The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, consisting of flagship USS Nimitz (CVN 68), Princeton, and Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyers USS Sterett (DDG 104) and USS Ralph Johnson (DDG 114), along with the Indian Navy ships Rana, Sahyadri, Shivalik and Kamorta, recently participated in a cooperative deployment in the Indian Ocean.
The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton, as part of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG), conducted a cooperative deployment with ships and aircraft from the Indian Navy July 20 and 21.
The two navies conducted multiple exercises while operating together, including a live-fire exercise, an air defence exercise (ADEX), flight operations and a farewell passing exercise.
During the ADEX four ships of the Indian Navy joined Princeton and Sterett to defend each other against simulated threat aircraft and missiles. Ships and crew from both sides were able to achieve a high level of integration and cooperation while conducting many events to include gunnery and air defense exercises.
Along with the ADEX, the two navies also conducted flight operations to solidify the capability of landing American helicopters on the Indian ships, and landing Indian helicopters on the American ships.
The joint exercise raised the diplomatic heat on China. While it was described as a routine “passex” (basic naval exercises when warships of two navies pass by each other in the oceans), the subtext pointed to a subtle demonstration of US-India partnership even as India and China were engaged in a slow disengagement process after the Galwan incident.
The series of exercises, weeks after a similar joint drill with Japanese Navy in the Indian Ocean, were meant to be a cause of worry and anxiety for Beijing.
India has improved its military ties with the US and also strengthened security and strategic ties with Australia, an important partner in the emerging anti-China coalition. The Australia-India Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement and the Defence Science and Technology Implementing Arrangement are two very significant steps in deepening our ties in the emerging Indo-Pacific security and trade architecture.
India shares the security concerns of the countries in the South China Sea and strongly condemns China’s hegemonic moves. India’s IOR strategy includes a robust naval policy and diplomatic outreach towards the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) countries.
India has revived certain naval/maritime possibilities and these include the likelihood of inviting Australia to join the India-US-Japan trilateral Malabar naval exercises towards the end of the year. This points to reviving the Quad — a group of four nations that came under one umbrella for the first time in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami.
Earlier, in 2007, India had mounted a Quad-plus Singapore five-nation naval exercise. China then bristled at what it considered to be a latent threat. Delhi, then, chose to placate Beijing’s concerns by reverting to a bilateral Malabar with the US.
Beijing perceives itself vulnerable in the Indo-Pacific given its enormous dependence on unimpeded merchant shipping, which is predicated on the freedom of the oceans and the sea-lines of communication.
Any new realignment of forces such as the China-Pakistan-Turkey-Iran axis will be highly detrimental to India’s security and strategic position in the region. Neither the US nor India can independently take on a hegemonic and expansionist China, which has scant respect for global rule-based order and transparent trade system.
