Gen Manoj Naravane has taken over the reins of the Indian Army as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) when a major reform of the higher defence organization has been implemented at the same time. The chief of defence staff (CDS) has been appointed along with a Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This entails some modification of the role and tasks of the COAS for the better. Since the CDS has not been made the operational head of the three Services and not placed in command over the Service chiefs, the Army chief is more of an operational commander than at any other time. He does not have to push the Army’s demands and interests with the MoD any longer, leaving much of it to the office of the CDS and the DMA. He should have more time to devote to land warfare strategy and its execution, counter-terrorism operations and optimizing the resources of the Army.
Operational Matters
Gen Naravane need not spend too much time on integration with the Air Force and Navy, seeking increase in budgetary allocations, joint doctrines, employment of strategic forces, space, cyber, information warfare and so on, except insofar as it concerns the Army alone. Luckily, Gen Bipin Rawat, having just side-stepped from the Army chief’s office into the CDS’s, is well aware of the Army’s requirements. The new Army chief will, of course, have to take forward the changes initiated by Gen Rawat, when it comes to Integrated Battle Groups, restructuring of the Army HQ, manpower, and so on.
Army Restructuring
The restructuring of the Army HQ in New Delhi, initiated by Gen Biopin Rawat, is in progress. It is the beginning of the first full-cadre review of the Army in over 30 years. Keeping in sight the emerging security matrix and the abiding challenge of sprucing up the force and equipping it with cutting-edge armoury and equipment on a budget, this is a part of changes that must be executed to achieve the objectives of a competitive force.
The restructuring of Army HQ to gear it up towards capability-based modernisation needs, would synergise and coalesce all revenue and capital spending under one organisation and effectively prioritise competing requirements with an operational focus to get better value for funds allocated by the government.
Under the restructuring approved now called Reorganisation of the Army Headquarters, two weapons and systems procurement branches will be merged and a new post of Deputy Chief of Army Staff created to coordinate with military intelligence, operations and logistics wings.
At present, there are an estimated 950 to 1,000 officers posted at the Army HQ. The officers who will be weaned off the HQ will be available to the formations and units. As many as 229 officers from the headquarters will be “optimised and relocated to units and formations of the filed armies”. Ninety per cent of these officers are from the ranks of Colonel and below.
Strategy & Operations. The new Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy) will oversee strategy and operations, intelligence collation, conduct of operations and the movement of logistics. At present, the DG (Military Operations) and the DG (Military Intelligence) report to the Army Chief or Vice-Chief. The new DG (IW) will have the erstwhile ADGs (Public Information) and Information Warfare (IW) wings under him to counter social media propaganda and hybrid warfare.
Information Warfare. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has also okayed the creation of a consolidated information warfare wing that will subsume two existing wings under the DGMI and the DGMO. The Information Warfare branch will be headed by the Lieutenant General rank officer and will come under another newly created appointment- Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Strategy).The new DG IW (Director General Information Warfare) will have under him the erstwhile ADGs PI (Public Information) and IW (Information Warfare) to meet needs of the future battlefield, hybrid warfare and social media reality.
The ADGPI branch deals with media projection and has a social media wing, which is likely to remain untouched. The existing Information Warfare branch operates under the Military Operations directorate. Separately, a cyber unit will also be placed under the DG IW.
Military Training. The third major reform is that the Army’s Training Command based in Shimla will now be sole adviser to the Army Chief on all training matters. The Military Training Directorate in Delhi is being merged into the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) in Shimla.
Capability & Sustenance. Also, the restructuring will merge the Master General Ordnance (MGO), who is currently under the Vice-Chief, and the DG (Weapons and Equipment) under a single vertical with the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning and Strategy), which will be renamed Capability and Sustenance. Now all acquisitions of the Army will be handled by a new office under the Director-General (Capability Development). The revenue budget will be handled by DG (Sustenance).
