The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) initiated an integration process within the three Services on 1 January 2020. Ostensibly meant to optimise resources, training and operational efficiency, the subsequent announcements of likely joint commands were a curious mix of three integration approaches currently in vogue, ie, geographical, functional and resource-sharing models. The geographical model divides the likely area of interest or sovereign territory of the country into geographic regions with control of assets of all three Services resting with a single operational commander like the much talked about Theatre Commands. The United States and, now China, follow this model. The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the future Peninsular Command are likely to be based on this model or its close variation. The functional model aggregates all activities related to a particular function, in particular resources under a single command and irrespective of service, is brought under a central authority as envisaged in the Integrated Air Defence Command (IADC). IADC should entail operational control of all Air Defence (AD) resources under a single entity like the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Each model has its own merits/demerits. Since IADC is the first step towards integration process in the country, it is imperative to look at the current organisation, its shortcomings and a likely ideal model for implementation.
Background
The Union War Book recognised the threat from the air for the first time in the 1930s. The concept of AD included “Coastal Defence, Anti Aircraft Defence and cooperation of military forces” under the Army measures. While Air Force measures comprised of “Home Defence against air attack and AD intelligence scheme”. That is how AD of air bases, coastal assets and strategic/industrial installations has continued to be provided since then. The distinction between Anti-Aircraft Defence and Air Defence continued to be maintained and the same formed the basis of procurement of various Land-Based Air Defence (LBAD) equipment with the Army till the 1980s. All operations from Independence till 1971 were fought on the above principle of jointness and clear division of responsibility. The meagre anti-aircraft resources of the Army were required to protect mechanised formations, troop concentrations, artillery deployment areas, ammunition/logistic nodes, choke points, logistic convoys, as also shore-based assets of the Navy and other industrial assets. Thus, Army AD started getting stretched due to increasing importance of assets in the combat zone and in rear areas as well. This led to the Air Force venturing into Land Based Anti-Aircraft Defence, making the well defined roles, overlapping. It was during 1993 that the “Anti-Aircraft Defence” was changed to “Air Defence” and with the inclusion the clause “The responsibility of providing Air Defence of Indian Air Space rests with Indian Air Force” in the Union War Book. With this commenced the vicious wheel of disjointed efforts for jointness, each Service acquiring weapons independently without looking at the core competencies, established war-fighting ethos, etc. While air-to-air combat against all enemy air intrusions in general was the domain of the Air Force, the ground-to-air engagement for AD was the domain of Army. That is the rationale for far more LBAD weapon system with Indian Army. Air Force understanding of LBAD weapon systems was purely from air bases (static) point of view.
Current Philosophy
The current philosophy of AD of the country is territory-based. The defence of the airspace falls upon the IAF and its air-breathing and unmanned platforms, while the LBAD weapon platforms look after the defence of critical assets, classified as Vulnerable Areas (VAs) and Vulnerable Points (VPs). This LBAD is divided between the IAF and the Indian Army’s Corps of Army AD. While Army AD is a specialised corps, with its own career personnel, the AD organisation of the IAF is still ad-hoc with personnel being posted on deputation. In terms of ground assets, IAF’s AD weapons look after its selected air bases. While the mobile and semi-mobile weapon systems of Army AD provide protection to the mechanised elements, critical logistics and operational assets during conventional operations in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) – a contested terrain where the battle is being currently fought. Airbases and naval assets not covered by AD of IAF are handled by Army AD.
Foreign Models
How does an AD organisation work? The most basic principle of employment of any AD system is based on detection, identification, interception and destruction (DIID). Here, three unique functions are in play, that of control and reporting (C&R), which looks after the first two in the series, the effectors, which look after the last two and, finally, the battle management system (BMS), which forms the transitory link between detection and destruction. Most AD systems in the world work on this model, with variations in ranges and types of kinetic platforms and the assets to be defended. The United States’ model of AD was first envisaged as defensive air shield against the erstwhile USSR’s long range manned bombers and incorporated multiple ‘radar lines’ (McGill, Pine Tree and Dew Line) crisscrossing the territory of both US and Canada. However, with advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in the 1970s, the focus shifted to aerospace defence and Ballistic Missile Defences (BMDs), interceptor aircraft, increased use of Airborne Warning & Control Systems (AWACs) aircraft, pushing out the radar lines to the Arctic – called the North Warning System (NWS) – and ruggedisation of the command and control structure took priority.
With the US splitting most of its prime air, naval and land resources to its various geographic commands, AD of the continental US was handed over to the Air National Guard (ANG) and North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The LBAD weapon systems for all operations outside the US are being controlled and managed by the US Army Air Defence. Russian AD setup is more focussed on providing AD to its combat assets both during battle and on the march. The major focus is on ground based mobile AD systems such as S series, Pantsir, Buk and Tor with Sukhois providing the air component. The fighting philosophy of each country provides the basis for its AD setup. Since there is no hostile country located contiguously to the US, its AD is mostly based on AWACS and BMD, with the interceptor aircraft of ANG forming the supplementary tier. Russia’s LBAD platforms focused on protecting combat assets and being mobile. In case of both countries, the ‘kill chains’, process from sensor to shooter are so optimised that instead of a linear chain, multiple parallel kill chains are created using a number of sophisticated communication technologies such as 4G/5G, public switch telephone networks, cloud computing and Wi-Fi. This prevents loss of information in case of break in chain. An all-round optimisation is a norm rather than an exception in conceptualising an AD strategy for any country. This is especially true when states also face airborne attacks by non-state actors such as the Houthi attack on Saudi oil fields.
