilities and investing in a technologically advanced future force remain critical tasks. But military diplomacy could assume greater importance, too. The diplomatic struggle for influence and leadership suggests that the U.S. military could play an important role in incentivizing cooperation with the United States and helping countries resist unreasonable Chinese demands. U.S. experience in military advisory missions and assistance can help strengthen diplomatic partnerships and counter Chinese influence efforts. The provision of public goods, such as security for key shipping lanes and humanitarian aid in the face of disaster, can help maintain the appeal of the United States as the global leader.

As the competition intensifies, U.S. military planners may need to expand the portfolio of possible contingencies involving China. The flashpoints between the United States and China today may not be flashpoints in the future, or they may coexist alongside new ones. Scenarios involving Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and cyberspace tend to occupy the concerns of military planners today, but these issues may be augmented by new ones that arise from China’s efforts to exert greater leadership, especially along its BRI routes and with client states on other continents. As just one illustration, China’s willingness to court Iran despite U.S. sanctions raises the possibility over time of proxy conflicts between forces backed by China and those by the United States in the Middle East. The more that China assumes the role of patron for client states, the higher the likelihood that, at some point, PLA forces or Chinese-backed host nation forces could engage in hostile acts against parties aligned with the United States.

The appeal and feasibility of Chinese military efforts to resolve longstanding issues, such as Taiwan, may need to be reexamined through the lens of the broader competition as well. From Beijing’s perspective, the potential cost and risk of escalation in war increase the more the competition with the United States intensifies. Thus, it is in China’s interest to delay the resolution of Taiwan’s status and that of other disputed regions until it has prevailed in its competition with the United States. This might mean that Beijing tolerates a stable cross-strait relationship premised on Taiwan’s rejection of formal independence so long as the United States retains the international upper hand and a credible military intervention option. Other PLA missions may be more pressing for the near term. However, the calculus could change, should China succeed in gaining a decisive competitive advantage in international and regional leadership and in its military posture near Taiwan. Similarly, China may regard as satisfactory a continued reliance on gray-zone tactics that incrementally change the status quo within the first island chain in a low-risk manner while it prioritizes efforts to weaken the U.S. position in Asia and elsewhere. To maximize deterrence and the protection of U.S. interests, the defense and foreign policy dimensions of any U.S. competitive strategy may need to be even more closely coordinated.

Any Chinese deliberation on how to tailor the controlled use of force in any confrontation involving U.S.-backed forces would carry serious risks, of course. The dangers of escalation and miscalculation paradoxically underscore the importance of finding ways for both countries to cooperate and ease tensions as a component of successful competition. The development of a strategy that includes some degree of reassurance and cooperation could help stabilize the competition and reduce risks of miscalculation and dangerous incidents. Moreover, as the international security environment experiences more fragmentation and breakdown, collaboration between the world’s two largest powers could prove nearly unavoidable in any case.

The return of great-power competition after decades of unchallenged U.S. global primacy has introduced new challenges and risks. Washington enters the contest burdened by fiscal strains, domestic political polarization, and competing international and domestic priorities. These constraints raise the imperative of developing effective strategies that allocate resources efficiently and effectively. The derivation of a Chinese strategy can, hopefully, provide a useful tool for that important task.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 1)

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Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 2)

RAND Corpn completed a research in Aug 2020, sponsored by the Office of the US Secretary of Defense, exploring possible international and defense strategies that China might employ to outcompete the United States and achieve a position of international primacy. The posited strategies, although created by the authors (TIMOTHY R. HEATH, DEREK GROSSMAN, ASHA CLARK), are framed by findings regarding Chinese political processes, concepts, policies, and national goals.

The purpose of the analysis was threefold: to support U.S. planning and decision-making, to educate readers about China’s strategy and policymaking process, and to spur discussion about the stakes and nature of the competition.

Here is an Executive Summary.