Vigilance & Human Rights. New wings for vigilance and human rights issues will be set up under major-generals. The ADG (vigilance) wing will have officers drawn from the three services for an objective and impartial approach and will report directly to the army chief. The ADG (human rights) branch will have a police officer on deputation, he said. The ADG (human rights) will report to the director general of military operations.
Countering Pak-sponsored Terrorism
Gen Naravane inherits the threat posed by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and its asymmetric warfare offensive against India, which began some 30 years ago in the Punjab in the 1980s. Since then Pakistan has shifted its proxy war to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), although we have seen some sparks again in Punjab through its support to Khalistanis and the use of drones to drop arms, ammunition and equipment to the separatists there. Yet, it is an existential threat in Punjab.
In Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), the Abrogation of Article 370 on 5 August 2019, and the subsequent steps taken to prevent large scale disturbances have brought down violence in the state, but the reorganization has brought in its own internal and external challenges, which are yet to show up in full. The political initiative, which was long overdue and which the Army had always been asking for, has yet to run its full course – until the elections are held in the state, as promised by the central government.
Pakistan’s deep state – the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the military – is somewhat subdued at present, partly due to the pressure being asserted by the Unites States and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to force Pakistan to take action against declared terrorists, money laundering and to conform to international financial transaction standards. It has not helped Pakistan that its all-weather ally, China, has not done sufficiently enough to come to its help despite trying to raise the J&K issue in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its chairmanship of the FATF. In fact, China has tried but Indian diplomacy has successfully thwarted all attempts by China to rake up the issue.
Troops levels are being reduced in J&K, casualty figures show a downward trend but cease fire violations on the Line of Control show an upward trend. The upper hand and the moral ascendency over Pakistan in the proxy war must be maintained. That would be Gen Naravane’s principal operational task.
One way which has been tried and tested in the last two years is to retaliate every time there is a serious breach by Pakistan and raise costs and consequences for it in all manner possible without crossing the threshold. That threshold is now being pushed further and further as the deep aerial strike of 26 February 2019 at Balakot, in response to the Pulwama attack that killed 45 CRPF soldiers, showed. It is no one’s guess that the surgical strike 1.0 carried out on 29 September 2016 after the Uri attack was not the last one that the country has seen. The time to remain defensive, confined to consequence management in our own territory, which was the norm for 30 years, has now passed. As a corollary, one must say that creating the military capacity for punitive action is a sine qua non if Pakistani terror is not to continue unabated.
Maoist Menace
The police and home ministry have been claiming great success in containing the Maoists and reducing their influence. The unfortunate fact, however, is that each year in Apr-May they launch an annual tactical counter-offensive and inflict heavy losses on the police and Central Police Organisations (CPOs) and loot weapons. Their strike power is intact and we have not been able to penetrate the dense jungles of Dantewada to destroy the armed Maoist groups in that sanctuary. The number of armed Maoist battalions has gone up from 3 to 21 in this forest redoubt. This is most dangerous and we cannot lull ourselves into complacency.
Conventional Capacity Building
Balakot was a great morale booster but it also pointed out glaring shortcomings in our national security architecture. We need to get our act together for urgently needed arms acquisition. The process is dangerously dysfunctional and mired in so much red tape that it is becoming impossible to execute major arms acquisition programmes in any reasonable time frame.
With the CDS in place with the express mandate to coordinate and prioritise acquisitions, there should be some improvement, but one cannot shy away from the fact that within the Army, too, refining and deciding upon requirements is a time-consuming process. There are external factors, which are beyond the COAS’ control, like the planning and budgeting process itself, complicated defence procurement procedure (DPP), multi-layered sanctions and approvals, repeated cancellation of tenders, long trial periods and so on. But even government-to-government deals and procurement under fast-track procedures have always overshot the laid down timelines.