Indian Requirement
How should India’s AD Command look like? What are the likely challenges being faced? The present arrangement of performing AD tasks by the three Services differently may not be an optimum solution. There is a need to identify commonalities/ overlaps and find a via media to integrate the three Services and align the responsibility to a single commander. The focus needs to be on enhancing the operational effectiveness. The AD Command, when it takes shape, should not eventually be shunted off to a single service, that is, the IAF.
This command has to be aligned and responsive to the present day aerial threats from varied platforms starting from ballistic missiles, stand-off-weapons, rocket-artillery-mortars, drones/UAS and swarm attacks, like being witnessed in various parts of the world. The primary concern being the threat must be neutralised, before delivery of its payload. Thus, the need for centralized planning with decentralized execution at the ground level, where the action is. The trio of surveillance-network-weapons of the three Services needs to be integrated in a bottom up manner to create a common grid. An ideal AD command will likely integrate AD assets of only the Army and IAF, since the Navy’s coastal assets are looked after by the Army and the Navy’s on-board AD systems are for close-in protection or AD protection of a particular task force (TF).
The most critical link for fighting AD battle in an integrated manner will be a real time, robust communication network with adequate redundancy. For communication requirements, IAF has already evolved a sophisticated and automated command and control AD system which integrates the data feed of its multiple radars employed across India’s territory called the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS). IACCS rides on the backbone of the Air Force Network (AFNET), which is highly reliable owing to permanent static location of air bases. For integration to be effective, this flow of information must be shared down to the lowest level. The focus needs to be on interoperability, which is a standard norm in all countries.
Since Army AD’s role is unique in terms of providing and catering for AD of its combat elements both during war and peace and especially in the TBA (a combat experience not available with IAF), an ideal scenario would envisage a ‘plug and play’ model, where different units of the Army and Air Force, without losing their organic strength, will share the same air picture and communications system and be integrated within the AFNET. The employment of the AD assets, especially that of Army AD will remain with local army commanders, being aware of the real time situation and in the ‘thick of the battle’. In other words, a graded responsibility matrix can be created where territorial AD looking after TBA is with Army AD and aerospace defence with attendant threats of cruise missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hypersonic vehicles goes to the IAF, with all systems gaining communication redundancy through sophisticated networks.
Command & Control
Another issue that needs to be examined is the interplay between the functional AD command and the envisaged Theatre Commands. We need to also look at the final control of these AD resources. Once the Theatre Commands come up, the AD resources need to be earmarked in the theatre. This reinforces the need for AD Command to be a functional one only to start with. Land forces in the combat zone and beyond borders will face threats of all kinds and will be the first responders to the air threat. Therefore, the AD assets up to medium level (under 100 km) must be dedicatedly allotted to the TBA, to function most effectively. The operational affiliation of Corps of Army AD with field forces and war fighting ethos have given rich dividends in all wars/operations that have been fought till date.
One of the important aspects that needs deliberation is the command and control of AD elements in the TBA. The TBA is where the field force commander executes his mission and the operating environment is immensely dynamic where combined arms operations are coordinated by him with all combat and combat enablers under his command. Hence, it is essential that all AD resources, too, are available at his disposal in order to ensure freedom of operation through unity of command while the operations control (Control & Reporting) chain can flow up through to the IAF control nodes.
Finally, the integration and jointness will be achieved only when the structures under IADC are well represented by all stake holders, as per their domain expertise and core-competencies. The apex structure should be a single ‘purple’ entity with jointness at Command, Corps and lower levels with minimum disruption to the proven structures. What one needs within this envisaged AD Command is a ‘system within a system’ and a threat hierarchy based on TBA versus aerospace, differentiating AD systems based on where they are employed instead of their range. This means aggregation of all communication including control & reporting, coordination of administration, logistics, procurement and training and disaggregation of kinetic capabilities. A seamless system that takes the best of both worlds approach will succeed spectacularly in the Indian context.
Conclusion
Jointness and integration is the need of the hour. For effective integration, the process should be deliberate with caution in a phased manner like test-bed process, without causing any turbulence in the existing set up. It should factor in the core competencies, limitations and concerns of all stake holders.
Air Defence Weapon Systems
• Prithvi Air Defence (PDV) Mark I Flight ceiling of 150 km
• Prithvi Air Defence (PDV) Mark II
Ballistic missile defence system/ Anti-satellite weapon 2000 km range and flight ceiling of 50 to 80 km.
• Advance Air Defence (AAD) Surface-to-air missile Ballistic Missile Defence system
150 km range and flight ceiling of 30 km.
• S-400 Triumf Mobile surface-to-air missile system Order includes 5 battalions, consisting of Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs), missiles and fire control radar.
• Barak-8 Medium range surface-to-air missile
• Akash surface-to-air missile Two regiments ordered by Army, one delivered. Akash Mk2 with increased range of 100 km under development
Two additional regiments ordered.
• QRSAM Quick Reaction surface-to-air missile. Under development. 30 km range.
• Kub surface-to-air missile to be replaced by Akash
• S-125 Neva/Pechora SA-3 EP surface-to-air missile Being Upgraded.
• S-200 surface-to-air missile
• 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) surface-to-air missile system 6×6 amphibious system
• 9K35 Strela-10 surface-to-air missile
• 9K22 Tunguska 2S6M self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon
• ZSU-23-4M ‘Shilka’ self-propelled anti-aircraft gun to be upgraded.
• ZSU-23-2 Twin 23mm AA gun
• Bofors L70 40mm anti-aircraft gun
Some have Dutch Flycatcher FCS.
• IGLA-S MANPADS
• FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS and air-to-air version