U.S.-China relations have entered a new phase characterized by sharpening competition. As the gap in comprehensive national power has narrowed, Beijing’s pursuit of national revitalization has coincided with a deepening of tensions with the United States over long-standing disputes regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the U.S. military presence in Asia. In addition, new points of contention, including China’s crackdown on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and escalating feuds over trade and technology have pushed bilateral ties to their worst condition in decades. Even shared threats, such as the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, have proved to be occasions for the two sides to trade accusations and compete for influence. The unsettled relationship between the world’s two largest economies has unnerved the international community. More ominously, observers anxiously warn of the risk that the intensifying rivalry could follow a well-established pattern of conflict between rising and status quo great powers.

Chinese authorities frankly acknowledge the inevitability of competition but reject the notion that conflict is inevitable. This perspective suggests that Beijing recognizes the importance of having a

balanced and nuanced competitive strategy that avoids disastrous missteps. No official Chinese document that outlines a strategy for managing competition with the United States is known to exist. If it does exist, its contents have not been made available to the public, nor should we expect Beijing to publish them, given the sensitivity of the topic. Yet the questions that any such strategy might have addressed remain imperative. How should we understand Beijing’s approach to the competition with the United States? What might be Beijing’s desired end state for the bilateral relationship? What does success in the competition mean to China? What foreign policy and defense-related objectives regarding the United States might China have? What might Beijing view as vulnerabilities in its approach? This research aims to shed light on such questions.

Focusing on the foreign policy and defense dimensions of the competition, the authors propose with this research to make three contributions.

First and foremost, we intend the report to serve as a planning tool by positing international and defense strategies that could allow China to outcompete the United States. Such a tool could facilitate U.S. government efforts to formulate its own strategies and policies to protect U.S. interests. Second, the analysis is meant to educate readers on how the Chinese view the competition with the United States.

In hopes of more closely approximating how Beijing might actually conceptualize the competition, the authors aim to reflect a Chinese perspective as much as possible. Third, we seek to raise awareness and encourage greater public debate about the stakes of a U.S.-China competition that has expanded in scope and complexity.

Because the authors seek to present competitive strategies from a Chinese perspective, we rely primarily on unclassified Chinese documents. U.S.-China relations remains a topic of intense interest among Chinese officials and analysts. An enormous volume of official documents, commentaries, and scholarly writings has examined the relationship from many angles. This literature provides an important resource for discerning key themes and ideas in Chinese policy and debates. As much as possible, the team from the RAND Corporation has sought to adhere to the same authoritative sources and intellectual materials that Chinese officials would draw from to develop any foreign policy or defense strategy document. In addition to these documents, the authors also examined Western reporting and  academic scholarship on issues related to the U.S.-China competition.

As presented by the authors, China’s international strategy aims to establish the country’s primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. It also seeks to establish Chinese leadership of the international order. However, China’s contest for global leadership need not wait until after it has secured regional primacy. The strategy proposes that China pursue both at the same time, underpinned by the notion that progress toward either regional- or global-level objectives could enable progress toward the other. If successful, China will have surpassed the United States to become the paramount regional power and the leading global power. However, China’s international leadership would bear little resemblance to the forms exercised by previous global leaders such as the United States and Great Britain. Exercising a partial global hegemony centered principally on Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, Chinese international leadership would be characterized by a reliance on finance, diplomatic engagement, and security assistance to exercise influence while maintaining a modest overseas military presence.

As posited by the authors, China’s standard for successful competition with the United States thus entails the following conditions by midcentury:

(1) War with the United States is avoided, although this does not exclude the possibility of militarized crises or conflicts of a limited scope (e.g., proxy wars);

(2) The United States respects China’s authority as the global leader, even as the United States remains a powerful, but clearly inferior, nation;

(3) The United States largely refrains from harming Chinese interests;  

(4) China has established primacy across much of Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, principally through patronage of client states;

(5) U.S. primacy has been reduced to the Americas, although it may still maintain a military, economic, and diplomatic presence worldwide;

(6) The United States and China manage their differences according to norms upheld by China; and

(7) The two cooperate on shared concerns on terms defined largely by the Chinese.

The consequences of Chinese success in strategic competition could be severe for the United States. Sitting astride the heart of the global economy, Beijing would be well situated to privilege its needs and those of its clients over those of the United States and its allies.