The Indian Army is the 2nd largest armed force at 1.3 million behind the Chinese Army. In the Global Fire Power Index, which is arrived at by considering 55 indices, Indian Armed Forces rank 4th. India ranks a poor 25th in terms of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV), which include Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV); and 26th in terms of Self-Propelled (SP) Artillery.
It would have been a different matter if India were an arms exporter but it ranks nowhere in the first ten. In fact, India was the world’s second-largest arms importer during 2014-18, accounting for 9.5% of the global total, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which released its report released on 11 March 2019.
In terms of defence expenditure, China spends five times more than India, with its Defence Budget pegged at $250 bn (1,9% of GDP) for 2018, while India’s Defence Budget for 2018-19 was $51 bn (1.63% of GDP).
A large quantity of the Indian Army’s equipment is of foreign origin, notably Russian and much of it requires replacement or upgrade. Among them are T-72 tanks, T-90 tanks, BMP-2, Zsu-23-2, Zsu-23-4, Kvadrat air defence system, OSA-AK air defence system, Dragunov sniper rifles and so on.
Weapon Systems and Platforms
Mechanised Forces. The mechanised forces are equipped with Russian T-72 tanks, assembled in India, many of which have undergone upgrades but are nevertheless in need of replacement with a ‘Future Ready Combat Vehicle’ (FRCV) or future main battle tank (MBT) – ultimately 2400 to be precise. The Army will in time add 464 T-90MS standard tanks in due course after negotiating a licence to make them in India. That will bring the T-90 tanks to a fleet strength of 1000. The target is 1600.
All 1770 BMP-2 IFVs require to be replaced by modern IFVs. The search for a Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) started in 2010. The Expression of Interest (EoI) was issued for the third time in November 2017 after two failed attempts. When it does come, it might be a world-class tank but whether the Army will embrace it, cannot be certain.
Anti-Tank Guided Missiles. The Russian Konkurs and French Milan anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are widely used and the Army has been waiting for many years for DRDO to finalise the development of the Nag ATGM. While the project is delayed, the government appears ready to approve the procurement of limited numbers of Israel Rafael’s Spike ATGM.
Ammunition. The CAG had pointed out in 2017 that “Out of a total of 152 types of ammunition, the stock of 121 types of ammunition (80%) was below the authorization level of 10 days intense fighting. And availability of 55 per cent types of ammunition was below the minimum inescapable requirement to be maintained for operational preparedness and 40 per cent types of ammunitions were critical level having stock of less than 10 days,” The situation has since improved after fast-track purchases, but it is still alarming. What has emerged is that the Ordnance Factories are unable to meet the requirements of the armed forces as indented from time to time.
Artillery. 10 K-9 Vajra 155mm tracked self-propelled (SP) guns, made under licence by L&T Defence in India, were inducted on 9 November 2018.The entire process of inducting 100 K9 Vajra at a cost of Rs 4,366 crore will be completed by November 2020.
The Ordnance Factory Board’s (OFB) 155mm/45 calibre Dhanush gun, developed from the designs transferred by Bofors in 1980 to OFB, as part of transfer of technology (ToT) of the FH-77 155mm Bofors howitzer has been successfully inducted into the Army on 8 April 2019. The OFB will make 114 guns.
The Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), developed both by Bharat Forge and Tata Defence& Aerospace, separately, based on DRDO designs has also passed muster and is undergoing final user trials. The MoD had sanctioned the ATAGS project in September 2012. A prototype was part of the Republic Day parade in 2017.
The BAE System’s M777 155mm ultra-light howitzer (ULH) was also inducted into service in November 2018. 145 pieces will be supplied.
An improved longer range Pinaka rocket for the multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) has been developed by DRDO. The Artillery also wants an indigenous Smerch-type long-range MBRL to be produced in India.
Air Defence. The Russian Igla-S has been selected as the very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) system weapon of choice through a contest between but the contract is yet to be finalised.
Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) and DRDO have completed trials of the quick reaction Surface-to-air missile (QRSAM).
