MILITARY HISTORY : A History of Military Aviation in India 1901-1947

The first (test) flight of a heavier than air aircraft – Blériot monoplane piloted by Keith Davis took place in India, nay Asia, at Allahabad on 10 December 1910, when he flew from Exhibition Grounds across the Ganges and Jumna, round the fort and back to the flying ground, the trip being made at a height of about 600 ft. This was followed by the first official flight on 17 December 1910 – exactly seven years after Wright Brother’s historic flight. In this flight, Henri Pequit flew a biplane with the son of Maharaja of Benaras (now Varanasi) on board, the first Indian passenger.

The second group led by the Belgian Baron de Caters with four bi-planes and two monoplanes reached Calcutta on 12 December 1910. Jules Tyke, the pilot of the group, made a 12-minute flight at Tollygunge Golf Club, a Calcutta suburb. On 21 December 1910, Baron de Caters took off with a lady passenger, Mrs. NC Sen, daughter-in-law of great social reformer Keshav Chandra Sen. This was followed by a rally on 28 December, which was attended by thousands of Calcuttans.

The third group was the Bristol and Colonial Aeroplane Company that arrived last and was led by Faranell Thurstan, along with well-known French pilot, Henri Jullerot with three aeroplanes of “Boxkite” variety (Humber-Sommer Biplane). On 6 January 1911, Jullerot made an impressive flight in front of a mammoth crowd at Calcutta Turf Club that included General O’Moore Creagh, C-in-C Indian Army, Sir Douglas Haig, the Chief of Staff in India and other principal military officers. These demonstration flights made these officers think about the relevance and potential of military aviation. According to Flight magazine dated 4 March 1911, over two million people witnessed the demonstration (Calcutta’s population in 1901 was nine million) giving an exhibition flight over the Calcutta Maidan Racecourse on one of the Bristol biplanes. The racecourse was specially lent to the British and Colonial Aeroplane Co’s Commission for flying demonstrations, and this is the only occasion upon which flying exhibitions have been given upon it. The Viceregal Party, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Norman Baker, the Lieut.-Governor of Bengal, and a crowd of about half a million people were present to witness the display.

 India in the Great War

Indian Army, including the British Army units, were just sufficient for maintenance of law and order within and on the borders of India as well as the provision of a field army capable, should the necessity arise, of undertaking a campaign beyond the borders for purpose of defence against external aggression. The Army in India was in no sense maintained for meeting the external obligation of an imperial character. It can be said that the force was not a potential reserve to the armed forces of the British Empire.

It was for the first time that an Indian corps of two divisions was formed to strengthen the British Expeditionary Force (Indian Expeditionary Force ‘A’) and was sent to Europe. Massey and his three colleagues, along with Captain Duncan Le Geyt Pitcher (39th Horse), happened to be at Farnborough and were attached to various RFC squadrons. Pitcher and Reilly were attached to No.4 Squadron and were involved in operational flying. Massey was appointed in command of No. 1 Reserve Aeroplane Squadron at home (UK), the other two were made flight commanders in two other squadrons. It was practically the end of aviation in India but only temporarily.

Nearer home, the Turks threatened Suez and an Indian Expeditionary Force (Expedition ‘B’) was dispatched to Egypt. Massey, Reilly and a party of RFC personnel embarked for Egypt, where they were joined by a detachment drawn from Indian Central Flying School to form an aviation unit intended to support the Indian Expeditionary Force defending the Suez Canal. A second detachment was formed from personnel drawn from India, Australia, and New Zealand to support British Expeditionary Force (Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’) in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). These detachments were used to support Indian Army operations in the field. The funds for both these detachments came from the Indian Exchequer though these operations did not take place in India itself.

An Air Force for India

Simultaneously, along with aircraft for defence of North West Frontier, the Viceroy had suggested the establishment of an aviation school in India for flying training of Indian Army officers. Both these suggestions were rejected by the War Office on 2 October 1915. War Office expressed its inability to spare instructors and aircraft for the school as well as difficulties in procuring spares and equipment. It ruled that training requirements would continue to be met by the existing training institutions in the UK. It, de facto, also led to the demise of the Indian Central Flying School at Sitapur, which had become inactive from August 1914 onwards.

Though the Government of India had surrendered to the Air Ministry, it tried to retain some control over Indian Army officers sent for flying training to the UK. It wanted that these officers should either return to India on completion of training or be replaced by a suitably experienced officer from the UK. To facilitate this exchange, the Government of India once again argued for ‘the establishment of an aviation school in India’ at which Indian Army officers could be trained.