This situation would likely entail a deleterious downgrading in the prospects for the United States. Poorly positioned to unseat China or easily reverse its own flagging fortunes, the United States could face dwindling economic prospects, international marginalization, and a diminishing ability to shape global affairs.

The international strategy presented seeks to achieve this end state through peaceful methods, although it does not rule out the possibilities of militarized crises or even conflicts of a limited scope, such as proxy wars. The core of the proposed international strategy is a reliance on China’s economic prowess and diplomatic maneuver to put Beijing into a position of advantage from which it cannot be dislodged by the United States. Regarding major powers, the posited strategy seeks to ensure the United States and Europe remain divided in their approach to China while Russia cooperates closely as a junior partner.

The Asia-Pacific region remains a priority area, and the strategy envisions Beijing weakening U.S. alliances, expanding its own network of client states, renovating and leading regional multilateral institutions, and deepening the region’s integration into a Chinese-led economic, political, and technological order. Beijing regards the developing world as a key constituency for its international leadership, and the strategy posited here aims to build a network of client states across Eurasia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Chinese success in establishing itself as a principal arbiter in Middle Eastern affairs, as the main sponsor of Africa’s economic development, and as a major partner in Latin America could result in a severe weakening in the strategic position of the United States as a global leader and undercut its position in the Indo-Pacific theater as well. In the multilateral domain, the strategy envisions a broad effort to shape rules, norms, and agendas to favor the interests of China and its clients at the expense of the United States.

Beijing’s global governance strategy similarly aims to bolster China’s influence and delegitimize that of the United States in appropriate venues. For each section of this chapter, the authors have proposed objectives for the 2035 time frame that could guide the development of relevant criteria against which China’s progress could be assessed. An appendix offers some sample subobjectives that could be used to evaluate Chinese progress toward relevant objectives.

Defense strategy plays an important but supplementary role to the proposed Chinese international strategy. A complementary defense strategy would aim to constrain Washington’s ability to forestall or prevent its own eclipse by building a superior Chinese military that renders the risks of military conflict intolerably high in the Asia-Pacific theater. The defense strategy also aims to deter the United States from challenging China in any contingency along its periphery and provide support to gray-zone activities that incrementally change the status quo at the expense of the United States and its allies. A major military responsibility would be to support diplomatic efforts to shape a favorable international environment by building strong security ties with client states and discrediting or weakening the appeal of the United States as an alternative. The defense strategy also raises the possibility of engaging in proxy or other more-limited conflicts to protect the interests of client states and demonstrate the superiority of Chinese power. To address concerns about the risks of miscalculation and escalation in any incident involving the United States, however, the defense strategy emphasizes the importance of preventing conflict, managing crisis, and strict control of military forces by civilian authorities in any contingency. At the same time, the strategy leaves open the possibility for cooperation with the U.S. military on shared security threats. The strategies depicted in this research should not be construed as predictions of how the competition may evolve. Whether China can prevail is hardly predetermined, and the United States continues to enjoy many strategic advantages. The outlook is further complicated by the sheer variety and types of factors—some of which may not be well understood today—that could affect the trajectory of the competition.

Read Also:- China’s Quest for Global Primacy (Part 2)

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Calls for Jihad against China have resurfaced in the Jihadist world. As Taliban strives to gain brownie points in the good books of the Chinese, the Islamic Khorasan (IS-K) and various jihadi affiliates have called for a jihad on China. These calls for jihad came to light, owing to the Chinese government`s treatment of the Uyghurs and Muslims in the Xingjian Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China.

This became even more apparent, when IS-K claimed responsibility for series of attacks, such as the one on a Shia Mosque in Kunduz province on October 8th and second on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar on October 15th. Both attacks were publicly claimed by IS-K. In the wake of such attacks, IS-K called for “Jihad against China” and declared war on Taliban.

