by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 1 here

AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

After initial SEAD strikes on 24 February (the first day of the offensive) a large train of Mi-28 transport and Hokum attack helicopters was seen flying towards the Hostamel airport. It was attacked by air and missile strikes and possibly also by MBRLs. Elements of an air assault formation (possibly one of the Guards airborne divisions) landed and seized the Antonov airport at Hostamel. The giant Ukrainian AN-225 transport aircraft (the world’s largest) was destroyed in the fighting here. As per standard practice, military experts expected them to hold an airhead (to fly in reinforcements and supplies) and await a land link-up with the tank columns of the 41st Army that were crossing over from Belarus border. Given the distance of approximately some 150 kms, the link-up would at best have taken 2-3days. However, what followed was somewhat unorthodox and confusing. Instead of holding the airhead, the airborne troops left it and charged straight for Kiev some 23 kms away. Reportedly, the 141 Motorised National Guards Brigade under Chechen Maj Gen Magomed Tusaev charged into Kiev. They were surprised by the stiff resistence and the Javelins and artillery took a heavy toll. Reportedly, they lost some 58 armoured vehicles to the ATGMs and the Chechen Maj Gen was killed. Finding the Hostomel airfield unoccupied the Ukrainians recaptured it, thus, denying the airhead for flying in reinforcements and logistics supply. Apparently, this coup de main operation was planned at the highest level because President Putin himself called upon Ukrainian forces to surrender. Later, he personally praised the sacrifice of the paratroopers. There definitely was a major failure of intelligence here. On what intelligence basis was such a bold operation launched on the enemy capital? It could not be based merely on the expectation that the Ukraine forces would not fight and surrender tamely? That cannot be the basis of operational planning and there seemed to be no fall back option or Plan B in this coup de main operation. It seemed to be based on very subjective parameters and assumptions.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The Russian advance began on multiple thrust lines. As assessed by IMR, it was a full scale invasion option. Rapid progress was made in first 3-4 days with spear heads covering over 150 kms to reach the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to siege warfare – surrounding cities, isolating the entry and exit routes and pounding cities savagely with rockets, cruise missiles and conventional artillery. Humanitarian corridors were agreed on by both sides to let civilians flee the cities. Some 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced and over 3.5 to 5 million have been forced to flee to Poland and other neighboring countries. The pace of operations has been slowed down greatly partly due to need for logistical pauses and very heavy and dogged resistance by the Ukrainian army, which used their Javelins ATGMs and Strella SAMs  to cause fairly substantial attrition. However the simple ground reality is that neither US nor NATO are putting boots on ground nor will they enforce any No-Fly Zones. So, theoretically, Russia has all the time in the world to methodically and steadily but surely grind down the Ukraine military in a meat-grinder war of attrition, which could carry on for months. The longer it lasts the more Ukraine will suffer. Unfortunately, it will also have a fearful impact on the global economy that was staging a tenuous recovery from Covid. Let me now cover the operations in the Northern, Eastern and Southern sectors in detail.

Northern Sector

The Russian forces attacked in the Northern sector toward Kiev the capital and Kharkiev (former capital and financial hub which had the T- 80 tank factory here).

Kiev. The 41st Army charged across the Belarus border towards Kiev on two thrust lines west of the Dnieper river, while elements of 36the Army advanced along the east bank towards Chernobyl nuclear plant and further on to Hostomel airport. These thrust lines made very rapid initial progress and in just 2-3 days were on the outskirts of Kiev. Thereafter, operations slowed down to try and isolate and then besiege Kiev, while they carried out precise Iskander TBMs and Kalibr cruise missiles strikes and limited bombardment by MBRLs. They made a few probes towards Kiev city centre but were repulsed. The satellite imagery on 4th/5th day of war showed a huge 65 km long convoy stretched on the road to Kiev. This included assault tank echelons, which should have been moving cross country but were stuck to the road due to the slush and mud caused by the spring thaw. The convoy remained stuck like that for a couple of days. Had the Ukrainian Air Force been active, this would have led to a disaster but apparently the convoy was well protected by the slant range of the S-400 missiles from Belarus and remained largely unscathed. It did not seem as if the Russians were planning to fight in the streets of Kiev, which were heavily defended by Javelin ATGMs and Stinger SAMs and would have entailed heavy troop casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population. Some experts felt this was a deception operation designed to keep the world’s attention riveted towards Kiev, while they made major advances in the East (Donbas) and the south sea coast. Cruise missiles were used to destroy the Antonov aircraft manufacturing plant and oil storage depots. Strangely, almost no attacks were made by aircraft or cruise missiles on key command and control targets like the Presidential palace, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior. This, to my mind, is a cardinal mistake of this war – the failure to target the top political and military leadership of Ukraine in a pinpoint and concerted manner.