The British Government rejected both these proposals. The War Office informed the Under Secretary of State for India on 2 October 1915 that: “It will not be possible for the War Office to supply instructors and aeroplanes to establish a Flying School in India, as every available instructor is already fully occupied in the training establishments. Should there be any officers on the Indian establishment who are desirous of, and recommended for, employment in the Royal Flying Corps, they could be sent to the United Kingdom for training.” Further, it stated: “As soon as the total number of trained pilots in the Indian Army exceeds the number required in India, with (Indian Expeditionary) Force D, and with Indian troops elsewhere, it would be necessary to ascertain in each case whether, having regard to the exigencies of the Service, it would be possible to provide a relief. Until then, however, the Council lay stress on the principle that every officer who graduates as a pilot must entirely be at their disposal, irrespective of the establishment from which they are drawn.

At the end of the Great War, the Government of India did not try to resurrect its pre-war proposal for the formation of Indian Flying Corps although Royal Flying Corps (later the Royal Air Force) had absolutely no objection to the formation of an Australian Flying Corps (established in 1912 but commenced training in 1914), Royal Canadian Flying Corps (established in 1917) and Royal New Zealand Air Force (established in 1923) and recruiting Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders directly into the RFC/RAF during the War and even thereafter. The only exception was India, this in spite of fairly good showing by the few Indians who had served with the Royal Flying Corps with one of them being awarded Distinguished Flying Cross. The after-effects of the Great Mutiny of 1857 still clouded the British mind and they could not just accept the Indians to be in the technical arms of the army like artillery and engineers and, of course, the Royal Flying Corps.

Indians in the First World War

The second Indian and the first Sikh to be commissioned in the RFC was Lieutenant Hardit Singh Malik. A student at Balliol College at the beginning of the war, Malik sought immediately to join the British Army but his application was turned down because of his being a non-European. After graduating and obtaining his degree in 1915, he applied once again but his application was rejected this time, too. Having failed to get his commission, he joined the French Red Cross as an ambulance driver in 1915 and served there for a year. While in France, he was accepted for the French Aéronautique Militaire (French Air Service). On learning this news, his former tutor at Oxford wrote to Major General Sir David Henderson, Director General of Military Aeronautics, who set the matter right.

The London Gazette of 6 April 1917 records “3rd Cl (class) Air Mechanic Hardit Singh Malik” was commissioned as a Temporary Honorary Second Lieutenant with the RFC on 16 April 1917. After training, he served with Nos. 28 and 11 squadrons on the Western Front and No. 141 Squadron in the UK flying Sopwith Camels, probably the most iconic British aircraft type of the War. He obtained his first kill on his very first operational mission on 18 October 1917. On 26 October 1917, he was a member of formation that raided the home aerodrome of Manfred von Richthofen, the legendary “Red Baron”. The formation was attacked by vastly numerically enemy formation. Malik managed to drive one enemy aircraft out of control – he was not granted this kill.  But four other aircraft were onto him and at least one of them shot at him. His aircraft had as many as 450 bullet holes, two of them entering Malik’s leg. Malik crashed in friendly territory and lost consciousness. Pulled out from the wreckage and carried to the hospital, he recovered but lived with those two bullets in his leg for the rest of his life. Malik described the episode as “a most foolhardy operation.” After his convalesces, he rejoined 28 Squadron in January 1918 and saw action in Italy. He, thereafter, was transferred back to England where he flew Bristol Fighters on Home Defence duties from Biggin Hill airfield that became a legend during WWII. He returned to France in mid-1918 for a brief tenure with No. 11 Squadron. After the Armistice, he returned to India hoping to join Royal Air Force but had to forgo this choice as he was told that Indians were not welcome in the Royal Air Force.

The longevity of pilots during the First World War was just 4-6 weeks. Malik was the only one of the four to beat this aircrew survival odds in that he survived more than this period of intensive operation.

Malik qualified and joined Indian Civil Service and went on to serve as free India’s first High Commissioner to Canada and later as ambassador to France.

Malik never flew without his turban. In the latter part of his career, he used a specially designed helmet that fitted over the turban and was accordingly nicknamed “Flying Hobgoblin.”