Apart from the growing rivalry between IS-K and Taliban over each other’s dominance in the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia, IS-K views Taliban as a traitor to Islam. IS-K believes the Taliban to be a Chinese appeaser rather than a fighter of Islam. This aggression against Taliban, also stems from Taliban`s supposed willingness to deport the Uyghurs from Afghanistan to China, upon the request of the latter. The IS-K supports the Uyghur fighters and also provides safe havens to them. It’s expected that Taliban`s courteousness to China will be received with disapproval of the jihadi affiliates in the region.

The most important factor derived from the recent IS-K orchestrated attacks is that the IS modus operandi has shifted. It has employed a hands-on stance against China compared to its previous not so provocative approach.

Following the Kunduz attack, ISK confirmed the mobilization of Uyghurs. This was the first time when the alliance between IS-K and Uyghurs was affirmed by IS-K on all media platforms. Previously, the Uyghurs were used as anonymous entities in both physical and propaganda warfare by the IS-K. The current proclamation by IS-K, has marked a foreseeable and an imminent threat towards China.

The Kunduz attack by itself pronounced IS-K’s intention at creating a wedge between China and the Taliban. The Kunduz attack came at a critical juncture, when China called for Taliban to sever its ties with Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). TIP has served as a close ally of Taliban and performed most activities under the guidance and approval of the Taliban. After the capture of Kabul, TIP lauded Taliban`s victory and called it “the restoration of Islamic Emirate”. While TIP may share strong allegiance towards Taliban, its resentment towards China cannot be dispelled. After exiting the war theatre, Taliban has been struggling with setting a working administrative, economic and political structure, while still focussing on how it wants to balance its narratives and beliefs socially. In order to be recognized as a legitimate Afghan state under the Taliban rule, the approval and nods of various surrounding nations is imperative for the Taliban.

Taliban now faces the challenge of appeasing nations like China, on whom it first declared war versus the loyalist jihadi groups, who fought beside them for years against nations like China. The displacements of the Chinese Muslim citizens, their killings and also the concentration camps for Uyghur for the so called “rehabilitation against jihadism” conducted by China, spells top priority on the list of most jihadists (who view themselves as saviours of Islam). So, any alliance with China is regarded by the jihadists as “bloodying” of one`s own hands with the blood of their people.

The possible re-emergence of TIP, therefore also becomes a security concern for China and especially when IS-K and AL Qaeda have declared Jihad on China.

In the light of such development, in the IS propaganda magazine “Voice of Hind”, IS-K has asked to avenge the deaths and treatments of all Muslims, who they believe have been murdered, tortured and sexually exploited by the Chinese. By doing so, they believe “to put the light of Islam in China”.

The Jihadist spider spins its web around China

For years the Islamic State has tried to use Afghanistan as a spring board to launch its own Jihad in the region. The current circumstances provide a perfect opportunity to monopolize and expand the jihad in the Indian subcontinent and in areas surrounding Afghanistan. By becoming the de-facto voice of Uyghurs, the ISK hopes to be the voice of Jihad in Central Asia.

Having a concurring view with the world in regards to the treatment meted out to the Chinese Muslims by Beijing, the IS-K has managed to strengthen its image as a saviour in some jihadist circles with apparent loss of face for China.

 In July 2014, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, named China “first” amongst the 20 listed countries to wage Jihad on and as a location to establish the caliphate. The focus was on the “extreme torture and degradation of Muslims in East Turkmenistan” (Xingjian province in China). This was followed with propaganda videos, audios and print materials in support of the Uyghurs by the Isis Central (parent body of IS).

In 2014, following Baghdadi’s call for jihad on China, Al Qaeda also declared war on China. In its magazine “Resurgence”, it critically outlined China`s Uyghur policies.

With the Jihadist world gaining momentum to wage Jihad on China, the pressure to recruit the locals and fighters from Central Asia became a priority. Since then, IS- Central and Islamic state Khorasan (IS-K) have both simultaneously tried to recruit Asian fighters from Central Asia. Over the years, several Chinese jihadists have joined the ranks of IS in Syria, while some were also invited to coalesce with IS. While the IS central were initially focused on negotiating with ETIM, the Huis who itched for mobilization of Hui insurgency in China also aligned with IS-K. IS used this opportunity to establish an ad-hoc group – The Gansu Hui Group.