Sumy. The 20th Army elements advanced on to Sumy and surrounded and bombed the city heavily.

Kharkiev. The 6th Army mounted heavy and sustained attacks on Kharkiev. It was surrounded and pounded to rubble. The tank manufacturing plant was destroyed by cruise missile strikes and bitter fighting took place on the streets. The Russians claim to be in control of the city but this is disputed by the Ukrainians.

Eastern Sector

This was the scene of major hostilities since 2014 and daily exchanges of artillery and mortar fire were taking place along the line of contact (LOC). Russians claim that Ukraine had massed some 60,000 of its best troops opposite Donbas and were planning to launch an offensive to take back the 30 per cent or so of the territories of the break-away districts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which was under Russian control. Attacks in this sector, therefore, were largely frontal and heavily contested. As per the Russians, it was to pin down Ukrainian forces in the North and not let them reinforce this sector that attacks were launched concurrently on Kiev and Kharkiev in the North.

•  The Russian 8th Army mounted fierce attacks on the Lukansk district and, by end of March, claimed to have liberated some 93 per cent of its territory.

•  The Russian 49th Army mounted fierce attacks on Donetsk district and, by end of March, claims to have liberated 56 per cent of its area. It also mounted operations towards Mariupol to link up with troops operating out of Crimea to establish a land corridor for Crimea.

•  In Phase II of the Russian operation they could complete the capture of the entire Donbas region and possibly try and encircle and annihilate the 60,000 or so Ukrainian troops operating against the Donbas region by encircling them from North and South in a major pincer movement.

Southern Sector

This encompasses the coast of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The three major ports here are Sevastopol (already with Russia on lease since decades) and now part of Russian occupied Crimea. The other major ports are Odessa and Mariupol. Russian Marines and Army made the most impressive gains here and have almost cut off Ukraine from the sea and made it a land locked state.

•  The Russian 58th Army and the Marines have advanced on Mariupol, laid siege to it and reduced the city to rubble by very heavy bombardment and missile strikes. The Russians claim to be in control of Mariupol, though Ukrainians claim that pockets of resistance remain. Mariupol and Kharkiev are the two major cities where the Russians have employed their standard tactics of capturing cities and the firepower used has been fearful. The land link up of Crimea with Donbas is now complete and is a major and significant gain.

•  The Russian 22nd Army and Marine elements advanced on and Quickly captured the coastal port city of Kherson (the first major city with a population of 300,000) that fell to the Russians. They then moved on and surrounded the port city of Mykolyiv and pounded it fiercely. Parts of the city have fallen to the Russians. Army elements and Marines have also advanced and captured the nuclear power plant complex of Zhaporizhzia. This is the largest nuclear plant in Europe with 6x 950 MW reactors (only one functional). They have also captured the Aneshader nuclear plant which has 25 per cent of the power generation capacity of the whole of Ukraine. Thus, almost all nuclear facilities in eastern Ukraine are now under Russian control.

•  While the world’s interest was riveted on Kiev, the Russians have made the most impressive advances in the South and have captured almost all the major seaports of Ukraine and cut off its access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. If Russians could induct fresh troops here they could drive up north along both banks of the Dnieper river and partition Ukraine into Eastern and Western parts along the Dnieper river. This could well be attempted by the Russians in Phase II of the operations.

Major Outcomes and Lessons Learnt So Far

The Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine is now in its second month. It began as a swift war of manoeuvre but now has turned into an inexorable attrition nightmare. Western propaganda is trying to claim it as a pyrrhic victory for Ukraine, which they armed very heavily with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs, which they claim had won the war in Afghanistan. These claims are over-hyped. Certainly, these defensive missiles have, to an extent, slowed down Russian operations and have been used to target their follow-on and logistics echelons. However, in no way can these tactical defensive weapons by themselves win the war for Ukraine. They can only serve to prolong it.