Akash Weapon System (AWS) has been developed as a short-range surface-to-air missile (SRSAM) and two regiments have been inducted into service, while two more have been approved for purchase.
For the ground-based air defence weapons systems for area and point defence – the L70 gun and the ZSU-23-2 – the RFI was issued in January 2019 and the upgrade efforts also continue.
Infantry. The Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) has been abandoned as an integrated approach. Instead, various components of the system are being pursued separately for procurement.
A Rs 639 crore contract was signed on 10 April 2018 with SMPP Ltd, an Indian vendor for the procurement of 186,138 bullet proof jackets (BPJs). The first lot of BPJs was delivered in April 2019.
A limited quantity (72,000) of Sig Sauer 716 assault rifles and 93,000 Caracal 816 carbines are being procured through Fast Track Procedure (FTP). Meanwhile, an Ordnance Factory is being established at Rae Bareilly to produce the AK-203 assault rifle in large numbers to cater for the remainder required of the armed forces and the paramilitary as well as for export.
The Infantry also requires a lighter, more lethal shoulder fired anti-tank weapon, notably the Carl Gustav Mk IV, a Battlefield Surveillance Radar (BFSR) and an improved 81mm mortar.
Network-centric Operations. The Rs 50,000 crore Battlefield Management System (BMS) was envisaged by the Army to enable a faster decision process by commanders at all echelons, enable better decision due to reliable operational information provided in real time and have the ability to quickly close the sensor to shooter loop by integrating all surveillance means to facilitate engagement through an automated decision support and command and control system, exploiting technology for mission accomplishment in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).
The project has been abandoned indefinitely due to costs involved. The Army chief reviewed the project in 2018 and decided to put it on the back-burner in favour of other projects.
Army Aviation. While the Army had asked for 39 AH-64E multi-role attack helicopters, the government has accepted to procure six for it for the time being in addition to the 22 Apaches on order for the IAF.
The Rudra ALH-WSI armed helicopter based on the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) is making steady progress, though the selection of anti-tank missiles it will carry is yet to be finalised. The production of the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) has started. The Army wants 114 LCH.
Army Aviation is expected to replace its ageing Chetak and Cheetah helicopters with the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) Light Utility Helicopter (LUH).
The Army continues to use Israeli IAI Searcher II unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and is looking to add to its fleet. Sadly, the Army is poorly equipped with such vital force-multipliers.
Combat Engineering. The Engineers are looking for lighter, redeployable, foldable and air-portable bridges. Similarly, they would like to have lighter, higher capacity assault trackway, quick repair materials for damaged runways and fuel-air explosive (FAE) solutions for destroying mines.
Infrastructure
Alongside modernisation of equipment, it si important for infrastructure – strategic roads, railway and bases – to be improved. The Chinese have built all-weather class-9 or 24 roads right up to all their posts in all sectors. They have excellent lateral roads. Their railway system and pipelines are being extended to major logistics bases. Deployment time of their formations has been cut down to enable them to launch an offensive for short duration wars while stocking is done for follow up echelons.
Overview
The fact remains that in the case of major systems, like artillery guns, main battle tanks, infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank weapons, air defence weapon systems, etc, we are far short of the ideal mix of obsolete-legacy-modern systems that should be in service at any time. Blaming the Defence Reasearch& Development Organisation (DRDO), public sector undertakings (PSUs) or Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) alone is not enough. The Army should push for change. The Army Design Bureau, now in a fledgling state, the almost defunct Army Technology Board, and other initiatives must evolve into effective organisations capable of driving research and innovation. The enhanced powers of the Army Commanders, vice chief of army staff and other down the chain must be utilised to support procurement from private industry so as to force DRDO, PSUs and OFB to compete. The Army must also resolutely fight for user involvement in development, favourable terms and conditions like penalties for cost and time overruns, shortcomings in quality and guaranteed serviceability and availability of equipment.