The founder of the Gansu Hui, Abu Abdul Ali Turkistani travelled to Pakistan to form a new group, which was tasked with recruiting Chinese Muslims. The Gansu Hui group, though not recognized as the “component” IS group, was eventually acknowledged under ISK by the parent IS central. Despite being called Gansu Hui group; it doesn’t field a majority of Gansu members and compliments a large number of Uyghurs. The group since its conception has brokered many negotiations and talks with the Chinese Muslims, ETIM, IJU and IMU and also Al Qaeda. An intricate yet a complex web of a jihadist network was spun with in and around China. By 2014, the Afghan authorities had already identified IS as a threat, however no efforts were made by China to participate actively with the Anti-ISIS Afghan authorities or the US led coalition forces. This catered to more jihadi affiliates associating without joining or being consolidated within IS such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajikistan), Islamic Jihadi Union (IJU), Islamic Movement of Turkmenistan (IMT), East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement 9ETIM), Harkat Islami Tajikistan and Islamic Jihad Renaissance party of Tajikistan (IJRPT)

During this phase, many outfits such as IJRPT strengthened their ties with IS, while AQ was clearly side-lined. By 2016, IS-K had a major influence in the decision making of IJRPT and had doubled its funding to the outfit compared to IMU, who was also funding IJRPT. It was safe to assume, IJRPT functioned like an auxiliary branch for ISK.

In the following years, IMU also forged an alliance with IS. Prior to the official announcement made by its leader, Osman Ghazi in 2015, IMU had already started supporting IS-K while it continued to receive funding from Al Qaeda. It avoided most Taliban propagandas and even refused to openly raise the issue of disappearance of Mullah Omar (co-founder of Taliban) in 2011.

It is apparent, the declining credibility of Taliban can also be linked to the lack of confidence which most groups felt in regards to the Taliban`s Quetta Shura. The leader of the Quetta Shura was far from present and the orders received by the outfits came from the Peshawar Shura and Miran Miah Shura. This reduced the influence of the Quetta Shura, whose workings presented to be unreliable, eventually losing the jihadi faith in the workings of Taliban. As a result, most jihadi networks aligned themselves with the IS-K.

 Importantly, Taliban suggesting the ban of outfits like IMU also triggered many jihadist outfits, especially IS-K who shares strong alliance with IMU.

However as of 2017, IMU splintered off, the Osman Ghazi group was absorbed by IS-K, while the mainstream IMU partially merged with IS-K and there were also others who have remained pro Al Qaeda and served Al Qaeda interests. Despite the developments, it is reported that IS-K managed to increase in cadre as of August 15th following the US exit from Afghanistan. Many fighters from Taliban, owing to the reasons mentioned above and the soldiers from Afghan forces, who remained unemployed and left to be hunted by Taliban are seen seeking employment with IS-K. This provides a great threat.

A militarily trained soldier or an intelligence officer with an acumen for waging warfare in the Afghan topography, will provide a strong resistance against any security force combatting terrorism in this region.

Many Islamic nations, who are assumed to covertly fund and train fighters for jihad are also using their stature to keep the power play going against China, regardless of the repercussions on the Afghan soil.

Over the years, China has blamed Turkey for having done nothing to prevent the resupply of fighters to ISIS and for aiding the Chinese Uyghurs to transit into Syria and Iraq to train with the Al Qaeda, ISIS and other Jihadi Affiliates.

Beijing believes, Turkey has its links with the East Turkestan Movement (ETIM) and East Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association and for the terror attacks on the Chinese.

Jacob Zenn, a counter terrorism expert also pointed the Turkish Links to the Uyghur terrorism group called Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), which is known to run its network in Istanbul for recruitment of the Chinese Islamic fighters against China.

Despite all the allegations against Turkey, its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed a shocking attitude recently.