Royal Air Force in India

The move of No. 31 Squadron from the UK to India heralded the arrival of Royal Air Force in India (RAFI) and the beginning of military aviation in the country. By September 1917, the Squadron had 34 Henri Farmans, 26 BE2Cs and 2Es, one Maurice Farman and some FE2Bs. With so many aircraft that were well over its establishment, it was not surprising to see that in the same month, No. 114 Squadron was raised at Lahore with D Flight of No. 31 Squadron along with its several BE2Cs, 2Es  and Maurice Farmans. Were two squadrons sufficient to meet the task of looking after North West Frontier? It would be but interesting to see the evolution and build-up of Royal Air Force in India till its departure on India getting its independence on 15 August 1947.

One important and significant facet of work done by Nos. 31 and 114 squadrons was that throughout 1916-1918 they had been to locate, photograph, and report on the suitability of a variety of landing grounds along the frontier region; resulting in the adoption of several ‘airfields’ for forward operations. By 1919, a number of these landing grounds possessed basic necessities like fuel, ammunition and some basic equipment required for emergency operation of aircraft. These landing grounds were guarded by local army units.

Nos. 31 and 114 squadrons were tasked for reconnaissance and army cooperation basically in the North West Frontier.

Operations in North West Frontier

The Indian Government had asked for aircraft for this purpose in 1915 and No.31 Squadron arriving in India by the end of the year. It was July 1916, when the Squadron had its full compliments of three flights and had settled down in Indian operating conditions, it was deployed for watch and ward duties in the North West Frontier.

‘The Pathans, who were used to leisurely shooting at British troops from safety of the mountain tops, fled from these deadly machines that soared over their hiding places, cutting down the tribesmen with bombs and machine guns,’ wrote Barry Renfrew.

Further success followed in 1917 when the aircraft bombed villages that the army had never been able to reach in parts of Waziristan. The political officers felt the positive impact of these air actions. These early bombing raids devastated Pathan villages and did massive damage to the impoverished tribes’ meagre possessions. The Squadron’s reconnaissance and bombing effort was duly appreciated by the Northern Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sir AA Barrett. In his report on the operations undertaken against Mahsuds during the period March to August 1917, he referred to ‘the valuable work performed by the aeroplanes of the 31st Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, both in reconnaissance and bombing the enemy’ during an operation ‘to destroy the village of Nanu, at the head of the Splitoi Valley.’ Subsequently, ‘several raids were carried out by aeroplanes of 31st Squadron, Royal Flying Corps. Shingai villages in the Takhi Zam and others in the Badda Toi were bombed and in a particularly successful raid on 26th June, nine hits were scored on Makin and six on Marobi, the home of Mulla Fazl Din, the titular chief of the tribe. These raids involved considerable risks. Engines were liable to failure in the high temperature prevailing, distances from the base at Tank were long and hills up to 8,000 feet had to be crossed. These risks were well repaid by the results obtained which undoubtedly contributed largely to the general desire for peace displayed by all sections of the tribe.’

Birth Pangs of the Indian Air Force

The unwritten policy of recruitment to the British Army, and that included Royal Flying Corps and subsequently Royal Air Force, was that the applicant for entry must be of pure European descent and the son of natural-born or (except for a boy) naturalized British subject. This policy was formalized vide Air Publication 958 Kings Regulations (First Edition, HMSO, 12 August 1924). However, the sudden outbreak of the First World War forced the British to relax their policies. The War Council in 1917 decided “to allow ten places each year at Sandhurst to natives of India, as well as granting of the permanent King’s Commission to the twenty Indian officers on Viceroy commissions and temporary commission to further 200 Indians.”  A few Indians, though not of European descent, saw service with the Royal Flying Corps. These officers performed as well as their British counterparts. It was clarified by the War Office in December 1918 that: “We are taking Indians into the Royal Military College for training for commissions in the Indian Army only. It is not correct to say that “there is no position in His Majesty’s Army from which the Indians will in the future be debarred by reason of his race”, for we are not going to let Indians command white men in British Regiments. A similar stance was also adopted by the Admiralty. The only exception was grant of commission to the medical officers who did serve the British and Gorkha units (these were considered at par with the British Army units) during the First World War and thereafter.