The American aim seems to be to prolong this war for a couple of months to humiliate Putin and impose maximum attrition on his war machine. This amounts to fighting the Russians till the last Ukrainian man or building standing. In the bargain, no one seems to care for the highly adverse impact on the global economy that has been struggling to recover from the impact of Covid pandemic. Nor does this approach show any sensitivity to the cost of human suffering of the people of Ukraine who have been callously dumped by the West.

The expenditure rate of these Javelins and Stingers missiles has been enormous. Zelinsky now wants 500 of these per day at an estimated missile replacement cost of $39 million per day. It is virtually impossible for even US and NATO to supply at such lavish scales.

Russian interdiction has now destroyed many oil storage depots, ammunition dumps, tank and aircraft manufacturing plants in Ukraine. They have captured all the Ukrainian nuclear plants in east Ukraine and control the water supply and power to most cities. Sadly, it is doubtful how long the Ukrainians can last in the face of such heavy punishment.

In a pure war of attrition, Russia is bound to prevail. Each day that the war lasts will tilt the war more in Russia’s favour. No amount of Western propaganda of an impending collapse of material and moral support for the war in Russia can hide this basic military fact. They may win the war on television and captive social media, the ground reality, however, will inexorably shift in Russia’s favour. In a meat grinder war of pure attrition Russian missile power, air power and fire power will prevail. Abraham Lincoln’s words – “You can fool all of the people some of time; you can fool some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all the people all the time” – may come back to haunt these shrill spin masters.

Russian force usage has been very uncharacteristically restrained. Whether this stems from cultural factors or a Russian apprehension that this war is likely to spread and escalate remains to be seen. They are clearly retaining their most advanced weapon systems for a time when they apprehend that they may have to fight NATO and American forces. So, we have not heard the last of this conflict and that is worrying. The Russians are clearly apprehending a widening and escalation of this conflict and are clearly husbanding their cutting edge resources. We have seen no T- 14 Armata tanks or active protection systems in this conflict despite the very dense anti-tank environment.

Traditionally, Russians maintain momentum by employment of fresh second and third echelons, which are carefully kept out of the battle for when the first echelons will run out of steam. Will Phase II see an induction of fresh troops and more material? That will depend on Russia meeting its minimal objectives – they say these have largely been met.

The use of the Russian air force has been rather limited. This failure to press home air superiority has needlessly extended this conflict.

Meteorological factors like the spring thaw and slush were not given adequate Importance.

Use of tactical ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles (Kalibr) have been Impressive and very effective. Over 1000 of them have been used in this war for pin-point destruction of targets.

Biden’s talks of Ukrainian sovereignty and calls for regime change in Russia are rather hypocritical and contradictory.

Economic sanctions could backfire if the dollar stops being the world currency for oil trade. Sanctions will hit Europe very hard and cause stagflation in the US economy.

Information and media war will be covered in a separate article.

Read Part 1 here

The post An Assessment of Military Operations appeared first on IMR.

by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM

Read Part 2 here

Gerasimov’s Hybrid War vs Traditional Russian War Doctrines

A few days before the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, IMR had done an in house war-game (Feb 2022 issue). Based upon known Russian doctrines and recent demonstrated combat performance in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria – we had forecast that Russian likely war aims would be to seriously wreck Ukraine as a functional military state and attempt regime change. They would advance on multiple thrust lines but seek to retain ground only in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the East and Crimea and the coastal areas in the South. These would be terrain objectives that would be retained at any cost. Russia had a huge advantage in airpower, missile power and traditional artillery firepower. Its T-72 and T-90 tanks were clearly superior to the Ukrainian T-80 and T-64 tanks especially in optronics and night fighting capabilities.