Erdogan is known to have a staunch stand against the mistreatment of Muslims and the rise of Islamophobia. In the view of the anti-China protesting Uighur community in Turkey, the Turkish President remained silent on the atrocities inflicted on the Uyghurs by China.

In the past, Erdogan gained fame for lambasting the west for its insensitivity to the Muslims, the current change of heart seemed to have baffled some. It appears, the Turkish president`s voice of reason like many remains selective when it affects the geopolitical and economic interests of Turkey, especially in the face of the Chinese fury. This incident has raised many questions in regards to Erdogan ‘s loyalty to the Muslim populous versus his boot licking attitude towards China.

It is evident, all central Asian groups have been drawn to ISIS`s commitment to Jihad. As long as AQ also continues to fund some outfits, the output would heavily be determined based on priority, while postponing the Jihad in Central Asia to some extent. But this may be debatable in recent future, given how fastidiously and quickly outfits like IS-K has been progressing with many donors queued to finance it. As for China, the jihadi spider has spared no effort in weaving its threads to against China.

It remains yet to be seen how China will actively participate in the “war on terror” or continue to fund and support nations like Pakistan who are the terror factories of such jihadist designs.

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China is keeping a hawkish eye on the mineral resources in Afghanistan, especially on lithium and copper. Also, China wants to ensure the security of 60,000 Chinese present in Pakistan for the project linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Beijing Meet

Meanwhile, suggesting a willingness to cooperate, Wang Yi hosted a nine-member Taliban delegation, led by the head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, on July 28 in Tianjin. That the meeting preceding the Taliban victory must have been used to discuss a concrete roadmap for the Taliban. Praising them as “an important military and political force”, Wang Yi urged them to “make a clean break with all terrorist organisations, including the ETIM” and attack them resolutely and effectively. Replying, Baradar hoped for Chinese assistance in reconstruction efforts and assured the Taliban will “never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China.” He apparently sidestepped specific mention of the ETIM.

Diplomatic Moves

Within days of the Taliban taking over Kabul, the Chinese foreign ministry said the current Taliban appeared more “clear-headed and rational” than they were when they were in power from 1996 to 2001. Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen told Chinese national broadcaster China CGTN TV that China cold play a big role in the “rebuilding, rehabilitation, reconstruction of Afghanistan.”

China hopes the Afghan Taliban can unite with other political parties and with all ethnic groups and build a political framework in keeping with national conditions that is broadly inclusive and will lay the foundation for enduring peace,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said after the Taliban took over.

Nervous About Instability

As one of six countries on its border, China has had years to engage inside Afghanistan. Now the landlocked country is even more unstable and without an external presence like U.S. and NATO troops to provide security guarantees.

It sees the success of a radical Islamist movement in Afghanistan as an inherent threat, leaving it even less likely to want to invest in the kind of infrastructure that might open up an already dangerous borderland even further.

Pakistan has deep ties with the Taliban and has long played the role of intermediary with Beijing. Whenever terrorist groups with links with the Taliban have targeted Chinese nationals and projects – in Pakistan, Beijing pressed Islamabad to find those responsible. China has never been fully confident that Pakistan had a real handle on these insurgent groups

China has all along opposed the various UN resolutions and pleas by several global powers to designate the JeM as a global terrorist organization. By implication, therefore, it can be said that China has been supportive of terror groups patronized by Pakistan for cross-border terrorism, targeting India in particular.

China wants to leverage its stranglehold over the Taliban leadership and control Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to remain a prime mover in the Afghanistan scheme of things.

Concerns About Xinjiang

Beijing is more concerned that terrorist insurgencies do not spill over into its Xinjiang province, where international human rights organizations and countries like the U.S. and U.K. say China is committing widespread abuses against the local Muslim Uyghur population. Beijing has consistently denied these claims.

Afghanistan could become a potential haven for the Uyghur extremist group, which could retaliate against the “widespread repression of Uyghurs.” Instances of Islamic extremist-linked violence have also occurred in other Muslim-dominated pockets in China, like the Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region and Yunnan.

Chinese intelligence is aware that Uyghurs have been trained at Al Qaeda training camps in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan and of their presence among the Taliban.