The First Taste of Actual Operation

The outbreak of trouble in 1937 in Waziristan gave the new force its first chance in active operations. Initially, the pilots were employed in ferrying and inter-communication duties between Peshawar and the operational stations of Miranshah and Manzai, but by September. ‘A’ Flight was ordered to move to Miranshah for actual operations. Flight Lieutenant Haynes led the Flight with other pilots being Mukerjee, Awan, Engineer and Narendra. Harjinder Singh recalled that on “reaching Miranshah, the RAF Squadron (5 Squadron) eyed us with ridicule and suspicion. However, it was not long before they realized that we were made of sterner stuff than they had imagined and the only difference between us was one of colour. Our pilots started flying as many sorties as were humanly possible between sunrise and sunset. The result of these sorties proved outstanding.”  The fact that the Flight flew 337 hours in one month – the feat had not been matched by any of the RAF flights till then – speaks volumes of intensity of effort and hard work of all Indians. The Flight flew a total of 1400 hours during the period of three months that it was at Miranshah. Hancock flew down to Miranshah to personally congratulate the Flight’s personnel for stupendous flying effort and maintaining 100% serviceability. This was in stark difference to the state of affairs in No. 5 Squadron which went through a very difficult phase during the period that Indians were at Miranshah. ‘Every Indian felt that the hour of trial had come and “this was our golden opportunity.’”

In the first week of December 1937, orders were received for the Flight to return to Peshawar. ‘A’ Flight wanted to continue their good work but were over-ruled by Air Headquarters. The other news that really brought cheers to the Indians was that the airmen’s scale of pay was to be doubled. Perhaps one of the greatest mistakes made during the creation of the Indian Air Force related to the pay of airmen in the various trade groups. These rates of pay were at first in general much too low for the standard of education and culture expected of a recruit, and many of the men could have earned far more in civilian life. Dissatisfaction with the conditions of service arose and many men had to be discharged in the earlier years. With this increase of pay and the improvement of living conditions to an equitable level ensured that any reasons for dissatisfaction immediately disappeared.

India’s Coastal Defence

The deployment for coast defence was not restricted to Nos. 27 and 60 Squadrons. No.1 Squadron had already been briefed on 20 August regarding the high possibility of a war breaking out. The Squadron got down to intensive practice in dive-bombing and front machine-gun attacks. On 26 August 1939, orders were received by the Squadron to deploy a flight of six Harts and Audaxes at Drigh Road, Karachi for operational duties in cooperation with the Royal Indian Navy in case Germany declared war on Britain. This Flight was named as ‘Q’ Flight. Simultaneously, No.27 Squadron RAF deployed four Wapitis at Juhu, Bombay as ‘V’ Flight; four more to St Thomas Mount, Madras as ‘Y’ Flight. No.60 Squadron, now equipped with Blenheim bombers at Ambala, sent two aircraft to Dum Dum, Calcutta as ‘Z’ Flight and another three to Drigh Road, Karachi, as ‘H’ Flight.

Expansion of the Indian Air Force From 1 to 10 Squadrons

The War had nearly bankrupted Britain and its military strength had started winding down. The situation in India was no better. By mid-1920s, Britain had nearly 1/3rd of its infantry numbering around 60,000 deployed in India. In 1927, the War Office conceded that India could not provide enough troops to meet the ‘minor’ and ‘major’ threats on its North West Frontier. The War Office prepared a plan for dispatch of eleven divisions from Britain. It was manifest nonsense, for such a force could only have been raised by conscription.  The Government of India could not pay for their deployment with the defence budget reducing every year. Until 1933, the cost of all troops stationed in India was paid by the Indian taxpayer and nearly one-third of the Indian government revenue was spent on defence. However, in 1933 in an attempt to quiet nationalist objectors, the British government began to subsidize the Indian defence budget – a subvention amounting to two million pounds annually under what was known as Garran Award. The RAFI also got a one-time grant of six hundred thousand pounds for re-equipping four squadrons.

If India had agreed to the offer of 12 Squadrons, then the capital expenditure for raising these squadrons would have come out of the Indian exchequer; the operating cost was to be in any case was India’s responsibility. Further, as per the terms accepted by the Indian Government when Britain agreed to deploy RFC/RAF in India in 1915, the operational control of all RAF units in India was to be with the RAF and not with the Government of India and these assets could be deployed even outside India, if so required. It is a little-known fact that Britain wanted India to pay 40 million pounds for deployment of elements of Indian Army abroad for the defence of Empire during WW1, in which over a million Indians were deployed. The War Office would not relent claimed payment from India for the Indian troops sent to China in 1927.