The signature Russian way of war has been to use massive fire assaults to create shock and awe and, thereby, economise on force levels and military lives. This was most evident in World War II, when Stalin called artillery the God of war and quipped that quantity generates its own quality. Russian forces have traditionally relied on echelonment of forces. Second and third echelon forces were kept in reserve and used to maintain relentless momentum in any offensive once the first echelon was used up or petered out. Based on this anchor premise, most military observers felt that Russia could achieve these objectives in 10 days (two to three weeks at best) in Ukraine. This war, however, has now entered its second month.

The Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare. The Chief of Russian General Staff Gen Velary Gerasimov had enunciated a whole of government doctrine for warfare based on a combination of hard and soft power in 2013. This entailed use of regular and irregular forces (conventional and sub-conventional forces) and coherent use of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, disinformation, political, diplomatic and economic tools to gain victory. Based on this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Russians had made impressive use of hybrid warfare in 2014 to foment insurgencies in Russian speaking areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. They captured significant chunks of these provinces (around 30 per cent), which declared themselves as independent (a la Abhkazia and Osettia in Georgia). Just before this conflict Russia recognized these as independent states. Hybrid war had worked very well so far in both Georgia and Ukraine.

Transition from Hybrid War to Regular Warfare. The key question here is – when on 24 Feb President Putin announced his decision to launch a “Special Operation” in Ukraine with the stated aim of destroying Ukraine’s military potential and carrying out De-Nazification, was he not making a direct transition from hybrid war now to full scale conventional war? From 2017 onwards, the US had been heavily arming Ukraine with Javelin ATGMs and shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In July 2021, US, Polish, Ukrainian and Latvian troops had held a joint military exercise in Ukraine (Ex Three Swords). This entailed over 1200 troops and 200 tanks and armoured vehicles along with air power elements. Tactics to counter a Russian attack had been worked out in detail. Russian sources indicate that plans were being hatched to mount an invasion of the Russian held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and concurrently ask for membership of NATO. This would involve US and NATO troops in this conflict. It was this exercise that had convinced President Zelinsky that, if Russia attacked, US & NATO forces would come to his aid. In December 2021, in yet another provocation Ukraine and USA co-hosted a major naval exercise (code named Op Sea Breeze) on the Black Sea in which 34 nations’ navies took part. American B-52 bombers made practice nuclear bombing runs against Russia and a ramming incident almost happened between a Russian destroyer and a British naval vessel.

Finally, in December 2021 itself, US and Ukraine foreign ministers signed the US–Ukraine Charter of Strategic Partnership that was said to be guided by the 2008 Bucharest Summit (where the idea of including Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was first mooted). By end-Dec 2021, Ukraine was a de facto member of NATO for all practical purposes and Russia was apprehending an attack on the separatist held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. Some 60,000 Ukrainian troops were massed against this Donbas region. That is why Russia had begun mobilizing its forces on the Ukrainian border in a massive exercise of compellence deigned to seek written guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and no offensive weapons would be deployed in 14 East European countries that had joined NATO. (In December 2021 itself, Putin had written to President Joe Biden clearly seeking these written guarantees).

To be credible, any such compellence exercise has to be structured for a seamless transition to actual kinetic operations. When that finally happened on 24 February 2022, the level of combat had clearly to shift from hybrid warfare to full-fledged conventional military operations with a clear option to cross the tactical nuclear threshold if USA or other NATO countries intervened. The continuation of the hybrid war mindset after onset of full scale military operations was, in hindsight, a clear miscalculation. This highlights the tension between the Gerasimov Hybrid War Doctrine and the traditional Russian way of war. This mismatch between the two mindsets has characterized this conflict. In trying to win the information war you cannot afford to lose or impede the outcome of the ground war.

Force Restraint

From the very outset of this war, the Russian campaign has been characterised by a surprising degree of restraint that flies in the face of the traditional Russian way of war. This has always relied on mass and scale – especially in the use of suppressive fires. From the purely military point of view massive suppressive fires were badly needed to neutralise huge numbers of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and Stinger shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been liberally supplied to Ukraine. Most military analysts were, therefore, surprised to find a near total absence of the Russian Air Force (VKS) for extended and extensive bombing campaigns. Even more surprising was the near total absence of large scale artillery and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) fire assaults on cities and built up areas – especially in the initial stages of the war.