The Taliban’s Chechen, Uzbek, Tajik, Uyghur and other fighters are, however, motivated by jihad, adventure, power and cash. Their victory will attract many others from around the world. They are unlikely to agree to halt the bid to expand their Emirate. Chinese analysts are also apprehensive that China’s problems will increase as the US will now focus its attention on containing China and its rise.

Mineral Rich Country

Afghanistan is home to the world’s largest reserves of lithium – the key ingredient of the large-capacity lithium-ion batteries that are widely used in electric vehicles and the renewable energy industry. And since China dominates Lithium-Ion Battery Production worldwide, it may seek long-term a contract with the Taliban to develop Afghanistan’s massive untapped lithium reserves in return for mining rights and ownership arrangements.

Afghanistan is also rich in several other resources such as gold, oil, bauxite, rare earths, chromium, copper, natural gas, uranium, coal, iron ore, lead, zinc, gemstones, talc, sulphur, travertine, gypsum and marble.

But even though Chinese companies (and mining companies in general) have a higher-than-average tolerance for risk, few have made the decision to enter the market in the war-torn nation.

China has already been burned by failed investments in Afghanistan, most notably the copper project at Mes Aynak, which sits just 25 miles (40 kilometers) outside Kabul. The Taliban had made specific commitments not to attack the mine, but even then, China decided to discontinue its operations.

Belt and Road Projects

Afghanistan’s stability is key to protecting the approximately $60 billion in Belt and Road projects in neighboring Pakistan that provide an overland route to the Indian Ocean.

Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid, on 6 September, expressed that the group “desires” to join the CPEC. CPEC is a part of China’s most ambitious project ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, aimed at renewing the country’s historic trade routes in the coastal countries of south-east Asia. With CPEC, Beijing aims to expand its influence in Pakistan and across Central and South Asia in order to counter the influence of the United States and India.

China’s BRI could get more reach if it able to extend the initiative from Pakistan to Afghanistan, with a Peshawar-to-Kabul motorway. The road, which is already being discussed, would create a much shorter land route for faster and convenient access to markets in the Middle East for Chinese goods. A new route through Kabul would also render India’s reluctance to join BRI less consequential.

American Air Bases and Equipment

In what could have serious security implications for India, the Taliban could hand over the Bagram airbase to China and Kandahar base to Pakistan for operational purposes. America’s former envoy to the United Nations Nikki Haley told Fox News, on 1 September, “We need to watch China, because I think you are going to see China make a move for Bagram Air Force Base.”

While a team of aeronautical engineers of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had inspected all the five airbases in Afghanistan, including Kandahar, Bagram and Kabul, a delegation of Chinese leaders held a meeting with the Taliban top hierarchy to discuss various security-related issues, including the possible takeover of the Bagram military airfield, sources connected to the ongoing developments said.

The military hardware left behind in Afghanistan by the US could potentially lead to arms proliferation in entire Asia and beyond. Tanks and special vehicles left behind by the Americans in Afghanistan are already being shipped to countries like Pakistan and Iran.

The collusion between Pakistan and China could ultimately land the leftover American military hardware in the hands of Beijing which could reverse engineer the technology to upgrade its military. China could also exploit the detailed analysis of the American military technology for developing counter-technologies like radars and jammers to foil the operational edge of the American military hardware being used by the Indian Defence forces

Comments

The Chinese expect that Afghanistan could form an inclusive and broad-based government, adopting a foreign and domestic policy that is prudent and moderate so as to echo and meet the aspiration and shared will of the international community and its own people. Independent analysts, however, feel that such claims on part of China are mere rhetoric to keep the Taliban and Pakistan in good humour. In reality, Chinese plans are unpredictable and diabolical.

China does not indulge in charity. It is evident that China has already made a deal with the Taliban to extend critical strategic, military, financial, governance support and give Taliban the international authenticity it requires to operate freely. In return, the Taliban has to protect Chinese interests in the region, and allow free access for Chinese colonization of Afghanistan.