The Japanese Invasion of Burma and the Role Played by the Indian Air Force

Just before the occupation of Andaman and Nicobar Islands by the Japanese on 23 March 1942, a Lysander of No. 28 Squadron made a trip to its lone airstrip at Port Blair – airstrips at Nicobar and Campbell Bay were constructed by the Japanese through forced labour a little later.

Japanese had stationed 13 flying boats at Port Blair for reconnaissance in the Bay of Bengal. Port Blair had also a few fighters. As the ground situation in Burma deteriorated, Calcutta became within range of the Japanese bombers and the orders were given for the port to be cleared and the ships spread over the Bay of Bengal, irrespective of the proximity of the Japanese fleet. The situation was such that, if reconnaissance could be prevented, this immediate tonnage of shipping might reach other harbours. The RAF sent two of its three Hudsons to attack Port Blair. It was a hazardous mission, likely to be disastrous to the crews, but essential because so much depended on it. The gallant aircrew in a determined low-level attack strafed the seven flying boats moored in one line and left two of them burning, one sinking and the rest damaged. Neutralization of the remaining flying boats was a necessity as it was imperative that the remaining surviving aircraft remained on or under water. The mission was even riskier than the first one as Japanese would be expecting the attack and would be ready to tackle the same. During the repeat attack, one Hudson was shot down and the second damaged by the Japanese fighters. The attack ensured that the Japanese remained unaware that seventy of the Allied vessels were making their passage to safety in the Bay of Bengal.

The next flight to Nicobar Island, a reconnaissance mission, took place only in early 1944 when Mosquitoes of Photo Reconnaissance Force flew a round trip of just 2,300 miles.

Operation Buccaneer was planned for taking over of Andaman and Nicobar Islands by an amphibious force. These islands would have provided a base for future amphibious landings on the Burma mainland and for bombing the new Bangkok-Moulmein railroad, which gave the Japanese in Burma direct overland connections with the Gulf of Thailand.  However, with Operation Overlord getting priority for resources, this operation was put on the black burner and was never proceeded with.

Though JAAF maintained considerable air activity over the immediate battle area, combined with attacks on Maymyo, Toungoo and Bassein, Rangoon area was left alone enabling the first stages of military evacuation to proceed unhindered. Akyab had its first heavy raid on 23 March and seven days later, Toungoo fell followed by Prome on 2 April. It was like dominos falling one after another.

The Japanese carrier-borne aircraft bombed Kakinada and Vishakhapatnam on 20 April 1942 leading to mass exodus of the population from the cities.

The Reconstitution of the Royal Indian Air Force into Two Independent Air Forces

On 25 April 1947, in the third Defence Committee meeting Mountbatten, circulated Liaquat’s paper on the bifurcation of the Armed Forces along with comments by Auchinleck and Sardar Baldev Singh. Mountbatten justified the presentation of paper over-riding the views of the C-in-C and the Defence Member as he required the Committee’s views on the future form of government in India. Baldev Singh emphasised that division of the forces should follow the political decision in favour of Pakistan and if it preceded such a decision, it might have serious consequences. Liaquat agreed with Baldev Singh’s suggestion but he insisted and stated that “there must be a plan in readiness to go ahead with the separation if Pakistan was accepted.” The Committee also discussed the likely administrative complications that might arise due to partition. Mountbatten expressed the opinion that the Armed Forces could either complete nationalisation by June 1948 or complete separation by the same date without undue risk. Any attempt to carry out both by that date would invite trouble. He suggested that Hindustan and Pakistan should pool their forces under a Federal General Headquarters until their separation was completed. He agreed that there must be a plan to divide the Armed Forces. Auchinleck stated that there were certain uncertain factors which might arise due to separation of the country and it was not possible to plan the division of the armed forces till the situation became clear.

The decisions of the Committee are of special significance in that it was the first time that the issue of division of the Armed Forces was discussed and there was, thereby, acceptance of the principle of such a division. More importantly, by discussing the division of the Armed Forces, the Defence Committee had de-facto prejudged the issue of partition of the country.

June 1948 was still far away and the debate on the division of the armed forces, perhaps, would have carried on for some more time. But with announcement, on 3 June 1947, of Mountbatten Plan to partition the country and fixing the date the very next day for transfer of power to be 15 August 1947 – a period of just 72 days – caused a lot of frenzy with the realty striking hard on everyone.

“A History of Military Aviation in India 1901-47” by Air Marshal Bharat Kumar will be published in March 2020 by IMR Media.