The Russian first phase SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) campaign was confined to just one single day. Contrast this with the US 40-day air campaign in Iraq and the 80-day air interdiction campaign by the US and NATO in Yugoslavia. Given troops to task calculations, the overall Russian force level deployed was far too less to cater for the reduction/ isolation of some 15 or more cities, unless use of heavy fire power was envisaged. Besides, there was a near total absence of Russian cutting edge equipment like T-14 Alamty tanks and even Active Protection Systems (APS) on the T-72 and T-90 tanks employed (despite the dense anti-tank environment they had to operate in). Like the Egyptians had done in 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Russians seemed to prefer to operate under the area denial umbrella of their Triumf S- 400 missiles deployed in Belarus and Russia proper. Though the S- 400s have worked quite well, this denied the Russian troops the heavy air support they could easily have counted on – given the air power asymmetry between the two sides.

So what explains this baffling and most uncharacteristic force usage restraint by the Russians?

Cultural Factors and Intelligence Failure

There is a widespread belief that Putin was misled by his intelligence (FSB) to seriously under estimate the degree of resistance that the Ukrainian armed forces would put up. It was mentioned that, perhaps, accurate intelligence was available but senior FSB officers lacked the moral courage to put it up to Putin. They only tried to reinforce his dominant perception that, like in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine itself in 2014, the opposition would fold up and surrender without a fight. There is indeed some truth in this premise. The Russians went in for just a one-day air campaign and even as the 41 Combined Arms Army was heading for Kiev from the Belarus border, an air assault formation (perhaps elements of a Guards airborne division) captured the Antonov Hostamel airport (just 23 kms from Kiev) in a brilliant coup de main operation. Military experts now expected them to hold this airhead till link up by the land-based tank columns moving in from Belarus. Given the 150 kms they had to cover, this could have been done in two or three days. To everyone’s surprise the airborne forces left the air base and charged up to Kiev, the capital, even as Putin demanded that Ukraine surrender. The Ukrainian’s put up stiff resistance and recaptured the vacated Hostomel air base. The airborne forces almost walked into a trap as it were. No operation can be premised on the expectation that the enemy will just surrender. There does seem to have been a major intelligence failure of humanint or even a deliberate trap.

Most Russian military officers I have spoken to have stressed that this nostalgic perception of people to people relations was not just confined to President Putin but was a widespread cultural blind spot in the entire Russian military. Many Russians and even people of Belarus have relations in Ukraine and Kiev indeed was once a important centre of Russian culture. As such, there was a clear cut and widespread desire to restrict force usage against kindred people. This cultural constraint cum Intelligence error tended to make military planning clearly subjective in the initial phase of the conflict. The Indians and Pakistanis too were once one people culturally and linguistically. Yet they have, since1947, fought four major wars and one long hybrid war in J&K. This has been characterised by particular viciousness on Pakistan’s part.

DETAILED ANALYSIS – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Phase One – Coercive Deployment

The Russian command level HQ at Varyinch (80kms from Donbas) seemed to be the controlling HQ for this operation. Tanks, missile launchers and artillery were moved from the far-eastern military districts of Siberia to raise two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs are equivalent of Indian corps). These were the 4th and 20th CAAs. Of Russia’s 12 CAAs, some 11 were deployed around Ukraine. Another estimate felt that out of some 170 Battalion Tactical Groups some 87 were used against Ukraine. In numerical terms this amounted to some 1,50,000 troops that were subsequently raised up to 1, 90,000.in terms of troops to task analysis, if encirclement/capture of 10-15 Ukrainian cities was involved, this force level was clearly inadequate. It could only make sense if it intended to use heavy air power and suppressive artillery fire power to carry out this task and compensate for low force levels.

The 41st CAA was sent for a 10-day exercise to Belarus. This positioned it to strike directly at Kiev. After termination of the exercise it was retained there itself. The Ukrainian forces were organized into 14 armoured, airborne and mechanized brigades and had mobilised a large territorial militia and also called up reservists. The defender, thus, clearly outnumbered the attackers but the Russians had an overwhelming technological edge.