Supremacy in the region has a lot to do with controlling the geography of the region. China is going about its old tricks, with natural ease.

The Pakistan state is fully compromised and embedded with China, to work for Chinese strategic, military and political interests. China will use Pakistan to ensure the Taliban will not work against China’s interests and keep tabs on it.

China will exploit the unstable geography around India with its aim to be a global military super-power, sooner than later. China is making its nefarious moves to gain full geo-political control of the region, before taking its challenge to the West.

The Taliban will no doubt offer all kinds of assurances but no one knows how they will govern. Recognizing the group as the de facto political authority and engaging with them makes sense for China.

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China is accused of mass detentions, religious persecution and forced sterilisation of Uyghurs and others in the resource-rich northwestern province.

Authorities there are thought to have detained about a million people in re-education camps in recent years for “vocational training” to counter radicalism and separatism in Xinjiang.

The three senior officials named by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in a statement were: Chen Quanguo, the communist party secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and a member of the powerful Politburo; Zhu Hailun, party secretary of the Xinjiang political and legal committee; and Wang Mingshan, party secretary of the Xinjiang public security bureau.

The US state department warned American citizens on Saturday to “exercise increased caution” in China due to heightened risk of arbitrary law enforcement including detention and a ban from exiting the country. “US citizens may be detained without access to US consular services or information about their alleged crime,” the State Department said.

A border clash has plunged ties between India and China to their lowest point in decades. But one beneficiary looks clear – the US-India relationship. Experts say India could finally end equivocation about openly aligning itself with the long-eager United States, although there will still be disagreements — which, paradoxically, are now mostly due to Washington.

Chen is the highest-ranking Chinese official ever to be hit by US sanctions. He is said to be the architect of China’s harsh policies against minorities, and was previously in charge in Tibet.

Former security official in Xinjiang, Huo Liujun has also been named in the list.

As a result of the US move, they and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into America. It is now a crime in the US to conduct financial transactions with all of them, and they will have their US-based assets frozen.

“The United States is taking action today against the horrific and systematic abuses in Xinjiang and calls on all nations who share our concerns about the CCP’s attacks on human rights and fundamental freedoms to join us in condemning this behaviour,” Pompeo said.
In a separate statement, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the US is committed to using the full breadth of its financial powers to hold human rights abusers accountable in Xinjiang and across the world.

“The United States will not stand idly by as the CCP carries out human rights abuses targeting Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and members of other minority groups in Xinjiang, to include forced labour, arbitrary mass detention, and forced population control, and attempts to erase their culture and Muslim faith,” Pompeo said.

Before ramping up the CCP’s campaign of repression in Xinjiang, Chen oversaw extensive abuses in Tibetan areas, using many of the same horrific practices and policies CCP officials currently employ in Xinjiang, the top American diplomat said.

Responding to the US move, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian told media briefing in Beijing that the US decision amounted to “serious interference in China’s internal affairs and grave violation of basic norms guiding international relations.”

“Reacting to this wrong move, China has decided to impose reciprocal measures on US individuals and institutions with egregious behaviours on Xinjiang,” he said.

Asked when the sanctions would come into effect, he said, “you will find soon enough.”

This is the third time this week US and China slapped sanctions and visa restrictions.

China on Monday imposed visa restrictions on US individuals with “egregious conduct” on Hong Kong-related issues as a counter to American sanctions against unnamed Chinese officials deemed responsible for curbing freedoms in the city.

The US action came after China went ahead with the implementation of its new national security law for Hong Kong disregarding international condemnation to quell mass protests opposing growing Chinese interference, marginalising “one country two systems” formula governing Hong Kong.

On Wednesday, Beijing said it would retaliate the US action to impose visa restrictions on Chinese officials involved in restricting access to foreigners to Tibet with visa bans on Americans with “egregious conducts”.

In recent months, the Trump administration has stepped up its actions towards China on all fronts, including clamping down on Chinese media entities, going after Chinese pharmaceutical and research cybertheft. Tensions between the US and China are already high over the coronavirus pandemic with Washington accusing Beijing of covering up the outbreak last year

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