In December 2021, President Putin had written a letter to President Joe Biden demanding written guarantees for non-inclusion of Ukraine in NATO. This caused a flurry of diplomatic activity in Europe. However, the dominant perception in USA and Europe seemed to be that Russia was bluffing and this force posturing was just a coercive military deployment to compel NATO to negotiate a new security architecture in Europe. The Ukrainians themselves were most nonchalant about the Russian deployment and dismissed it as bluff and bluster to Indian students who took their advice and did not evacuate in time. With modern satellite surveillance each and every tank, gun and truck could be picked up with ease. No force concentration can be hidden in this day and age. What can be kept secret is the intention. Was the force just posturing or would it really strike? It must be said that the Russians were able to keep this secret well and Russian maskirovka (deception) operations were highly successful in keeping the world guessing.

Putin gave ample chance for a diplomatic solution till the very end. This delayed the offensive and caused it to run into the spring thaw, which generates slush and mud and impedes cross country manoeuvre. As part of information operations the Americans tried to leak Russian military plans in the media and announced 16 February as the D Day. This, perhaps, forced Russia to delay the operation. It was finally launched a week later on 24 February with a near formal declaration of war (a special operation) to destroy Ukraine’s military potential and de-Nazify the country. Russia officially recognized the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states and cited their full liberation as the primary territorial objective. It must be noted that from 2014 onwards the Ukrainians had deployed some 60,000 of their best troops in this region and attacking them directly would have amounted to a rather costly frontal attack on a very live line of contact. Hence, any Russian operation would have to advance along multiple thrust lines that would tie down and divide Ukrainian forces and mask the main objective. So, was Kiev then a deception operation as subsequently claimed? This merits further analysis. However, after the initial surprise, the Russian forces quickly readjusted to the changed scenario and now carried out their operations with far greater deliberation and with due caution. They changed their overall operational design from rapid manoeuvre to set piece siege operations and increasingly greater use of suppressive fires.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

As stated, the Americans had carried out a 40-day air campaign in Iraq for SEAD and interdiction of enemy communications and infrastructure including destruction of Republican Guards armoured reserves. In Yugoslavia, the air campaign had extended for over 80 days. Hence, most military observers were baffled when the Russian Air Force finished its SEAD campaign in a single day. The Russian Air Force (VKS) used MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters as also SU-27 and SU-30s along with SU-25SM fighter bombers. Given that Ukrainians had extensively deployed Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, bulk of attacks would have had to be from mid- to high-altitudes (to stay out of the shoulder-fired SAM envelope). This would necessitate use of PGMs for ground attack.

It is not known what percentage of munitions employed were PGMs or just plain gravity bombs, which can be quite inaccurate. The bulk of damage, however, was done by the 9K720 Iskander short range ballistic missiles (200 miles range). These were equipped with decoys to degrade enemy air defences and the Ukrainian S-300, Tor and Buk SAMs failed to intercept any of these. The Kalibr and Klub cruise missiles were also used extensively. Russians claimed to have struck 11 enemy airfields, destroyed 18 radars and a number of S-300 missile batteries on this first day itself. In hindsight, these claims appear exaggerated and the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) seems to have been flawed.

Many Ukrainian fighters escaped by moving out to western Ukraine and some are said to have flown out to Romania before the Russian attack. Many S-300 batteries also were dispersed initially. They survived and were active much later in the course of the fighting. The Russians seemed to have relied heavily on the area denial capability of their S-400 and S-500 Triumf missile systems. From Belarus these downed a Ukrainian SU-27 fighter at a range of 150 kms over Kiev, setting a world record for the distance of engagement. The impression one gets is that like the Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Russians were more inclined to rely upon the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) capability of their Triumph missile systems. These were apparently quite effective as is proved by their ability to protect a 65 km long convoy of assault tanks and other vehicles for days on the outskirts of Kiev. But this also ruled out much air support by the Russian air force due to closure of air space. This was badly needed to suppress the swarms of Javelin ATGMs and the Stingers. These kept taking pot shots throughout the campaign. The Ukrainians were advised by the Americans to ambush rear/ logistics echelons and they appear to have taken their toll. The road axes were not protected adequately due to a paucity of infantry. Amazingly, the Russian air force was largely absent from the skies over Ukraine, after the initial day’s SEAD attacks.

The Russia-Ukraine War (Part 2) click here

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